CHINA'S KOREA POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00907R000301020008-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2012
• Sequence Number: 8
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP04T00907R000301020008-0 5X1
Central Intelligence Agency
China's Korea Policy
The recent fall of Hu Yaobang, who had special responsibility for relations with the
Korean peninsula, in our judgment will not seriously affect China's Korea policy. The
Chinese still seek to avoid a political or military crisis on the Korean peninsula that
could bring China into conflict with the United States and Japan, and want to curb
Soviet influence in P'yongyang without abandoning Beijing's growing indirect trade ties
to Seoul.
A Chinese Foreign Ministry official on 3 February reaffirmed to the US Embassy in
Beijing that China opposes the annual US-ROK Team Spirit joint military exercise as
heightening North Korean insecurity and reliance on the Soviet Union. The official
said the Chinese would raise the issue with Secretary Shultz:
? The official characterized P'yongyang's recent proposal to hold bilateral
political/military talks with Seoul as aimed at reducing tensions on the peninsula,
but doubted that the talks were intended to take the place of North Korea's
standing proposal for tripartite talks with the South and the United States.
North Korea has tilted toward the Soviet Union rather than China since 1984, and
Beijing is concerned that P'yongyang might conduct joint ground force exercises
with Moscow and permit greater Soviet use of North Korean ports:
? P'yongyang already allows overflights of its territory by Soviet reconnaissance
missions targeted against China and US forces in Okinawa.
The Soviet Union and North Korea have exchanged naval port calls,
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Chinese and North Korean media commentaries suggest bilateral tensions, most
recently over P'yongyang's suspicions that Beijing supports cross-recognition
between North and South Korea. At the same time, however, there are signs that
both China and North Korea desire to shore up ties:
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP04T00907R000301020008-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP04T00907R000301020008-05X1
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? In addition to endorsing P'yongyang's proposed political/military talks with Seoul
and opposing Team Spirit, Beijing recently publicly reiterated its support for the
North Korean Olympic Committee's proposal to co-host the 1988 Olympics.
? China has publicly endorsed Kim's son, Kim Chong-il, as heir apparent, while the
Soviets have not. For his part, Kim Chong-il reportedly is strongly biased in
favor of the Chinese.
Beijing continues to encourage a greater US role in improving relations between
Seoul and Pyongyang, and has repeatedly expressed its willingness to host--but
not participate in--tripartite talks involving the United States and the two Koreas:
? Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian told Secretary of Defense Weinberger in
October that the United States should develop direct, unofficial contacts with
North Korea.
? China's indirect trade with the ROK is more than double its trade with North
Korea ($1.2 billion and $500 million, respectively, in 1985).
? Chinese athletes participated in the 1986 Asian Games in Seoul and will probably
return for the 1988 Olympics.
China's Korean policy will face major challenges if the South-North talks collapse,
Soviet-North Korean military cooperation continues to expand, or there is serious
instability on the peninsula. In each case, Beijing's initial reaction probably would
be a combination of counseling Pyongyang to exercise restraint and pressing
Washington harder to show some flexibility toward the North.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP04T00907R000301020008-0