HAITI: PROSPECTS FOR THE MILITARY REGIME

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00990R000200140001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 14, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 17, 1988
• Content Type: MISC

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D.C. 2o565
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
17 October 1988
Haiti: Prospects for the Military Regime
We believe that over the next six to nine months
Haiti will become even more politically unstable than
it; was before the coups deposing civilian President
Leslie Manigat in June and Lieutenant General Henri
Namphy in September. Despite the military government's
efforts to consolidate its power, the current
fragmented military leadership, in our view, clearly
lacks the will and the resources to implement a
strategy to cope with Haiti's deepseated problems.
Whether Lieutenant General Prosper Avril remains
President, or is succeeded by another senior officer
will not, in our judgment, significantly alter Haiti's
course over the near term. On the other hand, another
coup by lower-ranking elements of the military also
would not encourage democratization, in our view, but,
rather, could lead to political chaos and ultimately to
the emergence of an authoritarian dictatorship similar
to the Duvalier regime. In any event, we judge that
Haiti will experience worsening economic difficulties,
This typescript was prepared byl (South America-
Caribbean Division, Office of African and Latin American
Analysis. It was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the
Chief. South America-Caribbean Division, ALA,
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periodic outbreaks of unrest, further erosion of
discipline in the Army, and political isolation that
will deter any meaningful steps to democracy.
In our view, Duvalierists--basically
antireformist--prefer rule by the military, but their
backing for. the regime is tenuous because political
ambitions ultimately place many of them at loggerheads
with the Army. We judge that Duvalierists are
primarily motivated by self-interest and do not
constitute a united movement, but that they are,
nevertheless,, capable of resorting to destabilizing
violence to protect their interests and to gain
political power.
The influential Catholic Church may emerge as the-..-,-
government's chief critic if the human rights situation
continues to deteriorate as it did under Namphy, but
other opposition elements appear reluctant, at least
for now, to challenge the regime. Moreover, US Embassy
reporting suggests that most Haitians are weary of
political turmoil and reluctant to respond to calls for
protest at this juncture. Still, we believe the
shattering of popular aspirations for economic
progress, coupled with perceptions that the revolution
against Duvalierism is only half finished provide
tinder for further spontaneous outbursts in the coming
months.
Although we foresee the military government
growing increasingly ineffective and unstable, we
believe a slightly less likely variation of this
scenario would be a tenuous consolidation of power by
the Army by mid-1989. The regime might -shore up its
control by governing with many of the worst
authoritarian and corrupt traits that marked the 29-
year Duvalier era. In a third, less likely scenario,
military leaders might appoint--or even hold an
election for--a handpicked civilian president to
legitimize their hold on power.
If Haiti grows more estranged from the United
States and more desperate for funds in the coming
months, the long-term implications for Washington are
serious. Increased repression or renewed unrest could
prompt an influx of boat people to the United States,
and the Haitian Government might decide to reject
repatriation of refugees intercepted by the US Coast
Guard. Port-au-Prince also might seek to raise revenue
by opening up the country increasingly to drug
trafficking, which
abetted by elements
in the military.
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Although Cuba-and Libya regard Haiti as a low
priority target for subversion,
we judge that the increasingly
unstable situation in Haiti could prompt them to
encourage local radicals to try to capitalize on the
country's political turbulence. So far, no extremist
,group with ties to Cuba or Libya has made significant
political inroads or mounted an armed struggle or a
',,terrorist campaign. Some Haitian radicals, however,
working with leftists in the Catholic Church, could
ultimately develop an effective grassroots movement
capable of inciting widespread unrest and presenting
whatever government is in power with a serious
challenge. Under these conditions, we believe that
Haitian or other Caribbean leaders might appeal for
greater US involvement, possibly to include military
intervention, to restore order and redirect Haiti's
political course
Introduction
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The two recent military coups in Haiti have demonstrated
that the Haitian Army is a. weak and volatile institution that
rules only because of a power vacuum. The Army's overthrow of
President Leslie Manigat in June underscored the military's
determination to be independent of civilian control and to remain
the key institutional power broker in Haitian politics. The
coup, led by noncommissioned and junior officers and coordinated
by then-Brigadier General Prosper Avril, placed Lieutenant
General Henri Namphy at the head of the military government and
appears to have been a largely spontaneous response to Manigat's
attempt to make sweeping changes in the Army leadership. US
Embassy and suggests that Namphy's '-25X1
ouster by noncommissioned officers and enlisted men on 17
September, bringing Avril to the presidency, was partly a
response to Namphy's incompetence, his growing alliance with one
faction of civilian Duvalierists, dissatisfaction in the lower
ranks of the Army, and a deteriorating security situation. 2.5X1
however, that military 25X1
discipline has weakened and that Avril has yet to consolidate his
posi ion or establish his control over the NCOs who led the
coup . F_ I 25X1
Although Avril has pledged to respect human rights, work for
economic improvement, and institute a transition process toward
1. For details on the NCOs who led the coup, as well as
their political. clout and agenda, see Appendix A. 25X1
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an elected successor, his long record in Haitian politics casts
doubt on his trustworthiness and commitment to hold fair
elections. Avril's inclusion in the original six-man ruling
council headed by Namphy, which succeeded President Jean-Claude
Duvalier in February 1986, was so unpopular because of Avril's
well-known Duvalierist ties that Namphy was forced to transfer
him to a less visible position. Nevertheless, the public at
large has not visibly reacted to recent events, indicating
widespread resignation to the military's political predomina ce
The Political Landscape
Haiti's political scene is--by default--dominated by the
military, but some extremists already appear to be positioning
themselves to try to undermine Avril.
the lower ranks in the Presidential Guard who initiated the coup
against Namphy support Avril, but Embassy and
this support is tenuous. Moreover, public
statements favoring Namphy's overthrow from various opposition
groups have not necessarily translated into support for Avril.
Although Avril has long had ties to Duvalierists, the US Embassy
reports that one leading Duvalierist--former Port-au-Prince mayor
Franck Romain--has attempted to follow Namphy into exile.
the military's ruling clique and Duvalierist
leaders are mutually suspicious, and Duvalierists may already be
plotting to take advanage of the situtation. Some prominent
centrist political leaders have abandoned their opposition role
and welcomed Namphy's overthrow or remain ambivalent about it.
Leftist groups, including the Communist Party, are
organizationally weak, but they continue to organize openly and
fashion appeals to "progressive elements" in the military. Other
far-left extremists seem incapable of fomenting more than
isolated, small-scale acts of violence.
The Regime and Its Supporters
the current government,
while potentially more competent an Namphy's regime, is still
relying heavily on croneyism.. The Embassy says Avril has
appointed able, though lackluster, technocrats to cabinet posts,
and has named Brigadier General Herard Abraham--a military ally--
is replacing most senior officers
and reconstituting the High Command with officers loyal to him.
Within the military itself, uncertain loyalties and the
increasingly unbridled lower ranks represent, in our view, the
2. For detail on Haiti's recent economic performance and
prospects, see Appendix B.
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to Namphy's ouster, reliable sources of the
strongest potential threats to the new regime's stability. Prior
political strength fluctuated regularly-
reportedly has placed former classmates from the Haitian Military
Academy class of 1961, which he headed, in high-level government
posts to consolidate his position. Although Avril has replaced
Regala in the cabinet and retired him from. the military, and
prom?oted key officers from the cohesive military academy class of
1973, the recent coup demonstrates that loyalties at all levels
of the Army can shift rapidly. Moreover, the initiatives of
noncommissioned officers and enlisted men in ousting their
commanders following the coup, in our view, suggests a serious--
and perhaps irreversible--decline in military discipline. Senior
and mid-level officers are..-becoming alarmed over the growing
influence and independence of noncommissioned officers,
with his chief rival Defense Minister Williams Regala. Avril
Namphy.
coup p o ing-- ong
endemic to Haiti--was under way in ep em er among disgruntled
lower-ranking elements other than those who actually overthrew
The Duvalierists initially appear to prefer the current
regime to Namphy's inept administration, but their loyalty to the
government is highly questionable.
ex-Army chief Claude Raymond, a leading Duvalierist, is
deeply concerned about mob attacks on Duvalierists and purges in
indicate that some prominent Duvalierists continue
to harbor presidential ambitions and may try to gain the alliance
own quest for power.
of Army elements in their
Moreover, the US Embassy
this time in lobbying for democracy.
The private business sector is politically diverse, but the
Embassy says most businessmen are at least tacitly supporting the
regime despite the negative economic repercussions of recent
political events. The Embassy says most businessmen probably
believe that democracy is not viable in Haiti at this time. Many
reportedly view the military coups as blows to Haiti's
international image, however, and are worried about the impact on
their enterprises. Moreover, Haitian businessmen generally doubt
that the military has the political.will and economic resources
to begin to address Haiti's deepseated problems. Nonetheless,
the Embassy reports that the private sector has no interest at
Several partisan leaders have become tentative supporters of
the regime. Embassy reporting suggests that some moderates
welcomed the Army's ouster of Nam h , whom they considered an
incompetent president. Marc Bazin, a
leading presidential contender in the aborted election last
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November, believes it is fruitless to oppose the military. Even
Gerard Gourgue, the former presidential candidate of the non-
Communist left, has publicly supported the coup. We believe
Bazin and some other moderates are cooperating with the regime in
the hope that the military will eventually turn to them to head a
civilian government.
A Fragmented and Demoralized Opposition
-.The Catholic Church has emerged as a leading opponent of the
Duvalie-rist right, but it does not appear willing to challenge
the government at this point. After several months of silence,
the Catholic bishops called for a purge of Duvalierists from
positions of authority. The bishops, however, also condemned
acts of mob violence directed against rightists. Radical
Catholic priests associated with the so-called "Popular Church"
continue to deliver stridently antigovernment sermons heavily
influenced by leftist "liberation theology." Still, we lack
evidence that any elements of the Church have yet decided to
encourage activity by their followers aimed at toppling the
regime.
The political opposition and the Haitian media are unwilling
or unable at this point to effectively challenge the regime.
Three of the four former leading presidential candidates--Marc
Bazin, Louis Dejoie, Jr., and Gerard Gourgue--remain nominally in
alliance but are deeply divided over tactics and strategy,
The Embassy reports that Sylvio
Claude, the fourth member of the alliance, has criticized the
takeover but otherwise has been restrained in his post-coup
opposition activities so far. Claude even accepted an invitation
to a meeting with Avril to exchange views. Nevertheless, we
believe the erratic Claude is likely to eventually provoke the
regime to suppress his activities altogether. The non-Communist
left, briefly united last year as the National Concertation Front
that backed Gourgue's presidential candidacy, is fragmented and
most of its components apparently are politically dormant.
Meanwhile, the Haitian media are practicing selective self-
censorship, as they did during the Duvalier era, presumably to
avoid attacks by Duvalierist extremists.
Extreme leftists--a small minority that apparently lacks a
clear strategy for opposing the regime--see opportunities in the
coup's aftermath to gain support among the Army's rank and file.
The Embassy reports that the Democratic Unity Confederation--the
so-called KID--has proclaimed its support for the purges of
senior officers by the "people's army." Judging by the recent
socialist statements of some noncommissioned officers involved in
the coup, some leftist rou s may already be influencing elements
of the rank and file. Haitian
Communist Party leader Rene Theodore wants to avoid any activity
that might provoke a crackdown on his party, and the Communists
have joined with moderates and other leftists in welcoming
Namphy's ouster. At,least two,extremist groups, however,
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continue to send members to Libya for military training,
So far they have failed to
demonstrate a capa i i y to rea en the regime. One of these
groups, the Haitian Liberation Organization, has meager resources
and only about 30 members but, nonetheless, may try to launch
terrorist attacks on US targets at Libya's behest.
Weak Foreign Influences
Cuba and. other prospective foreign interlopers do
not view Haiti as a priority target for subversion and have had
negligible influence on events there so far. Havana and the
Dominican Communist Party have given the Haitian Communists
political guidance, modest funding, and some military training
but are disappointed party's lack of tangible
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accomplishments. (rumors 25X1
that Havana has been infiltrating Creole-speaking black Cubans of
Haitian ancestry into Haiti to form a cadre of revolutionaries.
Tripoli disburses funds to Haitian 25X1
radicals through the Libyan People's Bureau in Panama in an
ongoing--and so far unsuccessful--effort to promote a terrorist
campaign in Haiti. 25X1
Western criticism of the former High Command's scuttling of
democratization does not appear to have significantly influenced
the military's political course. Following the election-day
violence in November 1987 in which, according to the Embassy,
some Army elements apparently took part, military leaders have
acted with disregard for Western concerns. 25X1
top officers failed to anticipate the adverse 25X1
reaction that the rigged election in January would have on
Western aid donors, and unrealistically hoped that Manigat could
quickly secure a resumption of government-to-government aid from
the United States. military leaders are 25X1
now aware that domestic conditions probably will deteriorate more
rapidly without an increase in foreign aid soon. 25X1
ost military figures are at least as 25X1
concerned with protecting ec ing their own and the military's parochial
interests as with mollifying foreign donors. 25X1
The Military's Agenda
Based on Embassy andl on the
Haitian military before the latest coup and on our analysis of
the personalities and political dynamics among the current
military leadership, we believe that the High Command presently
has three--and probably only three--primary goals:
-- To strengthen the military's institutional integrity.
3. For details on foreign assistance to Haitian radicals,
see Appendix C.
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-- To ensure the Army's political predominance.
-- To improve the lot of the NCOs and enlisted men.
Beyond these primary goals, and despite Avril's positive
statements about democracy, military leaders, in our judgment,
have yet to formulat objectives. Reporting from the
Emba?8sy'and earlier this year suggests that many 25X1
Haitian military officers generally disdain politics and civilian
leaders and view the military as the only effective instrument
for governing Haiti. The political mettle of the new members of
the High Command is still untested, but we lack indications at
this juncture that they are strongly committed to political
reform. The same is true of the enlisted men and NCOs behind the
latest coup--they have professed support for democratic reforms,
but appear more concerned with improving the conditions of their
ce. 25X1
former President Manigat's attempt to assert control over 25X1
the Army in June--or at least weaken its control over him--has
greatly enhanced the military's wariness of entrusting the
presidency to a civilian again. 25X1
Exercising Power With Little Political Vision
Despite Avril's pledge following the coup to institute a
transition process aimed.at restoring civilian rule, the regime's
actions so far suggest it is primarily interested in
consolidating its control. Embassy reporting suggests the regime
may be clearing the way to scrap articles from the 1987
constitution that severely curtailed the political role of the
military. Moreover, we see no evidence yet that Avril is
willing--or has sufficient support in the military--to confront
Duvalierists and other entrenched elites by launching far-
reaching political and economic reforms to address Haiti's
intractable social and economic problems.
Satisfying the Elites and Discouraging Opposition
In our opinion, the military leadership is aware that its
ability to maintain a semblance of civil order and impose a
relatively stable business environment are strong incentives for
Haiti's wealthy interest groups to remain in the progovernment
camp. The Embassy has indicated that affluent elites--which
account for about 1 percent of the population--generally view
only limited social and political change as in their best
interests. We believe this is especially true of businessmen
with Duvalierist ties. Businessmen of`mulatto and Arab descent
coexisted uneasily with the Duvalier regime, however, and the
Embassy says some of them are apprehensive about the potential
for a return to the practices of the Duvalier era, when
entrepreneurs who arbitrarily fell out of favor with the
President were punished or harassed by the regime.
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Despite Avril's statements about building democracy, we
believe the regime's threshold for tolerating political dissent
is low. The government has had little need to resort to
repression since coming to power because of the near total lack
of serious opposition. Moreover, the regime has yet to show that
it is interested in investigating atrocities committed by
extremists, much less other alleged human rights abuses, which
have occurred over the past year.
Finessing the Civilian Duvalierists
We believe the military recognizes the threat posed to its
political preeminence by rightwing civilians. Aside from Claude
Raymond, other Duvalierist figures such as Clovis Desinor control
armed loyalists drawn from the ranks of the infamous disbanded
militia popularly known as the Ton Ton Macoutes,
We doubt that either of these men would be
content with being merely the military's puppet president if they
somehow managed to attain the office. Raymond even predicted to
an Embassy official in August 1987 that a military coup would end
Haiti's experiment with democracy and that this would be the
first step in bringing a Duvalierist, preferably himself, to
power.
Outlook
We assume that the Army will retain power, during the
timeframe of this assessment because of the almost complete lack
of politically viable alternatives to the military government.
In our opinion, the stability and effectiveness of the regime
will be determined by three key variables:
-- The ability of the High Command to rein in increasingly
recalcitrant lower-level elements in the military.
-- The degree of interest shown by influential military
elements in returning the country to civilian rule.
-- The development and persistence of public protests,
tirimarily in response to worsening economic conditions.
Considering these factors, we believe that events could
unfold along three different paths over the next six to nine
months. In the most likely case, the military regime will grow
weaker and more unstable as jockeying for power increases and the
lower ranks become more coup-prone. A slightly less likely
variation of this scenario is that Haiti's military leadership
would remain tenuously in control of the government and the
security situation, ruling with little political vision beyond
retaining power, profiting from various forms of corruption, and
suppressing political and economic dissent through blatant
intimidation and brutality. Whether or not Avril remains as
President does not significantly alter these scenarios, in our
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judgment. We believe a third, and less likely, scenario is that
the military would again opt to handpick a figurehead civilian
president in an attempt to legitimize its hold on power. We
judge, however, that this scenario stands a better chance of
occurring beyond this paper's timeframe. In any event, we
believe that Haiti will experience worsening economic
difficulties, periodic outbreaks of unrest, and political
isolation that will deter any experimentation with aenuine
democratization by the regime.
We believe the probable failure by the regime to implement
meaningful political and economic reforms, despite reliance on
civilian cabinet ministers and administrators to help run the
government, will lead to more political instability and increased
military factionalism in the months ahead. The shattering of
popular aspirations for democracy and tangible economic progress
will provide tinder for a recurrence of spontaneous outbreaks of
unrest. Although such challenges to military authority during
the ruling council's tenure tended to galvanize the armed forces'
unity, the current divisions in the Army would, in our opinion,
be exacerbated by popular disturbances and leftist agitation.
Mid-level or senior officers who fear removal by undisciplined
troops may seek alliances with lower level ranks or civilian
politicians in an attempt to expand their clout or simply
consolidate their position, particularly if the regime appears
threatened by protracted unrest. We judge that such maneuvering
within the Army would result in a military government with a weak
and unstable leadership.
In our view, the initiatives taken by noncommissioned and
junior level officers to oust Manigat and Namphy--unprecedented
in recent Haitian history--are evidence that a coup attempt
against Avril by disgruntled elements in the ranks may become
increasingly likely in the coming months.
We
believe that mid-
level and junior officers, whom the
generally
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characterizes as reasonably well-trained
and
educated, could
become increasingly uneasy with the High Command's governing
style and more frustrated with its ability to improve pay and
working conditions. Although an outright split in the military
does not appear to be imminent, we believe a coup attempt by
noncommissioned or junior officers could be triggered quickly by
a combination of alarm over a deteriorating security situation
mismanaged by the regime and more parochial concerns about the
advancement of their own careers or protection of their
perquisites. Despite the populist tone of some demands made to
Avril by noncommissioned officers in mid-September, we have no
clear indication that the desire for genuine political reform
would be a prime motivation for a coup attempt by these or other
military elements. In any event, another coup or comparable
breakdown in military discipline might end the military's ability
to govern Haiti with any, dearee of effectiveness and could well
lead to political chaos.
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A Military Version of Duvalierism
Avril's purge of senior military ranks and placement of
cronies in key government positions--in effect, employing the
tactics of the Duvalier regimes--might allow him to consolidate
his hold on power at least temporarily.4 We expect Haiti's
military leaders to continue making platitudinous promises about
demd'cracy--much as Jean-Claude Duvalier did--mainly in an effort
to attract foreign aid, while suppressing opposition activity
with selective brutality. The Duvalierists' and other elites'.
opposition to fundamental systemic reform, in our view, will
further discourage any impulses in the military leadership or the
civilian-dominated government bureaucracy to implement innovative
changes. We believe the military also recognizes that even
modest reforms could revive the opposition and encourage it to
push for more sweeping changes, prompting the regime to
increasingly rely on repression to preserve itself.
We believe that the prospects for abandoning the system of
official corruption largely inherited from the Duvalier era are
particularly bleak in the present circumstances. In our
judgment, any effort to root out narcotics profiteering and other
forms of official corruption, such as military involvement in
smuggling contraband, almost certainly would require a new
military leadership--one with the will and strength to confront
corruption in the ranks--and much larger foreign financial
assistance than is currently in the pipeline.
Turning To Civilians Again
Although the least likely scenario in the coming months, the
military leadership nonetheless might feel compelled by internal
and external pressures to announce a timetable for a return to
civilian rule, to appoint a civilian figurehead president, or
even hold elections. In this scenario, we expect the military
would retain its firm grip on the reins of power. In our
opinion, the military's turn toward the civilians would be
primarily'an attempt to secure a resumption of US aid and an
increase in other foreign assistance rather than a genuine intent
to transfer power. We believe military leaders would choose this
option only if it concluded that other sources of revenue
available to the government were so meager as to imminently
threaten the military's hold on power.,- We consider it likely,
although beyond the timeframe of this assessment, that the
military eventually will organize and stagemanage a presidential
election to try to gain some legitimacy while ensuring that no
civilian it deems incompetent or hostile to its interests is
elected.
4. For details on the evolution of Duvalierism, see
Appendix D.
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Implications for the United States
We believe the military's political predominance and
probable culpability in a deteriorating human rights situation
will further complicate Haitian-US relations. Regardless of
whether Avril or some other military figure is President, many
international observers and human rights groups are certain to
continue condemning the regime and lobbying Washington to go
beyond withholding economic and security assistance and to impose
trade sanctions. At the same time, assuming the government's
financial position becomes increasingly desperate, the regime
could-adopt a siege mentality, lashing out at foreign and
domestic critics in both rhetoric and action that would preclude
any rehabilitation of its international image. Port-au-Prince
almost certainly would aim its harshest criticism at the United
States, Haiti's traditional benefactor. At a minimum, the
situation portends a dangerous environment for US and other
foreign investment in Haiti, prompting a potential departure by
investors. Such a development would deliver a crippling blow to
an economy already reeling from the suspension of US and
multilateral economic support.
Should the military announce a timetable for new elections
or appoint civilians to important government posts, the impact on
broader US interests would be mixed. Even a partial restoration
of US economic and security assistance to a more palatable
Haitian regime would be likely to enhance prospects for political
stability. Most Haitians and many international observers,.
however, probably would regard any resumption of US aid as a sign
of Washington's acceptance of, and possible collusion in, the
military's seizure of power. The view that the United States
somehow gave its blessing to a military coup in Haiti could have
a ripple effect in the Caribbean region and elsewhere in Latin
America. We believe the military takeover in Haiti and the
perceived US reaction to it could influence the course of events
in two other Caribbean countries in particular:
-- The Dominican Republic, where a presidential election is
scheduled in 1990 in an increasingly fractious political
environment, amid growing military disgruntlement with
civilian political leadership.
-- Suriname, where an uneasy transition from military
dictatorship to civilian democracy has been in progress
for the past year.
In the absence of new US and other Western assistance, the
military might try to keep the regime afloat by turning to
revenue sources inimical to US interests. For example, with the
motives and opportunities for official involvement in narcotics
trafficking already growing rapidly, we believe military leaders
might prove increasingly willing to use drug profits to
supplement government spending, despite official pronouncements
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advocating closer counternarcotics efforts with the United
States.
If no progress toward genuine democratization occurs in the
next nine months, we foresee the Haitian Government growing more
estranged from the United States and ever more desperate for
funding, portending serious implications for the United States
over the longer term. Unbridled repression or rapidly
deteriorating economic conditions could prompt a substantial flow
of refugees to the United States, and Haiti might refuse
repatriation of boat people interdicted by the US Coast Guard.
Moreover, even though we lack indications at thisjuncture that
Haiti plans to approach radical states for assistance or that
such states would be receptive to Haiti's overture, we believe a
desperate Haitian Government shunned by the West might eventually
turn to the USSR and its allies or to Libya in search of aid.
A sudden escalation of violence spurred by extremists on the
right or the left could lead to political chaos, creating
opportunities for radical states and bringing calls for a
stronger US role in Haiti. Some Duvalierists might resort to
death squad activity against the opposition and other spectacular
acts of violence if they believe the military government is
acting against their interests, or perceive an opportunity to
seize power for themselves. In addition, the left--in
conjunction with radicals in the Catholic Church--may develop a
capability, more likely in the next few years but possibly
sooner, to incite serious unrest. Such an unstable situation
could greatly encourage deeper involvement by interventionist
states such as Cuba and Libya that seek to gain a foothold in
Haiti. At a minimum, some Haitian or Caribbean leaders probably
would seek a greater US role to restore order and political
stability as prerequisites to ultimately resuming a democratic
transition. Indeed, we believe that some within the Haitian
military might even welcome US military intervention under these
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Appendix A
The NCOs: Assessing Their Political Clout And Agenda
Haiti's noncommissioned officers (NCOs), having played a leading
role in the coups in June and September-,,-are still testing the limits
of their power. The NCOs' de facto leader, Sergeant Joseph Hebreux,
functions as Haiti's unofficial vice-president in public, often
appearing by President Avril's side. Embassy reporting suggests,
however, that Hebreux is politically unsophisticated and susceptible
to manipulation by the politically wily Avril. Although Hebreux and
the NCOs do not appear to be acting in a coordinated or politically
canny fashion, we believe the military purges they launched indicate
that they understand.the power they have acquired and the veto they
hold over government policy.
In our judgment, the NCOs are, for the most part, poorly educated
men whose agenda includes some reform but focuses mainly on their own
welfare. The list of demands the NCOs presented to Avril following
the coup made some reference to political reform but emphasized bread
and butter issues for soldiers. Embassy reporting indicates that NCOs
are using their influence to demand jobs and favors for themselves,
and that the government--unwilling to jeopardize its support from that
quarter--is aquiescing. Moreover, Embassy and press reporting
suggests the NCOs and their allies among enlisted men are motivated
partly by an iconoclastic populism against military and civilian
.holdovers from the Duvalier regime. In any event, we see little
evidence thus far that the NCOs have the strength or the vision to
direct Haiti back toward a democratic path.
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Appendix B
Haiti: Daunting Economic Challenges
President Avril's efforts to consolidate political control over
Haiti will be complicated by an economic deterioration under way since
most US and multilateral aid was suspended after the electoral
collapg,e last November. The military coup in June dashed hopes that
increased foreign aid might ease Haiti's economic problems, and we
expect a further dip in assistance for the fiscal year beginning in
October toz.add-,_to_.Pao-rt-au-Prince's troubles. Meanwhile, the regime
appears-ill-prepared to deal with the government's budgetary crisis
and to cope with worsening foreign exchange shortages. Although most
Haitians appear weary and more fearful of protests since the electoral
debacle, higher prices and emerging shortages may well spark new
outbursts in the coming months.
The Ruling Council's Economic Record
Following the ouster of former President Jean-Claude Duvalier in
February 1986, the military-dominated interim government made some
progress in laying the groundwork for an economic turnaround. The
keystone of this recovery program was a sharp rise in foreign grants--
primarily US and French--an IMF Structural Adjustment Facility, and an
Economic Recovery Loan from the World Bank. In addition, the former
government enacted several reforms--including closure of the two most
unprofitable public enterprises and elimination of import quotas and
export taxes--to reduce the budget deficit and improve overall
economic performance.
Increased foreign aid enabled Haiti to strengthen its external
and domestic financial positions and to curb inflation in 1986 and
1987, although the economy remained stalled.
o External reserves of the Central Bank increased to $36 million,
equivalent to six weeks' worth of imports at the end of fiscal
year (30 September) 1987.
o Public sector deficits hovered around 7 percent of GDP during
this period. These shortfalls were covered primarily by foreign
aid--which accounted for nearly 40 percent of total expenditures-
-that allowed a net repayment to foreign and domestic commercial
lenders in fiscal 1986 and only minor domestic borrowing in 1987.
o Reduced public sector reliance on domestic credit beginning in
1986 helped to halt four years of expansive monetary policy.
Moreover, Haiti experienced an actual decline in consumer prices
in 1987, largely because of the removal of quantitative controls
on key imports such as flour, and cuts in excise taxes and prices
charged by some public enterprises.
Even so, the economy--the GDP in 1987 stood at $2.2 billion--grew at
an average yearly rate of less than 1 percent and exports declined by
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9 percent, largely because of disruption caused by sporadic popular
unrest. 25X1
Slashed Foreign Aid
High hopes for continued economic progress were dashed when major
donors. suspended assistance in the wake of the aborted elections and
the subsequent military coup. We calculate that foreign assistance
will reach about $190 million during fiscal year 1988--compared to the
$250 million originally planned. This contrasts with the $200 million
received in 1987, and $145 million in 1986. The United States halted
plans for a significant rise in economic assistance in 1988. The IMF
and World Bank, citing the uncertain political and economic climate,
subsequently suspended nearly $40 million in support for economic
adjustment. The coup in June prompted France and Venezuela, which had
increased aid after Manigat's election in January, and West Germany to
curtail their programs. Canada suspended direct aid to the Haitian
Government in response to the expulsion of a Canadian priest and
growing violence during the waning days of the Namphy regime.
We believe a further dip in aid will occur in fiscal year 1989
unless the regime takes meaningful steps toward political and economic
reforms. Most donors appear to be waiting until the new military
regime demonstrates whether it will provide effective leadership and
move the country toward democracy. In the meantime, Avril will have
to cope with lower aid levels.
Coping with Aid Cuts
As a result of the aid cuts, the Haitian Government is facing a
growing budgetary crisis and probably will begin soon to experience
shortages of some key imports and an upsurge in inflation. 25X1
Budget Gap. Reduced foreign budgetary support and shortfalls in
domestic revenue collection have substantially widened the public-
sector budget deficit and almost certainly will require inflationary
domestic financing from the Central Bank. We calculate that foreign
aid earmarked for the Haitian Government will take the brunt of the
cuts.in external support in 1989.
None of the four Haitian governments that have held power since
the US and multilateral institutions slashed economic assistance late
last year have succeeded in making the tough adjustments needed to
cope with the growing budgetary crisis. The former military-dominated
interim government responded in January to the aid suspensions by
cutting projected expenditures by $25 million, or 9 percent, from the
original budget and by raising taxes and public sector prices to add
$15 million to the government's revenues. The plan aimed to balance
the government's operating budget but fell far short of its goals
largely because of inadequate revenue collection. During his brief
tenure, President Manigat cut salaries for top-level government
officials and tried to improve tax collection. Even so, the Embassy
reports that the budget deficit, excluding capital outlays, totaled
$25 million during the first nine months of fiscal 1988. During his
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brief return to power this year, former President Namphy`s actions
almost certainly widened the budget gap. His appointments of
Duvalierist cronies to key positions in the bureaucracy--still in
place following Avril's coup--suggest that budgetary revenues will be
increasingly diverted for personal gain and tax evasion may increase.
If Avril tries to meet demands for improved living conditions for the
NCOs and enlisted men instrumental in putting him in power, the
budgetary crisis will worsen.
To help cover the substantial budget deficit, public domestic
borrowing-will reach nearly $80 million in fiscal 1988--almost five
times the level in 1987--and is likely to be on the same scale in
1989. This borrowing already has started a monetary expansion. that
will restart inflation and could lead ultimately to a devalu_ation.'of
the long-stable gourde--Haiti's currency. According to the prices rose 4 percent in the first nine months of fiscal year 1980--
compared to a 14 percent decline in the same period in fiscal year
1987. The Embassy expects inflation, still at moderate levels, to
accelerate as the full impact of increased aovernment borroving works
through the economy.
,Balance of Payments. Although Haiti managed the aid cuts so far
without much hardship, we expect the lack of foreign exchange to lead
soon to shortages of some key imports. The Central Bank' s..foreiC.
exchange reserves--$30-40 million in January 1988, largely due to
substantial foreign aid received in 1987--were drawn down to $6
million by July, according to the IMF. Moreover, arrears to foreign.
creditors, including the IMF, have begun to mount. Given the expected
drop in aid this year, we believe that Port-au-Prince will have some
difficulty ensuring adequate supplies of petroleum, grains, and other
critical imports in the near future. While we lack hard evidence,, we
believe the inflow of money from narcotics trafficking, however,
apparently has increased the supply of US dollars on the parallel
market and may help cushion Port-au-Prince's foreign payments
problems.
Precarious Near-Term Outlook
Considering the dim prospects for a substantial boost JUL., aid, we
expect Haiti's economy to weaken and become more vulnerable to
outbreaks of unrest over the next year. Financial constraints on
imports and new public projects, in our view, will cause the overall
economy to stagnate at best. Labor organizers are likely to resume
efforts to organize workers in assembly firms and to cause some labor
unrest. The unsettled political situation combined with another major
round of unrest could disrupt manufacturing and be the last stra._for
some nervous foreign investors. Although most Haitians appear weary
and more fearful of protest since the electoral collapse, higher
prices and possible consumer shortages may spark new demonstrations in
coming months. 25X1
In any event, we believe increased hardships for most. Haitians
and fear of an eventual crackdown in response to renewed unrest may
well boost the flow of illegal migrants from Haiti to the United
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States and other countries in the region. Following Duvalier's ouster
and the subsequent outbreak of political unrest, the numbers of
Haitian migrants interdicted by the US Coast Guard rose steadily; the
largest monthly total of over 1,200 came in August 1986. These
interdictions occurred at an average rate of approximately 300 per
month in 1gR7 and 350 per month for the first five months in 1988.
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Appendix C
Foreign Assistance To Haitian Radicals
foreign radical 25X1
interest in Haiti diminished somewhat when President Manigat took
office in February and has not significantly increased since the
military posed him in June. 25X1
the foreigners' true intentions and the extent of GJ/~I
their support to Haitian extremists remain unclear following the
military coup in September. 25X1
Libya
Tripoli's keen interest in
fomenting subversion in Haiti after Duvalier's ouster has waned
because of disappointment over a lack of results by Libya's clients.
Nevertheless, the Libyans reportedly continue to provide basic weapons
training to small groups of Haitian radicals.
Cuba
Havana is following a wait-and-see approach, continuing modest
support to the Unified Party of Haitian Communists, while exploring
the feasibility of oursuina a more activist ant-nda .
USSR
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Moscow has shown virtually 25X1
no interest in assisting leftist groups in Haiti. 25X1
the Soviets 25X1
at this juncture are not encouraging a Communist or leftist push for'
power any time soon, '25X1
Dominican Communist Party
The Dominican party supports Cuban efforts in Haiti but also h
its own more militant nap- nrla 25X1
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The French Left
the French Communist Party maintained 25X1
close contacts with exiled Haitian Communists during the Duvalier era
and began providing modest funding and political training to the
Haitian Communist Party when the leadership returned to Haiti in 1986.
the French Communists also 25X1
are disappointed with the party's performance. 25X1
Party has. c ose ties
Serge Gilles.
the leftist Patriotic Unity Bloc headed by
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the French Socialist 25X1
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Appendix D
Duvalierism: Political Ideology or Gangsterism?
Former President Francois "Papa Doc" Duvalier (1957-71)
formulated a political and cultural ideology in the 1950s to
facilitate his rise to power. Duvalier developed a populism to
garner mass support by manipulating the traditional hostility of
HaitL's impoverished black majority toward the small, but
wealthy, mixed-race Haitian elite largely backing Louis Dejoie,
Sr., his light-skinned opponent, in the presidential election of
1957. Duvalierism, as it became popularly known, was based on
the concept of "negritude," stressing the African roots of black
Haitian cultural achievements while vilifying the French cultural
preferences exhibited by the mulatto upper class. Meanwhile,
Duvalier's black supporters hoped to a'n ity
and an improved standard of living.
In practice, Francois Duvalier's presidency fit the corrupt
and brutal pattern of most Haitian governments since the
country's independence in 1804. Duvalier in power felt no
responsibility to improve the lot of the masses who supported
him--their quality of life deteriorated under his regime--and
instead sought to grasp power indefinitely in 1964 by declaring
himsel-f?-President-for-Life. Duvalier and his ruling clique
enriched themselves at public expense and consolidated their
control through the so-called Ton Ton Macoutes (Creole for
"bogeymen")--initially a group of officially sanctioned thugs--
who propped up the regime through terrorism and extortion.
Duvalier also replaced professional Army officers with
opportunistic svcoohants to weaken the military's threat to his.
power.
Following "Papa Doc's" death in 1971, his son Jean-Claude
"Baby Doc" Duvalier inherited the office and continued to preside
over the system of,pervasive official corruption, though with
relatively less brutality. Jean-Claude gradually jettisoned many
of his father's "old-guard" supporters, increasingly brought - -
mulattoes into his inner circle, and merged many of the Macoutes
with the uniformed militia, called the Volunteers for National
Security, that had reached a strength of 16,000 by 1985. The
Embassy reports that by early 1986, many longtime prominent
supporters of the regime--so-called Duvalierists--viewed Jean-
Claude as incapable of protecting their interests and did not try
to block the takeover by the military.
Duvalierism appears to us to have lost its cultural
significance as a political ideology as soon as it came into
power in the late 1950s, with the Duvalierists becoming a motley
collection of wealthy opportunists, old-guard extremists, and
military officers motivated mostly by self-interest. Although
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many leading Duvalierists are black, others are mulatto, and at
least one member of the old-guard, Clifford Brandt, is of white
Jamaican ancestry. Despite the Army's uneasy relationship with
Duvalierists, President Prosper.Avril has close ties to the old-
guard, according to the Embassy We 25X1
believe that Duvalierists, while generally rightist in political
bent, are not easily placed on the political spectrum nor
constrained by ideology in their tactics. For example, former
Porte-au-Prince mayor Franck Romain offered funds and weapons in
mid-1987 to members of an extreme leftist group in return for
creating civil disturbances aimed at disrupting the transition to
democracy, With their bands of 25X1
armed ex-Macoute loyalists to do their bidding, leading
Duvalierists, in our view, more closely resemble organized crime
chiefs or neofeudal warlords than political leaders. 25X1
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SUBJECT: Haiti: Prospects for the Military Regime 25X1
Distribution:
Original -- The Honorable Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State
for Inter-American Affairs, Room 6263, State
1 - Mr. Robert Pastorino, Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director for Latin American Affairs, NSC,
Room 391, OEOB
1.- The Honorable Donald Gregg, Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs, Room 298, OEOB
1 - Mr. Stephen I. Danzansky, Special Assistant to the
President for International Economic Affairs, NSC, Room
365, OEOB
1 - Brigadier General Peter Brintnall, Latin American Affairs,
NSC, Room 392, OEOB
1 - The Honorable Michael H. Armacost, Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs, Room 7240, State
1 - The Honorable Richard H. Melton, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for the Caribbean, Room 6263, State
1 - Mr. David Zweifel, Director, Office of Caribbean Affairs
(ARA/CAR), Room 3248, State
1 - Mr. Luigi Einaudi, Director, Office of Policy Planning and
Coordination, Room 6913A, State
1 - Mr. David Smith, Chief, Middle-America-Caribbean Division,
Office of Analysis for Inter-American Republics,
Intelligence and Research, INR/IAA/MAC Room 7637, State
1 - The Honorable Morton Abramowitz, Assistant Secretary,
Intelligence and Research Bureau, Room 6531, State
1 - Mr. Arnold Isaacs, Director, Office of Analysis for Inter-
American Republics/INR, Room 7358, State
1 - Mr. Richard H. Solomon, Director, Policy Planning Staff,
Room 7311, State
1 - Ambassador Richard T. McCormack, Permanent Representative
to the Organization of American States (USOAS), Room
6494, State
1 - Mr. David Cohen, Director, Office of Caribbean Affairs,
Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, Agency for
International Development AID/LAC/CAR Rm. 3242 NS
1 - The Honorable Richard Armitage, Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs, DoD, Room
4E808, Pentagon
1 - The Honorable Richard Brown, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Inter-American Affairs, DoD, Room 4C800, Pentagon
1 - The Honorable Ann Hughes, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Western Hemisphere, Room 3826, Commerce
1 - Colonel James Coni lio, DIO/DIA, Room 2A520, Pentagon
1 - Chief, Western Europe/Latin America
Branch, Estimates
DIA/DE3, DIAC, Bolling Air Force
1 - Mr. Randall Fort, Special Assistant to the Secretary, for
National Security, Room 2049, Treasury
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1 - SSCI
1 - HPSCI
Room 7BUZ,
Room 7B02, HQ
1 - D/DCI/DDCI Executive Staff
1 - DDI
1 - O/DDI,
1 - NIO/Economics - 7E62
1 - NIO/LA - 7E62
- NIO/Warning - 7E47
- C/PES/DI - 7F24
1 --NIC/AG - 7E47
1 - D/CPAS - 7F13
1 - PDB Staff - 7F30
1 - C/PES - 2G25
1 - CPAS/ILS/DI - 7G50
1 - SCIO/CPAS/DI - 7F27
5 - CPAS/IMC/CB - 7G07
1 - CPAS/ISS/DI - 7G50
1 - CPAS/CDP/CC/DI - GH25
1 - C/AL/LDA/DI - 1H39
1 - C/PPD/LDA/DI -,5G03
1 - D/OGI - 3G00
I - C/OGI/IND/DI - 1215 Ames Bldg.
1 -'C/OGI/FSIC/PI/DI - 2G09
1 - C/OGI/GD/TW/DI - 2G00
1 - C/LA/DO - 3C2016
1 - C/LA/DC=- 3C3203
1 - C/LA/DO - 3D54
1 - D/ALA - 3F45
1 - DD/ALA - 3F45
2 - ALA/PS (1 clean copy and 1 sourced copy) - 4F21
1 ALA Research Director - 3F44
1 - C/ALA/SCD/DI - 3F23
1 - DC/ALA/SCD/DI - 3F23
1 - C/ALA/SCD/E - 3F23
1 - C/ALA/SCD/N - 3F24
1 - C/ALA/SCD/W - 3F23
1 - C/ALA/SCD/CAR - 4F21
1 - C/ALA/AFD - 3F30
..1 - DC/ALA/AFD - 3F30
..l - C/ALA/AFD/W - 3F30
1 - C/ALA 4F29
1 - ALA/SCD Files
1 - ALA/SCD/CAR Files
DDI/ALA/SCD/CAR ( October 1988)
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