LETTER TO FREDERICK P. HITZ FROM STANLEY SPORKIN
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Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP05C01629R000100030010-3
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RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
15
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 12, 2011
Sequence Number:
10
Case Number:
Publication Date:
March 30, 1984
Content Type:
LETTER
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
~NASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
Frederick P. Hitz, Esquire
The Flour Mill
Suite 302
1000 Potomac Street, NVJ
ti~lashington, DC 20007
Enclosed is my response to the American Bar Association
questionnaire concerning oversig'rt and accountability within
the Intelligence Community. I hope that my views will he of
some use in your consideration of these issues. I want to
emphasize that the enclosed responses represent my personal
views and not__those of the Director, the Agency, or any of its
officials.
I ~?~ould appreciate it if you would advise me of the results
of the working group's consideration of these issues.
v ?.e rt r7 LL.1!1 p
Iri:?. l,~~~}
Sincerely,
tan ear.,/ porkin
~~ J
STAT
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QUESTIONNAIRE
A. Criteria for Evaluation
Please indicate the degree of your agreement or disagreement
(with any qualifications or reservations) with the following
general propositions, which are advanced as bases for the
evaluation:
1. The activities of the intelligence agencies should
be subject to congressional oversight, and the intelligence
budget should be subject, as at present, to the controls
inherent in the authorization process.
ANSWER: I agree with both propositions - that the activities
of intelligence agencies should be subject to congressional
oversight and that the intelligence budget should be subject
to the same controls inherent in the authorization process
that applies to all activities of the government. Congres-
sional oversight is essential for achieving a consensus within
our gover:enmental system on the necessity for and direction of
U.S. intelligence activities. Such oversight provides the
Intelligence Community with a degree of protection that is
indispensible to the effective accomplishment of its mission.
However, my agreement with these general propositions must be
qualified with caveat: the intelligence function is critical
to the exercise of two functions which are committed by the
Constitution to the President, at least insofar as the execu-
tion of those functions is concerned. These functions are, of
course, the responsibility to conduct military activities as
commander-in-chief, and the formulation and execution of
foreign policy as head of state. Consequently, congressional
oversight of the intelligence function stands vn a somewhat
different footing than does oversight-with respect to other
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areas such as, for example, execution of policy concerning
interstate commerce, in which Congress clearly plays a dif-
ferent role. A somewhat different approach to oversight of
the intelligence function is thus necessary to avoid making
intelligence agencies the ground on which the President and
Congress do battle over their respective responsibilities and
authorities.
2. The exercise of congressional oversight and bud-
getary control at present are satisfactorily adapted to take
account of the special circumstances of the intelligence
agencies. These include, in particular, the needs for opera-
tional secrecy and flexibility and the necessity of giving
foreign sources of information and assistance an adequate
degree of confidence ir, the ability of the system to protect
secrets.
ANSWER: I agree that the exercise of congressional oversight
and budgetary control has a satisfactory record for preserving
operational secrecy and establishing confidence within the
Executive branch on the ability of the congressional oversight
system to preserve secrets. While the Intelligence Community
has a high degree of confidence in the ability of the congres-
sional oversight system to protect secrets, one should note
the unlikelihood that foreign sources share the same confi-
Bence with respect to the overall system as they see it.
3. The provision of intelligence should be an objective
and nonpolitical activity. In order to foster this goal, the
mechanisms of oversight and accountability for the intelli-
gence agencies should be designed, to as great a degree as
possible, so as to insulate the agencies from partisan polit-
ical controversy; accordingly, the intelligence agencies
should be protected from undue political pressures, whether
coming from Executive Branch officials or the Congress.
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ANSWER: I agree.
4. Because the activities of the intelligence agencies
cannot be exposed to systematic public scrutiny, mechanisms of
oversight and accountability must substitute for the role that
informed public opinion plays in controlling the activities of
other departments and agencies of the federal government.
Thus, it is important that the structures of oversight and
authorization be perceived by the public as effective and as
making the intelligence agencies fully accountable to organs
of government which in turn are accountable to the people.
ANSWER: I agree.
5. It is important to ensure that the activities of the
intelligence agencies are conducted in accordance with law
and, even where there are no clear legal restrictions, that
such activities meet a minimum standard of propriety. The
latter concept is almost impossible to articulate, given the
moral ambiguities that necessarily inhere in the conduct of
intelligence activities. Nor is it easy to determine who
should set whatever standards are to be applied. Nonetheless
certain Forms of conduct (e.g. assassination or torture) are
widely considered as being unacceptable in all or virtually
all circumstances, and a broader range of conduct would be
considered by many as acceptable only in exigent circum-
stances. The structures of oversight and accountability in
the intelligence agencies should contribute to the development
of such standards and to their application in specific cases
and, in .particular, for these purposes should bring to bear
the viewpoints of individuals outside the operational sphere
of responsibility.
ANSWER: I would generally agree that all structures of over-
sight and accountability, and not just those in the intelli-
gence agencies, should contribute to the development of
standards of conduct. However, the application of these
standards to specific cases is one that must be carried out by
internal mechanisms and structures, beginning with the respon-
sible operating officials and, in appropriate cases, officials
who provide legal review and perform the Inspector General
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function. I believe that there is currently adequate oppor-
tunity for development and consideration of the view of key
officials outside the operational sphere.
6. The quality of the intelligence product should be
given a very high priority in the oversight activities of both
the Congress and the Executive Branch. The structures of
oversight and accountability should be designed to provide
objective and independent reviews of intelligence collection,
analysis and reporting. The purpose of such reviews should be
to ensure the proper utilization of budgetary resources, ade-
quate attention to long-range planning and to meeting intelli-
gence needs of national interest, and the objectivity and
sophistication of analysis and the reported intelligence
product.
ANSWER: I agree that quality of the intelligence product
should be given a high priority by oversight mechanisms. As
will be seen by my views with respect to Question B_4. infra,
I think there are adequate internal mechanisms to review the
quality of intelligence. Congressional review is important,
and is particularly helpful and useful when it looks at broad
issues concerning the intelligence production process.
External oversight review would be least helpful and effective
by urging the establishment of additional formal bureaucratic
devices, either within or outside the Executive branch, to
address this issue. Finally, oversight in this area should be
conducted in moderation, since too much second guessing may
stifle initiative and necessary risk-taking.
7. Given the special nature of the intelligence func-
tion, the normal processes of the Judicial Branch are not well
adapted to play a role in the oversight of intelligence oper-
ational activities, and an extension of the secret judicial
techniques embodied in the Foreign_Intelligence Surveillance
Act, unless constitutionally mandated, seems unwise.
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ANSWER: The FISA court represents a balance of the govern-
ment's need for secrecy with a due concern for the protection
of individual rights. Now that a consensus has been achieved
on?that balance, the area of greatest concern, electronic
surveillance within the United States, has been addressed.
Current oversight and control mecr~anisms, particularly various
internal legal reviews, adequately provide protection in any
analogous operational areas.
B. Specific Oversight Issues
Please comment on the following specific issues of oversight
and accountability.
1. Covert Actions:
(a) 4 Are there adequate mechanisms in place to ensure
careful consideration of the legality, feasibility
and desirability of covert action proposals?
ANSWER: Yes. National Security Council and other
internal policy review mechanisms provide for
careful consideration of feasibility and desir-
ability. Internal legal reviews, including review
by the CIA General Counsel and the Attorney General,
ensures careful consideration of the legality of
such proposals.
(b) Do current structures within the Executive Branch
ensure that the consistency of covert action pro-
posals with U.S. foreign policy objectives is judged
by officials with foreign policy responsibility and
that the CIA does not become by default a policy-
making institution?
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ANSWER: Covert action proposals are formulated
within the context of efforts to advance U.S.
foreign policy objectives. Officials and groups
within various agencies, including the Department of
State, play a role throughout. The ultimate check
on consistency with U.S. foreign policy objectives
is, of course, the necessity to obtain Presidential
approval.
(c) Is there satisfactory oversight within the Executive
Branch and the Congress of the way in which approved
covert action operations are carried out?
ANSWER: Yes, within both the Executive branch and
Congress there are periodic reviews by appropriate
mechanisms.
(d) Are there additional oversight mechanisms (e.g. some
form of specific approval by the Congress that you
think desirable with respect to covert actions?
ANSWER: No. A delicate balance has already been
struck in this area. A prior approval requirement
would paralyze the decision-making process. Current
arrangements go as far as is wise and may already
strain the balance.
2. Sensitive Intelli ence Collection?
(a) Are there satisfactory controls over the legality of
sensitive intelligence collection operations?
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ANSV7ER: Yes, Executive Order 12333, internal regu-
lations and procedures, and the statutory oversight
process ensure adequate legal review.
(b) Are there mechanisms in place to ensure a proper
degree of consideration (including obtaining objec-
tive opinion outside the operational sphere) of
proposed sensitive collection operations which carry
potential serious adverse consequences or raise
serious questions of propriety?
ANSWER: Yes, internal legal and policy reviews
ensure adequate consideration from outside the
operational sphere of such sensitive collection
operations.
(c) Are the mechanisms in place sufficient to ensure
'that sensitive collection efforts are focused on
intelligence collection targets of true significance?
ANSWEP.: There are a number of mechanisms to ensure
that sensitive collection efforts are focused on
intelligence targets of true significance. These
include both review and approval mechanisms within
the Intelligence Community and the National Security
Council policy review structure.
3. Operations Within the United States-
(a) Do existing mechanisms ensure compliance with legal
restrictions on domestic operations?
ANSWER: Yes. Procedures established pursuant to
Executive Order 12333 provide ;specific guidance for
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various types of activities. Some activities re-
quire a specific legal review and approval in each
case.
(b) Are there adequate checks on domestic operations to
ensure that potential interference with individual
rights and the integrity of private endeavors is
held to a minimum and occurs only when justified by
intelligence needs rising to an appropriate thresh-
hold of seriousness?
ANSWER: Yes, such checks are embodied in the
National Security Act of 1947, Executive Order
12333, and the procedures and review and approval
requirements discussed in my answer to 3.(a) above.
It should be pointed out that the activities of CIA
are not really focused in the United States and that
there is thus little potential for interference with
individual rights or interests.
4. Quality of Intelligence:
(a) Are there adequate mechanisms to ensure that the
United States is obtaining intelligence of the time-
liness, reliability and quality necessary to the
national security?
ANSWER:. There are a number of mechanisms that
address the timeliness, reliability and quality of
intelligence. These include the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board, the Senior Review Panel
of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Product
Evaluation Staff of .the Directorate of Intelligence,
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CIA and the analysis and production subcommittees of
the two oversight committees of the Congress.
(b) Are there sufficient protections to insulate the
intelligence analysis and reporting process from
political pressures or bias?
ANS4JER: Many of the same mechanisms cited in 4(a)
above also help to insure that analysis is as objec-
tive and as honest as it can be. Beyond these
mechanisms, however, the surest safeguard of the
integrity of the analytic process from political
pressure or bias is the integrity of the analysts
and their managers, Intelligence is too important
to the United States for there to be any room for
"skewing intelligence to meet political pressure or
bias and senior policymakers recognize this.
(c) Is there an adequate system for independent evalua-
tion of the quality of intelligence?
ANSWER: As I have already detailed, the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the Senior
Review Panel of the Director of Central Intelli-
gence, the Product Evaluation Staff of the Direc-
torate of Intelligence, CIA and the analysis and
production subcommittees of the two oversight
committees of the Congress ensure adequate indepen-
dent evaluation of the quality of intelligence.
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C. Possible Institutional Changes
Please briefly indicate your views as to the desirability of
the following institutional changes which have been mentioned
as possible ways to improve oversight and accountability in
the Intelligence Community:
1. The present congressional oversight committees should be
merged into a joint committee.
ANSWER: In my opinion, a joint intelligence committee should
not be established unless there are compelling reasons to do
so or unless it would result in advantages for both the
Congress and the Executive branch. My perception is that at
present things seem to be working fairly well and that there
is thus no need for change. However, some experimentation in
this area may be worthwhile, such as joint briefings or budget
reviews. However, each committee's role in voting, making
decisions, and other similar activities should probably stay
separate.
2. There should be a bipartisan National Intelligence Board
within the Executive Branch (with members appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate for stag-
gered terms overlapping presidential terms) to oversee intel-
ligence activities.
ANSWER: The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
and the President's Intelligence Oversight Board currently
play a role in this area. Creation of another board, with
members appointed by the President with the advice and consent
of the Senate, would appear to be unnecessary bureaucratic
layering without any increased or .added benefits.
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3. If there were such a National Intelligence Board, it
should
a) Deal only with issues of oversight and propriety;
b) assume responsibilities now held by the DCI for
long-range planning, budgetary review and establish-
ment of intelligence policy.
ANSWER: It should probably have the same functions as
the PFIAB and IOB.
4. Such a Board should be required by law to give an advi-
sory opinion on covert actions and sensitive collection opera-
tions and to review such activities periodically.
5. Such a Board should be required to approve all covert
actions and sensitive collection operations.
ANSWER: Advice with respect to covert actions and sensitive
collection operations can best be given by officials who have
to deal with the realities of getting these activities accom-
plished. Approvals for these activities are now respectively
granted by the President for covert actions and by other offi-
cials of the Community for sensitive collection activities.
To give an approval responsibility to a group that is insu-
lated from the problems that such activities are designed to
tackle would detract from an effective ability to operate.
This sort of bureaucratic layering would probably also result
in micro-management.
6. Each major intelligence agency should have a General
Counsel and an Inspector General appointed by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate.
ANSWEP,: I disagree, largely becal~~e the present arrangements
are working adequately.
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7. The Director of Central Intelligence should be appointed,
as is the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, for
a fixed term.
ANSWER: The nature of the duties and functions of the DCI and
the Director, FBI are very different. The DCI needs closer
interaction with the President because of ever-changing intel-
ligence requirements and priorities. This sort of bureau-
cratic requirement would diminish, rather than enhance, the
DCI's position.
8. The respective functions of the principal intelligence
agencies should be embodied in a statutory "charter".
ANSWER: A statutory charter is not necessary since the
principal intelligence functions are presently set forth in
Executive Orders and other Executive branch directives.
9. A statutory charter should be adopted also to define
rules on the conduct of intelligence activities now found in
executive order.
ANSWER: Statutory charters for this purpose are not neces-
sary. As the last charter exercise showed, statutory guide-
lines would of necessity be general, with exceptions and
specific operating guidelines embodied in classified, non-
public procedures.
10. There should the a national intelligence advisor to the
President separate from any intelligence collection or
analytic agency.
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a) Such an official should exercise functions over the
Intelligence Community similar to those of the DCI.
b) Such an official should play advisory role only and
have no "line" authority.
ANSLVER: The functions that such an official would perform are
currently performed by the DCI. To add another layer would
adversely impact on the relationship that now exists and would
clearly be harmful to the national interest.
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Distribution: OGC-84-50139
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