MORTON H. HELPERIN, APPELLANT, V. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. NO. 79-1849. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT. ARGUED 16 APRIL 1980. DECIDED 11 JULY 1980. REHEARING DENIED AUG. 7, 1980.

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP05C01629R000300520012-5
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RIFPUB
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K
Document Page Count: 
10
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 15, 2011
Sequence Number: 
12
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REGULATION
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This is not a situation where a moving vehicle was stopped on a pretext in order to avoid escape. Defendants had been closely observed for eight days. Sgt. Ware did not originally intend an arrest or search, but only a spot check. There was no suggestion of imminent flight or an exigent circum- stance. Most important, the car was even- tually lawfully immobilized because of its expired tags. In the District Court the police and the prosecutor explained that the car had been impounded for improper tags and that the police had consciously decided to exercise their authority under applicable impound- ment regulations with a view to taking immediate custody. On appeal the Govern- ment brief concedes that Sgf~ Ware relied on an inventory rationale. To allow this undisputed record to be ignored in favor of a different inaccurate justification, never advanced below, is in my view not appropri- ate. The regulation (General Order 602) is quite explicit as to the timing, scope, and location of inventory searches. See Part LB.4 at 12-15. Specifically, no search is permitted at the point of impoundment but only later at the police facility. Only prop- erty easily visible from outside the vehicle is to be removed in the first 24 hours. Because the police relied on General Order 602 they must comply with its require- ments. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976). They did not do so. Instead, under the guise of an inventory rationale, they conducted a comprehensive search covering the entire interior and trunk of the vehicle. Moreover, a general rule never before announced by any court to the effect that all moving vehicles create ipso facto an exigent circumstance regardless of the facts will discourage the use of warrants and will result in an unfortunate intrusion on priva- cy far beyond anything the Supreme Court has approved. Surely it goes too far to say that the police officers were acting with probable cause and in exigency when ~he recorcl shows that neither of these consider- ations entered their minds as they came up Approved For Release 2011/08/15 :CIA-RDP05C01629R000300520012-5 to the vehicle. [simply cannot accept the view that the police consciously throughout the proceeding below used a pretext to conceal their true investigatory motive even from the Court. Furthermore, the Su- preme Court in Opperman never intended to approve pretext in the sense suggested by the majority. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent as to Whitfield. Morton H. HALPERIN, Appellant, Y. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit. Argued 16 April 1980. Decided 11 July 1980. Rehearing Denied Aug. 7, 1980. Plaintiff in Freedom of Information Act case appealed from an order of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Oliver Gasch, J., which denied him access to CIA documents detailing legal bills and fee arrangements of private attor- neys retained by the Agency. The Court of Appeals, Wilkey, Circuit Judge, held that: {1) CIA documents detailing legal bills and fee agreements with private attorneys re- tained by the Agency were exempt from disclosure under Freedom of Information Act exemption prohibiting disclosure of matters specifically exempted from disclo- sure by statute; (2) plaintiff who did not allege an injury which was not common to all members of public, lacked standing to raise constitutional challenge against provi- sions of Central Intelligence Agency Act requiring secrecy for appropriations and ex- henditures of the CIA; and (3) statutory cy Act of 1999, ? 6 as amended 50 U.S.C.A. provision authorizing withholding of CIA expense data did not violate statement and account clause of Constitution. Affirmed. 1. Records ~- 55 Freedom of Information Act exemption protecting from disclosure those matters specifically exempted from disclosure by statute requires that matters be withheld from public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue or establishes partic- ular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld. National Security Act of 1947, ? 102(4)(3), 50 U.S.C.A. ? 403(4)(3). 2. Records e}63 [f statements of an agency withholding documents pursuant to Freedom of Infor- mation Act exemptions relating to national security contain reasonable specificity of detail, court is not to conduct a detailed inquiry to dc.~cide whether it agrees with agency's opinions. 5 U.S.C.A. ? 552(b)(1, 3). 3. Records