MORTON H. HELPERIN, APPELLANT, V. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. NO. 79-1849. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT. ARGUED 16 APRIL 1980. DECIDED 11 JULY 1980. REHEARING DENIED AUG. 7, 1980.
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP05C01629R000300520012-5
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
10
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 15, 2011
Sequence Number:
12
Case Number:
Content Type:
REGULATION
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Body:
This is not a situation where a moving
vehicle was stopped on a pretext in order to
avoid escape. Defendants had been closely
observed for eight days. Sgt. Ware did not
originally intend an arrest or search, but
only a spot check. There was no suggestion
of imminent flight or an exigent circum-
stance. Most important, the car was even-
tually lawfully immobilized because of its
expired tags.
In the District Court the police and the
prosecutor explained that the car had been
impounded for improper tags and that the
police had consciously decided to exercise
their authority under applicable impound-
ment regulations with a view to taking
immediate custody. On appeal the Govern-
ment brief concedes that Sgf~ Ware relied
on an inventory rationale. To allow this
undisputed record to be ignored in favor of
a different inaccurate justification, never
advanced below, is in my view not appropri-
ate.
The regulation (General Order 602) is
quite explicit as to the timing, scope, and
location of inventory searches. See Part
LB.4 at 12-15. Specifically, no search is
permitted at the point of impoundment but
only later at the police facility. Only prop-
erty easily visible from outside the vehicle
is to be removed in the first 24 hours.
Because the police relied on General Order
602 they must comply with its require-
ments. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000
(1976). They did not do so. Instead, under
the guise of an inventory rationale, they
conducted a comprehensive search covering
the entire interior and trunk of the vehicle.
Moreover, a general rule never before
announced by any court to the effect that
all moving vehicles create ipso facto an
exigent circumstance regardless of the facts
will discourage the use of warrants and will
result in an unfortunate intrusion on priva-
cy far beyond anything the Supreme Court
has approved. Surely it goes too far to say
that the police officers were acting with
probable cause and in exigency when ~he
recorcl shows that neither of these consider-
ations entered their minds as they came up
Approved For Release 2011/08/15 :CIA-RDP05C01629R000300520012-5
to the vehicle. [simply cannot accept the
view that the police consciously throughout
the proceeding below used a pretext to
conceal their true investigatory motive even
from the Court. Furthermore, the Su-
preme Court in Opperman never intended
to approve pretext in the sense suggested
by the majority.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent as to
Whitfield.
Morton H. HALPERIN, Appellant,
Y.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
United States Court of Appeals,
District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued 16 April 1980.
Decided 11 July 1980.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 7, 1980.
Plaintiff in Freedom of Information
Act case appealed from an order of the
United States District Court for the District
of Columbia, Oliver Gasch, J., which denied
him access to CIA documents detailing legal
bills and fee arrangements of private attor-
neys retained by the Agency. The Court of
Appeals, Wilkey, Circuit Judge, held that:
{1) CIA documents detailing legal bills and
fee agreements with private attorneys re-
tained by the Agency were exempt from
disclosure under Freedom of Information
Act exemption prohibiting disclosure of
matters specifically exempted from disclo-
sure by statute; (2) plaintiff who did not
allege an injury which was not common to
all members of public, lacked standing to
raise constitutional challenge against provi-
sions of Central Intelligence Agency Act
requiring secrecy for appropriations and ex-
henditures of the CIA; and (3) statutory cy Act of 1999, ? 6 as amended 50 U.S.C.A.
provision authorizing withholding of CIA
expense data did not violate statement and
account clause of Constitution.
Affirmed.
1. Records ~- 55
Freedom of Information Act exemption
protecting from disclosure those matters
specifically exempted from disclosure by
statute requires that matters be withheld
from public in such a manner as to leave no
discretion on the issue or establishes partic-
ular criteria for withholding or refers to
particular types of matters to be withheld.
National Security Act of 1947, ? 102(4)(3),
50 U.S.C.A. ? 403(4)(3).
2. Records e}63
[f statements of an agency withholding
documents pursuant to Freedom of Infor-
mation Act exemptions relating to national
security contain reasonable specificity of
detail, court is not to conduct a detailed
inquiry to dc.~cide whether it agrees with
agency's opinions. 5 U.S.C.A. ? 552(b)(1, 3).
3. Records