HISTORIAN QUESTIONS PAST FOREIGN POLICIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05S00365R000100500001-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 18, 1988
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

ext] Moscow ay 19 TASS-" a Soviet Union
FBIS-SOV-88-098
20 May 1988
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The US wanted all '
participants to display a truly
busin s-ltke and petent approach so t the culture
an results of dialogue at the ion matched the
lofty level responsibility wh' rested today on}-ll
nations trovskiy pointed
Etian Ties De oping
LD1905141W88 Moscow TAW n English 1339
attaches gre importance to So ' t-Egyptian relatipas
and bel' es that they have en developing
alo
lin ascent over the paA 2-3 years," Sovi
e
reign Minister Vl it Petrovskiy told
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limit Soviet-Egypt
the
puty
news con-
s," he pointed out.
the opinion of the
of great importan
developing dialogu
the region, for
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d resolving conc
g into motion th
so for
problems in
ent and, spcifi-
USSR attache real importance to rela ' s with
Egypt at variou ' ternational forums whe that country
adhered to ery constructive stan a added.
"Ti-USSR hopes that ou ationship will not only be
L
adened during the hcoming visit by the Egyptian
Foreign Minister mad `Ismat 'Abd al-Majid, but will
also be deep d and enriched," Petrovskiy said.
Historian Questions Past Foreign Policies
PM1905115188 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russia Pt 18 May 88 p 14
[Article by Doctor of Historical Sciences Professor Vya-
e, v Dashichev: "East-West: Quest for New Rela-
tions. Ononties of the Soviet State's Foreign
Policy"-boldface as published]
[Text] The realities of the nuclear age and of the scien-
tific and technical revolution demand new thinking and
new approaches toward the completion of foreign policy
tasks. Movement in this direction is only just beginning.
It is obvious that any serious changes will take much
longer. This is because the most difficult task of all is to
effect a restructuring of minds, to overcome the stereo-
types and the departmental, group, and personal inter-
ests which influence foreign policy decisionmaking.
It is particularly important to get rid of incorrect ideas
on a fundamental question like the correlation between
war and politics. For decades our political thinking on
this issue held positions which prevented us from finding
the correct ways to solve the problems of peace and
disarmament.
WORLDWIDE ISSUES
"There was a time," E.A. Shevardnadze said, "when
controversial topics were not raised and opinions differ-
ent from official views, even when they were inoffensive,
were not expressed. This time is now past. But just look
at what is happening. Bold, interesting, and questioning
articles have appeared on many basic questions of inter-
nal life in all its forms, of party and state building, and of
the economy, culture, art, and science. Yet there is
nothing like this in the foreign policy sphere. Does this
mean that everything here is correct and that there are no
other options apart from the ones being implemented?"
Indeed, you will not find even a single mention of the
slightest mistake or error in books and articles about our
foreign policy. No matter what was done, everything is
depicted as infallible. Of course, Soviet foreign policy
enjoys high esteem. It has always been marked by its
anti-imperialist orientation and has been aimed at ensur-
ing the security of the USSR and its allies and at
supporting the international workers movement and the
national liberation struggle all over the world. But was
everything done correctly? Is it possible to seriously
believe that, while we were committing major mistakes
in internal development, we managed to avoid them in
the international arena in all those 70 years? This simply
cannot be. To err is human. It is important to realize
your mistakes and to learn from them. There were times
when heated debates on foreign policy took place in our
country also. Let us recall just the highly tense struggle of
opinions-openly and fearlessly expressed-around the
Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty.
Our foreign policy now has no more urgent task than
reliably ensuring security and peace for all peoples. This
is why it is important to clarify above all the question of
the nature and mechanism of the arms race and the
launching of wars. "People," V.I. Lenin pointed out,
"live within a state, and every state exists within a
system of states which are in a condition of a certain
political equilibrium relative to one another." Any desire
on the part of a major state (or bloc of states) to sharply
expand its sphere of influence produced a disruption of
this equilibrium. To restore it, other states united within
an "anticoalition" against the potentially or actually
strongest state (in a given region or in the world).
Moreover, the counterweight that was created might
even be more powerful because the "anticoalition" was
joined by more states and mobilized to the maximum all
its material, spiritual, and human resources.
The "feedback" effect was often diminished by a series
of factors. While the strength of a power which was
expanding its sphere of influence rallied its enemies, its
rejection of expansionist aspirations caused hesitations
and disintegration within the "anticoalition" camp. Dif-
ficulties also emerged as a result of contradictions
between its actual or potential members. Nonetheless,
the "anticoalition" ultimately became so strong that the
power challenging it could not withstand the military
~o~,sh;c~ieJ
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WORLDWIDE ISSUES
and economic confrontation. Consequently, any hege-
monism contains the seeds of its own downfall. Evidence
of this is provided by the experience of two world wars.
Hegemonism has always been founded on a desire for
political and economic subjugation of peoples and states.
But from the time of the French bourgeois revolution, or
rather the Napoleonic wars, it began to acquire more and
more ideological overtones and operate beneath the
banner of messianism, in other words the imposition of
certain ideological values, a certain way of life, and
certain social setup on other peoples and states. This
hegemonism is typical mainly of countries in the grip of
broad ideological movements.. This ailment also afflicts
the policy of the United States, which has for a long time
striven to implant American values and the American
way of life in the world. The famous U.S. diplomat R.
Barkley wrote: "Ever since the first settlers, Americans
have acted as if they were carrying out a divine mission...
The foreign policy complications stemming from this
factor are obvious. Because to be guided in one's actions
by the feeling of being chosen by.destiny and the aware-
ness of one's own messianic role means pitting oneself
against the mighty forces of the international commu-
nity."
States with different sociopolitical system may unite to
counteract hegemonism. Let us recall that, soon after the
October Revolution's victory in Russia, France, Britain,
and the United States offered to give help to the Soviet
Government provided it agreed to continue the war
against Germany on the Entente's side. (The subsequent
intervention by these powers partially stemmed from
their desire to bring to power in Russia a government
which would continue the war.) An "anticoalition" of
countries belonging to different social systems emerged,
albeit greatly delayed, against Germany and its allies
during World War II.
The classic configuration of forces In Europe, which
developed by the end of the 19th century and prevailed
until the middle of the 20th century, consisted of the
central European grouping of states headed by Germany
and the opposing triangle of "Russia (USSR)-France-
Britain," which was joined by the United States and other
states in wartime. Germany's two attempts to decisively
alter the European balance in its favor by military means
and to establish Its domination in Europe ended in total
collapse. The classic European balance of forces ensured
the national security interests of Russia (USSR), France,
and Britain In the face of German expansionism. V.I.
Lenin realized the geostrategic importance of France and
Britain for Soviet Russia. During the Brest-Litovsk peace
talks, he categorically insisted that the armistice agree-
ment with' Germany Include a provision prohibiting all
transfers of German troops from the Eastern Front to the
West. The Soviet Government thus demonstrated its
consideration of the interests of the Western powers,
against which the German command was planning to
deliver a decisive blow after Russia's withdrawal from the
war.
The classic configuration of forces in Europe did not only
provide the Soviet Union with a counterbalance to German
aggression. One of its other advantages was the fact that
the formation of a united front of Western powers against
the Soviet Union was ruled out. That was because France
and Britain needed, as much as the Soviet Union did, an
effective counterbalance to Germany In East Europe.
Ultimately, these national-state interests of France and
Britain were more powerful than their class and ideolog-
ical differences with the Soviet Union.
German fascism reared its head in the thirties. All major
powers realized that matters were leading to war. This was
also realized in Moscow. It was realized, and right until
1939 attempts were made to create a collective security
system In Europe. At that time there was just one possi-
bility to curb a new German aggression: to revive the
Entente. But the French and British ruling circles at the
time did not make the proper efforts to create a coalition
with the. USSR in the face of the Nazi threat. As a matter
of fact, they played up to Hitler, and Munich lies on their
conscience.
This policy was dictated not only by anticommunism
and anti-Sovietism. After Stalin had decapitated the Red
Army by exterminating its best command cadres, Britain
and France ceased to consider the Soviet Union as a
serious and reliable military ally. Furthermore, they
found it difficult to deal with a supreme leader who had
trampled all human morality and had committed
unprecedented repressions using cruel and criminal
methods for the sake of establishing his authoritarian
power.
Finding himself in an extremely difficult situation, Sta-
lin ultimately concluded the nonaggression pact with
fascist Germany. He hoped to avert, even if only tempo-
rarily, war at any cost.
When the Soviet 'Union left the traditional European
configuration of forces, France and Britain were left
alone to face fascist Germany. As a result of this, Hitler's
command was given a unique opportunity to concentrate
136 divisions along the Western Front by the start of the
offensive against France, leaving just 10-second line
[maloboyesposobnyy] divisions in the East, against the
USSR. This enabled fascist Germany to swiftly crush
France- and take over almost all of West Europe's
resources. This later had the gravest effect on the security
of the Soviet Union, when it found itself face to face with
Hitler's Wehrmacht on 22 June 1941. In these circum-
stances, the Western powers could have stayed on the
sidelines, adopting the posture of pleased third parties.
Nevertheless, overcoming prejudices, antipathies, rejec-
tion of Stalin's regime, and the ill-feeling stemming from
the Soviet-German pact, political circles in Britain, and
later in the United States, chose what was, from the
viewpoint of their national interests, the only correct
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WORLDWIDE ISSUES
path-that of support for the Soviet Union in its struggle
against fascist Germany. The mechanism of balancing
opposed forces in the European Continent operated once
more.
The military-political situation in Europe changed
sharply following World War II. The world socialist
system started to emerge. The Soviet Union gained
friendly neighbors along its Western border, while the
Yalta and Potsdam decisions defined a postwar structure
in Europe which took into account the legitimate inter-
ests of our security and our tremendous contribution to
the rout of fascism.
The results seemed perfectly satisfactory for us. But the
obvious consolidation of Soviet positions and the spread
of Soviet influence in central and southeast Europe were
perceived by our recent allies from the anti-Hitler coali-
tion as an intolerable disruption of the European balance
threatening their interests. Right after the end of the war
the Western powers started hatching plans to counter the
growing Soviet influence. In subsequent years these
plans materialized in the form of the "cold war"
launched against the Soviet Union. Backed by Britain
and France, the United States filled the power vacuum
created after Germany's defeat. The U.S. military and
political presence on the European Continent became a
mighty-and enduring, even to the present day-factor
of anti-Soviet policy. All the Western powers united
within the NATO military-political bloc aimed against
the Soviet Union. West Germany, with its powerful
potential, was brought into this bloc. The Warsaw Pact
Organization which was created in response could rely,
especially at the beginning, only exclusively on the
Soviet Union's potential.
A united front of Western powers against the USSR thus
emerged. An unprecedentedly large and mighty (with
nuclear weapons and means for their delivery) anti-
Soviet coalition was formed.
Was such a demarcation inevitable? Probably. The
imperialist centers of power saw the growth of world
socialism as a direct threat to their interests and turned
to the concepts of "containment," "rolling back," and
"deterrence." Their priority in the arms race which was
launched after World War II was obvious. But, while we
have extensive knowledge of the West's unseemly behav-
ior, we still are inclined to assess our own stance at
various stages as unequivocally correct and the only
possible correct one. s a matter of fact, trends which
could have been and were perceive a- s hegemonist
operated also m viet foreign policy..
Let us recall V.I. Lenin. He, just like K. Marx and F.
Engels before him, was a decisive opponent of "bringing
happiness" to "other peoples." He mercilessly criticized
the leftist plans (put forward by Trotskiyites after Octo-
ber) for the violent spread of revolution to West Europe,
Afghanistan, India, and other countries, bluntly pointing
out that "so far, no decree has been promulgated to the
effect that all countries must live according to the Bolshe-
vik revolutionary calendar, and even if it were to be
promulgated, it would not be implemented."
These principles did not differ from deeds. The dangerous
illusions about "world revolution" were overcome. Condi-
tions were created for peaceful coexistence with the capi-
talist countries. Is it not striking today that, after the civil
war and right until 1931, the Soviet republic allowed itself
an army of only 560,000 men? This shows the great
services of a brilliant constellation of diplomats-Chiche-
rin, Litvinov, Krasin, Borovskiy, and others-who man-
aged to reduce the external threat to our country to a
minimum. The size of our armed forces also indicated that
the Soviet Union had no intention of threatening anyone.
Only the growing military danger in the early thirties,
especially after fascism's advent in power in Germany,
forced the Soviet Union to multiply its defense efforts.
Lenin's principles of not only domestic but also foreign
policy were seriously distorted during the time of Stalin's
rule. In essence, the foreign policy practice of Stalin and
his closest associates was based on the ultraleftist ideas
of Blanquism and Trotskiyism which are alien to the
nature of socialism. What came to the fore, especially
after World War II, was the spread of Stalinist socialism
wherever possible and its standardization in all countries
regardless of their national features. Overcentralization
in domestic policy inevitably engendered hegemonism
and a great-power mentality in foreign policy. One
indicative example was Yugoslavia's expulsion from the
socialist system in 1948 and the attribution of all deadly
sins to its leadership for the simple reason that it had
refused to submit to Stalin and obey his orders. This was
followed by the breach with China and Albania, and
once again we made mistakes. Conflicts and frictions
developed with other socialist countries.
Expectations that relations within the socialist frame-
work could be built on the rigid principles of intraparty
"democratic centralism" and the unity of socialism
could be thus ensured were not to materialize. Sad to say,
matters went as far as sharp confrontation and armed
clashes between socialist countries.
The hegemonist, great-power ambitions of Stalinism
which became rooted in foreign policy repeatedly jeop-
ardized political equilibrium between states, especially
those of East and West. In the process the interests of the
expansion of social revolution pushed into the back-
ground the task of preventing the threat of war. Approx-
imately the following propaganda argument operated for
internal consumption: "Since Western imperialism is
resisting the progressive social and territorial changes in
the world emanating from the Soviet Union, it is the
aggressor." On the one hand we heightened the level of
military danger by advancing on the West's positions,
and on the other we mounted a broad campaign in
defense of peace and spared no resources to organize a
mass movement of champions of peace (it is no accident
that a joke current in the fifties said: "There will be such
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a struggle for peace that everything will be razed to the
ground"). Over the years all this was embodied in
stereotyped and cliche-ridden thinking and in the men-
tality of leading cadres, who effectively were prisoners of
their own propaganda.
How did the opposing side perceive the USSR's policy
and goals, and, indeed, how does it continue out of
inertia to perceive them even now? In the eyes of the
overwhelming proportion of the Western public the
Soviet Union is a dangerous power whose leadership
wants to eliminate the bourgeois democracies by mili-
tary means and to establish a Soviet-type communist
system throughout the world.
The thesis of Soviet expansion served as the main
cement for rallying the states of the other social system
against the USSR. The NATO countries' ruling circles
viewed any progressive social processes almost exclu-
sively through the prism of a further change in the global
political balance in favor of the Soviet Union. This
greatly impeded the activity of progressive forces in the
capitalist zone and in the developing world, and massive
repressions rained down upon them.
Washington actively exploited the "Soviet military
_~ ecure a dominating in uenc n- est urope,
o a an a its own egemonis in erests in various
ES ions of the wor , a to cre21t n extensive network
of-strategic military ~ bases. actions on our
part provided U.S. expansionist circles with the desired
pretext for acts of aggression against many peoples, for
the deployment of powerful armed forces, and for the
creation of more and more new types of lethal weapons.
What about the dangerous extremism and adventurism
of U.S. policy? They too leeched on the "Soviet threat."
By the early seventies the Soviet Union had reached a
level of nuclear missile forces that made global nuclear
conflict unacceptable to the United States. A period of
East-West detente began. Western politicians' gaze
turned toward peaceful means of achieving anti-Soviet
political goals. Particular hopes were pinned on the
economic weakening of the Soviet Union and the ineffi-
ciency of its economy. This held out to the West the
prospect of an erosion of the USSR's international
positions and a contraction of its sphere of influence.
The implementation of this policy required a departure
from "cold war," the removal of strain [ostrota] in
relations with the USSR, and the attainment of compro-
mises on a wide range of issues.
Detente also gave a chance to the Soviet Union. The
opportunity emerged to reduce confrontation with the
West to the minimum level and thereby to prevent the
process of the buildup in the forces of the "anti coali-
tion." Additional resources could be used for the resolu-
tion of internal tasks, political and social development,
and the democratization of the country, and its economy
could be switched to the path of intensive development.
WORLDWIDE ISSUES
It soon transpired that detente was acceptable to the
United States and its allies only if the international
political and strategic military status quo was preserved.
However, as the West saw it, the Soviet leadership was
actively exploiting detente to build up its own military
forces, seeking military parity with the United States and
in general with all the opposing powers-a fact without
historical precedent. The United States, paralyzed by the
Vietnam catastrophe, reacted sensitively to the expan-
sion of Soviet influence in Africa, the Near East, and
other regions.
All this was interpreted in the West as a further increase
in the Soviet threat. The extreme right-wing political
circles that came to power in the United States and the
other NATO countries turned sharply away from detente
toward confrontation. The Soviet Union found itself
faced with unprecedented new pressure from imperial-
ism.
The expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence reached
critical limits in the West's eyes with the introduction of
Soviet troops into Afghanistan. In earlier times this
could have been grounds for unleashing war. But the
threat of nuclear annihilation did not permit the West to
resort to a frontal military clash with the USSR. The
"anticoalition" turned to other means of pressure. The
main one was a massive race in the most modern arms
that even the mighty Western economy finds it difficult
to sustain. The spiritual and material resources of the
capitalist world united against the Soviet Union. A
"crusade" against the USSR was proclaimed.
The operation of the "feedback" effect placed the Soviet
Union in an extremely difficult position in the foreign
policy and economic respects. It was opposed by the
major world powers-the United States, Britain, France,
the FRG, Italy, Japan, Canada, and China. Opposition
to their vastly superior potential was dangerously far
beyond the USSR's abilities.
Could such a severe exacerbation of tension in Soviet-
Western relations in the late seventies and early eighties
have been avoided?
Unquestionably so. It is our conviction that the crisis
was caused chiefly by the miscalculations and incompe-
tent approach of the Brezhnev leadership toward the
resolution of foreign policy tasks.
The general goals were quite correctly formulated: peace,
security, disarmament, cooperation, noninterference in
internal affairs, and peaceful coexistence. But there was
a manifest lack of purposeful, competent, scientifically
substantiated and tested actions. We were wrong in
assessing the global situation in the world and the
correlation of forces, and no serious efforts were made to
settle the fundamental political contradictions with the
West. Though we were politically, militarily (via weap-
ons supplies and advisers), and diplomatically involved
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in regional conflicts, we disregarded their influence on
the relaxation of to 1:1~1111t!11111'1 111 en the and t e
est an on their entire system o ips.
There were no clear ideas of the Soviet Union's true
national state interests. These interests lay by no means
to chasing petty and essentially formal gains associated
with leadership coups in certain developing countries.
;N' The genuine interest lay in ensuring a favorable interna-
v t ion onom ana sociopolitical stem.
However, at that time it was rev that no trans or-
foreign policy becoming exceptionally costly. The Rea-
gan administration foisted a colossal increase in military
spending on us. In the United States it grew from $122
billion in 1979 to $284 billion in 1985. To maintain
military parity, we tried to keep up with [tyanulis za) the
United States in this colossal unproductive spending,
which totaled over $1 trillion over the 5-year period.
The arms race-like war-may be regarded as the con-
tinuation of policy by other means. To abate the arms
race and make it pointless, you have to remove political
contradictions and balance the sides' interests.
3, matrons were needed...
The uncreative nature of the decisions resulted in our
Of course, it is wrong to separate the solution of political
problems and military problems. It is certainly possible
to solve them in parallel. But the primacy of political
issues is self-evident. Evidence of that is provided by the
sad failure of all efforts to curtail or limit the arms race
between the United States and the USSR in the seven-
ties. What defeated these efforts was precisely the fact
that fundamental political problems were unsolved.
To radically and irrevocably curb the arms race, it is
necessa to fundamentally rep n' rn
political re a ion . ere to on military issues are not
enough here. Ultimately the point is not what quantity of
nuclear and other weapons each side possesses or how far
the level of armaments should be reduced. a main
problem is whether a political modus vivendi is attain-
whether t yecan securea high level o mutua tru t. It is
here, in t e po tttco-i eo ogt sp ere, t at t e key to
disarmament lies. It is on this sphere that the further
operation of the "feedback" effect and the strength or
weakness of the "anti coalition" opposing the USSR will
depend.
The USSR and the Western powers must renounce total
confrontation, must not interfere in the internal affairs
of each other and of third countries, must organize broad
peaceful cooperation, must refrain from pressing the
other side's sore points, must not damage its interests,
and must not seek unilateral benefits and advantages.
WORLDWIDE ISSUES
The removal of political and military tension between
the USSR and the West is a process that requires mutual
efforts. Our part of the way is the total surmounting of
Stalinism in domestic and foreign policy, theory and
practice, organizational structures, and the public mind.
It is also a uesti international
con tons or socialist b ' iag.-F'or the narrowly e i is
i atur of-ro`reign policy decisionmaking, the distorted
picture of the outside world, and the Soviet Union's
isolation from the international community for a Ion
time doomed it to sociopolitical, economic, scientifi
and technical, and cultural stagnation.
Throughout the 20th century the nature and content of
the struggle for social progress have changed substan-
tially. After 1945 the Soviet Union played the role of
military guarantor of the expansion of the sphere of
socialism in the world. As a result it was dragged into an
extremely sharp confrontation with the main forces of
imperialism. Nuclear missile weapons lent an exception-
ally dangerous and risky nature to this confrontation.
Now socialism has become an invincible force. So it is
vitally important from the viewpoint not only of preserv-
ing peace but also of the further development of world
socialism to ensure that the center of gravity of the
struggle for social progress moves again from the sphere
of Soviet-Western interstate relations into the sphere of
the internal sociopolitical development of the Soviet
Union, the socialist countries, and the Western and
"Third World" states. If in 1917 it was possible to break
the chain of imperialism in a single country-Russia-
without outside assistance, immeasurably better condi-
tions now exist for the advance toward socialism on a
national basis. The Soviet Union ranand must influence
world social prr~ss exclusivel via its economic, I't-
ical sscienti tc an cultural successes, That is the funda-
ment, Leninist tenet regarding the Soviet state's role
and tasks in the international community. The full
restoration of the significance of this Leninist idea is one
of the noble aims of restructuring.
Such a turnaround in our policy in no way presupposes
some kind of "socialist isolationism." On the contrary, it
will greatly expand the scope for inter-nation collabora-
tion and the mutual influence and mutual enrichment of
socialist forces in the political, economic, theoretical,
scientific, and cultural spheres. Socialist solidarity will
become richer and acquire an organic nature.
The totally new tasks of the struggle for social progress in
the nuclear age also require radically new ways and
methods of realizing them-such is the conclusion of the
27th CPSU Congress, which initiated a fundamental
reassessment of values in foreign policy thinking. What
has been established as the keystone of our foreign policy
activity is a principle that develops Lenin's ideas: The
interests of saving human civilization from nuclear anni-
hilation take precedence over any class, ideological,
material, personal, and other interests.
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SUMMARY
OUTSPOKEN SOVIET COMMENTATORS HAVE OPENED A NEW FRONT FOR GLASNOST
BY ADVANCING REVISIONIST CRITIQUES IN THE HITHERTO ALMOST SACROSANCT
DOMAIN OF FOREIGN POLICY. THE PURPOSE EVIDENTLY IS TO BOLSTER
SUPPORT FOR GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA OF
INCREASED COOPERATION WITH THE WEST AND OF REGIONAL SETTLEMENTS IN
THE THIRD WORLD. AT THE SAME TIME, THE OPENING OF THIS AREA TO
CRITICAL REVIEW RAISES THE RISKS OF ELICITING BOTH A CONSERVATIVE
REACTION AND ATTEMPTS TO GO BEYOND LIMITS DESIRED BY EVEN A REFORM-
MINDED LEADERSHIP.
END SUMMARY
A BENCHMARK ARTICLE IN THE 18 MAY LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, BY REFORM
ADVOCATE VYACHESLAV DASHICHEV OF THE INSTITUTE OF THE ECONOMICS OF
THE WORLD SOCIALIST M, EEMS AIMED AT USING AN EXPOSITION OF
THAUITIONAL BALANCE OF POWER THEORY AND RADICALLY NEW
INTERPRETATIONS OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY UNDER STALIN AND BREZHNEV
TO BUILD UP SUPPORT FOR GORBACHEV'S "NEW THINKING" IN THE FOREIGN
POLICY SPHERE. PRESENTING THE ARGUMENT THAT AN AGGRESSIVE SOVIET
MILITARY POSTURE CAN DAMAGE SOVIET SECURITY INTERESTS AND HAS IN
FACT DONE SO IN THE PAST, THE ARTICLE EXPLAINS THAT CHALLENGES TO
THE EXISTING BALANCE OF POWER IN EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE HAVE
REPEATEDLY BEEN MET BY AD HOC COALITIONS OF RIVAL POWERS SEEKING TO
CORRECT PERCEIVED IMBALANCES.
ELABORATING HIS MAIN POINT, DASHICHEV ASSERTS THAT SINCE THE TIME OF
NAPOLEON COALITIONS OF STATES HAVE REPEATEDLY FORMED IN EUROPE AND
ELSEWHERE TO COUNTERACT THE EXPANSIONIST AMBITIONS OF A
" HEGEMONISTIC " POWER--HE IMPLIES THAT THIS APPLIED AT TIMES TO THE
USSR--AND THAT STATES WITH "DIFFERENT SOCIOPOLITICAL SYSTEMS"
(SUCH AS THE NATO COUNTRIES AND CHINA) CAN EASILY UNITE TO
"COUNTERACT HEGEMONISM. " TO ILLUSTRATE HIS ARGUMENT, DASHICHEV
OFFERS SEVERAL NOVEL--FOR SOVIET HISTORIOGRAPHY-INTERPRETATIONS OF
EVENTS IN SOVIET HISTORY:
0 ON THE QUESTION OF THE ALLIED INTERVENTION IN RUSSIA IN 1918, HE
WRITES THAT IT WAS MOTIVATED NOT ONLY BY ANTICOMMUNISM BUT BY AN
UNDERSTANDABLE "DESIRE TO BRING TO POWER IN RUSSIA A GOVERNMENT
THAT WOULD CONTINUE THE WAR" AGAINST GERMANY. MOSCOW HAS
TRADITIONALLY PUT ALMOST EXCLUSIVE EMPHASIS ON THE ALLIES' ALLEGED
DESIRE TO STRANGLE BOLSHEVISM IN ITS INFANCY.
..-4? ON THE ISSUE OF THE RUNUP TO WORLD WAR II, HE ARGUES THAT THE ONLY
WAY THAT THE RISE OF NAZI GERMANY IN THE 1930'S COULD HAVE BEEN
CHECKED WAS THROUGH THE RENEWAL OF THE ALLIANCE OF GREAT BRITAIN,
FRANCE,-AND RUSSIA AND THAT THIS DID NOT HAPPEN BECAUSE STALIN HAD
"DECAPITATED THE RED ARMY BY EXTERMINATING ITS BEST COMMAND
CADRES." THIS MADE GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE
'.`SSR'S ABILITY TO FUNCTION AS A "SERIOUS AND RELIABLE MILITARY
ALLY." MOSCOW'S USUAL POSITION IS TO ALLEGE THAT BECAUSE OF
BRITISH AND FRENCH PERFIDY, THE USSR HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO SIGN THE
NAZI-SOVIET PACT TO GAIN TIME.
0 ON THE QUESTION OF THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR, DASHICHEV SEEMS TO
LAY A PORTION OF THE BLAME ON THE USSR,, ASSERTING THAT THE
"CONSOLIDATION OF SOVIET POSITIONS" AND THE "SPREAD OF SOVIET
INFLUENCE" IN EAST EUROPE, WHILE CONSISTENT WITH THE YALTA AND
POTSDAM AGREEMENTS, WERE SEEN BY THE WEST AS AN 'INTOLERABLE
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DISRUPTION OF THE EUROPEAN BALANCE THREATENING THEIR INTERESTS" AND
PROMPTED THE SOVIET UNION'S ERSTWHILE ALLIES TO BAND TOGETHER WITH
WEST GERMANY IN THE NATO ALLIANCE. INTIMATING THAT THE USSR IS
PAYING FOR THESE MISTAKES UP TO THE PRESENT DAY, HE SAYS IT IS NOT
ACCIDENTAL THAT AN "OVERWHELMING PROPORTION" OF THE PEOPLE IN THE
WEST VIEW THE SOVIET UNION AS "A DANGEROUS POWER WHOSE LEADERSHIP
WANTS TO ELIMINATE BOURGEOIS DEMOCRACIES BY MILITARY MEANS AND TO-
ESTABLISH A SOVIET-TYPE COMMUNIST SYSTEM THROUGHOUT THE WORLD."
DASHICHEV CHALLENGES A NUMBER OF OTHER SACRED COWS OF SOVIET
HISTORIOGRAPHY DIRECTLY RELEVANT TO CURRENT AND FUTURE SOVIET
POLICIES:
0 ON THE USSR'S RELATIONS WITH SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, HE BLAMES
STALIN--AND BY IMPLICATION STALIN'S SUCCESSORS--FOR TRYING TO SET UP
"STANDARDIZED" REGIMES IN ALL SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, REGARDLESS OF
THEIR INTERNAL CONDITIONS. HE EXPLAINS THAT OVERCENTRALIZATION IN
MOSCOW'S DOMESTIC POLICY LED TO " HEGEMONISM " IN ITS FOREIGN
POLICY, AND THIS PRODUCED THE RIFTS WITH YUGOSLAVIA, CHINA, AND
ALBANIA. MATTERS WENT SO FAR AS "SHARP CONFRONTATION" AND EVEN TO
"ARMED CLASHES BETWEEN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES."
0HE ALSO ACCUSES THE " BREZHNEV LEADERSHIP," WHICH HE DESCRIBES AS
"INCOMPETENT," OF SQUANDERING THE OPPORTUNITIES CREATED BY THE
ATTAINMENT OF STRATEGIC PARITY WITH THE UNITED STATES AND THE
ENSUING DETENTE OF THE EARLY 1970'S. INSTEAD OF USING DETENTE AS A
BREATHING SPACE.AND AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO ADDRESS
ITS DOMESTIC PROBLEMS, THE BREZHNEV LEADERSHIP "EXPLOITED DETENTE"
TO BUILD UP ITS OWN MILITARY FORCES, SEEKING MILITARY PARITY WITH
THE UNITED STATES AND ALL THE OPPOSING POWERS ADDED TOGETHER--#'A
FACT WITHOUT HISTORICAL PRECEDENT." THIS, DASHICHEV ARGUES, LED
ULTIMATELY TO A 'MASSIVE RACE IN THE MOST MODERN ARKS" THAT
THREATENS TO UNDERMINE "EVEN THE MIGHTY WESTERN ECONOMY"--NOT TO
MENTION THE WEAKER SOVIET ECONOMY.
DASHICHEV ALSO CONDEMNS PAST SOVIET POLICY IN THE THIRD WORLD,
THEREBY LENDING HIS VOICE TO THOSE INSISTING THAT MOSCOW SCALE BACK
ITS INVOLVEMENT IN THIRD WORLD CONFLICTS. HE ARGUES THAT IN
/****** BEGINNING OF TAKE 002 ******/
REF: WA2505201288 FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE MEDIA
..ANALYSIS///ARGUES THAT IN
SOURCE:- .-FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE MEDIA ANALYSIS
TEXT: ..
ELABORATING ITS THIRD WORLD POLICY IN THE 1970'S THE SOVIET
.LEADERSHIP HAD "NO CLEAR IDEAS" OF THE COUNTRY'S "TRUE NATIONAL
STATE INTERESTS"' AND SQUANDERED MATERIAL RESOURCESS INIY POLITICAL"
CAPITAL BY PURSUING "PETTY AND ESSENTIALLY FORMAL GAINS ASSOCIATED
WITH LEADERSHIP COUPS IN CERTAIN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. "i
SUPPORTING GORBACHEV WHILE DASHICHEV'S ARTICLE DOES NOT MENTION
GORBACHEV BY NAME, IT VOICES STRONG SUPPORT FOR EFFORTS TO REDEFINE
RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, REDUCE NUCLEAR ARMS, AND
RESTRUCTURE THE ECONOMY, IMPLICITLY SUPPORTING REDUCED MILITARY
SPENDING. IT SAYS IT IS THE LEGACY OF THE BREZHNEV YEARS THAT THE
SOVIET UNION FINDS ITSELF ENGAGED IN AN "EXCEPTIONALLY COSTLY" "
ARMS RACE WITH THE WESTERN STATES, JAPAN, AND CHINA, WHOSE COMBINED
ECONOMIC POTENTIAL IS FAR GREATER THAN ITS OWN. DASHICHEV ARGUES
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THAT TO OVERCOME THIS SITUATION, IT IS NECESSARY TO "RADICALLY AND
IRREVOCABLY CURB THE ARMS RACE" BY "FUNDAMENTALLY REORGANIZING"
THE USSR'S RELATIONS WITH THE WEST SO AS TO REPLACE HOSTILITY AND
SUSPICION WITH A "HIGH LEVEL OF MUTUAL TRUST." FOR THE SOVIET
UNION9 HE STRESSES, THIS WILL REQUIRE THE OVERCOMING OF "STALINISM
IN DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY, THEORY AND PRACTICE, ORGANIZATIONAL
STRUCTURES, AND THE PUBLIC MIND." BUILDING ON A THEME FREQUENTLY
ELABORATED BY GORBACHEV, DASHICHEV ASSERTS THAT IN THE FUTURE THE
SOVIET UNION MUST REFOCUS ITS COMPETITION WITH THE WEST FROM
CONFRONTATION IN THE MILITARY SPHERE TO "ECONOMIC, POLITICAL,
SCIENTIFIC, AND CULTURAL SUCCESSES."
EARLIER SIGNS OF GLASNOST DASHICHEV'S ARTICLE KICKS DOWN THE
DOOR TO CRITICISM OF PAST SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY THAT WAS ALREADY IN
THE PROCESS OF BEING WEDGED OPEN, POSSIBLY WITH GORBACHEV'S CAUTIOUS
BACKING. IN MAY 1986, GORBACHEV DELIVERED A STINGING INDICTMENT OF
THE PAST CONDUCT OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY TO A MEETING AT THE
FOREIGN MINISTRY. (IN AN INDICATION OF THE LIMITS OF FOREIGN
POLICY GLASNOST AT THAT TIME, WHILE SOVIET MEDIA REPORTED THE
MEETING, GORBACHEV'S SPEECH WAS PUBLISHED IN SUMMARIZED FORM IN A.
LIMITED CIRCULATION BULLETIN AND THEN ONLY AFTER A SUBSTANTIAL
DELAY.) A MAY 1987 SPEECH BY FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE HAD ALSO
CALLED FOR RESTRUCTURING IN THE WORK OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. IN
THAT SPEECH SHEVARDNADZE APPEARED TO SUPPORT PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF
FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES. HE SAID SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY WAS BECOMING
THE "OBJECT OF CRITICAL AND EXACTING ATTENTION" FROM THE SOVIET
PEOPLE AND THAT "OUR DIPLOMATIC ACTIONS ARE SUBJECT TO STRICT
APPROVAL BY THE NATION." THIS, HE SAID, "DOES NOT MAKE OUR WORK
EASIER, BUT HELPS MAKE OUR FOREIGN POLICY MORE EFFECTIVE.'' IN 1987
AND INTO 1988 THE GORBACHEV LEADERSHIP'S APPROVAL OF GREATER FOREIGN
POLICY GLASNOST MAY HAVE BEEN REFLECTED IN INCREASING DEMANDS FROM
PROMINENT COMMENTATORS FOR A MORE OPEN DISCUSSION OF INTERNATIONAL
QUESTIONS AND THE BEGINNINGS OF CRITICAL ATTENTION IN THE MEDIA TO
FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY ISSUES.
STRETCHING THE LIMITS ALONG WITH DASHICHEV'S ARTICLE, OTHER
RECENT MEDIA CRITICISM OF PAST SOVIET POLICIES AND OF HOW THEY WERE
FORMULATED HAVE SEEMED TO SUGGEST THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP IS NOW
PERMITTING MORE OPEN DISCUSSION OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY. IN A 22
MAY SOVIET TELEVISION COMMENTARY ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF MOSCOW'S
AFGHANISTAN INVOLVEMENT,. FOR..EXAMPLE,.?IZVESTIYA'S OUTSPOKEN
POLITICAL OBSERVER ALEKSANDR BOVIN CLAIMED THAT THERE ARE TWO
LESSONS THAT SHOULD BE DRAWN FROM. MOSCOW'S. EXPERIENCE IN
AFGHANISTAN. THE FIRST, BOVIN SAID, IS RECOGNITION.OF THE.PRINCIPLE
THAT "THE VICTORIOUS PROLETARIAT CANNOT MAKE OTHER PEOPLES HAPPY BY
FORCE." THE SECOND IS THAT THE DISPATCH OF SOVIET FORCES ABROAD
"TO TAKE PART IN COMBAT ACTIVITIES" SHOULD BE DONE ONLY AFTER
DISCUSSION IN,-.AND WITHTHE CONSENT OF, -'-'THE HIGHEST LEGISLATIVE
ORGANS OF THE COUNTRY." THIS IS ONE OF THE "ESSENTIAL SIGNS OF THE
STATE OF. LAW WE WANT TO CREATE, " HE ADDED.
MOSCOW HAS ALSO BROKEN A LONGSTANDING TABOO BY DISCLOSING THAT THE
SOVIET MILITARY HAD LOST 13,310 DEAD, 35,478 WOUNDED, AND 311
MISSING IN AFGHANISTAN.
IMPLICATIONS THE FORCE OF THE DASHICHEV ARTICLE'S ASSAULT ON THE
STALIN AND BREZHNEV ERAS SUGGESTS THAT GORBACHEV FEELS CONFIDENT OF
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HIS CONTROL OVER THE FOREIGN POLICY SECTOR AS THE NEXT SUMMIT WITH
THE UNITED STATES AND A MAJOR PARTY CONFERENCE APPROACH. THE
UNPRECEDENTED SCALE OF THE ARTICLE'S CRITICISM OF SOVIET FOREIGN
POLICY SUGGESTS THAT ITS PUBLICATION WAS SANCTIONED BY ELEMENTS OF
THE TOP LEADERSHIP, PRESUMABLY BY GORBACHEV HIMSELF. THIS
IMPRESSION IS REINFORCED BY ITS TIMING, WHICH FOLLOWS THE
PUBLICATION OF THE LANDMARK PRAVDA EDITORIAL ARTICLE ON 5 APRIL
ASSAILING CRITICS OF GORBACHEV'S POLICIES OF DOMESTIC REFORM AND
GLASNOST.
WHILE DASHICHEV'S ARTICLE CRITICIZES ONLY PAST MISTAKES AND STRONGLY
DEFENDS GORBACHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY AND DISARMAMENT PROGRAM, ITS
PUBLICATION, ALONG WITH OTHER STRIKING CRITICISM OF PAST SOVIET
FOREIGN POLICIES SUCH AS BOVIN'S, RAISES. THE POSSIBILITY OF PUBLIC
DEBATE AND, AT SOME POINT, PUBLIC CRITICISM EVEN OF THE CURRENT
LEADERSHIP'S FOREIGN POLICIES. DASHICHEV QUOTES FOREIGN MINISTER
SHEVARDNADZE AS SAYING THAT WHILE "BOLD, INTERESTING, AND
QUESTIONING ARTICLES" HAD APPEARED ON ALL ASPECTS OF DOMESTIC
POLICY, THERE "'IS NOTHING LIKE THIS IN THE FOREIGN POLICY
SPHERE." "DOES THIS MEAN EVERYTHING HERE IS CORRECT AND THAT
THERE ARE NO OTHER OPTIONS APART FROM THE ONES BEING IMPLEMENTED?"
IN REPLY, DASHICHEV LOBBIES FOR ALLOWING CRITICISM OF CURRENT
POLICIES, RECALLING THAT IN LENIN'S TIME HEATED DEBATES ON FOREIGN
POLICY ISSUES HAD TAKEN PLACE WITH OPINIONS BEING EXPRESSED "OPENLY
AND FEARLESSLY." IT IS WRONG, HE CONCLUDES, TO ASSUME THAT ANYONE
IS INFALLIBLE, CITING THE PROVERB THAT "TO ERR IS HUMAN" AND
ADDING THAT WHAT IS IMPORTANT IS TO RECOGNIZE MISTAKES AND LEARN
FROM THEM.
ADMIN
(ENDALL) AG 3Z/NEWMAN/HEDLIN/KG 25/1911Z MAY
BT
08305
RATUZYUW RUCWAAA8305 1462012 MTMS-UUAA -
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