MOSCOW'S VIEW ON VICTORY IN GENERAL NUCLEAR WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05S00365R000500080001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 14, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/14: CIA-RDP05SO0365R000500080001-2
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September 1981
548
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An NFAC Journal of Alternative Views
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Moscow's View on Victory
in General Nuclear War 'P
Office of Political Analysis
made that evidence indicates "some Soviet lea ers
hold the view that victory in general nuclear war is
possible." Soviet assertions, military doctrine, and
strategic programs are cited as justifying the conclu-
sion, which appears in both the DCI's and the Intelli-
gence Community's versions of the Estimate's key
judgments. Alternative views are presented, centering
on the question of what the Soviets might envisage as
a victory in such a conflict. There are differing
viewpoints on this issue within the National Foreign
Assessment Center as well, and the following two
articles express views held by analysts in the Office of
Political Analysis. The first provides a succinct coun-
terstatement to the Estimate judgment. The second
examines one of the key items of evidence related to
that judgment.
If the conclusion is meant to convey the idea that
some Soviet leaders may believe the USSR might
prevail in general nuclear war, then it may be correct,
but we cannot conclude from evidence that this is so.
The same conclusion about the possibility of victory
could be reached by Soviet analysts about US leaders,
although the US defense programs, doctrine, and
assertions that could be cited as evidence would be
different. Even if it is correct, the important analyt-
ical question is what do Soviet leaders believe are
conditions that would permit victory and whether they
believe such conditions exist or could be developed.
The opinion held by Soviet leaders about the efficacy
of Soviet military capabilities and programs would be
highly relevant evidence on this point, but we have no
reason to believe that their judgment is such that they
believe US leaders will be unable or unwilling to use
US capabilities effectively.
Soviet leaders see military forces and programs as
necessary for a variety of policy aims and contingen-
cies, but not as sufficient to achieve victory in general
nuclear war. They build forces, particularly strategic
nuclear forces, in the first instance to deter nuclear
attack on the USSR and in the second to enable the
USSR to fight a nuclear war as effectively as possible
and thus give the USSR the best chance, conditions
permitting, of prevailing. Thus, they prepare forces to
fight in a nuclear environment and will try to "win" if
general nuclear war comes (though what they consider
"victory" in such circumstances is not known). They
may envisage theoretical possibilities of victory-for
example, if US leaders were to lose their nerve or give
up. It remains to be demonstrated, however, that this
approach to dealing with a contingency rests on a real
expectation or belief on the part of the Soviet leaders
that their current or planned forces, by virtue of their
size or characteristics, are capable of forcing a mili-
tary victory over the United States in general nuclear
war.
Soviet leaders are still committed to the worldwide
"victory" of their political system and have at times
maintained that even a nuclear war would not neces-
sarily deny them this goal. But they rest whatever
hopes they may have of prevailing in such a war on
political, social, economic, and ideological strengths
as much as on military ones-the same combination
of factors that they think would enable them to
prevail in the absence of such a war. Statements by
top Soviet leaders over the years have explicitly
argued against the notion that general nuclear war
could serve any rational policy aim for any state.
Achieving victory, they argue, certainly cannot be
counted upon. The most probable way Soviet leaders
envisage their strategic nuclear forces contributing to
victory in a major military conflict would be by
Reprinted from USSR and Eastern Europe Review, 23 July
1981.
25X1
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deterring US strategic nuclear forces and thus avoid-
ing general nuclear war, while other Soviet forces
prevail in other kinds of conflict in Eurasia.
Although the difference of view between the judg-
ment expressed in the Estimate and the argument
presented in this article may appear abstruse, its
implications for US policy are potentially significant.
To impute incorrectly a belief in the possibility of
victory in general nuclear war to Soviet political and
military leaders could, for instance, lead US policy-
makers to be overcautious in a future crisis or to
foreclose certain policy options unnecessarily because
they overestimated the boldness of the Soviet leaders.
The above article is Secret.
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Rereading Marshal Ogarkov's 1980
"Victory" Statement With Soviet Eyes
Soviet President Brezhnev's ringing assertion in Kiev
on 9 May that "the means of mass annihilation have
now acquired such a scope that their use would put
into question the existence of ... the whole of modern
civilization" came as no surprise to Western ears.
This statement has been an official Soviet position
since at least Brezhnev's Tula speech in January
1977. It was reiterated most recently in an article in
the main party theoretical journal by Soviet General
Staff Chief Ogarkov.
Soviet spokesmen claim that their public statements
regarding the possibility of victory in general nuclear
war have two aims. First, they correct an allegedly
widespread and potentially dangerous misunderstand-
ing in the United States of Soviet thinking on this
question. They further assert that this misunderstand-
ing derives from outdated Soviet military writings of
the 1960s, such as Marshal Sokolovsky's Military
Strategy. Second, they give the lie to allegedly willful
US distortions of the views of Soviet leaders by
placing Moscow's "true" views prominently on the
public record.
As part of the Soviet campaign to counter such
reputed misunderstandings or distortions, some Soviet
Americanologists have recommended that US offi-
cials consult such important "contemporary expres-
sions" of the Soviet position as an article on military
strategy which appeared last year under Marshal
Ogarkov's name.' Precisely this article, however, with
Reprinted from USSR and Eastern Europe Review, 13 August
1981.
: N. V. Ogarkov, "Military Strategy," Soviet Military Encyclope-
dia, vol. 7, 1980, pp. 555-565.
its discussion of the "objective possibilities" for
achieving victory in nuclear war, appeared to many
US readers to arouse or confirm their worst suspicions
about Soviet intentions.
Probably nothing better illustrates the perceptual
divide separating the United States from the Soviet
Union than the fact that the very article they recom-
mend as an antidote should have had exactly the
contrary effect. To explain this irony, we have to
reread the pertinent Ogarkov passage with Soviet
rather than American eyes:
At the foundation of Soviet military strategy lies the
proposition that the Soviet Union, based on the
principles of its policy, will not employ these (nuclear)
weapons first. It is also opposed in principle to the use
of weapons of mass destruction.... Soviet military
strategy proceeds from the fact that if a nuclear war
is foisted upon the Soviet Union, then the Soviet
people and their armed forces must be ready for the
most severe and prolonged trials. In this case, the
Soviet Union, and the fraternal socialist states, in
comparison to the imperialist states, will have definite
advantages stemming from the just goals of the war,
and the advanced nature of their social and state
systems. This creates objective possibilities for them
to achieve victory. For the realization of these possi-
bilities, however, the timely and many-sided prepara-
tion of the country and armed forces is necessary."
It is noteworthy that the two objective conditions he
cites for the possibility of achieving victory in nuclear
war are "social" ones: the force of a just cause, and
the inherent superiority of the Soviet (and "socialist")
state and social order. Also, although Ogarkov is
explicit regarding the necessary social conditions for
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the possibility of achieving such a victory, he does not
say that these conditions are both necessary and
sufficient for its actual attainment. He indirectly
acknowledges that there are other conditions that
would have to be considered in any full discussion of
the conditions permitting victory. Thus, the conclu-
sion of the statement in question hints at more
"practical," but still not necessarily adequate, re-
quirements: "For the realization of these possibilities,
however, the timely and many-sided preparation of
the country and armed forces is necessary."
Ogarkov does not enter into a discussion (nor would he
be expected to) of such practical matters as adversary
capabilities, or of what "victory" in nuclear war
would look like in political, military, or even gross
physical terms such as numbers of casualties or
economic costs. As is traditional in Soviet declaratory
statements of military doctrine, he subordinates his
comments on military issues to his political responsi-
bility. His intention is to approach the frontier of his
professed subject matter-actual Soviet military
strategy-but not to profane this strategy by reveal-
ing it in a public, political forum.
Thus, Ogarkov's intention in raising the issue as he
does is consciously limited. He is reminding the
primary addressees, the Soviet people and armed
forces, that their cause is just, that the historical
forces shaping world events and social orders favor the
USSR, and that the possibilities for achieving victory
can be actualized if they are prepared. He is also, in
effect, saying that the USSR harbors the "objective
possibilities" for victory only in potentia. The implied
emphasis is on the transition from "objective" possi-
bilities for conditions to those that are both "objec-
tive" and "subjective," that is, realized by the Soviet
people and the armed forces. In the idiom of the
Soviet theoretician, Ogarkov is advising his careful
readers that only what is simultaneously both "objec-
tive" and "subjective" is not merely theoretically true,
but also practically existent.
On the basis of such an interpretation, Soviet com-
mentators concluded that Ogarkov had discussed this
question on a purely theoretical plane, exclusively in
terms of the social advantages accruing to the "social-
ist" states. Thus, they have professed to non-Soviet
interlocutors that they find his formulation cautious
and unspectacular. When some Americans saw it as
confirming that some Soviet leaders believe in the
possibility of victory in nuclear war, they sprang to
defend their interpretation of Ogarkov's words. That
defense took the form of an attack upon the United
States for allegedly calculating its own military ad-
vantage in terms of the concrete effect on precise
military, economic, and administrative targets of ac-
curate missiles designed to ensure victory in nuclear
war.3
In defending their interpretation of Ogarkov's state-
ment, Soviet commentators are careful not to argue
by denying that what he said publicly is a true
reflection of what, or all that Ogarkov believes. To do
so would not only be impolitic, it would be undemon-
strable and unconvincing. Nor do they enter into what
would be a futile shouting match with American
military experts about the true or.ultimate purpose of
Soviet military practice.
Soviet commentators know that their official line
proscribes public assertions that the USSR will win a
general nuclear war with the United States. They are
thus confident that no objective analysis of Ogarkov's
"Military Strategy" article can unearth what its
author meant to conceal: namely, what he as a
professional military officer "really" thinks about the
USSR's prospects for victory. Therefore, they essen-
tially try to demonstrate that Ogarkov's US critics fill
his prudent silences on this question with expressions
of fears that arise in the context of the US domestic
debate.
In the final analysis, the difference between US and
Soviet interpretations of Ogarkov's remarks appears
to be rooted in a more fundamental gap in their
calculations of the relationship between open declara-
tions of intent and political and military advantage.
While in the United States it is believed that deter-
rence credibility is furthered by public declarations of
US military capabilities and resolve, in the USSR
silence is held to be a better bastion than speech.
' See, for example, Lev Semeyko, "Strategic Illusions," Novoye I
Vremya, 12 December 1980 25X1
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