LETTER TO VINCENT DAVIS FROM STANSFIELD TURNER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05S00620R000200480004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 2, 2009
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: July 6, 1977
• Content Type: LETTER

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ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER
6 JUL 1977
Dear Vince,
Although it's probably old hat to you, I thought I'd
send along the attached material on the Naval Reserve which
the CNO recently circulated.
In addition, I have to correct an error that
and I gave you regarding the possibility of my speaking in
Lexington. I simply had the months mixed up. It is November
11th that I am going to be at DePau u and Wabash. This makes
it appear to me that it would conflict with the speaker you
already have engaged for your November exercise -- we'll
find something else later on I'm sure.
Again, thanks for all your support. The battle goes on!
Yours,
Professor Vincent Davis
Director
Patterson School of Diplomacy
and International Commerce
The University of Kentucky
Lexington, Kentucky 40506
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THE UNITED STATES NAVAL RESERVE
During recent years, the Congress and the Administration
have differed substantially in their positions concerning the
size and use of the Naval Reserve.
On 21 May, I received a letter from Senators Bob Dole,
Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. and Sam Nunn which asked for my
personal view, as CNO, on the military missions, require-
ments and considerations which bear on the Naval Reserve's
peacetime missions and mobilization requirements.
The following is the text of the Senators' letter:
"We are increasingly concerned about the continuing
issues related to the United States Naval Reserve.
As you know, there has been over the past three
years considerable debate within both the Depart-
ment of Defense and in the Congress concerning the
size of the Naval Reserve and how this organization
can best serve the security interest of the United
States.
"This letter is to bring to your attention our
interest in your assessment of two distinct areas
of interest to the Senate, as pointed out during
the recent floor debate on the DOD Authorization
Bill for Fiscal Year 1978. These two areas
include the peacetime missions assigned to the
Naval Reserve and the distinct and identifiable
mobilization requirements which the Naval Reserve
must be prepared to meet.
"This letter is to request that you provide us
with your own view, as Chief of Naval Operations,
of the military missions, requirements, and
considerations which bear on the two principal
areas of our concern. We ask that you give
your personal attention to this matter. It will
be helpful to us if your response can be received
prior to the meeting of the Joint House/Senate
Committee on the DOD Authorization Bill."
On 3 June, I sent Senators Dole, Mathias and Nunn the
following response:
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"This is in response to your letter of 21 May 1977,
which expressed your concern over the continuing
issues related to the United States Naval Reserve.
The purpose of my response is to provide you with
my own view as Chief of Naval Operations on the
military missions, requirements and considerations
which bear on the peacetime missions assigned to
the Naval Reserve and the distinct and identifiable
mobilization requirements which the Naval Reserve
must be prepared to meet.
"I am particularly pleased to be able to respond to
you on this subject because it is one to which I
have given a great deal of my personal attention.
Shortly after assuming the position of Chief of
Naval Operations in the summer of 1974, I became
concerned with the mobilization potential of the
United States Naval Reserve, and became convinced
that circumstances had been so altered over the
recent years that a reexamination of the missions
and structure of the Naval Reserve was not only
indicated, but mandatory. The altered conditions
to which I refer are as follows. After World War II,
the nation possessed a powerful inventory of ships
lying in reserve in mothball fleets and many air-
craft stored in dehumidified containers or in the
desert. Our reserve concept had been that, in
time of mobilization, these mothballed forces
would be reactivated and manned primarily by the
personnel available from the Naval Reserve. As
a matter of fact, this was done during the Korean
War to substantially expand the size of the active
Navy. However, today the inventory of stored ships
and aircraft has virtually been exhausted. What
few ships remain are not capable of meeting the
first line threat of hostile weapons technology
and, in fact, most would require years of refur-
bishment simply to get to sea.
"It became clear that the United States Navy would
have to fight the next war with the ships, aircraft
and weapons systems in-being and that there were no
reserves of mothballed equipment available. The
Naval Reserve began to restructure in this direction
in 1973.
"Further, it was clear to me that the United States
Naval Reserve represented an enormous reservoir of
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skills in talented, dedicated, and patriotic men
and women who were willing and potentially ready
to fight in the defense of their country in time
of war.
"Therefore, I decided that a definitive current
policy which would address the requirements, employ-
ment and organization of the Naval Reserve needed
to be developed. As a result, the Chief of Naval
Operations Policy Statement on the U.S. Naval
Reserve was issued in October of 1974. This
policy viewed the Naval Reserve as an integral
part of the Navy total force which would contribute
to the overall security of the country. As a part
of the United States Navy, the United States Naval
Reserve must contribute to the Navy's mission,
which is spelled out succinctly in Title 10,
U.S. Code. To this end, the U.S. Naval Reserve
must be integrated into the U.S. Navy and must
assist in fulfilling the Department of the Navy's
requirements to perform its mission.
"Naval force requirements are determined by the
national military strategy, the threat involved
in the execution of that strategy, and the degree
of risk that is deemed acceptable in carrying out
that strategy. Our national military strategy
today is well defined and can be best described
as a forward strategy; one in which the oceans
are used as barriers in the defense of our
nation and as avenues for extending our interests
and projecting our influence abroad. This forward
strategy imposes three principal roles upon the
Navy: 1) to provide the invulnerable segment of
the nuclear strategic deterrent in the FBM forces;
2) to provide the naval component of overseas
deployed U.S. forces; 3) to protect the sea lines
of communication between the United States and
our own forces and our allies located overseas.
In order to fulfill these roles, the U.S. Navy
must maintain a steady-state peacetime posture
of about 30% of the active fleet deployed over-
seas, and about 40% combat-ready, operating in
the vicinity of their homeports, prepared for
immediate deployment to reinforce or to react
to the eruption of warfare or crisis. The re-
maining 30% of the active fleet is engaged in
modernization, basic training and preventive
maintenance to prepare them for the combat ready
status.
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"The roles and posture of the U.S. Navy, as described
in the foregoing, constitute the basic considerations
which led to the structure of a Naval Reserve desig-
nated to support the Navy's mission, functions and
roles. A principal consideration is that the Naval
Reserve is generally not available to the Navy except
during periods of mobilization or when the 50,000
limited recall feature is exercised.
"Based upon the mission, functions, roles and deploy-
ment posture of the U.S. Navy, and the considerations
of mobilization limitations, the missions of the
United States Naval Reserve visualized by the CNO's
Naval Reserve Policy evolved into two basic categories:
- Naval Reserve Force ships, aircraft squadrons,
and other units with assigned organic equipment.
- Naval Reserve elements used to augment active
force ships, aircraft squadrons, staffs and shore
facilities to permit the operation of these organi-
zations under combat alert conditions on a 24 hour-
per-day basis for the sustained period of time that
general warfare demands.
"Based upon the available ships, aircraft, and equip-
ment for Naval Reserve units; and the size, structure,
and active duty manning levels of the active fleet
and shore activities, a study of total Naval Reserve
requirements was undertaken.
"This study was conducted in the immediate staff of
the Chief of Naval Operations under the direction
of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans,
Policy, and Operations, and involved the full partic-
ipation of the Fleet Commanders and other manpower
claimants and sponsors. The purpose of conducting
the study in such an environment was to insure that
the Naval Reserve missions were completely integrated
into the mission of the U.S. Navy and the total force
requirements of the Navy to support that mission. The
study was actually conducted by Naval Reserve and
regular Navy officers all operating in the top level
of the U.S. Navy's plans, policy, and operations
staff organization. The results of the study,
which was completed in 1975, showed a projected
requirement for 102,000 Selected Reservists in 1977.
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This effort has continued, and a similar review,
now being completed, indicates a requirement for
about 100,000 Selected Reservists in 1978. The
drop in number reflects our declining active fleet
and Naval Reserve airlift force levels.
"Concerning the peacetime missions assigned to the
Naval Reserve, it should be kept in mind that
Reservists are available for fulltime duty only
upon call-up, either through general mobilization
or within the 50,000 Presidential contingency
recall authority. Moreover, Selected Reservists
do drill monthly and serve annually. I view
this as necessary in order to maintain their
technical proficiency. Therefore, it is possible
in peacetime, under non-mobilization conditions,
to utilize Selected Reservists in a significant
way, contributing to the peacetime posture and
operations of United States Naval forces. Some
ways in which Selected Reservists are used are:
- airlift operations
- intelligence analysis and production
- air terminal cargo and passenger handling
- SEABEE construction projects
- ship and aircraft maintenance
- command and operations centers watches
- communications center watches
- support to active Navy commands in such
fields as legal, religious, and medical
assistance in local areas.
"I have assigned the Chief of Naval Reserve as my
Executive Agent for airlift operations. His staff
and mine are studying the best means of implementing
the plan to transfer the continental United States
airlift mission and the associated transport aircraft
to the Naval Reserve within two years.
"The 100,000 billets defined by the OP-605 review for
FY 1978 provide the Selected Reserve manpower for 57
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reserve ships, 43 reserve aircraft squadrons, 2
riverine squadrons, 6 cargo handling battalions,
17 construction battalions, plus urgent and
essential mobilization augmentation to permit
282 ships, 120 aircraft squadrons, 352 shore
stations, 150 staffs and 888 other activities
to operate under wartime conditions of alert,
on a 24 hour-per-day basis, for the unlimited
period of time required by general war. An
additional 200,000 billets need to be filled
during the first three months of a war from
the Individual Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve,
retirees and new accessions.
"I recognize that the 100,000 Selected Reserve
billet requirements represent just that--our
estimate of our requirements in this area--and
that Naval requirements are not being met in
many other areas due to limitations of fiscal
resources. Similarly, the degree to which the
Naval Reserve billet requirements are not met is
reflected in a corresponding reduction in total
Navy force capability. There remains then the
very fine element of judgment as to how much of
our limited fiscal resources should be applied
to be able to utilize the talent, dedication,
and potential that resides in the men and women
of the United States Naval Reserve. Understand-
ably, the judgment as to the fraction of the
total Naval Reserve requirement that is met
must be kept in balance with our other require-
ments and with the total force structure of the
Navy and overall national security considerations.
"In summary, I can say that the United States
Navy does have a very firm and current policy
for the maximum exploitation of the talent
available in the Naval Reserve; that the plans
for this utilization are based upon mobilization
situations; that a very definite peacetime
benefit is attained by utilizing the Naval
Reserve organization even though it is based
mainly on call-up considerations; that 100,000
Selected Reserve billets have been identified,
and that all of these validated billets represent
a significant contribution to the total force
capability of the United States Navy in carrying
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out its mission and functions, and fulfilling
its tasks in the case of general war."
The texts of the foregoing letters are provided to
you both for information and to assist you in responding
to questions you may receive concerning the Navy's position
on the size, use and contribution of the Naval Reserve.
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