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December 22, 2016
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December 6, 1978
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Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 CIA MATERIAL REMOVED FROM: File Cabinet # Drawer # S.L. Folder # TO: Box/Envelope # l Item # e t7J~.s Subject 95 .,7,0o~eenzla*^ /v9 Material has been relocated to CIA Declassification Center by CIA/CIO/IMS/CDC 28 February 2002 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 #~1RT%CLB APP NEW YORK TThES C 4 DECEM?ER 2978 Letters :. i i A o a a o br s ad lu te a Cr s reign Affaus: TaPredut and Ev F Iran (teswx story 'rwn. z3):; wvnla:. tloa Ii embassy analysis way .oi a an the spot calla wmd4 be hdd r intdligenoi :piapOfated Bre~'date: ::;; the, intecmttaaal situatlao,:aon~ ? be mme..Iilo~gr Oo.bald.the.Pnddeot evncomedaee:'f' z. r;` ~ ,;.fb~s.this,tbete,sbouldbeanhar s - accountable for thequWty.of:4iaao.?K not stsa tamer op"?intellige "Itr, H. t not Precise exei+cise. given{ - (z) in part osawswe ov e ware!: on them can estabiisb sitR: T ` - . - s; - _ fain apparatus:=lt: d w ptimatp;m reliably, jet wbe.trouble.will boil? ~e foregomg.isdementary and,1 . spaosiblittt of.thS Seam of Stoup over::It.?iseas'.for iffi'taoce: to imow41' toassume,aotwantlnsinthepass' . were re.e t: bell rer_tee crisis < ; seem tq;: me., more ; , s ; (l We. to ate tier P P wlth the atb r. ol'- ba ic: cmtzy analysis and. canon- role of intelligence 'asopposed to that: obis : tw of a likely crisis; the second attempts- _ advanced western countries prop rly ` . _; , S . D[atr., No r. 197$ ,Analysis of situations is: one reason Why none hive followed they ,.deputy chcizmmt of- dirrV.Si SALT matter for tbfa ambesaa r1t in w fuccucim of a diplomatk mission. -A couatsy and bays ieady..ovest. access" ; from the Shah on down, in the caseof . all, aectort. ; poiticall military, eco f ._ .. legitimate -and otherwise, can here be;; that:. nation' and bow crtsia-prone itr k even importantly, Wthist but it is no ter, the foreign affairs, wt the intellL? j . Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501320001-0 MINNESOTA DAILY 21 November 1978 CIA said to want students to monitor Iranians By ERIC RINGHAM Copyright 1978 Minnesota Daily Men identifying themselves as representatives of the Central Intel- -ligence Agency (CIA) allegedly at- tempted this fall to recruit students to spy on Iranians attending the University. The Daily received information about the alleged recruitment effort after locating a University student and army veteran who claims he was approached by the ageecy.?The student agreed to discuss the sul- sect last week if his name remained confidential. The source said two white, middle-aged men claiming to be CIA agents came to, his home in September. Although they pre- sented no identification verifying their intelli- gence agency, they knew details of the student's career as an army offi. cer. Those details included his work as a psychological operations offi- cer and his security clearance for top-secret information. Asking if the student had heard of SAVAK, the Iranian security police force, the agents allegedly said the CIA was helping SAVAK agents in the United States identify and observe Iranians opposed to the rule of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The agents further said they wanted to get "something con- crete" on Iranian students to facili- tate their deportation back to Iran, according to the source. "They said they wanted to find out who was stirring up trouble, who the 'terrorists' were," the stu- dent said. "They referred to these guys as'terrorists.' " . The agents, the student said, ex- plained that Iranians on U.S. cam- puses are harming the shah's image abroad. "Their goal was to discred- it these Iranian) guys. That was the main thing," the source said. In a series of interviews the stu- dent- said the men offered him money and appealed to.his patriot- ism as a U.S. citizen in their at- tempts to get him to agree to their proposal. "This one guy gave fete this pitch that my responsibilities didn't stop when I got out of the army. They offered to pay my tuition, but I'm already getting that (through the G.I. Bill), so I didn't give a shit," the source said. "Besides, I wouldn't prostitute myself like that." The student said he refused to observe Iranians and report on their, activities. He said he agreed, how- ever, to ask other veterans at the University if they were interested in working for the CIA. Another veteran who did not want to be identified confirmed to the Daily that she had been in- formed by the source of the oppor- tunity to work for the CIA. "He came to me and asked if I wanted to make some more money, if I wanted my school paid for," she said. The veteran, a CLA sophomore, said- she wondered at the time. "Who would get messed up in something like that? Who'd need the money that much?" She said the cautious way in which the student approached the topic lent credibility to his story. "If he was BSing, I don't think he would have done that. "I believe him. I know him pretty well," she said. It is not known whether any stu- dents accepted the offer. ' The source said he believes his service record-detailing his army career in Southeast Asia, Germany and several bases in the United States-suggested to the agents that ' he might be willing to agree to their proposal. "I think r- j asychological opera- tions ba.k0ruund was what prompted t hr n to contact me," the 31-year-old veteran said. "It's the same sort of thing I was doing in Vietnam and several other places in Southeast- Asia and Eruope," he said. ' But another explanation the stu- dent offered for why the CIA con- tacted him is that he had once volunteered information to thei agency- - After serving in Vietnam as an in- fantry platoon leader, the veteran was trained in psychological opera- tions and returned to Southeast Asia. He later was stationed in' West Germany, again working in psychological operations but also serving as a drug and alcohol con- trol officer at a U.S. base near Stuttgart. Military records confirm his assignments. Ordered to stop the flow of Ills gal drugs to U.S. military personnel "at any cost," the officer repotted- ly developed contacts with the West German underground. Members of' ' the underground, including fugitive radicals, finance their operations partly through drug sales, accord- ing to the former officer. During this period, the officer re- portedly met "seven or eight" per- sons who said they were associated with the Baader-Meinhof gang. otherwise known as the Red'Army Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501320001-0 Faction. Andreas Baader, founder of the faction. committed suicide in prison in October 1977. Ulrike `feinhof, a former West German journalist and member of the group, hanged herself in prison in May of the previous year. The officer's contacts in the fac- tion, he said, suggested in 1976 that they were considering hijacking A airliner. They were vague as to the time and place of the'.atftA- ac, cording to the source. -Ihs rollowing? spring, ,irtt:r the Cal ?: ~r had left the army and re- iuraed To his home in St. Paul. he dec,J4fhat he should contact the authanues and tell them about the German terrorists. Looking in the St. Paul telephone directory under "U.S. Government offices." he lo- sated a number for the CIA. He dialed the number and requested a meeting. According to the student. a single agent visited his house, listened to his story and left. promising to get back in touch. The veteran did not hear from the agent again. For eveal - months, he said, he suspected he was being followed, but he was not contacted by representatives of the intelligence agency..Thnat fall. four terrorists hijacked a Lufthansa jet to Mogadishu. Somalia. . Nearly a year went by before the supposed agents allegedly contacted him about spying on Iranian stu- dents. Although the source and the Daily have been unable to deter- mine whether the men-were in fact from the CIA, they seemed to have had access to government files. ac- cording to the student. "These guys studied my file," the student said. The student said his conversation with the men ranged to other groups allegedly being watched by the CIA, including students from Hong Kong and Taiwan and mem- bers of the Young Socialist Alliance and Vietnam Veterans Against the War. The [run, the student said, resem- bled "anyone from 3M-_ -executive types." They sgid they were con- cerned about I "peace and order on campus." and about possible com- munist "insurgence" in Iran. ac- cording to the student. And. the student said, they seemed already well informed about Iranians at the University. "As far as the masks go. you can tell them (the Iranians) that they don't need to wear them," the stu- dent said. "They know every Irani- an student on campus." Iranian demonstrators often wear masks to conceal their identities. The source said he agreed to dis- cuss the story with the Daily be- cause "they (the CIA) spend millions of dollars on intelligence. activities and they don't know what they're doing." He said he is neith- er for nor against the cause of the Iranian dissidents. "I'd just like to see them (the CIA) get their shit together." he said. That U.S. authorities sometimes cooperate with the Iranian SAVAK has been reported frequently in the American press. Columnists Jack Anderson and Les Whitten. for ex- ample. have documented a relation- ship between Mansur Rafizadeh. the had SAVAK agent in the United States, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The New York FB1 office trades infor- rgenoo WA .5AVAK .K+ma(w rou- t) wly. dine "iher? b' notht' covert about it," according to one FBI of- ficial: And the presence of SAVAK agents in the United States also is well known. A House subcommit- tee chaired by Rep. Don Fraser (D. Mn.) has heard testimony from state- department officials that "there certainly are representatives (of SAVAK) in the United States." Alfred Atherton, Jr., assistant secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs. told Frase is subcommittee last year that "Irani- an authorities are interested in knowing about potential terrorists who may be among students who would return to Iran." "There's not much question that SAVAK has been making efforts to keep track of Iranian students." Fraser said during a telephone in- terview last week. "But I'm slow to accept that the CIA might be in- volved in recruitment efforts," al- though "I've made a lot of assumptions in the past that turned out to be wrong. "Even if the CIA were doing it, they certainly wouldn't confirm it." Fraser said. But to Iranian dissidents con- tacted about the story. CIA cooper- ation with SAVAK was a familiar topic. Preferring to remain anonymous, the Iranians identified themselves as members of the Iranian Student Association. One said he was the re- gional director of defense for the student group, which is organized on local, regional - and national levels. The regional official said that while his organization had not heard of CIA actions against Irani- ans at the University, "in other cities it's an old story." It is a common strategy, he sa;,.i. to portray Iranian students as -bor., wrists" and then deport -them. SAVAK, he said, works either alone or with local authorities :a provoking figtrsxarauti-shah dem- onstrations. Protesters then are ar- rested. he said. "Whether these things are dons by SAVAK or the local police, they are controlled by the CIA," the dis- sident said. The local Iranian Stu- dent Association has escaped such harassment so far: ,he said, "be- cause it's a young chapter..1 don't mean to say SAVAK is careless." . Contacted by telephone Monday, the CIA refused to comment on the particulars of its relationship with SAVAK. Dale Peterson, a public relations officer. said he was unable to gather facts that might relate to the story without the name of the Daily's source. Asked whether the CIA. works with SAVAK in conducting surveil- lance against Iranians in the United States, Peterson ? said no "agreement" between the agencies gives SAVAK the authority to oper- ate in this country. Asked if it were possible that the CIA might have tried to recruit! American students, Peterson re' plied, "I can't answer that. You're asking me to get into derail about activities we may or may . not be conducting against foreigners in the United States." Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 r'~1:TrCLL ;~'_Pvw MIAMI HERALD ? P46-~-% 26 NOVEMBER i 978 EDITORIALS .U.S.. intelligence Community Indicted, by Seres -of Failures PERHAPS the most. disturbing report. yet on the U.S. intelligence com- munity is the news that President Carter is'not satisfied with the quality of its reporting and analysis. Mr. Carter was 'caught off guard by the rioting in Iran. His intelligence re- ports said the shah had'such tight. con- trol of.his nation's political system that the opposition would be no more than a troublesome irritation. Apparently the CIA was giving more 'weight, tb.the shah's secret police than, any of its. other'. sources, assuming ? that the huge : CIA station; in Teheran has other sources. But the. CIA wasn't alone. The huge U.S. embassy staff was unable to get: any contrary information back to the State Department's Bureau of Intelli- gence and Research, and the even larger Defense Attache's Office did not make a convincing report to.the Pentagon: Or, worse yet,' any other reports were dis- -missed by the intelligence community staff as ? to Mr. Carter was prepared. .. This does not seem to'be air isolated instance. The intelligence community discount- ed the possibility of war in the Middle East in the fall of .1973. The Yom. Kippur War followed. .' . Military intelligence was unable -to foresee the total collapse of the South Vientamese army in 1975, and the CIA's Saigon station chief had been hornswog- gled into thinking a settlement would be .negotiated- ,.,.. :'The bureaucratic politics involved in , f intelligence estimates the preparatioao went on for, so . long that the White -House was:,unable?to get timely, accu rate information', on the Soviet, Backfire' bomber in 1976. - The CIA confessed in 1977 that its economic analysis had been faulty and that the Soviet Union was spending about twice as much money on defense as CIA analysts had ever predicted. And the best information available in- dicates that the. State Department failed to keep the President up to date on Fidel Castro's plans to release 3,600 political prisoners. Only the National Security Agency, which collects information by means of satellites and electronic eavesdropping, seems to have come through these years relatively untainted. I . The failures we list here are not aber- rant stunts like putting poison in Patrice Lumumba's'.toothpaste or sneaking itch- . irg power mi to Mr. Castro's skin-diving suit. Nor are, they the significant and systematic violations of Constitutional rights, that Congress and, the White House allowed the intelligence agencies_. to commit through lack of control. This Is a breakdown in the cardinal , function 'of U.S. intelligence - collect- ing accurate information and getting' it to. the President and other decision-mak-' ers when they need it. We can anticipate the argument that" we'll get from the CIA: All the leaks, the revelations of dissident ex-CIA .agents have'. closed off Sources in allied spy agencies. ? Hogwash! `;. The failures have gone on too long and are too pervasive. The intelligence agencies apparently were more interest-_ ed in being James 'Bond swashbucklers. than in being successful reporters. When President John F. Kennedy ded- icated the then-new CIA office building in Langley, Va., Or told agency employes that history would trumpet their failures and no-one will know of their successes. Apparently Mr. Kennedy's statement is being used by the spies to justify all their failures, because the successes are few and far between these days. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 BARRY G:,. WATE4 I,v;:OwY '?ZCniLCt' Siafcz ,~~Crta.fc D_--r 4, 1973 the Editor -he tiarri Herald 529 14th Street, Northwest Washing~mn, D. C. 2004-50 Iy~CJJ.f tt S.1w:-.-rte -n Z7 wL.X-t- COr MC oCL SC!E?:CE I\z-R ~~csOR'~" 5c C, CC. TLC ?+?wro'+` ??., S..-c C,p.~ r W CJ.T.OMS SLL.LC' COhMI7TCE ON 04T-7+E,cc In your Sunday, Nove nber 26th issue there is an article to which I take exception. It concerns fu ther abuses on the United States intelligence conr;rzaty. First, please keep in Hind that every abuse that befell this ca-riuuty cane as a direct result of Presidential orders by Presidents Kennedy, Johnson and ?:icon with no evidence on : ord yet. Our intelligence colle o-n s%-Stem is as good as you will find in the world, but how do you expect Lntelligent, highly trained t ersc:'_^.el to stay on the job after being repeatedly abused and slandered by the Dress of this nation, including your own paper? Yes, we are having a hard tire keeping mein with excellent ability on -hand, and, yes, we do have a hard time finding people w_ho can tihdeer- stand assessren-nt. But, if you and your brothers iinthe newspaper profession want to help the intelligence cw-rrrity in this country, for God's sake, get off their backs. Either sup- port then, or say nothing about it until you }z=my mire about it than your continuing writing evidences. Sing y, Ea _r y Col dw-4t Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 nessmen now under arrest on corrup. tion Charges. "It's not civilized," the-politician said, "l-ut if we; don't show the Dublin we are- serious: in this ? way, ; we. will have a revolution in the rest sense of the word and we will all be shot." Other leading opposition . demands are that the shah prove his good will by lifting.martial law, punishing, po- lice officials accused-of excesses and granting all> political prisoners a_gen. eral -: amnesty.' rather. than. releasing Position-leaden - -------` - favor-s.:steFbY-step heavals ; with. incalculable conse? 9ueace,.. They. are: especially worried Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE) Article appeared 7 December 1978 on page A-6 U.S.Jaking No Special Steps t&Protect, Secrets .of Arms Now in.. Iran! By Vernon A. Guidry Jr.. NasYi,Saa. Snr SWt Friar The Defense Department -says no extraordinary steps have been taken to protect U.S. military secrets that had been sold to Iran in the course of its military buildup.-- . "We will keep reviewing with them their responsibilities -and precau- tions," said a spokesman. The Moslem holy days this -month' are believed crucial for the embat- tled shah of Iran. Uncertainty about the'_ER re of his goveinmen- t has re- vived concerns about what might result if sophisticated American- made weapons fell Into unfriendly or unstable hands. " The question of compromising U.S" military secrets was most sharply debated a year ago when Congress reluctantly acquiesced to a $1.3 bil- lion deal to sell a complicated air- borne radar and computer system. (called -AWACS) - designed to-help control air battles. THAT 'SYSTEM; plus brand-new F-16 fighter planes and new Navy de., stroyers were not scheduled.. for.: delivery until the 1980s so their tech-. nology is not directly at risk.' ..-.4 , But the Iranians have a good deal~ of sophisticated American weaponry, including 80 F-14s, the U.S. Navy's first-line fleet defense fighter made by the Grumman Corp: This fighter. has highly secret black-box. electron- ics aboard, Including a computer and radar-system that can track multiple targets at great distance and attack them with the Phoenix missiles carried on the fighter. At the time of the AWACS contro- versy, CIA Director Stansfield Turner did not seem to have much confidence about Iran's. security in the best of-times. IN A CLASSIFIED document circulated on Captiol Hill Turner. said. "The shah is a proponent of the divide-and-rule principle. There is lit-. tle cooperation among, the intelli- gence and security services, and jurisdictional rivalries are a way of life." - Turner went on to say that, while U.S. observers believed security was tight in Iran, "it would appear pru- dent to recognize that the risk of Soviet penetration exists along with a consequence risk of compromise for information and equipment pro- vided." - . One source familiar with condi- tions in Iran said the unrest in the cities has 'hot. penetrated:militam bases where the armed forces- re- main loyal to the shah. The F-14s and associated equipment- area--main tained on double-guarded-bases; said a source. Grumman :has?about 450 employ= ees in Iran. who have with them nearly 500 dependents. The company has . not joined other firm& such. as General Electric and-Westinghouse in ordering their employees,'evacu- ated from the country: r 3' ,, 1. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 MEMORANDUM FROM PRESIDENT . Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501320001-0 DALLAS MORNING NEWS 28 NOVEMBER 1Q78 CIA and Iran: Intelligence Test TO THE secretary of state, the assistant for national secur- ity'and the director of central intelligence, the President of the United. States has passed the word: The quality of politi- c;l. intelligence we get from abroad is unsatisfactory. The President. in his handwritten memorandum, released late last week to the media, was speaking generally. But most of all he was "dissatis- fied," to use his own word, with recent reports on Iran. He had been told everything was fine in Iran; the shah, an invaluable U.S. ally, was in no danger. Then the riots and strikes erupted. The Peacock Throne began to totter. Why didn't someone tell me? Such was Carter's acrid complaint. Why indeed didn't someone tell him? There may well be more than one reason, but the paramount reason is that in the past few years, the eyes of our intelligence agents have been 40pmed, their ear stopped up, their tongues made fuzzy. .Intelligence? Who needs intelligence? Who needs spies, with their penchant for secre- cy, their disregard for the con- stitutional niceties? The questions may sound absurd enough; and yet, in one form or another, they have flitted through the minds of countless Americans over the past few years. The Great CIA Flap of 1975-76, initiated by the media, pursued by the politi. cians, served to persuade many that the CIA (like the FBI) was as much threat to American Liberties as guardian thereof. We were told of clandestine operations, of mail openings, of manipulation of journalists and businessmen - enter- prises that, ripped from context, made the CIA sound like some sinister capitalistic counterpart of the Soviet KGB. Amid these thunderings, the morale of the CIA plummeted like a failed parachute. The men out in the field had scarcely to be convinced the American people had lost confi- dence in them. They had only to read the papers. . What kind of work can be expected of a demoralized intelligence agency? Just about the kind that has stirred the President to anger and will surely provoke him again unless something is done to persuade the CIA that we. the people, still believe in its mission. That is no easy achievement to arrange. The President's own CIA director, Adm. Turner, is likely as responsible as anyone for the agency's c'ndition, having heavy-hand- edly tried. to clean house when he took over. Would anything be wrong with letting a profes- sional spy, for a welcome change, command our other spies? It is no frivolous point. After all, whom did the White House turn to for accurate reports on Iran after the CIA had flunked the intelligence test? To none other than the much-abused Richard Helms, a former CIA chief who was ambassador to Iran until recently. Spies, one readily learns, have their uses, however much they are out of favor when TV cameras roll and congressmen clear their throats to speak. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501320001-0 Analysis U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 11 December 1978 Why the CIA Is Under Fire Again President Carter complains he's being hampered by Intelligence failures. Result a probable comeback for the old-fashioned spy. Why was the Central Intelligence Agency caught by surprise by the cri- sis now rocking Iran? And: Why has U.S. intelligence failed to forewarn the White House- of other critical political develop- ments in recent months? The President himself is demand- ing answers to these questions-and he is addressing his demand princi- pally to an Annapolis classmate whom he drafted to manage the na- tion's troubled intelligence services. Adm. Stansfield Turner, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, has received a handwritten "Dear Stan" note in which Carter says bluntly that "I am dissatisfied with the quality of political intelligence." The note also went to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and White House National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, who share responsibility for alerting the President to potential crises overseas. . Carter's complaint was triggered by the CIA's optimistic assessments of the Iranian crisis. A mid-August report by the agency concluded that "Iran is not in a revolutionary or even prerevolutionary situation." ` . The President is disturbed by oth- er recent episodes. In one, the CIA failed to alert him to an imminent pro-Communist coup in Afghanistan. In another, the CIA gave no advance warning of a large-scale Rhodesian incursion into Zambia at a time when Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith was in Washington negotiating with the Carter administration. Poor morale. One fundamental ex- planation cited for the intelligence failures that resulted in Carter's de- mand for an in-house inquiry: The CIA is suffering from the demoraliz- ing effects of four years of scandals, investigations and reorganizations. The demoralization is especially acute among operatives engaged in clandestine activities overseas. These operatives have taken the brunt of the criticism and, despite his denials, they feel that Turner has downgrad- ed "human intelligence" in favor of ed evidence of a possible revolutionary crisis brew- ing there. In the new controversy over the CIA, Turner per- sonally is in an especially vulnerable position. He conducted a bruising but unsuccessful battle to se- cure control over every element of the American intelligence community. Also, he introduced a sweeping reform, ostensi- bly to insure maximum ef- ficiency in the collection CIA Diraetor Stanfield Turner, Carter's Annapolis and analysis of d informa- aamats, Is key figure in now controversy. lion by a half dozen agen- technological spying, such as satellite reconnaissance. President Carter tended to lend weight to this criticism at a Novem- ber 30 news conference with the as- sertion: "I have been concerned that the trend that was established 15 years ago to get intelligence from electronic means might have been overemphasized." Turner's preoccupation with run- ning a "clean" espionage agency-a pledge he gave to Congress-also is blamed for inhibiting the initiative of American spies. A former overseas operative says that senior officers are loath to risk dismissal by exercising too much initiative or participating in an unsuccessful operation. -'-The CIA has worked in Iran under exceptional handicaps. - There was an understanding with the Shah-a tacit one, if not explic- it-that intelligence officers and dip- lomats from the United States would not contact dissident groups or en- gage in any independent intelli- gence-gathering operations. Washington, as a result, was largely dependent on information provided by the Shah's personal intelligence service, Savak, which itself miscalcu- lated the scope and nature of the violent upheaval that threatens sur- vival of the monarchy. Administration policymakers ex- press dismay over the failure of CIA analysts to question the erroneous in- formation they were receiving from Teheran, especially given the fact that other intelligence organizations, Israel's for example, and private busi- ness analysts earlier this year report- Gies. He assumed overall responsibility for coordinating the collection and analysis of foreign in- telligence and also for managing the budget for all intelligence activities. When policymakers over the past year complained of serious shortcom- ings in the "product" that they were getting from Turner's organization, critics say that he rebuffed the com- plaints with the argument that the President was satisfied. At his news conference, Carter praised the work of the intelligence community but indicated clear dis- satisfaction with Turner's perfor- mance in political intelligence. Turner's apologists say the CIA is simply being made a scapegoat by frustrated policymakers. Scapegoat or not, the fact is that the White House repeatedly has complained of CIA failures since the early 1960s. Long list President Kennedy pri- vately blamed the CIA for disastrous miscalculations that led to the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger treated the agency's assessments with contempt. And for- mer President Nixon charged on French television on November 28 that the CIA for 11 years underesti- mated Russia's military buildup. Whatever the outcome of this lat- est inquest, a ranking Carter admin istration official says that this is clear. The U.S. must revitalize. the role Of the old-fashioned spy, which has been undermined by four years of scandal, organizational turmoil and preoccupation with technology. This analysis was written by Asso- ciate Editor Wendell S. Merick. ,, Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 6 December 1978 HQwUS,Soviets compete in electronic espionage states- compromised` American electronic svr- personal data on the Gurmman Tomcat F-14 veillance capacity in such_a_way as to interfere tighter and the- Navy's LAMPS anti-submarine . with - future verification oL: their country-', S .. , warfare program- The. latter is a system for weapons systems under-a--new strategic. arms- - gathering undersea- intelligence electroaicauy limitation treaty (SALT)?' from light helicopters The, short answer to this, say senior US'De- In Miami op Nov. 10, 1977, an American Tense. Department offici3ls;. is that both SALT I and a West German- were convicted of at. the draft SALT IIagreement now under tempting to obtain for the USSR components of Have Soviet.. spies operating.: m the Uniet - who thought they were buying from. US Navy v e s t i g a t i o n : in cooperation-with -US -Navy in- ? ees of the United Nations ? were convicted ' Br Jeri R. Cooky - The Christian Science Monitor Jersey, court: The Federal Bureau of 1n ' i WaaWgtee telligence, officials caught the two :. Russians, d photo spying` Their would playa central role m -'rope and the northwestern Pacific SALT vetitldticjtt; .; ~ -,--L' >, Carter` administration: - 'analysts, -tasked can .. be , med_;fa boths;'communications and 20 missiles, now deployed in both Eastern Eu- on th4rUS. KR-11 ":sateWte:surveillance..system, , -, Two months before the Boyce conviction. to a Soviet military attache in Greece.. two executives of another California defense The Soviet_accordingj tQ' US agents, gave . electronics firm,, L 1. Industries, were con- Mr: Kampiles $3,O a&"partial payment" for: 'victed of conspiring to export illegally other the which described operation of the electronic equipment to the Soviets. te as:`part of ,th ;`national. chnical '- To prevent US surveillance, the Soviets have `satellite means"-of US irtalfgence collection. atel>ites 'encrypted the telemetry of their SS-18 and SS- eyed in the US over the past-year:. and Defense Systems, was convicted in,Los. ?. Last' month;' former low-level Central In_.. Angeles on eight espionage counts for passing telligence Agency' (CIA) ;staffer William P_ to the Soviets information on how-intelligence Kampileswas convicted: in_ a Hammond, In- data are transmitted between US ground sta. M}ng'. encrypting the signals sent -out -electronmc missile ingredients that emit - data `by. their-own missile tests; Making it more dif- signals, called telemetry, would enable the So- Scult for-US monitoring devices to gather vital viets to reinforce their own "national technical data on them ? . '_~: "~ means,. of gathering data on US missile testa Clues ti-Soviet priorities in their espionage ? In May, 1977, Christopher J. Boyce, a for- -efforts are. found in the main spy cases uncov- mer employee.. of. TRW Corporation's Space hasa:not ? stopped. the Soviets--from -Defense analysts think possession of the i -0k :.. 41 1 lwro=forn-er: Sowiet employ mem `5 for s 1' a-_ A . missing and unaccounted-for as o.L Now`-,L, Fu krofi future missile tests under a SALT II agre t of 350 copies of the manual ul question:were is-time-consuming and would'.delay verificatio other` CLk' of dial said not just one. but. 17 out- . ably can be broken by the ?US, but- the proc o o lic . =Dfr SStestffied : aG, the- Kama: agreement; "usually' reply. that SALT : I was niles trial that US.'national. defense y ould: bet? - -never1 formally ratified. ` Electronic-'` ciphers negotiation forbid such interference.. the US Navy's Tomahawk cruise missile. ,, Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 ARTXLE VFZf. THE BOSTON GLOBE weighs plan to monitor By, William'Beecher Globe Washington Bureau'' WASHINGTON -The Carter Admin- istration. is. seriously, considering tough new provisions in the draft treaty to limit strategic.. arms that-- would Se aimed at preventing cheating .and. increasing .chances-for its passage by the Senate. _ Senior officials. say the United States .. may seek to ban. the coding of any data sent back. from missile tests to engineers on the ground to tell how guidance and other systems are working. By intercept- ing and analyzing the data - or telemetry - US analysts try to keep tabs on-im- provements in Soviet weaponry. The draft SALT-2 treaty contains re- strictions on certain missile improve- ments. Thus the monitoring of tests by spy satellites and other intelligence-gath- ering devices is considered' essential to ensure the accord is adhered to, the officials explain. "Unless the Senate .is convinced we can verify with confidence the terms of a new treaty," one State Department offi- cial said,,"the chances of ratification are -Pot g* principal impetus behind a ban on ' encoding telemetry; sources say, came from Stansfield Turner, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, who argued that without it the United States could not be confident the Russians were not cheating. He' is known. to have cautioned the White House that unless Moscow can be persuaded to accept such a ban, he would be duty bound to warn the Senate?during ratification hearings of the immense difficulties of verifying the treaty. But when Secretary of State Cyrus X,ance was in Moscow for SALT discus sions in October, well-placed officials (said. the Soviets rejected an even milder :proposal to ban encoding. It would merely', have called for a common written under- standing on what test data could and what could .not be scrambled. It was after the Russians turned down the part-way measure, sources say, that Turner called fora total ban. He is being supported by some officials in the De- fense and State departments. Sources say the telemetry issue is but one - of i series o'f obitac1es that ? ve: arisen recently to bedevil attempts to con' elude the SALT . negotiations.'^:" Officials have passed word to Moscow that utilr~sM.the xussiaas.provide specific 3_.?~ti. ~a`~e~tl,n are prepared: y o mscce; here is no'-point in scheduling ipcther Vance-Gromylio round of talks. Another involves the Backfire bomba.4;' . ,e Administration is concerned not The Russians .insist it does not havi- itri- -only about the Russian"t'teclinique of ? ex-' tegic range, but all elements of-the US in= pectilig new US. proposals. t_ each high- telligence community argue tt'does 1660.- gaining session, often without - Americanfaegotiators have treed to substantive new Soviet positions, but also persuade the-Soviets, among Other ' things.,,, aboutthe image being created in the Con- to agree.;not to `increase the- production great that the Americans are making most rate of the Backfire through 1985, the life :of the ' basic concessio> in the last stage' of the=projected treaty:' `:_ `of negotiations. The Soviets have said this--may be ?' Thus the United States is asking that acceptable, but they refuse to divulge the new Soviet positions be passed along by current production rate. When US negoti- ? Soviet. Ambassador Anatoly.Dobrynin in ators said the American understanding is Washington before a new round of talks is that, the rate is 2% a month, Foreign Min- scheduled, probably in Geneva. ister Andrei Gromyko said the Russians '. The ..coding of missile telemetry be- wouldn't aruge with that number, accord- (':came A pressing issue recently after the ing to a senior Administration official. Russians encrypted several high-f requen- But the Russians have been expanding cy radio channels during a test of the the plant that builds the Backfire, and a SS18, 'the largest ICBM in their arsenal recent US intelligence exercise concluded iSources-say this was the first time the: that it could not ~e.determined whether RusRussians have done that on the SS18. the rate is the same or has gone up, to, .. A key provision of the SALT-2 agree- anywhere from -three to five a month, meet would prohibit major modernization twice the previous understanding. ? of, existing missiles, such as providing Failure of the Russians to provide in- new guidance systems. Another impor- formation on their own programs is point- tant provision would restrict the number., ed to by some negotiators as an example -of warheads that could be placed on each of the kind of loophole that created prob- ICBM. - lems with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile But if tests of such improvements (ABM) and Strategic Weapons accords. -.could be masked from US spy satellites, For example, the ABM treaty banned, provisions would be.a sham, some Ameri- certain tests except at existing test rang- --can officials argue. es. There the United States enumerated Some, in fact, would go even further decing lined neoodiotions when the Russinas ABM ' than barring telemetry encoding. They declined to so. Later on, site- in after ABM also :would ban the use of low-frequency tests at a nonennumerated site Soviet telemetry - which could only be read by Asia were protested by the Americans, ground stations on the test range ea and l Russians claimed the test range had would prohibit test data being recorded in loon ng been in existance and it wasn't their a capsule on the missile and parachuted fault the tinged States had failed to men-, down to the ground'to analyzed by Soviet tiara it during negotiations. a" engineers - but not monitored by US in-' Another obstacle to a new treaty, Ad- tell genre systems. ministration officials say, is the lack of movement in the Soviet bargaining posi- Sources say the United States does not tion since Gromyko was in Washington in encrypt its missile test telemetry, but 1 September. does employ low frequency signals. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 TTCLE r WASHINGTON STAR 0 F'' 3 DECEMBER 1978 William F. Buckley Jr. Skulciugger~ the satellite and SE1I,T Early this year a junior clerk in the CIA doing night duty at the operations center in Langley, Va.. spotted a manual on a desk, stuck it into his briefcase. and took?it:home. On March 2; he sold this document to a Russian: is Athens. for $3,000. Now listen carefully: Returning to the United Stites. the young, man wrote to. a former col- league -Ia ,CIA advising. h3m~: that the Soviet Union had offered' in- duce the. clerk to -transmit; secret information. This bizarre communi- cation alerted to one al- most certain, and'-another probable, piece of bad news. The first was that the young., clerk had: already turned something over 16-'the Athe Russians. Why?c,Because even the KGB-has traditions, them, very well established, is that cash is paid not for prospective, butfor past services; The KGB, in the words of Michael Ledeen in :NewNork Magazine, does not buy "on spec:.'.' But if the clerk: William Kampiles is his name:-;- whose-letter suggested that it might ? be useful tw-the .agency if he trans-, mitted "disinformation". to the-Rus- sians, i.e. information designed to throwthe KGB off the track, took- a step which would clearly lead to an investigation of him as someone who had almost certainly- already com- mitted a crime, why did the KGB en- courage him to make the offer?- In ef- fect- to burn him. The. supposition is thatE our announced pp?tts of.- policy of. supporting the Shalt. It tends the strategictiarmds.! 11&ementiZ*nd- particulariy; members , ot. the Jbit3L to legltimue; the opposition; and' Do Chiefs of .staff bt ;tli8rr: aides.:have ; ggest that, the. .U.S. is hedging it; : t spec hed_td use this - -Mid -?3. deal as-a asst: `his the tried. a' weapob-' against, j r. It`d : cral~yt?since a CIA- agent sat in oil the treaty. with?the Soviet Union.. plot tinga a generals who overthrew In other ords; the'administra t; Vgo. Dinb-D in Vfetnarrz:in.196a) This especiailyy tttestrdCiive~ leak tion's problem is 'not' with the- Soviet _ -1 s _ ~- . . Union sending z`IIGs to Cuba, but with cratic infighting since it comes id-t)' e' , . , the American people learning that it '.context of badly mistaken CIA esti has done so. The administration would mates of strength of the Shah's opposi? appear to have ' concluded, that the tion. Perhaps the. leak is intended to MIGs ate not relevant _ to the 1982.:. , show that the CIA is shaping itself up; .I pledge or to SALT.. The President indi- or'.perhaps it's- Intended .to? show that sated in his press conference yester , the. President- is cracking the whip to day that it is relying an Soviet ptom';r.,correct the deficiencyr.Either way, it's ises not to. ship nuclear. weapons-:fdr'r.a.small,motive for. the..cost involved. the planes. but It is mnost-doubtful thaf` r ? s WE Have' no way. to know: whether we can verify whether this- has or: evil! ,Lthe `administrator fsrying about be done. In. all . probability the memo the :CIA-Iran leak. the: wayMr-Reston wee leaked byt someone-disturbed"at '-'described it worrying about; the MIG- this, decision: ,Yet now that:- the, facts Cuba leak. We hope it is.: but . without are out. the people and the Senate'calimuch. expectation. .=: -;:` - t~ I, ~, Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 11 December 1978 Washington U.S. jets that flew over Cuba to spy on MiG-23s there came back with an unexpected intelligence bonanza: The American planes were able to chart the Cuban air-defense system by pinpointing location of radar units tracking the high-flying planes. How much does it cost the Kremlin to support Cuba. About 9 million dollars a day-more than 3 billion a year--according to latest intelligence estimates. That is twice the rate of last spring. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501320001-0 !R IC`:^ +;,; ;M NEWSWEEK D'l ?nor 11 December 1978 Periscope SPYING ON CUBA'S MIG-23s An extraordinary U.S. intelligence effort backed up President Carter's assurance last week that the new, Soviet MiG-23 jet fighters now in Cuba pose no ; nuclear threat to the U.S. Among other reconnaissance tactics, the U.S. employed sensors that. can detect ' nuclear weapons--and that are so secret that no one will say whether the sensors are land-based, airborne or beamed from ships. But it is known that an SR-71 Blackbird spy plane made a rare flight over Cuba to collect information on the MiG-23s, and that the Blackbird carries some kind of sensor in addition to its cameras. U.S. Navy P-3 pa- trol planes also flew near Cuba to do some spying, presumably by radar. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 MISCELLANEOUS Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501320001-0 Article appeared on page- B-6 THE WASHINGTON POST 7 December 1978 Suit bvrVidow Judge Dismisses R. Richer 3a%dismissed. a. $33: million' damage: suit.- brought against- former secretarfof: state, Henry A. Kissinger and the Centrals Intelligence Agency by the!*': widovr a Kensington- man.. W6- was hires; as, a'.mercenary in the -1976 wac;ia=dngola: t w SheDS Gearhart and= her-four chit= .dren.had-'claimed that: Kissinger;: the ?` CIA and'other_-U.S.. officials were're- sponsible torthe Angola government's execution- of Daniel F:. Gearhart; by not- warning him of the dangerous sit- uatioa Ia.' the', African -nation ? at the time-he went there..r But, Richey: ruled Tuesday that the Gearharts had - failed W. "state with sufficient specificity facts -upon. which relief could, -be granted" and dis. missed the suik;' Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PACAYUNE 25 November 1978 Secrets and Public Trials There have. been several exam- pus b recent Jeirs? of aecase I criminals whose past connection with security agencies have af- forded them a free pass to break the law. Rather than risk the re- lease of national security informa- tion In public courtrgoms, thg government has dropped- or lower- ed eriioinal.charges. Now, the Justice Department, CIA and other Gies have decided to file a test against the tecbntgus of "gray- mall" - the threatened disclosure of national secrets by criminal de- fendasts during their triaL Attar? ney General Griffin 8e11 and others now that dismissal of crimi- nal charges Is too high jr price to pay for the government to keep its secrets. The test case will be filed in con- nection with the trial of Robert. Berrelles, hn official of Interna- tional Telephone and Telegraph, who is accused of making false statements to a Senate committee. Mr. Berrelles's attorney has de- manded, access to classified Info- mation to pprepare his defense, which. will; appare$iy. include references to still-secret CIA operations In Chile. Under the Justice Department proposal, a secret pre-trial hearing would be held in which the defense would be required to disclose what secret infortnktion it plans to bring out during the trial. If the judgp rules the information is irrelevant - and therefore inadmissible - the defendant would be bared from mentioning it . Defense attorneys are normally permitted to talk about their cases in opening arguments, including any information involving national secrets which the defense plans to introduce during trial. During the trial, the judge would rule - in public - whether the information could be considered by the jury. Under the Justice Department's plan, the entire question would be settled In secret before the trial. The proposal raises significant legal questions, including whether a defendant's '.due process" rights would be violated if he is disclose his case before trial. In addition, a defendant has a right to a "public trial" and it is question- able whether this right would be satisfied if there is'a secret pre- trial hearing. Justice Department. attorneys suggest that much.more public information would be 'available under the plan because if a can is dropped due to the risk secrets might be made public, no Informa- tion would come out. It is a thorny problem, and there is no clear-cut answer. The danger Is that if secret proceedings are permitted in national security cases, the precedent might be ex- tended to other cases where prejudicial publicity Wat Issue. 'Pre-trial proceedings are often critical junctures in the criminal justice system. If the public and the press are excluded from such proceedings, matters of Important public concern would be resolved in secret, and without public over- sight Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501320001-0 NEW SOLIDARITY 1 December 1978 I1:Dfeu4;cof the Cen'tra fi.te by Lyndon H. LaRouche. Jr. NEW YORK, Nov. 26 (NSIPS) - Last summer. CIA Director Admiral Stan- field Turner launched a massive purge of the so-called "clandestine services" of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Now, more than a year later, some very foolish people pretend to be perplexed by the CIA's alleged incompetence in reading the situation in Iran. The facts are as follows: First, . Turner's purge of E. Henry Knoche and hundreds of other senior CIA specialists gutted the CIA's capa- bilities, in the Middle East and many other regions. This left the CIA analy- tical sections dependent on what was predominantly second-hand infor- mation. fed into the. Agency through predominantly British and.. Zionist conduits. Second. as-.4, result of leaks '.to Congressmen, exposing', -Admiral Turner and ' Zbigniew Brzezinski as liars in their efforts to blame-Cuba for the Shaba U affair, heavy clamps were -imposed by' Brzezinski et al. on CIA consultation with private channels of relevance outside the Agency itself. This was aggravated by the- conviction of former CIA operative Snepp: which -had. the effect of gagging the CIA's discussions even in matters where no secret information was transmitted. Third, since ' approximately mid- August. and increasingly since the conclusion of the "Camp David Summit." elements of the U.S. intelli- gence establishment have been under strict orders not to receive or take into account any information which might .suggest that the "Camp David" pack- age was anything less than h new reli- gious miracle. This gag-rule had the effect of preventing the CIA (in particu- lar) from receiving any of the kinds of information which would have informed them that the national esti- mate subsuming the Iran situation was a fatally flawed misconception from the start. a Purged and Gutted Agency. , These and related facts fully account for the current problems of the CIA:. It . is a purged and gutted'agency which has operated under 'orders '.not to contradict any national estimates. authored in support of the policies of- Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry A. Kis- singer. There: are two additional matters to be taken directly into account in this connection. The first is the prevailing illusions concerning the relative weights of the CIA in the U.S. intelli- gence community. The second is the specific idiocies of national estimates directly responsible for CIA misjudg- ment in various matters, including the Iran case. 0 On the first. The CIA purge of "clan- destine services" under Mondale. Brze- zinski, Schlesinger and Turner has wiped out the CIA's general ability to independently cross-check and correct intelligence information and estimate& generated by other elements grouped under-the National Security Council. At. present, the center of gravity of official intelligence. operations is technically located in the Pentagon, with the- British,. and -Zionist-penetrated . National . Security. Agency,_ Office of Naval .Intelligence, and Air Force Intelligence' the principal'- official bastions of Brzezinski's operations. The, increasing of the relative weight of the NSA. ONI and Air Force Intelli- gence:is consistent with Brzezinski's technetronic policies, 'policies recom- mended in Victor Marchetti's The CIA and the- Cult of Intelligence; policies supported by Philip Agee and Agee's ally Morton Halperin. This places the emphasis of U.S. intelligence gathering on NSA telecommunications and mail- taps and satellite and other, related forms of information-gathering. For qualitative, human political-intelli- gence gathering the USA is now vir- tually at the mercy of the combined resources of British-Canadian and Israeli-Zionist intelligence networks. The importance of CIA "clandestine services" is the means to know situa- tions on the ground intimately, to be: able to develop intelligence concerning matters which no informant could pos- _ .siblvsunohr. in_advance: -how yat'ipmul forces,,wilLr,think .and react--ut} gr circumstances those forces do not yet anticipate' as occurring. There is no substitute for the experienced, quali- fied senior clandestine operative in this aspect of intelligence-gathering. precisely the aspect of work in which the CIA's reported Iran estimates collapsed. On the second point. although U.S. cooperation with the. European Mone- tary System has been formal U.S. policy since the Bonn "summit." many elements in the Administration and in the leadership of the Republican and Democratic Parties have been dedi- cated to London's policy of intransigent -opposition to the EMS. Exemplary is the pushing of a 1979 depression in the U,S, by Blumenthal and' Miller, among others, and the disgusting antics of Robert Strauss-and his- Clay machine- . and Israeli intelligence sidekicks at the GATT negotiations and in Japan. EMS Is Policy Foundation The, significance of this inconsistency for CIA estimates is located in the fact that the development of a new world monetary system around the keystone of the Jan. 1, 1979 institutionalization of the. EMS is the foundation of all strategic policy-making of the principal governments of continental Europe, the Middle East, southeast- Asia.. Japan. Mexico and numerous- other nations. The EMS-centered policy is also a war- avoidance, pro-detente policy, and is in direct opposition to the resurrection of Henry A. Kissinger's policies in-the Middle East, southern Africa and else- where. On all the closely related policy= issues intersecting the EMS, the major- ity of the U.S. domestic national press ' media, most emphatically the TV news media. and the Washington Post, have been consistently lying since May 1978. Similarly, the leadership of the Repub- lican National Committee has been variously duped or outrightly lying --I with the liars those most closely allied with Henry A. Kissinger and with the "free enterprise' campaign of the Mont Pelerin Society and the Heritage Foundation front-organization of . British secret intelligence. ,, I, ?, Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 the NSA, Air Force Intelligence, ONI and National- War College- under puppet-like control of British and Israeli intelligence,: the overwhelming weight of influence. on most of the policy-making arms of government has been composed of combinations of outright lies and other forms of disin- formation. There has been a ' gross misestimate of all aspects of European.. Middle East and other developments on all issues bearing on the EMS and new world-~onetarysyst@m._,t i_ Disregarding These facts in, connec- tion with the British effort to destabilize the Shahanshah of Iran meant over- looking the complex of counter- measures taken against the British. Bahai, British Freemasons, and other accomplices of the attempted "destabi- lization." These countermeasures were taken on the basis of the strategic correlation of economic, monetary and political forces being developed around the imminent institutionalization of the new monetary system, and were mightily aided by the mobilization of Arab and European forces against the .hideous. farce the "Camp David summit" was rightly regarded to be in those quarters. - What do you critics of the CIA expect that agency to do to, correct such problems - perhaps shoot Brzezinski and Kissinger? P 1 ' " Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501320001-0 THE WASHINGTON POST 6 December 1978 Pentagon Official Due to Be Chief _ Of Senate Foreign Relations Staff Sen. Frank Church (D.Idaho), who right-hand man, he can still have sub-' is expected. to assume the chairman- stantial influence. Informed sources ship of the senate Foreign Relations speculated that Bader could play an. Committee in the, new Congress, has Important role in the Senate :debate i selected William Bader, a Pentagon . on a new strategic arms limitation official, to be the committee's staff treaty (SALT) with the Soviet Union.-I director, informed'sources report. ,_ ... As chairman of the-committee, Church. Bader, 47, is deputy director of the is expected . to be the SALT floor.. office o f -planning" for the- secretary tender. of - defense. He- has been responsible._. Bader;with a doctorate from Prince- ton, is former foreign service of- for coordinating defense intelligence fiver and official of the Ford Founds operations:`; ....d. on- the staf! of the tion. He worked for. Sen., Church on,. Bader serve the staff of the select committee that- Foreign- Relations--Committee.-, from.. investigated the Central Intelligence;, 1966 to 1969. His appointment is not, likely to be anounced until Church--:-;Agency- has been formally__ Installed as chair man in_ January. - / - Bader would -succeed Norvm Jones, who is reported to be taking* a ` private industry." ?" Staff members , on Foreign Rela , tions. report directly .to individual senators who, in effect, named them. to their positions, 30-the staff director is leis powerful than on many other. committees. But as= the chairman's Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 'AI= WAwiINGTON STAR 3 DECa4B 1978 A veteran's view What hinders. CIA. 'from doing its job'? By Jack Maury A wise veteran of White House councils has said that the greatest danger to'peace in our time could be an ill-informed American president. Small wonder, then, that the presi- dent reportedly has expressed con- cern over CIA performance with re- gard to the potentially explosive situation in Iran. But it is difficult to see how any intelligence service could function effectively in the face of the coirycidence of circumstances which have conspired over the past several years to disrupt and demor- alize the agency. The roots of many of today's prob- lems lie at the door of agency man- agement. The peremptory dismissal of hundreds of skilled and experi- i enced officers have profoundly affected morale, resulting in the voluntary retirement of hundreds of others. CIA. and indeed our entire national security apparatus. is victim.of the theology, prevalent in parts of the present administration, which holds that' official secrecy, like military strength. is, by definition, immoral or sinister. The resulting restraints and inhibitions have'seriously eroded intelligence initiative. This unilateral' disarmament in the-midst of intense intelligence warfare with foreign adversaries ? has had little effect in reassuring the agency's domestic critics, and even less in encouraging reciprocal restraint on the part of the KGB. It has, however, resulted in considerable disenchantment among friendly foreign intelligence services whose valuable collaboration with us in the past had been based on the be- lief that CIA was ready and able to taker the lead in providing the Free World with protection against sur- prise and subversion. But perhaps as damaging to *he long'-term effectiveness of our inte,ii- gence services as any of the above has been the irresponsible zeal of the- American media in exposing the se- crets, attacking the purposes and dis- torting the facts regarding our intelli gence activities. This is. not to suggest that there is anything unhealthy in the adversary attitude of the media toward any gov- ernment agency which operates clandestinely. Nor is it surprising that the media have not yet recov- ered from. the euphoria - indeed the arrogance - of their success in vitally affecting, the conduct and out- come of a major war and contribut ing to the downfall of two presidents. But just- as the press has been so effective in dramatizing events in Indochina and uncovering mischief in the White House, so should its own performance be subject to scrutiny. The corruptive effects of power are not limited. to government alone. -Among recurring. seriously mis- leading themes. appearing in the news or editorial pages of influential- publications have been the following: -.CIA is a sort of "rogue elephant," operating beyond the control of presi- dent or Congress. In fact, as both the Church and Pike committees con- cluded. CIA. in the words of the Pike report. "has been highly responsive to. the Instructions of the president and assistant to the president for na- tieital security affairs." And the agency has always reported to Con-. gress precisely in accordance with procedures laid down by the Con- gress itself. ? A front-page item appearing in the New York Times in 1969 alleging that there had been "at least one con- firmed battle death in Laos -.when an American CIA agent was killed by'an advanced post." As a subsequent embassy investigation made clear, the "CIA agent" turned, out to be a, five-day old premature baby of the family of an employee of Air America: the CIA-controlled con- tract air carrier. The story was espe- cially mischievous because of the strict U.S. policy, in line with the Geneva accords to which the U.S. was a party. against any combat in- volvement by U.S. personnel in Laos. ? Washington: Post item in. 1976 by a member of the Post editoriaistaff de- scribing the so-called Penkovskiy Papers as "precisely the 'coarse. fraud, a- mixture of provocative invention and anti-Soviet. slander' that' the Soviet authorities . - - claimed it was at the time." In fact, having been the CIA officer in 'charge of the Penkovskiy opera- tion.. I haveassuredthe Post. as.their senior. . editors were assured when they originally serialized the Papers. that virtually every word in them at- tributed to Penkovskiy was his own. ? Washington Star headline in 1976: "CIA' Goal: Drug, Not Kill, Ander son." In fact, the story said only that the White House had consulted a "former CIA physician" about drug- ging Jack Anderson "to discredit him.-" ? A number of. press stories alleging CIA introduction of swine flu virus into Cuba. Although flatly and ppub- Ucly denied by the agency in both press releases and assurances to con-: gressional. committees, most of these allegations have never, been re- tracted. Quite as damaging as some of the- false and misleading stories have been disclosures of sensitive opera- tional information. It is difficult to ' see- how the public interest is served by revelations which destroy the fruits of important, dangerous and expensive intelligence undertak- ings, strain diplomatic relations or embarrass individuals. organizations or foreign governments who have provided the agency with valuable assistance. Who is served by publica- tion of details of the efforts of the Glomar Explorer-to salvage wreck- age of a Soviet submarine? As Eric Sevareid, commenting some time ago on press stories of the intercep- tion of foreign communications and of submarine reconnaissance. in for. eign waters, asks: "Were these two stories information that people had a right to know and benefitted by knowing? Only a rather exotic cult of editorial thinkers would say yes." CONTIi,70ED. . CIA was a witting accomplice in the Watergate burglary. In fact, as the Rockefeller Commission con- cluded. CIA. had no reason to- know that the assistance it lent Howard Hunt (documentation.. camera. recorder) would be used for im- proper purposes. Moreover CIA Director. Helms refused. to allow agency operations in Mexico to. be used as a pretext to obstruct post- Watergate investigations- - CIA has been involved in illegal drug traffic. In fact, as John Inger-, sell, director of the Bureau of Narcot- ics and Dangerous Drugs, stated in- response' to a congressional. inquiry. CIA has been the bureau's "strongest partner" in uncovering- foreign sources of illegal narcotics. .In addition. there have been numerous false or misleading indi- vidual news items. A few examples: Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 The media have been ever ready to make instant celebrities of those for- mer . CIA employees. who, for whatever motives, choose to violate their solemn secrecy- commitments. sabotage sensitive and important operations and jeopardize the ca- reers and personal safety of former colleagues by "telling all." Typical among these has been the recent idol of the talk shows and book reviews, John Stockwell. The mindless zeal with which some, of the media have accepted uncritically his unsubstanti- ated allegations would befit the acco- lades heaped upon the pronounce- ments of Fidel Castro by Radio Havana. Lost in the avalanche of publicity is the fact that while still" in. the agency he failed -to present his complaints to the. inspector general. or other senior officials, or to report them to the appropriate oversight committees of the Congress; and that some of his allegations are outright falsehoods, such as the especially serious claim that "..: the CIA's re- cent record includes the assassina- tion of Patrice Lumumba; Ngo Dinh Diem. the South Vietnamese Presi dent; Rafael Trujillo Monila, the Dominican Republic president; Gen. Rene Schneider, the commander of the Chilean Army..."- (The "tell all" fraternity It not limited to junior or middle-grade offi- cers who were probably ideologically or emotionally unfit for the demands of the intelligence business in the first place. It includes. at least in some degree; a former director, Wil- liam Colby, who defends his record of going. beyond the traditional bounds of security on the ground that only in this way could the agency's reputa- tion. be. cleared and. its critics reas- sured. (Among Colby's bitterest critics have been some former members of the high priesthood of secrecy, the counter-intelligence clique. Perpetra- tors and victims of the myth of the. omnipotent KGB, their basic as. sum ption is not only that all of our se- curity agencies are penetrated (probe ably true, at least to some degree). but that most of what we take to be reliable intelligence is being fed to us Over a dozen reporters - were. by Soviet deception artists. It is present during the hearings. They ironic that some of these self-pro- provided extensive coverage of the claimed guardians. of the agency's testimony of media representatives, security, conscience should, in an but no testimony critical of :he. apparent effort to settle old scores media, or challenging allegations of and cover past fiascos, now turn up CIA corruption of the media, or of in the ranks of the, "kiss and tell" KGB penetration of the media. brotherhood- along with the likes of This is a sorry record. It brings to Messrs. Marchetti. Agee; Snepp; mind the words of Mr. Jefferson Stockwell. See, for example,: Legend: when, in 1807, he wrote to his friends The World of Lee Harvey Oswald, by , John Norwell of Kentucky: . Edward Jay Epstein.) "Nothing can. now be believed- There is also the problem of news which is seen in a newspaper. Truth selection and' news suppression. 'A, itself becomes- suspicious by being? casein point- is the coverage of hear- ings into on CIA and the media, at. the But the purpose of recounting this, beginning o8-this year :by a subcom- record here is not to- suggest a solu mittee' of the House Select Commit- tion to the problem of irresponsible.. tee on.Intelligence. Although several journalism. Rather, it is to'identify a. former CIA: officials testified there- source of disturbing disarray in ours had been no significant cases where first line of defense and to warn those news -disseminated to 'contaminated audi concerned' about the effectiveness of ences by 'CIA had contaminated the CIA of the future nor to bemisled stories destined for American- read- by. media-created myths' regarding ers. I noted . that despite lengthy the CIA of the past..-These. myths other congressional have already generated public and. committees and numerous cries of I political pressures -for cures worse- alarm by editors and commentators. than me. disease, or legislative re- strictions and public exposures had been identified. Typi- cal headlines the. next day; however, g y s effec- was this in The Washington Star, tiveness even more than it has been "M.S. Media Took Stories Planted by, damaged already. Clkas Genuine". But these is one measure which There was' also my own testimony might do much to restore the effec. that while there was little evidence of tiveness of all our intelligence serv- CIA corrupting the American media, ices -- the- passage of legislation there was good reason to believe that, providing meaningful protection for- the KGB had been quite active in this sensitive intelligence sources and regard:. I cited a top- secret manual methods. Out, basic espionage law is entitled- "The- Practice of Recruiting , woefully inadequate. In order to con- Americans" in the U.S.A. and Third vict under it- the government must-- prove that the disclosure of classified Countries' published by the First information was done with "intent nection had 'either - contaminated news disseminated in the U.S. or Interfered-with the obligations of an American journalist tar his publisher or his public. Nor did anyone explain how the American Dream would be placed'in mortal jeopardy-by CIA re- cruitment of a Tass.corresvondent.. US UUF.AWWV I' U Y& SLU. aaww~-va, records, export controls, patents, re- neither he nor any media represents-. lief roils, and even insecticide form u- tives cited- a case where a CIA con-- lass b tyntell' nc 1 c e a c a a, Journalists "could lead to the death., Chief Directorate of the KGB and" listing, in Oder of priority, 12 catego- ries of recruitment targets. The first was government employees with ac- cess to classified information. The second was members of the media. I referred to evidence that Soviet. ef- forts in this regard had. been quite successful. On the use of journalists in the col- lection of intelligence, Eugene Pat tenon, president of the American Society of Newspaper Editors. warned that: CIA use of even foreign ors reason to: believe" that it was "to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any for- eign nation. Thus if even the most, sensitive information, such as the identity of agents or - the details of intelligence - collection techniques, art revealed publicly, conviction is often impossible unless the defendant is caught in flagrante- with a foreign agent. It is ironic that we have laws providing prison sentences for reve. lation of information on such matters as crop statistics, bank loans, Inter- Sele nal Revenue d tive Service t ,. g p em oyees can, with impunity, violate their sworn . commitments, betray their organiza- tion and destroy the careers and jeopardize the lives of former col- leagues by "telling all." They can de- stroy the effectiveness of valuable and costly. technical collection sys- tems which have been years in the making. And in doing all this they can be assured of fame and for t::;:e. If these instant celebrities crave future adventure and reward they can develop, and. some undoubtedly have developed, mutually profitable relationships with foreign intelli- gence services. Their. appeal as tar- CONTINUFa Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDPO5SOO62OR0005O1320001-0 gets. for recruitment stems not only I ..-the identities of agents or the de- :_ from. their knowledge of. our own ; tails of technical collection systems. intelligence operations; with their It would have no-applications to other ready access.::to the media, and lec. categories of classified material. And ture halls, they are Ideally situated it would be binding only on those indi- "agents of-influence:" In this ca- viduals who, by virtue of employ.. pacity they are uniquely qualified to ment with an intelligence agency, 41 serve what a former. Soviet intelli- voluntarily assumed the obligation to gence officer has described as one of protect source. and method informa. the .KGB's highest priority. objet- Lion. fives.: to put out the eyes of our In considering such legislation; it enemy by discrediting and disrupting may' be appropriate to recall' the his intelligence service. comment. of Gen. Washington. who. All this is not to~s uest anything just over 1200: years- ago. 'wrote-in a. gletter to Col. Elias Dayton: "The as drastic as the British Official. Se- ! . necessity for procuring good intelli..: crets Act, or the espionage .laws of gence is apparent and need not- be most other democratic countries.; All further-urged- - all that remains for that is: proposed is a.bill which'would -m to add is that you keep the whole-. whole- cover Aatedybinform of >lically .matter- as. secret as :possible. For the Intelligence yr. the heads rector of.tha other- '=-Pon secrecy', success depends in_. -,mostenterprises of the kind and for, cies as intelligence,: sonrces and` methodgi".~. ant"?f it, they are- generally. de-. feated,howevpr-xeljplanned:",, Jack Maury who recently retired as an assistant secretary. of defense, served 18 Years in, the CIA, includinjeight years as:.' chief of Soviet operation:: and five years in charge of CU relations: witlJCongress_,, Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDPO5SOO62OR0005O1320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 i 1 L' s As i'L'iBED U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 18 December 1978 Washington ~ho@p@m, Groping for ways to deal with the :Iran crisis, National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski is calling in more Outside experts. Not only is for- mer Under Secretary of State George Ball sitting in on Iran policy talks, bur also Richard Helms, former CIA di- rector and ambassador to Iran, is be- ing consulted. Reports are-.flyiag that CIA chief Stanfield Turner will be moved to another job because of intelligence foulups-possibly to replace Alexan- der Haig as head of NATO. Turner 's successor? John DeButts, retiring head of American Telephone & Tele- graph, is said to be a top candidate. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501320001-0 THE WASHINGTON POST 10 December 1978 Article appeared on page C-6 Fu 'i our, intellig coliec e ts: amAW pro`vida for .the; cantlaning hiring iurnan _Elemen in Intelligence Gs therlnr~ his lettaC* Thee?Paet- ["Americ a Spy, ;moet nniversaIIys sce d~: ' the activitiw and that o-:aimswere to eni. ~a .; accessrrto? motiveak' tc ;iateation:~~ . nttnue -to; provide the irreplaceably; thoughts and plans. They will'alwaya be:~T . element of. human: intelligence is onr vital twoio ofwcoantr~s saciaity:'. :ewlectim th ., .t r w. enn4i l~rin they:, dog age .ihumaaf.coDeatt~;~ that are 'sensible sad' collection: permit ur twixtend our-m o6w& ionw A&ft-, .Gle them. ate of this irecta aa! mncb ..todag-as `:is aa-3nezact.~deace and relies heavily. the agency oa tha reporter "s-1 tened. Can -you-still dial- into that govern ment computer bank, John?" the law- yer asked, explaining to the reporter. "Godf How 1, wish I had been in the col- lections business when he had that 1 :code and aecess:.I mean to tell you- thisl guy could find out anything about any-: body from that computer." Ellsworth explains that he no longer has direct computer access. "There; were too many abuses;" he says. "The1 wrong kind of people- were: using it, Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 A` I I i CLEF ,A.+UP eN PAGE BALTIMORE SUN 2S NOVE BER 1979 'viaence doesn:'t.con Urm' ? Washington (AP)-Carter administra? tive fallout during the pant three months," i tioa? officials say they are increasingly the institute said.. doubtful that thert- was a nu- Officials . clear test in the South Atlantic September said there had been "absolute- Iv nothing" besides. the initial- reports , 22.:.;`{_ .from-New Zealand to- corroborate Theiofiidals, asking that they :not be-'-- a s -dear test. No seismographic or radicae-J . named; said it. is-unlikely that -;-- 7 P ,five evidence has turned up; scieatifie?panel convened by the adminis- .-: tratioqwill be able-t6 conclusively explain'`, Noe have American intelliease a en- whaVeauseda flasbe-detectad:by &recoo,.isles come uo-ai any MR& 71 Find that 'naissancrsatellitosthadate The flub,-very significant 11 a country. like South wassii i -to?thatxtaated-Irdetooadw; Africa had set off z test,.dozens. of people: o[ ' "a Cieerdevicei Would know about it;, or at least about a ?- -At e'time the flaair:was publicly die part of it. But there's been nothing, ' on closed': Ia?. late- October,: offidals': said it::: official said. closely resembled t lo"eld nuclear test worldwide search; t no corroborating - evidence - has4 been found, to indicate a nudeatmplosion occurred,-they said. iw~. The latest- blow Ito the-nudear eiplo- -sioa theory was delivered late last weekat the New., Zealand Institute of Nuclear' Sciences.' Scientists there had previously announced the detection - of: radioactive fallout. they:. 'believed might have. come': from a late September blast in the South .. f Atl= But on Friday, the institute said, "New measurements ?... do not confirm our, earlier results - The Institute said its final conclusion was that the fallout does not contain certain-isotopes that would have been pres+eat in a September 22 blast -There l's no evidencetof fresh radioac- nud ar-tes Vn AtLantIe,r Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 SPIES -- THE 'JORLC OVEF Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 ARTICL2 r.PPT FD ON PACE SOUTH AFRICA'S YOUNG SPYMASTER 10 DECEMBER 1979 with no known experience in intelligence. In one sense, Botha's choice of Lukas Barnar , an outsider untaint y t years uence- uying scan dad, is reminis- cent o rP''resi ent Carter's appointment of an outsider to polish up the tarnished image o Me CIA. I he sin anties between Bar- Hendrik van den Bergh was the archetypi- cal spymaster. The grim, steel-spectacled general founded South Africa's Bureau of State Security (BOSS), and his unques- tioned authority over security operations made him one of the most powerful men in the country. But van den Bergh, 64, was forced to resign because of his part in South Africa's information scandal, and it took Prime Minister Pieter Bothanearly a year to find a successor. The choice was surprisi 6- is pe fted with biblicions to "the s of God," and he strongly favors the e of swaardmagsansie.-the sword-power sanction. Barnard believes South Africa should develop a nuclear weapon-and make it known to the world as a deterrent. Like Botha, Barnard be- lieves that South Africa should create "a self-sustaining com- munity of states in sputhern Af- rica-with white and black governments-as a regional bastion of power against the Communists' path toward world domination." As direc- tor of the Department of Na- tional Security, the new name for BOSS, he will help plan an activist foreign policy-includ- ing possible military interven- tion in Zimbabwe Rhodesia if leftists seize power there. Barnard grew up in the cautions politicians that the fi- nal solution cannot be a mili- tary one. "A well-motivated and progressive society is defi- nitely the most effective counter to terrorism," he ar- gues. But his Old Testament beliefs and his outspoken views on nuclear weapons make him the perfect executor of an in- creasingly aggressive foreign policy-as well as a handy scapegoat in the event that such a policy should backfire. CHRYSS GALASSI with PETER YOUNGHUSBA.W in Cape Town STAT hard, thornbush country of Southwest Af- rica, now known as Namibia. The son of an educational administrator, he studied at the University of the Orange Free State in Bloemfontein, where he still resides as dean of the faculty of political science. He en- countered there the religious idea of a "Christian state" that still dominates his personal philosophy. "The government re- ceives the sword from the hand of God to guarantee interstate stability and provide justice in a crooked and twisted genera- tion," Barnard wrote in one of his essays. HANDY SCAPEGOAT: Barnard is not all bul- lets and bombast. While he bluntly advo- cates a "mailed fist" approach to South Africa's problems with terrorism, he also Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 02f PAGE NEW YORK TIMES 3 DEC 4B 1979 Head of Blunt Spy Ring Named by London Paper i LONDON. Dec. 2 (UPI)-Thespymas- ter who controlled one of the most effec- tive Soviet espionage rings in Britain probably operated in the United States too, The Observer said today. The Sunday newspaper identified-the spymaster as Ernst Henry, a German Communist now living and working in Moscow as an author. It said he ran a British spy ring that betrayed top secrets to the Soviet Union and was believed to have followed one of his British agents to Washington. l ;_ .,,,, ' ; The article followed a sari es the news- paper published last month an. Soviet es- pionage_ Prime Minister ? Margaret Thatcher subsequently disclosed that Sir Anthony Blunt, who served for years as art adviser to Buckingham Palace, had been a Soviet spy. He was deprived of his knighthood after Mrs. Thatcher's report to Parliament.. Mr. Blunt was one of. many spies re- cruited from high-level circles in Britain before World War II who infiltrated the British Foreign Office and the. secret service. After his unmasking last month, Mr. Blunt-said he never knew the name of his spymaster, but The Observer said its research disclosed that Mr. Henry was the man to whom Blunt betrayed secrets. "The man is a former member of the Central Commitee of the German Com- munist Party who came to Britain in the mid-1930's," The Observer said. "Now aged 72 or 73. he lives in Moscow under the name of Semyon Nikolayevich Roe- tovsky. but is better known as Ernst Henry, the author of occasional articles in Izvestia and the literary Gazette.' Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 ARTICLE APPEAR ED //~~ ON PAGE______ THE WASHINGTON POST 3 December 1979 R. Emmett Tyrrell fr.\ So Civil, fora S py, Why did he not shoot himself? Of course, he is an eminent art historian. and so there are aesthetic considera- tions. Colors might clash, and then once the trigger is pulled one has absolutely no control over the- patterns those colors might leave on carpet and wall. Still, modern science has provided us with an amplitude of civilized intro meats for one's happy dispatch. There are pills and potions, and there remains the old heave-ho into the Thames, pock ets filled with lead, "Dos Kapital" strapped to the waist. , ^ . . Apparently England's Mr. Anthony Blunt will take no such course of a tion. Blunt, knighted in 1958 and stripped of his knighthood last month, was on Nov. 15 exposed as the."fourth .Maclean-Philb man" in the Burg spy ring. He had been a renowned member of the English establishment, the queen's own art curator, a Cam. bridge graduate who for 40 years ear joyed all the benefits and confidence of English society. Now he admits to ha ing made "an appalling mistake," to wit: he became a Soviet spy. In the '31s he was a Soviet "talent scout" at Cam- bridge. During the war, he sedulously carried classified documents from his lofty position in Britain's counterintelli- gence agency, MI5, to the progressives over at the Soviet Embassy. And in 1951 he was back in contact with the Soviets,- apparently assisting. his friend Guy Burgess in absconding to Mother Rus- sia. Now, does he feel any shame? After dishonoring friends. in- the highesL realms of English life and betraying his country to one of the most barbarous regimes of the century, is he.remorse? ful?Notatall. ~..' On Nov. 20 he held a -hews-confer. ence" in the comfortable surroundings of the board . room.' of ; the - London Times..There, with four carefully s lected Journalists and before repairing to a lovely lunch of smoked trout, ve4 cheese, fruit salad and wine, Blunt deigned to answer questions.. He also brought a carefully worded apologia. it all no trace of shame was detectable- not even remorse. Rather, this honor. ary fellow of Trinity College, Cam. bridge, explained his years of treason augustly and sanctimoniously, some' what as though he were explaining at life. devoted to the Society for the! Prevention of Cruelty to Animals or to the promotion of vegetarianism and all the arcane uplift that goes with it. ."In the mid-1930s it seemed to m and to many of my contemporaries that the Communist Party and Russia co stituted the only firm bulwark against fascism," asserts Blunt, a man whose life and work had revealed so little bi. terest in politics that his closest friends) doubted he had any politics whatever. How did he come to such a carefully' calculated political position? And his; perception of. the Soviets as the staunch bulwark against fascism-was it wob. bled by the Hitler-Stalin pact, the purgei trials or Orwell's reports on the Spanish Civil War? Apparently not; he served his Soviet-friends loyally throughout the war. tical con l f " - i po Phis was a case o science against loyalty to country. I, chose conscience.... I could not de-; nounce my friends," declares the high minded Blunt. But, of course, in betray- ing his country he betrayed any friend living there who felt loyalty to its gov- ernment and to its ideals. Who were his friends? One was Burgess, his fellow traitor. Blunt describes him as "one of the- most 'remarkable, most brilliant and.-making a distinction, one of the most intelligent people I have ever known.'London's Spectator puts it dif ferently: "Burgess was a drunken rake, 'a homosexual with a voracious-appetite fog the gutter." Some will find Blunts words veryi reassuring. No. one was killed duringi the war as a result of his services to the Soviets, he has said. Well, Blunt) has been described as one of Eng. land's greatest scholars; he ought to+ know. When it comes to indiscretions) of the sort committed by Blunt on be-i half of, progress and, enlightenment, there is an. entire subculture of lized people on both sides of the Atianl tic willing to let bygones be bygones The self-righteousness of Blunts; apologia, his imperturbable hauteur- those who know and love the Hiss saga are familiar with the phenomenon. Nor should we be surprised that-various of his sleek and wellborn friends are tear-i fully .extending their condolences i Soon he will be back in their elegant; dining rooms. There will. lamentably,: be difficult moments. Does one men- tion Mrs. Thatcher? Is Solzhenitsyn a sore subject? Should one a goodi word for socialist realism? . Yet there is something troubling l about this case. Here is a man who de. voted his whole life to the singularly:. elevated subject of beauty. Neverthe-j less, he betrayed his country and his i culture, as Malcolm Muggeridge ob- serves, "to help advance the power and' influence of the most ruthless, PhilitI tine and materialistic autocracy the world has ever known." It is as though a lover of antique furniture fell in love with a termite. What is there in Blunt's life that will explain his "appalling misl take"? .. ,. The writer is editor-in.chief of The I American Spectator. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 ARTICLE LFPEl1M ON PAGR_ ~~ Five hands in'.- the game: of betrayal.. By R.T. Crowley . Mr. Crowley recently retired as a senior official of the CIA " after. the thirds man, the fourth man, after the fourth man, the fifth man, always beside you WASHINGTON STAR 2 DECEMBER 1979 Eight years later, on January 23, 1963, Philby vanished from Beirut where, a month earlier, he had admitted (to Nicholas Eliot of M16) his role as a Soviet agent. On July 1, 1963, Edward Heath told Commons: "... [we now know] as a result of an admission by Mr. Philby himself that he worked for the Soviet authorities before 1946 and that in 1951 he, in fact, warned Mac- Lean through Burgess that the se- curity services were about to take ac- gton ..tion against him ...." ... - old Adrian Russell Philby., .. As a A somewhat older Marcus Lipton result of the American-Israeli secret asked:".,,.. does the statement mean intelligence connection. each of that Mr. Philby was, in fact, the these three spies was identified,. 'third mad'... Maciean's identification leading to ~.>> Mr. Heath replied-"Yes.- sir." - Burgess', thence to Philby"s. . The In the 12_ years between the Bur- subsequent manipulation, which in- gess 7firSt man)-=MacLean (second cluded providing them-with inteul. man) escape and Philby's final re= gence information, to mislead the Soviets, makes the overall operation treat to Moscow, it was generally, is-4 .. - , sumed that the "third man- had 11 a classic case 'Identification warned the two other spies that they) occurred as the result of any nub- or at least. MacLean had come under could have suspicion of MIS..Although Philby's b of-11 chance #4 circumstances. a on in n t Cyril Connolly. MI. The events leading to the 1951' flight to the Soviet Union by the-. British Foreign Office officials, Bur- gess and MacLean, makF an unlikely tale. Its improbability makes it un- suitable as fiction and almost unac- ceptable as fact The public's awareness of a still deeper complexity began-four years and four months later, on October 25, 1955. when Lt. CoLMarcus Lipton rose in Commons and put a startling question to Anthony Eden: " . . . Has the prime minister made up his mind to cover up, at all costs, the dubious 'third man' activities of Mr. Harold Philby?... " Philby, an ascending star in M16, had been the linkman between the British Service, the FBI and the embryonic CIA during his assign. ment to Washington (1949-1951). Lipton had to wait until November 7 for Harold Macmillan, then foreign secretary, to reply for the govern- ment: ". _ . I have no reason to con- clude that Mr?..Philby has, at-any time, betrayed. the. interests of this country...:' ..; .,.: Philby, meanwhile,. called.a press conference at his. mother's London flat and in a. most disingenuous-way. suggested that..Lipton probably would not chance the-consequences of repeating the accusation without the protection of Pgarhiamentary im- munity. He went on, to confess -that the last time he had spoken to a Com munist,"... knowing he was a Com-_ monist..:.,"was in 1934. Philby was seen as a good-tem- pered martyr whose reputation had been maliciously impaired. He suc- ceeded in conveying the notion that his sense of duty and obligation under the Official Secrets Act denied him the freedom to act in his own' warning to Burgess was timely and urgent, he could not have known rom s remo a from his t in Washin post Those in OSO, most notably James Angleton were pleased to have the Israeli relationship to themselves. And over time, not only during the Truman years, the rela- tionship produced some remarkable results and intelligence coups. One 1, in particular is worth mentioning briefly. It involves the identification': and subsequent. manipulation of three British intelligence officials who were Soviet spies. Donald Mac-' Lean ... Guy. Burgess. - . and Har. , ip Uw" %.% , con- veys the unambiguous use of an agent - perhaps still' another num bered man. exactly when the security service - In this case it is "Basil"who as the , would move. fifth man, played a critical role in' L On Friday, May 25, 1951, (Mac- 194&49. "Basil" was uniquely quasi- the following Monday. The interro. gation was to be conducted by Wil. liam James Skardon, who had gained public recognition as "the man who . co a ora- broke Klaus Fuchs." ' - - ' tion was in reporting to the Soviets By mid-day on the 25th; Burgess the day-to-day progress of the US-UK .learned from someone that time was : Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. running but. That evening he met, MacLean as a non-scientist looked to at with Beacon MacLean- Shaw and had a Tatsfield light M meal ..Basil,'.' a distinguished physicist. 1 ac- . ,Lean's home. where he was intro- duced is Mrs. MacLean as "Roger Styles," a Foreign Office colleague.~j That night the two men boarded the channel ship Falaise at Southhmpton cans 38th birthday), Herbert. fied to influence and report on the Morrison, then foreign secretary, activities of Donald MacLean. They finally gave authorization to MI5 to shared a commonality of interests, interrogate MacLean at 11 a.m. on I friends and advantages. More impor- tantly, they were active Soviet agents committed to strengthening the USSR by weakening the United, States The main area of ll b ' for technical advice. Soviets Slip Up At the end of World War ff. both the U.S. and British security ele- and began the first evasion o>r their] ments became aware of the loss of passage to Moscow: ] important, highly classified infor- ` Kl mation from the British Embassy in . Namedbyhraelis Washington. Intensive investiga-. The-"someone" who had provided the spies with such'an immediate re- port* of the-precise terms of Morri-. son's decision had gained the confi- dence at a very high level in the Foreign Office or the security sere .ice. To the MIS officers who bore the private outrage and public. scorn, it- .was evident that there was still' another numbered man., In the 1977 book The Armies of Ignorance,, author W.R. Corso, in describing intelligence successesn based on. U.S.-Israeli cooperation t wrote:-':' tions were underway' when the Soviet consulate in. New York pro- vided a clue in the form of poor 'radio communications security. The CONTIN. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 lapse led to the decrypting of mes- sages to Moscow which named "Homer" as the British Embassy spy. Surveillance of "Basil" disclosed his association with MacLean in noc- turnal homosexual adventures. "Basil" was then approached sepa rately and persuaded to accept re- cruitment by the U.S. rather than exposure and arrest as a Soviet agent. "Basil" acquiesced, identified MacLean as "Homer" and for some time following, acted as a link be- tween MacLean and the Soviets in New York and Washington Two years following the publicap- pearance of Burgess and MacLean in Moscow, the "someone" who had warned Burgess of the Morrison decision to allow interrogate MacLean voluntarily' approached the British security authorities and confessed his role. In exchange for a full disclosure of his work on be0alf of the Soviets, he was not subjected to prosecution. He, too, had worked in the wartime MIS and, by reason of his "old boy" status and social prominence, retained close and con-, tinuing contact with seniors in the Foreign Office and the security serv- ice. He is "Maurice," the fourth man. In The Fourth Man - the new book which caused the public un- masking of art expert Anthony Blunt as Maurice last month - au- thor Anthony Boyle succeeds in presenting an engaging version of this bizarre story based on somenew evidence. In the introduction, he ac- knowledges the contributions by the FBI and CIA in releasing documents under the Freedom of Information Act. Boyle also acknowledges the "personal guidance of former mem- bers of the American intelligence community' which led [him] to the independent discovery of Basil and Maurice." Although these unnamed Britons spied. for the Soviet Union, both confessed:. "Basil when cor- nered in Washington and Maurice many years later in London."-Both men were pardoned and received the assurance of governmental protection. To name them now, ac- cording to Boyle, would give rise to gray-mail proceedings based on extra-legal considerations involving. U.S. and UK national security. Litvinov's Insight o` Y Boyle attributes the: idea of at- tempting to subverts middle- and upper- class intellectuals to Maxim Litvfnov, one-time*Soviet envoy to London. who, among;Russians, had an unusual understanding of Eng- lish class structure and the peculiar role of mutual trust which.bound,', the establishment.. i.'. I .. . Alexander Orlov, the dean of pre.. World War II intelligence defectors, saw the plan develop differently- ". .. Chiefs of the NKVD hit upon an idea which solved this most dif- ficult problem (i.e? the penetration of and promotion within the British establishment) as if by magic. One of the chiefs approached the problem not only as an intelligence man but as a sociologist as well. . . "Accordingly, in the early 1930s, the NKVD residenturas concen- trated their energy on the recruit- ment of young men of influential families. The political climate of that period was very favorable for such an undertaking, and the idea of joining a 'secret society' held. a strong appeal for the young people who dreamed of a better world and of heroic deeds.:. . "What they wanted wa a purpose in life and it seemed tom that ;hey had found it. By t}a:tr mental makeup and outlook the/, jteminded one very much of the yoRussian Decembrists of the past ntury. They brought into the Soviet intelli- gence the true fervor of new converts and the ideal-i ism which their intelligence chiefs had lost long ago....' Burgess went to Eton, MacLean to Gresham's and Philby to Westminister school, each in tarn consid- ered a natural forcing house for sons of the ruling: class. At Cambridge, new boys allied themselves with one of the prevailing three major sects: The Dandy/Aesthetes, the Rogue/Rebels or the Hearties. Burgess, MacLean and Philby - a homosexual; a bisexual and a heterosexual afflicted with satyria- sis - seem an odd troika for recruitment by the Soviets. Disgusted With Russia While still at university each openly professed the conviction that communism was the only recipe. for a stable and just world. Later, each aligned him- self with the right wing and gave voice. in support of Hitler, Mussolini and Franco. Each visited the Soviet Union and all three came away with what seems a sincere, though mild, disgust with the Rus-. sian people, preferring to defer final judgment until the "building of socialism in one country" had progressed beyond the chaos they witnessed.. Throughout the Spanish civil war, the three maintained right-wing postures - Burgess with the BBC, Philby as a London Times correspondent with the Franco forces and MacLean as a rising Foreign Office diplomat. With the beginning of the Second War, Burgess joined the Special Operations Execu- tive and found a berth there for Philby. Later, Philby moved to M16 where he was counter-intelli- gence chief for the Iberian section. Defector Betrayed . In September 1945, Konstantine Volkov ap- proached a British official in Istanbul and asked for political asylum in Britain for himself and his wife. He identified himself as an NKVD officer and claimed to know the true names of three Soviet agents operating within the British government, two in the Foreign Office and one as head of a counter-intelligence, organization in London: A re- port of the meeting was promptly sent to Maj. Gen. Stewart Menzies, chief of M16, by pouch since. Vol- kov kov had also reported that the Soviets were inter- cepting and successfully decrypting British.cypher traffic. Menzies proposed the dispatch of David Rob- erts of MI6 to Istanbul to handle negotiations with Volkov. Roberts claimed an unconquerable aver- sion to flying and Menzies then turned to Philby, asking that he depart London for Istanbul by air. Philby, on reading the Volkov file before leaving London, called for an urgent clandestine meeting with his Soviet controller in London and reported Volkov's "treachery." By the time Philby arrived in Turkey, Volkov had been seized, brutally beaten and transported to the Soviet Union by a special military aircraft on an unscheduled flight. Philby in his KGB-sanctioned version of the event con- cedes that Volkov's information would have de- stroyed him had not the Soviets intervened. Lurid Behavior Burgess' outrageous behavior, his drunkenness and total disregard of personal hygiene formed the basis. for the Evelyn Waugh character "Basil Seal" about whom Waugh wrote: "... He seldom de- scended to the artifice of the toilet . - ." Burgess was flattered by Waugh's attentions and took. several autographed first editions with him to Mos- cow. ~.. .,u?i. CONTINtJ Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 MacLean's uncontrollable rages and suicidal drinking bouts continued to be indulged by an im- plausibly forgiving Foreign Office. In 1963, when they were joined in Moscow by Philby, the melan- choly trio pretended fulfillment and gave..a brave face to the West. Philby's former wife Aileen, deserted in-England, soon died. When Eleanor, his third wife, found Mos- cow uncongenial, Philby turned his attentions to Melinda MacLean. Burgess. unable to form easy homosexual rela- tionships in the workers' paradise, was morose until the visiting Tom Driberg led him to an under- ground public convenience in Moscow where he met "questing male slays. ..", including Slava, the electrician who later became his roommate. Bur- gess died, pseudononymously. on an-iron bed in the Moscow Botkin Hospital as Jim Andreyevich Eliot. His brother Nigel, the'MacLeans, Philby and a mournful Slava attended the memorial service. Burgess had bequeathed to Philby his books and clothes when he died. Among the books were the signed first editions of Waugh; among the clothes, a few Eton-made suits: MacLean's eventual loss of his wife to Philby and the Burgess bequest were seen by the social historian Martin Green as "cessions of property which, perhaps, indicate the usual style of transactions between Philby and,his more flamboy- ant cohorts -each, in different ways, made submis- sion to him. Few Triumphs Left Burgess is dead. MacLean is seldom seen. Philby's last reported operational success was the theft of MacLean's wife. Kim Philby is best remembered for his betrayals. of British agents, Albanians, school chums, various wives and other women, the British Establishment, Volkov and the many service colleagues who have their trust_ Today he is redundant to the needs of modern Soviet intelligence, having little left to contribute and no other place to go. He lives in surroundings in which his urbanity and disarming stammer count for little. As a matter of course he lives iso- lated among people for whom he has always had scant regard and less respect. His Russian superiors know him for what he is, an aging, congenital de- ceiver, recruited more than 40 years ago for pur- poses which have been obscured by the passage of time. Among those victims of his treachery who are still alive there is a small, vindictive wish that he will live a very long life. Unresolved Question The Fourth Man seems to have had the advantage of interpretive insights as provided by the parable speakers among the senior retired service officers who had direct -knowledge of the events gained while in positions of responsibility. Still unclear is the proposition that the U.S. permitted Philby's con- tinued participation in a joint US-UK operation in Albania at a time when his Soviet connections were suspicioned if not confirmed. - Sir Dick White-one-time chief of MIS and later chief of M16, was given the Augean task of restoring the service. His political masters viewed the case as a manufactory of further embarrassment and ad- verse political reaction. The temporizing of Eden and others, who would not confront the problem. inhibited the investigation and contributed to the massive damage. - - Maurice lives comfortably in England, Basil near Washington. Both have enjoyed distinguished pub- lic careers which have brought them high honors. It is conceivable that their secret careers, though less well known, might have had greater import on the world. Perhaps one day they will record the de- tails of their. work as ideologically driven Soviet agents and document this nearly extinct species. -Followingpublication ofBoyle 'sThe Fourth Man, (UK title: The Climate of Treason), Blunt was iden- tified by Prime Minister Thatcher as Mavrica The British press hasnamed Wilfred Mann asBasiL Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 CHICAGO DAILY CALUMET 17 November 1979 012 vkEicn tAttorney Hopeful By Mark Klesling (Staff Writer) The deeision, * to ; uphold' the. con- viction of accused spy. William Kam- piles by the 7th Circuit Court of Ap- peals Thursday has not halted action on the part of Kampiles' attorney to vindicate his client. Although all nine points of the ap- peal were rejected by the three-judge panel, attorney Michael Monica in- dicated yesterday that he will file a petition for an appeal review before the entire 7th Circuit, but will also file a motion in federal court in Hammond for a new trial. Kampiles, convicted one year ago today in Hammond before U.S. Judge Phil McNagny, remains locked up at the Metropolitan Correctional Center in Chk go, where he has been since his arrest Aug. 17, 1978. - . "We may state all nine points again," Monico stated. "We're going to raise the same issues before the whole (appeal) panel." . The nine points dealt with the suf- ficiency of government evidence, the adequacy of the court's handling of pre-trial publicity,. the district court's treatment of the Kampiles'- con- fession, Monico's allegation that Kampiles was coerced into confessing by FBI agents and the court's refusal to grant the defense an - hour's con= tinuance to call a witness in from. Chicago. The 29-page opinion of the appeals court went into all nine points raised by Monico, but the attorney indicated yesterday he has, another plan of at- tack for a retrial motion. , -? According to Monico, he plans-to in- troduce evidence linl$Ing two men con- 'victed of espionage in California in early 1977 to the leaking of the same information Kampiles was convicted of selling in February, and March of 1978: Monico cited the April 29, 1979 edition of The New -York Times as providing sketchy.-information about convicted spies Andrew Lee and Christopher Boyce which alleged, Monico said, "a year before Kampiles sold the documents, the Soviets had information about our photo satellite system." "Exactly what they (Lee and Boyce) had, I don't know," Monico admitted, "but the article said that among the hundreds of documents sold by Boyce and Lee were plans for theKH-11." It is the technical manual for the KH-11 orbiting surveillance satellite f that Kampiles was,.- convicted. of selling on a vacation to Greece. He received $3,000 from Soviet agent Michael Zavali for the booklet, and the ,information compromised the U.S. space technology and jeopar dized the Strategic Arms Limitation ,Treaty (SALT) II talks, according to :the CIA. .- As a-former CIA_-employee, Kam piles had access to the KH-11 manual everyday in his job, and was con victed of taking the document before leaving the agency in November, 1977. He had only worked for the agency for eight -,months, and was allegedly, having some problems with his job. However, Monica' is also disputing the CIA contention that the sale of the ddl urn nL actuality compromised any U.Si t security -or', put the-- SALT negotiations in ieopartly.."We have statements " from Department' of Defense people who were at the SAL II talks that seem to contradict the statements of the CIA on the effects of the, alleged,- compromise, - Monica said..: -- Monica- Madded the motion will' filed for the new trial before McNagn as well as the appeal review petition in the 7th Circuit within the month. Kampiles, 24, graduated from Chicago's Washington High School, 114th and Avenue 0, in 1972 and from Indiana University in 1975. He movedi to an apartment at 7845 Hohman.Ave., Munster, in mid-1978. He was arrested; at the apartment six weeks afteri moving in with Perry Felecos, a Mun-i ster'police officer and lifelong friend. ' Kampiles' mother, Nicoletta, still ! lives in Hegewisch at 13558 Burley i Ave. 1.~ Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 SALT II Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 ~iLT1CLE AP: L. ON PAGE White House As. By George C. Wilson w..else T.A aua wear The White House is askiat defense contractors to We President Carter an assist is persuading the Senate to approve the strategic arms limi limitation treaty (SALT M ' ' that Several executives of firms produce weapons for the government told the Washington post they ha been called over the last few weeks by White House staff memo the Whit ?. Anne Wexler, head House public liaison office, confirnud that defense contractors are among the businesses her- staff had called on behalf. Of SALT' IL routine." She termed the calls "very She answered "abs Autelp not" when asked if there-was any White House implication that futubre defense con- tracts would be linked to SALT U suppo ade to Wexler said the calla, b beinother g ng made burl- defense contractors ad,e to be nesses are in- the "ate House brief- followed-later by Whi ings on the arms treaty.;, Most executives . contacted about e SALT II, Wexler said, told the White House staffer who called, them that' they would have to checl4 with their .top. management. before .,giving the firm's stand on the treaty:------ .: . ..One aerospace executive, said he THE WASHINGTON POST 4 December 1979 Arms Firms to Lobby for SALT II was called: by: Judy Mercado,: a White House fellow working for one of the asked if his firm, which is nation's top -defense ' contractom would:get.behind:the treaty.:. ; "They want us to contact our con- gressional delegation," he said. "I told them I would have to check with my :top management - and report- back. They -do.: this kind of thing all the time. T considered it routine." . Mercado said she. called defense rcontractors, as well -as others, on be- half of SALT U. She replied, "I would rather not, comment" when asked 1 what she had??requeated. defense con- tractors to- do. - _ - . "Ot course. the intent L to help us with SALT:- Wexler said of the;phose conversations with defense contractors. Mercado was, "doing nothin_li-,im- proper" in making those calls.... ,:.?~ Some defense executives, told :The Post that the calls seemed to, be White House pressure to support, the treaty. "They really shouldn't- -leer'diet way, Wexler replied when told about, this interpretation. Some business Ot I :ecutives will be. for: the treaty. some 1 will be against it, she said.. She putthe Carter admihistratioXs .SALT II lobbying in the same ca ,gory as the earlier effort to make tIe case to the business commuaity,fQr-I ; the Panama Canal treaties..._,,_-..,,,, Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDPO5SOO62OR0005O1320001-0 ARTICLE APPEAM ON PAGE NEW YORK TIMES 2 DECEMBER 1979 What Price SALT?- Quite Considerable Among the reasons Henry A. Ki" ger is not very popular at the State De. partment and the White House these days is his lukewarm, at best, support for SALT I1, even though he drafted two-thirds of the . arms. limitation treaty while be was Secretary of State. Mr- Kissinger, . the charge goes,, is playing politics to win the hearts and minds of Republican Presidential can- didates.. - . Neverthelesi: last week Defense 'Secretary Harold Brown negotiated personally with Mr. Kissinger and Sam Nunn, the Georgia Democrat who, is the Senate's reigning expert on mill. tary affairs. over higher levels of fense spending. Such is the Admininis.. tration's need to win wavering skep- tics on SALT, that when Mr. Nunn told Mr. Brown that Mr. Kissinger would be present for their private talk, the Defense Secretarydid not object - More to the point, the Administra, ` Lion approved a rise. of nearly 5 per- cent (President Carter had earlier an. nounced 3) for the fiscal year begin. ring Oct_ .1. 1960. Mat would mean a Pentagon appropriations request near SI60 billion; the current (1980) year's request was $138.6 billion. Even more spending may not push. SALT through the Senate. A draft re.. port by the Armed Services Commit- tee, disclosed: last week. recam? mended "major changes" in the treaty teat, Including eliminating Mos. cow's "heavy" intercontinental mis. sites and limiting its Backfire bomber (not covered by the treaty). Examina- tion of those: supporting the report raises to seven: the antitreaty Demo. crats now in the open.. That means at least 15. Republicans are needed for ratification, a prospect that, at the mo- ment; is doubtfui."=` BarbaraSlavia and Milt Freudenhelm Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDPO5SOO62OR0005O1320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 ARTICLE 'APPEARED ON PAGE THE WASHINGTON POST 2 December 1979 S enate*.SAL T Debate.-I Not Seen Lilely :? Begin This Year ? By Robert G. Kaiser' ~. w..uinason rapt sett wear ` ~': '~. - ::Because of the- Iranian' crisis ands an overcrowded CIngressional calendar, the Senate debate on. the :;kLT II= treaty is unlikely to. begim this year Jources predicted last week::. ,,:Pro- and anti-SALT maneuvering eontlnues- tn_ *ensely in the Senate, -but both sines now expect the floor debate to begin in earnest no, sooner than. Jan- aary. It may be,-difficult to get' a-final vote on the: oceaty before'the~New Hampshire.primasy'on Feb.: ~8. some Senate sources say.': Friends and, foes of the- treaty agree. that!=contfn- ued slippage in the SALT timetable is likely to help the treaty's opponents more than the Carter istration. ;:...,??w 4 .." e::~ < z.K 7 +!' The- Senate- majority leader, Robert. C.. Byrd '(D- W.Va.), has expressed dismay at the-propsict that SALT will be on the floor during the presidential primaries, but that now appears to be inevitable Byrd told reporters yesterday that in view-of Sen. ate delays on the windfall profits tax bill and of the need for a week or so for the Armed Services Com- mittee to study -five-year protections for military spending, it's only marginally likely that the treaty would even be made the pending..Senate?-business before the scheduled Dec. 21 adjournmentI And that final vote wouldn't come until many weeks, perhaps months, into the 1980 session. Some opponents of. tl,e treaty scored.publie-rela- ions points last week:'. with. a strategic leak of draft report. that the-Sedate Armed Services Com- mittee may consider soon that is sharply critical of D,4LT IL l~..?;.?'=` Aides to senators hostile to SALT 11 leaked the document,..a 3I-page, report written.- by staffers Nhich had no..officiak status; and -claimed that 11 members of the 17 member committee- would en- 'Zbrse it. At leas one- of-the- alleged=1Lsupporters: Robert . forgan_ (D-N.C),,said he ;would oppose-thepro. aiosed report',it tt tomes -before the- committee; but .4here appeared'to be-majority supportfora strong 3hti-treaty statement, if the committee decides to 'make anrstatement of this kind.. ; - 1 -- Treaties are outside the, jurisdiction of the Armed Services Committee, and some senators, probably Including Chairman John C. Stennis (D-IYliss.), may appose it. committee finding on SALT IL _; , _. Treaty supporters on the committee were angered! by the leaks. Ones. Gary Hart (D-Colo.), called the leaked draft report "a hoax." since it had no official status, and had not even been circulated to the full; committee. Numerous aides and other Senate sources said! ',the report was the work of Richard Perle. the re- sourceful defense policy aide to Sen Henry M. Jack-; son (D-Wash.). Perle acknowledged helping write the report, which he called a "collaborative effort" of several _ Senate offices. Behind the scenes last- week, the Carter adminis- tration continued its efforts to pls.ate senators (and 'former -secretary of state- Henry: A.. Kissinger). who have demanded Increased defense spending as the price for theii-support of SALT IL Defense Secretary- Harold Brown met during the week with Sen. Sam. Nunn (D-Ga.) and Kissinger,-1 and with both, Byrd and Stennis to discuss additions to the defense budget Administration officials have 'also met with more dovish senators who are unen- 4hustastic about increased defense spending to es plaid their position. ; %ccording wsources; the president is likely' too approve- a 3.6 percent real increase, after] .inflation, in the fiscal'1981 defense budget. This is a, 'much biSSer? increase than Carter planned before 1 Ee enseespending.-became an issue in the SALT de.' ft-- the- subsequent. four years, these sources said, the president will probably propose annual in-1 fireases of more than 4 percent per year in defense spending If _appropriated,.`tnese increases could-i zing the defense budget close to 5200 billion a year 1'-198& However, strong congressional opposition a.auch increases is expected. Munn declined to say last week what his incliner tiens on SALT are, adding that he wanted to wait ;for, the- president's final decisions on the defense' Jjedget, which may come this week. Some SALT opponents in the Senate began pre. 'dieting that Nunn would end up supporting the; treaty,-though. perhaps not with much enthusiasm' Administration lobbyists regard: his support as cru-1 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 ARTICLE APPEARED ON PAGE 0 - a"'. THE WASHINGTON POST 2 December 1979 es for NATO: - I New A No- liyArthurThw7JCox T N TWO WEEKS the NATO alliance wM decide whether to deploy 464 ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe which have sufficient range to destroy targets in the Soviet Union. This proposal is ill-conceived - not because Soviet President Brezhnev and Foreign Minister Gromykooppose it, but-because it may mark the and of any further arms control agreements and a substantial :increase in the possibility of accidental nuclear war.. The ;nuclear weapon package for NATO is directly tied to the , SALT U treaty, but it abandons an essential principle of ..SALT even before the treaty is rectified by the Senate Ground-launched cruise missiles cannot be monitored by intelligence. If they are deployed, verification of a, SALT -~ It has long beenvnderstood that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union would risk arms control ag- reements based on trust. During the seven.years of com- plex negotiation of SALT II both aides made compro- mises to enhance verification because they knew that no treaty was possible without insurance against cheating; Perhaps the most controversial issue of the negotiations, from this standpoint, was the control of ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles. ? The control of these weapons was '. so difficult; in fact? that the SALT II treaty merely postpones a final dad- :lion. The protocol to:-the SALT II treaty provides that "each party undertakes not to deploy cruise missiles . capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers [360 miles] on sea-based launchers or on l 360 e -mi . portent because' weapons';' 't v ,,y s ~,: ~^ based' in Europe could not reach the Soviet Union at that distance. The protocol,' on! integral part of the treaty, remains in force until Dec31, .198L :.., - Attached to the SALTII treaty are the screed "Princi- ples and Basic Guidelines far Subsequent Negotiations" which Presidents Carter and Brezhnev signed in Vienna on June 18. These guidelines call for resolution of the is- sues included in the protocol in. the, context of "signifi- .'cint and substantial reductions in the number of strate- gic offensive arms, including restrictions on the develop ment, testing and deployment of new types of strategic offensive arms and on modernization of existing strategic offensive arms." The intent of this language is clew Both sides have agreed to cut existing forces, rather than deploy additional weapons. But the NATO proposal calls for t1i. deployment of .108 Pershing. It ballistic; miasma, and:?464 ground launched cruise missiles with a range of more than 1,000 miles each to be located in West Germany, Britain, Bel-~ gium and Italy. The NATO decision will also include al yet unspecified, but directly linked, proposal to the Soviets to negotiate a reduction of medium-range nuclear ^ The. justification for the new NATO weapons is that the Soviets have been modernizing their medium-range weapons- by deploying about 100 mobile SS20 ballistic j missiles, each with three warheads and about 90 super- sonic Backfire bombers. Neither of these weapons is con-I trolled by SALT II, though Brezhnev in a letter to Carter; has made a commitment to limit the deployment of thel - Backfire to 30ayear with no refueling capacity. Both sides have bad medico n-range systems since the 1950s. The United States has forward-based systems ce- pable of reaching the Soviet Union, including bombers located in. Britain and on aircraft carriers, as well as Poseidon submarines, - carrying almost 500 warheads, which are assigned to the NATO command. Both Britain ,. and France have their own independent nuclear forces, capable of hitting Soviet cities. The medium-range nu-1 clear forces have been essentially balanced. for years. f, However, since the Soviet weapons are more modern it is _ 'claimed that they must be matched by NATO........ - It might make sense to. plan the deployment of the Pershing.Il, which is a ballistic missile with characteris- .- tics somewhat similar to the SS20. It might make sense also to build a new bomber as advanced as the Backfire. But it makes no sense at all to plan to deploy. the ground launched cruise missile. These weapons are so small, about 18 feet long and two feet wide, that they can be easily hidden, easily moved i and easily launched from mobile launchers. Modern in. J telligence- technology has. amazing capabilities,. but iti cannot provide adequate information on the location. and I numbers of ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles.: Adequate verification would be impossible. The deploy.4 meat of ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles would provoke an unrestrained arms race with no way to puti the genie back in the bottle. U.S. proponents of the cruise missile deployment deci-i sion come from opposing camps, making for strange bed- fellows. indeed. The opponents of arms control and the,' SALT II testy see the decision as a possible means to kill the SALT process.,They are not concerned about1 CONTINUED Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 verification, bemuse they oppose the treaty. They believe} we should use our technological advantages to reassert technology which we should exploit, they believe. Fur- thermore, they note that the ground-launched cruise missiles will have longer range than the Pershing Its and can be produced a year or two faster. . The conventional wisdom in the Carter administration, however, is that a NATO decision to deploy the weapons now will provide a bargaining chip which will advance the cause of arms control in the next round of negotia- tions. Theoretically it would appear that a. NATO com- mitment to deploy the weapons'.would- strengthen the hand of Western negotiators to press the Soviets for real . But the history of the nuclear arms race, so far, demon- strate. the opposite. Once the decision-to deploy the new weapon is. made the bargain is lost,. because the Soviets invariably counts with additional weapons of their own Brezhnev and Gromyko;have stated that this would their position.. Whether%that -proves to be-true or not, a decision to deploy weapons inevitably generates so much momentum. ::political,:, military, technological and: The decision. to deploy multiple warheads (MIRV) on ~'. 'noloa: end. placed multiple gotiated a ban on MIRV be, cure, and'wa would havesaved billions=of dollars. The real bargaining chip is the .decision itself, before it is made: , In the case of .NATO decision in December it is true that no action will be taken until the, parliaments of the NATO governments have-approved the action,. and until the weapons. have been produced,. tested and deployed, which. map- take three or four years. The West German might not be necessary` to , develop air-of-the . weapons," perhaps. only a few and' in.the ideal- case,-absolutely Schmidt is willing to go along with a NATO decision b sayx "If negotiations with Moscow` are successful Soviet Union. its willingness to negotiate on,the deploy Union relocated on German soil:"' itx Germany would. receive the largest share of the new weapons. It they are deployed, it would be the first time government of Cliancellor.Helmut Schmidt is very semi- none." Schmidt does not want to jeopardize the benefit strategic superiority over Russia. Since, then many edito=l future seaaity, because the United. States no longer has created a questioning the. plausibility of NATO's and Willy Brandt have L:' It = r. ----but thaw was, no bar- be a buildup of theater nuclear forces in Za%pe, ao that invoking the U.S. strategic nuclear guarantee does not become Europe's only option in a conflict This argument is wrong on all counts. Unlike the indepedent French and British nuclear for- cm the and con~troolled by NATO the weapons will be United States. In fact, the West Germans have stated categorically that they will not accept . the two-key system whereby a decision to I send a nuclear weapon toward Russia would be shared by the United States and Germany. Thus, a decision to launch would be an -American decision, whether the weapons used are based in, the United States or in Europe.. NATO would not gain any greater assurance of proteo- tion than it has today.The president of the Unted States would still make the decision and U.S. cities would be equally theatened by Soviet retaliation. Moreover, the deployment of these weapons in Europe would guarantee that the NATO member states would be early targets of .Soviet rockets in the event of war. What would be the se- curity benefit for Western Europe? And why should the NATO governments be subj to this emerging political turmoil, which may weaken the alliance? Furthermore, why should the U.S. taxpayer. be, subjected to the substantial cost of producing -weapons if, after all, it is not intended that, they shouldIl be deployed? The implications of the cruise missile d ployment have not been thought through, nor have the~j ,been debated.: 4 The best course would be for NATO to adopt the posij :tion recently taken by the Danish government. Denmark has called for a six-month postponement of the NATO 'decision to ascertain whether the Soviets are willing td negotiate mutual cuts, including the level of their SS20s begin at once: If not,;NATO would move ahead- - Arthur Cox is a former State Department and CIA ;official who writes and- lectures on U.S.-Souiet.affairs and arms-control issues. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 ARTICLE APP-.ZD O1 IAGE 1 NEW YORK MAGAZINE 10 December 1979 learn to Start Worrying end Care About SALT I do have deep reservations about some of the aspects of SALT If, but I think you'll note that when I said deep reservations I was focusing with great- er priority on the concept of American defense in the central strategic area and the evolution of thought and the trending toward first parity, and then what we call in the trade "minimum deterrence" or "assured destruction" or "launch on warning concepts," which really place our posture in a position where the Americans have really no alternative but to indulge in population destruction in a crisis with the Soviet Union that's nuclear in character, when you follow the scenario through the doomsday application. `General Alexander Haig (Retired) Someone-usually an expert-is al- most always saying something like that about the SALT iI treaty, which is Maybe we shouldn't dismiss - doomsday scenarios. - probably why no one listens and why more than SO percent of the respon- dents in a nationwide poll could not even name the two countries who are parties to the agreement (us and them). But just because most of us don't know anything about SALT doesn't mean it's not important. It is. The second Strategic Arms Limita. lion Treaty (SALT II) is now before the Senate for ratification. It's chances are iffy-at best. As usual. many of our representatives, the ones we elect to supposedly exercise their judgment, are looking to public opinion (the kind measured by Gallup and company) to clue them in on how to vote. What follows then is a layman's guide to a few of the arguments and issues sur- rounding SALT, with special empha- sis on the question of verification- defined simply as our ability to de- tect Soviet cheating once, the treaty is in effect. Q Wiwi SALT is not: SALT is not, as its title would have us believe, an arms-limitation treaty. That goal, a true reduction in Soviet and American arsenals, will come in SALT Ill-or so say the treaty's proponents. SALT 11, say its supporters, and SALT I be- fore it are merely part of a long proc- ess, a feeling-out, a dialogue, a way to develop the understanding and trust which will permit true arms control next time-which is what SALT I's proponents originally, and incorrectly, prophesied for SALT if. In any event, as Senator Moynihan has written,, "whatever else SALT I might have done, it accomplished little by way of Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501320001-0 limiting strategic offensive arms." And, says the Wall Street Journal, "it is by now an uncontested fact that during detente and under SALT I we have witnessed a massive Soviet military buildup.". What about SALT II? Here's Wil- liam Perry, undersecretary of defense for research and engineering: "I antic- ipate that [under SALT II] the Soviet Union will continue to pursue the mod- ernization of their ICBM program and that we will respond to that, so that both sides then will continue to have significant increases in nuclear war- heads. That is the bad news. The good news [here it comes again] ... is that SALT II also establishes a process and goals. The most significant goal [em- phasis mine] is the one to achieve a real reduction in nuclear weapons." And so on. - [3 The death of MAD: To many proponents of SALT. Dr. Perry has hit the nail on the head: The process is everything. No matter that both SALT treaties ratify the arms race; at some point all the talking and negotiating will help us to trust each other, and then, finally, real arms reduction can begin. Behind this thinking lies MAD --the doctrine of "mutual assured de- struction," the rationale of deterrence. As defined by Robert McNamara some years ago, ? deterrence "means the certainty of suicide to the agres. sor. In other words, the Russians are supposed to know that if they strike the United States, enough of our nu- clear force will survive so that we can retaliate and-destroy- the Soviet Union. So, the argument goes, let' the Rus- sians foolishly spend millions of dollars in order to overkill us a hundred times. It doesn't matter-as long as we know we can wipe them out once. Sounds good. But wait. There are some-and their number is growing- who say that ? those sneaky Russians are actually developing (have already developed! says Moynihan) nuclear superiority, the kind of superiority that permits them to wage a nuclear war they can not only survive but actually win. A common scenario runs some- thing like this: The Russians cheat on the SALT agreement and develop the capability to take out our land-based Minuteman missile force. We would still have our submarine-based nuclear missiles and our strategic bombers- enough, presumably, to wipe out the Soviets-but before the president 'or- ders- the retaliatory strike the Russian high command offers us an option: We can go ahead and launch against the Soviet Union, in which case, the Rus- sians tell us, they will simply launch back and destroy the remainder of the United States, not merely our Minute- men. Or, say the Russians, we can stop here. You Americans can -accept the loss of your missiles-and the collateral loss of, say, 5 million, but not 150 mil- lion, people. And, best of all, you Americans don't even have to~yturn over your own country. How f"out some, other countries? How / about America getting out of Western Europe? Would a president of the United States yield to such a demand? Would he, as they say in Haig's trade, go the route' of "damage limitation"? Would he sell out Europe to save the United States? Well? - There is another, perhaps more realistic theory concerning the advan- tage gained by nuclear - superiority, short of its actual use. It is the notion that the stronger side in the nuclear equation can be more adventurous, can "move in on" other nations with- out fear of reprisal from the other nu- clear superpower. This is the argument .of Paul Nitze, a leading opponent of SALT II and a former deputy secretary of defense. Nitze maintains that we have already seen this theory at work -in our favor-during the Berlin and of verification. "Will the Russians Cuban missile crises. confrontations with the Soviets which we "won" be- I cheat?" asks Glenn rhetorically. "They, cause we held the bigger stick and, I will if they can. They always have." presumably. were prepared to use it. "To some of us who lived through the Berlin crisis in 1961," says Nitze, "[and] the Cuban crisis in 1962 ... [the ideal that an adverse shift in the stra- tegic nuclear balance will have no political or diplomatic consequences in fact is the clear history of the Rus- sians and SALT I," says John Glenn. the one U.S. senator to have become an authority on the complicated question John Glenn is conscientious and straightforward. Despite having voted against SALT II in the Foreign Rela- tions Committee, he wants very much to vote for the treaty when it hits the; Senate floor-which could be within! a few weeks, or not for some time. comes as a shock. In the Berlin crisis our theater position was clearly un- favorable; we relied entirely on our strategic nuclear superiority to face down Chairman ?Khrushchev's ultima- tum. In Cuba, the Soviet Union faced a position of both theater inferiority and strategic inferiority; they withdrew the missiles they were deploying." Nitze goes farther: As the Soviets gained nuclear strength, we could no longer have our way. Thus, he says, "in the 1973 Middle East crisis, the theater- and the strategic nuclear balances were more balanced, [so] both sides Com- promised. "The nuclear balance is only one ele- ment in the overall power balance. But in the Soviet view, it is the fulcrum upon which all other levers of influence -military, economic or political- rest." To. the Nitze crowd the Russians have invalidated MAD, thus forcing us into a new ball game-where the other guy is winning and the consequences are dire. "Strategic [nuclear] superior- ity," -says Moynihan, "is the ability to make other people do what you want them to do." E3 Watch out: Assume that the So- viets seek (may already possess) nu- clear superiority and that MAD is no longer a credible policy. Assume that and you understand the need for us to know exactly what the Russians are up to. Assume further that the Soviets will rush through every loophole in order to legally-if only technically-violate the spirit of the SALT treaties. "That Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501320001-0 There is, however, no chance that Glenn will vote for SALT II if he continues to believe, as he does to- day, that we are incapable of verify- ing Soviet compliance with the treaty's provisions. "The administration:' says Glenn, "has been very careful, very precise. It speaks of being certain that we have the means to 'adequately' veri- fy Soviet compliance. That is to say. we can detect large-scale Russian cheat- ing 'in time' for us to take 'appropriate'! countermeasures-either protest or mil- 1 itary buildup of our own. All of those words are, of course, open to varying interpretations, which is bad enough, but the key point is that we can't verify the treaty now, at the time when the Senate is being asked to ratify it." The._Carter administration has come to take Tohn Glenn very seriou e is briefed r often Defense Di- Secreta Harold Brown and rector St s d Turner t emse Ives. He is thorou familiar with our inte f- ence ca abi ities--and he is worried. "The loss of Iran was a great blow:' says Glenn. "I don't care what anyone says." Here enn is re erring to our two supersecret Iran-based eavesdrop. pininstallations some 700 miles from the Soviets' main miss e-testing act tty at T ratam near the Aral ea. "At this point, the a ministration confesses the significance of the Iran loss," says Glenn, "but it keeps asking us to be confident that we' can regain that lost capacity by other means, and quickly. But we haven't regained it yet, and I'm waiting for them to prove to me that we have. At first, the adminis- tration asserted that wb could make up for the Iranian loss by employing U-2 overflights. But the planes would have to fly over Turkey, and our relations with the Turks are pretty strained. The Turks finally agreed to permit the flights, but only if the Soviets didn't object. Well, the Soviets have objected -which, by the way, gives you some indication of their real interest in seeing that SALT II is followed In any event, the U-2 argument is no longer credible, so it's been dropped. "The administration would also have us believe that we can make up for a lot of what we lost in Iran via our reconnaissance satellites. But those sat- ellites were compromised when the : Russians got, their hands on the oper- ating manuals. So now the Russians know how the satellites work and can take measures to negate their effective- ness. But even if the satellites weren't compromised, you just can't get the same quality of information from 100 miles up that you can get from ground stations in Iran. . "I'm sure we can make up for the Iranian loss in other ways. The ques- tion is when? Harold Brown says we can do it in a year, but we haven't yet. It all gets back to what constitutes 'adequate' verification. I don't see anything wrong with our delaying a vote on the treaty until the adminis- tration can prove that we once again have the kind of intelligence capacity we lost in Iran." While there is disagreement over the extent of the Iranian loss, a candid appraisal of the problem and a de- tailed evaluation of our overall intelli- gence abilities are the subject of a sensitive 177-page report under 24- hour guard. on the top floor of the Capitol in Washington. The report may be read only by senators them- selves and by a mere handful of senior aides. It may be read during business hours only, and no notes may be taken from the room. It is, says Glenn, com- prehensive, "sizzling" stuff. It took him almost four full days to fully compre- hend and digest. "Once again," says Glenn, "the problem is the administra- tion's assumption, this time contained in the report's 'executive summary.' The summary asserts that we will have an adequate verification capability. But, I say again, we don't now, and I'm still waiting to see it proved. I become oper3tional:" As Evans and Novak point out, "a block of 200 new, missiles could change overnight the i strategic balance of power"-especially if those particular missiles are of the "heavy" variety and happen to carry a large number of warheads. Incredibly, as of the middle of No- vember, only a very few senators, only a handful, have bothered to take the' time and trouble to read the report In Its entirety. Such Is Glenn's acknowl- edged expertise in this area (combined with his general reputation for fair- ness) that it is likely that some of his colleagues will follow his- lead when the treaty finally comes to the floor for I a vote. And, although he is mum on the subject, it seems reasonable to as- sumo that Glenn would request a closed Senate session in order to go over the report for the benefit of those colleagues who can't see their way clear to reading it themselves. Still, it would be far preferable for the sena- tors to do their own homework, and, given SALT's importance, those who don't should probably be drummed from office. This is no penny-ante game. The stakes couldn't be higher--espe- cially if you subscribe to the notion that the Russians are anxious for nu- clear superiority and a first-strike capa- bility. _ SALT professes to be about peace, and it may be, although there are those, like Senator Moynihan, who argue that '.'everything the SALT process was de- signed to prevent has come about" (including a further increase in the defense budget-a Carteradministra. 'tion concession designed to win the support of SALT opponents like Sena- tor Sam Nunn). If Moynihan is correct (and he makes a persuasive case in the November 19 New Yorker) it is be- cause, above all, SALT is about war. And while weapons. have changed dramatically over the centuries, war itself has remained pretty much the same. It is not a punch-pulling activity. What Thomas Hobbes wrote In 1651 is true today: In war, "force and fraud are the two cardinal virtues." hope it will be, of course. But I'm still waiting." According to columnists Evans and Novak, one paragraph of the report says, "If a covert deploy- ment were attempted, the Soviets could evade detection and identification of the activity for as long as three years. during which some 200 missiles might Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 ARTICLE DEAREm ON PAGE uiptoma: for intelligence work- By John Maclean.. Chicago TNbuRe Prow Sanfu:?-= tee of correspondence, a-high-level fed-' eras group, dispatched its agent. to the Continent with all appropriate secrecy." Jones, the agent was to appear as. a simple merchant. His intelligence re- ports home-were to do be done,in invisi-' ble ink between the lines of common business letters...... . . Jones' reports concerned the most vi- tal interests of his country, the possibili- ty of French military, political, and eco- nomic aid for the American Revolution. Was Jones, whose real name was Silas Deane, America's first spy? . Hardly. H. was America's first diplo- mat, sent to France in -1778 under orders from Benjamin Franklin, chairman of the Correspondence. Committee-, which has since been supplanted by the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency and State De- partment.. CHICAGO TRIBUNE 6 December 1979 no difference between a CIA employe engaged in legal intelligence gathering and one involved, in convert activity. The militants say that proof of CIA em- Much attention has been focused on the ployment is enough evidence for them of CIA's masterminding of the scheme that illegal espionage activity. returned to shah to power in 1953. Ker- Espionage, however, long has meant mit Roosevelt, the CIA agent in charge the clandestine gathering of information of the plot, said it took no more, than and the practice of covert action, cr S10o000 in cash and six agents" to "dirty tricks" as such activities became sweep the shah back onto the Peacock known during the recent years of public . -Throne. CIA scandal. P BUT WHEN Iranian . revolutionaries ESPIONAGE MAY be the world's sec ousted the shah earlier this year, the and oldest profession. It may even tie- . State Department wound up paying $2 for first, considering the role often million ransom to the rebels to secure played by women's wiles. the release of 22 CIA employes at an Acts of espionage crop up in the Bible" electronic spy station near Iran's border - such as Joshua's dispatch of spies ik with the-Soviet Union. into Jericho before his assault across . As late as 1978, the CIA had mini- the Jordan river. Classical authors such., as Xenophon and Caesar also give ex- amples. In modern "times the practice of build- ,ag intelligence organizations and sup- plying 1iplotatie cover for spies has created special problems. Organized es- pionage first appeared in the 17th Centu- ry under Cromwell in-England and Ri- chelieu in France. Since then it has be come standard practice for diplomats proven to, be spies to be expelled from host countries. but then; the U.S. intelligence agency EVER SINCE the pattern of modern diplomacy first appeared during the Middle Ages, there has been a blurry, gray area- where legitimate intelligence nage. When Italian cities of centuries --it was said that "an ambassador is .spy acting under the. protection of the -Today in. Iran, that statement has no meaning. In the eyes of militants hold- ing American hostages in Iran, there is spies came from the Shah of Iran. Dur- hopeful signs, for the-American revoiu- cial whose . job is to observe trends in - could not speak French, be had not been the local press. That- distinction is get- told of efforts under way by Frenchmen ting lost [in ithe Iranian crisisi." ".' .. on behalf of the U.S., and his clumsy IRONICALLY, ONE of the clearest cover story fell apart. Charges of per-- statements about the role of diplomatic Wl sohe! the F Frreewenchere connection showed: uEMBASSIES TEND to attract spies by- cause they offer a safe haven. Two'SOvi- ets employed at the United Nations were convicted- last year of espionage and were sentenced to 50 year terms. A third Soviet citizen was implicated in the scheme, but was released because be was an attache at the Soviet mission to the U.N., entiinr him to diplomatic im- munity. "AS A GENERAL PRINCIPLE, EM- BASSIES DO NORMALLY CARRY ON INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS," SAID mized the significance of unrest within Iran, an intelligence failure that prompt- ed a major shakeup of the organization. One major reason for the misjudgment was the shah's insistence that nor CIA agents talk with anyone who might be considered the political opposition. During the final three years of his reign, he repeatedly warned U.S. offi- cials thut he would expel any CIA agents who engaged in activities he thought improper. -- , had become so dependent on SAVAK to provide its information that it had only three agents in Iran who could speak the local. language, Farsi. THE CIA and foreign intelligence agencies continue to. operate worldwide. - John Barron,, author of a book pub- lished in 1974- called "KGB: The Secret Work of soviet Agen9s,'-' has said that so many Soviet spies now operate here that there are not enough U.S. counterintelli- gene agents to watch them all.. '_ David Trask, the State Department's THE GATHERING of Intelligence wilt chief, historian. "Most intelligence gath- ' always be a primary duty of envoys- ering involves reading public docu- abroad. A lesson exists in the career of; ments. Silas Deane, the first American envoy;s- "There's a hell of a difference be-` in how to carry out this function..- tween Mata Hari and an embassy offi- Deade foundered in his mission. He intelligence agency, SAVAK, within the nourish the alliance. He.succeeded bi il- tinted States. ; : I - liantly. Historians 'say-.his dispatches He told the interviewer the purpose of ' -home read like highly skilled intelli. SAVAK. activities here was "checking gence reports. up on anybody who becomes affiliated Deane died an embittered and dis- with circles, organizations hostile to my graced man. The good manners and country, which is the role of any intelli striking apperaance that had contributed gence organization." :. to his choice as envoy proved no substi-. The role of the CIA in Iran,has ranged '%tute for preparation, seriousness, andl frf' i overwhelming to ..incompetent ( skill. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 ARTICLE AP ~EA ED ON. PAGE- THE WALL STREET JOURNAL 6 December 1979 Honesty on Iran As the crisis in Iran grinds on, one of the tests of the American nation will be its ability to be honest with it- self: This may not be decisive in the crisis itself, but will by and large de- termine whether lessons are learned for the future. The thought is immediately brought to mind by the UN Security Council resolution, which is almost universally proclaimed a "victory", for the United States. It is of course true that the resolution passed by a 15 to 0 vote, and that it does urgently call for the release of, the, hostages. While the resolution, is not much likely to in- fluence the Iranians, -these accom- plishments are probably worth the baggage that accompanies them. But before bragging about a vic- tory, we ought to look at the rest of the resolution. For example, the clause urging "the governments of Iran and the United States. to exercise the ut- most restraint in the prevailing situa- tion." And the clause calling, on the two. governments "to resolve peace- fully the remaining issues between them." And we also ought to note the resolution's legislative history, includ- ing what amounts to a U.S. govern- ment invitation for the Iranians to come to the UN for a propaganda field day against the- shah and the U.S. Taken in its totality the LTI resolu- Within 48 hours Mr. Carter's ad ministration was leaning all over the shah to get him out of the country. As soon as the Mexicans decided not to readmit him, the administration'put out public word that it still expected him to stand by his "promise to leave. The administration is being pushed toward honoring the Presi- dent's proclamation by the reality that no good refuge exists for the shah. Bute clearly there was a discrepancy be- tween the President's words and hiss policy before and after he uttered them, and this is a disquieting portent. For if the episode ends in anything but total . disaster, the nation in gen- eral and the administration in particu- lar will be tempted to grasp straws looking for a victory. All of us want the hostages released, of course. And all of us will breathe a sigh of relief if that happens, regardless of what further national humiliation this may involve. But even if they were re- leased tomorrow, we need to recog- nize that the U.S. has suffered a mas-1 sive international setback, and that itsi repetition cannot be tolerated. We are already witnessing the spread of the Iranian tactics; the as- sault on the U.S. embassy in Pakist probably did not involve governmen connivance, but the assault on the-U. tion tends to obscure the reality of the embassy in Libya almost certainly Iran crisis That the Iranian regime- did. We risk being shoved around has committed an act of aggression any dictator with enough galt to stor against the United States. That Iran an embassy, especially if he has som stands-in flagrant violation of histori- oil to sell. We need to think th row cal convention, and international law. how we are going to stop the trend.; That the United States has been re- - Military retaliation against strained for humanitarian. and pruden- and for that matter Libya. should not tial reasons, but would have every be ruled out. We need to insure that! moral justification' for the use of force we have'the military forces to make, against Iran. For our "victory" at the this option real. We need to redevelop UN. we have paid the very consider a capability for covert action, and can able price of.undermining our right to start now by straig tening out the con- assert these principles unilaterally: aressional reporting r uirerrents Thoughts about honesty, are- also, ' that hobble the CIA. We need to pro- stirred by the administration's actions vi a our own protection for embassies, on the- shah: President Carter said at at the price of breaking relations - even his press conference last Wednesday when a host government like the Lib- that when the shah should leave is. "a y, objects to Marines. In short, we decision to be made by the shah and by need to abandon the supine- postures his medical advisers, and that while ' that invite these provocations. the shah had, stated his intention to - leave whew. medical- treatment was .. > These are the lessons of the-Iranian completed, "I.- have not encouraged crisis, regardless of how it is ultihim to leave. He was free to come . mately resolved. If we fail ? to- face here for medical treatment and he will. them squarely, we will not have sal leave on. his own: yolition. even so much as a lesson. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 ARTICLE AP? ON PAGE WASHINGTON POST 5 DECEMBER 1979 Rowland Evans grid Robert Novak The Soviet `Forgery Offensive' The- decision by Iranian militants to show the world an alleged "secret" don ument that they said had been put loined from files in the occupied U_%- Embassy adds an ominous new factor, in the battle of American: intelligence against Soviet forgeries aimed at div. crediting the United States. _ _ ... '7- Whether the militants have what they claim, to have or whether the al- leged CI assi ents for the two new staff ers at a Embassy In Tehcan are bogus, the surfacing of-the docu- ment compounds the problem of identi - fyiug and exposing proliferating Soviet :forgeries.. These. forgeries are- now ? known; to have drawn both President Carter-and Vice President Walter Mon- dale into their worldwide operations. The Soviet ..-forgery., game-. was analyzed early this year In a classified government document called "the for- gery 'offensive," which opened with this flat assertion: the dangerous Soviet game of lying about the United States lit the struggle between the two super- powers is undergoing "an appreciable upsurge." ; 'The political purlwee of these for genies, their technical sophistication- and intelligence reporting all point to- the Son s various East Euro- pean allies and Cuba as being the re- sponsible parties," the document said. The study containing, that charge against Moscow was followed ~ is late summer by a second analysis? limited to "official use only" and published by the Defense Intelligence Agency-a major branch of the U.S. Intelligence commu g i. It proclaimed that Moscow has- "continually employed forged docu- ments to implement foreign policy, sup. port political objectives and to lend substance, credibility and authenticity . to their propaganda claims." The United States has new played the forgeries game against Russia or any other country. One reason could be that in an open society forgeries would almost surely be. exposed by those op?. posing the practice-by politicians, for. example, who in-the-past have taken pride in o undercover oge- tibns by the regardless of foreign. policyobjecttves< i~. : d The-Soviets have a c1ose l society and no known scruples against dirty tricks of any kind. But the efforts--described as being "of suspected Soviet origin"- to put false words in*the mouths of the president and the vice president of the United States touched a new low. The falsification of- Jimmy Carter's spoken word came in December 1977, in the form of a bogus press release from ordered to collect information "on ways to bribe European officials and to devel- op other covert means by which to dam- age or eliminate foreign trade competi- tion" with the United States. The timing was calculated to cash in on the uproar in the United States over bribery accu- sations against U.S. corporations. This .forgery, American intelligence now believes, was an EmMenT t forgery success" despite some sloppy -(now . the. - International -Communic *. discrepancies, such as bad punctuation tions Agency). It purported to be a ver- in the .covering letter that came with batim report on a speech Carter gave in the-American perspective series." - Newspapers in Greece-and almost certainly in other countries where the forgery never surfaced-received the phony Carter speech in the-mail Two newspapers in Athens published It. In his "speech," Carter flayed- the Greeks fuzzy copies of the alleged airgram. heating up, partly under the stress of the Iran crisis, top intelligence officials have ordered the anti-forgery watch put on overtime duty. But for every 'forgery discovered, there probably are half a.dozen that go undiscovered. The for letting down NATO;, demanded far whole world is a forgery market and it higher defense spending by Greece and is inconceivable that the United States made demeaning remarks about this will not be damaged in the days of major Mediterranean. ally. .. heated rivalry that lie ahead with an The forgery involving Mondale came adversary who. plays by only one rule: lust over a year ago when Xeroxed cop- the rule to win. inotaainterviewheallegedlyrgavetoa European newspaperman named 'Kart Douglas" were mailed to Parisbased cor- respondents of several newspapers . In the "interview," the vice president cast aspersions on Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem. Begin. Mondale, according to the bogus 'interview," called Sadat not the master of his own house (imply- ing the then-pending treaty with Israel would not be adhered to) and claimed that Begin was suffering from a- "ter- minal illness." . Botho these efforts were crude, and neither one did American policy much, if any, damage. But they illustrate this. point-there is no limit to the Soviet ef? -fort to "disinform" governments and - peoples-of the world about the perfidy of the United States by exploiting all -techniques of forgery and black propa- ganda. - Moreover, other attempts to undermine the United States have had conspicuous success.-< In 1978, in an altered version of a-gen- nine State Department document known as "Airgram A895Q" dated Der- $ Lg74r u& ,embassies in Europe were Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 ??`? - ~~ 5 DECEMBER 1979 FAGEe4-/a 014 Titles Often Used Dipoina 1i grace 'Aides -protect By Robert- G. Raiser, =x- ' \ -knowledgeable sources report that.tlie CIA western spies- with diplomatic status on w.snnn.ton post atstt wrtt.r regards diplomatic cover as the best possi- their territory. Though rarely proclaimed. publicly, the ble. protection for its operatives abroad, and Several official sources says it was sloppy, use of diplomatic titles to protect intelligence has?long struggled in Washington to maxi- of '.the embassy in Tehran to keep on file officers in foreign countries has long been mize the number of diplomatic slots alloca- copies. of a telegram referring directly to a standard pfor the .United States teTh gency employes. CIA presence, in the embassy. One source ad for t practice ari vie' Union, Israel. Britain. ,The` present ratio of ordinary diplomats close to the intelligence community also ex- nnd cefo, Vest- Germany and probably every taCIA emplOYes:in foreign missions is not pressed' surprise that the CIA apparently' cuun -chat. G intains an intelligence. sec. publicly known, but informed- sources said had. been eager to put new agents into the a~, ~, ? f :.'i:. the ;division was the subject of a formal Tehran embass . last summer, given__the vice. 19agreement between Secretary of State i h f h it ti O t ty :o t t e s on there: er ua t U.S. officials- dismiss as' irrelevant arrow' sens Cyrus R. Vance and the president's national sources said the -agency was just doing its tions by ` Iraaianc radicals that the American. security . affairs adviser, Zbigniew Brze- - . Embassy In. Tehran. was a "nest of espion. job. age." In the, viewsof these officials, no such.: znnski A - number of past, and present foreign Several sources pointed out that intelli- service officers said is interviews that the f ' ; a: blatant violation o accusations ustifys aaccu i law-tha arbitrary nt detention of .genre work covers a myriad of activities, 'American personnel in embassies abroad in. ations _ ~._,_ he --i6- l 'including. much information-gathering that variably know who among them is working An intelligence officer assigned to an em- reporting. "Every CIA employe is decidedly the- station chief, or senior CIA official bassy and given formal. diplomatic, status not a James Bond," one source said. - the embassy, is common public knowledge. enjoys. the full benefits of diplomatic im- "Espionage" can mean counting the num- Most embassy staffs also include military munity;according, to.. traditional diplomatic ber of trucks that cross. a particular bridge attaches, one of whose undisguised functions practice: ,` as. well as opening the prime minister's is to gather information on the military The. stationing' of'-'-Central Intelligence - mail, one- source noted: establishment of their host country. Agency employes with diplomatic, titles in If a host country is displeased by a diplo- American embassies has been discussed mars - behavior, the remedy Is to expel the openly for' years. In 1974 The Washington diplomat, a State Department official said. Monthly published an- article called "How to Expulsion has been used by dozens of govern- Spot a Spook" in- which Jahn Marks ex- ments?'around the world, most often in re- plained how CIA employes with diplomatic cent -years against Soviet diplomats, but cover could be- identified in. open State De- , partment directories. against Americans and others as well. The directories Marks cited have not been T-In .1978 , the United States expelled a, published since then. However, CIA agents Soviet diplomat at, the United Nations, Vla- apparently continue to ,carry the most tell- dimir P. Zinyakin. after implicating him in a. tale designation - Marks. described, an FSR spy operation that involved two other So- (foreign service reserve officer) rank in. viet,citizens who, did not have diplomatic stead of the standard FSO- ((foreign service-., status, . Those two, Rudolf F. Chernyayev officer) tag carried by ordinary State. De-. ,and Viadik A. Enger,. were - tried. Ind sen- partment-diplomat& - ' . 4 ~i-fenced to long-prison' terms before being The cable -released by- Iranian students' swapped to the Soviet Union this year-for Saturday in which the U.S. charge d'affaires- a group of dissidents. in Tehran appeared to acknowledge the- . In 1971 the British government expelled presence of two CIA men in the embassy, 105 Soviet nationals; most of them diplo- included a reference to this telltale "R mats, after charging them with. improper as?- the old 'and apparently insoluble proms espionage activity- The Soviets.-also have blew of,.R.,de3ignation",for CIA employes.:, followed this pattern when. they have, caught Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 ARTICLE APPEARP ON PAGE 1Z ~ CHICAGO TRIBUNE l DECEMBER 1979 Spying shouldn't be left to politicians ONE OF THE GREAT mysteries about. ? that they've made the same mistake all. If the Iranians mean we bad people In us as a nation is .how we've always been the wrong public officials who ever lived charge of gathering information about a so suspicious of everything our gov- made. They think they're doing what's _ lot of things going oil there, I suppose ernment has done here at home and so best for the. country, but they don't dare they're right: Spying these days wouldn't trusting about what it's done abroad tell us -because they don't. think we're, make much -of a movie. It's mostly a' We don't let our elected officials cross smart enough to understand. They think matter of gathering a lot of dull statistics the street in Washington without comp- they have special information that makes _ about crops, production facilities, gross laining about the way they dolt. On the them better able to. decide for us.. national product. and political move- other hand, when it comes to fmenu. Spies aren't even looking for that that what they' foreign e is MOST OF THIS "special information one all-important secret written on a lit- affairs honest awend is assume m the best at the comes -to diplomats from our Central tie piece of paper anymore. There is no United and and mankind nd ri1i e of general. the Intelligence Agency. I just wonder how such secret. Probably the closest we have bad it would be if all CIA reports were.' to that is the number of the telephone on ' The strange thing about it. Is that the printed in the newspapers every week. Is the nightstand next to President Carter's exact reverse. is true among the pow there any chance it wouldn't be bad at all. ~bed.-- They trust the democratic process- but good in the long run? V i when it comes to letting us-decide what. -The Iranian terrorists have accused us 'THE BEST SPY. story I ever beard is? they should do here, but when-it comes to of having, spies In our embassy in one I mayhave rewritten in my memory, foreign affairs they seem to think that-. Tehran. Spy is a strange word. It means but it is closer to the truth about spying what we don't know won't hurt us. one thing to us if it's applied to a devious, .. than most of the novels written about it. I think we're all becoming a little. less- furtive Soviet. agent ferreting out' the During World War II, a German spy got confident of our conduct in foreign affairs most important secrets of our defense; it. hold -of the top secret formula this coun- because, for the first time, there's some means something else if it's about James try had for its most devastating nerve; evidence that we've 'been sneaky in the Bond gathering information in a foreign gas. After the war, someone asked the past. It ' isn't that our foreign policy country about their plans to destroy the. German spy how he ever got It He said operatives have been dishonest. Its Just United States. that he found out the name of the'dom- pany that manufactured it and simply wrote to them and asked for the formula; 'which they sent him..-=._ I have a theory about what ought to. happen to any. of the cloak-and-dagger. 'spies who. are caught:. I'm not for any. 'drastic. punishment.' Any. spy. caught in the -act.ought to be put to- bed in his embassy without his supper and not al.. lowed. to gar out and play with the other. spies for two weeks: If our diplomats don't want to lose thel confidence. we've-always had in them, they might consider doing away with all -this- sneaky- maneuvering- They ought to trust the democratic principle even i, diplomacy. My' history :is weak; but I remember Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen points just well enough to have been able to look them up just now. He referred to "Open covenants of peace, openly ar= 'rived at, after which there shall be. no private international--understandings of any kind but, diplomacy shall proceed "always frankly and in the public view.- "'Right on. Woodrow!: '- , .. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 ARTICLE APPrAR- D CW PAGTHE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 4 December 1979 Chronology of hostage standoff Nov. 4 Tehran: "Students" seize US Embassy; hold some 100 hostages, including 63 Americans; demand Shah's return for trial. Nov. S Washington: US rejects demand. Iran: US Consulates In Tabriz and Shiraz seized by followers of Ayatollah Khomeini. 1959 treaty with US and 1921 treaty with USSR cancelled: treaties, gave the two powers right to intervene- militarily. Nov. 6 Iran: Prime Minister Bazargan resigns. Ayatollah Khomeini orders Revolution- ary Council to take over government. "Students" warn they will kill hostages if US uses force in rescue attempt. Nov. 7 Iran: Ayatollah Khomeini refuses to ne- gotiate with US. PLO envoys... - Nov. 9 New York: UN Security Council -ex- presses "profound concern" for hos- tages; calls for immediate release.. Washington: US halts $300 million mili- tary shipment to Iran. Tehran: Abolhassan Bani-Sadr is named acting foreign minister. - " Nov.10 Washington: President Carter orders deportation proceedings against Iranians in US illegally. .._-,...._ . . Nov.11 Beirut: Iranians break into US Em- bassy, occupy for 90 minutes before be- ing dispersed. Tehran: Ayatollah Khomeini rejects Vatican offer of mediation. . ? Nov. 12 Washington: President Carter orders suspension of oil imports from Iran.- Tehran _ Oil embargo declared against Nov. 13 New York: Iraq requests UN Securi Council meeting and return of Shah property in US. Nov. 14 Tehran: Iran plans to withdraw funds from US banks. ?%' Washington: President- Carter Ord Iranian assets in US frozen. Nov. 15 Tehran: Government hints that women and blacks will be freed soon; "stu: dents" reject any compromise. Nov.17 Tehran: Ayatollah Khomeini' ord women and blacks freed; others to tried in Islamic courts as spies. Nov. 20 Washington: US suggests use of military force to free 50 remaining . hostages; President Carter orders second naval i task force to Indian Ocean. Mecca. Saudi Arabia: Takeover of Grand Mosque by Muslim fundamental- ist splinter group. , - :-n , ; : ;~,?; Nov; 21 Tehran: Five non-Americans released: other hostages will be executed if US uses military force. Washington: President Carter warns Iran will be held "strictly accountable" if hostages harmed. Islamabad, Pakistan: Mob attacks US' Embassy; two marines killed. Nov. 22 Iran: Iranian Navy put on full alert. Nov. 25 New -York: UN Secretary-General Waldheim schedules urgent Security Council meeting for Dec. 1. Nov. 26 Washington: US orders partial evacua-} tion from Muslim countries- Bani- Tehran: Acting Foreign Minister - --" Sadr requests delay for Security C Nov. 27 Tehran: Ayatollah Khomeini attaci plan for Security Council meeting: milil ~Mi Nov. 28 Tehran: Mr. Bank-Sadr replaced by Sadeq Ghotbzadeh as Foreign Minister. Washington: Speech by President C or; We -, will not yield to blackmail." Nov. 29 Washington: US asks International Court of Justice to order release of hostages. ? ? . Mezico City:.Mexico says it will not re- new Shah's visa_ Nov. 30 Tehran: Mr. Ghotbzadeh will not make trip to UN. Dec.1 New York: Security Council opens debate. hold Tehran: Militants announce they two CIA spies. . ' Dec. 2 Tripoli. Libya: US Embassy attacked by 2,000 demonstrators. bassy to guarded locations in cityMr. Ghotbzadeh will send a representative to UN for administrative duties only.. - .1. New York: Shah flies to a military hospi- tal in-, Texas; granted temporary -sanctuary-" - - Dec.3 _ New York: Security Council debate continues. . Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 ARTICLE APPI 'AI ,D ON, ,PAGE-_,. THE WASHINGTON POST 3 December 1979 Rowland Evans ,. And Robert Novak A Soviet _ Eric Rouleau, a leading Western jour= nalist on Iran. wrote in the lett4eaning Paris daily, Le Monde, Nov 2& "Even the denunciations of the 'oppressive communist regimd of Afghanistan have stopped, as well as the hostile slo-1 gans against the Tudeh (Iran's Comma nisi Party) that the masses have beet it' shouting out" - The shift is directly traced to Sadegh Ghotbzadeb, boss of Iranian radio and -television ever since he accompanied the. ayatollah from Paris to Tehran last February. This is the same 'man who now dominates civilian political power in.Tehran, as acting foreign minister under Khomeini. The sudden pro-Moscow propaganda switch ordered by. Ghotbzadeh coin- cided.with the Soviet offer of "support" against U.S. military intervention. de- livered In Moscow by Foreign Minister Andrei- Gromyko to Iranian Ambassa- dor Mohammed Molar. - Although Ghotbzadeh has been por- trayed. on - some. American, television screens as a moderate since his surprise elevation to foreign minister. officials here believe otherwise. He not only an-1 nounced Iran ? would not attend thel emergency session of the U.N. SecurityI Council, but to regarded as an author of the boycott policy. - Indeed, U.S. officials have long sus. pected that of all the non-religious radl. cals in the Iranian revolution, Ghotba-I deh is the most dangerous to the United States. He has known Marxist links and Is closely associated with radi. cal Arab liberation fronts-4ncluding the far4eft Popular Front for the Liber- ation of Palestine, which helped In tak ing over the U.S. Ember in TWmm NOV. 4.. Thus, the ascendancy of Ghotbzadeh dearly, gave --new.. leverage to the Soviets in exploiting U.S. vulnerability In the Iranian crisis The day before Ghotbzadeh rated out his presence at the Dec. I U.N. session, Soviet delegate Oleg Troyanovsky showed the true Soviet colors while Moscow confirmed the illegal" of the embassy takeover, he told council members, the Security Council should let the Iranians speak first atthemeeting .., 'That would establish an immediate' anti.American tone for the extraor- dinary security council session. The ac- cused. not the accuser, would have the run of the courtroom at the outset of the trial _ Nobody knows how far Moscow b willing to risk playing out Its malevo lent band. but an. example may have been set by the Kremlin's refusal to give Carter an escape hatch in the re- cent Cuban crisis. The prospect of simi- larly disdainful treatment in this far more serious Iranian crisis helps ex. plain the anxiety that permeates the In Iran:::~= That Moscow is playing a malevolent hand in the country's Iran crisis became indisputable when the CIA's top secret National Intelligence Dar Informed President Caterter that Moscow has pri- vately promised to "support" Iran in the event of U.S. military action. The Russians intentionally left the nature of that "support" ambiguous. As pieced together by high-level opera. tives in the Pentagon, the State Depart- ment and the Intelligence community, the Soviet objective is clear. induce Ay- atollah Ruhollah Khomeini to. hold the hostages long enough to entice Presi. dent Carter into military reaction. If and when that happens, Moscow''s Intention may well be to offer Iran no more than political and moral support. But no official here is certain that the Russians would be content (as one prominent authority put it to us) "to harvest the rich anti-American crop" throughout the Moslem world that would bloom with an American attack on Iran. If not content, Moscow could Indeed offer military help, using a mechanized division manned by crack Farsi,speaking Soviet soldiers long held in readiness just north of the Iranian- Soviet border. This malevolent game, clearly the de- sign of Soviet policy at the. highest levels. may be understandable as one superpower seeks to exploit the other's vulnerabilitiee. But amid the shadowy power politics swirling around Iran, there seems more than simple explo tion. This looks like calculation and de? sign. Some three weeks after the hostages were seized, the - state.controlled Ira- nian radio and - television suddenly stopped its harsh. unremitting criticism pf the Soviet Union. This propaganda shift contradicted the historic reality that the Russian giant to - Iran's north has always been -viewed as a. natm aggressor; never i friend.;' r" .L administration today . Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 ARTICLE APPEA ED ON PAGE THE WASHINGTON POST 3 December 1979 U nite ions,, dNizts' T IS TRULY regrettable. that Iran's acting foreign portent They signify a readiness to listen with com- minister, Sadegh.. Ghotbzadeh, an authoritative plete seriousness to whatever the. Iranian regime .confidant of Ayatollah Khomeini, was not present in wishes to say to the United States. This is, we believe, the U.N. Security Council to hear Donald McHenry's a fair offer, and it would baffle Americans, and many' presentation of the American can for the release of others, if the Iranians did not take it up. the hostages. For it is of the essence that a direct and The latest moves in Iran are not good. For instance, i honest dialogue be-substituted for the ragged ex. Abe students have produced a document purporting change of statements and.. signals that is now the to show that among their 50 hostages are two CIA of- 'mode of, communication between the=United States titers.. This is, of course, completely irrelevant For. and' Iran, and the.; UnitedNations would ' be a good even if the two are CIA men, they enjoy diplomatic' .Place to launch it' If. Mr. Ghotbzadeh-:-were-there, immunity on the same basis that intelligence officers moreover, hecould testforhimself the truth and sig? do in many embassies, including Iranian em nificanee- of the- position Mr. , McHHenry-laid out to abroad. Moreover, they have not been accused of any open the debater' suspect activity. Mr. McHenry said; iirsE of elZ that "nolcountry can Yet it cannot be ignored -that to many Iranians break and ignore the law while seeking its benefits." "CIA" evokes the full panoply of fears and resen Unquestionabl' , Iran is breaking the law by holding meats left over from past American intervention irt, the hostages:It,mortgages much of its Immediate fu- Iran. For some-not the cynical leaders-it may have ture as a nation j it:does,not act in away that allows been those fears that led them to mistake the shah's) it to claim the protection, of. the law as events move arrival in New York for medical treatment as part of - ----- - -- ------ -------- At the same time; Mr: McHenry addressed the emo. Whether Iranians can understand the plain fact that tional- core -of-Iran's conduct-"None of us is deaf to America is not trying to restore the shah to power in the passionate voices that speak of injustice, that cry - Iran is a question. If Mr. Ghotbzadeh is among those .out for understanding," he said. "There is not a single who -do not truly understand this, it is all the more grievance alleged' orspoken-. is this situation that unfortunate that he did not come to the United N could not be heard in an appropriate forum"-upon lions to hear the case authoritatively stated by Am-l the release of the.hostages_These are words of great bassador McHenry. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 ARTICLE AP?EAP-n l ?i P!1_CE =J NEW YORK TIMES 2 DECEMBER 1979 IRAN SAYS HOSTAGES INCLUDE C.I.A. AIDES; U.S. CONCERN RISING USE OF SCAPEGOATS IS FEARED' A Cable Students Say They Found Lists Two Agency Employees Assigned to-the Embassy WASHINGTON, Dec. 1 ""-'MilitantIra-r nians holding the United States Embassy; in Teheran said today that they had iden- tified Central Intelligence Agency per sonnel among the 50 Americans they are holding, a development that heightened' concern here over the safety of the hos- tages. They are in their 28th day of, cap. tivity. _ - . The United States had no official coin-, ment on the purported cablegram made public by the Iranians that was said to, have been sent -on 'Aug. 8- by L. Bruce Laingen, the charge d'affaires. The mes- sage spoke of "the great sensitivity 1o-; tally to any hint of C.I.A. activity." It has been 'assumed throughout the, crisis that some of the embassy hostages may be C.I.A. "employees carrying out duties that are -often similar to those of regular Foreign Service ?officers -to re- port and analyze political; economic and,. military; events:: Most. .nr*ions?attach'in- teiligenceofficers to -thit'embassies~to-. perform such function- Concern They M y Be Scapegoats There 'is. concern= that 'the Iranians, conditioned to equate 'C :I:A ";with of-,+ forts to subvert Iran, may try to. make scapegoats of those they charge with : being intelligence officers. The agency usually has analysts. attached to: United. States embassies under a cover title < f The documenfinentionecttwoembassy3. offfcers3.Malcolms Kal*and-WWiamt Daugherty: and said thattheyshoala be lnvol ed hii,'S:R.F.,.coverage" and should us* the'title$ of seoottd third t; secretaty#ask. mpsage also' said-,the 'em .shoUI 1t.. .... S . R F~assigitnentst for tli~fdceseabl e' f it- ture ?'.The Iraniana~a the. embassy said'+s Mr. Daugherty;hadsledged work ; Ingfor.theC.I.~ti};..'1a1r;? Reference to Cover Designations Defense Intelligence Agency, and some Pentagon officials have expressed con- The state Department declined to ex- , tern about the. fate of the attaches in plain the abberviation "S.R"F.," but for- Iran. mer officials said it stands for "special reporting facility" and refers to an office in embassies that is usually staffed by C.I.A. analysts who perform functions similar to those of Foreign. Service offi- cers.. It is common, a former official said, for an embassy to pass on a recommendation and. assert, that "S.R.F. concurred,". meaning that the C.I.A. analysts agreed. .The-purported Laingen cablegram also ,..expressed concern about the "old and ap. ~parently insoluble problem of 'R'_desig- nation for S.R.F.. officers." This was'a seeming-reference to the identification of embassy personnel.`. Those who enter the Foreign Service through examination-- are listed as "F.S.O. or, Foreign Service Officer.- Those who enter the Foreign Service someother way are listed as "F.S.R," or Foreign Service Reserve. C.I.A. employ- ees 'attached to embassies' are among those in the "F.S.R." category. ` ' The two categories of Foreign Service personnel used to be identified in a public 'document, The Biographic Register, ,issued by the Statement Department. Its publication was halted three years ago to ,prevent vital information from becoming public. Officials said the United States had sought to reduce the number of C.I.A. analysts in Iran because of the volatility oof the situation. The document produced in Teheran today seemed to indicate that the C.I.A. presence was minimal com- pared with other posts. Similarly, military attaches attschecb to United States embassies report jo the The cablegram also mentioned the word "reftels," or reference telegrams, meaning previous exchanges. The State Department,, meanwhile, showed irritation over conflicting signals from Iran. Yesterday the new Foreign Minister, Sadegh GhMbzadeh, said that Mr. Laingen and two of his aides who have been isolated at the Foreign Minis. try since the embassy takeover were free to leave but that their safety could not be guaranteed if they did. The Iranians hold- ing the embassy said the three could not leave. The State Department commented that the Foreign Minister "may not have the powers traditionally associated with the Foreign Ministry." Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 ARTICLE Appp ON PAGE NEW YORK MAGAZINE 10 December 1979 "...The Carter administration sees Khomeini as a `cancer' which, in the national interest, must be removed by any possible means...". "What you must comprehend is that Ayatollah Khomeini is going for broke." The man speaking was an experienced Western European diplomat based in 'Washington, con- cerned, as are so many in the' international community, that Iran's religious leader has Sim- ply become a clear danger to world peace and the world economy. "You must see the historical dimension of what is occurring," he continued. "Kho- meini is determined to push for the fullest confrontation possible. He wants to push President Carter into military action-he is baiting him. He wants to draw everybody, Islam and the infidel West, into a bloody battle. He is a fanatic, but he has coldly thought out his moves. He is playing on anti-Ameri- can and anti-Western sentiment in the Arab world and everywhere in the Third World. He thinks that time is on- his side, that the Third World is with him, and he's not afraid of a bloodbath. This is Carter's terrible dilemma." The acceptance of this view has only come recently to the Carter admin- istration. Indeed, it -actually followed Khomeini's threat to try the 49 hostages held in Teheran, the attack on the Great Mosque in Mecca, and the anti- American rioting-inspired by the aya- Tad Szule writes regularly on foreign affairs for New York Magazine. tollah-which ensued in Pakistan. But even before these occurrences, the ad- ministration had concluded that Kho- meini was a "cancer," as one official put it, to be removed before it spread. It was at that point, around November 38, just two weeks after the embassy seige e an, that the Carter a minis- tration a an studying a mix of pos- sible military action and CIA-managed subversion to remove the a ato a from indeed, elder U.S. government concluded possible. that re- moving Khomeini was in the national interest. Although senior administration offi- cials would not publicly discuss the likelihood of direct application of United States power, overt and covert, toward the ouster of the ayatollah and his regime-particularly while the hos- tages were still in danger-top-priority studies are 'now under way in the National Security Council, the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency, the Pentagon, and other government organs. Indeed, it was only concern for the hostages that prompted the president to veto a secret plan to drop weapons and pos. sibly American agents into the oil fields of Khuzistan, where Iranian Arabs are strongly opposed to the ayatollah. The American hope in removing the . ayatollah is that he can be replaced by a more moderate leader- ship, perhaps one including former Prime Minister Mehdi Barzargan and military commanders not tainted by close relations with the former shah. The U.S. government thinks that a favorable climate for Khomeini's re- moval might be created in time-despite his popular support if Iran falls into further internal chaos. Yet the view that the ayatollah "must go" does not stem from a desire to punish him for the capture of the embassy in Teheran-and the threat to try the hostages still under detention on espionage charges. The concern over Khomeini's continuation in power goes much deeper in terms of fundamental American strategic considerations in the Middle East: Iran under the aya tollah's. sway is seen as a formidable threat to the stability of the whole region. What the seizure of the embassy and its aftermath accomplished was to convince the administration beyond any- doubt that normal dealings with Kho- meini were no longer possible and that, therefore, drastic steps were justi- fied to hasten his departure from power. "The eighties will be the crucible of in- tense crisis for the United States," a respected diplomat said last week. "You Americans are the target. And no mat- ter what happens, the Middle East and the world won't ever be the same again. A historical line has been crossed, and you lack power to draw new lines." In recent private discussions, several senior administration officials have rec- ognized that the United States may have been inexorably damaged by Kho. meini's politics and posturing. Indeed, the Iranian crisis has precipitated the sudden unraveling of the basic Ameri- can relationships in what has been called r In Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 the "arc of crisis," the immense Islamic swath of the world extending from North Africa to Pakistan and possibly to Indonesia and the Philippines. This process of unraveling, in turn, now threatens to undermine and de- stroy the policies and relations pains. takingly built by the United States in the Middle East and in the Third World generally. It touches on the menace of a partial or complete cutoff of oil to the United States (notably if there is administration committed a second er- ror stemming from the original mis- judgment. It thought that the situation was negotiable through diplomatic channels, and that, with patience, it would be resolved. This led President Carter to decide from the very outset to rule out military action in Iran, a decision which subsequent and inevi- table events in Iran forced him to recon- sider sixteen days later, when it finally dawned on the administration-after military intervention in Iran), on Arab- Khomeini threatened to try the embas. Israeli peace prospects, and on contin- ued American influence in Middle East politics. . While Khomeini's Iran was the flash point of this crisis of "historical propor- tions," senior administration analysts now acknowledge that the explosion might have occurred elsewhere sooner or later. Ruthless and reckless. as the old ayatollah's challenge to the estab? lished world order has been, it never- theless symbolizes the essential conflict between the North and South, between the affluent, industrialized West and destitute Third World, between pro. ducers and consumers of raw materials, and between two sets of cultural' values separated by a vast chasm. The explo- sion was perhaps inevitable, though America never really believed it. And, in the case of Iran, it was enormously aggravated by religious fanaticism so dexterously exploited by the ayatollah and by the oil weapon he wields.. It is now evident that the Carter ad- ministration--and the West-misunder? stood and underestimated the true meaning of the student takeover of the Teheran embassy, its origins, and its consequences. This presumably explains policy errors committed before and af- ter the occupation of the American compound. The first miscalculation was clearly the decision to admit the shah for medical treatment in the United States, humanitarian as. the motives may have been. To say this. is not sim- sy hostages for espionage-that the con- flict with the ayatollah transcended the in- fate of the shah. As a Washington telligence expert remarked privately that wee k ou must never rule out anything, because you don't now what as going to happen next." Though there is general approval in Washington of Carter's handling of the crisis-his coolness and prudence-the view was developing among many ad- ministration officials and foreign diplo- mats that the White House did not fully understand the situation until quite late in the crisis. Khomeini's rejection of mediatory attempts by the Palestine Liberation Organization, despite his closeness to the PLO, and by Pope John Paul II. a fellow religious leader, should have convinced the administra- tion that the ayatollah was-and would remain-totally uncompromising. There was no reason to believe that mildly punitive actions such as the ban on im- ports of Iranian oil and the freezing of official Iranian assets in the United States and in U.S. banks abroad, re- quired as they evidently were to sat- isfy American public opinion, would sway Khomeini. Overall, the growing conviction in Washington is that Khomeini's attitude- and the ongoing confrontation with Iran have already wrought irreparable damage to the United States in the Mid- dle East, and that it will worsen pro- ply hindsight: Classified messages be-- gressively: tween the - State- Department and the _ Thus administration analysts- see the embassy in Teheran, found and publi- Middle East already greatly destabilized. cized by the Islamic students, show The attack on the mosque in Mecca has that the administration was fully aware visibly shaken Saudi Arabia, creating that the shah's entry into the United newfearsofmovesbyMuslimfundamen- States might well trigger violent adverse talists and other radicals of the left or actions by- the Iranians. But it is equally . the right. These fears in a country with .clear that the administration had mini- a large foreign work force, including mized the inherent dangers, and, above Palestinians and Pakistanis, may be af- all, failed to place them in the histori. fecting the -Saudis' oil and foreign poi- cal context of the runaway Iranian re- icies. Whereas the Saudis had raised ligious revolution. their production by a million barrels a Once the embassy was seized, the day, over 10 percent. to make up for the post-revolutionary shortfall in the Iranian output, Treasury Secretary G. William Miller, visiting Saudi Ara- bia late last month, was unable to ob- tain assurances that the high produc- tion level will be maintained. The Saudis, according to some Wash- ington officials, may not wish to appear to their own population or fellow Mus- lims, regardless of sect, to be excessive- ly pro-American. A reduction by the Saudis may be imitated by other Per- sian Gulf and Arab producers, who are inclined, in any event, toward conserva- tion for political reasons. Most of them disapprove of the ayatollah, but, given rising internal pressures, they may be wary of antagonizing him. Khomeini has already urged them to withhold oil from the United States, and, analysts say, there are signs that the Middle East understands the "historical dimen- sions" he has unveiled. _ . A reduction, let alone a suspension. of Middle Eastern oil production would have catastrophic consequences for the United States, which imports one half of its petroleum consumption, and for Western Europe and Japan-particu- larly with the onset of winter. It could throw their economies into a tailspin. Built into Middle Eastern oil strate- gies are other political considerations as well. These add to new dangers in the stalemate in the negotiations be- tween Egypt and Israel over the ulti- mate fate of the West Bank and Gaza. Saudi Arabia is opposed to the Egyp- tian-Israeli peace treaty, and it has been hinting it will use the "oil weap- on" if Israel fails to make basic con-.. cessions to the Palestinians. In the context of a generalized Mid- dle Eastern turmoil resulting from the Iranian crisis, the Palestinian deadlock may force the Saudis' hand. Iraq, a radical Arab state, has again been urg- ing the application of this "oil weapon"._ against the United States if Israel re- mains intransigent. Thus far the Iraqis- have failed, but the situation could well change overnight. To persuade Israel to return oil fields in the Sinai to Egypt under peace-treaty provisions, as the Israelis did late in November, the " United States had committed itself to provide it with alternate petroleum at tolerable prices. But. this could become impossible, reopening the full question of the peace treaty. Likewise, Washington analysts, say, the United States can no longer under- estimate Khomeini's impact on Islamic countries. Pakistan has apologized for Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 ARTICLE A.P R ON PAGE U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 10 DECEMBER 1979 reads a miac Support for the use of military power, a big increase In defense spending, new backing for CIA covert action and still more to come-the effects of the Iranian crisis add up to a change of course for U.S. Show of force. Much of the increase in defense funds is earmarked to estab- lish a stronger American presence in the Persian Gulf region and to develop a capability to intervene militarily in crises in that area. Pentagon sources say that a carrier task force will be maintained in the In- dian Ocean almost continually in the future. And the American naval facility on the island of Diego Garcia will be upgraded to provide logistical backup for the fleet. In addition, more transport aircraft will be ordered for a rapid-deployment force that is being developed for quick intervention in remote crisis spots. Roving supply ships also will be built to ! provide logistical support for this force. I keep permanently in deep freeze its negotiations with Russia for an accord to limit superpower naval strength in the Indian Ocean. Pentagon officials ! point out that such an accord would have prevented the U.S. from staging the massive show of naval strength un- der way in that region. An armada of 19 American warships, comprising three separate task forces, is deployed in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea. It is the greatest demon- stration of U.S. sea power in this region in recent history. The armada is built around two aircraft carriers, the Mid- way and the Kitty Hawk. For an administration that took of- fice with a 'pledge to slash defense spending and that has been preoccu- pied with arms control, all of this rep- resents a dramatic change of course. Besides the military buildup, the cri- sis in Iran has led to a radical change in sentiment concerning the role of the Central Intelligence Agency. Even cer- tain liberal columnists such as Joseph Kraft are advocating that the agency's capability to carry out covert onera- tions around the world be rebuilt. A similar change has shown up in Con- gress as well. Says Representative Samuel Stratton (D-N.Y.), chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on In- vestigations: -We've got to re-establish an effective CIA. Some people wonder why we don't have the CIA ... take back our embassy to free the hostages. The sad fact is that the CIA no longer has that capability." Even more striking is the change in attitude toward the use of American military power. One knowledgeable of- ficial says it is noteworthy that, in the current crisis, no one has mentioned the War Powers Act. The law was passed after the Vietnam conflict to limit the President's authority. to use military forces. "What this tells me," says the official, "is that there is support for a more in- terventionist policy-but within limits. This does not mean a blank check for the President. to go to war." The ranking Republican member of the House Armed Services Subcommit- tee on Sea Power, Representative Floyd Spence of South Carolina, put it this way: "I'd say Iran has turned around the anti-Vietnam syndrome. . Now, here in the House, I hear mem- bers talking hawkish." The fallout from the Iranian crisis is also having an impact on congressional attitudes toward energy needs. Repre- sentative Bob Eckhardt (D-Tex.) says that he senses a new determination to escape from dependence on foreign oil producers. His assessment: "Events in Iran are making people for.the first, time look at energy realistically." Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 AfTICLE APPEARED ON , 1 NEW YORK DAILY NEWS 2 December 1979 ells ru our. it..ByJOS5PHVOLZ ~?Washington (News Bureau): State Department officials were Of fled yesterday In the face of cn- flicting comments from the new Jr` Alan foreign minister, Sadeq Qot tadeh, about the future.of the to U.S. diplomat In Tehran. L. Bruc Laingen, Qotbzadeh said on Friday that Lain gen, the U.S. charge d'affaires, and two ether diplomats who have been staying at the Foreign Ministry: were free to leave. although providing security to the] airport would be "rather difficult." Ci But Yesterday, Qotbzadeh denied tha he had ever said they could leave. Qotb. tadeh's backdown appeared to come in response to the increasingly militant' tone of the Moslem students occupying )he U.S. Embassy. i::; State -Department officials. here said that it Is just about impossible to know who in Tehran speaks with any author ity. At times the militants, who hold ;io position In the government, appear to have more Influence with the Iranian strongman. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomei- nl,'than cabinet officers. At other times cabinet officers seem' to be An charge, only to be summoned by the ayatollah and chastised. See a CIA presence One key theme seems to be emerging, though,-with. increasing force - the! theory of the students that Central Intel- ligence-Agency officers are. among the hostages., Although the students . have :called all 56 hostages spies, there is some 'question as to whether they be-' tieve that. ? But yesterday, for the ' first time, the militants showed- newsmen in Tehran a ecan't exit document that they said wasan',August! 1979 cable from Laingen to Secretary of State Vance discussing how. to' provide) cover for CIA officers at the embassy. . ? State Department officials ? never comment on allegations of U.S. espio. nage activities and had no comment yes- terday. It could not be learned here whether the cable was legitimate-or a, forgery. But some of the terminology puzzled; former intelligence officers who have! read CIA .cables'>from abroad in past: years. The Fable reportedly told Vance' that "we should hold to the present total: of four SRF officer assignments for thel foreseeable future." It was not clear] what SRF might mean. ' ' The cable named two Americans who) were supposedly CIA 9fficers but were serving under dip;omatic cover.. .> A key reason for the turmoil over the CIA now is *that the agency in the past did play. an overwhelming role in Ira- nian-Internal affairs. A CIA task force, led by Kermit Roosevelt, engineered a 1 countercoup in the 1950s that returned' the briefly deposed shah to power. It seems clear from talks with offs- clals here that the Cia is not currently carrying out any espionage activities in, But some of the more militant stu-i dents are said to believe that somehow; the shah will make one last return to' power in Iran with the help of the CIA. U.S.officials argue that anyone who' really believes that is just incapable of, listening to reason. Not only has the) shah no support and bad health, the! officials state, the Carter administration would under no circumstances allow the .CIA to participate in bringing him back; to power. 4 . I Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 ARTICLE 05 PAGE ('Z THE BALTIMORE SUN 2 December 1979 Tehrad The- Iranians-` holding 50, Americans hostage In the United Sta Embassy here charged yesterday that Z of their captives, William: Daugherty and Malcolm Kalp, are employees of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.,:-.. The "students" who seized the U.S. Em- bassy November 4 distributed a purported. copy of a secret message sent in: August by L. Bruce Laingee, the. American charge d'affaires here, implying that the two men, are CIA agents. A spokesman for the, Iranian captors alleged, "William Dougherty confesed he is a CIA officer." The Iranians did not,contend that any of the other hostages, including Mr. Kalp, have acknowledged spying or working for the CIA. .. The captors did not further identify t her two Americans except to say, "They are both with us." The Iranians also released a booklet of other U.S. Embassy communications dug out of.tbe filet during nearly a month of ransacking the embassy. They charge the- documents show that "this was not an em- bassy. This was a?den'of espionage:'Here they (Americansr plotted against thr peo- ple of Iran to loot their resources:": The communications presented by th Iranians are quite routine documents, con- taining the ?kindr"of reporting that nearly. all"embassie , send' back to-their govern. { menu: Their presentation' as "evidence"' demonstrates- what- could; at best, called the captors' lack of sohistication. The one purported, u.s cable released . yesterday that Iran could use as particu- lar evidence againt individual hostages is the one naming Mr. Daugherty and Mr. Kalp. Sent to the. State Department from. Mr., Laingerr last summery and. labeled. "Secret;.' it reads: "I concur: fh assign- ments Malcolm Kalp and William. Daugh- ertyas described Reftels. 3.. =Win. _ "With opportunity available to assn the sense that we are starting from a clean - slate in SRF coverage at this mission, but with regard also for the great sensitivity locally to any hint of CIA activity; it is of the. highest importance that cover be the best we can come up with. Hence there is no question. as to. the need for second and third secretary tides for these two off I. cers. We [mush have it. "I believe cover arrangements in terms of assignments within embassy are appropriate to present overall staffing ' pattern. We should however hold to the present total of four SRF officer assign. ments for the forseeable future, keeping support staff as sparse as possible as well until we see bow things go here: "We are making effort to limit knowl- edge within ELMB of all SRF assignments: that effort applies particularly to Daugh-. erty, pursuant to new program of which- be is a product and about which I have been informed. "I suppose I need not (remind f they d partment that the old and apparently! in- soluble problem of designation for SRF of. ficers will inevitably complicate and to some degree weaken our coverage efforts locally, no matter how much we worlra It. Laingen." Asked what the initials-"SRF" refer to, a spokesman for the hostage-holders said "You can ask theCIA and tell us."--?"ss- ' What is -clear from the cable. If it is, genuine, is that Mr. Laingen insisted?that Mr. Daugherty and Mr. Kalp be give diplo- matic status - witting the U.S: Embassy here so that they would be protected b diplomatic immunity if they got in trouble In Iran because of the sensitive nature o 'their work.: = . _ The Iranian captors reiterated yesteri. their threat to disregard traditional respect for diplomatic immunity and -4 try the American hostages for alleg :spying- Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 ARTICLE AFFM " .ED NEW YORK TIMES all PAGE_, ? 2 DECEt? t 1979 It, Tr i r-_ Students Step Up Pressure .tor spy ra1s .91 ByJOHN x,i'N" trial. Sp.cdaT1.NSWYO&`nffM - However, the prospect of the Shah's TEHERAN, Iran, Dec. 1- Pressure leaving the United States for some other for "spy trials" of American hostages at country-a "worse crime" on the partof the United States Embassy appeared to 1 the United States than the admission of increase today as Iranians holding 50 hos- the former ruler, the students said today tages at the United States, Embassy - put the situation into a new light. released a document that they said Having insisted that the hostages were proved that two of the captive diplomats "proven" to be spies by the papers found were Central Intelligence Agency opera- at the embassy, could the Iranian au- tives. . thorities release them without obtaining The diplomats were identified in the the Shah in exchange? document as Malcolm Kaip and William "We'll cross that bridge when we come I Daugherty. It said they "must" be given to it," Mr. Ghotbzadeh said at his press "cover" because of the "great sensitivity.- conference yesterday. But he also pre- locally to any hint of C-I.A. activity." :.: i rented a hypothetical situation: 4 Suppose, Mr. Ghotbzadeh told the as- The students, who have held the Amer t- sembled foreign reporters, you had can Embassy since Nov. 4, said that Mr: caught a thief. Suppose, however, that Daugherty had "confessed. to beings a the thief had given your stolen goods to C.I.A. officer."" . someone else. You insisted on getting the In another development, the Foreign mean, Mr. Ghotbzadeh asked, that you 1 i Minister, Sadegh Ghotbzadeh. denied should release the thief? ?~ .L- t?L-L T-- .LAS r...wad t o Is not that he said as day that L. Bruce Laingen, the American students said at their news conference en- today, "thehostages will be tried and the A ' m and two other charge d aftaires. trials will be conducted on Islamic princi- can officials who have been in the For- pies." - eign Ministry, since the takeover of the The students distributed copies. of a embassy were free to leave the country. ' telex message, addressed to the United it is of the highest importance that cover be the best we can come up with. Hence there is no question as to the need for sea and and third secretary titles. for these terms of assignments within embassy are t appropriate to present overaW staffing present total of tour S.R.F. officer assign. supporting staff as sparse as possible as well, until we see how things go here.: "We are making effort to limitltriowl- edge within emb of all S.R.F.. assiga- "I suppose I need not mind the depart- ment that the old and apparently insolu- ble problem of R designation for S.R.F. some degree weaken our cover efforts la cally, no matter how much we work at it." Proof of Espionage Claimed The students said the message proved that those inside the embassy had carried out espionage "and plotted against the Iranian nation." They also distributed a booklet in Per- sian and English of the documents they had previously released, several otwhich appeared to show that the United States had been considering admitting the Shah at least as early as July, three months be- fore he entered a New; York hospital for medical treatment. ? After the students said Mr. Laingen would be tried along with the other hos- UCAILJ lidos.. v ..-.. .? - conference at the embassy that "Laingen lion through- "Roger channeE" and re- ; ferred to designations called " S.R.F: as- - .-.__ d ,ik -..i? be re-- i e tr e and the the rest." t` Contents of Message There has been a rising chorus from the ? s` t the th -.. a cents in recent days Embassy on Taleghani Street was not an Kai and`. William Daugherty as de- outpost of diplomacy but a"nest of spies" 1 ~; cppornunity available I., r to us in the but with regard also for the great sensi- sian Gulf country. '` . ~' ,spies, although they would be forgiven: ,meini it the- deposed, Shah -Mohamm tages, several reporters pointed out that Mr. Ghotbzadeh had said yesterday that Mr. Laingen was not a prisoner and that the only problem in his leaving Iran was guaranteeing his safety between the For- eign Ministry and the airport. "Mr. Ghotbzadeh did not say such a thing." the student spokesman said.i "I deny this:' , . xemaras xecoraea on -rape i - There was a loud bursa of derisive laughter from the more than 200 foreign I correspondents, most otwhom had heard Mr. Gbotb=deb , make' thee- statement three times during yesterday's news con- ference. Some. of the correspondents i re.. corded his remarks on tape.: Further questions on the-subject were cut off. ; ; ??; . - , .:- . f,i' _ ? Mr. Ghotbzadeh released a letter today that he had sent to the United Nations Secretary General, Kurt. ? Waldheim. warning that "American -imperialism and international Zionism have resorted to a new plot to carry out their crimes on an international scale ; y?,r;`?' ;iA LP Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 ARTICLE APPEA "D ON PAGE L THE NATION 1 December 1979 ? EJ With the Ayatollahf Khomeini's announcemen that the remainiag* hostages are "spies" and "therefore" will beput on trial, it becomes clear that only concern. for the hostages' safety is holding back an explosion of frustration and! hatred toward Iran. in this country. Violence begets violence, and one hopes that whatever the Ayatollah's next action or threat, the Carter Ad-, ministration will heed the counsel -of restraint, and begin a belated process of education ex-. plaining to the Iranians why the United States can't extradite Mohammed Reza Pahlevi under our law and our moral and political values, and why any attempt to bring him to justice must take place in accordance with international law.! Carter should also 'explain to the Americans the motives behind 'the Iranians' tragic action. No peace will be possible between Iran and the Unit-" ed States until the Administration acknowl edges our past complicity in the Pahlevi regime's installation and,by extension, its record of tor-' ture,, repression and economic plunder. The more we learn about the decision to admit. the Shah to this-covntry, the more his entry takes: on the cast of another Henry Kissinger sideshow.,' It now seems cleat that the Shah could have ob- tained adequate medical treatment in any num ber of other countries, and the Carter Adminis tration has yet to explain why it submitted to the Kissinger-David Rockefeller pressures. Those pushing for the Shah's admission could not,: perhaps, have anticipated the embassy takeover, but they could 'not have been unaware that it would destabilise-our relations with Iran and thus strengthen the advocates of an intervention- ist foreign policy. It would be a catastrophe if we permitted the emotions aroused by this affair to provoke a resurrection of the covert inteUigence~ activities that saddled the world with the Shah- in the first place.. :} ?r BES .+_INT .A T I A - FO F _R Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 ARTICLE A-PPLIR-wD THE WASHINGTON POST ON PAGFs~,~ 1 December 1979 sz* B ts ania's- ,. _. 0-%,re *~ Gif Remeraberino" 'theSu'btle Seduction of High U.S. Officials by Zahedi . By Eugene r. Meyer wasWnetoo Post Staff Wrtter Shortly before his sudden departure from Washington nine months ago. Shah Mohammad Rea - Pahlavi's am-- bassador to the United States gave a Persian rug to Henry A. Kissinger for his Yew York City apartment. The gift from Ardeshir Zahedi was described almost casually by a Kis- singer aide as, "kind of a - going-away present" from one friend to.another., In this case, however, : It;. bespoke a- friendship between a former secretary of state and the emissary of the de.. posed ruler of Iran. Zahedi had also given Kissinger and his, wife a. gold goblet as a wedding., gift: Since Kissinger -was then im of- fice, that gift : was turned . is to the government, as were a silver tea set and a silver cigar box from the shah himself. Friendships such as this, nurtured during the years when Kissinger was' one of the shah's chief proponents in the U. S. government, would later form part of the backdrop for the cri sis that has engulfed Washington and _ Tehran since the ailing -shah was ad- mitted to. the-United States- for medi- cal treatment four weeks ago, It has been alleged, at Kissinger's behest. EXCERPT At various other times; Zahedt gave awAy the clips; cuff links, Persian-pill- boxes, pistachios and gold coins, the l last "to ladies he would meet offI.+ eially in his travels,'?'according to Del- phine. BIachowicz;-Zahedi's?- personal secretary from 1973 to 1979: EXCERPT r Blachowicz rec ed the 1973 Christ mss gift list as "mostly my work. I sat with the ambassador for several hours while he personally went over every name.". The final list, she said, Included no In the White House, practically every. one in the Cabinet, lots of congres- sional. figures and five in the Central . Intelligence)- A ency." That year, she said, "The Turquoise Bridge,"' a hand. some book of Persian art, was dis? patched to- Cabinet members. and- White House staf . y Also on the list; she said, were State Department officials "who dealt-with Iran" and. "a-number of military peo- pie " . - .- --- . Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 FLORIDA TIMES-UNION (JACKSON+NILLE ) 25 NOVEMBER 1979 :Events in Iran underscore need for an effective CIA "The lesson from the events in Iran is that America needs a stronger Central Intel- ligence Agency..;: "Our intelligence oper- ations have been operating al- most as if America - has- one arm tied behind its back, while the rest,-of the world 'is swinging-with both arms.,_ "Why aren't we anticipat- ing these problems rather than reacting to them?. "Why must we be-faced with no effective. options - be- -tween being,-humiliated and sending in the:Marines?". These statements by Pennsylvania Sen. John Heinz .are hardly originaL.- just about any man on the street could make them today - yet noteworthy for two reasons. One is the timing: All this has been said before - but now people are ready to listen. Back in 1975. veteran CIA "street man" (spy), Mike Ac- kerman. told--why he resigned in a copyrighted article in:: the Miami Herald' His decision came aftera'se?Cret.meeting "with a . Communist source who-was, risking his life. to, see me. - 4 "I realized s'I , could not guarantee his seftrity. There :was no way, I could promise him that some irresponsible member of Congress or (CIA) ex-employee wouldn't leak his information or that some re- porter wouldn't blast it allover the front page." Former CIA Director Wil- liam Colby. earlier this year wrote (prophetically) in the Washington Star: - . - "It is often wise to use the minimum necessary interven- tion (CIA type operations) rather than order carrier task forces or Marine amphibious groups to the alert-" . Sen. Daniel Patrick Moy nihan, at about the same time, summed matters up bluntly: "(Today) there is no intel- ligence agency of any cone, quence within the' United States. government." The second reason that Sen.. Heinz' statement is im- portant is that he puts the blame where it should be - upon the very body which can do something about it: "Unfortunately, the blame for this sad state lies as much with the Congress as with the administration. In its effort to correct abuses Con- gress has reined in our intelli- gence community. to the point where. it is ? seriously handi- capped irr its basic mission." Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 ApPrARED cr; ~~:1cL THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 14 December 1979 C1ss played in a lower key' By Joseph C. Harsch Perhaps it didn't mean anything, but on at least one day this past week (Dec. 11) there were no. marching, shouting demon- strators pertorming for television cameras outside the United States Embassy in Tehran. Was it because Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini had other things to worry. about besides the American hostages who had been cooped up for over a month inside that embassy com- pound? Perhaps someone in the office for demonstrations in Tehran forgot to schedule a contingent for that day. Perhaps it was because a new consensus had built up among the Ayatol- lah's leadership group in Qom that the hostages had lost their usefulness. - The essential fact out of it is that the hostage crisis does seem to be quieting down. The new watchword among the Iranian leadership is that PATTER! OF DIPLOMACY the Americans in the embassy are "guests," not hostages. It' now is asserted repeatedly that none of them, not even those alleged to be CIA agents, hence "spies," would be killed. Sometimes crises end like that. They just seem to dissolve in other preoccupations. Ayatollah Khomeini does have other things on his slate right now. The referendum on his new constitution has not been ac- cepted by all provinces, or by all other ayatollahs, in Iran. Azerbaijan province, in the north, on the Soviet frontier, is in a state of rebellion. So, too, are- Kurdistan and Baluchistan, and the area around the oil fields along the coast. There is as yet no effective Khomeini dictatorship. Perhaps most important is that for the moment anti-Americanism no longer seems to be enough to maintain Ayatollah Khomeini's grip. Presumably, if he could get any more use out of holding the, hostages, out of abusing them, or out of general anti-American propaganda - he would do whatever served his purposes of the, moment. But if such tactics cease to serve his' purposes - well, call them "guests" and begin to ignore the whole busi- ness almost as though it had never happened. The main beneficiary from the crisis continued over the past week to be President Carter in Washington. Polls showed his public approval rating at a new high. A majority of Democrats had decided, according to the polls, that they now prefer Mr. Carter over Sen. Edward Kennedy. Republicans were suggest- ing that perhaps Mr.-Carter ought to begin moving away some of those US warships now in Arabian waters. Sen. Howard Baker, an important Republican presidential candidate, noted that having them near Iran could lead to some dangerous in- cident between the US and the Soviets. In other words, Mr. Carter's rivals for the US presidency have a stake now in the earliest possible deflation of the crisis. A Khomeini outburst calling on Americans to vote against Mr., Carter was, of course, tqe best propaganda boost Mr. Carte has had in a long time. A Herbiock cartoon captured the mood. It showed all th rivals looking in horror at a headline: "Khomeini says: Vot against Carter." "There goes the ball game," say the rivals Only deflation of the crisis could restore anything rase the pre-crisis political status quo in the US. The Western allies could share the hope of the rival Amer- ican politicians for a deflation of the Iran crisis. It has brought down on them heavy US diplomatic pressure to join in boycott- ing Iran. They find the pressure unwelcome. US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was treated with utmost courtesy when he reached Brussels for the dual purpose of. promoting "new nukes for NATO" (Pershing II and cruise; missiles) and rounding up support for the Iran boycott. He; would have had an easier time getting agreement on the "newt nukes" had he not had to try for the other. On that other, bei got more politeness than performance. The Japanese were also unhappy about the pro-boycott pre*! sure. The sharp American reaction to their purchases of Ira-; elan oil reminded them of the affront they still feel when they, learned from the newspapers that Richard Nixon was going to, Peking. They continued to buy up all the Iranian oil they could! find on the "spot" market. '? Perhaps Moscow was a minor beneficiary. The continuations of the crisis, even though in lower key, kept attention away, from reports that the Soviets had moved a unit of their owns troops into Afghanistan. Their-client regime in that country is still having serious guerrilla trouble in spite of rising Soviet! support. Guerrilla sources put the number of Soviet people in Afgha- nistan as high as 25,000 men. US sources think this estimate; may be exaggerated, but agree that Moscow is doing a lot to try to help the regime in Kabul. Guerrillas say the Sovi" have sent in 100 big armored helicopter gunships. The Sovie position in Afghanistan looks more and more like the US ex- perience in Vietnam. perhaps Moscow got a little advantage out of bad US rela bons with Iran. It continued to pump out propaganda "w ings" against any US military actions against Iran. It was easy and safe move since the US has no intention of taking a such action. But Moscow has its own preoccupations. Its continued at-' tempts to scare NATO away from those "new nukes" has; failed. The Iranian crisis and Soviet efforts to exploit it have almost certainly shelved SALT II. Conceivably that project, might be revived next year; but it seems more likely than, ever that the Carter White House will allow it to go over until, after the next presidential election. Moscow's effort to sweeten its relations with its Western, neighbors by a token pull-out of an armored division from East Germany seems to have come too late. It did not head off they decision on the new nuclear weapons for NATO. It did not save i SALT IL US-Soviet relations seem to be at their worst point! since Henry Kissinger invented "detente." Little is left of that And this deflation of detente comes at a time when the So- viet economy is doing as poorly as is the US economy, in some ways worse. Moscow has managed to conceal its inflation. But it has not even tried to conceal its shortfall in grain produc- tion. It is more dependent on the US for its food today than it was a year ago, or a year before that. Soviet crop failures are putting Moscow in the same position toward the US that the. US tt in toward its foreign suppliers of oil. The Economist magazine (London) says that in 1979 Moscow turned in "its worst peacetime economic performance." Neither the USA nor the USSR is yet a "pitiful. helpless gi ant." But the economic foundation under the military power of, both is sagging For Westerners there is at least some con- solation from their troubles in that Moscow is in deepening economic stagnation as well. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501320001-0 UTMAREV THE WASHINGTON POST ON PAl'E A J~r_ 14 December 1979 Stephen S. Rosenfeld On Iran Prudent Iran- means not only a crisis but a prize in the policy-making wars. Everyone-is trying to lay exclusive claim to it to bolster the policy of his choice. The people who have been ar- uing for a military buildup and a has strengthened his hand-the Amer- ican hand-in dealing with Iran. He has gone far to separate his own stand- ing from the disaster that remains one possible outcome of this affair. Interestingly, few people are say- ing that Carter is playing it too hard or too soft in Iran, or even that he is playing it hard or soft. He has made those categories seem not really rele- vant. He has gotten people to take his performance on its own terms. I think this goes beyond matters of tactics-threats, feints and induce- .ments, ship movements, economic sanctions and diplomatic initiatives- though these seem to have been han- dled well enough: It also goes beyond the impression Carter has' conveyed of being serious, cool and in charge- in this crisis, anyway. I think it is that for the first time Carter appears to be accepting the le- gitimacy of all the purposes and all the instruments of Amercan. foreign tamed that prudish and unseemly 1 prejudice. I am not saying he neces- sarily will or should use force in Iran or elsewhere,. or that. he. has aban doned prudence for the But his manner suggest, to me anyway, that he will do what he has to do. , The "students" in Tehran are glea- f Xy P ucmn w_ ey r as en e of.a resence. it this turns out to be so, my guess is that many Americans will be pleased at the proof that Carter was not deny ing himself intelligence resources in: i s place where good intelligence has been in notably short supply. They will be pleased to know that he had not let the ayatollah staff the- em- bassy. In sum, slinging our weight around Is not the answer. Nor is taking a crash course in cultural anthropology. Using our considerable assets wisely is the better way and, in this crisis at, least, Carter has been following it g more strategic approach to world af- fairs are saying with grim satisfac- tion that Iran nails down thew case. Those who believe the episode proves that we should show more under- standing for the sensitivities of oth- ers are, though not so numerous, no less insistent. The argument recalls what somebody once said about drinking: it intensifies, the mood ou're already in. y Okay. Iran proves to everyone that it's necessary to review old assump- tions about how the United States should deal with instability . in the Third World. The debate is yet to be properly focused, The show we're- tough people, for instance, have not explained how. adding more muscle solves the problem of our being muscle-bound in dealing with Iran. The show-we'reeympathetic types have not Indicated where to draw the histori g line between sho c r in be a o cultural empathy mat But the argument goes on. however, too narrow. An It is , tant element is missing: the question of political management. If this crisis rove s d on_ r_ p aa ing so for, It is' that-skillful manage- ment, in the broadest sense, tends 1) to smooth out the differences' in sub- stance and approach that and 9 to bestow political rewards- Since Nor.-A, Jimmy Cartes Path formance has earned the reapeet.of most people, as measured in the polls and- in the special Washington coin in what people around town say qui- etly to each other. Vulnerable earlier, he has presented a shrinking target a the eris$ has flowered- As a remit, he. policy That is, for the first time his policy is not inherently tendentious and divisive The moralistic element, which has made him-seem so interest- ed in using foreign policy to, struggle for the soul of Americans, has been subdued. Such discussion as there has been has centered on means, not ends. We can all guess what Carter pri- vately thinks of the shah, for instance. But publicly he is not turning his back --quite the contrary--on a figure who for all his failings provided serv- ices (keeping the Russians out, keep- ing the oil flowing, performing politi- cal odd jobs) that the United States.i prized highly at the time and that it sure would be glad- if, someone else were providing now. And what he does publicly is what counts. In the past, Carter made no secret of his view that it is unworthy to con- I template the use of force. But in this crisis, though he has V== to, a final test, he Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 I nE 1.nILJ I LrUI 41-LLJ ..I- 19VRL I VI. ARTICLE APPZAf u ON PAGE US out on the limb with him 12 December 1979 Shah's search fora'home:t captors demand. :- for the Shah's return to Iran, as his Iranian William Gallegos of Pueblo, Colorado, one of 50 US hostages, in. Tehran, expressed.?`hope" ? By Join IL Cooley " . Shah and all who befriend him. Ayatollah Staff correspondent of -Kalkali has said one of these teams was re- The Christian Science Monitor sponsible for the murder in France recently of one of the Shah's nephews. - - Washington The Shah's eldest son, Crown Prince Reza. After working closely with United States and his wife, Empress Farah, who is with presidents, Cabinet officers, and military him, seem to be as equally threatened as are men since World War II. Shah. Muhammad bb sisters and other relatives and close { Reza Pahlavi of Iran sits under US Air Force fends, scattered in hiding around the West- protection in Texas, wondering whether that ern world. is his final residence. Sheltering the Shah and Prince Reza, who In a controlled interview taped for Iranian has completed his US Air Force pilot training and then US television Dec_ 10, Marine Cpi: -in this country, is likely to compound US difn J But only a small minority of Americans seem to echo thatview, and many doubt that it is really what Corporal Gallegos himself be- lieves. The Carter administration is firm in its de- termination never- to yield on this- principle, and to guard the life of the Shah, a staunch friend of the US since the 1950s. Neither President Carter nor any other US spokesman has so far been willing to address in public the question of whether the Shah should have permanent US asylum if he is un- able to go elsewhere. Since the US Defense Department took over direct responsibility for the Shah's well- being at his new residence in the Wilfred Hall medical facility at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, only President Sadat of Egypt has publicly offered a haven for the Shah. -At early stages in his exile in Egypt, Mo- rocco the Bahamas and Mexico before his The Shah accepted President Sadat's hot- ' But Defense Department officials, at the time pitality after he left Iran last Jan. 16, Some of the Huyser mission, described it privately administration' analysts believe that if the as an effort to prevent a budding-"white" Shah accepts it again, President Sadat's gov- coup by top pro-Shah Iranian Army officers ernment, the cornerstone - of ` US Mideast against the transition government of Prime peace efforts, would be in great danger from Minister Sbahpour Bakhtiar, and not at all to extremist subversion: President. Sadat him- speed the Shah's departure. self, these analysts say, would be even more-4- As former US Central Intelligence Agency the target of possible assassins than he has. officer ermit velt describes in his new been since his historic=Jerusalem trip in No- boo "Counter-Coup." the CIA: with Presil vember.19?1:*: -Vi'e'-oft ' d0`' `'Y ~.-;,?;?",?r dent Elenhower's approval. helped restore ? -Ayatollah Ii;nbollah ms's associate, his throne after a wave of Irania: Ayatollah Xhalkali, has announced that his = support for nationalist. Prime Minister Mu "hit teams" would ruthlessly hunt down the , ossadeq in 1953. culties in the third world. - especially since neither the Shah nor his son have formally ab- dicated or renounced the Iranian throne. - In memoirs now being published in install- ments in Europe, the Shah repeats charges made to this reporter in an interview Sept. 18, 1978, and to others, that some American ele- mentssought his downfall. - - - _. Although in September, 1979, as the revolu- tion began,- the Shah's suspicion fell on US oil companies, his blame now falls on the US military. He had worked with US military _ men ever since 1943, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt first sent to Iran a USmilitary, mission to work with the Shah in building the future Iranian gendarmerie and Army. Gen. Robert Huyser, now commander of the Military Airlift Command, headquartered at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, went as top US military emissary to assist US Ambassa- dor William Sullivan during the final days last January before the Shah's departure. - General. Huyser's job,. the Shah now charges in his memoirs, was to- "neutralize" arrival in October in New York for medical Iran's- Army during his overthrow by mobs. The Shah quotes an Iranian general as saying treatment - the principal Western govern- General Huyser "threw the king out- of the meats had all privately turned thumbs down country like a dead mouse."- -- . __ .. - on permanent asylum for the Shah. - -- General- Huyser has declined ~ comment. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 RTICLE' APJEARD I J?AGE f4-- L - [ray to' Form S pecdal Panel g _ U.S. Role By Brnce van Voorst- And Raja Samghabadi- -~ ;'~' TEHRAN, Iran Iran's foreign minister, Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, says that the 50 Americans being held hostage here will. not be. tried as al- leged spies before an "international grand jury" -'which he hopes will meet within. 10 days - can hold hearings and deliver its findings. - "The trial is- not going to be con- ducted before the grand jury is formed and the results known," Ghotbzadeh said at a press confer- ence yesterday. ' The foreign. minister indicated: earlier that the hostages would testify in the investigation. ..', "- , - "We are going to investigate the American foreign policy in the past 25 years in Iran. Ghotzbadeh told ABC television. 11,_. . Those Ameri- cans who have been here will testify before the grand jury on what they have done . some of them'are en- gaged in espionage and we have the documents." - (In Washington, aides indicated that President Carter does not in- tend to "sit by as a spectator" itthe American hostages are put on trial. But press secretary Jody Powell re- fused to say what Carter-contem- plates if."show trials" are-held,in Tehran. . (State-Department officials said yesterday that they cannot accoun for the whereabouts of about 20 0 the 50,-Americans who have been held l ,ostages since Nov. 4 and that i is possible they are being .brain washed in preparation for a trial.. (The officials...who asked not to identified,: spoke:; in: Monday' night"televisioa intervie with oneot the hostages.. Marine Cpl. William Gallegos.otPueblorColo.. which he said he had not seen abou THE WASHINGTON STAR 12 December 1979 (Officials said it was possible that 'the remaining 20 are being held else- where in the embassy compound under conditions similar to those de- scribed by Gallegos... (But they said it is also possible that.the Iranians have singled out those hostages they intend to put be- i fore courts on espionage- charges and are- somehow coercing them into making confessions.)-. Ghotbzadeh, in his comments yes- terday, could-not say how long the so-called grand jury session would last. "That all depends," he said. "We are trying to expedite that as fast as possible:".. _Ghotbzadeh- gave assurances the proceeding would be open. "Obvi- ously, that's the main purpose of the grand jury," he said. . He confirmed that independent visits to the hostages are imminent. "We hope to have, international representatives visit the prisoners within a very short time," he said. "A visit is agreed upon and it will be done in the very near future." Later Ghotbzadehsaid that mem- bers of the local diplomatic corps would be included in the delegation, as well as outside participants. He was unclear whether members of the press would also be included. Ghotbzadeh expressed little inter est in how the militant Moslem stu- dents holding the hostages may react to the notion of a grand jury. "It is not a student affair." he said. "It is-.a government affaiz.where we intend to explore American foreign policy in Iran for the past .2.5 years.: This is what we are going to do. Whether the students might give their grievances and testimony will be determined afterwards." A-spokesman at the embassy said an official student position would be .releated later. ` ?. c The foreign minister- dodged a: question. whether the-United States might be represented-on or at the "grand. jury", sessions~to answer, charges. The grand jury is not a court," said Ghotbzadeh. "Generally the jury- will be free;toaskanybody and are fret to doso:"-r?.rxNV. -.' Ghotbzadeh; who has repeatedly promised to set a date for the trials of the hostages, refused to do so yes- terday.. Asked flatly whether he -would provide a starting date, -: Ghotbzadeh said. "No-." The foreign minister even hedged somewhat on. whether there would be trials. Pressed further on a- trial date, he replied with some irritation: f 'l - l didn't even say-the trial would gd after (the grand jury). All I said isl that the trial would not start.before. hand' .. . -. -. ? . ?- . ..:.- Ghotbzadeh remained.,es hard-I line as ever on the basic Iranian dew .mand for the return of.the shah.; How and- in what manner the United States goes about this,."is more or less their problem.". he said. Asked whether, in light of Carter's apparent determination not to deliver the shah,. there were other diplomatic possibilities, Ghotbzadeh said: "I don't see any.' Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 THOMASVILLE TIMES (N.C.) 27 November 1979 visa a ;hostage Some -days following the seizure of .the American Embas- sy in Tehran, the State Depart- ment got around to lodging a relatively mild protest with the Soviet Union for what it termed "unacceptable" broadcasts . to Overshadowed as it was by. the-: . - .. Iranian., crisis, the news about this development. was more _ or--. , interference. in Iranian internal less lost in the shuffle and didn't attract much attention.- There- fore, the Wall Street- Journal has. service in employing its consid erable resources - to =discover what this was all about. . Extracts of Moscow's Persian-- were printed by the Journal, and ~;. reprinted by other newspapers throughout the country. , - affairs,. counter-revolutionary campaign being waged against the United States throughout the world, and 2 - a partial explana- tion, although -certainly not an excuse, for the irrational Iranian hostility toward Americans, The - Soviet propaganda : Is spiced with enough half-truths to lend plausibility- to,. trumped-up charges of U.S. imperialism and activities, and CIA espionage- So much forte: _ -The ~ Journal. makes a telling point in analyzing the Carter administration's -soft answer to the Soviets despite their- serious - _ aggravation of a dangerous cri- sis involving.U.S. lives and na- tional honor:.. The administra- tion, having staked. its political 11 prestige on . ratification of the SALT 11 treaty, does not wish to A study of these transcripts raise public fears about Soviet gives a better insight into.: I - duplicity lest this raise fresh The Soviet Union's incendiary questions about the treaty. In role in the Iranian crisis - an other words, - the ' Soviet Union example. of the unceasing.: hate holds a hostage of its own. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 HUUJ I UN L.HKUNILLt 14 November 1979 -Ira nians leral-, hera isacree W1117 tak6ove- r of US& E b 'a s's'' 11 .. 2~_-! Y1 BIf J Several Iraniansw residing in Houston say they disagree with the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in4Fehran but msintaia -tfsat the shah should be returned to Iran. Interviewed Tuesday as they waited for meetings with Immigration and Natural- ization Service- officials, they. indicak some sympathy with the goals cf Iraiiiaiia demonstrating, throughout the- United States but disagreed with the violent anti-- American actions. taken in their, native country. Magid Ahrabl, 26, said he thinks Ayatol- lah Ruhollah-Khomeini is taking such- strong actions to force the United States to hand over the shah because the reli- gious leader is pursuing a personal feud with the ailing ruler.".-"', -' '..' Ahrabi, who-said he is an Ehglish major at Texas Southern University, said the ayatollah is seeking revenge because the shah ordered the deaths of two of his sons. He said he left Iran when the revolution was just beginning last year, but does not want to return until he earns his' degree here. Ahrabi also said he is concerned about his safety in Houston because some Houstonians are becoming increasingly.. anti-Iranian. ' Khosorow "Bob" Soltani, 26, who was in the INS office with his American wife Dagmar, 22, acknowledged that he was in violation of his student visa because. he was taking a semester off . to work - full- - time as an electrician--- But Soltani said he was hoping the INS will grant him a permanent residenttvisa ~ and allow him to stay in this country because he was forced by-a tuition ?in- crease to suspend his education. "'I have a kid and a 'wife, and I. cannot spend $1,000 for tuition," he said, noting that- when- he enrolled-. at-TSU . im-1976, . tuition for foreign students was only $350. Both Soltani and Ahrabi say that some Americans have made obscene gestures at them. The two men said they are con- cerned that Houstonians are venting their anger indiscriminantly despite the fact that some Iranians have not -participated in the demonstrations here and do not support the anti-American actionsrover- seas...~ "Even- if you're not a demonstrator -.,they (Americans) persecute you too, which is not totally fair," Soltani said. . "Two wrongs don't make a right." y ..__.~ Mrs. Soltani said her husband his never participated, in demonstrations. She said her friends have remained "very -suppor- tive" despite - the recent increase in anti- Iranian feelings. - "When you come here on. a student visa, you should study," Soltani said. "Most of the demonstrators don't go to school. Per- sonally,- I'm against the shah and what he did to my country. He murdered many people, and I think he should be sent home. But not this way. I hope the hos- tages will be safe. It's not good what Khomeini did." Mrs. Soltani said that if her husband- were ordered deported, she would remain in the-United States because in Iran she would be persecuted for being an Ameri- can and a Christian. She dismissed Khomeini as "nothing but a mouth. I I don't think-he's really religious ---' ? , _ - Nick Fardi: -25,-a- TSU graduate and. owner of Mehran's Deli and Restaurant, -2405& Shepherd, described the situation in Iran as "terrible" and said he will not return to hip native country until the- reli- gious fervor? and-. anti-Western hysteria. dies down. ' He said his family in Iran has suffered from the revolution: "They (Khomeini's followers ) took away our home. They took away our money." Fardi said that unlike many of his coun- .` trymen, he believes the shah is ailing in New York: He said the eo le- in Iran think the shan is well and. Blotting with t Fe ( to regain control o is country. ; pained why the ayatollah and his followers refuse to accept news of the shah's illness. "They1don't believe any- body.' Because- they are not. straight' (truthful), they. think no. one, is.'straight-. They are corrupt." Fardi said he -is not-religious and is scornful of the Moslem holy men direct- ing the revolution. in Iran. "They (the religious leaders) are very stupid. I know it because t was raised among them. They are against technol- ogy. They are against progress. They are not open-minded." . .. Fardi said he is sorry that 'Americans are being held.captive in Tehran. "I would do anything to help them," he said.- "I would exchange myself for them." Jholan.Jahanahmadi, 27, who identified' ?.himselfasa.TSU"student, said the Iranian people seized.the U.S. Embassy because they could not get justice through normal means... Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 5 DECEIGER 19T9 E-Syst~ms to sue Ira By ROBERT DODGE pang has made In the last year to re- Staff Writes cover the money it is owed. "The company is being careful E-Systems'Inc. said it will file suit -about the answers to questions due to today in federal cour seeking ap- _ the effect- on legal proceedings." the proximately $15.2 million in damages spokesman said: and cancellation of $4.4 million in let- But according to a.Pentagon source tern of credit from the Government of familar with the contract, the two Iran and the Bank of Melli Iran. tanker-type jets were to be equipped The Dallas electronics company said. with sophisticated electronic hard- it would file the suit in U.S. District , ware for use in a "James Bond" like Court in Dallas charging that Iran de- program called IBEX in which the la- faulted on a 1977 contract in which test American technology was being the company's. Greenville Division applied in Iran for deposed Shah Mo. was to install communication and hammad Reza Pahlavi with the assis- navigation equipment on two Boeing Lance of the Central Intelligence 707 jets owned by the Gulf Agency. nation. P Under the $500 million program, "We filed the lawsuit to protect the the Shah wanted to establish a border company and its shareholders proper- ty interests in these aircraft," John M. Dixon, chairman and president, said in a prepared statement. "We are ask- ing the court to declare the contract in default and to permit foreclosure of liens existing on the aircraft. Once au- thorized, the aircraft will be. sold at auction." In its one-page statement issued Tuesday, E-Systems said the value of the contract, orginally set at $28 mil- lion, had escalated in value to about $35 million by the time Iran defaulted _ ed he wanted the best electronic ears in November 1978. The amounts to be claimed by E-Systems, the comnpany, said, represent sums due under the contract and other unspecified. dam- ages. t An E-Systems spokesman,' who asked to remain unnamed, declined to explain why Iran defaulted on the project, how the planes "would have been used or what efforts *the com- surveillance system for Iran. The pro- ject called for 11 ground monitoring posts, six airborne units and several mobile ground units. Bids were sub- mitted by four U.S. corporations in- cluding ESystems, Rockwell. GTE Sylvania and Mechanics Research Inc. IBEX, which according to some press accounts, involved the launder- ing of millions of dollars through Swiss bank accounts to pay for work done by American corporations, was and eyes on his borders. Informed sources said the 707 jets were flown to E-Systems' Greenville facility. from the Boeing Co. in Seattle in late 1977. While ESystems has de- clined to say how the planes were to be used by Iran, a company spokes- man said Tuesday that the aircraft were being outfitted with sophisticat- ed navigation and communication sys- tems. - . No work is currently being done on the planes other than that needed to prevserve the aircraft, - the company' said; The IBEX program has been beset with troubles since it began. A Jan. 2, 1977, story. by The Washington Post detailed instances of corruption, pay-'. ments to U.S. firms from Swiss bank accounts and the Aug. 28, 1976.. mur- der of three Rockwell International employes connected with the project' in Tehran. The CIA has also declined - to an- pro- swer questions -regarding the ystems was one of many United States firms to have business with the country before the fall of the Shah. In most cases, firms selling military hardware to Iran were protected ? against losses under the Foreign Mili- tary Sales program which required Iran to establish a trust fund and - make pre-payments on projects. But sources close to the Defense Depart-. ment said the F Systems work was not a part of the military sales pro- gram and did not qualify for any of the trust fund money.. The company declined to say how it was paid or if the Bank of Melli - the government owned bank of Iran - had failed to honor letters of credit that would have provided E-Systems payment for its work. However. the company did say loss of the payments would not have any "material adverse effect on its financial statements" be- cause of a $1.5 million reserve fund CONT IIIUM 7 jets; Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 ?reenville facility where Iran's Boeing 707 jets were being worked on by .E-.Systems 7 the company established in 1978 to cover Iranian losses. Sources close to E-Systems have in- dicated there are a number of subcon- tractors who also worked on. the pro- gram and who are also waiting to be paid. In its news release, E-Systems said that its attorneys .had advised the company had 6rgin0y intended to company "its liens on the aircraft are ' file its suit later in the week, but de- superior to the claims of third parties cided it needed to do so earlier than which may file lawsuits to attach the Pied, . '-We will have someone aircraft in satisfaction of their claims . there (district court) as soon as is against the Iranian Government" physicaUy possible," the spokesman The E-Systems spokesman said the said. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 17 DECENM 19T9 A Matter of Principle By Marvin Stone The search for a place of refuge for the de- posed Shah of Iran has started a controversy in this country that regrettably is spilling over into the presidential campaign. Obviously, it would be convenient if a for- eign sanctuary were found for this sick and be- leaguered man, thus weakening Ayatollah Kho- meini's pretext for holding 50 Americans in the occupied U.S. Embassy in Teheran. But this is not a question of convenience. It is a question of principle-moral and political. In simple decency, the United States has a re- sponsibility to offer succor to a former head of state who was *a loyal ally to this country for more than 30 years and who now, in his dying days, finds himself without a home. To argue thus is not to say that we condone without reservation the policies or the behavior of the Shah during the long period that he ruled Iran. He doubtless was guilty of a mea- sure of tyranny and corruption. But seven American Presidents did not find his "crimes" so gross or intolerable as to jeopardize their close relationship with the Iranian ruler. Henry Kissinger put the point well: "I do not doubt that wrongs were committed by the Shah's government in his long rule; the ques- tion is how appropriate it is to raise them, after four decades of close association, in the period of the Shah's travail." In appraising Mohammed Reza Pahlevi's re- gime, and our role in it, a little history is use- ful. Persia-Iran has been a violent arena through much of its existence. As late as the 1700s, political victors put whole towns to the sword or worse. The country has always been a place where one ruled by getting the other fel- low first-because he was plotting to do the same to you. That tradition persists to this day. One can go further. Were the Shah's trans- gressions any more 'abhorrent than those of countless leaders still occupying power, and some who are in exile? Indeed, who would ar- gue that his excesses were worse than the Aya- tollah's hundreds of senseless killings? Diplomats have run into trouble in Persia before. In 1218, the Persians beheaded a Mon- golian ambassador-wlro was trying to make a trade -agreement. In 1829, a - Teheran mob looking for a fugitive royal eunuch and two harem women invaded the Russian Legation and hacked the ambassador to bits. Historically, thus, it has been a problem to find someone in Persia with whom to safely ne- gotiate. The United States found such a person in the Shah. And he was a friend. In the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, with the Mid- dle East in turmoil, he accepted the risks of ig- noring the Arab oil embargo, fueled our Navy' and even continued to supply fuel to Israel. When the U.S. needed intelligence monitoring stations to watch Russian missile tests, he of- fered Iranian sites freely. American administra- tions, Democratic and Republican alike, looked to the Shah to contribute to stability in the vol- atile and strategically vital Persian Gulf region. Now he is a man without a country. He had assumed that, once his medical treatment for cancer in New York was completed, he could return to his haven in Mexico. But the Mexican government got weak knees. Whether or not the Shah finds lasting sanctu- ary outside the U.S., he should have the assur- ance of a safe resting place in the United States as long as he requires it. Honor demands no less. And politically, if America succumbed to the intimidation of the zealot who now rules Iran, who would trust America again? - For Senator Edward Kennedy to drag this is- sue into the campaign raises anew questions about his judgment-and his steadfastness as a leader. He seemed to be implying that, if he were President, he would contemplate a deal of some sort-sending back the Shah. This is un- principled, even as an electioneering ploy. It is the kind of loose talk that can contribute noth- ing to the resolution of the crisis and the re- lease of the hostages. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 AllI i (;i:A Ali+ r wAbk11.B '1 Vf! 5'r'Att (Gt't 1 I1 LIU ) en PAGE Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 r xof 1ntrveW `with Hos#age 101arine NEW YORK (AP) - Here are ex- cerpts from the'text of the interview yesterday with Marine Cpl William Gallegos, one of the hostages at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, conducted for NBC-TV News by its correspond- ents George Lewis and Fred Francis NBC: Cpl. Gallegos, do you have something- to say- before-use start questions? Gallegos: I just want my family to know I'm OK...: I want everybody's family to know, most of all, were all fine. We haven't been mistreated in any way, yet, at all.... It was just what do you do here. You know, what's your name? How long have you been here? And that's it. And then we were taken and just kept in our little cubicles.... I know every- one here wants to go home. I don't know what negotiations there are to- wards.this, what's happening be- tween the Iranian students and the American government. I know they keep telling us they want the shah to return to Iran, and we'll be released. Other stipulations Q: Let me ask you about human rights; your own.... What is your daily routine like? A:... Get up in the morning, have breakfast, go take a shower, come back, read a book, clean up my area a little...: Q Are you tied? .. Not uncomfortably. We're tied with cloths so that we can read books and exercise... Q: You said, 'we.' Are you kept alone? A. Oh no, sir. There are many, many hostages.with us. I'd say at least 30. Q:. Are you permitted to converse with each other? - A: No, sir. The rule is, silence is golden here. Q: Why were you the one singled out to do this interview? A. I don't know.... I was reading a book. Next thing I know is; they come and say: "Come with me." were that if the shah wasn't re- Q: What if you just said "no?" turned, all the hostages would be put A.- I, I thought about saying no, but on trial. I don't know what would I felt that many of the people don't happen after that, but. I'm leaving it. know what's going on.... I want up to my country, my people. i nave faith in them. V Q: Have yofi discussed ... this type of political observation with your captors.:..? A. No, we haven't.... They ask us why, you know, (why) our govern- ment keeps him (the shah), and we don't have the answers. Q: How do you personally feel about the issue of returning the- shah? A: Myself, as a Marine guard,. you all know I'd give my life for any American - any American; any. president of the United States ... And I just, I can't see it now.... In some way, I don't see this as a good cause. ccedes to Q: If President Carter accedes- the demand -that the shah be re- turned, isn't that inviting similar at- tacks on other U.S. embassies else- where in the world? .. . A: Yes, sir;, it does implicate. (imply) that in such a way. As. I don't know, I don't know, like I said before, I don't know the circum- stances... . Q: Are you a s ? A: 0+o, sir. in not. I:n a United States Marine security guard. Q: What kind of interrogation have they given you, if any, about the spy issue? A. Nothing else, sir. They .. . made accusations, and as far as we know, the students seem to think they've found quite a few documents that implicate us. Q: How do you know that? A. I don't, sir. I said 'the students think.' :. _ . Q: _ .. Do you feel like being brainwashed? A: No, sir. Not at all... . you're.] Q: There are about 30, you say, in this room. A: Yes, sir. V Q: Where are the others? A: I have no idea, sir. Q: Some of the political officers who were at the embassy? - i A:... I was with one of them, and ' after'that we were moved down to this other place - mushroom - and I haven't seen the other one. And then they were taken away with some other ones. And they move them in and out. . them to know that we're. okay.... I want President Carter to know. . . that we're relying on his decision to let us go home. Q: Will you accept his decision no .. V matter what?. A. Yes, sir. V Q:. What about the psychologi- cal strain of being in that room? How do you see your fellow hos- tages? Are they holding up well, or are any of them having problems? A: The strain is tremendous on all of us. We're holding up, though.... The hostages look at each other, they look at the Marines, and the Marines give them a smile of confidence.. Q: What has the worst part of all this been for you personally? A: The first two days; I would imagine, were the worst part of this .-.the takeover of the embassy - were the worst part.... - -Q*Did they accuse you of being a spy, corporal? A. Yes, sir. I was accused of being ki f d a wor ng o gent. was accuse CIA in a "spy den." I was accused of. of many types of activities. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 ARTICLE 1pp1AgL Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 ON PAGE ? f/ 11 D ER 1979 siacx annerson Carte'r Wca&.AdNised Not to Admit Shah overnment In the baclirooms of Washington. .shah a visa. He was privy to the many [g ? ] should take place after It everyone seemed to know the shah was warnings and prognostications that the is in place some two-three weeks and . bad news. The State Department, and shah's presence in the United States some few days before the shah would Central Intelligence Agency advised would mean trouble. come here. In the meantime, we should ' against admitting him to the United Yet Newsom's only concern was how- begin to prepare the Iranians by telling, . States. It would probably incite militant to minimize the impact of the shah's ar- them of the intense pressures for the in Iran, they warned. to storm: -the rival. He would have preferred. for ex? ' shah to come here- pressures which American Embaeey and seize American ample: to bring the shah into the coup- we are resisting despite our traditional ' hostages. try next year _ after the Iranian situa- open-door policy ..: President- Carter was-aware of-:the- tion became more stable- If there is. no no prospect for Iran to- warnings: In reeponseeo-mPik.that Henry Preeht,- who, heads the Iranian , settle down, there may be an argument i he admit the. shah. Carter reportedly , desk.?at the State Department. was in for going ahead and admitting the shalt once asked his advisers ruefully: "When touch with developments in Iran daily. anyway to get that inevitable step be- take our people m Tehran He knew the political. ingredients in hind us, but it will be. necessary first t the Iranians o . hostage, what will you advice me then?" Iran-were highly combustible and, with review how dangerous the situation is. Nevertheless, he authorized,t a -shah's . the slightest spark, could-. explode in In either of these scenarios we should entry, America's face aim for a positive change in our position Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance an- Yet on Aug. 2, he sent the American on the shah by January 1980- derstood the danger. On July 21X he.sent embassy, a "secret/semdtive" planning . Instead the shah;, pleading medieat - out an urgent, "eyes only' cable- to paper on how to: prepare "for the shah need, arrived in October. Sources close ? Charge d'Affaires L Bruce to come to the United States." The plan . to the shah acknowledge that his. ail- Tehran : - was to wait until Ayatollah Ruhollah meats, though real enough, could have "We are considering." the cable said; Khomeini pushed through his new con- been treated elsewhere- The humanitar- "how to respond to the shah's continu- stitution and established a new govern- ian appeal. in other words, was a ruse. The compelling question is why? WVby ads throaW various to regarding establishing residence in n Then. the paper stated,-"we United States ... I would like to form the new government that we wish admit the shah. contrary to the best- in. have your personal and private evalua- to clear our decks of old issues on the terests of the United States? The usual tion of the effect of such a move on the agenda. One of those old issues will be justification is that they could not turn, safety of Americans. in Iran [especially ..'the status of the shah. We could inform their back on a loyal ally and that they the official Americans in the corn the government that we have resisted could not give the ayatollah a veto over- pound.]" intense allow him to come who can enter the country. Laingen warned that the shah's ar the U.S, because we'did not wish-to com? ? Poppycock. Their greater obligation rival in America could ignite anti-Amer- plicate [the ayatollah's) problems or our was not seldbu to the nationat ican actions, including probable repri-... efforts to construct a new relationship. interests. A day r passes that th the sals against the embassy.. Yet Vance ad- "Now with the government firmly es. United States es doesn't n't ba undesirables wised the president to admit the shah on . tabl shed- and accepted. -it seems ap- whose presence not r helpful.' "humanitarian" grounds. proptiate to admit the shah to the US. The pressure to admit the shah came-, The shah's ease was bandied at the The- new government may not like. it, primarily from David Rockefeller and State Department by Undersecretary but it is best to get the issue out of the Henry Kissinger. Despite their disclaim- AM tnev mmducted a relentless cam-. ? . David Newsom. - He- probably under- stood better than anyone else it. Wash- ington the consequences of granting the Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 ARTICLE "FEARM 11ZW i vrua -i ij'ie.o ON PAGE- 11 DEER 1979 L jtebellious.Aierbaijani. Party KHOMEINI REBUFFED BY RIVAL AYgT06WH' t, i- Thm TEHERAN; Iran, Dec 10-Ayatollah Kazem Shariat?Madarl - today resisted pressure from: Ayatollah Ruhollah Itboo-. meini,. the revolutionary leader, _to-dis-: solve the.. rebellious.. Moslem- People's, Party. which has been active, in the-Azer baijani minority- region of northwestern Iran. . - _ .. .... "Wecannotanoumce that the party is,. annulled," the dissident Ayatollah said in a statement. "Today it is the turn of the Moslem People's Party..tomorrow it is the turn of other parties. They want to make all theerpsstiea step aside to have Pee single party=and we will not accept Critical Letters from Seminary Ayatollah- Shariat-Madari was criti- cized today in letters from the faculty and students of Qum Theological Seminary. In view of the interplay of religion, law and politics In Iran, a rough analogy would be an attack on the Chief Justice of Supreme Court by the Harvard Law School. - The faculty of the seminary called on Ayatollah Shariat-Madari to reject the Moslem People's Party "so that this stain on-the clergy and dear Islam can be re- A letter from the theology students con- teaded~ vertu was %larnio an creanances alone worked with the. ruling Revolutionary Council had been-broken and that the council wanted to discredit all other polit- was broadcast over the radio and televi sion, condemned those responsible for the disturbances in Tabriz. "These people are not Tabrizis, " the Ayatollah said:: try over? Those who come and say so are lackeys of the embassy and Its af ili- "A holy war against Islam?"Ayatollah Khomeini said. "A holy war on behalf of Carter? You wage a holy war so that Car- ter can be successful and take your coca "Tabrizis do not think of fighting Islam."' In an apparent allusion to Ayatollah Shariat-Madari, the revolutionary leader ,said people had been going into the vii- Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 ARTICLE 0 ?AGG _kkLL'D OIt PE. ~`~frL THE WASHINGTON POST 11 December 1979 ByStuart-Auerbach }-- Waahtnstoa last latdan auvtea- - TABRIZ, Iran,. ,l_)ec..10 -. Repre- sentatives of Iran.' ruUng Revolu- tionary Council were rebuffed today In their, effort to halt factional fight- ing, bettuees, s" p"r ? oL .rival,ayr tollahs.. . In the.holy city of Qom, Ayatollah Kazem Sharlatmadari; :. the spiritual leader of this. region's -Turkish-speak ing Azerbaijanis, forbade negotiations, with the team-and issued a statement supporting his partisans here. and ac- cusing the central. government of reneging . on -an- . agreement' reached with him 'last week.. '" . His 'rival,. revolutionary!- leader Ayatollah' Ruhollah~'Khomeini, mean- while put out his--statement blaming the troubles in Tabriz on "American spies" and_calling on. American voters not to reelect President-Carter, whom he branded a. "traitor;" ' "'' ='""- ``? The,' Revolutionary Council peace mission, headed bye Finance Minister and former foreign minister - Abol- Hassan.. BaniSadr, . was only able to see a Khomeini representatives Aya- tollah- Mohammed EnghjL_ Members of Shariatmadari's- Moslem People's Republican Party . dedined'_- tor. meet with: the delegation. " Although: tfief.oity L remained nse - tonight, there was- no repetition =of Sunday night's fighting :.between sup- porters of Khomeini and Sharlatma- dari,.who is regarded 'as the?country's second moat popular-ayatollab and the : most revered.veIigious-. figure- here in .his native Azerbaijanr' -_, Af the Moalem`People's ' Hepublicaa- Party headquarters here,-,.Sadreza. Moghimi. a party worker,, said, "Kho- meini is saying these people who, want freedom belong to- the. United-States. Please take notice of me-Do I'belong to the-United.StatesL",.",:, There was -,, r.~i -tonight great confusion'.?"to at -the .party headquarters, an - old building overlooking a roundabout with a small pond in the center. - Ci-owds were gathered-in`front of the building when darkness fell, and party workers had dragged, large sewer pipes across part of the road to slow-down traffic. The front gates were chained and padlocked shut, and armed guards sat behind sandbagged barriers on the first floor balcony with. automatic rifles trained on. the - street. S.: Inside, party workers were. rushing? about and handing ? out weapons. Moghimi told reporters he expected an attack during the night from Kho- meini supporters. "Get out, get out," he said. "Maybe they wiU= attack here.: I will see;; you tomorrow-if we are alive.` In Tehran, Rahmatollah Moghad dam-Maraghei, a political leader allied with Shariatmadari; was reported still `in hiding after his office was raided :'last week. Revolutionary authorities-..said- the- students had found his- name in files in the-U.S. Embassy. The file purportedly. contained a re-, 'port of an interview he gave to US political officers in the embassy, on' the situation in Iran. One of" Moghad-. dam-Maraghei's recommendations was -thatthe-United States-press for,mee - ings with "Khomeinf to try to ease the strains between the two countries. He also suggested that Americans not in the government be r endouraged to come here y !: ~4 . 4~ .. Among. the two he suggested - as rep. resentativeirwere-Ramsey Crark the former.-attorney.;-general `'who- met Khomeiniilni and, Richard?.Cot- tam, aaprofessor"atthe University of: ` Pittsburgh.Z considered here-L.'.-to-'.have. been?.geaerallj;. eadlyiid the;revolu tionr One. local-, newsaaver.-- however,. changed tta e the former CIA ehief and TT R.. ambassador to Iran.e....; eatedlv accused him of beingaa CIA anent a charge that he denied. Hej -also said. a a } oug he and, other captives had bee so- accused, he"had not been interrogated.. He said be di not know whether the others had been. After saying. "the students here have been really good to us,"-'Gallegos disclosed that he and about 30 other captives were being kept. in; "little cubicles." He de- -scribed a room divided up by partitions four or five 'feet- high. Gallegos said each hostage was loosely bound and had -:a-mattress, toilet articles;' and enough to :;eat,. but were not allowed to'speak to each other or their captors- The Marine, shown by an Iranian television crew. throughout the. interview with a. large color- poster of Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini In the background, added that the cleanliness is-really great." - He said the hostages were allowed to shower- every "day. This contradicted the reports of'other recent visi- tors to the embassy, jncluding Rep. George: Hansen (R-: --Idaho), who said after seeing some-of the hostages that they, badly needed baths and changes- of clothes.,:.-,.* The Marine said he -was allowed. to exercise. at Ieast, three times. a. day for 15 minutes: at a. time.. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501320001-0 Asked if he, would accept a, presidential decision to I Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501320001-0 custody indefinitely, Gallegos said, "Yes, sir. I'd have to - Later, esked,.by.the NBC interviewers what- he would lice to see i anon. the corporal. replied "We're not ready to hold out her. forever. I don't know- how much longer we- can-.take this.' And especially- If the shah's not re- turned;: I Imagine it would get a little worse. I don't -know:" X: Gallegos, 21, appearing remarkably-composed for being ,:held hostage for .37 days, lost some of his composure when he'was asked about the 20 hostages whose where- " abouts-he did not know: "Where are some of the-senior people at the embassy?" Gallegos was asked. "Have you recognized any of them?" "Senibt people as to who,. sir!'.. he answered, showing ~command and;-control". sites,.] the -.Russian = said.. Kissinger-1 protested- that.. the sites were . differ=: "You'll see, they, are eat," Dobrynin said. "Wait: Eventually, the CIA report- .. ed - the. Russians ; were fitting" capsules into-. the silos which -transmitting launch com- - the command post.-The ad- ministration accepted the ex- _planation, although some offi-: cials. continued to. worry that. the. command. silos could be, converted - : to launch- silos -within weeks.. , he flame over- the so-a ,~ j . , and =other -smbigti ~~ sous acbVittes,led-tot meant within.the: U.S. govern- went of a new mechanism for; monitoring - SALT.;. The- I point of 'the-. "SALT -verifica tion"' bureaucracy - is a'_ CIA committee called " the.`; DCI's =(Director of Central