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December 8, 1979
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Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501330001-9 ARTICLEAn,;U WASHINGTON STAR ON PAGE 8 DECEMBER 1979 ,,.Cord Meyer soviet radio and American silence Stirred by the growth. of the millions. Although there to condemn the use of Rus. events abroad they may be public support for increased have been a few defections, sian helicopter gunships less willing to play with fire defense expenditures. some 75 of the world's Communist and napalm against the Mos. in the Middle East. Carter advisers are urging Parties still owe their pri- lem villagers in Afghanis- Similarly, the bland VOA the president to take advan- mary allegiance to Moscow. tan. No one protested the broadcasting to Cuba needs tage of the groundswell to Heavily subsidized, they are proven use of Russian nerve to be stiffened with hard strengthen the. American disciplined conveyors of. the gas against the Meo tribes is news of the heavy Cuban ability-to influence opinion Soviet propaganda message Laos by the Soviets' Viet- casualties in Angola to in- abroad. ' _* _' -with the advantage of oper- namese- ~ .allies. If these crease the domestic price to The gross disparity be- acing from within non-com- atrocities had been commit,. Castro of his African adven- tween the funds the Soviets munist societies. ted by the U.S.. Moscow--- tures. spend on propaganda- work In the, U.S:' this=outpour- would- have-orchestratedate -The Cyrus __Vaace-Mat and the U.S. allocation, is- ing of Russian propaganda- Worldwide outcry. shall Shulman axis in the wider proportionately than has virtually no effect. Few -State Department is-reluc- the military spending gap -Americans bother to listen Faced with this evidence tant - to see even these and potentially as danger- itwice to the obviously of-Soviet-Cuban ability to modest improvements made. ous. But the biased voice of Radio Mos- manipulate Third World They have consistently price of modem weaponry, cow, and Soviet magazines. Opinion, some White House -relied. on discreet diplo- the cost of the long-overdue in English have to be given aides are, urging a selective matic protests to Ambassa- improvements- needed in away for lack of buyers. - concentration on weak spots dor Dobrynin to restrain official U.S. information pro-But in the far reaches of in_ the Soviet _ protective Soviet misbehavior - with- grams is modest. ., : the Third World, where armor. They are not advo- ? remarkably little effect. And According to conserva-. widespread illiteracy makes cating a mindless return to they have leaned over back. tive CIA estimates- the radio the prime means of the rhetoric of the cold war wards to improve the gremlin is reckoned to communication, the steady but a realistic recognition chances for SALT by down- s-ending more t as S2 bil 'denigration of American that the Soviets have never playing evidence. of Soviet. lion annua on it - motives by Moscow's broad. accepted a truce in ideologi- interventions. gan a a ara u The U.S casts has a cumulative im- cal warfare as part of their The other source of oppo? spends about a third as. . pact. The- consistent por- :definition of detente. sition to- any expansion of . much. in the words of a re- trayal of American society These Carter advisers the U.S. information pro. cent congressional study, as a capitalist monster bent specifically urge that the gram is the Office of Man- the Soviet Union has be- on imperialist aggression congressionally-funded agement and Budget. Car- come the world's leading wears away favorable atti- Radio Liberty broadcasting ter's bookkeepers ridicule international radio broad- tudes- toward the U.S. and to Soviet Central Asia be 'contentions that a S per cent caster, beaming more than creates a foundation of dis- strengthened-by the addi- increase in the information 2,000 program hours a, week trust on which local dema- tion of powerful new trans- effort may be as necessary in 82 languages over 28S gogues like Khomeini can mitters.-The present Radio as an increase in defense shortwave transmitters to later build their edifice of Liberty broadcasts in the spending. - nearly every country. hate. Turkic languages to the 40 But there was a glint of Toorchestrate its world-' million Soviet Moslems in steel in Carter's perform- wide -propaganda cam- Behind the shield of this Central Asia are so weak ance at his last press confer- paigns, the Soviets secretly., propaganda offensive, the..,they_;cannotbe.heard above ence. The president can now subsidize 13 separate inter.;-* have been' getting the jamming. Once the count on a. responsive Con- national front organiza- away with murder. No neu- Soviet leaders realize they gress if he asks for the the World Federa- tral country raised its voice can. no. longer protect. their modest amounts needed to tion of Trade Unions. Each 'at the-meeting . of the non- restless Moslem population make the American voice claims mass membership in - aligned natiotl-in? Havana from.- accurate ne%y- -of more clearly heard. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 ARTICLE APPEARM ON PAGE NEWSWEEK 17 DECKER 1979 2151'S All NX The spindly towers of oil rigs surround the Soviet city of Baku like some mammoth metallic forest, sprouting on stilts from the shallow Caspian seabed and ringing the rocky hills that rise from the shore. Years ago, Baku's spidery network of pipelines and causeways supplied two-thirds of the Soviet Union's petroleum. But Caspian Ba- sin production has long since peaked: acces- sible fields are nearly exhausted, and the Russians do not have the technology to tap more difficult reserves. Similar problems plague Soviet energy efforts elsewhere. For the oil-consuming West, the implications are alarming: if the world's largest oil pro- ducer cannot sustain its output, the interna- tional oil crunch is sure to grow worse. barrels a day. Already, in fact, Moscow has been avoiding any promises that it will step up supplies to meet its satellites' future demands. That could compel the Eastern bloc to turn to the world market, generating new competition for OPEC supplies. But, most Western analysts are convinced that i the Soviet Union simply cannot afford to cut back on the I million barrels a day it now exports to the West. More than 40 per cent of the nation's hard currency comes from such sales. Rather than lose that cash, which is badly needed for purchases of food and- technology, the Soviet Government might decide to shortchange energy con- sumers at home. Ironically, the Soviet Union may be far richer in oil than anyone had realized. A comprehensive new analysis by Petro Studies, a Swedish research firm specializ- ing in Soviet petroleum, sets proven Soviet reserves at 150 bil- lion barrels--five times greater than estimates by the CIA. REMOT! WAST!St But to take advantage of their oil wealth, the Soviets will have to solve some formidable logistical problems. About 90 per cent of future on- shore supplies lie east of the Ural Mountains in the remote wastes of Siberia and the deserts of Ka- zakhstan. Yet 80 per cent of all Soviet energy is consumed thou- sands of miles away in the west- ern part of the country. Devel- oping the. new fields requires huge investments in transporta- tion and equipment. And so far, development has not been very efficient. In western Siberia, about 30 smaller fields have been found near the giant Samotlor field, which has apparently reached its peak production. But say S Bruce McK Everett . , Caspian Sea wells: Technological troubles ahead , the U.S. Department of Ener- There is considerable disagreement among experts over just how dangerous the Soviet predicament may be. The U.S. Cen- tral Intelligence Agency predicts that pro- duction will peak this year or next at about 12 million barrels a day-and that it could drop by one-third by the mid-1980s. Some recent developments suggest that the CIA's gloomy scenario could come true. Last month, for example, an economic report to the Supreme Soviet acknowledged that 1979 production will fall 59 million barrels short of the Kremlin's target-and that the projection for 1980 output had been dialed back by 300,000 barrels a day. Serious production problems, would probably force the Soviet Union to cut exports to its Eastern-bloc allies, which now depend on the U.S.S.R.. for 2 million gy's Soviet expert, "the Russians have been consistently behind plan in get- ting their equipment in." The Soviets also lag in deepwater-drilling technology. Thus, in the Caspian Sea, where many of the old shallow wells are nearly depleted, an estimated 3.7 billion barrels of oil and 35 trillion cubic feet of natural gas remain untapped farther offshore. FOREIGN AID- For help, the Soviet Union is relying heavily on Japan and the industrial- ized West. A consortium of Japanese com- panies directed exploration of the Sea of Okhotsk off the Soviet east coast-and discovered a giant new field. And Soviet workers are now assembling a $50 million semisubmersible rig to probe the Caspian's depths. Its designers: an American-Finnish , consortium headed by Armco, Inc. Some analysts think that the Soviets will spend S24 billion over the nest decade for offshore equipment alone--and that it is in Ameri- ca's best interest to provide as much as possible. But it will besome timebeforesuch invest- ments pay off in the form of new supplies. Meanwhile, Soviet policymakers are stress- ing domestic conservation measures and are trying to hasten development of natural gas and nuclear powerto replace oil useat home. The Kremlin may even accept a slightly lower rate of economic growth to keep ex- porting oil. If such policies don't work, however, the world oil market could soon have thirsty new customers putting greater pressureon prices and supplies. MERRILL SIfEILS with WILLIAM E. SCH?MDT in Moscow and W ILLIA:S4 J. COOK in Washington Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501330001-9 bonuses to workers, whose typical wage .of to 160 rubies monthly is roughly in line he national average. Earnings also are used for buying new equipment and are ap- plied to such projects as buying interests in various nurseries around town, to guarantee places for workers' children. L elia's business success is shared-engi- neered not only by its own workers (96% of them women) but also by a sprawl of offi- cial agencies. Many of them are: like Lelia. under the Ministry of Light Industry; and most of them are highly specialized. Thus, when Lelia wants to. buy wool. it goes through one government. unit: when it wants to sell dresses, it goes through an- other. For guidance on fashion trends, it consults one.. official organization; for pric- ing'consults another. It wages are the question-then is yet another body .-It Lelia needs new equipment, there Is an agency' do the buying'although.Lelja foots the bill. What's more.. Lelia-doesn't-always deal directly'wtth the.-major decision-makers. Gosplan, for instahce.? is an extremely itn': porsant organization: bat Mrs. Hamra says Lelia usually-.rloestr't work directly with-it. rather. the' Ministry of Light Industry us& ally deals with,the planners on Lelia's bet, half. The government's control of all the a sal economic levers has its positive sides It is.the reason.. for - instance.. that there isY ah most no unemployment In-the U.S.M-It 13 also why the state can keep prices low on such items. as. foodstuffs (which generally are cheap, though supplies are spotty) and baby clothes., - :But, too. there are difficulties. Authority Is ` fragmented, and one agency frequently doesn't know- what another one it .doing. Nonetheless; decision making within each fragment- is highly ,centralized, and the cen- ter often is tniles%L or continents-away from the production site. Despite recurrent "re- forms," the system and the bureaucr_ acy re_-. main resistant to change. - Like most far'Aung systems, this one is. rife with inconsistencies. For instance, ' the- government recently raised the price of fur by 5Wo.. but it didn't increase the price of Lelia's -coats with fur trimmings: Such a change in raw-materials costs can "really make it hard to follow the fixed price." Mrs. Hazova says; but Lelia- hasn't' any{ choice. Now, it is trying. to find cheaper materials or figure out how else to cut costs. T~:?::. Nonetheless, the system is more flexible than many outsiders- realize. There is room- for give-and-take between supplier and cus tamer or between planners and producers.: Indeed: Ts '' l people at. Lelia- tell:. it,' the; gi e-andetake nuns' through' tile-: entire' pro= cess It all begins some 18 months before the clothes, come oft the.-line . at'' Lelia..: with. something called the Vltnius House of Fash- ion-a unit of the Ministry of Light Industry charged with keeping abreast of thelatest in looks. The House of Fashion consults around -with the- ministry. with ` local factories, with. retailers-and then proposes. a. Hue-of, clothing to be made in Lithuania. Those pro- posals bubble through the system, and grad- ually a production plan for Lelia and the' other area producers takes shape. - ? "Sometimes the ministry requests some- thing that's impossible." Mrs. Hazova says. "They might ask us to make a suit for which we would have to change all our pro- duction lines for suits. So we have to send back the plan and say. 'We're sorry, we can't do it'-but they can do it at another factory that is situated in another place." - By,May of each year, the Lelia factory and the ministry are "generally agreed" on the next year's plan. Mrs. Hazova says. By year's end, the plan Is established in detail. As the.production year unfolds, there might. be minor adjustments In each quarter's plan. (A. typical.. plan..calla, for. a certain number of men's suits in- a particular styte- and at a given price; it Is up to the factory and its customers to work out such matters as sizes. . Once the plan is broadly set, Lelia gets in touch-with its suppliers and customers. One way it reaches. those outside Lithuania is through trade fairs. Within the republic. It has longstanding relationships with a num- berof enterprises; it has two regular wool suppliers, for example, and seven major re- tail customers-although even with them, it usually must work' through official tnterrtie- diary agencies. (Nonetheless, the retailers often suggest-and get-small changes in Lelia's styles to suit their own tastes.) Like producers everywhere, Lelia Is sub- ject to the whims of consumers. who some- times don't like its styles. Last year, one item-a loose-fitting 'woman's coat lmit in wool - bombed in - Lithuania; so Lelia shipped its unsold output to another part of the country, where the coat was a big suc- Undaunted. Lelia's designers kept work- ing with the style and turned It Into a more tailored coat. This year, they Introduced the revised version in Lithuania. It was an im- mediate. hit. . . - : .. -- .. . Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 1RTICT. !".PP" n ei PAGE LOS ANGELES TIMES 10 DECEMBER 1979 e +Jf ' ra t Malaise: AN o ,Easy C St?' is no respecterof ideological.bounda-;{? year:'Meanwhile; production in existing oilfields is: res. In the Soviet Union. too, economic growth declining::: is slowing. Production goals for such key items The jury. is still out on the ' American.. CIA's as oil,-coal, steel and foodstuffs are not being met:-,- forecast that- the Soviet Union wiff. become a net Hoped-for gains in productivity are not materializ im ort er o f o il by 1982, but it does app ear a that in,,. Consumer.. shortages persist.: And prices are overall production is pe g, and i gra going up-. 1 Bunn t s. Columbia : University's Research Institute on ...- few days ago, Soviet planning officials coned- International Change, in its annual Global Political ed that 1979 production goals have not been met for Assessment, concludes that the. Soviet Union's a whole- list of important items, including oil, coal,. econonse performance in 1979 probably has been fertilizers, plastics, rolled steel and many consumer "the worst in all the .years of Leonid. L Brezhnev's items. Targets for -1984 are, in many cases; being { leadership.' %..' 'r. , . r ! .- - ;; '- scaled back tomore-modest levels.. The roots `of the Soviet economic malaise are too The CIA now expects the Soviet economy to w fundamental to be cured easily. by less than 3% annually for the next few years; The Kremlin's central planners devote 25% of'. .and says the growth rate could: fall to less than, national 'investment funds to agriculture, a far "if worst-case analyses of the Soviet energy siua on bigger.slice_than farming gets in the United States, -: groverue.:. and -a disproportionate- one-quarter of the, Soviet The Soviet system has away of muddling through workforce works-in the countryside.. Yet there are--. economic ? problems. without the - necessity* of chronic shortages of meat and fresh vegetables, and fundamental change. And. it could happen.. again. the-; Soviet Union` is compelled to make massive Many experts are convinced, however, that, this grain purchases from the West. -y time is different. . Bad weather is obviously an important part of the -. To quote the Columbia. study, "The ? post-Stalin- problem. But so are the.inefficiencies and d isincen == leadership is not used to, nor is the Soviet Union as tives that appear to be endemic to Soviet commu- . it exists today prepared to deal with, those kinds-of nism._ It's worth noting -that; more than 60 years emergencies confronting them in the 1980a" after..the Bolshevik revolution,,. the big state and : Some.-- solutions, such as decollectivization- of. collective farina produce only two-thirds of Russia's agriculture and adoption of fundamental reforms-in food. The rest. comes from privately tilled plots.that. ? industrial planning and management, are likely to' i make.uprjust.1/% of arable land.:.. remain ideologically out of bounds. - -. ~r Thanks in great part to demographic factors, the Military, spending, which exceeds that' of. the.': Soviet economy faces an increasingly serious labor United States in both relative and absolute -terms, shortage Whereas an average of more than could be cut. And that is the option that Western lion new workers entered the labor force each year governments, to. the best of their abilities, should during the 1970s, this will fall off to about.300,000 , . try to encourage. But a large enough ieduction to do per year by the mid-1980& s = y _ much good would require a virtual revolution in the Making things worse, a disproportionate number Soviet Union's internal politics, where the military= of-tfie new entrants into the labor force will come industrial complex. is far. more powerful than in from the warmer, non-Russian regions of the south. , ` democratic societies. They may not. be - easily persuaded- to. work.. in..-: The Kremlin may, in the end, find. itself unable to,. Siberia and other unattractive areas where they, will make-any of the hard choices and settle into an be-mostneeded.=%~., tendedperiodofdebilitatingslowgrowth :': -- _, -Soviet industry is also afflicted by overcentralized ' Unfortunately, 'as current Russian mischief- planning-. and by -bureaucratic managers. who. are _ making . in Irani reminds , there is -another, averse to risk-taking and resistant. to technological uncomfortable possibility.- - innovation. And then there is the energy situation: If the. *,energy: squeeze does worsen. and bring !.The Soviet Union has vast deposits of oil and.coal; : ?'. economic stagnation in its wake,. the Soviet Union but these lie mostly.beneath Siberia and .the rough might come to see a grab for the Middle Eastern and perpetually icy.waters of the Arctic and North oilfields: as -the:-least: unattractive. of -alternatives Pacifies far from. the populous industrial centers. of ':Because:.vital-. Western -interests would' .be so ' European Russia; Transportation and other. bottle-' -'obviously threatened by such a.move, that.would bey necks will' delay, full-scale development for~many bad news Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 C- ac,--~S Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501330001-9 ON FAGEJ~t WASHINGTON POST 13 DECEMBER 1979 Jack Anderson Brzeziiiski Tactic on Ct" Iris Vance For the gentlemanly Cyrus R. Vance, words like "counterproductive" and "in- appropriate" are as scathing as he ever allows himself to use. Both words ap- pear in an angry memo, which he has addressed to Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security affairs chief. This is the latest development in a seething, behind-theacenes controversy that I revealed Oct. 31. I reported that Brzezinski had . drafted a top secret memorandum outlining a three-phase program to put the Soviets and Cubans in their place. It could only be described as a blueprint for reviving the Cold War. As part of the scheme, Brzezinski or- dered a questionnaire sent to all U.S- ambassadors requesting data on Cuban activities in their areas for use in a worldwide propaganda campaign. The questionnaire, stamped Top Secret Umbra, was opposed by Vance. The secretary of state believes that the United States should seek detente, not confrontation, with the Soviets. Two- thirds of the ambassadors also protested the instructions, an unprecedented show of opposition. But Brzezinski would not be dis- suaded. He wouldn't even allow the Ira- nian crisis to interfere. Nov. 7, three days after the American hostages had been seized in Iran, the ambassadors were reminded not to miss the Nov. 15 deadline for filing their Cuban reports. This was too much for Vance. He dashed off a sharp memo intended for Brzezinski's eyes only. "The continued U.S. diplomatic emphasis on the Cuban- Soviet relationship is counterproductive and particularly inappropriate at this time," declared the secretary of state. `The U.S. can best secure the coopera- tion of Third World countries both in the long run and during this crisis," he suggested pointedly, "by recognizing that they have legitimate national con- cerns entirely apart from the U.S.Soviet relationship." The responses from the ambassadors, meanwhile, flooded into the State De- partment by secret cable from diplo- matic posts all over the world. There was no enthusiasm in the messages. The ambassadors to anti-communist coun- tries reported that a new propaganda campaign would be preaching to the converted. The ambassadors to nonalig- ned countries warned that they had to keep a low profile. Ambassador Marilyn Johnson cabled from Togo, for example, that the tiny African nation "doesn't look at the U.S.S.R.-Cuban relationship as nefar- ious" and "doesn't believe the U.S. is threatened by Cuba." She concluded tersely. "Economic and social development can keep Togo more moderate; propaganda campaigns against a Third World nation will not . The ante for strong anti-Soviet pod- tions is not words, but economic and military support." From the neighboring nation. of Benin. Charge d'Affaires John Davidson reported: "It is not productive to under- take an effort to get out the facts about the extent of Cuban dependence on Soviet aid.... Benin has little reason for focusing on the darker side of the affili- ation between Cuba and the Russians." Brzezinski's Cold War campaign has aroused widespread revolt in the for- eign policy establishment. Vance has complained privately that the Brze- zinski plan would "reverse 15 years of American diplomacy," sources told my reporter Ron McRae. But President Car- ter is going ahead with it. Iranian Threats - Incredibly, some Iranians in the United States, far from keeping a low profile during the Tehran hostage situation, have been passing out literature urging acts of violence against Americans. Among the terrorist suggestions are attacks with knives and razor blades on Jewish women, aimed at preventing the reproduction of Zionists. The FBI knows who is responsible for these threats, and has them under con-' stant surveillance. But because our laws forbid the arrest of someone who makes general threats without taking action, the police are helpless. Meanwhile, the Senate's sergeant- at-arms has advised senators to change their personalized license plates and avoid routine routes on their way to : i work. And additional metal detectors are being installed at entrances to the Senate office buildings. Under The Dome - Robert Strauss, Carter's reelection campaign chief, ex- pects a bitter fight with Teddy Kennedy for the Democratic nomination, and he's not all that sure that the president will . come out on top. "We may not win," he told a recent meeting of party leaders. "But we're going to fight like hell." ? Susan's confusin' the U.S. Mint as well as the public. A Gainesville, Fla., resident recently ordered a mint set of the new Susan B. Anthony dollars, and -I received instead a mint set of quarters. :1 The 25cent piece is close enough in size and shape to be mistaken often for the controversial coin dollar. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 DETROIT NEWS 5 DECEMBER 1979 oSt em ~b asses pkovide cover nor own !Bd pI(a s By HUGH McCANN News Staff Writs 'the primary purpose of an embassy is to provide an official link between nations. But embassies have 'traditionally also served to collect informa- tion about the host nation. Some of this information is public or is available on request from the host country; other informa- tion is secret and is known as "intelligence." Indi- viduals who gather intelligence, or who recruit others to collect intelligence, have always been known as spies. Such intelligence gathering usually is taken as a matter of course and discovery of spying attempts by a "diplomat" results in that fndividual's expul- sion. But in the case of Iran, where students have taken Americans hostage in the embassy, a differ- ent response has arisen. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini says that the Americans were involved in spying and will be tried on that charge. BACKING UP their complaints, students besieging ehran produced a captured the U.S. Embassy in Tehran' document last Saturday purporting to back up charges that embassy personnel were involved in spying. The document, dated Aug. 2 and marked "Se- cret,"purports to be a communication from Lowell B. Laingen, the embassy's deputy chief in Tehran, to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in Washington. The message discusses a request for "cover" for two men - Malcolm Kalp and William Daugherty - who were on "SRF assignments." "There is absolutely no way of guaranteeing that the document is genuine," said ,a spokesman for the Department of State. "There are many ways that fakes can easily be made." In the intelligence-gathering community, the. term "cover" refers to an identity and/or occupa- tion that an intelligence agent adopts so that he may go about his real mission undisturbed by local police or internal-security forces. ASKED WHAT "SRF" stands for, the state depart- ment spokesman said that it is "an internal defini- tion within the State Department." The second paragraph of the message reads, in part."... We are starting from a clean slate in SRF coverage at this mission, but with regard also for the great sensitivity locally to any hint of CIA ac- tivity, it is of the highest importance that cover be the best we can come up with. _ Hehft there is no question as to the need for second and third secretary titles for these two offi- cers. We must have it. "We should, however, hold to the present total of four SRF officer assignments for the foreseeable future, keeping supporting staff as sparse as possi- ble as well, until we see how things go here, "We are making effort to limit knowl d e ge within (the embassy) of all SRF assignments; that effort applies particularly to Daugherty, pursuant to (the) new program of which he is a product and about which I have been informed..." - SEVERAL FORMER employes of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency have written of the way in which the agency operates overseas. They say that the top CIA man in a foreign country - he is known as the Chief of Station - often has the "cover" of a special assistant to the U.S. ambassa- dor or of the embassy's second or third secretary. Under such an arrangement,, the CIA station is inside the embassy building but insulated from the workings of the rest of the embassy - except ! in the matter of operating communication facili- ties with the U.S. Ex-CLA man Victor Marchetti, writing in 72ze CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, says that the CIA station handles all electronic communication, whether it is between the CIA station and CIA headquarters in Langley, Va.; or between the embassy and State Department headquarters in Washington, D.C.- For certain messages that the ambassador does- n't want the CIA station chief to read, the State Department has its own special codes - called "Roger channels," says Marchetti. THE MESSAGE produced by the Iran students is identified as a "Roger channel" communication. In Sub Rosa: The CIA and the Uses of Intelli. gence, another one-time member of the CIA, Peter de Silva, says: "More often than not, however, 'cover' would be relatively nominal and consist of the agency station being a part of an official American entity, such as an embassy. "Presidential directives were explicit in de- scribing the subardination of the CLA station chief to the American ambassador, if cover were to be established within the embassy. "Furthermore, the ambassador had full rights to know'anything and everything being done by an agency station in the country of its assignment; it only remained for the ambassador to set limits on what he wanted to know and what.he didn't care to hear about." According to"former OIA man John Stockwell, author of In Search of Enemies, "85 percent of all CIA field case officers already are well known in their local communities because of their liaison relationships with foreign police, their own open admissions of CIA identities, their free-wheeling, high-profile lifestyles, and the gossip and conspic- uous clannishness of their wives. "In Abidjan (India), my first post, all CIA station personnel were listed in the embassy's unclassified, public telephone book as the 'Politi- cal 11 Section.' 'Political 1 Section' was legitimate State Department personnel." Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 ARTICLE APPEARI Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 THE NEW YORK TIMES ON PAGE 13 December 1979 Scholars. Foresee a New Age of Terrorism By BLANCHE CORDELIA ALSTON A group of experts on terrorism sug- gested yesterday that the taking of American hostages in Iran could be Indic- ative of a new age of terrorism. Yonah Alexander, the director of the State University of New York's Institute for Studies in International Terrorism, said that the number of "significant wherever they go because the host coun. try cannot protect diplomats" And if a country cannot send diplaa.~ mats, he said, "the fabric to resolve dis-I putes peacefu ly" is weakened Mr. Fin r rai ed President . Cairter's cautious a roac to the crisis and bIs~ is on not to use torce to T the three] c, su=m ted that "selective miiita as 1970 to 1,511 in 1978. In first months of this year alone, he said, there ton-- CIO USSCL e a sail at t e to u- had been 765 such acts. ence community "IS the key to the ter. r Of the 6,294 incidents noted between roT r e d reactivate, strengthen and 1970 and 1979, Mr. Alexander said, more increase t e use o an e a td ant had takep place in the than 60 ete f n nut w re :n countries our n- three P past . year s. He said that about 45 percent of all ter Ceres are at stake," he Suggest . "Ter- 7 rorists acts were directed against busi-1 rorism is ous more is no raj ness. "Future incidents will be much memedy for it. The Iran pattern will be more costly in terms of protecting people repeated elsewhere unless we find some and property," he said. leverage to use against a hostile regime."! ? Mr. Alexander spoke at a news confer- Part of that leverage, he said, might bei ence sponsored jointly by the Institute for! for United States military forces to seize' Studies in International Terrorism and i strategic oil terminals In the Persian Gulf the City University of New York's Ralph as a bargaining tool. . Bunche Institute on the United Nations. Seymour M. Finger, president of the Ralph Bunche Institute, said that the tak- ing of hostages in Teheran was "a much more serious threat to internati peace and security than wehave known." Diplomats Called Sitting Docks "The Government of Iran has endorsed the taking of hostages and has not carried out its obligation of international law t ,.protect foreigners," he said at the new conference at the New York City office o the State University of New York, 60 East, 42d Street. "Diplomas are sitting ducks) Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 AgTICLR LFPZ!PD I S oy PaG3 THE WASHINGTON POST 14 December 1979 Rowland Evans and Robert Novak Of the Soviets, Skeptical The sudden upsurge of formal but unpublicized complaints about Soviet conduct now being conveyed by President Carter's top diplomatic of- ficials to Ambassador Anatolly Do- brynin reveals a startling change In Jimmy.Carter that was unimaginable a few months age The pres eat Is no longer a coo- vinced partisan of the view that Rus? like his own United States, plays politics by rules. loose but roughly The latest evidence of this change is a request for "clarification" of the Kremlin's stunning, still unan- nounced incursion into Afghanistan by at least one and probably two bat- talions of organized military units. The use of these troops, belonging to a crack. Soviet airborne division, marks the first time since World War II that Moscow has intervened in a Third World country with organized- units under Soviet command, and', Carter is demanding an explanation. Carter's growing disillusion with the Russians also expressed itself In a private complaint direct from Secre- tary of State Cyrus Vance to Dobry- nin on Dec. 6. Vance was angry Over' evidence of new Soviet nuclear test ban cheating. Lumped with Carter's dismay over earlier Soviet rulatreak ng, such as its outrageous radio campaign to Incite violence against Americans In Iran and its interference with food supplies to starving Cambodians, these new sig- nals of presidential anger hint that Carter might aced belatedly -be running out of patience. Carter is reported by White House insiders to have. been mightily buoyed up by popular acclaim for his handling of the Iran crisis. These inti- mates believe the president's new show of relative realism . toward Moscow's superpower rulebreakint has a psychological root in his spec- tacular climb in the polls. This rein- forces his disenchantment over growing Soviet truculence in doing what It wants, whatever various tree- .ties and rules of conduct say. Vane's confrontation with Dobry nin on Dec. 6 was long overdue, con- sidering unambiguous evidence of repeated Soviet violations of the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty. This sets. a i54kiloton limit on underground' nuclear tests. The United States has obtained "hard!' information that the Soviets exploded two underground tests this year not yet reported by the Carter administration. It was those two tests -each with an explosive force of be- tween 180 and 210 kilotons-that Vance wanted Dobrynin to expla: Dobrynin predictably denied there had been any violation. That failed to satisfy Vance. He called on Dobrynin to supply U.S. scien- tists with the full geologic data on rock formations surrounding the test site and with geographic coordinates so they could more precisely measure the size of the two unannounced blasts. At least one additional 1979 under- ground test is known to have exceeded the 154kiloton legal limit (by at least 50 percent). Three 1978 explosions also broke the ceiling. Yet, until Carter or- dered Vance to lodge his formal com- plaint, nothing whatever had been said to.the Russians. The American people have never been told. The TTBT is onl one of three trea- ties that U.S. InteMence agencies have to Carter t e Russians have broken. One t ese, as we have re. previously, is the 1963 Atmos- pheric Test Ban Treaty, systematically violated in 1978 and once again this year, on Oct 19, when an underground test "vented" its fallout Into the atmos- phere through carelessness. The third treaty that is now the tar- get of a formal Carter administration charge of violation is theanti-ballistic i missile agreement Despite the spe- cific proviso in Article 6 of that, treaty,' which forbids antiaircraft I radar to be used to track incoming .ballistic missiles (rather than air- planes), the United States charged a' possible violation by the Soviets last October, at the height of the crisis .over Soviet combat troops in Cuba. The radars used were the most mod- ern model associated with SAM10 antiaircraft missiles, Yet last. July, when U.S. intelli- gence first reported Soviet testing of SAM10 radars at Sary-Shagan in cen- tral Russia to track incoming ballistic missiles, not a word about violations was said to the Russians. That failure infuriated defense-oriented senators who knew about the Soviet ma neuver, including Republican Sens. John Tower, Gordon Humphrey and other members of the Armed Serv- ices Committee. They are now lob- bying Carter to make ,a diplomatic ; issue of the' violations and let the American people in on this secret: the Russians have been playing fast' and loose with vital treaties on which the future security of both countries could depend. Whether or not Carter takes'that ad vice, his transformation from a be- liever in Soviet good intentions to a 1 chastened skeptic, while leaving room for further growth, is a healthy sign of political maturity that fits well with his new showing in the polls. o1Y7 Th 4Ent.iwta..,rnc. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501330001-9 ARTICLE t~PEEAARFED -4- Q.'( PAAGE WASHINGTON STAR 8 DECEER 1979 TheNafioff! Supposed CIA Agents Identified Covert Action Information Bulletin, a periodi- cal which says it is out to destroy the CIA, yester- day published the names of 14 men and a woman it identified as CIA-agents-under cover in various U.S. embassies and consulates around the world. It also gave the name of a 15th said to have been the chief of station in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia who "crossed the street'"-and was said to be working now as adviser to.theSaudiforeignintelligence. - Despite its policy of. "naming. names.. Covert-Ac tion said: it had-declined to reveal the names of any American intelligence agents attthe captured - U.S. Embassy in Iran.::: Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 At least one justice is so uncertain about the S case that a lower court has been asked to send up e e Tests. more data on it. Attorneys have-learned that Jus- tice John Paul Stevens requested the full case file Right, to Write from the Court of Appeals. Normally, the justices by do not get interested in such files until after the court has agreed formally to rule on a case. ' . Only members of the court and their-staffs E Employee know what problem any justice is having with the case. l h ate t at ;. But legal etcperts have begun to specu By Lyle Denniston _ il' one significant factor could be the government's w"h1?aeouStar sartwrlnr- -=i potentially sweeping claim that it has a right to ARTICLE -APPEAR-F-% WASHINGTON STAR 0,A PAGE- _/.? 9 DECEMBER 1979 The Supreme Court is having trouble making up ! collect all the money that Snepp. has.made or will.. its mind on a key case on the rights of a former make from his book._'." ` CIA agent who turned'author and sharply crib=a` The government contends.that Sneppspromise- cized U.S policy in Vietnam. ` tp the CIA not to write anything.. without permis.- - Frank W. Snepp's appeal and'an opposing_appeal-4.'sfon. amounted to a legal "trust' and' he,has now-17 by the government pose a variety of significant .violated, or breached,. that trust. Thus, the govern. legal and constitutional issues, but the court has -'? meat argues. Snepp has profited from that breach, spent weeks pondering, whether it will even re- [:making the, money_he'has received "ill-gotten April 1975. view the case. i = After resigning from the CIA, Snepp wrote be- cent Interval, a book that. assails the U.S. with- drawal from Vietnam at the end of the war in. justice Department lawyers handling the. Snepp case.reportedly were put.hnder pressure by CIA; Director Stansfield Turner not. only- to go after Snepp's'proceeds,-but also to attack his publisher," Random House, and'the CBS television network promise to clear everything he. wrote with the. !- and CBS reporter Mike Wallace for a "60 Minutes:' agency, and' the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals - program about the book. = has ruled that the government is right. Snepp In .the Supreme. Court appeal by the govern . major impact on the right of government employ- ees, not only those who work for secret agencies.. to write about their experiences. argues that he can't-be forced to clear in advance any writing that does not include secret material: his book is said to contain: none. taking up the case. for at least brief discussion with theirstafis, but.then putting,off any action ; lawyers- following the case ha$e been told that . it has been circulated among the justices at:least. six times-without a vote. Now it appears that the court will take no action until at least early January. The justices have one more-session, tomorrow,, before.taking:a? four-:; weekrrecess. and. the Snepp case is not'likeI3? to, be, mentAoned theta; other writers, not themselves federal employees tion for profit." or officials, who write books-or articles based on - The Court of Appeals, however, overturned that what they have been told by persons in govern- part of Lewis' decision, and- ruled that the govern-_ ment~ If. meat "is not entitled to- a constructive trust." It' Conceivably.' Some attorneys are now.suggest- s ould have been, that court said,, if Snepp had-. ing, the case's final result might reach books like written about secret material.. ..' ..r.?; The Brethren, the- new book about the Supreme - The government's claim- to the proceeds is the Court by, two reporters, Bob Woodward and Scott only issue the Justice Department has taken to the .' Armstrong of The Washington Post.;--h eourt r ., Since much of that book came from secret court"`~ ` documents apparently' supplied by the. justices' Snepp, with the support of publishers and varilaw clerks` in violation of court policy if not the .ous-news organizations, has asked the court to* clerks' own promises... it might fit the theory that rule that government officials and employees may the government is using in the Snepp case legal not be`required to give up their constitutional experts have said. -;;- .; _ , . r right of free. expression asa condition of their The Snepp case has been pendingat.the Su- V o >t r~ ~ ,;: ~.. N preme Court since last summer. It was- ready for , ,i ~ The appeal also asks. the justices . to rule that the justices' action when they returned to the-- Snepp should not. be.. required to-submit, in ad--?I bench in early October-; ; ' ance; any writing that he: does about non class:- The justices have spent: more` thanitwo months fled material. The court order requiring him to get.' meat; however, only the proceeds to Snepp are .the government's theory. Lewis imposed a "con- structive trust for the benefit of the United States" over any money Snapp makes - on the book, re- clearaa`ce includes not only writings about the CIA, but fiction as wells That order also extends to-" publishers who wouldhandleSnepp.. : Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 A.tTICLE APPSL l THE WASHINGTON POST MAGAZINE 0 PACB 9 December 1979 A Scandal Star's Mom Says Judy's Sex, Spy Saga Has Had a HapDv Ending BY RUDY MAXA es' a mother to do when her. 22-year-old !.r daughter- -ap- g pears on na- tional television. to admit she is a prostitute? What do you say to your Fairfax County neighbors when she details in a paperback her sexual adven-' tures as a Washington hooker, : a career that included a six- month stint as paid escort to a- celebrated Russian defector? The parents of characters in Washington's sex scandals are ,generally anonymous, and the case of Judy Chavez's kiss. and-tell -adventure last year with a Soviet defector; diplo- mat Arkady Shevchenko, was no exception. Chavez's parents avoided reporters clamoring for details about the mystery woman who claimed -the FBI and CIA provided Shevchenko- with more than $40,000 to buy her expensive company. "What do you do?"' Marlyn Taylor, 51, asks today. You try to keep yourself busy doing something - else. You don't think about it- and hope - everything comes. out for the best." Taylor ? (Judy Chavez ' kept the surname of her' former husband) is a - feisty McLean housewife and mother of two adopted daughters who thinks, -everything. has come out:- for the- best--After 28 years as civil. engineer with . the U.S.. Forest Service, her husband. Heyward, is looking forward to' retirement. The couple have 'put their home on the market and plan to head for the sun to operate the Gold Mine Saloon they recently bought in Pan- ama City, Fla. But this time last year the Taylors sat -in their tastefully decorated liv- ing room and watched in horri- fied fascination as their older daughter's face appeared on network television and the na- tion's front pages. . - At first they were shocked. But by the time their daugh- ter's paperback autobiography appeared last spring, Mrs. ,Taylor was sending au- tographedcopies to friends. :.She collected press clippings and today says, "Judy is grown , up, -and she's turned her life over to the world now. We talk about once a week ... she was always very individualistic." -As a young girl, Judy was a Brownie and. Girl Scout whose interests-: included ballet;: tap dancing,, and the - piano.- She graduated at age 18 from Fair- far i County's Oakton ---High School- after. - quitting- Fairfax Christian School She married a.- local'- boy-and _the couple moved-td California before turning to Washington to find a job. They separated-m-1975., Gradually Mrs. Taylor began to wonder., how her daughter supported herself "I always had a feeling," she says. "She lived. well, drove a- new Camaro, had a nice apart- ment; kept irregular= hours.: But when I asked her what she. was doing, she'd just get up. and- leave." Recalls Judy- "I believe they thought I was in real estate-I was evasive;" JI She gave her parents several hours' notice before NBC-TV - broke the story of her vocation and expensive- liaison with Shevchenko. . "I asked her why she didn't marry him,"- Mrs. Taylor re- calls, "and she said because he's too old, 48. You know how- l feel about him? He got ex- actly what he deserves, mess- ing around with a 22-year-old. That dirty old man." Today Chavez, lives in New' York and works on a book about ? how to be a femme fa- tale. She attends classes in French, music and ballet be- cause, she says, it keeps her .out of trouble.. A romance- with a minor rock musician -has faded, which makes her. mother . happy--she . didn't much like him the one time y;_ they met. 'Judy likes `good' -living," says Marlyn Taylor:: "Maybe - what got her off on the wrong foot was I never gave it to her. I always told her she had to work for it. But evidently she found an easier way-"' - -: Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 ARTICLE AFPZ on ?AG E_! _. _ THE WASHINGTON POST MAGAZINE 9 December 1979 Spy satellites can't see through metal apartment buildings of North Ar- lington, Mr. X cautiously opens the door - to his walk-up flat. There is no nameplate on the door or on the mailbox. His telephone number is not listed. "I take precautions," says Mr. X, a middle-aged Russian who bears a vague resemblance to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. An orange rug covers the floor of his sparsely fur- nished apartment and a picture of his wife, mother and two grown sons-all in Moscow-sits on the table beside the sofa. "I have always been against the system," says Mr. X, who defected from the Soviet Union two years ago for "ideological reasons." . "When I was a student I criticized it, even during the years of terror. Then during Khrushchev's time, I hoped Russia was changing. They released people from camps. The armed forces were reduced 40 per- cent, then ...." His voice trails off. "The reason I didn't defect earlier was because my, children were young," he says, pouring a glass of Rhine wine and laying the table with typical Russian- fare-pickled cabbage and herring, beets and sour cream. "I miss them, sure; I want to get the Soviet authorities to let them go, but when my son applied for an exit visa, they put him in a psychiatric institu- tion for three week's observation." In Moscow, Mr.. X held a position related to arms control Here he fills his day by working with right- wing groups concerned about Soviet imperialism and advising members of Congress about the pitfalls of SALT. - bus= atr i Russian min BY RUTH DANILOFF rt s darkness settles over the crowded isgruntled Soviets like Mr. X can be more effective watchdogs for the SALT treaties CoI TZ than all the space-age electronic equip- ment orbiting the earth. Atop-level defec- tor could bring news to the West of Russian noncom- pliance with the treaties. _ Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RD-- -P05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501330001-9 ,,if the Soviets are contem- plating cheating. if they think they can gain strategic advan- tage, they have to think, `Can I- get away with it? Supposing one of my boys doesn't like it and leaves,' " says former CIA director William Colby. A spy-in-the-sky can count Soviet missiles, but only a spy I on the ground could tell the i CIA what the Kremlin intends to do with them. He could also say if the Russians secretly ' equipped their SS-18 and SS- 19 missiles with more than 10 warheads-in violation-of the treatise.-ea -some senators fear. Are they- surreptitiously developing a devastating new weapon - something- which takes 12 years to get off the drawing board and onto the launch pad, where it can be spied on by satellites? Elec- tronic gadgetry can discover much about the enemy's capa- bilities, but it cannot see through steel. It cannot look into men's minds or learn of high-level policy decisions in the Soviet government. In 1976, a presidential For- eign Intelligence Advisory Board, now defunct, warned that the United States was too dependent on electronic sur- veillance. "One well-placed human agent in Castro's government could have provided early warnings of the Soviet bri- gade's presence and described what its true purpose was," says Cord Meyer, former CIA assistant deputy director of plans, and now a columnist. Recruiting spies, however, is easier said than done, espe- cially in a totalitarian society such as the Soviet Union, with its closed borders and its watchful KGB. Soviet intelligence has some built-in advantages when it comes to gathering informa- tion with people, not satellites, say experts. "It costs us bil- i lions of dollars to collect infor- mation on the Soviet Union which the Russians can pick up out of Aviation Weekly for nothing," says Colby. In addi- tion to material on the open market, the Russians have had considerable success buying top-secret information from money-hungry U.S. citizens. Although the Soviets can find agents in the United States,the United States wins hands-down on- defectors. They range from artistic de- fectors such as Mikhail Bary- shnikov or Mstislav Rostro- povich, who move easily into, U.S. society, to important Soviet and,East European offs- cis" whose whereabouts, intel- I.ligence contributions and adaptation to American life !remain one of the darkest secrets of the American spy es- tablishment. - However, since 1975, when Congress began to investigate the CIA, some information has been made public about defec- tors' lives in America. These "leaks" are causing alarm. "After all the publicity about what happened to Nosenko and Shadrin," says Dr. Ray Cline, former deputy , director of the CIA, "we may have trouble encouraging other defectors." Yuri Nosenko was a watch- dog for the KGB at the U.S.- Soviet Disarmament Confer- ence in Geneva when he de- fected nearly 16 years ago, just I three months after the Ken- nedy assassination. His asser- tion then that Lee Harvey Os- wald was never in the pay of the Soviets remains controver- sial today. The information smelled to certain CIA factions of "disinformation," part of a mission to distance the Soviet i Union from the aseuaination. Last year's testimony before the House Assassination Com- mittee revealed that in order to "break" him, the CIA sub- jected Nosenko to imprison- ment for four years, including a period of confinement in a specially constructed 10'x10' windowless vault of steel and concrete. There, to keep his sanity, he fashioned a chess set from the threads of his clothes and tried to keep track of time in the dust. Finally, in 1967, a decision was made to clear him. N icholaa Shadrin was a high-living Soviet naval com- mander, who, in 111958, stole his ship's long boat and escaped with his Polish fiance, Ewa, in a 24-hour Baltic crossing to I Sweden. In the summer of 1966, while- working for U.S. naval intelligence in Washing- ton, he was approached by KGB agents to spy for the Soviet Union. The FBI en- couraged him to play along, feeding the Russians carefully selected "soft" information. But three years ago, while ' in -Vienna, Austria, to. meet a KGB contact, Shadrin myste- riously disappeared. "The Swedes warned us not to come to the U.S. They use you and dump you," says Ewa Shadrin, her eyes filling with tears as she sits in the living room of their Arlington house surrounded by mementos. of their marriage. , Mrs. Shadrin, who believes her husband could still be alive in the Soviet Union, ac- cuses the CIA and the FBI of using him as bait and of botch- ing his surveillance in Vienna Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Most intelligence experts agree with Ray Cline that if disaffected Russians and East Europeans are frightened of becoming espionage casualties like Nosenko and Shadrin, then a vital intelligence source is endangered On the other hand, a few case officers who have experience with defectors wonder if the information they supply justifies the troubles they bring both to their per- sonal lives and to the agency resettling them in the United States. "You never know if a defector is for real," claims one former intelligence officer_ "The- Russians- have Qooded- the market with phonies." The U.S. intelligence's first task is to penetrate the lies, to establish the defector's "bona fides." Is he genuine, or is he a "plant"? His name is run through the computers and an urgent meeting is convened of the Interagency Defectors Board, made up of representa- tives of the CIA, Defense In- telligence, the military serv- ices, the State Department and the FBL Speed is essen- tial. Once the Russians learn someone is missing, they start agitating with ' the local au- thorities. If that country is friendly to Moscow, it may mean smuggling the defector "out black"-hiding him in the trunk of a diplomatic car or flying in a plane to pick him ' up. In the United States high- ranking defectors tend to settle in the Washington area to be near the CIA. "Wringing out"-debriefing--can , take two years, after which a defec- tor may continue as- a "con- sultant" with a stipend. "The house was always full of people," recalls Ewa Shadrin. "The guards mostly sat in front of the television smoking. A couple came in to do cooking and cleaning." Indeed, the CIA and the FBI become the defector's sur- rogate family, giving new iden- tities, providing Jobe and houses, fixing up a divorce and in tie case of Arkady Shev- chenko, the Soviet's No. 2 man at the U.N., who defected last year, they. may have under- written a call girl "The business of hand-hold- ing defectors," says one former. CIA officer, "is an obligation imposed for life. It does no good to say 'but I left the agency last year' when they call in the middle of the night. They cling to someone who understands - their problems and could do something." ___ ome defectors come with grandiose ideas of their own importance, expecting Washington to create miracles. One particularly troublesome Rus- sian. insisted on becoming a professor, though he didn't want to learn English. "In the end the CIA gave him a $35,000 stipend and found him a special tutor. Then he wanted us to send his kids to private school, then to private college. It was a terrible drag on the agency," says one for- mer CIA agent. - Another who expected spe- cial treatment was Anatoly Golitsyn, who defected from the Soviet embassy in Helsinki in 1960. Allegedly the highest KGB defector ever, he was the man. who confirmed that Kim Philby, head of the anti-Soviet section of British Counter In- telligence, was the mysterious "third man" who tipped off Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess that M16 was about to arrest them as Soviet spies. (Anthony Blunt, Queen Eliza- beth U's debonair arts curator, was recently identified as the fourth man who likewise warned Philby.) At first, Golit- syn insisted on being debriefed I by the U.S. president. The stocky Russian believed a "mole" (a double agent) exist- ed in the CIA. Give him $10 million, he suggested, -and he would agree to become chief of 1I NATO counter intelligence. Successful adjustment to the American way of life largely depends on a defector's reason for leaving his country in the arst place. Motives vary, though a large percent- age are middle-aged men with marital or drinking problems. Some are attracted to the con- sumer society. Other defec- tors come to revenge their country's political system. This is particularly true of East Europeans who want to get back at the Russians. "The defector who, comes for ideological -reasons does best,' says. Konstantine Bol- dyrev, a, Russian- emigre who has helped refugees in the United States. "Their ideology is a crutch. Those who come for material reasons usually break down. The intelligence defectors are pretty pathetic; all they are trained to do is spy." A secret CIA study in the late 1960s on communist de- fectors' adjustments to Ameri- can life concludes that the Soviets have the most diffi- culty. A sentimental people, they become depressed easily and start drinking as they wrestle with guilt and loneli- ness in a society where indi- vidual initiative, not' state planning, is the key to success. Whatever the motive, what- ever the adjustment, one thing defectors share is fear. U.S in- telligence officials have been told that every Soviet embassy has a leather-bound "blue book" containing names of J traitors sentenced to death in absentia-the KGB hit-list. Since Stalin's death, the KGB 11 has curtailed its terror tactics, though the Shadrin. kidnap- ping and the Bulgarians' poi- son umbrella attack in London last year have caused defectors! to worry. Today, in an ern of ! partial detente, a tacit agree- ment has emerged that says, "We won't trouble you if you shut up and don't engage ini anti-Soviet ? - activities." Nonetheless, the KGB con- tinues to track down some de- fectors, trying to- "double" them, or pressing them to come home by mailing them copies of Goloa Rodiny (Voice of the Motherland). - Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 -. Y. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 - After a bad start his wife's suicide in Russia, scan- dals with a call girl and a bout with 'I the bottle-Arkady Shev- chenko is determined to prove that a defector can make it in America without a change of identity. Once . he completes his memoirs, for which he re- ceived a $600,000 advance, he plans to come in out of the cold as a public personality, to lecture, teach, write and speak out on issues. "He knows the risk, but he prefers to live in freedom for as long as he can. That's.'- one reason ' why he lel says-=Br11- Geimer - the' Washington lawyer. Shev- chenko hired to protect his in- terest and to quash his play- boy image. Now married to an Ameri- can, Shevchenko leads a quiet life in a Washington suburb. He has had no contact with the Soviets since three days after his defection, when Ana- toly Dobrynin, the Soviet am- bassador to Washington, and Oleg Troyanovsky, the Soviet ambassador to the U.N., tried to persuade him to return home. . . U.S. intelligence experts say the lives of defectors are often fraught with problems and risks. "But that's the business they chose," Cline says. "I can't feel too sorry for them. They knew the name of the game when they got into it." Unlike reconnaissance satel- lites, human spies cannot be turned in for more sophisti- cated models. As long as the United States and the Soviet Union remain political antago- nists, defectors will be the sad but vital pawns in the East- West game of "I Spy." . - ^ Ruth Dansloff, a Washington free-lance writer, first became in- terested in defector, afterencow-teringRusian spies Guy Bur? gels and Donald Maclean in Moscow. - Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 ARTICUP Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501330001-9 ON PAGE_CI -4 11 December 1979 By Maxine Cheshire F_ malty interested in a boot-encased leg -which washed ashore recently. from the- Chesapeake Bay onto a beach to the community of Herald Harbor. Be- cause the leg had been In the water more than a year, investigators are 'trying to determine if there might be a connection to the mysterious death of former CIA official John Paisley, whose badly decomposed .body was :pulled from the bay on Oct. 1, 1978; with a bullet hole behind the left ear: G='~iarylaai~ police df$cials in sev `~eral 3urlsdi~tions~are more.-than nor- EXCERPTED Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501330001-9 Marks has suggested there might not have been a drug culture in the United States during the 196os if ISD and - other chemical cocktails had not been mass produced by pharmaceutical. companies with MKULTRA contrails PETERSON SAID that two. years ago when the mind control project was un- earthed, the CIA feared they would find that many people received doses of mind-altering drugs in the program. "Now we think there was only a handful," Peterson said. In one. highly persuasive- cape, a victim jumped to his death from a New York hotel room window after a dosebt psychedelic medicine` While the CIA was de ;sing pfam to .develop an LSD weapon, the Army . was busy testing several germ warfare agents em ww#iag Americanw- another welIVMicisd, horror story.. Senate bearings in 2971 disclosed that the Army tested a variety of "biologi- 'cal simulants" on unsuspecting people in the U.S. between 1949 and 1968. The germ; warfare simulanta do not cause ' disease, but allow the scierttists to test.: just how effectively they can spread the agent. in?a population., The Army tests ranged from. Washington's National Airport m ?" Hawaii, San Francisco to Key West,,* and San Clemente-to-Alaska.-..r...?' - Although the tests occurred from 1949 to 1968, therw is a puzzling gap of. eight years between August,. 1955, when' germ agents were tested in the Penn- ,j sylvania Turnpike tunnels and- January, 1963, when a test was run off. the coast 1 RawaiL 1=TRA project there have been In- dications that the CIA took charge of these tests during the 1959.68 gap. Based on thw the New York project code named "Operation Big City' was simply a continuation of the covert-. - tests. - I .,I - "Big City" was one of 18G projects that were operated under ;tU{ULTRA. Sidney Gottleib, the official in charge, has testified that he destroyed all ? ;: memos, reports, and other documents outlining what "Big City" was about. He neglected, however, to destroy the expense vouchers. These vouchers have prompted a lot of speculation by CIA watchers, not- ably the church of Scientology, which - has engaged in a dispute with Amerr can intelligence agencies. A group of Scientologists spent four! months analyzing the "Big City" ex- ?pense vouchers and concluded that the, . ing and used the, people of Manhattan: as. human guinea pigs. the House and Senate Intelligence and Armed Forces committees as well as the CIA and the-Army, the Scientolog ists said. It also was delivered to jour nalists, along with mimeographed -copies of the. CIA expense vouchers' that have ~~been available for nearly two, ha ?e_" - -I Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501330001-9 ARTICLE AFFURED Oli PAGE f writer of the Christian Science Monitor THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 12 December 1979 " CambrWge,.Maetts Assistants gilded in and out with the required deference: - :ones flashed and rang,. And flashed again. The legendary ratroop general seemed a trifle uneasy. He glanced at his istwatcb as if a second wave had failed to jump on time.. ;ig crisis here," be grinned. General James Gavin might have been regrouping the -,ttered 82nd Airborne Division after its D-Day drop. One expected a wounded trooper to stagger in with the elec- Eying news that a column of German Tiger tanks was spill- ; off Route 2 and grinding menacingly toward us. At any )meat. I thought, we might have to dive under the desk as a -arm of Messerschmitt 109s strafed the parking lot. Per- ps I should be asking where the front was now, and how any casualties we were taking, and would the boys be home The former commander of the 82nd Airborne Division had - situation well under control. "The phone calls," he_ oans with a wave of the hand. "I'm involved in saving Mar- i and George Washington. You know. the pictures by Gil rt Stuart that.the Smithsonian wants to buy from the (Boo- , . - -. : - - ii Athenaeum.". The handsome face is a little more rugged these days. but- gray-blue eyes are just as piercing. and the mouth every as firm and combative as it ever was. He might not care to ring from the door of a W-3 on a night jump, but-one sus- cts that beneath the gray suit there still swaggers a green- . id paratrooper. One recalls his feisty..message to the 505th mbat Team prior to its airborne assault. on Sicily in 1943. he term American parachutist has become synonymous- th courage of a high order. Let us carry the fight to the en- iy and make the American parachutist feared and re-, ected." he declared. "Attack violently.'.'' General. Gavin is sitting here in his office at Arthur D. tie, Inc.. - the industrial:. research and consulting firm., sere be's been successively executive vice-president, press nt and chairman of the board. He's been acting as a consul- -fi to the firm, since- he retired- in 1977. His graduation )ma from Mount- Carmel Area Senior High-School in, nnsylvania hangs on the wall. . , To have reached the general's office is something of an lievement imitself-For several -minutes-one-seemed un- ely to progress beyond the front desk: Cameras and tape :orders are viewed as suspiciously here as they would beat ne supersecret intelligence establishment. A card thrust me demanded' to know whether I was a US citizen (which i not) and wbethet I was on a classified visit (which I had Early in 1977 General Gavin learned that I -Jimmy Carter was- considering appointing him CIA director- "It was the darndest thing I've 'evergotten into," he remembers with 1 amused exasperation. 'I didn't- want to get into that. I needed it like a hole in the head; the publicity likewise. I really didn't need it."- It seems that a member of Jimmy Carter's transition team called him to let him know he was on a short list. "I talked to Tip O'Neill's office and said, `Well, what do you think about this? If it comes up, do I have any support or should I even consider it?' And then I went see my old friend Frank Church. I took him to Russia with me on a trip some years back. So I asked him what he thought about it, and he said, `Jim. I think it's the greatest idea ever-' I talked to Barry Goldwater. He and I. werW second lieutenants a long time ago. down in Arizona. He said: `Jim that'd be great.. I'd like to have you down in Washington.' So the next darn thing that I knew. Tip O'Neill an--: nounced to the press that I'd be a great candi-. date, and Church did the same thing. I could - have died.. And the. White House had its mind ,.made ups'.. _, '-:_'.'..}. '..rst:-?-.r-. .. _:f .;J v`-?~i. General Gavin insists that the US "must. -have the world's best espionage agency- -i e s d the KGB has been having a field I y of th what's been exposed bv-I Congress and others." He says the CIA should never "have gotten involved in Watergate, -because it's to be used solely against foreiKn ers. The CIA slot a little-off-base on that.. Bu we absolutely must have a good CIA.> It's -''! Ge6eiErG a n is an avidreader'oiespionage book iie~ thoroughly enjoyed ,The Wizard War" by R. V. Jones and "The Ultra Secret" by F. W. Winterbotharn - not to mention Anthony CaveBrown's "Bodyguard of Lies." _ = r. /,,"r ri - "What the..British did during World War II is incredible.. Every time we landed in Europe - and I landed in Sicily.; - Italy and Normandy = the Germans outnumbered us. They could have easily have outnumbered us two to three-on divt- sions, but they were always fooled out of position."..:,, :onless.Iwasn't~'.A,+~c>..,~: EXCERPTED Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501330001-9 ARTICLE AP~P}"!'~ ATLANTA Cv1YSTrITMa1V on PAGE_GXs'l_: 8 DECEMBER 19T9 Terrorism Galls For The FBI And CIA. .Lt was reassuring to read this -that is, the CIA that antedated. resolution adopted by the Society week that the Carter administra- Watergate. 11- of Former Special Agents of the tion has - di- - -f - w~ And to- combat terrorism- at Federal Bureau of Investigation rected the- -U.S. Marine; Corps to organize. . a 50,000-man."'. spearhead- for i a Rapid De-? ployment Force. Such a force home what we need is an effec- at its recent annual convention in tive team along the lines of the Washington. Federal Bureau of Investigation That resolution! "requests, as -that is, the FBI that antedated justice demands, that the indict- Watergate. meats of L. Patrick Gray III, W. In the caterwauling generated Mark Felt and Edward S. Miller by Watergate this nation's politi be dismissed upon the action of cians indulged in some sort of -the attorney general as not being frenzied hara-kiri which disem- in the best interests of. this na- boweled . both the FBI and the tion and its citizens." CIA. Neither has fully recovered. Further, "the society reaffirms its intention to 'continue to ex- tend its full facilities and capaci- ties to those present and former FBI agents who have been in- dicted or threatened with criminal or other action or other- wise harassed as a result of their good-faith official ?investigation of three Marine brigades, and the : And we are the losers, both na- first is to be ready by 1983. 4 tionally and internationally. The concept stems - from the : A, year ago when the troubles unstable world in which we live in Iran were attracting our. and with the, obvious need for the attention there were cries both United States to be able to re- - within and without government spond quickly and effectively - that the CIA had not kept us, virtually anywhere in the world fully informed of what was possi- robable-in that coon artici- ble-or th M i dditi t I e ar ne p p on o n a = , of-, terrorist activities. without pation, there will, of course, be a try. . need for. aircraft and ships- Those who cried out either con- "personal gain ,.. f; for . themselves ... ~., ' ::.: , .- .. While all ' of '? this is encourag- . veniently forgot or chose to ignore that - Sen. Frank Church In addition; the- society called , ing, it can in no way be regarded D-Idaho, is hiss illconceived upon the Justice Department to as the exclusive and entire solu- ambition. to be the Democratic pay the legal expenses of those tion to the. complex problem of presidential nominee in 1976, had who have had to pay out of their. terrorism and turmoil What this successfully al emasculated the CIA own pockets "for private counsel force does is: respond when a in the defense: of employment-- crisis reaches a certain point order to grab headlines for related activities." In the name of decency, honor and justice-if What we need-in addition to-..-- And as for the FBI,.:we have those terms apply to the-federal that is some- method of finding - the e-curious--and disgusting- out in advance that. events- are-'-anomaly that the terrorists .are government anymore-that is an covertly moving toward a crisis"` either- forgiven or made-, into elementary: demand. ,tee,:' in a given country or aa, given heroes, while those in the FBI ? In an address to' they society, . area... .... - ? r who, sought to serve the best James, L. Buckley made one of. In short,+what'-we .need is an Interests of the nation are prose many telling points:-,.- :.:.r ,.: :..~ effective team along, the lines of . crated-or persecuted. `" : ?+ `"The blunt fact is that editorial the. Central, Intelligence Agency - That came to mind with.the - writers, call ege: presidents,-. and eoxTiMM T Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 influential' churchmen condoned the most appalling acts because those committing them clothed themseives. in the most. high- minded causes: opposition to the Vietnam war in the case of SDS; to racism in the case of the Black Panthers; and to what they described as the predatory eco- nomic and social order in the case of the Weathermen. "This collapse of the ability to make the most elementary moral distinctions between means and ends had the effect of turning criminals into victims; and this, in turn, prepared the way for as ?a-- Miscarriage- of jus- tice as we have seen- in recent years, one with which you are all too familiar. " . Terrorism is on the rise throughout the world. We must have the means of combating it both at home and abroad. The concept of three Marine brigades as a Rapid Deployment Force is a partial answer. But in addition -we need an effective FBI and an effective CIA, as we had before infamous politicians goaded by blind ambi- tion gutted them.:. - Whether we can recreate such effective organizations is moot. But a lgood first step would be to dismiss - the indictments against I. Patrick Gray m, W. Mark Felt and Edward S. Miller-and compete ! all those who have incurred legal expenses in their defense ~ . , Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 ARTICLE APP_ 03 PAGE TRENTON TIM' (N.J.) 23 NOVERSH> ER 19T9 .,now . just anothe'' r-, recruilek, ton Cain `PRINCETON (AP) - The Central Intelligence Agency has invaded enemy territory looking for converts. Once the scene of massive anti-war, anti-CIA protests, Princeton University is now the site of. a recruiting drive by the intelligence agency-. . "You have to recruit people-from somewhere, and a 'university is. obviously a. good place to get qualified applicants," said, Kathy Pher- son, public affairs spokeswoman for thejCIA. "It's a normal recruiting situation; it's like any other government" agency or large corporation trying to fill their positions," she said. THERE WERE no protests when a CIA representative spoke to nine potential employees on campus this week. "We get a number of government agencies coming to campus to re- cruit, and the CIA is one of them," said Minnie Reed, Princeton's act. ing director of career services. r ? ' - "They've been coming here every year since 1967, when We first had business and government recruiting" for seniors. Nine students of 1,100 Princeton seniors signed up for interviews. The number was about-average: Eight had signed up the previous year and 14 in 1977, Ms. Reed said. James J. Fitzgerald, a CIA personnel respresentative based in New York, told the students the agency is hardly all trenchcoats and cloaks and daggers. He outlined the four main branches of the agency: Scien tific and technological, administrative, intelligence and operational. "MOST OF our employees work at headquarters in McLean, Va., ut we have people overseas, too," he said. "We're looking for people ho want a career, not a job." Most students. out of college start at $14,000 a year, while engineers gin at $18,000, he said.. Vacation is 2% weeks every year, and a +' ;;. month after three years in the agency. 3 . The application process is grueling. A 17-page employment form re- quests, detailed information about" every-. place the applicant has w* about his entire family' Eight references are necessary, as well`", a security check that Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Hardly a story this week that does not use the threi manic letters - CIA. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER 3 December 1979 Diplomat foresaw -chaos after s?aah 'By Richard G. Zimmerman P*i Os sr bw~ . WASHINGTON - The State _!rtment was warned 15-years ago that "if a revolutionary -change. were to occur in Iran, the pent-up grievances are likely to explode into demagoguery, extre- mism, revenge-seeking, and a- seaich for new enemies.:. . The author of the .elassified di etch, then a junior political 'counselor. who had been posted in only 10 months, was just as pessimistic over the ability of the government .of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahievi to survive. -:'The. shah's regime is regarded as an unpopular dictatorship not onlyby its opponents but, far more 'si` ritficantl , by its - g Y i Proponents as well," Martin F. Herz warned his ..superiors on the basis of own .. rva ons and conversations, :CLA'reports and other. diplomatic. f President Carter obviously was, ,act-aware of how unpopular the shah was with his own people until it was too late- In 197T, during a toast delivered in Tehran,. the president lauded the shah for "the- :respect, admiration and love which your people give to you:') While Herz', observations ob-- vioualy carried little weight. with- his superiors; he did rise to- be- come an ambassador. and is now director of studies at Georgetown University's Institute for' the Study of Diplomacy... ; . ` .: "Ambassador Holmes (Julius 1 Holmes, then. U.S. ambassador toy Iran) let the report go through, although he didn't, Herz recalls today-1'He knew it would. -Ponn y e grist for the lower levels .at the State Department." Herz recalled that Holmes "`came from the old sohool, slightly jaded, slightly cynical."- -He- said Holmes felt the shah :would be in power for some time :and that it was in the best interest :of the- United States to get along with him. Herz said he. was "quite pleas- ed" when he recently. reread the 15-year-old memo in light of cur- rent events in Iran. ' Herz, a realist, observed in his dispatch that "even an unpopular dictatorship. can be defended on, the grounds that it is necessaryand that no viable alternative j But Herz said' that in his 10 months in Iran "we have heard this forthright defense of the re- gime from only one man General Hasan Parkravan, the chieftof SAVAK, the shah's inter: nal security organization.." Yet even Parkravan, one of the- most-hated men in Iran at- the time, "is known to be periodically, in despair about the situation be- cause he feels that repression is not a: solution: to. the - principal problem of government in Iran,. which into obtain a broader.. populary+- _consensus,";;~: Herz. observed:. The United States was making a possibly fatal mistake by con- tinual!y defending the. shah, by- continually touting and overem- phasizing his pro-American senti- ments, Herz felt. "By being given credit today for 'power to influence the situa- tion in Iran that we do not actually possesss, we of course incur the blame for deficiencies that we are in no position to prevent or remedy," the dispatch warned. Herz concluded that "the most distressing aspect of this situation is that concessions made to popu- lar pressure, for instance by way of giving leeway fQr freedom of expression and assembly, are quite- likely to be the very thing that might set off a revolution in. Iran." (Fifteen years later, the. shah was in the process of granting concessions when he was driven from his throne.) . "The shah, in other words, is riding a tiger from which hecan- -not safely dismount," Herz cor- rectly prophesied.....:..:-...___._.._._ Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 WASHINGTON AFRO-AMERICAN (D. C.) 4 December 1979 Crying for blood Who can believe the wave of emotional hysteria that we are now experiencing in the midst of the Iranian crisis? Is this the same generation which just a few years ago risked shooting and im- prisonment in protesting U.S. militarism in Vietnam? - It hardly seems possible that the American people (including its youths) are now crying for blood. Yet it is trae. All kinds of anti Khomeini memorabilia from tee-shirts to tavR threaten to make mockery of the season honoring the Prince of Peace. The Iranian ayatollah is even the center target on dart. boards. Worse than all of this, however, is the wave of prejudice and outright harassment of persons of Iranian descent in 'the United States. Crowds hurl cat-calls and other objects at Iranian students, and other persons (some of whom are Iranians who have become naturalized citizens of the U.S.) report that they experience fear just walking down the streets of our cities. All of this reminds us of horrible parallels in our own past. It all sounds too much like the treatment blacks experienced for years in the presence of whites in the South. And it reminds us also of the terrible wave of anti-Japanese fever that caused thousands of U.S. citizens of Japanese descent to be hurled into concentration camps during the last world war. In reality, it seems as if many amore us are literally begging for a war. Part of this unjust and unfair situation can be traced to President Carter, whose own action against Iranians dents has been criticized as unconstitutional. (Although, we must say that the response of Jo Connally and some other potentia Part of itjustappears to be a part of the American psyche. (Although it is almost unbelievable to see this hysteria directed against another Caucasian people - the iramans are not Arabs.) Even the State department and CIA have joined in with such "old hgr"-Rcusations such as those which claim that the present uprising is really being directed by Communists or some Marxist group like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. When as, everyone Imows, the Muslim world is an antagonist of the Communist world. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 MINNEAPOLIS TRIBUNE 7 December 1979 Iran Iranian students here have ex- 1 plained - and many of us have read the same for years in church-mission newsletters and journals - that the U.S. embassy in Iran was used by the CIA for directing "events" in Iran. including which relatives of whom should be tortured how. The real danger in putting the shah on trial is that U.S. financing and training of torturers would receive official light. This side of America is a side we do not know how to discuss publicly yet, it seems to me. But we had better learn. Pretend that some foreign country's embassy In Washington began sending agents out among us, leaving our friends' bodies dying on our doorsteps from torch burns. We would not be fooled .by claims that the embassy must be given diplomatic immunity. I doubt t that that embassy would be standing long. And I wonder whether we would take as few embassy lives a-si the Iranian "fanatics" have in tht# process. -Robert Spottswood, Mi ^neapoi s. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 'BL= r IELD TELEGRAPH (W. VA.) 9 DECEMBER 1979 Church, as chairman of the Senate Foreign ; ? 'Never Learn? Relations Committee, has seemed bent on In the television coverage of the month -long destroying the CIA as a functioning organ ization. Iranian crisis, viewers have been treated over and there are indications that he has just about and over again to the film clip of President succeeded. Carter on his visit to Iran, standing beside a There also is good reason to believe that the confident shah and praising that nation as "an folks back home in Idaho have caught on to island of stability" in a troubled area. Church and are going to bounce him out of The inevitable question is why did Carter Washington when they have the opportunity next think the shah was secure on his throne - if he year. They certainly should do it, but in the really did - or that Iranian dissension posed no meantime the damage he and his cohorts have real threat to him or to'this nation? Was the inflicted on our intelligence apparatus needs to President ignoring information our government be repaired, if that is possible. had, or had he simply been given wrong in- Perhaps it isn't possible. There must still be formation? some good people in the CIA and other in- Whatever the reason for his apparent telligence agencies who know what should be ignorance of the fact that the shah was about done and how to do it, but it may be that in the through, it is obvious that he should have known. current climate in Washington it simply isn't The taxpayers of this nation have forked over possible to operate the kind of intelligence billions of dollars of their money to create a operations we must have if we are to survive in number of intelligence agencies, notably in- the hardball game our opponents are playing cluding the CIA which are have firm overseas. information on the stability, or lack of it, of our It also is quite possible that even in its important allies. present stifled and defensive state, the CIA's When we don't have that kind of information, . vast apparatus still is producing the hard in. or when our leaders ignore it when we do have it, formation that our leaders need to operate in- we inevitably are caught by surprise and end up telligently in the world arena, and those leaders looking like idiots, as Carter and the rest of his either aren't getting it or aren't paying any at. administration did in the case of Iran. tention to it when they do get it. It could be a little It should be noted that the shah is claiming of both. that U.S. pressure, meaning from the Carter Whatever the problem may be, the vast administration, helped force him off his throne. majority of concerned Americans must be It is perfectly possible that Carter did do that, thoroughly fed up with the continuing spectacles without a backup plan to avoid the kind of thing which develop as we are caught by surprise now going on in Iran. It can happen when again and again by overseas developments Washington has no reliable information about inimical to our interests. Iran is merely the such situations. latest instance of this, and certainly won't be the It is of course true that our intelligence last. agencies, again led by the CIA, have been under a long and sustained attack by incompetent charlatans like Sen. Frank Church of Idaho. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 AR.r!CT,'_.' O`i P GI - THE BUFFALO EVENING 15 December 1979 C`- 3c ? dies ]nto .&&1 St:ate3 ? -> > >G By MAX McCARTHY .'wc VV,hing:or- 8unnu WASHINGTON - -The ?. I ets, according to CIA sources. The ob- ject is said to be the hope'for Soviet Soviet influence in a possible breakaway Union is enlisting Iranian citizens for military training in Afghanistan, The Buffalo News has learned. According to CIA sources. the Ira= nians are members of the Baluchi' tribe in the. southeastern part of the oil-rich nation. Intelligence analysts believe that this latest piece of information about the ambivalent role of the Soviets in.. the U.S.-Iran- crisis suggests that-?: Kremlin policy is geared toward the "fragmentation of Iran into small; independent states." The Soviets previously have been observed in actions that would tend to foster:the breakup of the country- into these parts; state. Kurdistan -The Kremlin is pour- ing money into the coffers of the, Kurdish Democratic Party which, ac- cording to intelligence analysts, is; under the influence of the Kremlin.; Khuzistan - Heavily populated' with:Arabs, many professing Marxist, beliefs, Khuzistan in southwest Iran. contains most of Iran's rich oil fields. Experts on Iranian politics are! now saying that if Iran were to losel these four areas it would be "emascu-i lated - left only with the ruling Per sians with little to rule." The author- ities recall that "The only way-the' former shah and his father kept all' these disparate' elements together' Azerbaijan -Soviet broadcasts in= ",was with a strong central government': Turkish- have been--aimed : at- this .backed up by a', big and effectivei large, restless- province and have 'army-." fueled aspirations for local autonomy.o it estimated 500,000 Turkish-speak-I ing Azerbaijanis this week marched. through the provincial capital of Tabriz declaring. support for their religious leader: autonomy-minded) Ayatollah Kazent Shariat Nladari. CIA agents recall that the Soviet! Union in 1946 fostered the creation of! a Communist republic in the regions and withdrew its troops only- after! President Harry S. Truman threat-! ened to use atomic weapons, on which the U.S. then had a monopoly, if they did not withdraw. : i Baluchistan - Iranian advocates' of an independent Baluchistan are re-I ceiving political training by the Sovi-I NEWS (N Y e ana:_ sts a''so claim :hat the gremlin is ;oiiowifl the so- called ''rite fruit" policy in Iran. Soviet leaders in recent) ;ears have likened Iran to a piece of fruit which, when fully! ripe, would simply drop into their hands Petroleum executives and CIA analysts explain that the Soviet Union is "rapidly run ning out of oil in its own wells, and will be forced to bring in huge quantities' of foreign oil within the next few years." ! Some analysts ascribe "ex-I traordinarily devious" motives to the Kremlin in the current crisis. They are claiming that the Soviet hierarchy "actually' would like to see the United States intervene militarily in! Iran." Their theory is that ani American military strike against Moslem Iran would in- flame much of the Islamic world into an anti-American fervor. They note the irony cf' "the fact that many of the 4,0L01 Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan. today are killing Moslems" in' that country, Iran's eastern neighbor. The same experts are also saying that one reason the Sovi- et Union may use its veto on the U.N. Security Council to rill possible U.S.-sponsored. U.N. economic sanctions against- Iran would be to folks the' United States into exercising its, military option to help secure, the release of American. hos-' tapes. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501330001-9 pn PAGL WASHI.TGTOY Wr E W 18 DEC EM 1979 The Washington Post has ignored reports of how. the Soviets are forging U.S. documents. By con trast, it has given front-page publicity to a claim by terrorists in Iran that an embassy document links the American hostages with the CIA. On December 2, the Post carried a page one story headlined, "Iranians Say Document Ties 2 Host- story concerns charges by two of " Th e ages to CIA. Khomeini's aides that a "purported secret State De- partment cable" shows that two of the American ." hostages are CIA.officers However, in the fourth paragraph of the story, a State Department official is quoted as saying that the Iranians occupying the embassy "have an ample record of forgery, misrepresentation and fabrica- tion." And so have the Soviets. Sen. Gordon Hum- phrey recently revealed that the Soviets have been of a worldwide t . forging U.S. documents as par KGB misinformation campaign. This story has been ignored by the Post. Is this "purported secret State Department cable" a KGB or Iranian forgery? The Post doesn't know. But it went ahead with the story, which linked American hostages to the CIA. The Post Published In Miami Herald, Houston Post and Dallas Morning News - But Censoret .By Big Eastern Media even ran a photocopy of this allegedly secret docu- ment. The Post has often publicized charges that the CIA has been involved in Iran. But often it ignores charges of Soviet involvement there. On November 23, for example, UPI released a story charging that Ayatollah Khomeini was a Sov- iet agent in the 1950s. According to UPI: "The Sov- jets penetrated the Shiite Moslem sect as early as the 1950s and the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was a Russian agent at that time, according to a Polish army counter-intelligence chief who defected to the Westin 1960." The former Polish espionage chief,-Col. Michael. Goleniewski, was debriefed by the CIA and re- portedly. told the agency that Khomeini was the most important of five top Russian agents in Iran. According to UPI, Goleniewski "reported to a high Iraqi government official, who in turn passed infor- mation to the Russian KGB through its agents in Warsaw, where Goleniewski was headquartered." UPI said that Goleniewski's information has been reliable. It noted, that he had exposed Soviet, agents operating in Britain, Sweden and Israel. The. story that Khomeini was a Soviet agent was dramatic news. It was carried sYVa World. We also saw it by a New ?York Newspaper, the in the Miami Herald, the Dallas Morning News and the Houston Post. Big Eastern Media-the New York Times, Wash- ington Star and Washington Post-ignored this UPI story. Isn't a communist defector-whose information has been proven correct in the past-as reliable as some Iranian terrorists'who have a record of forte 1J ery and fabrication? Apparently not for newspapers like the Washing- ton Post.. -Cliff Kincaid Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 THE WASHINGTON POST 01 CAGE 19 December 1979 Jack Anderson Cz T'teis Logic. VS franian Fanatithm A frustrated President Carter, with cautious, as dogmatic as Carter is rea- his logical engineer's mind, cannot seem sonable, as militant as Carter is mild, as to cope with the illogical, if not irra- bloody as Carter is squeamish. The aya- tional Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini tollah apparently views Carter's forbear- The president has turned, as he usu- ance as weakness, his restraint as timid- ally does, to the textbooks for the an- ity, his concessions as appeasement. The swers. He is studying two secret printers president, jeered Khomeini, "lacy on the ayatollah. One is called "Ayatol- guts." lah Khomeini of Iran: His Personality The secret studies also indicate that and Political Behavior." The other is the ayatollah's advanced age and brood- more specific, "A Psychological Perspex ing bitterness have affected his mind..! tive: Khomeini's Political Behavior and He dared to defy the shah, risking pri- Decision-Making in the Current Crisis." son and assassination. He is convinced Carter's classified reading also in. , that the shah's agents murdered his cludes other related documents analyz- - father and one of his sons. For 15 years, ing the role that Khomeini's fanaticism the exiled Khomeini has nursed a smol- has played in the Iranian crisis. The aya- dering, pious hatred for the shah. Now tollah emerges from these studies as a at age 79, he won't be deterred from get- dedicated, calculating, rancorous,impla. ting. revenge. This hunger for revenge, cable old man who would sacrifice the analysts, suggest, is his dominant Iran's oil wealth, his own safety, life it- - passion: self to pursue his goals. This strange, stubborn, unyielding No threat of reprisal is likely to budge man 'has now been united with a popu- him. Boycott? "If we have to lose our lace that for 25 years has been boiling honor in order to fill our stomachs, then with anger without focus, grievances we would prefer that our honor is pre. without unity, revolutionary hopes served and we will go hungry," he said. without a revolutionary leader. He has Oil cutoff? The Persian people lived given that revolutionary role a driving with petroleum for 5,000 years, and force by his strident religious appeals. Khomeini believes they can get along, More than 95 percent of Iran's 36 mil- without oil again. Military attack? "Why lion people are Moslems, and most of should we be afraid?" he retorted. "We them belong to the militant, martyr- consider martyrdom an honor." - minded Shiite sect. Khomeini has fired There is no doubt in the minds of Cen- them. up with ? calls for a more aggres- tral to ence en analysts t at[ sive Islam, for a holy war against the in- the a atoa means it During the street' fidels. This is "a struggle between Islam fighting that brought down the shah, and the infidels," he has declared. Khomeini sent 'instructions from his Nothing in the textbooks can instruct exile in France for his followers to wear the engineer in the White House how to white robes to show up the blood from overcome the vulnerability of a mighty, their wounds. , comfortable, cautious nation before the Khomeini is as reckless as Carter is : powerless zealot, or how to battle the tyranny, of the aggressively weak over the self-disarmed strong.. j Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 ARTICLE AFT&0M ell Paz A r_ NEW YORK TIMES 19 DECEMBER 1979 Ally of Khomeini Is Murdered By CHRISTOPHER S. WREN Special to The New York Times TEHERAN, Iran, Dec. 18 - A promi- nent Moslem clergyman close to the re- gime of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was gunned down today along with his two bodyguards by killers who escaped on a red motorcycle through the con- gested streets of Teheran. The murder of Hojatolislam Mo- hammed Mofateh, a 51-year-old former member of the ruling Revolutionary Council and dean of the Divinity College of Teheran University, followed the style of several assassinations attributed earlier this year to a terrorist group called Forghan, which seems directed against clergymen in politics. Plotting Is Charged The Revolutionary Council issued a .statement attributing the crime to agents of the Central Intelligence Agency and Savak, the Shah's secret police. By impli- cation, the statement also accused the Carter Administration of complicity. [The allegation of C.I.A. i volvement was denied in Was ingt The Iranian radio and television said: "Once again the criminal hand of the United States emerges to deal a blow against the Moslem people and divert opinion from the crimes of the United States and prepare grounds for plotting against the Islamic revolution." The murder diverted attention from the 50 hostages who have now been held six weeks in the United States Embassy. The Revolutionary Council resolved yesterday to set up a 24-member grand jury to investigate United States policy toward Iran. The hostages could appear at such an inquiry, though possibly as witnesses rather than defendants. The relationship between this panel and any hostage trial was not clear. The regime appears to be waiting for instruc- tions from Ayatollah Khomeini. As Dr. Mofateh lay dying in a hospital, followers mounting a vigil outside, chanted "Blood will triumph over the rifle" and "Carter will be annihilated." Universities and schools as well as the bazaar in Teheran have been asked to close tomorrow in mourning. A demon- stration scheduled at Teheran University is expected to take on anti-American overtones as it proceeds through the city. The Iranians who are holding the em- bassy issued a communique linking the at leDr. ast Mofateh who was wren was a married and had murder to the United States and Savak. which ranks just below ayatollah in the "Does the United States think that it can change our people's minds in their hierarchy of the Shiite branch of Islam. A fight against the United States with these native of Hamadan, he studied at the kinds of murders?" the captors said. Qum seminary. The Iranian press said he In an earlier statement, broadcast was jailed in 1975 under the Shah and today, they accused Foreign Minister Sa- later helped organize anti-Shah demon. dPOh Ghnth7adeh of sounding too concili- strations. When Ayatollah Khomeini re- ctory toward the United States on the issue of the hostages. The rambling state- ment did not mention him by name, but it evidently alluded to his interviews with the Western press in saying that the For- eign Ministry was "exceeding the limit in remarks about the spies, their trial, their release or meetings with them." The statement said such remarks were out of "rhythm" with Ayatollah Kho- meini and the revolution. The statement said it was "a disgrace to talk with the enemy, and more important, with an enemy like the evil United States, more than is necessary." It reiterated that the United States must return the Shah even if he had left for Panama. turned from Paris in February, Dr. Mofa- teh served as his Arabic interpreter. . He resigned from the Revolutionary Council earlier this year, apparently to devotemore time to teaching. But he con- tinued to speak at. mosques and rallies. ! Official reports said he belonged to Aya- tollah Khomeini's Islamic Republic Party. Another account called him a member of the rival Moslem People's Party loyal to Ayatollah Kazem Shariat- Madari, under whom he had studied at Ghotbzadeh Seems More Cautious Mr. Ghotbzadeh has seemed more pr . u-.. dent since the criticism. Ayatollah Khomeini shed no new light on the fate of the hostages when he spoke today from the window of his home in Qum to followers who had been injured in the revolution. He repeated his conten- tion that the only solution was to send the Shah back to Iran for trial. The Iranians holding the American; Embassy also contended in today's com- muniqu6that Iranian embassies abroad were not revolutionary enough and pro- posed that they be staffed by militant youths, with "an ambassador raised from the revolution and in service to it." Kamal Kharazi, deputy director of the Foreign Ministry's Political Department,i said 402 out of 800 employees in his de- partment had already been purged. The attack on Dr. Mofateh took place when *he was getting out of his Chevrolet' Impala sedan in front of the Divinity Coi- lege on Mubarezan Street at about 9 A.M. Two young men, wielding pistols,'. walked up and shot his two armed body- guards first and then wounded Dr. Mofa- teh in his right leg while an accomplice 11 maintained a lookout. The bearded, dark- haired professor managed to limp into the college entrance pursued by one gun- man who shot him in the shoulder, the wrist and finally the head, where the fatal bullet entered his left temple. According to several witnesses, the gunmen scooped up the Israeli-made Uzi submachine guns carried by the body- guards, climbed onto a Yamaha 125 motorcycle and fled. Dr. Mofateh was . taken to Taleghani Hospital for surgery but died about 1 P.M. without regaining consciousness, hospital officials said. Group Blamed for Some Killings He was at least the fourth prominent figure in the regime to be slain since last spring. They included Ayatollah Morteza Motahari, like Dr. Mofateh a member of the Revolutionary Council. The terrorist group Forghan has been blamed for some of the killings. ? ' . - ? . U.S. Denies C.I.A. Involvement Special to The NewYorkTlmes WASHINGTON, Dec. 18 - The United States today denied allegations that the Central Intelligence Agency had been in- vo v In the mur murder of Dr. Molateh. "That is absolutely untrue," Jody Pow- ell, the White House spokesman, said. "There is an effort on the part of the Ira- nian authorities to escape the conse- quences of their own actions and to divert the attention of the Iranian people from problems in Iran by continually blaming every problem on the United States." Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 ARTICLE THE WASHINGTON POST ON FAGE~ ~' 19 December 1979 "homeini Aid' Is Killed;!' Irama nis ame, the* C'_` By Michael Weisskopf center where gunmen carrying what Washinatan Pont Forum Service were said to be .45-caliber revolvers, TEHRAN, Dec. 18-A leading Is- shot him in the head. He died in _a ~ lamic scholar and close associate of Tehran hospital two hours later. . Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was While the popular cleric underwent shot to death this morning on a surgery, angry crowds gathered out- crowded Tehran street, and Iranian side the hospital. Some of the shouts leaders immediately blamed the assas- heard were: "Carter, Carter will be sination on, agents of the CIA. ahnihilated ..:.Blood will win over Iran radio quoted eyewitnesses as - the rifle . . . assassinating personali- saying that Mohammad 1lloffath was ties has no effect any more." gunned down by two or, three men on Tehran radio interrupted its normal motorcycles as he and two bodyguards Programming after the shooting and stepped from a car into a Tehran the. played funeral music while Iran's rul- ology college which . Moffath .directed. ing Revolutionary Council declared:. The guards also were killed. "This is the work of the CIA and Sa- Moffath, a senior member of the yak (the deposed shah's secret po- ruling clergy who strongly-supported lice.)" political rule by Iran's religious hier- was the third influential cleric archy, and Khomeini ally murdered since Khomeini led his Islamic revolution last February. Although no one claimed responsi- bility for today's slaying, the assassi- ? nation. is similar in style to two previ- ous murders for which a little-known fundamentalist religious group that called itself Forgan claimed credit. The organization, which has de- scribed itself in leaflets as fiercely op- posed to political actions by Iran's spiritual leaders, has been attacked by leftist and religious- groups. as "'an agent of imperialism" linked to the Moffath, who said to be in his-1 50s, held the,clerical rank of hojatole slam, one step -below -thee position, of ayatollah..-He was exiled and jailed under- tbe. shah and was-believed to have served on the first secret Revolu-.1 tionaay Council- after the shah-was overthrown. A longtime friend of Khomeini who served as the 'revolutionary lead- er's Arabic interpreter in the period leading up to the revolution, Moffath fought for the section of the newly- ap- proved constitution giving- supreme governing power to the ayatollah. I According to eyewitnesses, Moffath was shot first in the legs. He managed to drag himself, into the theological, Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 THE WASHINGTON POST ARTICLE Gi'l's:.L.~.:D 19 December 1979 G!wtbzadeh gays U.S. Probe Of Shah Could neso, Crisis By Michael Weisskopf and Stuart Auerbach washington Post Forei?'1 Service - Asa gesture to spur-the U.' S. deci- sion on an investigation,. Ghotbzadeh' said Khomeini had decided to allow the hostages gifts from their families, Yule trees and Christman; Eve services conducted by Catholic and Protestant ministers, who will also serve as the long-sought independent observers to certify the good- health of the 501 Americans. .-."That is the gesture that we make to disinflame the public opinion" in America, he said. As welcome as,the holiday services. may be, the clergy are not the same as the delegation of independent in- ternational observers, including a doc- tor, that the United States has de= manded be allowed to see. the hos- tages. These den{ands have been ' brought, to the -Foreign Ministry by diplomats here who have volunteered { before any of the hostages can be re- leased. At one point he mentioned a con- gressional probe, similar to the ones that sparked the national debate on j America's- involvement in Vietnam. But he emphasized that some assur- ance of government action is needed by Iran. . If the hostages are released without j the promise of a serious investigation, 1 he said. U.S. ,government . officials, "will bury the more general issues" which he listed as including CIA in- volvement in Iran, the. wealth o t e s a , e sale of unneeded _ military. equipment of Iran and the alleged --bribery of American officials by.Ira-, nian diplomats. He also said Iranian authorities will.' supp y ma ena to ai the US. dov- ern e probe an sugeeste that newspapers use the Freedom of Inf r- ma on c o get documents to show w a t _e CIA has done in Iran.. Ghotbzadeh said word of American Investigations into what he considers the real issues separating the United States and Iran-the alleged crimes of the shah-could be' used as leverage to ?persuade the students to give up the hostages. - - - ? "These things," he, said, "will at least give a, certain impression here that the American government is re- ally trying to do something about the real case." - . Ghotbzadeh's suggestion, however; presents problems for' the United States which must decide how to re- spond in a positive way without ap- pearing to be giving in to extortion. The foreign minister, a long-time close aide of. Khomeini, visit the .79-yearold religious leader Monday in the holy city of Qom. Ghot- bzadeh said they talked about general foreign policy Issues, including the outline"of policies regarding the hos- tages. "I am talking with full authority and I know what I am talking about," said' Ghotbzadeh, referring to the, charges of the radical students that he is speaking out of turn. , . - What Is important for Iranians, Ghotbzadeh said, Is for the United i States to . realize that "behind. the { question of the hostages is the ques- tion of the shah." TEHRAN, Dec. 18-Iran's foreign minister today expressed doubts that any of the 50 American hostages here will be freed before Christmas, and said that an official U.S. investigation into ? alleged crimes of the deposed shah would be a "very positive step" that could end the 45-day crisis. Foreign \Iipister Sadegh Ghotbza- deh said in an interview that his scaled-down demands for the release of the hostages carry- the "full author- ity" of Iran's ruling hierarchy and are "already cleared from- many angles." He repeated twice that he was using this interview to signal Washington on ways to end the impasse that has dragged on for more than six weeks. The, call for a- full. probe by the American government into relations with Iran since the 1953 CIA-backed coup that returned the shah to power was far cry from the original demand that the deposed shah be returned in order to secure the hostages' release.- While- the students still maintain that demand, other Iranian - leaders have steered further and further away from'it as the hostage crisis drags on and as the realization grows that the- United States could not and would not return the shall. The foreign minister does not have the final word on policy. decisions -in a country, whose power is divided among the radical students- holding the U. S. embassy, the Revolutionary Council which is nominally in charge, and Ayatollah' Ruhollah Khomeini, 'who is the religious and .,political- leader. for example, today re- Khomeini , peated the demand that the. United- States return the shah even though he is now in Panama, a country the reli- gious leader said is -controlled by America. . Significantly, however' for the first time in 45 days Khomeini's demand- for the return of the shah was not' o linked to the fate of the hostages, who were not mentioned in his tall[,.. , no.. Ghotbzadeh.. said authorities here have not thought about allowing news correspondents or television cameras Into the embassy on Christmas Eve so -I that the American public can see for themselves the condition of the hos- tages. . Ghotbzadeh inlicated that authori- ties here had been considering a "Par- ticular -case" for pre-Christmas re-. lease, but he declined to reveal any details-Including why the release - fell through, how many Americans .were involved and how this "case" differed from that of the rest of the hostages,; Diplomats here have `said they have been trying to arrange for the release of three Americans who are reported fo suffer from chronic heart or circu- latory ailments. - Ghotbzadeh, though;. Insisted that none of the hostages-whom he once called "prisoners in a slip that he im- mediately-_:corracted-"feel slightly bad .in. any way:" - -'Ghotbzadeh's retreat from his state- ? ment Sunday, which raised the possi- bility that some of the hostages could be -home for Christmas, vividly Illus- trates his lack of control over the em- bassy. militants: -The students have steadfastly maintained that no hos- tages . would be released until they all face. spy trials, and said today that' the: foreign minister has "gone over the limits" in statements about the hostages. During today's interview,. Ghotbza- deh left vague what kind of investiga- tion the United States should conduct, and whether: It must get under way Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 THE WASHINGTON POST 20 December 1979 b Carter think Khomeini simply tried to take I t hey on Jac:, Anderson 11v IT s n T ante belated leadership of a situa t dininon istrarir at he atheir warnings nd Brzezinski- were ignored y didn't foresee, and has no real control Top Carter a are privately expressing angnge Ever since the preventable disaster over tstudent radicals- are hoping that dealing with third-rate intelligence information occurred and the Tehran embassy was over the arlah is the way dealing end the they have had to work with in the Ira- seized, our long intelligence blackout the We put hostage crisis, and are trying to crisis," one source said. "But we know put the blame on past administrations. ?3c Co Co in Iran has caused serious problems better." It's understandable that the presi- for Carter . as they try to figure a dent and his national security adviser, way out of the mess they helped to cre- ate. The sad fact is, our intelligence ture the selvesnsld, would try to pic- ure themselves as the innocent reap- agencies know practically nothing' ers of a whirlwind sown by their about the so-called students who have predecessors. That way, Carter also led the world to the brink of war by can harvest the political windfall of taheir intransigence in the hostage situ- the crisis without having to accent any associ- Intelligence sources told my responsibility for causing it ate Dale Van Atta that they have been Unfortunately for Carter, it's a bum able to identify at least three separate rap in many respects. While it's true among the terrorist- that pdevotionto tshah. he aof ec their Captors of groups embassy personnel. But hand uffed Sthe intelligence gent the haven't been able to provide its ndc also true that U.S. at Carter and andd Brzezinski much more than the barest of thumb- Indeed, some U.S. the intelligence had two years to correct the situation. lenail aders. sketches Yet the Iranian revolution a year hasn't even determined the names of ago. caught U.S. leaders by surprise- several of the apparent ringleaders. either because our agents were provid- Small wonder, then, that our intelli-, inc inaccurate information, or their re- Bence community is divided o the best ports were being ignored by our way to deal with the fanatical phan- policymakers. toms who are threatening American Hardworking spies and analysts lives. e who tried to regain the ground that had Our experts aren't even surver. Some takeo been lost over the years in the Iranian stigated b he e embassy mad mullah. Some intelligence desert, and by midsum. put pointin that t pat. 've already at ayatollah omade, iinfl outatory state- part. and State Department ex- menu several days before the seizure perts warned, months before the in which he called the embassy "a nest event, that U.S. diplomats might be of spies." They think he may still be seized as hostages if the former shah calling 'Most Inteh Bence analysts, however, ots. But were allowed into this country. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 THE NEW YORK TIMES 20 December 1979 1. 4 c' ? A.3ALlyof U.S., Militants Say Documents of Embassy Show Links By CHRISTOPHER S. WREN Special teT , 4,ww YoftTmw TEHERAN, Iran, Dec. 19 -The Ira- nian militants occupying the American. Embassy here announced tonight the ar rest of Iran's Ambassador to Scandinavia, and produced what they said were em-; bassy documents to accuse him of having; collaborated with the United States. Abbas Amir Entezam, who served as Deputy Prime Minister and spokesman; for the former revolutionary Government of Mehdi Bazargan, was the first promi nent Iranian to be arrested after having, been mentioned in American diplomatic) correspondence seized by the militants. Mr. Entezam's arrest, which according; to one account took place at the Teheran airport, occurred after he was summoned home from Stockholm, purportedly for, consultations. The militants said tonight that they had waited for him to be taken into custody before making excerpts from the documents public. Excerpts Road on Television Two of the young militants, appearing' unshaven and in rumpled army jackets on a late evening Iranian television pro., gram, read extracts of papers said to have been taken from the files of the seized United States Embassy. In them, Mr. Entezam was portrayed as a friendly Iranian official who was eager to'mend relations between his country and the United States and who had offered to act as a conduit from his embassy office in Stockholm. The excerots read out tonight did not contain anthat clearly demon- strated Mr. Entezam had been an agent for a Central intelligence Agency or sow at he had done anything to te- tra his country. But the frequent menni Iron of him in the documents held by the radicals, given the current climate of anti-American feeling, seemed sufficien to bring accusations of disloyalty if not of treason, a crime that is punishable byi death under Iran's Islamic law. 'Intelligent Sneaker' for Regime The two militants took turns reading out references to Mr. Entezarn in Persian, from sheaves of capers piled before them and in interpreting their significance. The dates of the correspondence were not made clear, but they appeared co span a period from last summer, when Mr. En-: tezam stepped down as Government spokesman, to the seizure of the Ameri- can Embassy on Nov. 4, while he wasi serving as Iran's ambassador to Sweden,' Denmark and Norway. One document read in Persian and at: tributed to the embassy's charge d'af- faires, L. Bruce Laingen, described Mr. Entezam as an "intelligent speaker for', the revolutionary Government" and "ac- tively interested in maintaining contacts with the United States and sincerely' trying to mend bilateral relations be-, tween Iran and the United States." The documents said that the embassy would; continue talking with him as much as pos-1 ble. A second document, as read out by onel of the Iranian radicals, said that the C.I.A. had asked the embassy to inform Mr. Entezam that it was rea to ex- change information after Sept. 10. There was no other evidence produced to sug- gestest t ah t~ ntezam was knowingly in- volved in contacts with the intelligence agency. t er purported documents quoted him as assuring the Americans that it would be "easier to talk in Stockholm" and that. he would help when he returned to Tehe- ran every two months for consultations. The militants said that he also hoped to. be appointed as Iran's ambassador to the! United States. Mr. Entezam, a former businessman who imported electrical equipment, was an active figure in the first Government, that emerged from the February revolu tion that deposed Shah Mohammed Riza, Pahlevi. However, he made a number of enemies and there were rumors in Tehe- ran that he had profited from arranging exit visas for wealthy Iranians who, wanted to escape the new regime. His arrest seemed likely to lead to a, roundup of other Iranian citizens and to heighten the current antagonism against the United States in the wake of the em-, bassy takeover. Carter Called a 'Frightened Lion' Earlier today, Ayatollah Ruhollah Kho- meini likened President Carter to a' "frightened lion" and said that military and economic threats by Washington would have no effect on the Iranian peo- ple. "These are the cries an animal makes to frighten its opponents," said the Ira- nian religious leader, speaking of Ameri- can pressures that have included a pro-posed naval blockade of the Persian Gulf., He made the-remarks in an Interview in the city of Qum with Mohammed Hassa-j nein Heykal, an Egyptian journalist now In disfavor in Cairo., . - ----- - j "We are not afraid of tough talk 'r-,m Carter," said Ayatollah :Cwwmeini, w,:o has consistently supported the takeov-r of the United States Embassy by the r ac i- cal youths more than six weeks ago.-.e asserted that the Iranian people were not frightened because they welcomed rather: than feared death. "People say, ' We want, to be martyrs,' "he asserted. "Mr. Carter tries to frighten such a people with military intervention," the Iranian leader went on. "Mr. Carter him-, self is frightened because he does not be-, lieve in the afterlife." While he was meeting with Mr. Heykal, tens of thousands of Iranians surged through the streets of Teheran in a fu neral procession mourning a murdered associate of Ayatollah Khomeini. The procession turned into the most impas-, sioned anti-American demonstration for: several weeks. U.S. Blamed for Killing Hojatolislam Mohammed Mofateh, the dean of the Divinity College of Teheran, University, was shot down yesterday, along with two bodyguards by unknown assailants. The policy-making Revolu-i tionary Council blamed the United States and the C.I.A. despite the absence of any evident aahd the contention was echoed, by the crowds today. The Ayatollah and his militant support- ers occupying the American Embassy, have not budged from their insistence; that the 50 hostages there will be put oni trial for espionage unless the deposed; Shah is sent back to Iran. The only signs; of a willingness to compromise have come from a few officials within the Ira-, nian Government. Hashemi Rafsanjani, the acting 1Minis-; ter of Interior and a member of the Revo utionary Council, raised the possibility in a Teheran newspaper interview today, that relatives of the hostages might be al-; lowed into Iran to see them in the Christ-'i mas period. I "About the hostages," he said, "I; should say that we will be extremely happy if, from the human point of view, we create conditions so that these people can have contact with their relatives and the American nation so that it can be in-' formed about the health of these individu-, als and understood to some extent that our issue is not the issue of these 50 people who are hostages but the interests of a country." Mr. Rafsanjani also has the title of hojatolislam, of lesser importance than ayatollah, in the Shiite religious' hierarchy. The interview appeared in the newspaper Bamdad. Decision Up to Khomeini Asked whether his statement meant; that the Iranian Government might let the families of the hostages visit them during the Christmas season, Mr. Raf- sanjani replied that this decision was up to Ayatollah Khomeini and the militants holding the embassy. "However, there is a possibility their families will be allowed to visit them and we would like such a thing to take place," he said. CD;, TI.v UE,Q Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Militants at the embassy, reached by, telephone, played down the idea of such! visits while not ruling it out. A spokesman called it only a "suggestion" by Mr. Raf- sanjani and said: "We haven't reached any decision about that yet." ,L, -,e militants have agreed to accepts some Christmas cards or the hostages' though it is not 'Known whether the Amen cans nave received them, and apparently they are willing to allow Christian clergy-' man to see the hostages during the holi day time. Most of the hostages have been kept out of sight since their capture on Nov. 4 and assurances from Ayatollah Khomeini and the radicals that they are all in good health have not been con- f irmed independently. There were previous hints yesterday that some Government officials were. looking for a graceful way to resolve the confrontation over the hostages. The For- eign Minister, Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, sug- gested in an interview that it might help it the United States undertook its own in-? quiry into the Shah's alleged misdeeds., Mr. Ghotbzadeh had previously been re-' buked by the embassy militants for sug gesting that some hostages might bei released by Christmas. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 yZT 1 ~l+lf .a+ ~.w~ o:1 PAGZ_~L Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 WASHHI:+GT0;1 STAR (: LOB) 20 DECDOER 1979 ,. custody after secret U.S. Embassy he spoke with the full authority of ?~^~ R ej e redocuvolmuentstionary were p turned over to the Khomeini, but the religiotis leader j rosecutor. T remained virtually silent on the ; +. spokesman claimed the ca lured power struggle. . ' ~~ documents )rove t e an,. assa.vr Ghotbzadeh's immediate predeces- tras a sn sor, Abol Hassan Bani Sadr, also r an e red out portions of the Ameri- afoul of the militants. He was subse- o Hostaves can documents, quoting one in quently replaced. 7 which Charge d'Affaires Bruce Lain- TEHRAN, Iran (UPI) - Militant gen wrote that Amir-Entezam had. Diplomatic sources said the future students, scuttling anothr proposal been working to re-establish closer of the hostages might rest on the out by a member of Iran's government, ties with the United States. come of the struggle. The militants ruled today that relatives will not be The ambassador, a dgpury premier insist the hostages will be placed on allowed to make Christmas visits to in'fie rovtsioiia government of trial for spying unless their "mini- the 50 American hostages being held ormer rime 14inister Atehdi Bazar mum" demand that the shah be in the U.S. Embassy. : i an tense i trans erre to i returned to Iran is met by the United "No relatives will be allowed to Swe,en to maintain his A cots States - even though the former see them at Christmas," a militant facts the spokesman charged. ruler is now in Panama. spokesman said. "After all, they are\ : He read another document nur- hostages." - portedly showing a former y , Fighting between rival groups in art He ' eastern Iran's troubled Baluchistan He refused to say whether the political officer identi h ro ly CIA officer region, meanwhile, left two persons hostges - in their 47th day of cap- Mr Stempel had been a tivity, -- would be allowed to attend in Iran. dead and 36 others wounded, Tehran Catholic and Protestant church serv. ne militants' announcements Radio reported today. -,.. I ices next week as promised by For- have been a deep embarrassment to eignMinisterSadeghGtiotbzadeh. Ghotbzadeh and heightened the It was the latest outbreak of vio- "That's his opinion, not present struggle with the students lence in areas of Iran where ethnic necessarily ours," the spokesman -for influence in Iran and the ear of minorities have been Khomgi for said. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. greater y from Interior Minister Hashemi Rafsan Earlier this week Ghotbzadeh sug- central government. jai had raised the possibility of gested a U.S. inquiry into the ousted Christmas visits yesterday when he shah's rule might improve the cli said, "There is a possibility their mate in the hostage crisis and possi- (the hostages') families will be al.. bly speed their release. The lowed to visit them for Christmas militants opposed the idea, and and we would like such a thing to Khomeini later said any such pro- happen." ceeding would have to be in !ran. The students and Ghotbzadeh In the holy city of Qum, Khomeini were ocked in a yower stru,~le today said the majority of Americans after Iran's ambassador to Sweden now oppose any U.S. military inter- wa arrested on charge of being a vention in Iran to free the hostages. g "Many of them (Americans) have TAmilitant s said come to our side. Fifty-five percent nspokesman that Ambassador that oa Abbas state of the American public opinion op- television poses military intervention," he Amir-Entezam was taken into said. "The American nation is experi- encing an awakening and will soon see through these superpowers trying to impose their will," the 79- year-old Iranian leader told several hundred revolutionary guards who marched past his house shouting, "We are your soldiers Khomeini." The militants at the embassy this week launched a full-fledged public, attack on Ghotbzadcli, calling his, optimistic statements on the future of the American hostages "irrespon- sible." They accused him of "deviating" from Khomeini's wishes and said many Iranian embassies were nests for "counter-revolutionaries" and threatened to occupy them. Ghotb- zadeh defended himself by insisting Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 ^iCL~ ~~PE'9RED Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER 21 December 1979 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 cTi,'T' ~P'~~" ED o PAGE - THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE) 21 December 1979 J.S. ~Iants Hostages mute if Tried ? The Carter administration at present wants the U.S. hostages in Iran to stand silent if they are put on trial and may not provide them with lawyers. - Official sources say.this is the. tentative decision on handling a situation that the administration is still trying to head off. Hopes are waning that the release of the 50 hostages can be obtained before some form of trial, despite U.S. warn- ings of further economic pressure or possibly a naval blockade. Iranian authorities are talking about convening an international tribunal next month to examine al- legations of U.S. crimes in Iran dur- ing the rule of deposed Shah Moham- Reza Pahlavi. The hostages will med be used as witnesses before the tribunal, some authorities have said. The militants holding the U.S. embassy in Tehran are still talking about having spy trials for the cap- tives. It is not clear whether the tribunal might merge into trials. American officials have warned' that the hostages must not be put on trial. They have implied that mill. tary action will be taken if trials are held. And in public statements they have refused to discuss the question of legal defense for the hostages, in- sisting instead that trials would be illegal. But in confidential discussions the administration has been consid- ering how to react if a tribunal or trials go ahead. The official thinking now is that the United States will denounce them as a violation of international law, which prohibits legal action' against diplomats, refuse to partici- pate in the trials, and try to get word to the hostages that they. should not testify. "It's sort of like prisoners of war they shouldn't give anything more than name, rank and serial num- ber," one official said yesterday. But the administration recognizes that after two months in captivity some of the hostages might be in such a mental condition that they will cooperate in a trial. Responsible. officials here hesitate to talk loosely i about "brainwashing," but the possi- bility is in their minds. One reason for not having the hos- tages testify, officials said, is that anything they say is likely to be twisted. While some of the material found in the embassy and made nub- the militants seems to show CIA involvement - which the mili- tants say proves spv,g - the mili- tants have also implied hostile and espionage meaning to routine embassy materials. As an example of twisted interpre- tations, one official mentioned the papers cited by the militants to justify the arrest of a former deputy premier, Abbas Amir Entezam. He was called home from his post as ambassador in Sweden and charged wit being a CIA say because he had dealt with the embassy in an effort to improve Iranian-American rela-1 tions. A second reason for not letting t hos a es testify is that a material imp ying acne ty cannot be ex- Ta ineci away- icia s here concede that there were personae in the i em a sy. ey quickiZ add none 01 t e ei activities violated interna- tional aw on embassy wor and therefore there is no legal basis for a trial. ince any-Iranian jury or interna- tional tribunal selected by Iran presumably would already have its mind made up, the' United States does not think there is any purpose in providing lawyers for the hos- tages. An attempt to argue points of law with a regime that is flouting inter- national law and defying a decision of the International Court of Justice - which said last Saturday that the hostages should be released immedi-. ately - would just be appearing to dignify the proceedings -without helping the hostages, officials think.. The staff of the legal adviser to Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance prepared a memorandum recently that outlined four possibilities on providing legal defense if the hos- tages face trial or tribunal. The options-were trying to send lawyers from the United States to de- fend them, engaging international legal experts who could argue as neutral specialists, hiring Iranian lawyers, and letting the hostages de- fend themselves. One of them is a lawyer with experience of repre- senting the .State Department in- legal proceedings. - The memo has been left lying on top officials' desks and the options are not being pursued, one source- I said, because no defense at all seems the best way to handle the situation. - Henry S Bradsher. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 ARTICLE G:i PAGE 21 December 1979 Few Iranian ats-Hav~m Left U.S.1. By Don Oberdorfer washinE1o Post stolf write[ Despite the widespread public im- pression that most Iranian diplomats here have been ordered to leave the country, ,the State Department said yesterday that few,, if? any, have actu- ally left and it is uncertain whether any will depart in the near future. The order announced Dec. 12 called on Iran to cut down its representation In this country from 218 accredited diplomatic personnel to only 35, with a deadline of last Monday, Dec. 17. The action was taken "to demonstrate to the government of Iran our contin- iding concern over the Illegal. holding of hostages and American property in Iran," it was announced last week. State Department officials said the Iranian Embassy furnished a list Wed- nesday of 34 officials who have. been designated to remain. At the same time, spokesman Hodding Carter said it Is "murky" whether and when the vast majority of the diplomatic per- sonnel will leave. A substantial number of the Irani- ans are married to- Americans or are long-term residents pressed into serv- ice temporarily by the Iranian regime after the downfall of the shah, accord- ing to the State Department. These people have a claim to remain here on other grounds, even though they lose their diplomatic status. - Other Iranian diplomatic personnel may wish not to return, on grounds that they may face persecution at home, according to the State Depart- ment. However, there is no report that any current Iranian diplomats have sought political asylum. Those who intend to-leave have been granted "a decent interval" to get their affairs in order, Carter said. He said,the slow-moving and murky situation is due to "our courts, our own laws, the procedures of' a civi- lized' country and the difficulties of sorting out who Is who" In a demo- cratic society. In his daily briefing for reporters, Carter also said that the possiblity of a Soviet veto or an unfavorable vote from other nations in- the U.N. Secu- rity, Council would not deter, the i'i.:.ns THE WASHINGTON POST United States from seeking economic sanctions against Iran. No such decision has been made, he said, but it is among the options un- der consideration. Some officials be- lieve President Carter will authorize a drive for United Nations sanctions in the next few days. - "The United States intends to seek its goals through every appropriate le- gal avenue ... whatever we think-of the chances of success," the State De- partment spokesman said. Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Do- brynin had been expected to return from Moscow this week with an answer to U.S. feelers about economic sanc- tions on Iran. But Soviet Embassy officials said Dobrynin is not back, and they have no indications when he will return. The State Department, reversing last week's strong criticism, praised Japan for cooperating with measures to put pressure on Iran. Spokesman Hodding Carter noted recent state- ments by Japan's Prime Minister Ma- sayashi Ohira, as well, as new actions to prohibit in influx of Iranian oil in Japan. Carter said- the United States has been assured that "Japan will,, keep step with European countries:;, in applying economic pressure. While -the administration continues to expound its policy, a former high official of the Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations was sharply critical of the U.S. failure to take stronger ac. the early days of the crisis. James R. Schlesinger, who served as CIA director, defense se retarv ar &t energy secretary, among other ne. told reporters that the United Stag.: should have set a deadline for relea3 of the hostages and threatened Irair with "punishment" if the deadllne'was not met. + Asked about the risks to ? the hd -. tages and the U.S. stakes in the 311d r, East, Schlesinger declared that-; "the greatest risks are those assocs., ated with inaction." He said tat a strong. military force should- have been dispatched to the region at the, same time the initial ultimatum was delivered. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 "People think Nixon is a crock and Henry Kissinger is honest. To me. both of them shared an evil vision whereby the world would ? be ruled by American power and a few other powerful nations, plus some multina tional. corporations - none of which is concerned with the suffering of the Third World. "To me, that's the immorality that needs to be at- tacked: an immorality of social vision." He preached that view for 17 years as Yale chaplain. He arrived in 1958 and said the students were a privi- leged elite with no sense of the injustice in the world. He became a campus hero in the 1960s, first for his civil rights activities, then for opposing the Vietnam war. He was a leader of marches on Washington, a codefen- dant in the most celebrated antiwar trial (his conviction , was reversed on appeal), a leading figure in Norman Mailer's nonfiction account of Vietnam protest, "Armies of the Night." With the possible exception of Yale Presi- dent Kingman Brewster Jr., now Ambassador* to the Court of St. James's in Britain, Coffin was the than Yale men most admired. Unlike Brewster, an aloof and majestic figure, Coffin mingled. On the opening day of school in 1967, freshman wearing coats and ties trooped in to watch a processicr, led by Brewster wearing formal academic robes. After dinner that day, Coffin appeared in corduroys, a sweater.! no coat or tie, and sat on the edge of the tage to "rap." He invariably recognized students, even recent gradu- ates, as they passed him on the street, called out to them, made them feel like valued friends. But by the early 1970s, with the war over and a reces- sion making getting jobs difficult, the next generation of students had turned generally conservative. They came. to regard Coffin as a benign irrelevancy. The media stopped asking for comment, the activist organizations disintegrated, Coffin turned 50, and in 1975 he retired to write an autobiography. He was something like the bearded would-be-hip coffeehouse reverend in Garry Trudeau's "Dooaesbury," a 1960s activist who ran out of time and causes. When he took a job, he returned to the establishment, at Riverside. the Rockefeller family church in New York. To his embarrassment, his only public opponents on the church board ignored his decades of activism and con- demned his two divorces as unseemly for a man of God. Occasionally he made headlines - blessing a 10-ton. food shipment to North Vietnam, the first since the end of the war, or organizing a defense fund for an accused North Vietnamese spy. But he also presided over the fu- nerals of Nelson and John D. Rockefeller, who epito mized the American Imperium he had so often de- nounced. It seemed that at 55 he had made his private peace withAmerica. Until he was invited to go to Iran. One of his first comments after the invitation came to ! him and two other US clergymen was that President Jimmy Carter's call for economic sanctions "was highly reminiscent of Lyndon Johnson's bombing of North Viet- nam." He said: "Patriotism is a wonderful thing, but it must be based on morality.' He said! "We must never cease asking what is the virtue of unity if it is.unity in folly." To his assembled parishioners at Riverside, the man who has made a religion of politics and a politics of his; religion said: "Let us gather around the Holy Child rath-J!, er than rally around the flag." Then the former (';A specialist on Russia flew off toy Tehran to tend tote men and wom?n 2ccuscd by Iran of working for the CIA. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDPO5SOO62OR0005O1330001-9 ARTICLE kPF7'_k-77, O:i THE WASHINGTON POST 1 January 1980 Two. Plots to Assassinate .' Khomeini. Allegedly Foiled By Ronald Koven 'Weshihfis? Pnft Poison wrrk.. PARIS, Dee. 31 Twice during the past month, hired killers from Europe were frustrated in.pians to assassinate Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, accord- ing to a reliable Western source. The source speculated that the as- sassination plots were most probably ordered by Iranian political exiles who are centered in Paris, the focus of the exile-communifys' re-. turn to power in_lran. On bothroecasions, the source said, a foreign intellienceservice, learned of t e assassination plans, and' ar- ranged to warn the Iranian govern- ment through diplomatic channels.- Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDPO5SOO62OR0005O1330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 r :Ll'YinItZED U: T THE NEW YORK TIMES 1 January 1980 The Wrong Iran Lesson on American Intelligence important to keep those two issues clearly separated - for the sake of the hostages as well as for future relations To The Editor: It might be hard to get consensus on what is the most depressing aspect of our difficulties in Iran, but surely Ray S. Cline's Op-Ed piece of Dec. 20 must be a prime candidate. Mr. Cline thinks that the major lesson for us in that.. tragedy is that we must restore the old C.I.A. methods and philosophy, but with a better cover. Could it be clearer. that that is ex- actly what we do not need; that it was precisely what Mr. Cline is calling for. that got us into the mess-we're in? The intelligence we need in such places as Iran is information about the injustices people are suffering, injus- tices that, if not corrected, are certain to lead to festering resentments against the regime imposing them and against the United States if it condones them. If there was a failure of intelligence in China long ago, in Cuba, in Vietnam, in Iran and in many other places, it was plainly a failure to discern the in- tensity of grievances that masses of people were feeling, and the inevitable attractiveness to them of extremist solutions in the absence of any reason- able alternative. Although the radicals' seizure of the American hostages cannot be tolerat- ed, the outrages that pushed them to that outrage cannot be ignored. It 13 1 I cannot know, of course, whether there was a failure of our intelligence) operations to obtain the kind of infor- mation we needed. It is conceivable) that, despite Mr. Cline's orientation, those who were supposed to know such things did know them, even reported them, and were ignored. That would represent an intelligence failure of an- other sort: either the concealment of vital information from the American public or the stupidity of leaders the public had ignorantly elected. In any case, the lessons about intelli- gence that we should be learning from our recent international debacles are two: (1) If we fail to appreciate the de- gree to which our actions and inactions cause people to resent us, we shall for- ever be unpleasantly surprised; (2) if. we appreciate how much we are re- sented and choose to accept the resent- ment, then we must also accept the enormous costs of being totally ruth- less - and in the long run probably failing. Ask the Shah. My best guess is that such reactions as Mr. Cline's stem from the assump-; tion that the major objective is to max-1 imize American power, and that all means directed to that end are justi- fied. That is a fatal mistake. Thei major objective is to make sure that American power is, and is always seen to be, a means to the protection of free-i dom and furtherance of justice. The) two conceptions are worlds apart;': they lead to radically different kinds; of actions, including "intelligence"' gathering, and they will have radi cally different kinds of consequences. Mr. Cline thinks that the best way to prevent "Americans abroad [frrom being] sitting ducks such as they were in Iran" is to develop better covert; operations. I think that the best way to prevent Americans from being seen as! enemies of the people is for the United' States not to support enemies of the people. HARRY C. BREDEME!ER Professor of Sociology; Rutgers University New Brunswick, N.J., Dec. 21,1979 To the Editor-.-- Ray S. Cline cannot really mean that the C.I.A. replacement should be called U.S.I.C. "You sick(?)" is' no I name for an intelligence-gathering group. Mr. Cline has no understanding I of the power of a strong acronym. t What he wants is Intelligence Gather- ing Opera;ions ("I go!") or United States Intelligence Receiver ("You j Sir! ") Never, never "You sick." DONALD M. KtRSCRENBAtM - Brooklyn, Dec: 21,19179 .1 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501330001-9 ARTICLE !lu'P3iiri1 PAGB? _ ON Jack Anderson o Ice- Vea., While deploring the Iranian threat to world peace and orderly diplo- macy, the Soviet Union has been moving quietly to exploit the situa- tion to its own advantage. By keeping a low profile and en- gaging in its usual cynical double- dealing, the Kremlin hopes to emerge as the dominant power in a weak, disunited Iran. To this end, the Soviets proclaim their support for the Iranian revolutionaries, while simultaneously working to undercut the new regime behind the scenes. The Russians obviously welcomed the ouster of the pro-Westen shah indeed, may have helped to foment the revolution that ended his rule. And the near-anarchy that has fol- lowed in Iran has been tailor-made for Soviet mischief-making. But working both sides of the street can be a tricky business, even for such experienced dealers in du- plicity as the Kremlin bosses. Intelli- gence sources tell me that the Soviets are probably no more in con- tro of events in rant an we are. Thus, the remain is clearly de- lighted at the United States' discom- fiture in the hostage situation, and its ambassador has been spotted in- side the captured embassy corn.- pound, either as coach, cheerleader or privileged guest perusing secret documents. In Moscow, meanwhile, Soviet For- eign Minister Andrei Gromyko as- sured Iranian Ambassador Moham- THE WASHINGTON POST 31 December 1979 mad Mokri that the Soviets "would not remain neutral" if the United States should attempt "armed ag- gression" against Iran. But at the same time, the Soviets are believed to he counseling re- straint out of concern that the situa- tion might get completely out of hand. Soviet interests are best served by keeping the fuse burning without igniting the powderkeg. Gromyko, therefore, encouraged the Iranian ambassador to continue detaining the hostages - for an- other year if necessary - without harming them or provoking the United States to resort to military ac- tion. - The Soviets would like their oil- rich neighbor to be continually beset by turmoil, to remain militarily weak; economically drained and politically threatened. Moving into the power vacuum in southwest Iran, the Soviet-backed Tudeh Pary has quietly organized workers in the oil fields, which are the backbone of the country's econ- omy. The Sovietized workers are res- isting attempts by Ayatollah Ruhol- lah Khomeini. to solidify control of the vital region. Clearly, the Soviets are torn be- tween support for the ayatollah's revolution and a desire to under- mine it. They are cautious, there- fore, about encouraging autonomy among the Azerbaijanis, Kurds and other ethnic minorities. An unpublished report, prepared for the congressional Joint Eco- nomic Committee. also makes this point: "Soviet leaders probably fear that the evangelism of the Iranian revolution will cause ... [Soviet Muslims to demand more autonomy from the central government in Moscow." On the other hand, the unpub- lished report notes, the Kremlin might "seek to take advantage of the discontent among the various Ira- nian nationalities by attempting to establish pro-Soviet states among these people." Interestingly, Iran's petroleum reserves figure as importantly in Kremlin strategic planning as they do at the White House. ThTh al- Intelligence Agency. in widely dis- I puted findings, reported that before 1585 the Soviet union will he unable to _11 i t its own domest' 5-and - ural eas needs. Under a 1975 agreement with the shah, the Russians were to build a pipeline for export of Iranian nat- ural gas to Western Europe through the Soviet Union. The transit fee was to be paid in natural gas - 13 billion cubic meters a year. But since the revolution, work on the pipeline has stopped, and Khomeini is consider- ing dropping the project altogether. So for what cold comfort it play bring U.S. leaders, their opponents in the Kremlin are also faced difficult decisions regarding the present and future course of Iran and its troublesome revolution. ,y on Iran laid lo Suviellos ~j Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 ~'D . Ti'^.i.L' ~'1'1...~u+ oi'1 PAGE, THE WASHINGTON POST 30 December 1979 Jack Anderson 'Incurable Fondness for Dictators' The Iranian crisis won't disappear when the fate of the hostages is finally settled. Recriminations will start bub- bling to the surface of the American political landscape. The question to be answered goes deeper than our humiliation in Tehran, serious as that has been. It goes to the heart of U.S. foreign policy. what is to blame for the hatred and ridicule that have been heaped on this country in re- cent years. and what can be done to re- verse the situation? In a way. it's unfor- tunate that this issue will be discussed in the overblown rhetoric of an election year, because it is one that. deserves more dispassionate consideration. The Iranian crisis is only the latest, and most dramatic, evidence of the en- mity the United States has aroused by its support of repressive dictators in the name of anti-communism. In Nica- ragua, a Tehran-style backlash was pre- vented only because the revolutionar- ies who ousted the U.S.-backed Anasta- sio Somoza were less fanatical than the mullah in Iran. In Cambodia, revenge for our support of the corrupt Lon Nol was avoided because there were no Americans left to terrorize. In.South America and Africa, we continue to prop up the regimes of generals who beat their countrymen with one hand and rob them with the other. But it was too little and too late. The revolutionaries who ousted the shah remembered only the decades of U.S. support for the tyrant, not Carter's pressure on him to moderate his rule. And to our client dictators, who have been trading on their anticommunism for billions in U.S. aid over the years, Carter's abandonment of the shah was seen as simple treachery to an old ally. The Intelligence community's role in America's current no-win predicament erta my worth 1ookinQ LCO. Dld oils lntelligence-ftathering agencies send hones accurate information to Wash-11 ington, where it was distort at the to evels to co orm to - it1C - i- c ties ahead estabilshed? Or di~theex- parts at the Centr Agency and the State Department cen- sor their,own reports to tell the olicy- makers what they wanted to ear. For years I had. reported that the shah was unpopular with the Iranian 7 masses and quite likely to be deposed by popular revolution. is in orma- tion was reported by U.S. intelligence, which considered the shah an unstab e me omaniac. But it was apparett y i aored in or of more optimistic as- sessments. only two months before the shah's collapse, Carter's national security ad- viser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, telephoned ! the Iranian dictator and assured him corrupt 40 years of family rule was made possible by U.S. backing-was losing out to a popular revolt, did the United States give up-after an ate! tempt to rob the rebels of victory by back-door maneuvering. Our apparently incurable fondness . for dictators-who need only to spout a ' convincing anti-communist line and?as= sure us of their stability-may get us in more trouble before too long. In Argen- tina and Chile, we continue to back repressive military regimes to protect. U.S. business interests. And in Zaire, another enjoys American support, President Mobutu Sese Seko, is repor' tedly heading toward a Somoza-style debacle. He has enriched himself while his people starved and imprisoned any ; who dared criticize his dictatorship. _ But he jovially wines and dines U.S. of-?, ficials and businessmen. Robert Remole, former head of the U.S. embassy's political section in Kin- shasa, told me Mobutu's days may he numbered. Remole's summary of the-41 situation puts the U.S. predicament in a. nutshell. "Mobutu's an s.o.b.," he explained,:. "but the powers-that-be say, as always,' that he's our s.o.b. I'm sure he's not" going to be around much longer.... the' people of Zaire will blame the United- States for supporting him." Those who will not learn from his-. tory are doomed to relive it. It's time ; U.S. policymakers read a little of our' recent history so we won't be doomed' to repeat it endlessly. oiY79,un-taFaaie.e~LCat~,LaG , s n t in U.S. policy toward these repressive j that the United States was behind him regimes might spare us future Tehrans 100 percent. In a matter of weeks, the -and Islamabads and Tripolis-when reality of the shah's collapsing situation the inevitable revolutionaries throw ? finally sank in, and Carter withdrew the rascals out. his pledge of support, after the shah As a basically decent man who inher- had refused to liberalize his rule. ited years of locked-iaconcrete alll- : in Cambodia, knee-jerk anticommu-' an- antes, Jimmy Carter has reaped the nism saddled the United States Lon whirlwind sown by his p :other corrupt, unpopular After two years of kowtowing to Shah NoL When this pathetic bumbler was Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, for example, thrown out by the savage Pot Pot re- b he was finally persuaded that the shah's fate was sealed, and played a crucial role in his final exit a change ot already too late i If i y gime, which was in turn overthrown Vietnamese-backed communists, the United States had no place to go. The re- sult was the shameful U.S. vote in the United Nations to recognize the govern ment of Pot Pot, although he had butch- ered half the population of Cambodia. In Nicaragua, only when it became obvious that Anastasio Somoza -whose Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 T; Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 //~~ (fir lFPI;ARUD AIL i IL JP J t~~ T J fI THE NEW YORK TIMES 30 December 1979 Carter r i learn' Gets Its Act Together By STEVEN R. WEISMAN WASHINGTON - Carter Administration conduct of foreign policy has sometimes tended to be disor- derly, as In the case of former Ambassador Andrew : Young's unauthorized meetings at the United Na- tions with Palestine Liberation Organization offi- dials. By contrast, in dealing with Iran, the Presl dent's advisers have displayed an unusual degree of, unity. There have been almost no signs of internal discord, and secrecy has been tightly maintained an sensitive actions such as unannounced messages to, the Teheran authorities and undisclosed military moves bolstering the announced buildup. Mr. Carter tells White House visitors that he has never seen his foreign policy machinery function so smoothly. Despite differing approaches to world poll-, tics, participants are unanimous in assigning pri-? ority to the plight of the hostages, White House offs-I dials say. But they also suggest that with Iran, the', Administration's "crisis management" operation has come into its own. From the moment the United States Embassy was seized in Teheran on Nov. 4, the President issued or- ders to avoid the disarray - and appearance of dis- array - that characterized Iran policy a year ago. Then, the Administration shifted fitfully from un-1 swerving support of the Shah to conciliation of "mod-I erate" forces struggling to bring him down, followed by a period of recrimination over the inadequacy of American intelligence and foresight in Iran. The primary vehicle for crisis management is the Special Coordination Committee of the National Se- curity Council - a working group of top aides' presided over by Zbigniew Brzezinski, the National) Security Adviser. Their discussions in the window- less, woodpaneled Situation Room in the White House basement open with the domestic, legal, economic and energy-related aspects of the crisis. Then, they turn to security and diplomatic issues - secret maneuvers and the channels of communication, how- f ever tenuous, with the Iranian revolutionary Govern- ment. Those present without a direct interest - the President's domestic advisers - leave the room at! this point, underlining the insistence on secrecy. Mr. Carter set up the Special Coordination Com-,. mittee early in 1977 as a subgroup of the National So- curity Council. During the eight-week Iran crisis, the parent N.S.C. - Mr. Carter, Vice President Mon-; dale, Secretary of State Cyrus It Vance, Defense; Secretary Harold Brown, Gen. David C. Jones, chair-i man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Adm. Stanfield; Turner, director of Central IntelliQen met i fewer than h dozen times. The S.C.C. meets al- most every morning. briskly hurrying through a fixed agenda. The members include security aides, and Hamilton Jordan, White House chief of staff; Jody Powell, the press secretary; Treasury Secs; tary G. William Miller; Charles W. Duncan Jr., Sec-i retary of Energy; White House counsel Lloyd Cutler;; domestic affairs adviser Stuart E. Eizenstat. ands Hedley W. Donovan. senior adviser to the President. Mr. Brzezinski's staff types up the minutes fog President Carter every day, allowing space for himt to write notes in the margin and to ratify decisions by, checking a box marked "agree" or "disagree." By Mr. Brzezinski's order, S.C.C. members do not re-, ceive copies of the minutes, even at the next day's meeting when they are read aloud with the Presi- dent's comments. They are kept in a fat gray loose- leaf notebook on Mr. Brzezinski's desk. "The President wanted more discipline, and het wanted Brzezinski to exercise it on his behalf," said a i senior official-"When he approved the compartaten. talization of the meetings, he made it possible to en- force that discipline. He was determined that this, crisis be run by him directly, and he laid down the! rules that everybody has accepted. 11 i "When you think about it, it's absolutely amazing that there have been so few leaks." another official said. Last Nov. 20, for example, when the White' House issued its strong warning against putting the hostages on trial - implying a threat of military re; taliation -- a private message in much stronger terms was conveyed at the same time through diplo-l matic channels. It warned the Iranians of "grave consequences" if trials took place. "They understood that doesn't mean economic consequences," an aide: said. Existence of this note did not become known, until recently, and officials say there are several) other such communications, still secret. The United) States is also understood to have taken several, un.! disclosed military maneuvers beyond those an. nounced "so that if we had to take military action, we'd be in a position to do it," the aide added. The White House precautions seem to have found al counterpart American news organizations' restraint.1 Several have compiled lists of the hostages in Tehe-4 ran, but few have publicized them, at least in full.j The State Department has refused to confirm names, contending that "would not be in the best interests"' of the hostages and their families. Replying to suggestions that S.C.C. secrecy policy] may deprive them of fresh viewpoints White Houses orrrcials point to task forces under the committee's1 jurisdiction designed to explore alternatives, bring-I ing to the President the thinking of outsiders, includ-i ing academic experts and others with thoughts about the psychology of the Iranian revolutionary leaders. The liveliest debates, one participant said. haw' not concerned particular tactics, but rather "basic; assumptions." These, he said, go beyond the geopo- litical ramifications of United States actions in the, Middle East, to such questions as the rationality of the Iranian authorities. "Our basic operating as-, sumption all along Is that the Iranian leaders are ra-i tional, that the holding of the hostages is not the most important thing in the world to them _ that there is a i cost beyond which they wouldn't go in order to keep) the hostages," this official said. "But how can you bel sure that assumption is correct?" Secrecy has had its drawbacks, however, in mak- ing the Administration's case to the American pub-) lic. For one, American officials disagree with a pub-i lic perception that virtually none of their efforts have! produced tangible results. One top official said the' President was convinced, from information providedi by diplomatic intermediaries, that the Iranians tad', in fact responded to American threats of military ac-i Lion and, as a result. had deferred action on trials of the hostages. Whatever evidence there may be fort this assertion has been withheld, however. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 ARTICLE P::+?s' THE WASHINGTON POST ON PAGEs - 29 December 1979 A atollah Paperback Out - With H; elp From 0 't CIA translated Khomeini's thoughts, but Manor Books marketed them. By Warren Brown wxshinKton foal staff writer Some enterprising Americans have found a way to turn the ayatollah Ru- hollah Khomeini's sayings into money. They have published a Central In- telligence Agency translation of Kho- meini's theories and put them into a slick paperback entitled: "Ayatollah Khomeini's Mein Kampf: Islamic Gov- ernment." The asking price is $2.50. The act of publication by Manor House Books in New York City is le- gal. Anyone could do it. "It's done fairly frequently," said Kathy Pherson, CIA public affairs of- ficer, "It's no fancy deal." like this. The CIA, using the services of its Joint Publications Research Service in Arlington, fre- quently translates foreign language documents for agency analysts. Just as frequently, especially if they are adjudged to be of "public interest," the typewritten translations are turned over to the National Tech- nical Information Service (NTIS) in the Department of Commerce. The NTIS documents are unclassi- fied and can be had by anyone-for a price, but not for profit, since the government is not a profit-making or- ganization. However, private entrepreneurs can reprint the documents fora profit. Ironically, in the case of the Kho- meini book, the sayings of the ayatol- lah apparently are cheaper from tha private publisher than from the fed eral government Pherson's "unofficial" cost estimate of the NTIS copy of Khomeini's words was $6.25, compared to the $2.50 asked b AT or Books an y Translations of other Khomeini speeches and position statements also are at NTIS, Pherson said. She said the document published by Manor originally was published by the CIA's Joint Publications Research Service on Jan. 19. There is no copyright on U.S. government publications. Manor officials were unavailable for comment last night. However, the first page of the paperback carries this statement: "Understanding the intentions and tactics of an enemy is the first de. fense against him. In that spirit we of- fer this volume.-The Publishers." Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDPO5SOO62OR0005O1330001-9 AR' I CTJ2 Al ?Fr's;F:? or; PAGE_ WASHINGTON STAR 29 DECE -IBER 1979 By Lance Gay WashingtoaStarStatf Writer The clergymen who visted the American hostages in Tehran say: they could see no speedy way of re- solving the crisis in Iran now that the positions on both sides have hardened. But the three; the first Americans allowed to visit the hostages since they were captured eight weeks ago, said yesterday-the hostages are safe, in good condition and guarded by "deeply convicted" young Iranians who do not want to harm them. "I don't-see an easy way out," said Bishop Thomas J. Gumbleton. Roman Catholic auxiliary bishop of Detroit. The students, he said, continue-to demand the return of the shah and "they seem to be absolutely adamant on it. They are not going to be re- lenting easily. So it is going to con- tinue to-require great- patience on. our part, on the part of the hostages and the part of the people here." Gumbleton said he cannot suggest any quick way out. "I'm not able to imagine what steps could be taken, that's not my role," he said. The Rev. William Sloan Coffin of New York's Riverside Presbyterian Church said he sees no way out of the present crisis unless the United. States offers some sort of small ges-. !He said the administration could rna e es ures such as promising not to aepor ranian students. Lakin out lull page-a s forte Ayarn' u o a .omeini in newspapers s owing tae ranian si e o tile ats- s u e, or urnin over paper concerning U.S. policy in Iran for the last quarter of a century- "I think the same arrogance, as admitting the shah against the ad- vice of our own embassy, is still operating when we think we can get our hostages out without paying any price for it," Coffin said. "The more we exert conventional pressure, the more hardened the re- sponse will be," said the Rev. M. liam Howard, president of the Na- tional Council of Churches- The three clerics came here yesterday to meet with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, State Department officials and the families of the 43 hostages they saw in Iran. Shortly after the meeting with Vance, Carter reiterated U.S. policy warning that Iran faces increasing pressure if the hostages are not released.. In an two-hour meeting at the U.S. Catholic Conference headquarters here, the three clerics also met with 50 relatives of hostages and gave them messages that had been scrib- bled out or memorized. Gumbleton said the clerics have decided not to release the names of the 43 hostages they met with "at the - request of the families." The group carried back no diplo- matic message from the students or -the Iranian, authorities, Gumbleton said. "We were not there to do the work of the government. That was -not our mission," he said. The group conveyed "impres- sions" of what they found on their -two-day.trip. Gumbleton said the main impression he got was that the "students are in charge, they're the ones who are running the com- pound." The other impression he got was T'a"JOVAJr "They agree that this is wrong, but they say, 'You have to understand the wrongs we have had to endure for 26 years.' We talked to clergy who were themselves in jail (under the- shah) and they say. 'What about that., wrong)."' he said. - Gumbleton told the-families of hostages that "the foreign minister in Tehran told us that the Ayatollah. Khomeini has instructed the stu- dents not to let anything happen to any hostage." The trio said they were instructed before they saw the hostages not to discuss current events with the group, and Coffin said It was. stressed to the clerics not to tell the, hostages that the shah had left the United States for Panama. ture to express the gratitude of the - United States for allowing the- clergymen to visit the hostages... Threatening Iran with economic sanctions only serves to stiffen the resistence of the captors, he main- tained. - "It may be hard to get out of, but it was the easiest thing to get into. The dumbest thing we did was to admit the shah, particularly with those- telegrams coming over from the - embassy saying don't do it. But now we're in it and I think some recipro- cal gestures is the business of diplo- macy," Coffin said. that the captors were firm in their I position on the return of the shah. Gumbleton said he discussed the- hostage-taking with Moslem reli- gious leaders in Iran and, said they indicated belief the so-called stu- dents were wrong. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDPO5SOO62OR0005O1330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 TI JE 12 FiitED THE WASHINGTON POST 2 January 1980 So-Viets Say C-1 Trained Afghan . a . Rebels in. Fakistan By Kevin Klose Wa.hinston Post Poreirn Service MOSCOW, Jan. 1=The Soviet Un- ion expanded its allegations of Ameri- can subversion in Afghanistan -today in a continuing effort to blunt world criticism of the Soviet military inter- vention there. An authoritative article in the gov- ernment newspaper Izvestia said, The U.S. Central Inttlligence Aden is direct y involved in-training Afghan rebels in ca - ining con acs with counterrevolu- tionaries and reactionaries in Atgfiafi- ' stan itself." The paper claimed that CIA agents under Coyer of -the anti r71' hnarrl and the American 'Asian Fund' nne*- ate in the area of the-Afghan-Pakistan frontier." Izvestia apparently meant the U.S. .Drug Enforcement. Administration (DEA). which has investigators in the South Asia region as part of the fed- eral government's worldwide narcot- ics traffic suppression efforts. The "Asia Fund" could not be specifically identified but may be a Soviet refer- ence to the Asia Foundation. a private American assistance oganization.. The State Department refused to comment on the Soviet charges, but one official said a DEA agent is per- manently assigned to the embassy in Afghanistan. The agent. however, was out of the country'on vacation at the time of the Soviet incursion, accord- ing to the official. Under the authorship of Mikhail Mikhailov, regarded here as an au- thoritative voice, reflecting leadership views, Izvestia expanded earlier offi- cial accusations to include Britain and Pakistan, along with China and Egypt, in the alleged subversion effort under- taken by Washington in Afghanistan. "Pakistan's anti Afghan course had the support of the U.S. and Britain." the paper said, "and was decisively the result of instigations on the part of these countries, China, Egypt, and some others." Two days ago, the Communist Party paper Pravda hinted strongly that Pakistan was invovled directly in the alleged subversion plot. By naming Is- lamabad in today's account, the Sovi- ets appear to have written off any early easing. of their already strained relations with the Pakistanis, who have strongly backed China in a. se- ries. of Soviet-Chinese confrontations Islamabad, like Tehran and other. Moslem capitals, has sharply de- nounced the Soviet military incursion, which Washington estimates at be- tween 30,000 and 40,000 with another 12.000 or so ready to cross the border..: Meanwhile, the official Soviet Tass agency reported a telegram of thanks to Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev from Babrak Karmal, who came to power in Kabul Thursday in the So-viet-backed coup. . .- Babrak, a staunchy pro-MIoscowi communist who was pursed from Ka- bul leadership last year by the man he{{ overthrew, Hafizullah Amin, told' Brezhnev he is "convinced that with the fraternal assistance and undimin- ishing cooperation" of the Soviets, "we shall win and overcome all diffi- culties we inherited from the past." Soviet media have avoided describ- ing the insurgents opposed to Kabul's Marxist government as Moslems in an apparent attempt to improve re- lations with other-Moslem countries. In descrihing the angry rally by Afghan exiles at the Soviet Embassy in Tehran today, Tass simply called them "hooligans who refused to dis- close their names" and said they were "hostile to the Afghan revolution." Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 0-i THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE) 31 December 1979 U.S. Reslales Pled V -,e P~- k mr: Brzezinski Says U.S. Force Possible to Counter Soviets By Walter Taylor Washington star staff writer In an unusually blunt warning. presidential adviser Zbigniew Brze- zinski says that the United States would be prepared to react with military force if the Soviet Union carries its Afghanistan incursion into neighboring Pakistan. Brzezinski, appearing yesterday on ABC's "Issues and Answers," re- ferred pointedly to a 1959 agreement with Pakistan, which lies to the south and east of Afghanistan and .which reportedly has been aiding rebel Afghan factions. He said he had been authorized, presumably by President Carter, to publicly reaf- firm the agreement "In case of aggression against Pakistan," he said, reading from a text of the document. "the United States, in accordance with its consti- tutional procedures, will take such appropriate action, including the use of armed force ... in order to as- sist the government of Pakistan at' its request." "We want it to be understood," added Brzezinski, Carter's chief na- tional security adviser, "that the United States stands by its commit- ments, and its friends should be sure of that and any potential adversaries should have no illusions about that."! Brzezinski's remarks were thel strongest public statement by a i White House official to date follow- ing Russsia's acknowledged partici-j pation last week in a coup that saw one pro-Soviet regime in Afghanis- tan liquidated. and supplanted by one even more closely identified. with Moscow. The president last week formally protested the Soviet action and the continuing movement of Russian troops into Afghanistan, saying it could have "serious consequences" for relations between the two super- powers. In addition, Carter dispatched Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher to meet with U.S. allies: to discuss possible joint countersteps to the Soviet move. Christopher new to London yesterday for consulta- tions with Western European allies and representatives from nations in the Afghan region, notably Pakistan. The protest and Christopher's trip have not deterred the Soviets from', continuing the deployment of com- bat troops into Afghanistan, how-' ever. Brzezinski acknowledged that since Carter's protest, conveyed di- rectly to Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev via the Washington-Mos- cow "hotline," the Soviets actually have increased the concentration of troops in Afghanistan. gj,d there was "increasing evi- dence" aooarent.1 from US. SPY satellites that Russian troops e- ed to the Afghan-Soviet b roe had begun to cross t e rontier y land and occupy key urban areas. He cited movements by Soviet armored columns into areas of the northwest and additional northeast- ern areas of Afghanistan yesterday. "Several tens of thousands of men" were involved in these maneu- vers and the total number of Rus- sian troops in Afghanistan now is estimated at between 20,000 and 25,- 000, he said. Brzezinski dodged questions about possible direct response by the United States to what he character- ized as the Soviet's "naked use of military force." For example, he would neither rule out nor embrace the suggestion that the United States might provide military aid to guer- rilla units battling the Kabul gov- ernment. But he stressed repeatedly that the United States his "certain inter- ests" in that part of the world "by which it will stand" and said specifi- cally than Carter had reaffirmed to Pakistan the U.S. defense commit- ment. "It is an important commitment and the United States will stand by it," Brzezinski said. The United States this year cut off most economic and military aid to Pakistan in a dispute over Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. The at- tack on and destruction of the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan's capital several weeks ago further strained relations between the two nations. Brzezinski implied, however, that the aid cutoff decision could be quickly reversed if Soviet military activity spread south or east across Pakistan's borders. "The security of the independent countries in the region is not a mat- ter of indifference to us, not is it a matter of indifference to the inter- national community," he said. "The only way to preserve peace is for all concerned to understand that there are certain explicit limits to unilateral action and that these limits must be respected." Noting Afghanistan's border with Iran to the west, Brzezinski also said that Iran, locked in a dispute with the United States over its detention of American hostages in Tehran, ought to be particularly alarmed over the latest Soviet moves. "Every sober-headed Iranian" ought to ask himself, said Brze- zinski, "what do the events in Kabul portend for.Tehran? There have been Soviet troops before in Tehran. Tehran could be next." Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 A3TICL 'aP2' xD U.S. Affirms Clo P~kis-tan New Soviet Moves Into Neighboring Afghanistan Noted C By Don Oberdorfer Washitttton Pest staff writer The United States publicly and pointedly reaffirmed its 20-year- old commitment to the security of Pakistan yesterday, as its next door neighbor, Afghanistan, was re- ported invaded by new, heavily armed military units of the So- viet Union. Presidential national security af- fairs adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, speaking on "Issues and Answers" (ABC, IVJLA), read portions of the 1939 U.S.-Pakistan ao eement, as a public message to Pakistan and the world that "it is an important com- mitment and the United States will stand by it." Brzezinski said he had been specifi- cally authorized to reaffirm the U.S. commitment, presumably by Presi- dent Carter. There is no indication that the con- tinuing flow of Soviet forces Into Af- ghanistan, described by Brzezinski as "direct invasion" and "large-scale ag- gression," is likely to move on- to Pakistan in the short run. However, a Soviet-dominated Afghanistan man- ned with Soviet.combat forces would be an ominous new fact of life for al- ready unstable Pakistan to deal with,. and would -present a long-range mili- tary threat of major dimensions.. The 1959. commitment read. by Brzezinski calls for the United States,-.. in case.. of- communist -aggression against-Pakistan,-to take. appropriate: action, including the ? use -o! armed- force, as agreed by the two nations and in accordance with-U.S_constitu-. tional procedures." Official sources said..the -commit- rat nt has been. reaffirmed privately on at least three previous occasions- in thi& last year, as Pakistan worried about conditions in Afghanistan and. about repeated charges and warnings. from Moscow concerning alleged Pak- istani istani aid to Moslem insurgents bat- tling pro-Soviet governments in c.f-? ghanistan.... - : - ti THE WASHINGTON POST 31 December 1979 After a telephone conversation Fri. day between Carter and Gen. Moham- med Zia ul Haq, Pakistan's president, U.S. Ambassador Arthur 1-Pummel be- gan intensive discussions with Pakis tani officials about new measures to 'l assist that country and assure its secu- _ rity. . These discussions, which are re- ported here to be still in an early stage, are complicated by the applica- tion of U.S. nonproliferation laws bar- ring economic and military assistance to countries seeking to produce or ac- quire nuclear weapons for the first time. Early this year the United States cut off aid to Pakistan, except for food assistance, under these laws because of Pakistan's secret drive to build an atomic weapons capability. Official sources said it is unlikely that Pakistan will stop its nuclear de- velopment. In this circumstance, di- rect U.S. help will be limited by law to food aid and cash sales of military equipment and supplies. Carter, in a White House luncheon with reporters Saturday, made known his resolve to speed up delivery to Pakistan -of purchased weapons and spare parts, estimated to be about silo million worth of armored person- nel carriers. tactical missiles, ammuni i tion and spare parts. - Pakistan has made no new- weapons request to Washington since the open Soviet moves in Afghanistan began a week ago, according to officials, nor is it clear. what role- the Pakistanis envi- sion for the United States in view of the.. still growing : Soviet presence across th border. Islamice fundamentalism and anti- American sentiments in Pakistan have been stirrred by, the'strident appeals of Ayatollah Ruhullah Khomeini and other figures in Iran,. another impor- tant Pakistani neighbor. On Nov. 21, a Pakistani mob attacked _ and burned the U.S.. Embassy in Islamabad, lead- ing to the. departure, of many Ameri- cans. New signs of'-Pakistan's sensitivity to its Iranian neighhor were official statements ver the weekend that against Iran. where 50 Americans have been held hostagerrinceirov::~l, and that" it, takes exception.?'to : the U.S. freeze of Iranian financial assets. This suggests that despite- an enhanced So- viet military threat.:. Pakistan may choose to continue a lnw profile rela- tionship with Washington while the U.S.-Iranian conflict : ontinues. Brzezinski, in his television inter. view, said there is increasing evidence- of large-scale Soviet troop movements into Afghanistan at two points along the border-,from Soviet Kushka into the Afghan city of Herat and from So- viet Termer toward the Afghan capi- tal of liabul and the nearby airport at Bagram. i? The national security adviser said the Soviet fore's in,-lude "armored' formations, a lar_e number of. heavy tanks. the most mourn Soviet tanks, Soviet armored personnel carriers, motorized infantry and so forth:' lie said that Saturday's official estimate of 20,000 to 23,000 S u v i e t combat troops. plus about 5.030 other Soviet military personnel, probably has been exceeded. but officials did not release a higher total yesterday. Of greater potential significance than t e continuing mu%emeti act s~ th glaa or er are mte sRenee re- orts that large numbers of ad itLOn3 corn at units are being move wit n ,, lie Soviet Union in ways that sug?_est the may be iea a to the border area for assignment to the nauj front. The Soviet forces that have entered Afghanistan so for may be adequatei to secure key cities, airports and im portant roads, according to U.S. offi- cials. :Movement of additional units' on a large scale to Afghanistan in days to come would be taken here as a sign that the Soviets intend all-out military operations against rebellious Islamic tribesmen. Brzezinski declined to say wheiher the United States is considering mill tary aid to the rebel forces in Afghan- istan. However, informed sources indi- cated that this is among the subjects to be discussed in London today by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher with senior officials of Britain: France, West Germany, Italy and Canada in a meetng on possible responses to the situation in Afghani- stan. Christopher, boarding a Concorde flight to London, called the Soviet in- tervention "a grave threat to interna- tional stability." He added, "I think the world community is so- outraged that the Soviets will find in the long run that it will be most,, them." .:Y.:. Following)-the: surfd'on nzeetutg, Christopher is -scheduled to go to Brussels, where a special meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza tion council has been scheduled. Tues- day to discus,*i_, Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 C'.t 1:.CI ..: THE NEW YORK TIMES 3 January 1980 WASHINGTON, Jan. 2 (AP) - Law-.I yers for Philip Agee, a former officer of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the! State Department will meet with Federal1 District Judge Gerhard Gesell tomorrow to discuss steps in Mr. Agee's fight to r& gain his revoked passport. I On Monday, Federal District Judge Barrington D. Parker rejected a request by Mr. Agee's lawyer, Melvin Wulf, to issue a temporary restraining order bar- ring Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance frorrtstripping Mr. Agee of his passport. Mr. Vance. ordered Mr. Agee's passport revoked after the former intelligence offi cer, who lives in Hamburg, West Germa- ny, spoke of involving himself in the Ira- nian hostage situation. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Ait?IOIL3 SPP~ C:f PAC-3 PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER 2 JANUARY 1980 A former CIA agent will get a new hearing. Philip Agee ~Y H -?4 Philip Agee, who was turned down ' in an initial legal bid to h i s ' ' U.S. passport, was granted the hear-- ing after a US. district judge agreed- that the case presented "substantial issues" that merited a further hear- ing. Agee, who had written-books and articles on the CIA since quitting the- agency several years ago, was, stripped of his passport Dec. 23 by Secretary of State-Cyrus K. Vance. The action was taken after-Agee, who now lives in West Germany, had spoken of involving himself in the Iranian hostage situation.. . Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 ARTICLE APP1&jct:D ON PAGE - THE WASHINGTON POST 1 January 1980 The U.S. District Court fot thr-Dts4 tract of Columbia denied a requestSo an order temporarily- restraining.thi. overturn a State Department order.r unkind his n~ssri,,rl his first court battle yesterday- t Former CIA agent Philip Agee Ios, Regain Passport Agee Is Rebuffed.- In Court Fiaht to > department's action.. The department revoked.:-Agee passport: Dec. 22 on grounds' ot,ntr> tional security. Agee had sugge*sbed44t the militants occupying the U.S.: E bassy In Tehran that they reieas their captives In exehange'`idr theM complete Central Intelligence :Ageq .fuel on operations in Iran. The request for a temporarg' r straining order was, filed with the f eral court yesterday by Agee's.?Ne York attorney; Melvin Wulf;- and'- representative- of the American, Ci Liberties Union, Charles Simmsr. The petition asked that Secretary o fa State Cyrus R. Vance- withdraw thi-O order revoking Agee's passport. By noon, the petition was denied. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 ARTICLr; APPEARED 0:v THE NEW YORK TIMES 1 January 1980 Plea by Ex-c.I.A. Agent to Restore Passport Is Denied, By ROBERT PEAR Specbl W T New Yak rtmee WASHINGTON, Dec. 31 - Attorneys for Philip Agee, a former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency, filed suit in Federal District Court here today in an effort to force the State Department to re- store his passport, which was revoked. nine days ago on national secprity Judge J Barrington D. Parker said after a court hearieg that the case raised "very important and fundamental issues" involving Mr. Agee's First- Amendment rights, his right to travel and the authority at the Secretary of State. But he denied Mr. Agee's request for im- mediate relief -a temporary restraining order against the State Department - saying that his attorneys had not shown that their client would suffer immediate, irreparable injury. Another judge will probably hear further arguments later this week on the request for an injunction. Mr. Agee. who lives in Hamburg, West Germany. has been an outspoken critic of the Central Intelligence Agency and its clandestine activities. He has written a book and several" articles that, the Gov- ernment says, disclosed classified infor- mation, including the names of covert C.I.A. agents. Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance took the extraordinary step of revoking his passport after finding that his activities "are causing or are likely to cause seri- ous damage to the national security or the foreign policy of the United States." NeverTested In Corot . State Department lawyers said that the 1967 regulation used in the move had been employed in only a few other cases and had never been fully tested in court.. Mr. Agee's? lawyers asserted that his passport had been revoked "without duei Philip Ages Lary of State to revoke a passport for na- tional security or foreign policy reasonsi was invalid because it went beyond any l Mr. Agee has proposed exchanging thel intelligence agency's files on Iran for thei hostages at the United States Embassy in j Teheran. I Glenn V. Whitaker, a Justice Depart went lawyer defending the State Depart-I merit's action, said Mr. Agee should not be allowed to have his passport, espe cially during the Iranian crisis, because{ "it is his stated intention to go about dis-i rupting the intelligence activities of thel United States." Finds Hostile Feeling Intensified , In an affidavit submitted to the court David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. said that bir. Agee's statements about C.I.A. activities abroad intensified anti-American feel- ings and increased the likelihood of at- tacks such as those on the American Em- ~---_-- S. I.. i ~?'a d Pakistan an that one factor in the decision to revoke the passport was a newspaper article that said Mr. Agee had been invited to Iran to participate in a tribunal involving the i hostages. Mr. Wulf said that the report was false and that his client would not participate in such a tribunal if invited. The lawyers said that without a valid passport, Mr. Agee, who has already been expelled from several- countries in Western Europe, was in "imminent dan-1 ger" of deportation from West Germany. process of law in order to penalize and suppress-his criticism of the United States Government's policies and prac- tices." to The case was described by lawyers on both sides as an important test of the Government's power to cancel a pass- port. Mr. Agee's principal attorney, Mel- vin L Wulf, argued that a Federal regu- lation specifically authorizing the Secre. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 ARTICLE AP "" ON PAGE - WASHINGTON SPAR 1 JAI VARY 1980 Ex-CIAAgent In an affidavit filed with the court yesterday, David Newsom, undersec- retary of state for political affairs. Loses Round in I said Agee's visiting countries to identify officials engaged in CIA t- the United s k d Passport-Fight By Allan Frank Wa%htngtunStar Staff Writer Former CIA officer Philip Agee has lost his immediate bid to regain) his U.S. passport that was revoked, last week by Secretary of State Cyrus; Vance. U.S. District Judge Barrington Parker yesterday declined to issue a i temporary restraining order that would have prevented - for at least 10 days - the revocation of Agee's passport, which had been valid until. 1983. N Parker said that Agee's attorney, Melvin Wulf, could not prove that the former CIA agent, now living in Hamburg. Germany. would suffer ir- reparable harm if the restraining order were not granted. The judge added, however, that the case presented "substantial issues" concerning the First Amend- ment and the right to free travel that merit a further tearing tomor- row before U.S. District Judge Ger. hard Gesell. Vance revoked Agee's passport on Dec. 23 because he feared the agent would further complicate the situa- tion in Iran, possibly by identifying agency operatives there. The State , Department said Agee's actions "were causing or were likely to cause serious damage to the national.; security and foreign policy of the United States." . angerou . is wor States. Newsom said, "It is clear to me that if Sir. Agee continues to travel at will ... to make public allega- tions against United States officials in foreign countries, such activities 'are likely to cause serious damage to the--national security and foreign policy of the United States. "Among the adverse conse- quences which could result from such activities would be that United Stales diplomatic facilities,?includ- ing embassies and consulates would be taken over by force," Newsom continued, "and that United States diplomats and other nationals would be physically harmed." Agee could become a man without a country if the passport revocation is upheld. Without a valid passport,. he may. not be permitted to remain in West.Germany, where his wife is a dancer with the Hamburg Staatsoper , Ballet, or to travel to other coun- tries. Wulf, attorney for the American, Civil Liberties Union, argued that the lifting of Agee's passport uncon stitutionally violated the former agent's First Amendment right to free speech and to travel freely as a journalist.. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501330001-9 ARTICLE IfORTKERiI VIRGINIA SUN ON PAGE_ 29 DEMMER 1979 `THERE IS A DISGUISED CIA AGENT AMONG YOU!' Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDPO5SOO62OR0005O1330001-9 ARTICLE AFFUit1 ATLANTA CONSTITUTION Or( PAGE 15t 28 DECFr' ..R 1979 Adieu TO Agee Were we still operating in the days of James Bond, the matter would've been set- tled differently. But, well, Mr. Bond was employed in His Majesty's service and, well, he was fic- tional anyway. He did, however, have a way of handling matters in a rather permanent manner. But, these days at least, our govern- ment is more polite in how we handle "defectors." The State Department Sunday revoked the passport of Philip Agee, a former CIA- agent. in Latin America now living in Germany. It was Agee, you will recall,. who authored a book published . abroad which, among other things, named some 900 CIA agents serving in various nations under The publication of the names placed the agents still*active in peril - and perhaps re- sulted in the killing of at least one agent - to say nothing about crippling American espionage activities. Agee, while living in Germany, has been "lending himself to anti-American propa- ganda intelligence." The news that Agee had been stripped of his passport - "his last pre- tense of citizenship" was applauded by CIA members, many of whom harbor strong ha- tred for Agee. It was, indeed, an action long overdue. Agee probably should rejoice that the- "old days" are over - or something other than his passport would have been re- voked. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDPO5SOO62OR0005O1330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 SALT II Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 OD`d P AGE-2 NATIONAL REVIEW January 4, 1980 THE CIA & THE KGB Taking nothing away from the Soviet Union, it is herein claimed that most of America's wounds are sey-inf7icted, largely by three categories of people: 1) "the dropouts"; 2) "the philanthropoids"; and 3) "the intellectualoidr" W y the Soviets Aren't orried MILES COPELAND THE WORLD of the President and his security plan- ncrs bears little resemblance to the world of the President and his SALT II negotiators, and of the bureau- crats, politicians, and editorialists who continually fuss over detente, the difficulties with NATO, "improving Soviet-Amer- ican relations," and all the other spurious questions which presuppose the possibility that the Soviets may abandon their objectives. The former world is concerned with our "foreign foreign policy," with the strategies guiding our moves in the game that is played for keeps on the inter- national gameboard; the latter is concerned with dur "domestic foreign policy" which-fortunately or unfortu- nately-dictates many of the moves which are passed off as foreign foreign policy. In fact, most moves on the inter- national gameboard are not genuine moves on that board at all, but inert reflections of moves in the domestic games of the various players. Consider the picture of Soviet-American relations that the general public gets from the sources available to it. Our media, a goodly props*ion of our politicians, and a majority of what we so loosely call "intellectuals" have, first, adopted the language of the Soviets to describe the various conflicts taking place around the world (e.g., call- ing terrorists "freedom fighters" and "movements of na- tional liberation," and lumping black African minorities together as "the black majority"-what Pat Moynihan calls "semantic infiltration"). Second, they have all but ignored what the Soviets them- selves say about detente, the SALT II talks, and (in the phrase used by some State Department people) "improv- ing Soviet-American relations." After President Nixon re- turned from Moscow to make what our jittery friends abroad saw as a Chamberlain-like peace-in-our-time sort of speech, the Soviets turned loose their entire propaganda machinery to assure Eastern Europe and "peoples repub- lics" everywhere that nothing that had been said in Mos- cow was to be taken as indicating any intention of relaxing one whit the. Soviet Union's "revolutionary determination." Not one word of all this was mentioned on any of the three major U.S. television networks, currently the prin-' cipal source of news for the American peo ,k,,and the! New York Times gave it only the briefest rr}fn[ion on the back pages. .1' I In that other world, however, those who plan our na- tional security do ponder what the Soviets are thinking and doing. When they retire to their garrets to plan strate- gies for safeguarding our national security, they take with them a view of the world that is more in line'with objec- tive fact. Here are the conclusions, established at least to the extent. of their being acceptable as "planning assump- tions," to which this view has led them: 1. There is not the slightest chance that the Soviets will abandon "Communism" as we know it, or the "struggle against imperialism and capitalism" that it necessarily en- tails. There is not one sentence, not one word, either in literature the Soviet government disseminates to its own people or in communications that Soviet officials circulate among themselves, tomindicate a softening of intentions. Nor is there any iiid cation that the obvious failures of the Communist system-failure to develop the country's vast mineral resources, to motivate the working population to work at top efficiency, to remedy the appalling adminis- trative chaos that causes machinery to wind up in one place a3 spare parts wind up in another-will bring about its collapse. On the contrary, the Soviet leaders blame their troubles on the continuing presence in the world of "ex- ploitative and corrupting capitalist systems" which distract them from problems which would otherwise be soluble, and they argue that what is needed is more Communism, not less. Moreover, the argument advanced by some of our academics that the Soviet Union's aging leaders must inevitably be replaced by younger men of moderate dis- position is confuted by the youngsters themselves-who are, if anything, more fanatically opposed to accommoda- tion than are their elders. 2. SALT or no SALT, the Soviets are developing their military power not merely to achieve parity but to achieve superiority-clear superiority, superiority the whole world will recognize. They believe that SALT will assist them in achieving this objective or they would not favor it. Nor are the Soviets neglecting their conventional-warfare capabil- ities in order to concentrate on nuclear superiority. Mil- itary intelligence people now believe that the Soviets have PA TIA' UED Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501330001-9 so improved their conventional capabilities that they can sweep through Western Europe any time they wish--or, for that matter, through any one of those parts of the world which, according to recent polls, our citizenry would not be willing to go to war to defend. In addition, the Soviets are pouring time and money into proxy forces-the Cubans, the North Koreans, the Palestinians, and others who are involved in military op- erations against Western interests. Although it is not the policy of post-Stalin Soviet strategists to wield out-and- out control of proxy forces, the extent to which Moscow,' now trains and supplies them enables it to conduct pre- cisely the kind of warfare we are least able to resist. Furthermore, proxies make higher "capability levels'-con-' ventional Soviet forces, Soviet nuclear power-seem all the! more intimidating. Successful intimidation is an essential feature of any campaign designed, in part, to win over fence-1 straddlers of the Third World in whom a desire to wind up on the winning side is a key motivation. 3. The Soviets do not envision a hot-war confrontation. They will not attack us head-on-for example, by an as- sault on NATO-but will go for our means of sustenance, specifically the raw materials and energy supplies of Africa and the Middle East. As numerous Soviet experts on the United States have said repeatedly, they do not have to smite us when it is so easy to choke us. They are proceed- ing to do just that, through a carefully chosen, orderly suc- cession of scenarios in which we seem to be backing the Bad Guys of the Third World (and it is in the Third World that the raw materials and energy supplies are located), and the Soviets seem to be backing the Good Guys-and, through their manipulation of our semantics, the Soviets have seen to it that this seems to be the case even in the eyes of our own people. Concretely, the Soviets are achiev- ing their aims through the construction of an "Iron Chain"! from Angola to Pakistan which will, in chronological j order: 1) scare the Saudi royal family and the Gulf sheik-: doms into adopting a so-called "positive neutrality"-a; position which, experience to date has taught us, causes an adherent to cooperate m t with whichever major power it is most afraid of, or wlichever power seems to be winning; 2) enable Western Europeans to see which side their bread is buttered on, and to alter their policies ac- cordingly; 3) induce attitudes in the American public of which Andrew Young's remark that "The Cubans have brought stability to Africa" would be truly representative. This is the Soviets' World War 111. When these three objectives have been reached they will have won it-in the sense that they will have gained everything they might conceivably go to war for, including the power to dictate the economic terms on which we will be allowed to exist on this earth. To put it another way, they will have gaine as much for their purposes as Hitler would have gained for his had Nazi Germany won World War I1, either through actually fighting it or by default. 4. Present-day Soviet strategy, like Soviet strategy when' Lenin was alive, is based less on Soviet strengths than oni American weaknesses. Thus, it depends more on anti American forces than on pro-Soviet forces-in fact, the Soviets will happily give aid and encouragement to forces that are anti-Soviet so long as they are sufficiently anti- American as well. This is by way of saying that, for all their emphasis one military preparations (and our experts tell us that the mil- itary forces are the only segment of the Soviet system that operates efficiently), the Soviets' strategy is based funda- mentally on subversion. To our intelligence community it is perfectly obvious that the Soviets would prefer to anaes-1 thetize our powers of resistance by subversion, rather than I enter upon the dangerous and costly business of bombing us into submission-especially now that we have dis- mantled our anti-subversive capacities, and have adopted moral preoccupations which would hamper any attempts our government might make to reconstruct them. (There is, of course, a possibility that Iran will change all this.) "It's very nice to have a winning philosophy," said top So- viet ideologist Mikhail Suslov, "but victory is so much easier if the enemy has a losing one." With its professional penchant for cause-and-effect anal- ysis, our intelligence community has understandably be- gun to see the hand of the KGB in our national affairs. In fact, an inter-agency intelligence task force has recently worked out a detailed rationale to support the thesis that, while the KGB is "not actually in control" of any signifi- cant segment of our molders of public opinion, it may s very well be on its way to building a "network of influence made up of individuals who are unaware of who is back i inn them but who are effectively nudging our native effu-{ sioas into channels which benefit the Soviets. To use an idiom of the intelligence 'community, the "current, ,.situa- tion" in our country is precisely what it would be had the1 Soviets been able to create whatever climate of opinion they wished for simply by waving a magic wand. The notion is worth examining. The following items. 1 according to Soviet operational specialists, are standard ingredients in the emasculation of a country and the break-! ing down of its ability to resist the Kremlin's particular kind! of onslaught. They are features of modern American society! which have been described in Soviet strategy papers and explicitly labeled as propitious from the Soviet point of' q view: -A public which so distrusts its government that it views all official utterances with suspicion, and which can be counted on to react negatively to appeals of the government in the face of national emergencies even in the rare cases when it sees no reason to doubt the gov- ernment's veracity; -A pervasive philosophy of "anti-social individuality,"' as Suslov has called it (or "situational ethics," as we call, it). by which an individual citizen finds it easy to ration- alize his refusal to join in a common effort for the com- mon good-such as, for example, a military draft; ..The replacement of democratic electoral processes by: a channeling of popular enthusiasms through "special interest" groupings which are capable of inordinate in-I fluence in behalf of "single issues," whatever their com-! plexion; ..Epidemic abhorrence of the military, of industry, and of all institutions which smack of power and a capacity for organized effort; - Unilateral disarmament-or, at least, a public which) is strongly resistant to military expenditures, either per se or because of a preference for alternative expendi- tures, real or imagined; rnNTINUEE Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501330001-9 I Aside from any specific faults persons in these cate-i -Gt ncral acceptance of language by which our friends,; our allies, and ourselves can only be designated by words with unfavorable connotations while the Soviets and their allies are designated by the opposite (cf. the "New-:, speak" of George Orwell's 1984); .In general, a popular tendency to see our enemies abroad as "freedom fighters," "movements of national liberation," etc.-or, at least, as reasonable people, fight- ing for just rights, who could be won over to our side by a bit of sympathy and understanding-and to regard governments, groups, and leaders on our own side with hostility and suspicion: -Castration of our intelligence and security agencies, and of all means whereby we might discover an alien hand in these elements of the "current situation," ac- companied by legal safeguards to protect those among us who work against the national interest and by cam- paigns to discredit those who oppose the safeguards; a-As a consequence, a popular ignorance of-or, rather, an insurmountable emotional opposition to factual in-I formation about-the "current situations" in (for ex-i ample) Iran, southern Africa, and Central America, where proxy forces under various umbrellas stimulate and direct popular uprisings and channel them toward outcomes suiting Soviet purposes. Our security agencies in response, spend their time searching for "moles in our government and in quasi- governmental organizations. Lists similar to the one I have just given have been matched against names of persons, organizations, and informal groups responsible for the various items, and investigations have been made, and are now continuing, in an effort to detect Soviet connections. But, according to evidence to date, Soviet successes in this country-by which I mean developments in this coun- try favoring the Soviets which result directly from KGB operations-have occurred only in the field of intelligence acquisition. True Soviet "subversion," as our security offi- cials use this term, has yet to be proved. The KGB may be subsidizing some of our own citizens' efforts, but it doesn't I have to direct them-it's just sitting back and watching ! it happen. Anthropologists under contra* to the CIA, looking hard for ways to explain disaffection in various societies, have bracketed three categories which they believe apply to our own: 1) people who can't make the grade in an increasing- ly competitive economic order, and who blame it on the order rather than themselves, and who might be called, for want of a better word, "the dropouts"; 2) those who can, and do, compete successfully enough, but who for some reason, usually unconscious and irrational, feel guilty and uncomfortable with their success, and whom we might call "phi/anthropoids," since they often give large amounts of material aid and moral support to their "less fortu- nate" co-belligerents; 3) the "verbalists" in our society-the "intellectualoids"-who do not grow corn, manufacture clothing, build houses, or cure diseases but are engaged in professions which escape the disciplines of "results orien- tation" (e.g., newspaper editorialists, college professors, etc.) and who are therefore free to adopt any crackpot theory that catches their fancy. gories may find in the producers of our society, they sim ply do not like them. This elementary fact alone is enough to put them in opposition to those persons and institutions! which provide most of our economic well-being and physical! security-bankers, multinational corporations, small busi- nessmen ("Babbitts"), and that hated, half-legendary in-~ stitution known as the "military-industrial complex." Only a minuscule percentage of those who belong to' one of the three categories and whose words and behavior contribute to the "suicide package" described above might conceivably he KGB agents. So far as I can be certain. only the martyred Orlando Letelier, the Chilean who was associated with the intellcctualoid Institute for Policy Studies and who received a salary from the KGB-associ- ated Cuban intelligence service while so doing, has been definitely proved to have been an agent of a foreign gov- ernment. There are others who are being subsidized by ei- ther the KGB or some associate (Cuban. East German, or North Korean). but not with their certain knowledge; for- eign contributions to individuals and organizations en- in activities which contribute to paralyzing . our gaged nation in the face of Soviet aggressions are almost all channeled through intermediaries in such a way that the recipients are unaware-or may plausibly claim unaware- ss-of the source. I Practically all of the recipients. moreover, believe their motivations to be entirely patriotic. Even the Institute for Policy Studies, the organization which members of our intelligence community believe to be the rallying-ground for destructive dissidence . in our country, has survived the most painstaking investigations: with the exception of Letelier. not one member or associate of that organization can be proved to have taken direction or financial support from a foreign power-not. anyhow, with evidence that could stand up in court. The dropouts, philanthropoids, and verbalists aren't the society show. Moscow sees even more advantage in a fourth contributor to the suicide package. I refer to the' special interest group. The neo-Leninists now concocting: Soviet strategies look to any segments of our society.I whatever their aims and motivations, that contribute to the centrifugal force which weakens our ability to take, united action. Abortionists and anti-abortionists are equal ty valuable, so long as they exert their energies cache against the other and put their "single issues" above thej general national interest. Ethnic minorities are even more valuable-Greek-Americans for effectively opposing any de- fense plan the Pentagon may devise which involves co operation with the Turks; Jewish-Americans for effective- 'Iv opposing Arab-American relations or anything we might do to accommodate the Palestinians; Arab-Americans for effectively opposing any plan for the security of our Mid-1 dle Eastern oil supply which might involve cooperation with, Israel. CON TI~UFD Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 pended by this category of special interest groups. our security planners are blocked from creating any workable plan for protecting our overall national interests. There is no recommendation, no plan. no project which the' President of the United States can advance as being good for the nation as a whole, whether in the field of eco nomics, energy, or national defense, that will not have against it some powerful group strongly motivated to kill it. and entirely capable of doing so --and doing so not by proving that it is damaging to its own well-being but by proving that it is against the interests of the country as a whole. A wealthy and highly concentrated 2 per cent of our population can almost always have its way over a dif- fuse. unorganized. and largely apathetic 98 per cent. And this, it happens, is the key to the success of the 2 per cent which shapes up as a special interest group: the skill of its spokesmen in arguing variations of "What's good 'for General Motors is good for America" These 1 spokesmen are among the smartest, highest-paid, most persuasive people in America. They are the elite of the verbalists. Compared to them, those who argue honestly for the general national interest are a lot of country- schoolteacher amateurs. Soviet defectors. although anxious to ingratiate them- selves with their FBI and CIA interrogators by furnishing them masses of juicy revelations, invariably insist that "what you are doing to yourselves" is so effectively de- structive that it robs KGB stations in New York and Washington of arguments to use on their Moscow head- quarters for bigger budgets. The sad truth is that the KGB doesn't need agents and Fifth Column operations to achieve its aims. Indigenous individuals, groups, and or- ganizations-and even parts of our own government agen- cies-are saving it the trouble. C1 Mr. Copeland is the author of The Game of Nations. His next book. The Supergame, will be published in Mas' bt? Simon & Schuster. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 or 1 THE WASHINGTON POST 2 January 1980 Warner Urges President To Pull Back SALT II. AOeodated Pens Sen. John W. Warner- (R-Va.) called on President Carter yesterday to pull back the SALT II treaty from the Senate. "In view of the president's state- ment that [Soviet Ptesident Leonid] Brezhnev lied to him about Afghanis- tan, is might well be that Brezhnev lied during the SALT II negotiations," Warner said. - Carter said in an ABC' News, inter- view. Monday night that Brezhnev gave. him a false account of Soviet . actions in last week's overthrow of the government of Afghanistan. Warner- noted that he has previ- ously urged delay of Senate debate on the arms limitation treaty because of Soviet troops in Cuba, the absence of anX Russian assistance in freeing American hostages in Iran "and now this blatant invasion of Afghanistan." "How can we possibly enter into a contract with a nation which is be- having so illegally all over the world and against the interests of freedom?" he asked. "I call on the president to pull back the treaty, to make a complete reas- sessment of our foreign policy with respect to the Soviet Union and to shape a five-year defense program which can meet these new and menac- ing threats of the Soviet Union," War- ner said. He said the treaty should not be considered- until after tt a presidential election next November. "Whoever is elected president would have a strong mandate of the people as to how to deal with the So- viet Union and could negotiate a strong and more balanced SALT II agreement. if, in his judgment, it will lead to improving freedom and global stability," Warner said. . Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 ARTICLE A??~"Lr"-~/ ON PAGE- qay Key .1 THE WASHINGTON POST 31 December 1979 ." ]Bus5nessDlafl o Mobut a ' o By Leon Dash - waahinscon Yost Yortlsn service KINSHASA, Zaire-Maurice Tem- plesman, an American friend and business associate of President Mo- butu Sese Seko, and reputedly a per- son of influence in this country, had a say in the recent appointment of the new U.S. ambassador to Zaire, accord- ing to one U.S. diplomat here. In fact, the diplomat said, the local American business community knew about the appointment of Robert Oak- ley even before the U.S. Embassy did. In Washington, such views of Tem- plesman's role are described as exag- gerated if not utterly wrong. But in Kinshasa, the New York diamond and metals businessman is viewed as a mover and shaker with important po- litical ties to both Democratic and Re- publican organizations back home. It was Templesman. sources here said, who put together the interna- tional combine that owns 80 percent of the world's richest copper and co- balt lode, lying under 900 square miles of savanna just outside Kolwezi, in Zaire's mineral-rich Shaba Prov- ince. The rest of Zaire's mining opera- tions in the area is owned by Geca- mines, the government company, which is forbidden to touch the rich lode. The story of how the wealth nearby came to be--owned by outsiders provides a rare glimpse into the laby- rinth of iliterlocking relations be- tween Industry and government in de- veloped nations, and a Third World dictator. Those who know Templesman say that he "grew up in African metals" as a salesman, middleman and inves- tor. His father had established the firm of Leon Templesman & Son long before independence fever swept Af- rica after World War II. Maurice Templesman, according to one diplomat, shrewdly anticipated Africa's changing political tide in the late 1950s and early 1960s and began to "move in with the new regimes." Today, his firm has branch offices throughout West Africa, dealing pri- marily in diamonds, but including metals as well. Templesman's involvement wit* Mobutu dates back to the 19604. v'h.s Mobutu was looking for markets for Zaire's industrial diamonds. Accord- ing to U.S. diplomatic sources, both men share business interests in Zaire's two main diamond mining con- cerns, MIBA and Britmond. U.S. Bureau of Mines figures show Zaire as the world's principal pro- ducer of industrial diamonds. More important, however, are Zaire's re- serves of the world's total industrial diamond reserves estimated at 680 million carats, more that 500 million are located in Zaire's south-central Kasai province. Total yearly export sales-in industrial and gem diamonds from the two companies run into the hundreds of millions of dollars. Mobutu's rise from a salaried army officer in 1963 to one of the world's richest men is mainly the result of his personal control of Zaire's diamond exports, Western officials say. The exact nature of Templesman's involvement with Mobutu is not known. Templesman's office in New York would not disclose even general informa- tion about him_ But a diplomatic source who knows both men describes their relationship as "very per- sonal" and said-that both are reaping substantial earnings from the gem diamond trade. When Mobutu sought to put together a second copper mining company in Shaba province to offset Zaire's total reliance on Gecamires, he turned to Templesman. According to business sources here, Templesman brought together foreign investors from the united States, France, South Africa and Japan to form the Tenke Fugurume Mining Society, in which. he and Mobutu also each have a personal share. The Tem lesman croup is re .resented in Kin. shasa by Larry Devlin. a retie entr me r gence Agency otticia ser'~ ed as-the agency's - ??ca?ie to Dower in a 965 ted ,..,..,.. U.J. suppor erassi, who ormer y ea a the .a. mi to mis- gion to .aL e. "L rv can talk to Mobutu any time he wants to." said a Western source who knows Devlin. Devlin, w So operates out of a t it floor of ice in ins a- sa s Texaco w ind was un3c-aua, a for comment. after an initial investment of S250 mil fun or roads and down payment on mining equipment, Tenke Fugurume now needs an estimated $400 mil- lion more to start assembling the plant. The project has been stymied since 1976, when the Benguela Railroad, which gives the mining re- gion in southern Zaire access to s? ports in Angola, was closed during the Angolan civil war. It remains closed because of antigovernment guerrillas operat- ing in the neighboring country. One investor, Standard Oil of Indiana, recently sold its 28 percent interest to a French government mining company. Standard apparently was. frus- trated by the continued disruption of the crucial railroad. Templesman is believed to have helped. Mobutu with advice on political matters in W'sh Blair, for- mer in Washington is U.S. ambassador to Denmark and the Philip- pines and one-time law partner of Adlai Stevenson. Templesman has made campaign contributions to both Republicans and Democrats. In 1973, he con- tributed S5,000 to Richard Nixon's election cam- paign. This year hee gave $1,000 each to the reelec- tion campaigns of Sens. Frank Church (D-Idaho) and George McGovern (D-S.D.). In Zaire, Templesman's influence is considerable. "Things get very personal here." said a senior diplo. mat. "and to get along with the chief of state is all that matters." Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 ARTICLE App.:iZED THE WASHINGTON POST nr PAGE .3._._ 30 December 1979 311obulds Slayin, r Poiver Is AltribufeJ 9 To His Pouncal -S Jki 11. and'Raw Fo-rce By Leon Dash Washieston Yost roreisn aerVtee LUBUMBASHI, Zaire-A squat ce- ment monument, topped with a choco- late-brown arm gripping the replica of an Olympic-style flaming torch, dominates the main roadway leading into this regional capital of Shaba Province. Close by, a large faded green billboard spells out in yellow letters: "Mobutu Sese Seko-Our Only Hope." Variously known in the govern- ment-run media as "The Guide," "Our Savior" and "The Prophet," the char- ismatic and imperious 49-year-old Mo- butu has maintained himself in power through ruthless suppression and the shrewd use of what one Western dip- lomat called "illusions, mirrors and gimmickry." An Army general in the turbulent five years following independence in 1960, Joseph Mobutu, as he was then known, came to- power in .a U.S.- backed coup in November 1965; when Zaire was still called the Congo. Although he originally pledged to run the country only five years, Mo- butu Sesee Seko Kuru N gebendu Wa Za Bangs, as he is now known, has for the past 14 years presided over this potentially rich Central__ African country's brief ascendancy toward prosperity and its subsequent rapid degeneration into threadbare poverty. Mobutu's enormous staying power is attributed by political observers to his skillful political manipulations that fluctuate between occasional cosmetic reforms and steady reliance on raw power. - He formed Zaire's only legal politi- cal party, the Popular Movement for the Revolution, appointed himself head of the governments legislative, judicial and executive branches, and created a network of party informers and an efficient secret police organi- zation, known as the National Docu- mentation Center. Mobutu also molded all labor unions into one, which was. incorporated in his party. University students, large numbers of whom were killed when they demonstrated against Mobutu at the outset of his rule, were eventually dependent on South Africa's rail- brought into the party framework. ways to the ports of East London and _ Although he permitted nationwide Durban. In turn, he muted all crib.- elections in 1977 for a legislative cism of South Africa's racial policies. council, there was never any doubt Mobutu also has. reached a com- where the ultimate decision-making promise with the Roman Catholic authority lies. Church after an open conflict over a Yet under his rule, Zaire's debt to decree prohibiting. Western names. Pope John Paul Western governments and banks has II is scheduled to. grown to $5 billion while domestic visit Zaire next year, a tribute to the corruption has reached such propor? changed relationship. tions that an estimated 40 percent of While growing increasingly resent all government funds- winds up in the ful of the oil-rich Arab nations, whose pockets of government officials. support he had wooed, Mobutu has., In the process, Mobutu has ad- m8?ded his relations with the United' vaned from a salaried Army officer States. He visited President Carter to become one of the world's richest in Washington last September. His popularity at, home declined men. sharply after Angola-based rebels in. Mobutu started out as a popular waded Shaba in 1978 and economic l national figure whose government difficulties that followed the drop in brought' stability following Zaire's copper prices. But he continued to political turmoil of the early 1960s. run Zaire with an iron hand, elim- His emphasis on cultural African na- inating all dissent. An unknown num. tionalism, or Zairism "authenticity," her of political prisoners are tor- also found popular acceptance. . tured. First, he changed the name of the In an effort to preclude any coups, country from the Democratic B,epub- 3Iobutu has sought to divide poten. lie of the Congo to Zaire, then cre- tial opponents by setting ethnicI ated Zaire's distinctive attire, the groups against each other. "He took! so-called abacost. He justified his his lesson from the Belgians," Zaire's one-man rule as consistent with pre- former colonial rulers, one Zairian colonial Zairian traditions. said. In the early 1970s, while still en- Mobutu's closest advisers are all joying popularity at home, Mobutu from his. Equateur region while key! military men come either from the i also took an active role in Third World affairs, criticizing South Africa president's province or from Upper and leading the Africa-wide break of Zaire in the northeast But the gen- diplomatic relations with Israel fol- erals report directly to him and in- formants say that his soldiers are ''re- lowifrg the 1973 Middle East war. cruited from all tribes except those" In that period he startled- Washing- in the rebellious Shaba- region. Ion by his Public charges that e "This is bow he maintains Shaba's- CIA had tried to assassina~iiman security and his own," one source to alehis government. Dip oma said. ,aw this as a p oy to gain re T By excluding the Shabans from the in the Third World. "You aren't some- government, according to the sour- bodv in the Thir Worl until the ces, Mobutu has made other ethnic CIA tried to assassinate you,' one groups wary of the southern tribes. European diplomat sal - "It is like juggling," one Zairian By 1976 Zaire was in dire economic described Mobutu's policies. "It keeps straits. As a result of. mismanage- everybody off balance." ment, corruption and a drastic drop .Mobutu has done the same with in the world price of copper, Zaire's Western countries that support his main export and revenue source, Mo- government. "We're his major sup. butu became increasingly dependent porters," a European diplomat said. on Western banks and governments. "But he does the same thing to us he The civil war in Angola closed the does to everyone, plays us off, one Benguela railroad, leaving Mobutu against the other." . Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 3TICL E THE WASHINGTON POST or, PAGE 30 December 1979 People of Zaire Direct Supyresse' at ]Wobnu,:Ii. Want Grips Once-Rich African Nation By Leon Dash Washington Post POrokgn 3srvIC. KINSHASA, Zaire = Ekofo Ma- bamba spat with disgust as he looked over. his crowded; dismal neighborhood in ' the Livulu slum. "None of us have enough food to eat." he said. _ The words poured out in an angry stream as he moved- from the gray light of his front door into the small living room lit with a kerosene lamp. "We can say no- thins about it, or we go to jail." Once a week, on Wednesday morn ings;. Catholic priests in the slum dole out small quantities of protein- , rich soy beans. "The priests only feed the chil- dren they can see,. the weakest Ekofo said. "There. are too many to feed." Ten thousand malnourished children under 4 year of age are brought yearly to Kinasa's Mania Yemo Hospital. named after Presi- dent Mobutu Sese Seko's mother. For the last two years. well over half of them have died there. Of- ficials said the annual child mort- ality rate in some rural areas of this mineral-rich country of 27 mil- lion people may be much higher than 50 percent. Ekofo (not his real name) is one of nine Zairians interviewed who asked that their names not be-used for fear of arrest or reprisals,_ fears i that help. explain- the absence of. public outcry about conditions. As one Western observer put it, "The-squeaky wheel doesn't get the.oil here: he gets thrown in jail." Most of their suppressed anger is directed at Zaire's military head of state and authoritarian president for the past 14 years who is reportedly one of the world's richest men. But beyond. Mobutu.. 49, Zairians condemn the West, particularly the United States, for.what they perceive as vital support for a. corrupt and mis- managed regime that has brought one of Africa's potentially richest. coun- tries to the brink of insolvency. The perceived U.S. identification with Mobutu appears to parallel in many ways Iranians view o : mere- en are said to have been put in power by the CIA. Despite obvious cultural, reu- gious. and economic differences be- . tween Zaire and Iran. they face simi? lar development problems accompa- nied by rising expectations. The undertone.of Zairian interviews also suggests a growing tendency in I the developing world to scrutinize U.S. support for various Third World; dictators, a tendency that will con- front Washington with new problems in the post-Iran period.. EXCERPTED Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 CIA ESTIMATES Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 p;f PiGZ ___ 2 JANUARY 1980 Soviet Oil Outpu*t D edine ~ oss9b le, Some Experts Sad United Press International The world's largest oil producer, the. Soviet Union, may be hard pressed to hit its oil production goal this year, an oil industry weekly says. Some experts think that Russian production could peak at 12.2 mil- lion barrels a day this year and then fall, the Oil & Gas Journal reported. Soviet oil production in 1979 was estimated at 11.7 million barrels a day. While the pessimistic forecast raises some fear among major con- suming nations that Russia might soon become a net oil importer, com- peting with the West for tight sup- plies; a Soviet government econo- mist said the fear was unfounded. "Skepticism voiced in the West about.the U.S.S.R.'s?capability of ful- filling its oil export commitments is groundless," said the economist. "Output growth will continue, and the 1980 increase will be 420,000 bar- rels a day." the economist said in the article. The production growth prospect for western Siberia, Russia's oil field area, have been "greatly extended," said another Soviet official. -? "The drop in our oil output growth rate should not be associated with signs of oil hunger," said the official. "The U.S.S.R.'s ability to con- WASHINGTON STAR (GRE i LINE ) centrate its efforts and resources on crucial problems is well known." The pessimists note the 1980 out- put target of 12.12 million barrels of crude and condensate was scaled down from .the original target of 12.4 million to 12:8 million barrels. If Moscow hit its 1980 goal, it would contradict a CIA forecast which predicted no rise in Russian production this year and a gradual decline in the decade. Soviet production was a record 11.- 868 million barrels of crude oil and natural gas liquids in October, up from 11.7 million barrels a month earlier and 11.65 million barrels the previous October, an indication the target might be met. However, the nation's perform- ance on annual production goals in the past four years offered little cause for optimism. Production in 1976 was 10,000 barrels a day under the goal, and the Oil & Gas Journal said production shortfalls increased in the following years to 500,000 bar- rels in 1979. The CIA forecasts that Soviet pro~uc onii wistart declining in the early 1980s and slide to 10 mil lion barrels of crude and condensate in 1985. The most recent CIA stud predicts 1980 output wt lion to 11.8 million barrels a day - about the same as 1979. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 ., rT!( T, PP;: R THE NEW YORK TIMES 2 January 1980 Doubts Raised On Soviet Oil barrels daily in 1978; 80,000 bar- rels daily in 1977; 170,000 barrels daily' in 1978, and 500,000 barrels a day in; 1070 TULSA, Okla.. Jan. 1 (A?) - The Soviet Union remains the world's larg-, est oil Producer but will be hard- pressed to reach its 1980 output goal of more than 12 million barrels a day, ac- co~ to a petroleum industry publi, The OR and Gas journal noted yes. terday that Moscow's revised 1980 "goal of 12.12 million barrels a day compares with an estimated 11.7 mil- lion barrels a day produced in 1979." The "original Soviet 1980 target was. 12.4 to 12.3 million barrels a day, set ! just before the start of the current five- ' Year plan," the magazine said. . But the magazine added that new -$oviet analyses assert "that because of :persistent and worsening problems in i, exploration and development, Soviet oil prpductim-in 1980 is likely to tall short of its-goal-by 400,000 to 800,000+ '.barrels a day.'.'. + -:Sovietoil vutppt far outstrips the No. '2 producer, Saudi Arabia, with 9.5 mil- ?iion bkrrais.a day, and the third-ranked United States, with 8.6 million. The Central Intelligence Agingy last r orecas a IMU Soviet oil out ?putof 11.8 million to 11.8 million 42-gal- Ion barrels a day, indicating an insig. .tl ificant gain or possibly a decline from The Oil and Gas Journal said the Russians fell short of revised goals by The C.I.A. estimates that production, Vill continue to ine in the early. 1980's and drop to a level of about 10! millioy barrels a day in 1985: Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 SUPPORT FOR CIA Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 ARTICLE APP " "' ON PACE 4 THE ATLANTA CONSTITUTION 2 January 19780 "Jul Gulliver The CIA 'h. al 11.0 We can't really have it both ways on how we think American intelligence agencies, like the Central Intelligence Agency. should function in the world. The national debate- on the CIA and other agen- cies was already going on when -- those hoodlums seized the American hos. tages in Tehran. Congress and President Carter were - already is the process of trying to lay down clear guidelines for the CIA and other intelligence opera- lions. The seizure of hos- tage. In Tehran will now play a part in that do- What do we really want the CIA to do? - The agency came under fire after Watergate and other investigations held varied amounts of dirty linen out for all to see. The CIA had been involved In drug experiments on people who were not told what was being done. in conspiracies to overthrow constitutional governments, in assorted 141zarre plots to kill certain foreign leaders. Some of these things were undoubtedly bad things, things that most Americans would neither approve nor condone. And yet, in the wake of the Iranian crisis, some quite respectable folk are deploring the no- tion that we do not have a greater "covert" abil- ity, even recalling with nostalgia the time when the CIA literally helped install a friendly govern- ment in Iran. In other words, the notion is being pushed that the CIA (or some agency) have the capability to fool around with the politics and governments of other countries in ways very simi- lar to those criticized in congressional investiga- tions. This theme, the role of the CIA (or some other agency) in covert activities, may indeed come to be the main national debate after the Iranian crisis is resolved. George Ba% formerly of our state depart- ment, has been critical of this country's longtime support of the now deposed shah of Iran. But Ball also has suggested that the fierce criticism of the CIA may well. have been a factor in leading the Iranians to want to try the American hostages as spies. "While emasculating the CIA, we wallowed so masochistically in the disclosure of its wicked- ness," said Bag "that we have created the im- pression not only that the agency is guilty of every misdeed but also that it is 20 feet tag with almost magical capabilities for evil." Some pundits and politicians are already saying that there will be a great national wave of. recriminations and blame after the current crisis` in Iran is over. Who let the shah in? Why didn't' our intelligence people know more? Who "lost Iran? the questions would go. . ; I don't believe that. American have re-=l sponded with great maturity to the painful efforts, to deal with. crazies who have taken some of our. citizens hostage. It is my belief that the same ma- turity will preclude any finger-pointing kind of, search for somebody to blame when all this is over. But them-will be-and should be-a national discussion of our intelligence agencies, of what we want them to be, of we think about covert opera- tions, even of Sen. Howard Baker's notion that there should be a 50,000-member military strike force, capable of being moved anywhere in the world on short notice. Meanwhile, most CIA people probably do the best they can in the most difficult kinds of jobs.. catching it on the chin when they presumably bad- done too much and now catching it again when. some say they did too little. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 BUSINESS WEEK 31 DECF20ER 1979 M 5, The C!A: Trying to put `Humpty-Dumpty' together When Senate Select Intelligence Committee staffers were called together a few weeks ago for a meeting on a new version of the proposed charter for the Central Intelligence Agency, none of the committee Senators showed up. That demonstrates the new mood in Washington toward intelli- gence activities: Liberals up for reelection no longer consider cIA-bashing a politically profitable sport. Long gone are the white-hot indictments of U. S. intelli- gence excesses that marked the Church committee's hearings in 1975. And that committee's sharpest liberal critics of the CIA-Senators Frank Church.(D-Idaho) and Charles H. Percy (R-Ill.), along with the present committee chairman, Senator Birch Bayh (D-Ind.), have quieted down. In fact, one of Washington's most discussed questions-the subject of a half-dozen seminars bringing together academics and intelligence cadre over the past few. weeks-is: what is wrong with U. S. intelligence and how can it be beefed up? A White House strategist complains woefully. "You can't put Humpty-Dumpty back together again so quickly." And he, like many observers inside and outside government, is concerned about a number of problems. The combination of flagging morale, the loss of CIA veterans, and the discrediting of American intelligence among both friend and foe have probably cut into analytic capabilities. This problem- worsened by an orchestrated campaign by the Soviet's KGB secret police to discredit the CIA-has been exacerbated by years of trying unsuccessfully to replace the personal, clan- destine collection of information with technology. Moreover, friendly foreign intelligence apparatuses are becoming disinclined to work with U. S. intelligence because of American legislative insistence on openness of files. Final- ly, the demoralization 'of the service has been aggravated by bad blood between White House Director of Central Intelli- gence Admiral Stansfield Turner and the agencies for which he now holds the purse strings. These include not only the CIA, but all other U. S. intelligence services. And the hard feelings have intensified since Turner was publicly criticized by Presi- dent Carter for intelligence failures in connection with Iran. War or paralysis. All this comes at a time when there is growing consensus in the U. S. security bureaucracy-and growing acceptance by the public-that America is on the defensive around the world. The Iranian situation, for exam- ple, has dramatized for the world the incapacity of the U. S. to carryout clandestine activities. The aim, presumably, of the inquiries of 1975 was to restrain excesses, such as plans to assassinate Fidel Castro. But the effect has been to limit the U. S. to the choice between all-out war and virtual paralysis. The problem of U. S. credibility with both friend and foe is complicated and may have been exaggerated by defenders of the status quo ante in the intelligence community. But it is true that the general atmosphere in the U. S. makes foreign networks and individuals reluctant to work with Americans now. U. S. law, for example, requires that requests for govern- ment documents be honored under the Freedom of Informa- tion Act-even if the requests come from such Communist sources as East Germany and Cuba. True, the law permits authorities to hold material back to safeguard national securi- ty. But because of constant pressure from civil rights activists for liberal interpretation of the law and because of the huge administrative load placed on all government departments, the release of material becomes almost a matter of individual judgment- sometimes by inexperienced personnel. It now seems unlikely that Congress will fulfill the original intent of some legislators.of laying out a detailed charter to govern U. S. intelligence action. However, if it does so it will clearly have to consider not only the protection of individual liberties, but also the reconstruction of American intelligence in an increasingly hostile world. ^ Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 K o PAGE WASIII:iGTON STAR (GREEN LINE) 2 JANUARY 1980 0 S ]KI 1 -0, in a a Enters Ind Decut1fl , in the area. With its new-found treaty with Is- rael, the Egyptian military strength can be deployed to protect the deliv- ery of oil from the gulf to Japan, Western Europe and the United States. In particular. where the Egyptian army would most logically be sent is II Oman and the crucial Strait of Hormuz. Western intelligence sources sav t at t" the most an erous porno con.uc tot Le entire area is a : its borders stand Cuban anthiopian troops backed up by Soviet equipment and advisers. The Soviet navy has major units, including nuclear submarines, posted in the former major British naval base at Aden. Sultan Qaboos of Oman has publicly declared that he can cope with any South Yemen mili- tary move against his country. But he says he will need help if "foreign forces" strike against Oman. Western military sources say that Egypt's military forces could be air- lifted into Oman quickly and effi- ciently. Although Sadat and Qaboos Weizman, that when Egypt needs ; help, 'especially against Kadafi. Egypt will have it." By Sadat's own reckoning, every . move he has made these last 10 years, including his treaty with Is- rael, is. not a passing fancy but a permanent part of a new Middle East. Sadat believes without reserva- tion that after he passes, the treaty with Israel will remain. He believes that his polices of the past decade, from throwing out the Russians to starting a new but limited war with Israel in October 1973, then making peace with Israel, are designed to maintain Egypt's integrity as the first nation of the Arab world. - He does not feel weakened by . ostracization from the rest of the Arab world - far from it. "They need Egypt more than Egypt needs He is intensely proud that the Egypt he began to lead at the begin- ning of the 70s, now enters the '30s .the dominant military and intellec- tual power of the Arab world. That is his strength and why he survives. He is an Egyptian first. do not admit that Egyptian troops. are now in Oman, it is a widely held belief of Western intelligence sources that at least 200 Egyptian officers are in Oman as the advance. j party for the arrival of major Egyp- tian military assistance. It should also be noted that Oman was the only Arab country to sup- port unequivocably Sadat's peace initiative with Israel. Two others who went along did so discreetly. The 'military intelligence sources: say that Sadat has already received assurances from Israel that if Egypt has to make a major commitment of troops to Oman, the Israelis will take up positions in the western desert of Egypt facing Libya as a deterrent to any Libyan ambitions to move in. Libya's Col. Mummar Kadafi has' openly threatened to "destroy" Sadat .. and would obviously contemplate making a move, were Egyptian: troops to leave their present frontier facing Libya. "Sadat would never leave those, positions unmanned," says one of . Sadat's generals. "He has firm assur-: ances from Israel, especially from (Israeli Defense Minister Ezer) threaten war against Israel without Egypt. In the chaotic atmosphere of in- security brought to the Middle East by the rise of Khomeini to power and Soviet interference stands as the tan, the Egyptian army single most powerful Moslem army By Dean Brelis Time-Life News Service At the start of the 1970s, Anwar Sadat. who had just replaced Camel Nasser as president of Egypt, was given very little chance of lasting more than a few months. Now, a decade later, Sadat remains president of Egypt and has accom- plished what had been considered impossible - peace with Israel. Along the way, Sadat has just about made himself the most unpop- ular leader in the Arab world - unpopular, that is, outside Egypt. Within his own country of 40 mil- lion, the path he has followed, namely peace with Israel, has re- ceived a favorable response from the majority of Egyptians. But in the rest of the Arab world, whether it be conservative Saudi Arabia or Kuwait, or radical Algeria, Libya or Iraq, he is rated "the most dangerous man in the Arab world." The reason: Sadat has refused to water down his peace initiative. He also spurned an offer of SS billion not to sign the Camp David accords and after the shah fell willingly paid host to the once-powerful monarch. Sadat, at the same time, described the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini as "a lunatic." As a result, contracts for Sadat's life have been put out by Marxist-oriented Palestinian groups. But Sadat remains alive and well, and as volatile and visionary as ever. How does one explain the man's sur- vival in what is essentially a hostile Arab world? To begin with, as Sadat himself has declared, it is impossible for any combination of Arab powers to Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501330001-9 ~U ~... r .?1I PAC, THE WASHINGTON POST 2 January 1980 Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, Unease in Oman MUSCAT, Oman-This anticommu- Similar reports come from intelli- nist, pro-Western redoubt on the Ara, even some Saudi services of otheals htin i aria bian peninsula's southern shore is con- vinced of Soviet complicity in the No. ' as much. While U.S. officials reject the vember assault against the Grand Omani report as evidence of a ten- Mosque in Mecca, deepening belief dency here to find Russians under here that the Russian bear is on the every bed, they concede the Mecca ter- march in the Persian Gulf. rorists got arms from South Yemen. Oman's leaders claim their ante erica Whatever the degree of Soviet com- leaves no doubt the liemra attack was plicity, it was taken here as evidence of hatched in communist South Yemen Moscow's arrogance. ,It stunned me," under Soviet auspices as an audacious ef- one Omani official told us. "I would fort to overthrow the conservative royal think the Russians would want to en- government of Saudi Arabia, the world's sure the reelection of a weak president richest oil state. To Oman. this represents like Carter, or better still, Kennedy, ultimate arrogance in the Kremlin and and not make any trouble. It shows just blatant disrespect for the United States how arrogant they are." in Its Iranian ordeaL Physical evidence of that arrogance Oman's answer is to intensify its ap- ! is the growing Soviet naval presence peal to the rich but nervous Persian here. According to Omani inteiliaencee. Gulf hereditary monarchies and to eight to 12 Soviet nuclear submarines, Western powers, particularly the are berthed in permanent pens in ! United States, for new aircraft and .. South Yemen alongside several surface ships to patrol the strategically vital ' ? warships. Straits of Hormuz against the expand-' Until recently, a Krivackclass Soviet Ing Soviet presence. But beyond hard-,4 destroyer (bristling. with electronic lis- ware, the Oman's want a tougher U.S. tening equipment) was on station in the posture since the United States permit- Straits of Hormuz, through which pass-, led the shah of Iran to fail and has suf. I es Persian Gulf oil destined for the fered the humiliation in Tehran. Western world. Lt. Tom Hammon, Brit While the Mecca assault stunned all e ish commander le-firing fast patrol boatsmt Oman's d td us it after-Baghdad's blast. But Omani offs-; vials claim many Arab states-includ jug Iraq-privately expressed interest in helping Oman police the straits.. "I can assure you," one official here told us, "we want no part of help from Iraq:' It does want help from the United States; an, aid package of defensive arms has been approved in the State Department. The recent U.S. delegation seeking emergency basing facilities re? ceived a warm-reception here: - Oman's position is a welcome for the ?j U.S. naval presence "just over the line of the horizon." Such force-out of sight, but nearby-reassured this thin. ly populated (around 500,000) nation., whose armed forces, though number- ing only about 15,000, are excellent by Mideast standards. Nevertheless, the sultan's government remains uneasy as It compares the Kremlin's arrogance with Jimmy Carter's restraint in this cauldron of world conflict. our0.r~.wsawep 1.i Inc. e Islam. it especially disconcert conservative sultanate of Oman, thanks was recently replaced by a Kotlin class to reports from its iatg erica service destroyer. "It doesn't ms mebohy out 1 (which, like its arm services, is run "They've always got by British officers). Those reports -,- there. ject the official Saudi attribution of the With the Iranian navy departed fol- attack to religious fanatics not con lowing the shah's fall, the only counter- nected with any foreign power. weight is Oman's competent but tiny Omani intelli a ce contends that the navy; Swhich tan troll the Qaboos, straits. Oman s ca a or the Mecca assault was trained ingly, in the People's Democratic Republic of old pro-Western ruler, has asked fl- Yemen (South Yemen), the Soviet out nancial help from the Gulf states and post on the Arabian peninsula. Al- the West to buy patrol boats, mine! though some arms were of British man- sweepers, helicopters and patrol ufacture for the purpose of "deniabil- planes. ublic criticism ity, they were supplied from South There was sharp p Yemenrthermore, Omani intelli-from leftist, heavily armed Iraq, which Bence contends that the attack on , decries Oman's breaking of Persian Mecca, if successful, was to be followed Gulf solidarity to endorse the Camp by uprisings at Medina and "other ; David accord. The-Gulf s jittery heredi- Oman places in Saudi Arabia." i tary states backed away from ; Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 FORMER CIA EMPLOYEES Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 :'... PPE A RED 0:+ I: rh THE NEW YORK TIMES 3 January 1980 U.S. Asks Judge to Bar Mr. Liech y's case "may be expected toI disclose information detrimental to the n~at:onal security, if not properly protect-' i CL A. Data Di'sclosurel Jan. 2 (UPI) - The Government asked a Federal district judge today to prevent a dismissed offi- cer of the Central Intelligence Agency from disclosing classified information, 1 including details of alleged South Korean payoffs to Congressmen. The former officer,. C. Philip Liechty, contends in a lawsuit against a former su- pervisor that he was dismissed because he kept prodding his superiors to turn over to the Justice Department infor:na- tion about South Korean payoffs to mem- bers of Congress. Mr. Liechty said that he : reported the information to high officials of the agency in 1974 The Justice Depart- ment did not begin a broad investigation into Korean influence-buying in Congress: until two years later. In court papers filed in in Alexandria, Va., the Justice Department argued that Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 ARTICLE APP IRIED ON FAGE-C. S_ THE WASHINGTON POST 3 January 18 IU.S. Acts to Enter Stilt, For Security Reasons The federal government asked yes- terday to intervene in a civil suit in- volving a former CIA agent and a cur- rent CIA agent to rrevent the possi- ble disclosure of unnamed national se- curity secrets. ' Federal officials asked U.S. District Judge Oren R. Lewis in Alexandria to -let the government join CIA agent Robert F. Bodroghy as a defendant in. the $2 million sander and defamation I of character suit brought against -Bo- droghy by former agent C. Philip Liechty. The suit concerns remarks Bodro- ghy allegedy made about Liechty dur- ing a child custody fight Liechtp-ls having with his estranged wife. In that suit; Liechy gave a deposition about purported national security' matters which- Lewis placed under seal at government request. The judge told Justice Department attorneys on Dec. 21 he would.-not take similiar actions on alleged,;tna- tional security.matters unless thegov- ernment officially entered the- case. Lewis scheduled a hearing ?on?'the government's motion for Friday. Liechty has said outside of court that CLA officials "covered up" infor- mation about attempts by Korean offi- cials to bribe American congressmen in the early 1970s. The CIA has de- clined:comment. - Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 A:,TICLE APPS' ON PAGE__ .441 THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE) 3 January 1980 U.S. Seeks W'st3er Gag in CdA Agent's Spit Lawyer Asks Disclosure Of Surveillance Data By Allan Frank Washington Star Staff Writer The U.S. government yesterday asked a federal judge to prevent for- mer CIA agent C. Philip Liechty, who served in South Korea, from divulg- ing any agency secrets in the course of a private lawsuit. At the same time, Sol Z. Rosen, Lie- cthy's attorney, asked that the government. be forced to disclose any surveillance it has conducted of him in connection with the case. Papers filed with Senior U.S. Dis- trict Judge Oren R. Lewis by the Jus- tice Department and the CIA ask the judge to forbid Liechty, who was a covert operations officer, from di-1, vulging any agency secrets. Liechty has said he objected to inadequate reporting by his CIA su- periors in South Korea in the early, 1970s of their knowledge of illegal payoffs by the Korean CIA to Ameri- can congressmen. . The Justice Department has asked Lewis to allow the government to enter a harassment and invasion of privacy lawsuit filed by Liechty against his former boss, Robert F. Bodroghy. The judge on Dec. 12 and Dec. 14 agreed to seal Liechty's answers to wrMen,questions from Bodroghy and to order Liechty not to disclose ; information in the depositions. At a Dec. 21 hearing, Lewis indi- cated he would entertain a motion from the government for a more- widespread gag order in the case. At that same hearing, Justice De- partment attorney Stanley D. Wright revealed that Rosen and Liechty'S other attorney, Thomas Fortune Fay, were being subjected to security checks. Papers filed by Rosen yester- day asked Lewis to order the govern- ment to disclose whether it has con- ducted any wiretaps of his office and home telephones and whether other surveillance of him has been con- ducted for the security check. Other papers filed by Fay and Rosen recently included excerpts of the questions that were asked of Bo- droghy during the taking of deposi- tions Dec. 27. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 MISCELLANEOUS Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 G:t2YCLE ti i' L.RD THE WASHINGTON POST PARADE MAGAZINE ON 30 December 1979 wafter Scott's Mika Q. Stanfield Turner, director of the CIA. seems to take a lot of flak from the pers. Isn't he bright? a former Rhodes scholar?- Bill Clair, San Diego. Cal. A. Admiral Turner is indeed bright. He was ranked No. 25 among 820 graduates of the U.S. Naval Academy, Class of '47. He and~~lamaiesJimmy it Carter both applied for Rhodes was Turner who was awarded one. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501330001-9 APTICL , Pi T's:I D THE ARLINGTON JOURNAL & GLOBE 26 December 1979 Names in the News s ooze For CA I Services The Director of Central Intelligence, I Adm. Stansfield Turner, has awarded the Distinguished Intelligence Medall posthu.Z-ously to Frank A. Briglia of Vienna in recognition of his outstand-i ing service to the Central Intelligence! Agency. Briglia, who was deputy' director of the CIA's Office of Re-1, search and Development, and his wife, ; N. Belle Briglia, were killed in an auto- mobile accident in August. The medal; which is the agency's; highest award for performance of out- standing service, was accepted by the) Briglias' four sons in a recent cere-, mony at CIA headquarters in Langley The citation accompanying the award commends Briglia for adding "newt analytic and collection capability to! the intelligence community" through] his "insight and persistence." Hiss engineering and managerial contribu tions to the-agency are described as! "reflecting the highest credit on him! and the United States government." 27A CZ17, Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501330001-9 ARTICLS 05 PAGE Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 WAS11I; GTO-' STAR 30 DECEIBER 1979 TheWorid Manila Holds 16 on Plot Charges MANILA, Philippines - Military authorities yes- terday announced the arrest of 16 persons al- legedly involved in a plot with American dissi- dents to topple the government, murder top offi- cials and set off bombs in Manila. The military also declassified secret documents in the supposed plot and said they had seized huge quantities of explosives and documents on urban terrorism marked "CIA." Metropolitan Manila Commander Brig. Gen. Prospero Olivas said he could not say if the initials referred to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. The 16 included a Philippine-born U.S. citizen, two Manila newspaper executives and 13 others. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501330001-9 ARTICLE AP'::Aii.trD THE WASHINGTON POST ON PAGE 91& 29 December 1979 Say, Defecting En'V.0Y efl 11i g . rke for Cairo inte ? position "in the service of the cial ies:" referring to nn li c d Debusma Did po By Bern Cameav 1978 Reuter the accords signed in September bel and States The , by the United -DAMASCUS, Syria. Dris zo- Syrian government, surprised by the Egypt. The agreements paved the peway ace resignation o` its ambassador to the for last 3larch's EbYPti'Israeli United Nations, accused him today ce pact, which is regarded as treason to with EgYPtiaa intelligence the Arab cause-by Syria and most collaborating and misusing his official position- other Arab states. Ambassador Hammoud Choufi an' Chouft's resignatiocoincided ath Party, a New his resignation. last - at night at which a which congress of opened the last Syrian Saturday against a New York news conference of Pre he accused the government re- a background of sectarian violence dent Hafez Assail of corruption, and widespread economic discontent: pression and the effounism. He said he At .least 120 people were reported to have died over the past six months could join the efforts to forge an op aimed chiefly at position front abroad. in violence aim members Choufi, 52, was the highest opow cier of the minority Moslem Moslem Ala`h'ite sect, to defect since Assad seized of which Assad is most prominent nine years ago. He has been ambassador representative. to Buenos Aires, Rome and Moscow, The government has blamed the and chief of the United States section Moslem Brotherhood, an extr `mister- panizatiQn pledged to fight at the Foreign Ministry. was The ministry said Choufi influence on Islam, for the violence. The state-run press has accused Saudi ordered home Dec. 7, after presenting and Jordan of training bro. views at the United Nations to heed the Arabia activists. fi said order an policy. He refused therhood and to heedd thhe order. of Foreign Affairs ad- At his news conference, Chou "The Ministry he believed the. only Lioni the a vised Choufi of its decision to tran s far problems lay built him to Damascus [ar.dl punish iable and formidable front, his involvement and collaboration tian upon the involvement of all pani peg- the intelligence service of the E,YP forces and sectors of the Syr regime," a statement said: Choufi, it added, misused his offi- ple." Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05S00620R000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 ARTICLE .1l'Pi::iitl:J ON ?AGE A 2a- THE NEW YORK TIMES 2 January 1980 A Bad Bill By William H. Schaap WASHINGTON - The parliamen- tary record is chillingly direct: This bill, the lawmaker admitted, "could subject a private citizen to criminal prosecution for disclosing unclassified information obtained from unclassi. fled sourcces." The quotation, however, is not from any Latin-Ame ican dicta. torship. nor from Eastern Europe; it is, unfortunately, from the Congres.. sional Record, and the speaker is the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, Edward P. Boland. In October, a bill known as the Intel- ligencce Identities Protection Act, was quietly introduced, and, if It passes, In. vestigative journalists and Govern. meat whistle.blowers are both in, for big trouble. The bill, proposed, authored and promoted by the Central Intelligence Agency, makes It a crime for anyone who has had access to Information that identifies undercover intelligence per- sonnel to disclose such Information, and also makes It a felony for anyone else to do so with the "Intent to impair or impede the foreign Intelligence no. tivites of the United States." ? The first provision would completely stifle criticism and reform from within the intelligence community; the seoaM would eliminate scrutiny . from the outside. Indeed, the bill would represent the Insidious begin- ning of an Official Secrets Act. It would criminal fze the writings of Philip Agee, John Stockwell, Frank Snapp and others. even though they ex- posed large scale violations at law, gh lying~Co thouthey laid bare ss, even though they to- tally belied the high aporal_tone of- This law would also strike at the heart of investigative journalism. For example, It would have criminalized the sciosure of regular C.I.A. pay- ments to King Hussein of Jordan; It would have prevented exposure of the key role the C.I.A. and military intelli- gence played In torture and murder In Vietnam; it would have prohibited ex. posoze of the backgrounds of the Intel- agents involved In Watergate. That the bill is "limited" to informa- tion that Identifies officers and agents is of little significance. It is virtually impossible to expose Illegal or im- moral activity within government : without disclosing who is responsible for, or involved with, the illegalities. The requirement that journalists' activity, to be criminal, be carried out with intent to impede intelligence as tivities is another spsokeecreen. From the C.IA's, and from a prosecution's, viewpoint, any disclosures would be considered an impediment to opera,- ti; the motiv of the disclow would be of little real significance. What is more, the bill is rot even lim- . Ited to the protection of legal active- tiee. This bill is unnecessary and unwise. Even the Justice Department advised against it, noting that existing espio- nage lawradequately protect national security. Laws such as this must be strictly limited to protecting what is in fact se. . cret, and to what is in fact damaging to the national security. Anything more represents a serious infringement of the FirstAmendment. This Is the difference between the laws and the Constitution of this cam- try and those of countries that have Of- ficial Secrets Acts. Such laws allow the government to prohibit the disclosure of information that the government declares to be secret - regardless of reality. Such laws shield immoral and illegal conduct; they-are not aimed at external: enemies, but at whistle- blowers and reformers In government, and at journaliists outside. We must be aware of this attack on our rights and our responsibilities. William H. Schaap, a lawyer, is co.edt- tar (with Ellen Ray and Louis oif) of the CovertActfon Information Bulle- tin. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 11; ?AGE, TO THE POINT 14 DECEKLER 1979 SP AL REP OR " UNITED STATES Pilaying more and more ~nm?E hands By Allan C Brownfeld IN the US, many today hold the view that in the late Forties and Fifties Americans overestimated the.aggresslve intentions and subversive be- haviour of the Soviet Union and Its agents in the US. The view is wide- spread, In addition, that no real threat to the national security exists at the present time and, as a result, that it Is entirely proper to dismantle the internal security apparatus which has been, many argue, a threat to civil liberties. In an important new book Self Destruct, Dis- mantling America's Internal Security (Ar- lington House, 1979), Robert Morris takes sharp exception to these prevailing views. He believes that the Soviet Union, from the end of World War Two until today, has striven all too successfully to weaken the US, with a view to its ultimate destruction. He shows how the US, for a variety of masons, has become a party to the on-going process of its own destruction. Robert Morris is well qualified to tell this story. During World \Var Two he served as an officer in Naval Intelligence and in 1950 be- came chief counsel to the Senate Internal Se- curity Subcommittee. It was largely the record he compiled as chief counsel that inspired the House of Delegates of the American Bar As- sociation to commend the sub-committee for its work over the years. He has also been a judge in New York City, president of the University of Dallas and president and founder of the Univer- sity of Piano. In his foreword, William Rusher, publisher of National Review, writes: "Some people may choose to scoff at Morris's deep concern as dated or old-hat - but have they looked at the world around them? Since Morris last retired as chief counsel to the Internal Security Sub- committee in 1958, the Soviet Union has: "Drawn at least abreast of the US as a milit- ary superpower. 'Established a spacious island base just 120 km off the coast of Florida. "Come within inches of taking full control of Indonesia and Chile. "Drawn India into its orbit. "Quarter-backed the communist conquest of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. "Erupted with permanent naval forces and bases into both the Mediterranean and the In- dian Ocean. "Deployed at least 30000 surrogate Cuban troops on half-a-dozen fronts all over Africa- and nonetheless persuaded bemused Republi- can and Democratic administrations alike to believe it is sincere about wanting 'detente'. If what we have been witnessing is 'detente', no wonder the Russians want it!" Morris points out that, "Within the brief time-interval of 20 years, the position of the US has declined from that of the undisputed leader of a confident world alliance of free peoples to that of a beleaguered island in a rising sea of totalitarian despotism ... When I left Washington early in 1958, security agencies were maintaining surveillance over subver- sives. Today. the subversives are discrediting security agents. Colonel Rudolph Abel, the Soviet spy, was arrested and convicted then. Today former FBI officials L Patrick Gray, W Mark Felt and Edward S Miller are under in- dictment for measures undertaken to track down the terrorist Weathermen." The decline of the US capacity b protect its internal security is indeed dramatic. In 1958, the US was protected internally by several committees of the Congress, the Subversive Activities Control Board, the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice, the counter-intelligence departments of the army, navy, air force and coast guard, counter- intelligence departments of law enforcement agencies, including police departments, and of course the Fet and the CIA. Now, in 1979, the House and Senate internal security committees, the Subversive Activities Control Board and the internal security division of the Justice Department have all been abolished. In addition, writes Morris, "L counter-intelligence departments of the armed forces and of law enforcement agencies have been emasculated, and many o our leaders are trying to strithe FBI of its intelligence: gathering function and to weaken the role of the A. AlI of this has not come about because the threat from the Soviet. Union has declined. Moms shows the reader in great detail that it has, in fact, increased. He points out, however. "One of the first purposes of a conspiracy is to convince its targets that no conspiracy exists. The misinformation, camouflage and inces- sant propaganda of the communist apparatus, neatly complemented by the self-deception and gullibility on our own part, have conditioned us to accept with indifference the growth of a meance to our very existence. "And as this threat, now clear aqd unmistak- able, becomes more proximate and more omin- ous, a strange response is setting in. Instead of shoring up our defences in the face of such a threat, we are dismantling our ramparts and treating as meddlesome extremists those who would halt that dismantling." It is Morris's view that the nation's internal security requires the maintenance of an intelligence-gathering organisation that can as- sess the strength, the motivation and the inten- tions of every real or potential enemy. The US, he argues, must also maintain a counter- F' 1. M S . - - am, NEW &A It ti law liortasie sae':riat se trirn~ f intelligence force that will preserve it from misinformation from tenG enemies, rom their etration of the U s and from the disloyalty or ineptness o its operatives. US intelligence has, in recent years: lamely failed to understand what the Soviet Union was doing ewor -an what was taking place in strots a-spots as Iraa and Nicaragua. Major-General George Keegan, former head of US Air Force Intelligence, stated that "During the past five years, I have watched at first-hand the culmination of 25 years of consistent under- estimates of the Soviet threat ..." General Keegan's explanation for this at- mosphere is that estimates of Soviet strength have been deliberately understated and falsified to conform to what the politicians want to hear. This grim book should cause its readers much concern. When before in history has a country under concerted attack, dismantled its means of defence? Robert Morris hopes that it is not too late to restore the nation to sanity. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9 ARTICLE AM MUD on PAGB__,A_, ?.... THE WASHINGTON POST 1 January 1980 The lightning superbolt was described as "un- likely,". because Its signature is nothing like what was written in the sky the night of Sept. 22. What the satellite saw was a double pulse of light that is.the'Characteristic fingerprint of a nuclear ex- plosion, in which a fireball briefly disappears when the shock. wave makes it opaque from space, then reappears when the wave dissipates. The panel covened by the White House has also concluded. that a? lightning strike quickly followed by a meteor burning up in the atmosphere does not ?explain.the event of Sept. 22. Said one White House source: "The statistical chance of that happening got bad very quickly -once we started looking at it." Despite the evidence that an atomic explosion took place Sept. 22, the White House has not dis- banded its panel of seven experts. The White House will convene the panel at least once more after it has researched even the remote possibility that the Vela satellite may have mistaken a double glint ;of `A-Blrxst' was 1?TT Lightning dolt, P~n~i Decides By Thomas:O'Tonle wasn-nvtoa past awt writer A board of outside experts narned by the White House- to decide whether an ato nie explosion took place near South Africa Sept. 22 has ruled out al- most every other explanation for the event. In. a.,mrrting convened by the Rhite House Office of Science Policy just before Christmas, the panel of seven unidentified experts concluded there was no reason to suspect that the .Veia satellite which - spotted . the. Sept. 22 event. had malfunctioned, or that, what the satellite saw was 'caused by an ener moyts strike of lightning, as another theory- sag-. gested. . `'The signal the satellite saw, s4ilt looks in. every. way'[ike' a nuclear explosion in the atmosphere," one White House source said. "The trouble is, -we still have no absolutely no separate data that would corroborate that it was an atomic explosion.". The most.- solid such data .vo'eld be radioactive fallout from the explosion, which took .place (if it was-an explosion) . in the middle of the night Sept. 22 above- a wide expanse of the Scuth Atlantic and Indian oceans. The nearest country to the source of the explosion was South '.Afrie:q, which led to wide speculation that the South .Africans had exploded:. their first atomic bomb. Late in. November, New Zealand thought it had detected fallout in its rainwater. but -officials re- tracted that statement shortly- thereafter, saying they' coaid not be sure. One organization in New Zealand- that measures radioactivity around the coon.. tryside said it had seen no evidence of fallout. Some.* scientists suggested the Vela satellite had made.a.mistake, either by malfunctioning or mistak ing,.a ; `superbolt" of lightning= in the clouds above x? the ocean for a nuclear explosion: The panel con- the.Whlte House was asked to look care- Iully_.into each possibility. ? .. . At the meeting, convened= by the White House be- tore Christmas, the outside panel just about ruled out these possibilities:: White House sourees:said the panel concluded the _ satellite was- is excellent working condition. Each time the satellite was interrogated from the ground, the sources said, it returned the' correct informa- tion. What'r more, the satellite has never repeated its Sept, 22, observation, suggesting it saw- a real event in'the skies near South Attica that night, ? sunlight off another satellite. Approved For Release 2009/04/27: CIA-RDP05SO062OR000501330001-9