NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05S02029R000300830001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 63
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 12, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part-Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/11: CIA-RDP05S02029R000300830001-2
Directorate of
Intelligence
-"Secrets
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Near East and
South Asia Review
12 September 1986
Se
NESA NESAR 86-021
12 September 1986
Copy 322
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Near East and
South Asia Review
12 September 1986
Page
Articles Middle East and North Africa:
The Challenge of the Regional Recession
If OPEC states continue to comply with the recent agreement on
lower production quotas, employment prospects improve, and
regional leaders can tap the private sector for nonoil investment,
growth probably will rebound in 1987. Otherwise, the regional
economic outlook will remain weak and. raise prospects for domestic
unrest in some states.
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Saudi Arms Diversification: Prospects and Implications
Saudi Arabia is diversifying its sources of military assistance in
order to limit its historical reliance on the United States and to
guarantee a constant supply of weapons for its military
modernization program. This program will most likely reduce Saudi
military capabilities over the next five years.
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Bahrain: Looking for a New Best Friend
Bahrain has concluded that it cannot rely on Saudi Arabia to
protect its interests, and the government has launched a campaign to
expand ties to the United States and dramatically increase
purchases of US weapons. Closer military relations, however, are
likely to be opposed by Bahrain's Shia majority.
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Morocco: Status of Military Modernization
King Hassan is continuing to pursue a $1 billion military
modernization program to address his country's military imbalance
vis-a-vis Algeria and to meet increasing equipment needs in Western
Sahara, but Morocco's weak economy and the absence of foreign
funding hamper the King's efforts.
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NESA NESAR 86-021
12 September 1986
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Algeria: Bendjedid Versus the Hardliners
Radicals within the Algerian Government are beginning to
challenge President Chadli Bendjedid. He is not in serious danger of
being ousted, but he almost certainly will be compelled to pay
greater attention to the demands of his opponents.
Syria: Vice President Meat Assad Down But Not Out
Rif at Assad remains in self-imposed exile in Paris, where his
personal diplomacy, public comments, and other activities have
conflicted with but not fully contradicted the policies of the Syrian
regime. Rif at's actions are geared toward creating an image of an
international statesman and undercutting his rivals in Syria
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Syrian Air and Air Defense Forces: Developments
and Prospects
Damascus is expanding its early warning and air defense systems,
stressing joint air and air defense exercises, and pressing the Soviets
for more and new equipment. This drive probably will enhance
Syrian capabilities but will not result in the qualitative gains needed
to put the Syrians on a par with the Israelis.
23
Israel: Labor's Appeal to Sephardim
Israel's Labor Party is intensifying its effort to cultivate support
from the Sephardim, who now constitute a majority of Israel's
Jewish electorate. Labor's success will depend largely on its ability
to shed its exclusivist Ashkenazi image in favor of a more
equalitarian party offering Sephardim a viable alternative to Likud.
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Israel's National Religious Party: Still a Coalition Key
Secret
High hopes for reform were dashed at the recent National Religious
Party convention, which was marked by infighting that almost led
to a split. But with Israel's next election likely to produce another
dead heat between Labor and Likud, even a split NRP probably
will still play a key role in determining who leads the next
government.
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Jordan: Friends in the Occupied Territories Caught 37
in the Middle
King Hussein's steps to increase his influence in the Israeli-occupied
West Bank and Gaza have caught Jordan's supporters in the middle.
He is offering a range of financial inducements to foster a leadership
loyal to Jordan and willing to negotiate with Israel, but so far his
efforts have encouraged Palestinians to rally behind PLO chief
Arafat.
Pakistan: Government Weathers Current Unrest
Prime Minister Junejo and President Zia still have a clear upper
hand over Benazir Bhutto and her Pakistan People's Party, who are
trying to force new elections. Junejo will probably be able to
continue to fend her off through a combination of force and legal
action and is counting on rivals of Bhutto to divide the opposition.
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Sri Lanka: The Return of Sirimavo Bandaranaike
Since returning to the public arena, former Prime Minister Sirimavo
Bandaranaike has spearheaded her party's opposition to most of the
government's political initiatives and has been particularly
nettlesome during the peace negotiations with Tamil moderates.
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India's Space Satellite Worries
India has asked the West European government consortium
Arianespace to launch its INSAT-IC satellite following the canceled
launch of the US space shuttle and Washington's refusal to make
available an expendable launch vehicle. Further delay would disrupt
the INSAT program and reinforce Indian doubts about US
reliability.
India's Attempts To Meet Its Rural Energy Needs
New Delhi's programs to boost agricultural output and encourage
local small-scale industry have increased rural energy demand,
which has led to extensive deforestation. To reduce the demand for
firewood, New Delhi is expanding electricity generation to many
rural areas and trying to take advantage of alternative energy
sources.
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Gorkhaland: Creating Tensions in India's Northeast
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi is facing new separatist activity in
India's northeast. The Gorkha National Liberation Front is seeking
the creation of a separate state?Gorkhaland?to guarantee the
rights and privileges of Indian citizens of Nepalese origin.
Declining Health Services in Iran
55
The provision of health services in Iran is deteriorating because of
the war, severe shortages of foreign exchange, and Islamic doctrine.
There are no indications that Iran's health care will improve, and
most Iranians have little choice but to endure.
Brief Tunisia: Economic Reform Efforts
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63
Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents
normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single analyst; these items
will be designated as noncoordina ted views.
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Near East and
South Asia Review
Articles
Middle East and North Africa:
The Challenge of the
Regional Recession
An estimated decline in real economic activity of 4 to
5 percent in 1986?compared with 3 to 4 percent
growth in 1983 and 1984?plagues the Middle East
and North Africa. If OPEC states continue to comply
with the recent agreement on lower production
quotas, employment prospects improve, and regional
leaders can tap the private sector for nonoil
investment, growth probably will rebound in 1987.
Otherwise, the regional economic outlook will remain
weak and raise prospects for domestic unrest in some
states. The poorer states probably will request further
aid from the United States.
The Downturn
Hard currency earnings plummeted during the first
half of 1986 in the Middle East and North Africa and
show few signs of improvement over the remainder of
the year:
? Revenues from the sale of oil and petrochemicals?
which together are by far the major source of
foreign exchange earnings in the region?have
fallen as much as 50 percent in some countries
because of the weak oil market. Nonoil producers
also have been hurt because of the price decline for
such resources as phosphates and natural gas.
? Worker remittances to labor-exporting countries
probably will drop by about one-third from their
1985 level. As Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf
states are slowing construction projects, expatriates
are leaving because of decreased job opportunities.
Egypt and Sudan, in particular, are faced with the
difficult task of providing returnees with housing
and jobs.
? Tourism?an important moneymaker for Egypt,
Morocco, and Tunisia?has declined because of the
fear of terrorism.
1
? The lower value of the dollar also has substantially
reduced the real value of current oil earnings and
has eroded the value of a large portion of overseas
investments.
Symptoms of poor economic performance are evident
throughout North Africa and the Middle East.
Business failures are becoming more common. Banks
throughout the Gulf are awash with bad loans
because Arab debtors are delaying repayment of
principal and interest. Some banks are reluctant to
grant more credit, further depressing economic
activity. Capital flight continues as investors seek
higher rates of interest and greater political stability
abroad. Inflation is running at about 20 percent in
North Yemen and Iran.
Severe labor force problems lie ahead for many area
governments. Unemployment and underemployment
are at least 30 percent in Algeria, Iran, Morocco, and
Tunisia. Unemployment is compounded by the return
of large numbers of foreign workers to countries such
as Egypt and Sudan.
The younger generation faces particularly tough
times. Population growth is rapid-3.5 percent in
Kuwait and 3.3 percent in Jordan?and in several
nations over half of the population is under 25. In
many cases, untrained young people cannot compete
with more highly skilled and lower paid South Asians
seeking jobs in the region. Women also have been hit
hard by tight labor markets. In Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, and Oman, women increasingly are as well
educated as men but do not have the same job
opportunities because of cultural prohibitions. The
economic decline has reinforced these prohibitions.
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NESA NESAR 86-021
12 September 1986
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Middle East and North Africa: Regional Recession
Note scale change
Real GDP Growth Foreign Exchange Current Account
Rate? Reservesb Balanceb
Percent
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
Billion US $
80
60
40
Billion US $
11)
-10
Budget Deficit
Billion US $
25
0
- 20
20 50
-30
-6 1982 83 84 85 86c 87c 0 1982 8 84 85 86c 87c -40 1982 83 84 8) 86c 8 1Q81 8" 84 85 86c 87c
, Weighted average, estimated.
b Estimated.
Projected.
310251 8 86
Middle East and North Africa
Portugal
Spain
Western
Sahara
Yugoslavia
Italy
Alban
c/unisia
)
Malta
Libya
Greece Turkey
Mauritania
Senegal
--ta The
ti
Guinea 9shsau
Guinea
Sierra Leone ivory Togo Benin Nigeria
Liberia Coast Ghana( (
Mali
whine
Cyprus .,Syria),/
Lebanon / Iraq
\c't)rigan
Egypt
Sudan
Soviet Union
Iran
Bahrain Ornan
(tater
UAE
Saudi
Arabia
P.D.R.Y.
(South
Yemen)
(North
Verne"
O soo lop, Kilometers
O 1000 Miles
560
ASomalia
Oman
Secret
2
708391 (547686) 8-86
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Expatriate Worker Remittances Billion US $
1982
1983
1984
1985a
1986a
Total
4.95
6.26
6.90
6.57
4.51
Egypt
1.94
3.17
3.93
3.78
2.00
Jordan
0.93
0.92
1.05
1.03
0.90
North
Yemen
1.18
1.13
1.06
0.94
0.87
Sudan
0.11
0.25
0.25
0.23
0.14
Syria
0.42
0.44
0.30
0.30
0.35
Tunisia
0.37
0.35
0.31
0.29
0.25
a Estimated.
Lower foreign exchange earnings are barely adequate
to maintain imports of essential consumer and
military goods in some countries. Shortages or black
markets could become more of a problem in Iran,
Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and Syria. Some regimes
postponed completing their budgets because of
uncertain oil revenues. Libya, Oman, Saudi Arabia,
and Tunisia have been forced to devalue their
currencies.
Efforts To Cope
To contend with large budget and current account
deficits, most governments have used a combination
of reducing subsidies and salaries, cutting back
development expenditures, and slashing imports.
Some regimes have tried to increase revenues by
raising customs duties and licensing fees. Austerity
measures, however, generally have not been tough
enough. Poorer nations have relied heavily on
continued Saudi aid and foreign borrowing to muddle
through rather than face the difficult economic and
political decisions that present conditions demand.
Non-Saudi aid and loans to the region probably will
dry up unless recipients implement stricter reforms.
Egypt, Mauritania, North Yemen, and Sudan almost
certainly will ask for more aid from the United States.
Richer countries, such as Saudi Arabia and the
smaller Gulf states, have bought time by drawing
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down foreign exchange reserves. Reserves in Saudi
Arabia and Oman probably will shrink
dramatically-by almost 30 percent in 1986. These
states will have to rethink this course and enforce
more rigid austerity measures if the oil market does
not turn around.
There have been some positive trends. A few countries
highly dependent on imported oil-particularly
Lebanon, Morocco, and Sudan-have benefited from
lower oil prices. Furthermore, regional borrowers will
save a small portion-about $1 billion-of their
collective interest payment obligations in 1986
because of lower interest rates.
A number of governments increasingly are calling for
more free market competition and privatization to
boost economic growth, according to Embassy
reporting. Such policy developments are unusual in
the Middle East, where postcolonial governments
traditionally have distrusted market forces. Bahrain
hopes to establish a regional stock exchange where
successful public-sector companies would be
privatized and shares would be traded by Gulf state
nationals. Some leaders in Morocco are promoting
industry deregulation. Saudi Arabia is encouraging
private investors to match the government's funding
of some development projects. Saudi Government
agencies also have contracted with local companies to
improve existing infrastructure. Despite these moves,
the poor outlook for the economy and oil revenues has
discouraged private domestic investment and
promoted capital flight.
Prospects
Under a scenario of continued OPEC compliance with
lower production quotas, oil prices probably will
strengthen but still remain volatile. Given higher oil
revenues, modest improvements in government
efficiency, and private-sector investment, positive real
GDP growth of 2 percent could be achieved next year.
On the other hand, regional economic and political
difficulties will mount if the OPEC agreement
collapses. A prolonged recession would weaken
political support for regimes such as Iran, Iraq, and
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Libya, where living standards have fallen off sharply
in recent years. Although economic difficulties could
provide the stimulus for destabilizing unrest in Egypt
and Sudan, the recession alone is unlikely to produce
instability in other countries in the region because
generally strong domestic security forces discourage
organized protest.
Remittances probably will level off rather than
continuing their dramatic decline even if the OPEC
agreement does not hold. Saudi Arabia and the
smaller Gulf states would like to reverse their
dependence on expatriate labor but are constrained
for several reasons:
? Nationals are unwilling to do manual labor?which
they consider demeaning?or are not appropriately
trained for jobs that expatriates now hold.
? Demand for maintenance and operational staff
remains high outside the construction sector.
? Influential groups within the native populations?
particularly landlords and merchants?have vested
interests in maintaining their incomes by keeping a
large immigrant population.
Continued reliance by the Arab Gulf states on
expatriate labor could relieve pressure on labor-
sending countries in the Middle East and North
Africa that have suffered from the recent drop in
remittances.
A prolonged recession probably will aggravate
existing problems in regional labor markets and
present further impediments to economic growth.
Disaffection?especially among unemployed and
underemployed young people and women?will grow
unless regional governments train local labor more
effectively, create more jobs, and permit freer entry
into the labor force.
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Saudi Arms Diversification:
Prospects and Implications
Saudi Arabia is diversifying its sources of military
assistance in order to limit its historical reliance on
the United States and to guarantee a constant supply
of weapons for its military modernization program.
US Congressional opposition to Saudi arms purchases
has led Riyadh to question Washington's reliability as
a source of weapons. Although Riyadh will continue
to rely on the United States as its ultimate security
guarantor, it will expand its defense relationships with
West European and other nations. This arms
diversification program will most likely reduce Saudi
military ,capabilities over the next five years and at
the same time weaken US influence with the Saudi
armed forces.
Roots of Diversification
Riyadh
views the recent debate in the US Congress over the
sale of military equipment to Saudi Arabia as another
exercise in "Arab bashing" and as further evidence
that Washington no longer is serious about
maintaining a strong US-Saudi security relationship.
As a result, the Saudis are coming to the conclusion
that the United States is an unreliable supplier of
military hardware that cannot be counted on to
continue flows of equipment once original contracts
have expired. Moreover, we believe Saudi Arabia
greatly resents the US refusal to sell Stinger missiles
shortly after providing the same weapons to various
"freedom fighters" around the world.
Riyadh's initial steps toward diversification actually
began several years ago. In 1980, Saudi Arabia signed
a $5.2 billion naval expansion contract with the
French. Since then, Riyadh has contracted for at least
$14.3 billion worth of military goods and services
from non-US companies, including a $7.5 billion
package for British Tornados that the Saudis settled
for after the United States refused to furnish
additional F-15 fighter aircraft.
The growing sophistication of West European
weapons and the technical expertise found in newly
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industrialized countries is giving Saudi Arabia new
flexibility in military purchases. In the past, Saudi
requirements for top-of-the-line military hardware
could be filled only by US suppliers. In the last few
years, however, West European arms manufacturers
have developed systems that equal, and sometimes
surpass, similar weapons produced in the United
States. In addition, the spread of US weapons around
the world has built up a large corps of technicians
from newly industrialized nations who can replace US
contractors on such systems as the F-5.
Impact on Capabilities
In our view, Riyadh's diversification efforts will
reduce its military capabilities over at least the next
five years because major purchases of non-US
weapons will prove difficult to integrate into the
predominantly US-supplied Saudi armed forces:
? Training. Diversification will require that soldiers
become familiar with completely new weapon
systems. The Saudis have already experienced
problems in retraining crews from US-built to
French-built ships since the two systems are
fundamentally different. The French also have had
difficulties in training Saudis because English must
be used as an intermediary language between
French and Arabic.
? Logistics. Saudi Arabia will have to establish
additional supply networks, as well as adequate
supplies of spare parts, ordnance, and support
equipment, to augment its present US-style system.
? Maintenance. Readiness rates for Saudi military
equipment will suffer because maintenance crews?
already in critically short supply?probably cannot
become proficient in several different weapon
systems simultaneously. In addition, some West
European systems, such as the Tornado, require
significantly more maintenance than their US
counterparts.
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8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
Saudi Arabia: Military Contracts By Supplier
Million US$
,0-11
*Estimated
? Command and Control. Saudi Arabia's efforts to
diversify will limit the effectiveness of its US-
designed command and control network. Much of
the radar and communication equipment that comes
with non-US systems will be unable to communicate
with the highly centralized Saudi communication
system.
Impact on Policy and Pocketbook
Diversification will reduce Saudi Arabia's reliance on
the United States and make it less vulnerable because
of arms request rejections by Washington. Moreover,
West European suppliers place no restrictions on the
use or basing of equipment. By having several sources
of supply, Riyadh can virtually guarantee a constant
flow of military equipment in the future.
Furthermore, foreign suppliers of weaponry will
almost certainly be able to respond to Saudi requests
more quickly than the United States.
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*3A* 0 ,0*
.US
r N
*AA
Non-US
Advanced weapons purchases from other countries
will, in our view, be more expensive in the long term
than comparable US systems. The cost of the
complete new logistic infrastructure will more than
equal any savings attained on the unit cost of the
weapon. The Tornado, for example, will ultimately
cost at least twice as much as the F-15.
Regional Implications
Riyadh probably hopes that its efforts to diversify
arms sources will reduce criticism from other Arab
states, particularly the more radical states that have
long criticized the Saudis for their close security ties
to Washington. Over the years, states such as Libya,
Iran, and the Yemens have complained that Riyadh's
close relationship with Washington is inconsistent
with its role as impartial mediator in Arab affairs. As
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a result, Riyadh probably believes that a cooling of
the US-Saudi "special relationship" will help its
image in the Arab world and improve its standing as a
regional power.
Saudi Arabia's arms diversification policy will have a
mixed impact on the other Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) members. By increasing its purchases from
France and the United Kingdom, the Saudis will be
advancing GCC military standardization since most
of the other Gulf states rely on these countries for
their military hardware. In time of crisis,
standardization will improve military cooperation
between the GCC states, both within the context of
the GCC Rapid Deployment Force and on a bilateral
basis, such as Saudi resupply of Kuwait.
Since Riyadh acts as the security guarantor for the
smaller Gulf states, however, the decrease in Saudi
Arabia's military capability will negatively affect
GCC security. The GCC Rapid Deployment Force,
despite its embryonic moves toward standardization,
will not be able to adequately defend the Gulf states
from their militarily superior neighbors and will
continue to rely upon Saudi Arabia for the bulk of
their military strength. Any diminution of Saudi
military power, therefore, will decrease the GCC's
ability to defend itself.
Implications for the United States
We believe that Saudi Arabia will continue to
diversify its military purchases toward European and
Third World suppliers. Although small US military
sales will continue, future prospects for multibillion-
dollar contracts are slim. Within the next five years
Saudi Arabia may sign several large contracts for a
variety of military equipment including tanks,
helicopters, submarines, and fighter aircraft. The
United States is a serious contender only in the
competition for helicopter sales. In addition, service
contracts for previously delivered equipment, once
mainstays of the US defense relationship with Saudi
Arabia, will continue to be awarded to other
countries.
Riyadh's decision to diversify its sources of weapons
also may affect US military capabilities in the region.
In the past the Saudis purchased more ordnance and
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spare parts than required for their defense, meaning
that a ready supply of compatible ammunition,
equipment, and spare parts was potentially available
to the United States in a regional crisis. Although this
stockpile will remain for a number of years, in the
long run fewer US-compatible weapons will be
available as Saudi Arabia replaces its stocks with
newer West European weapons.
The US ability to influence indirectly Saudi military
policy will diminish as the kingdom's reliance on US
weaponry decreases. When supplying sophisticated
weapon systems, the United States can place
constraints on the Saudi military in several ways,
including:
? Restricting the use and deployment of the weapons
so as not to threaten the security of Israel.
? Mandating adequate security to protect the weapons
from theft for possible use by terrorists.
? Controlling to whom Saudi Arabia might sell the
weapons by requiring prior US approval.
Reductions in the number of US military advisers will
also decrease US leverage in Saudi Arabia. For years
the United States has benefited from extensive
contacts with the Saudi Government through
programs such as the US Military Training Mission.
An influx of West European weapon systems,
trainers, and technicians will probably displace some
US military training personnel.
Saudi arms diversification will result in billions of
dollars in military contracts, which previously would
have gone to US firms, to be made with West
European and Third World countries. US defense
contractors in Saudi Arabia have already been forced
to reduce drastically the number of workers in the
country. Moreover, the cost to the United States of
sophisticated weapon systems, such as the F-15, could
increase as reduced overseas sales cause unit
production costs to rise.
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Bahrain and Qatar have been contesting ownership of the
Hawar Island group at least since 1939, when Great
Britain awarded Hawar to Bahrain,which maintains small
military and police contingents on some of the islands.
Hawar itself is a barren island, and the only other
inhabitants are transient fishermen. It does not possess
any significant oil or gas deposits, but both countries
would like to exploit potential offshore drilling sites.
Gulf Cooperation 0_
eil States
EGYPT
SAUDI ARABI&
IRAN
BAHRAIN
TA
SUDAN
YAR P.D.R.Y.
//ETHIOPIAgIBOUTI
0 A 4.
AN
*MANAMA
Hawar
Aland
Disputed between
Bahrain and Qatar
707686 4-8E
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Fasht ad Mal
(reef)
Reef seized by
Qatar, 26 April
tE4
Amen? Seized by
Island Qatar, 28 April
Qatar
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Bahrain: Looking for a
New Best Friend
Bahrain has concluded that it cannot rely on Saudi
Arabia to protect its interests, and the government
has launched a campaign to expand ties to the United
States and dramatically increase purchases of US
weapons. Closer military relations with the United
States, however, are likely to be opposed by Bahrain's
Shia majority. In addition, declining oil revenue and
dwindling financial reserves will pose economic
limitations to an arms buildup.
Desperately Seeking Someone
Humiliated over its inability to recapture the Fasht ad
Dibal reef from Qatar and distressed by Saudi
Arabia's reluctance to play a more supportive role
during the recent dispute, Manama is actively seeking
increased US weaponry and lessened dependence on
Riyadh. According to the US Embassy, Crown Prince
Hamad, commander of the Bahrain Defense Force
(BDF), recently offered to grant the United States
access to military facilities and pre-positioning rights
if requests for 12 F-16 aircraft and other military
items were approved. Hamad also suggested the
possibility of building US military facilities in the
Hawar Island group, which?like Fasht ad Dibal?
Bahrain and Qatar both claim.
Manama's Misconceptions
Bahrain's belief that it must expand its relationship
with the United States stems from the Fasht ad Dibal
dispute. Manama was confident that Riyadh would
side with Bahrain militarily and diplomatically after
the attack by Qatar. The Saudis did neither. Manama
now believes that Saudi Arabia, by failing to act
decisively on Bahrain's behalf, can no longer be
considered a reliable ally. In our view, such beliefs are
misguided because Riyadh sees Bahrain's security as
vital to its own strategic interests and would quickly
come to its aid in the event of a serious external
threat. The fall of Bahrain would threaten Saudi
oilfields that lie just 30 kilometers away on the
mainland. For the same reason, King Fahd probably
would try to intervene in a domestic crisis that
threatened the stability of the Al Khalifa regime.
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Secret
The Fasht ad Dibal Dispute
The British Government in 1947 awarded Fasht ad
Dibal to Bahrain, which at the time was under British
rule. Qatar protested the decision and continued to
press its claim to the reef, which is located on Qatar's
continental shelf. In 1965 Bahrain agreed to
international arbitration to resolve the dispute, but
the case never made it to a tribunal.
On 26 April 1986, Qatari troops seized Fasht ad
Dibal, where Bahrain was building an early warning
radar site. Qatar, which claimed the reef was to be
used as a Bahraini coast guard station, captured it
and 29 foreign workers without resistance. The US
Embassy reported that Bahrain's decision not to use
its Defense Force lowered respect for the BDF and
forced the government to turn to Riyadh to negotiate
a settlement.
Manama expected Saudi support because it believed
it was the victim of an unprovoked attack and
because of its close ties to Riyadh. The Saudis have
provided extensive military aid to Manama and are
paying for the Bahrain-Saudi causeway in its
entirety. Saudi neutrality in the dispute, therefore,
was viewed by Manama as a breach of faith.
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The dispute has not been fully resolved, but some
progress has been made. Qatar released its prisoners
and withdrew its forces in exchange for Manama's
commitment to destroy the radar site. The case still
has not reached international arbitration, primarily
because Bahrain wants all discussions held within a
Gulf Cooperation Council framework.
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Although Bahrain believes additional weapons
purchases will help it reach military equality with the
other small Gulf states, its primary obstacle is
manpower, not equipment. According to the US
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Embassy, Bahrain's 300- to 400-man Air Force is
having problems supporting four F-5 aircraft, and
additional aircraft would require a dramatic increase
in expatriate manpower. Bahrain has been
constrained in its domestic recruiting because the
ruling family wants to ensure that the military
remains dominated by Sunnis, who are regarded as
more trustworthy than Bahraini Shias.
Manama also desires closer ties to Washington
because of a growing belief that Iran will win the war
with Iraq. Manama understands that with its
70-percent Shia majority, it would be an easy target
for increased Iranian aggression and subversion.
Bahrain, however, can never hope to defend against
an all-out Iranian attack?an event we believe
unlikely?by itself. Subversion also will be a problem
regardless of the outcome of the war, and weapons
purchases alone will not reduce that threat.
Guns or Butter
The cost of Manama's arms buildup would be felt
most by Bahrain's economically neglected Shia
majority. Manama can afford the military purchases
it is contemplating only with continued Gulf
Cooperation Council support and sharp cuts in
domestic spending. Reduced expenditures, coupled
with an already depressed economy, would prompt
tremendous criticism from both Shias and Sunnis and
increase the possibility for unrest.
Bahrain's economic choices would become even more
difficult if Riyadh refused to underwrite the cost of
new weapons. Saudi aid to Bahrain?nearly $1 billion
last year?accounts for the bulk of Bahrain's defense
budget, and Manama will continue to be dependent
on aid from Riyadh. Saudi reluctance to fund arms
purchases from the United States would almost
certainly prevent them.
Implications for the United States
The royal family's efforts to secure a closer
association with Washington risk sparking unrest that
could threaten the royal family and create severe
problems for the United States. Washington's
relationship with Bahrain centers on the Al Khalifa,
much as the relationship with Iran was with the
Pahlavis. Closer ties to Washington may encourage
Secret
US Military Equipment in Bahrain Defense Force
In Inventory
4 F-5 fighters
7 155mm howitzers
310 TOW missiles
6 Sidewinders
300 LAW missiles
On Order
8 F-5 fighters
7 155mm howitzers
190 TOW missiles
60 Sidewinders
54 M-60 tanks
Wish List
F-16 fighters
C-130 transports
Copperhead ammunition
Hawk SAMs
Sparrow missiles
Maverick missiles
Standard missiles
Blackhawk helicopters
175mm SP howitzers
155mm SP howitzers
Stinger SAM missiles
Air defense radar
Bahraini opposition groups to unite and jeopardize US
military access to the island.
Bahrain remains an important military ally of the
United States. The Middle East Forces Command,
the naval component of the US Central Command
(CENTCOM), is headquartered in Manama and
maintains de facto pre-positioning of military
supplies. Loss of this facility would hamper
CENTCOM's mission and reduce US military
access to the region.
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Morocco: Status of
Military Modernization
King Hassan continues to pursue a $1 billion military
modernization program to address his country's
military imbalance vis-a-vis Algeria and to meet
increasing equipment needs in Western Sahara.
Morocco's weak economy and the absence of foreign
funding, however, hamper the King's efforts.
Traditionally, Rabat has relied on foreign credits and
grants, primarily from Saudi Arabia, to fund military
purchases. Riyadh, however, has reduced its payments
in recent years because of shifting priorities in its
Middle Eastern policy and Rabat's questionable
accounting for Saudi aid. Military aid also is a factor
in US-Moroccan relations.
I Moroccan Government has continued to focus its
efforts on acquiring new arms to replace equipment in
Western Sahara and to redress Algeria's increasing
military advantage. The lack of spare parts due to
foreign exchange shortages, an aging inventory,
generally poor maintenance procedures, and frequent
cannibalization of equipment have lowered the
military's operational readiness. In addition,
equipment losses in the Saharan war have not been
replaced. Furthermore, the lack of funds has
prevented Morocco from keeping pace with Algeria's
military modernization program, resulting in an
increasing numerical and technological advantage for
Algiers.
Efforts to improve Morocco's air defense capability
have focused on new-generation fighter aircraft from
both the United States and France. Early this year
Rabat requested information on the price and
availability of 24 F-16s. The cost was estimated at
$550-750 million depending on the options package.
According to the US Embassy, Hassan almost
certainly would have broached a deal during his visit
to the United States, possibly offering a partial
payment package and requesting concessional US
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Force is interested in an offer by Northrop for five
new F-5E/Fs and spare parts, as well as having their
F-5A/Bs reconditioned. The cost of the F-5E/Fs
would be about $5 million per aircraft, while the cost
for repairs is estimated to be approximately $1 million
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Keeping its options open, Rabat remains interested in
purchasing 24 Mirage 2000 fighters,
Paris has indicated
a willingness to sell aircraft to Morocco if Hassan
secures the necessary financing. The French
Government refused late last year to approve a loan
proposed by the French aerospace manufacturer
Dassault-Breguet because it did not believe Rabat
could secure the necessary financing.
Rabat also wants to upgrade its armor capability. In
this regard, Moroccan military officials have focused
on acquiring a new main battle tank and replacing
wornout equipment.
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The Economy and Foreign Assistance
Morocco's weak economy has hindered the King's
ability to maintain and modernize the armed forces.
Defense spending has averaged about 22 percent of
the national budget over the past decade, but inflation
and the financial crunch have limited real growth in
defense spending since 1979. Contracts for new
materiel as well as deliveries have declined, while
military personnel costs have consumed an increasing
share of available resources. In addition, Rabat has
accumulated a $1.2 billion military debt over the past
several years, which complicates efforts to secure
favorable financial terms for new arms deals, and it
has narrowly avoided default on US FMS loans on
several occasions. Large-scale debt rescheduling in
1983 and 1985, however, reduced contentions with
lenders at least for the near term.
Because of its deteriorating financial position,
Morocco has had to rely on foreign credits and grants
to maintain its military. Saudi Arabia provided as
much as $350 million in military aid annually from
1977 through 1982 but halted it because of Morocco's
questionable accounting practices and new Middle
Eastern priorities in Riyadh, particularly the Iran-
Iraq war. Declining world oil prices also have
contributed to the decrease in funding.
Since the loss of Saudi aid, the United States and
France have been the primary sources of loans for
materiel and arms. Speculation by Moroccan officials
and foreign diplomats of renewed aid from the Saudis
and the UAE surfaced in June following visits to
Rabat by delegations from both of those countries.
Secret
The King almost certainly hoped
these meetings would result in agreements for at least
partial financing for a US arms deal before his
scheduled trip to the United States, but no deals were
announced.
Outlook
Morocco's equipment needs will become increasingly
critical over the next year. Hassan's inability to meet
current military requirements?new fighter aircraft
and armor, particularly for Western Sahara?could
lead to morale problems and growing unrest in the
armed forces. Continuing economic difficulties and
the inability to secure traditional sources of foreign
funding, however, will almost certainly hinder, if not
prevent, major purchases of Western arms in the
foreseeable future.
The possibility of Hassan securing the necessary
funds for a major arms purchase should not be ruled
out. The King may still obtain funding from the
Saudis or the UAE by providing more military
personnel or convincing them that his regime could
face internal threats from a disenchanted military or
an external threat from Algeria.
He may also try to use his recent meeting with Israeli
Prime Minister Peres as a bargaining chip to obtain
aid from the United States. Although Hassan told the
US Embassy that he is satisfied with bilateral
military cooperation, he could threaten to reduce the
level of cooperation, particularly the access and
transit agreement, to press Washington to provide
additional assistance.
Hassan could turn to the Soviets for arms, as he has
intimated in the past to US officials. Moscow
probably would offer more lenient financial terms
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Secret
than a Western supplier, possibly including a barter
deal for Moroccan phosphates. Many Moroccan
officers were trained on Soviet equipment in the
1960s, and this would facilitate training on new
equipment. The King's distrust of Soviet intentions,
however, probably would reduce the possibility of a
deal unless either the Saharan war or military unrest
significantly threatens his regime.
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Algeria: Bendjedid Versus
the Hardliners
Radicals within the Algerian Government are
beginning to challenge President Chadli Bendjedid.
Falling oil prices, US-Libyan tensions, and
Bendjedid's recent physical infirmity have given his
opponents opportunities to try to undermine the
President's domestic and foreign policies. The old-line
radicals are particularly unhappy about Bendjedid's
program to move the country closer to the West and
away from adherence to a Soviet-style economic
system. Bendjedid is not in serious danger of being
ousted, but he almost certainly will be compelled to
pay greater attention to the demands of his opponents.
As a result, we anticipate greater indecisiveness at the
top, more cautious policies at home and abroad,
greater Soviet meddling, and additional difficulties in
US-Algerian relations.
Bendjedid Takes Charge
Since coming to power in 1979, President Bendjedid
has gradually removed those in the ruling National
Liberation Front (FLN) and the government who were
closely tied to former President Boumedienne. Many
of these individuals were fighters from the
revolutionary period who lacked the skills necessary to
run a complex government apparatus. Unlike his
predecessors, Bendjedid is little moved by ideological
dogma or revolutionary fervor. His political priorities
are more pragmatic, focusing on national and
Maghreb concerns, such as agricultural and gas
production and the Western Sahara question.
The President's successful initiative last year to
modify the National Charter?a document that
outlines the country's ideology and objectives?was
the capstone of his efforts to redefine the country's
political orientation. The charter, approved in a
national referendum last January, deemphasizes
socialism and places greater stress on private
enterprise and government decentralization. To
implement this program, the President has tried to
move new people into positions of authority.
The Hardliners Fight Back
In our view, Bendjedid's initiatives are losing
momentum. Embassy reporting this year
15
indicates that leftist ideologues, led by FLN
Permanent Secretary Messaadia, are fighting back.
Messaadia and his followers, for example, are trying
to get their militant message across by gaining control
of the official media. Those opposed to the President
consider their action as one of the last opportunities to
preserve the socialist heritage of the Algerian
revolution.
We believe the best evidence of the radical challenge
is Algeria's improved ties to Tripoli, growing
cooperation with Libya and Iran within OPEC, the
slow pace of Algerian-US ties, and the government's
desultory record in making economic decisions. In our
view, the factionalism reflects ideological divisions
primarily, but other motives, such as bureaucratic
maneuvering and personal rivalry, also are involved.
there are sharp
differences between the Bendjedid and Messaadia
camps on topics such as relations with Libya, Iran,
and the USSR, as well as with the United States. In
addition, they are at odds on the Western Sahara
dispute. The hardliners believe the government should
fully support the Islamic revolution in Iran. On Libya,
Messaadia's supporters want Algiers to offer Qadhafi
military assistance to demonstrate solidarity with
Tripoli against US pressure. They also perceive that
Bendjedid's policies have moved the country too close
to Washington, and that this works to the detriment
of Algeria's strategic relations with the USSR.
Finally, Messaadia's group wants the government to
take more direct action?
to
counter Morocco's military success in Western
Sahara.
Developments this year have helped the hardliners in
their efforts to undermine the President's policies. The
rapid fall of petroleum prices and the need for
austerity will slow the pace of domestic reform.
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Outlook and Implications for the United States
At this stage, none of these challenges, in our
judgment, represents a serious threat to Bendjedid.
He remains first among equals in Algeria's consensus-
style government and maintains the support of most of
the military. Nevertheless, the President almost
certainly has lost some standing among his peers. For
example, Bendjedid was widely expected to announce
significant personnel changes in the FLN at its recent
Central Committee meeting, but no changes were
made.
We expect Bendjedid to act cautiously and to try to
placate his opponents. He will have increasing
difficulty imposing his agenda for political and
economic reform on the FLN. Nevertheless, during
the rest of the year we do not foresee the political
opposition gaining the military support necessary to
challenge the President.
The Soviets will almost certainly try to influence
developments. Algerian-Soviet relations have
deteriorated under Bendjedid, and Moscow would like
to reverse his turn toward the West. They almost
certainly view Bendjedid's current problems as an
opportunity to strengthen his opposition but probably
will move cautiously to avoid souring relations with
him.
They may
decide to give Algiers trade credits or military
equipment not previously offered as a way of
strengthening the hand of the hardliners.
In our view, continued political infighting will create
difficulties in US-Algerian relations. Bendjedid
probably would not push for more contacts in order to
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placate the hardliners. The Algerians believe the
United States is not encouraging bilateral trade in
natural gas, modifying its pro-Moroccan policy?
particularly on the Western Sahara dispute?or
allowing Algiers to purchase sophisticated military
aircraft. We doubt that Algiers is prepared to develop
closer bilateral ties at this juncture without what it
perceives as a significant gesture from Washington on
military aid. Although Algerian leaders want
sophisticated weapons from the United States, they
probably will be unwilling to make the political
concessions, such as breaking with Libya, to obtain
them.
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Syria: Vice President RiPat
Assad Down But Not Out
RiPat Assad, Syria's Vice President for Security
Affairs and brother of President Hafiz Assad,
remains in self-imposed exile in Paris, where his
personal diplomacy, public comments, and other
activities have conflicted with but not fully
contradicted the policies of the Syrian regime. We
believe Rirat's actions are geared toward creating an
image of an international statesman and undercutting
his rivals in Syria. He may be laying the groundwork
for stepping up his antiregime activities, however, and
could be exploring prospective locations to base his
opposition.
We believe Rif` at possesses only limited political and
military support in Syria and would require strong
backing from his brother before competing for the
presidency in a post-Hafiz era. Over time, Rifat
probably will realize he cannot compete for succession
from abroad, and we believe a face-saving way will
eventually be devised to allow him to return.
RiPat's Rise
Rirat Assad has ridden the wave of his brother's
political success over the past 10 years and depends on
the President as a lifeline to power, as do other
members of Syria's Alawite ruling elite. Rif` at's
antagonistic relationship with other powerful Alawites
fits Assad's style of rule in which he keeps his
lieutenants in competition and dependent on him
alone. Rirat is a maverick in Syrian politics, a fact
that has often forced the President to choose between
family loyalty and maintaining discipline and order
within the regime. In a society where sectarian and
tribal loyalties are hallmarks, however, Rirat's status
as the President's brother confers special privileges,
the limits of which he is continually testing.
During his first 14 years in power, Hafiz Assad relied
on Rirat to stifle internal opponents. Rirat's Defense
Companies?which served as the regime's praetorian
guard?consisted of an armored division and
intelligence and security elements. Rifat loyally
served the President, using his power to intimidate
19
rivals in the regime
Secret
Loyal cronies and kinsmen of
the President, including senior Alawite generals and
the chiefs of the intelligence services as well as the
Sunni majority, resented RiPat's behavior but did not
question his loyalty to the President.
RiPat Versus the Inner Circle
The special status Rirat enjoys as the President's
brother enables him to operate independently of the
President's inner circle and at times the President
himself. Until 1983 many observers believed that
RiPat would succeed his brother, and, given the
strength and loyalty of his Defense Companies, few
could contest him. Inner circle members suppressed
their personal animosity toward Rifat in deference to
the President's wishes and tried to overlook his politics
When Assad was seriously ill in November 1983,
inner circle members and other Alawite elite figures
declared their support for Rifat to demonstrate
solidarity at a time of political uncertainty. Rirat
overplayed his hand, however, when he resisted orders
from Army Chief of Staff Hikmat Shihabi to rotate
certain division commanders who were loyal to him.
After Army units were deployed in Damascus to
enforce the order, Rifat countered by blocking access
to the city with Defense Company troops and
positioning tanks and missiles in the mountains
overlooking Damascus. RiPat's moves in turn were
opposed by the forces of Maj. Gen. Shafiq Fayyad,
commander of the Third Armored Division, and Maj.
Gen. Ali Haydar, head of Special Forces, who were
supported by Air Force Intelligence Chief
Muhammad Khuli and Army Chief of Intelligence
Ali Duba. Although most important Syrian power
wielders blamed Rirat for the near violence, Assad
attempted to demonstrate evenhandedness by briefly
exiling Fayyad and Haydar?Rifsat's two most vocal
critics?to coincide with Rirat's exile to Europe in
early 1984.
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Rifat as soldier...
Rirat's exile seriously damaged his political
ambitions. His supporters in the government and the
military were systematically demoted, and his once-
powerful Defense Companies were reorganized and
partly dismantled. Rirat assumed a low profile in the
hope that Hafiz would forgive and forget.
When Rirat returned to Syria in November 1984, he
began almost immediately to lobby for a larger role in
the regime, according to the US Embassy in
Damascus. In January 1985, President Assad
appointed Rirat Vice President for Security Affairs
Assad also actively
campaigned to reconcile Rirat with his inner circle,
who remained fearful of Rirat's ambitions.
Rif` at had little success in mendin fences des ite his
many machinations.
Secret
and statesman
Rirat also was stymied in an attempt to influence
Syrian foreign policy in 1985. He unsuccessfully tried
to chip away at Syria's alliance with Iran, which he
has always opposed. During the siege of Tripoli,
Lebanon, in the fall of 1985, Rirat directed the forces
of the largely Alawite Arab Democratic Party against
pro-Iranian Sunni fundamentalists in the Islamic
Unification Movement (IUM). According to the US
Embassy in Damascus, Rirat's proposal to impose a
"Hama solution" on Tripoli, which would involve
shelling the city into submission, was overruled by
President Assad because of close ties between the
IUM leader Shaban and Iran. Rif` at also
unsuccessfully pressed for reconciliation talks with
Iraq at the behest of Saudi Crown Prince Abdallah,
with whom he has long been associated, according to
the Embassy report.
Exile II: A New Strategy
Rif` at's failure to cajole his brother to restore his lost
power probably precipitated his departure from Syria
in November 1985. Rirat probably believed that
Hafiz, fearing his capacity for mischiefmaking
abroad, would entice him back to Syria with promises
of greater responsibility.
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Rifat 's daughter Lama's
marriage to Shafiq Fayyad's
son was intended to mend
fences.
Rif at has used his voluntary- exile as an opportunity
to promote himself as an international statesman
rather than an ousted troublemaker. He enjoys an
extensive network of personal and professional
contacts that affords him ready access to powerful
politicians throughout the Middle East and Europe.
RiPat has been particularly bold in talking to officials
from countries that have severed or strained relations
with Syria:
? Rif at met with Lebanese President Amin Gemayel
at a party in Nice in late August, according to the
US Embassy in Beirut. The meeting contrasts with
Syria's policy of boycotting Amin since the collapse
of its Tripartite Accord. Assad may have known of
these meetings in advance, but no Syrian spokesman
at the time acknowledged they took place. Whether
the President knew of the meetings in advance or
not, we believe he was informed by his brother of
their outcome.
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Rif at has also engaged in activities that appear to be
mildly subversive but have potential as launching
points for serious opposition to the regime:
? He has begun publication in Paris of an Arab-
language political weekly al-Fursan, which is
banned in Syria. The first three editions of the
magazine have been mildly critical of the
government.
magazine is in great demand in Syria.
the
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of Rif at's confidants requested that Argentina
provide political asylum for him and his entourage.
We believe Rif at wants to expand his contacts with
the large Syrian community in Argentina rather
than give up his ambitions. In any case, Argentina
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Although Rif at has made statements critical of
Syrian policy while in Europe, the attacks are
probably not subversive but are meant to be attacks
on his political opponents at home. RiPat's
denunciation of Syrian economic policy is geared
more toward undermining his rival Prime Minister
Kasm's position than repudiating Bethist socialism,
according to the US Embassy in Damascus.
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according to the Embassy, Rif at's complaints to his
brother that senior Alawite officers are Soviet minions
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probably reflect more his resentment at having been
stripped of his military forces than a belief that Syria
should reassess its ties to the Soviets.
Rirat has shied away from engaging in anything
smacking of overtly subversive activity in Europe.
Despite his family link to the President, he realizes he
can only go so far. Should Rirat decide to move, as
has been rumored, to Morocco or possibly Argentina,
it would probably indicate not an abdication of his
quest for power, but a search for a new base. As long
as Hafiz lives, Rirat will use various machinations
and considerable personal wealth to insinuate himself
into the Syrian political limelight.
Rieat and the Succession
In the immediate future, Rirat's prospects for
succession to the presidency following Assad's death
or incapacitation are low. Rirat's chances will depend
in large measure on his ability to return quickly to
Syria and to recoup some of his lost assets in the
military and security fields.
Support for his
candidacy within the military, however, is uncertain,
although
Rirat's popularity remains high among remnants of
the predominantly Alawite Defense Companies.
In the longer run, we believe Rirat will realize he
cannot compete effectively for the succession from
abroad, and he could eventually agree to a face-saving
formula to return home. Should the President carry
out at least a nominal restructuring of the military
and security services, for example, Rirat could claim
it as a personal triumph. In any case, Rirat will
demand some increase?however symbolic?in his
responsibility as Vice President for Security Affairs.
Although anti-Rirat sentiment remains high, we
believe as long as the President lives, Rirat's role in
Syria's future cannot be ignored. Despite the power
and influence enjoyed by the senior Alawite military,
security, and intelligence chiefs who make up the
Secret
ingslifi Basil Assad?son of the
President and informal envoy
between the feuding brothers.
inner circle, their individual indebtedness to the
President?and antagonistic relationship with each
other?would limit their ability to jointly oppose the
restoration of Rirat to power. The President seems
torn between maintaining a close cadre of intimate
and trusted associates and holding open the possibility
of an Assad family succession. A key factor?and an
important unknown?is Rirat's standing with the rest
of the Assad family, particularly with his other
brother, Jamil, who runs the family's intelligence
network in the Alawite heartland, and Basil Assad,
the President's son. Basil, although only 25, is
rumored to be the President's choice as successor and
has served as intermediary between the brothers.
In any case, political allegiances and alliances are
likely to shift both immediately before and especially
after Assad's departure from the scene. Rirat could
exploit divisions in the inner circle and entice some of
its members with promises of power and influence in
his regime. Should Hafiz designate Rirat as his
successor, a destabilizing, possibly violent succession
crisis would be likely if Rirat has not enlisted support
from key military and security figures. Rirat's ability
to co-opt senior Alawites depends ultimately on his
skill in convincing them that he is no longer bent on
undermining their prerogatives nor is a threat to the
stability of Alawite rule in Syria.
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Syrian Air and Air Defense Forces:
Developments and Prospects
Damascus has intensified its campaign to counter the
Israel air force since it shot down two Syrian fighters
last fall. Starting in late November, Damascus began
to further expand its early warning and air defense
systems, stress joint air and air defense exercises, and
press the Soviets for more and new equipment. The
drive probably will enhance the capabilities of Syria's
air and air defense forces but will not result in the
qualitative gains in manpower, training, and
command that are needed to put them on a par with
the Israel air force, which, despite budget cutbacks,
continues to improve.
The Soviet Connection
Although Syria's renewed emphasis on air and air
defenses is directly due to the Israeli shootdown of
two late-model MIG-23 Floggers last November, it
has been spurred by the US airstrikes on Libya last
March and April and by the war scare with Israel in
May. In their negotiations with Moscow, the Syrians
are apparently using the perceived poor performance
of Soviet weaponry during the US-Libyan clashes and
the war scare to try to extract more and new arms. As
a result of public accusations of tepid support for
Libya and the tensions between Damascus and Tel
Aviv, the Soviets probably feel compelled to bolster
their most important ally in the Arab world.
Consequently, Moscow probably will soon begin
delivery of the MIG-29 Fulcrum, which is a
counterpart to the US F-16, and agree to provide
other advanced weapons.
We expect President Assad will travel to Moscow
later this year to sign a new arms agreement that
probably will cover most, if not all, of the weapons the
Soviets will provide during the current five-year plan,
which extends through 1990. During this period, they
probably will agree to supply new early warning and
electronic warfare equipment, additional air defense
missiles?possibly including the SA-10 or more likely
the SA-11--and more MIG-29s. Although the
Soviets almost certainly will provide more late-model
MIG-25 Foxbat interceptors, we believe they will
23
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refuse to supply its successor, the MIG-31 Foxhound,
and the SU-27 Flanker, a counterpart to the US F-15,
which are both just beginning to enter service.
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Improving Air Defenses
A few days after the shootdown, Syria began to
extend and thicken its air defense coverage.
Damascus initially responded by temporarily moving
low-to-medium-altitude SA-6s and SA-8s into
Lebanon's Bekaa Valley while it readied and then
fielded medium-to-high-altitude SA-2s in prepared
positions along the Lebanese border. The movement
of the SA-2s led the Israelis to shift their
reconnaissance flights westward from the valley to the
Lebanese coast, impairing their ability to collect
intelligence on Syrian rear areas. When the Israelis
publicly complained about the presence of the SA-2s,
Damascus countered by redeploying the SA-6s and
SA-8s into the Bekaa Valley, creating an integrated
air defense network. Although President Assad
defused the crisis a few weeks later by removing the
tactical missiles, most of them have been kept
adjacent to the border, ready to move rapidly to
protect the SA-2 sites.
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After the Syrians withdrew the SA-6s and SA-8s
from Lebanon, they began to construct the first of two
new SA-5 complexes?one at Izra and another west
of Hims. the 25X1
missile crisis led the Syrians to speed construction of
the Izra complex, which would extend their air 25X1
defense coverage further over Israel and Jordan and
enable them to interfere effectively with Israel air
force battle management and aerial refueling
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Syria has
essentially completed work on both SA-5 complexes
and is awaiting the arrival of additional equipment.
While the Syrians were finishing construction at Izra
early this year, tensions between the United States
and Libya were building over Colonel Qadhafi's
support of terrorism, and the Soviets may have placed
priority on shipping SA-5s to Libya. The US
airstrikes on Libya last March exposed the
vulnerability of the SA-5 to electronic
countermeasures,
Enhancing Operations. As the Syrians worked on
extending their air defense system, they also were
engaged in improving its command and control
capabilities.
25
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last
December Syria called home air defense personnel
from training in the USSR, but, to maintain high and
sometimes full alert through May 1986, Damascus
had to mobilize 40 percent of its air and air defense
reservists. To overcome the deficiency in trained
personnel, which was further worsened by Assad's
decision to send additional air and air defense
personnel to aid Libya after the US strikes, Syria
lowered the draft age from 19 to 18 starting in July.
This change has created a onetime bulge in the size of
the conscript pool and has prevented many educated
youth from evading service by enrolling in foreign
universities. This should boost the readiness of the air
defense forces in the near term and later increase the
number of trained reservists.
Acquiring Better Equipment. The Syrians will
primarily rely on the Soviets and their East European
allies for new radars, communications equipment, and
air defense, but?much as they have done in the area
of electronic warfare?the Syrians probably will seek
advice and possibly procure some equipment from
Western sue hers.
The SA-2 and SA-3 almost certainly continue to form
the backbone of Syria's air defense missile force.
President Assad may be pushing the Soviets for the
SA-10, a system that can engage targets from 20 to
30,000 meters. In the USSR, the SA-10 has mainly
replaced SA-2s and SA-3s and appears to
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complement the SA-5, which is still the mainstay of
Moscow's long-range air defenses. Ideally, President
Assad probably would like to begin fielding the SA-10
south and west of the capital to support the SA-5
complex at Dumayr, forming an integrated strategic
air defense network protecting the main avenue of
approach from Israel. Although the SA-10 has been
entering service since 1980 and its low-altitude
acquisition radar was fielded briefly in Syria with
Soviet forces, the system is at the heart of the USSR's
effort to modernize its air defense force. Its
deployment is proceeding slowly?suggesting the
Soviets are unlikely to export it during the rest of this
decade.
If Assad cannot obtain the SA-10, he probably will
press doubly hard for the SA-11, a mobile system that
can engage targets from about 20 to 16,000 meters.
This system is replacing the obsolescent SA-4 in
army-level air defense brigades, which indicates the
Soviets believe it is suitable for area air defense.
Every SA-11 launcher carries four missiles and has a
built-in target tracking radar, so that an SA-11
battery can enagage a number of aircraft
simultaneously. The Soviets are concentrating on
introducing the system into their own forces, however,
and may be reluctant to export it for a few years.
Upgrading the Air Force
Although the loss of the two MIG-23 Floggers last
fall was a blow to its pride, the incident has
apparently not led the Syrian Air Force to change its
procedures or modify its training. The shootdown,
however, may have played a minor role in the
deployment of ground attack squadrons from northern
to southern bases. The shift created a better balance
between fighter and ground attack aircraft
throughout the country and put the Syrian Air Force
in a better position to strike at Israeli targets.
the Syrians have
improved their ground attack training, but they
continue to use standard intercept tactics?relying
heavily on tight ground control throughout an
engagement. In contrast, the Soviet Air Force began a
program in the late 1970s to improve the performance
of its pilots once they are in the vicinity of their
targets. Called maneuvering air combat training
(MACT) by Western analysts, the program is
structured to improve pilot proficiency by blending
existing training practice with doctrine for offensive
and defensive operations. It tries to make
maneuvering combat as efficient as possible by
teaching every pilot a "scientifically" designed set of
maneuvers that are to be used if he fails to surprise an
enemy aircraft. The Soviets do not train in aerial
dogfighting per se, because they believe it would only
marginally improve their chances for success.
Statistically, Syrian Air Force training is similar to
Soviet Air Force training.
Secret
Unless the Syrians begin to train more aggressively,
they will never fully utilize the capabilities of the late-
model MIG-23 Floggers they have or the even more
advanced fighters they will acquire. We do not know
whether the lack of MACT training is attributable to
a Soviet desire to restrain the Syrians, to lazy or
incompetent Soviet advisers, or to a decision by Assad
not to incur higher maintenance and training costs
and possibly the higher political risks entailed in
encouraging even limited initiative.
New Aircraft
The USSR agreed some time ago to supply the
MIG-29 Fulcrum, a versatile fighter that began to
enter Soviet service in late 1983.
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SOVIET AND SYRIAN FIGHTER
TRAINING IN 1985
SOVIET
President Assad almost certainly will ask Moscow for
more MIG-29s as part of the new arms agreement.
The aircraft is not an air superiority fighter?an
aircraft with sufficent range and weapons carrying
27
SYR I AN
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it is a state-of-the-art counterair fighter that can also
be used for ground attack missions. The MIG-29
combines good maneuvering combat capabilities with
advanced medium-to-long-range radar and weapon
systems, giving it good capabilities to track and
engage aircraft flying at low altitudes. With these
features, the MIG-29 has considerably more combat
versatility and a greater capability to successfully
perform MACT tactics than older Soviet fighters.
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MIG-29 Fulcrum fighter
Outlook
The continued acquisition of new Soviet equipment
will aid Damascus in its drive to expand and
modernize its air and air defense forces, but Syria
probably will not be able to make significant
improvements in the overall quality of these forces.
Paradoxically, the very process of adding more and
new equipment to the air, particularly air defense
forces, complicates the task of rectifying the major
weaknesses of the past?command and control and
training. Moreover, the job of correcting these
shortcomings probably will be hampered by
periodically heightened alerts because of fears of an
Israeli attack.
While President Assad calculates the gains versus the
costs of improving training, the Israelis will continue
to acquire more new aircraft and "smart" munitions,
improve command and control systems, and refine
electronic warfare and air defense suppression
equipment. Barring a severe reduction in its
operations and maintenance budget that could
seriously affect day-to-day readiness, the Israeli air
force almost certainly will maintain a marked
advantage over Syria's air and air defense forces at
least for the next few years.
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Israel: Labor's Appeal
to Sephardim
Israel's Labor Party is intensifying its efforts to
cultivate support from the Sephardim, who now
constitute a majority of Israel's Jewish electorate.' In
recent elections, the Sephardim have overwhelmingly
supported Likud because of its more hardline views on
foreign policy and because it is perceived as more
sympathetic to Sephardi economic and social
grievances. Labor's success will depend largely on its
ability to shed its exclusivist Ashkenazi image in favor
of a more equalitarian party offering Sephardim a
viable alternative to Likud. Labor's relatively
pragmatic stance on Arab-Israeli issues?particularly
its advocacy of West Bank territorial compromise?is
not widely supported by the Sephardim, although
their views may moderate over time.
The Sephardim in Transition
When large numbers of Sephardim began
immigrating to Israel in 1948, they faced an
Ashkenazi- and Labor-dominated society and
government. The Sephardim initially dealt almost
exclusively on employment and immigration with the
Labor-controlled Histadrut trade union federation
and World Zionist Organization. Prime Minister Ben-
Gurion's charismatic leadership combined with
limited access to Labor-dominated official agencies
led the Sephardim to view the Labor Party as
synonymous with the government. Ashkenazi cultural
prejudices against the Sephardi immigrants from the
Arab countries were compounded by a government
preoccupied with consolidating the fledgling state and
struggling to cope with an immigrant influx twice the
size of the pre-1948 resident Jewish population.
Sephardi immigrants were placed in ramshackle
absorption camps for extended periods of time, moved
to isolated development towns, and then provided with
only meager aid and poorly funded social programs to
help integrate them into their new, non-Arab, and
intensely more Western Ashkenazi society. Away
' Sephardi Jews are those who emigrated to Israel mostly from
North Africa and the Middle East. Ashkenazi Jews are those of
Central and East European origin.
31
from mainstream urban Israel, the Sephardim
suffered from government neglect and the harsh
physical environment of land reclamation efforts.
In part as a protest against Labor's neglect, by the
late 1960s they began to vote for Likud in increasing
numbers. This trend became even more apparent after
Ben-Gurion's death in the early 1970s that led many
to turn to Menachem Begin because of his emotional,
patriarchal style of leadership. Since the 1977
national election, Likud has enjoyed the consistent
support of the majority of Sephardim.
Generational differences are now coming to bear on
the Israeli political arena as ethnic origin seems to
have somewhat less impact on the views of young
Sephardim. Previously seen by the Ashkenazim as
staunch rightwing conservatives, an increasing
number of Sephardi leaders have gained the
confidence and political acumen to espouse a broad
spectrum of political stands. On the left, a small group
of Sephardi intellectuals have founded the "East for
Peace" movement, by which they hope to bring to the
peace process Sephardi perceptions of Arab ways. On
the far right is Kahanism, supported largely by
working-class Sephardim. Most Sephardi voters are
somewhere between the two extremes, and it is to this
large constituency that Labor hopes over time to
project a more credible appeal.
Labor's Appeal
During the Labor Party convention in April 1986,
party secretary general Uzi Bar'am, himself part
Sephardi, successfully led a movement to alter
Labor's image by changing the procedures for election
of the party's Knesset candidates. This reform allows
for direct vote by the party rank and file and limits
the number of Knesset seats reserved for senior Labor
leaders. At the convention, the party repeatedly drew
attention to Sephardim who already have ascended to
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senior positions including Energy Minister Moshe
Shahal and Labor Knesset faction leader Rafi Edri.
According to US Embassy reporting, the convention
appeared to have more Sephardi delegates than ever
before.
Prime Minister Peres, as leader of the Labor Party,
has often been the focus of Sephardi resentment.
Through the statesmanlike leadership he has
displayed over the past two years of the National
Unity government, however, he has gained Sephardi
respect as reflected in public opinion polls showing a
small but gradual increase in the popularity of Labor
leaders in some Sephardi communities.
The Labor Party is aware that an image change will
not be enough to win increased Sephardi support.
Sephardim, who constitute most of the blue-collar
labor force?especially in remote development
towns?are more affected by economic downturns
than are the Ashkenazim. Peres's hard-won struggle
to move Israel toward economic reform has been
achieved at the cost of increased unemployment,
which has been particularly painful for Sephardim in
development towns where the unemployment rate is
often several times the 8-percent national average.
But Peres and his Labor colleagues seem confident
that the Sephardim are sufficiently placated by the
successes in stabilizing prices and social aid programs
to give Labor the benefit of the doubt.
On foreign policy, Labor hopes to transform Peres's
dramatic visit to Morocco and the tacit recognition of
Israel gained by this event into a major electoral
advantage. Moroccan Jews, the largest ethnic group
within Sephardi ranks, and other Sephardi groups
enthusiastically welcomed Peres's trip. Some
Sephardim who previously opposed Labor's approach
to foreign policy may now have a greater incentive to
support the party's tactics.
Party leaders are particularly hopeful that university-
educated Sephardim will turn toward Labor. They
cite the "East for Peace" movement and the
receptivity toward West Bank territorial compromise
of some Sephardic leaders, including those in the new
SHAS party, as a trend that may significantly affect
future Sephardi attitudes at the grassroots level.
Secret
Labor officials assert that Labor representatives in
the universities, once unable to successfully approach
Sephardi student leaders, have been welcomed to
recent Sephardi meetings. In a move interpreted by
Labor as a favorable indicator, at several universities
Likud student leaders requested that they be removed
from Likud Party lists and placed on the more centrist
"alternative" list.
Outlook
Labor's hopes of increased support from the
Sephardim probably are overly optimistic for the near
term. We believe that Labor will make only marginal
gains among Sephardi voters in the next Knesset
election. The majority will continue to oppose
territorial concessions. Younger Sephardim will
probably continue to seek to reaffirm their Israeli
citizenship and to put distance between themselves
and their Middle Eastern heritage.
Over the longer term, distinctions between Sephardi
and Ashkenazi views on foreign policy may become
increasingly blurred as native-born Israelis step to the
forefront of the political stage. Prestate ethnic
prejudices may also fade as intermarriage?now
affecting 25 percent of the population and much
higher among Israelis under 30?accelerates. This
process of acculturation will probably be slower than
Labor leaders hope but may eventually open up new
opportunities for the party to make inroads into
Likud's bedrock of voter support.
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Israel's National Religious Party:
Still a Coalition Key
The National Religious Party's convention ending on
4 September was intended by reformers to climax a
yearlong effort to rehabilitate the party, which has
lost two-thirds of its strength in the last two Knesset
elections. High hopes for reform were dashed,
however, as both sessions of the two-tier convention
were marked by factional infighting that almost led to
a party split. The fractious image the National
Religious Party (NRP) displayed will harm its efforts
to regain lost electoral support in Israel's next Knesset
election. But with Israel's next election likely to
produce another dead heat between left-of-center and
right-of-center blocs, even an NRP with only a few
seats probably will still play a key role in determining
whether Labor or Likud leads the next Israeli
government.
Dwindling Electoral Support
The NRP's representation in the 120-member
Knesset has slipped from 12 in 1977, to 6 in 1981, to 4
in 1984. Two long-term trends account for the party's
slide. Before 1967 the NRP and its supporters focused
mainly on religious issues. After Israel captured the
West Bank and other areas in 1967, foreign policy
and territorial issues became more important to a
significant segment of the party. Once the focus
shifted from religious to foreign policy issues, the
NRP found it difficult to compete with hawkish
parties like Likud and Tehiya and even Meir
Kahane's radical Kach group. Party stalwart Yosef
Burg told US diplomats in Tel Aviv last year that
younger NRP members in particular had been
attracted to the strongly nationalistic appeal of the far
right parties.
Disaffection of Sephardi voters from the NRP also
accounts for the loss of some electoral support. The
party gained considerable support from Sephardim in
the 1950s and 1960s, but it is today perceived as an
exclusivist Ashkenazi party. A leader of the party's
Young Guard complained to the US Embassy last fall
that the Sephardim have forgotten the NRP's efforts
during the massive Sephardi immigration in the 1950s
33
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to assure their access to religious education. The
creation of two new Sephardi religious parties, TAM!
in 1977 and SHAS in 1981, also cut into NRP
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Longstanding internal problems have also hurt the
party's status. Burg told US diplomats last year that
the NRP had 140,000 dues-paying members?which
could translate into nearly twice the party's current
Knesset strength?but suffered from a weak internal
organization unable to mobilize all of its supporters on
election day. We believe that the factional squabbling
and leadership struggles over the years have repelled
some potential NRP supporters. A leading member of
the party's Young Guard, moreover, told the US
Embassy last fall that religion has become so
institutionalized in Israel?with such measures as
limitations on business during the Sabbath and
dietary restrictions in public institutions?that the
religious community no longer feels a compelling need
for a religious advocacy party.
Revitalization Efforts
Reacting to the shock of its poor showing in the 1984
Knesset election, the NRP's Central Committee last
year established a special committee to examine its
problems and recommend reforms. The reform
commission recommended national registration of all
NRP supporters, the holding of a national convention
for the first time since 1973, and controversial
changes in the party's constitution. Simultaneously,
according to the US Embassy, party activists made
intensive efforts to lure back breakaway factions of
the party?the Sephardi TAM! Party and the
prosettlement Matzad faction of the Morasha Party.
The first step in the party's revitalization effort?its
internal registration drive conducted during the spring
of 1986?succeeded in registering 155,000 people,
more than double the number who voted for the NRP
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in 1984 (72,000). The increased registration resulted
partly from the party's decisions to make registration
possible for any interested citizen and to offer voting
rights in NRP internal balloting for each registrant.
Leaders of the renegade Matzad faction also decided
to participate in the party census, a prelude to their
subsequent decision to rejoin the party. The high
registration apparently reflected attempts by
competing NRP factions to improve their standing by
flooding the rolls with quickly recruited potential
supporters. The US Embassy speculated that many on
the list were not genuine NRP supporters, and the
Israeli press highlighted reports of fraud, including
the registration of deceased voters.
Matzad's decision to rejoin the party, while boosting
the party's electoral prospects, intensified factional
jockeying. Given the uneasy balance between the
moderate Lamifne faction and the more hardline
Young Guard, Matzad's inclusion probably has tilted
the party balance in favor of the hawks on Arab-
Israeli issues.
The NRP Convention: Young Guard Sweep
The NRP's conference, conducted during two
separate sessions in August and early September, was
highlighted by bitter factional infighting, the failure
of key party reform measures, and a clear victory for
the Young Guard in contests for leadership posts. The
Young Guard won their decadelong contest for
primacy with the old-guard Lamifne by aligning with
Matzad and Sephardi supporters. Young Guard
leader Ze'vulon Hammer was elected party leader and
his deputy Yehuda Ben-Meir, chairman of the party
steering committee. A Young Guard-allied member
of the Matzad faction, Rabbi Yitzhak Levi, won the
contest for secretary general.
US Embassy officials interpret the convention results
as indicating a continued shift to the right by the
party on both religious and peace issues. The Young
Guard's need to align with the even more conservative
Matzad faction to edge out Lamifne probably will
reinforce the rightward leanings.
Key recommendations of the NRP reform committee
were ignored or overruled at the convention,
according to Embassy and press reporting. Most of
the unsuccessful reform proposals were designed to
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break the power of entrenched factions. A key
proposal to streamline the party's Central Committee
was defeated because each faction wanted to reward a
maximum number of supporters with Central
Committee membership. A compromise ultimately
was adopted to appoint the entire 1,000-person
convention plenum as the new Central Committee.
The move will give a clear advantage to candidates of
the Young Guard?Matzad alliance when the party
selects its next Knesset list.
Implications
The results of the NRP convention will make it more
difficult for the party to join a narrow Labor-led
government should the National Unity government
collapse or Labor win a decisive victory in the next
national election. According to the US Embassy,
Labor has worked hard since the 1984 election to
reestablish its historic alliance with the NRP, which
allowed Labor to lead every government from 1949
until 1977. To this end, Prime Minister Peres and
other Labor leaders have focused on building support
within the NRP's moderate Lamifne group. The
Young Guard's hawkish alliance with Matzad,
however, will probably complicate Labor's strategy.
There remain two scenarios that could still lead to a
resumption of the Labor-NRP coalition in the next
few years. If the Young Guard intensifies party
control, it may eventually break with Matzad. The
Young Guard remains staunchly in favor of Israeli
settlement on the West Bank and against territorial
compromise. But since Israel's Lebanon trauma,
Hammer and Ben-Meir have publicly questioned the
unbridled use of force in regional policy. Over time,
they may fully institutionalize Young Guard control
of the party and feel freer to espouse more
controversial positions. It is conceivable that a
Hammer-led NRP freed of its alliance with Matzad
might eventually join forces with Labor.
Given the intense factional antagonisms during the
NRP convention, the party might eventually split.
Lamifne leader Burg at one point during the
convention threatened to bolt the party, and the US
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Embassy reports that other knowledgeable observers
are predicting the party will disintegrate. A moderate
successor party formed around the Lamifne faction
would probably gain at least a couple of seats in a
subsequent Knesset election and might enter a Labor-
led government coalition. Given the likelihood that
the next election will again leave Labor and Likud
evenly balanced, even a few Knesset seats held by a
moderate NRP could make the difference between a
Labor or Likud-led government.
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Jordan: Friends in the Occupied
Territories Caught in the Middle
King Hussein's steps to increase his influence in the
Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza?part of his
ambitious strategy to undermine PLO Chairman
Arafat?have caught Jordan's supporters in the
middle. Hussein is offering a range of financial
inducements to foster a West Bank and Gaza
leadership loyal to Jordan and willing to participate in
peace negotiations with Israel. But so far the King's
efforts have encouraged
Palestinians in the territories to rally behind Arafat.
Despite Jordan's inducements and the staunch
support of a handful of West Bank and Gaza notables,
most West Bank leaders are unlikely to abandon
Arafat because of distrust of Hussein's intentions
after years of Jordanian neglect, the strength of
Palestinian national aspirations, and fear of
assassination by radical Palestinians.
Jordan's Strategy
Over the past few years, Amman has unsuccessfully
attempted to promote moderate Palestinian leaders
willing to seek a negotiated solution in the face of
PLO opposition.
Jordan is trying to develop a range of inducements to
improve its position in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
Jordan is circulating a draft five-year development
plan that calls for spending $1.3 billion on agriculture,
construction, education, health, and social welfare
projects. King Hussein also hopes to energize the
Jordanian bureaucracy to adhere to a more activist
policy toward the territories by expanding the payrolls
of several ministries. In a move that will give him even
more control over funding to the West Bank, King
Hussein apparently has dismantled the joint Jordan-
PLO commission set up in 1978 to channel aid to the
West Bank from other Arab states.
37
The King's ability to enhance his position by
dispensing money is severely limited by Jordan's own
economic problems and reduced Arab aid. US
Embassy sources in Amman say a senior Jordanian
official will tour Western Europe and the United
States to solicit international funding, but this effort
almost certainly will fall short of satisfying Jordan's
requirements.
The King's new, more active policy has encouraged a
small number of West Bank and Gaza notables to
cooperate with Jordanian and Israeli authorities to
develop an indigenous Palestinian leadership.
Bethlehem Mayor Elias Freij, Jerusalem businessmen
Uthman Hallaq and Isam Anani, and former Gaza
City mayor Rashad Shawwa are the King's most
prominent supporters. Hallaq and Anani met with the
Israeli Civil Administrator for the West Bank in July
to discuss proposals for supporting Jordan's West
Bank political initiative after first securing the
approval of Jordanian authorities.
Israeli authorities, are
moving ahead with plans to appoint mayors for the
West Bank. According to the US Consulate in
Jerusalem, three mayoral candidates?Muhammad
Jaabari of Hebron, Hassan Tawil of Al Bireh, and
Khalil Musa of Ramallah?have developed adequate
community support for their appointments.
Caught in the Middle
These leaders?like most Palestinians in the West
Bank, and to a lesser extent in the Gaza Strip?
depend on Jordan for decisions directly affecting local
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government, education, health, housing, passports,
religious affairs, and banking?giving Jordan
considerable clout in day-to-day affairs. Many
employees and officials have continued to receive
salaries from the Jordanian Government since 1967,
and thousands of retirees likewise continue to receive
pensions from Amman.
On the other hand,
most residents of the West Bank
strongly support the PLO's claim to be the sole,
legitimate representative of Palestinian national
aspirations.
We believe that most Palestinians in the territories
want a negotiated settlement with Israel but believe
that only the PLO has sufficient Arab and
international credibility to represent their interests.
Although many moderates were dismayed by Arafat's
failure to demonstrate greater flexibility on peace
negotiations during his last dialogue with Hussein,
few rallied to the Hashemite banner following the
King's break with the PLO leader. Hussein's call for
them to consider a new PLO leadership was widely
taken as confirmation of longstanding suspicions that
Hussein wants to dominate the Palestinian movement
and regain control of the West Bank. Jordan's past
neglect and failure to improve the quality of life in the
occupied territories, moreover, have weakened West
Bank moderates who have been unable to show results
from their support for Jordan.
What Is at Risk
Jordan's failure to attract a large following in the
West Bank is also because of the PLO's success in
creating a climate of fear and intimidation.
Jordan's closure of PLO offices
in Amman on 7 July and attempts to find an
alternative to Arafat have led to a dangerous
escalation of the PLO-Jordanian competition for
political control over the occupied territories. PLO
leaders consider the West Bank and Gaza vital bases
of support and will use any means to protect their
dominant position.
Secret
Moderate leaders fear the same fate as Nablus Mayor
Zafir al-Masri, who was murdered in March shortly
after his appointment by Palestinian radicals for
alleged cooperation with Israel and Jordan. Al-
Masri's death was particularly poignant for moderate
West Bankers because he was widely considered the
prototype of a more pragmatic group of West Bank
leaders.
The fear of assassination from Syrian- and Libyan-
backed radical Palestinians is particularly strong in
light of recent events. A person claiming to be an
official spokesman for Abu Nidal's organization
recently threatened to assassinate all three West Bank
mayoral candidates as well as Freij and Shawwa for
their support of the mid-July summit between Peres
and Morocco's King Hassan. An explosion recently
damaged a factory owned by Shawwa, and Israeli
police defused a bomb under his car. Freij has
received several threats against his life recently and
proposed that Jordan implement a personal security
plan for selected West Bank leaders.
Outlook
Hussein's new policy is likely to fail if he cannot
bolster moderate leaders by making good on his
ambitious development proposals. West Bank and
Gaza leaders who in the past were critical of Jordan's
neglect are skeptical that Jordan has the political and
financial backbone to implement a coherent policy.
Recent moves to lift trade and travel restrictions
across the Jordan River, however, may help ease these
suspicions, particularly if further reforms are
implemented to facilitate West Bank and Gaza
exports to Jordan.
Even in the unlikely event the King is successful in
building a new base of support in the territories, the
results may be short lived.
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the generation of Palestinians born after 1967?
unfamiliar with Jordan and willing to assert
themselves as the new leadership?have a much more
radical view of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This
generation has been groomed by PLO propaganda
and looks to Arafat?rather than collective action by
Arab countries?to eliminate Israel's occupation.
King Hussein is disparaged as a pawn of the West and
as a Hashemite "outsider" interested only in serving
the interests of the Hashemite regime. The attitudes
of these younger Palestinians?like those of their
elders?are likely to change only to the degree that
they perceive cooperation with King Hussein will lead
to some kind of autonomous Palestinian entity.
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Pakistan: Government
Weathers Current Unrest
Prime Minister Junejo and President Zia still have a
clear upper hand over Benazir Bhutto and her
Pakistan People's Party, who are trying to force new
elections. Bhutto has failed to win many new
converts?the recent violence has been confined
mostly to southern Sind Province?and she will
probably resort increasingly to violent tactics to fulfill
her goals. We believe Junejo will be able to continue
to fend her off through a combination of force and
legal action. The Army will not intervene unless
unrest becomes a problem in the key province of
Punjab. Over time, we expect anti-US rhetoric within
the opposition, including the new National People's
Party, to increase, especially if Washington is
perceived as endorsing a hardline government
approach to opposition agitation.
Bhutto Challenges the Government
The latest unrest was sparked by opposition leader
Benazir Bhutto's plan to hold a large opposition rally
in Lahore on 14 August, Pakistan's Independence
Day. The Sind and Punjab provincial governments'
responded by banning all political activities out of fear
that the rally would produce an embarrassingly large
turnout and touch off antigovernment violence. Prime
Minister Junejo, who had earlier canceled a
progovernment rally, backed the provincial
governments' actions and repeated his rejection of
Bhutto's demand for new elections by the end of this
year. In the violence that followed between followers
of Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party and the police and
Army, some 30 people died, mainly in volatile Sind
Province.
Low-level violence continues, but it is mostly confined
to Sind. Punjab Province?where 60 percent of the
population lives?remains relatively quiet, according
to the US Consulate in Lahore. US diplomatic
reporting also indicates that at least several thousand
opposition activists have been arrested since 13
August. Bhutto herself spent over three weeks in a
Karachi jail until she was released along with other
opposition leaders in Sind on 8 September.
The Government Wins This Round
In our view, the civilian government of Prime
Minister Junejo has come out ahead of Bhutto and
her party in the wake of the violence. The violence has
probably further alienated the large share of the
electorate that opinion polls report are already hostile
to Bhutto's party. Bhutto's challenge probably has
also reinforced the Army's suspicion that she is a
dangerous radical who will use any means to achieve
her goals. Still, Junejo has suffered some damage to
his reputation because the crackdown on political
activity aids opposition charges that his civilian
government is merely "martial law under a different
guise."
The government seems confident. The US Consulate
in Karachi reports that, although some violence is
continuing, the ban on political activities has been
lifted for part of Karachi and that Army units in
southern Sind have returned to barracks.
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President Zia, who was on a pilgrimage to Mecca
during most of the unrest, has publicly stood by
Junejo and endorsed the government's actions in a
recent press interview. He stressed, however, that
responsibility for the government's response lay with
Junejo.
Government Planning for the Future
The government is drawing up contingency plans to
deal with future opposition agitation.
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During most of the opposition
unrest, President Zia was on a
pilgrimage to Mecca.
...YOU MEAN I
TAKE THE BLAME?
Islamabad is counting on rivals of
Bhutto such as Ghulam Mustapha Jatoi, who was
sacked by Bhutto as Sind People's Party chief last
spring, and Mustafa Khar, another People's Party
dissident, to divide the opposition. Jatoi's frequent
criticisms of Bhutto and his recent formation of the
National People's Party serve Islamabad's purpose of
sowing dissension within the opposition. Although
Jatoi has publicly denied rumors that he is Zia's
choice as a possible replacement for Prime Minister
Junejo, a source of the US Consulate in Lahore says
that Jatoi is willing to "cut a deal" with Zia.
Benazir and Opposition at Crossroads
Bhutto and her People's Party apparently have failed
to win many new converts to her cause, and we believe
she must decide whether to continue her
confrontational strategy or to moderate her tactics
and concentrate on organizing and developing
grassroots support. She will probably be faced with
conflicting advice?from moderates who will urge her
Secret
Far Eastern Economic Review ?
to return to nonviolent tactics to win in local elections
next year and from radicals pressing her to adopt a
tougher approach. Some rivals within the opposition
have publicly criticized Bhutto for prematurely
forcing a confrontation with the government.
We believe that, given the government's rejection of
her demands for new elections, Bhutto will probably
agree to more violent tactics. Her ultimate goal is the
ouster of Zia and attaining power. In the coming
months, we believe she will conclude that her goals
can only be accomplished through force. Her People's
Party and allied opposition parties have set a deadline
of 20 September for the government to announce a
date for new elections.
In addition to endorsing violent tactics, Bhutto will
probably concentrate her efforts on winning popular
support in Punjab Province. She knows that her
campaign cannot succeed without that province's
support, in our view. She has stated publicly her belief
that policemen and soldiers?most of the Pakistani
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Army is made up of Punjabis?would defy orders to
fire on fellow Punjabis, prompting senior Army
generals to depose Zia and Junejo.
Outlook
In our view, the most likely scenario for the near term
is that Zia and Junejo will fend off Bhutto's challenge
and remain in office. The government threat of legal
action against Bhutto?such as trying her for sedition
or restricting her movements?is unlikely to moderate
her campaign, but we believe violence will continue to
be confined mainly to Sind Province, where it can be
contained by police action?backed up, if necessary,
by local Army units.
In our opinion, the odds are small that Bhutto can
arouse enough public support in Punjab to threaten
the government. Although many Punjabis may
sympathize with her goal of new elections, we believe
they oppose the sort of violent agitation that is
occurring in Sind because they do not want a return to
military rule. Islamabad will also take steps?such as
directing government funds to constituencies of
progovernment legislators?to ensure that it retains
its base of political support.
A crucial test for the Junejo government will come
with local elections scheduled for September 1987.
Junejo's Pakistan Muslim League must make a good
showing in these polls to prepare for the 1990 national
elections. If the Muslim League does poorly in the
local elections, we would expect complaints to be
raised within the League and the military about
Junejo's poor leadership and his inability to deal with
opposition. Zia may then call for a parliamentary vote
of no confidence and appoint another prime
minister?perhaps Ghulam Mustapha Jatoi?without
resorting to new national elections.
At the same time, however, lingering violence in Sind
and the continuing standoff between Islamabad and
the opposition could erode public confidence in the
government. We believe Jatoi's new National People's
Party, given time to organize, could capitalize on this
sentiment and have good prospects for the 1987 local
elections.
43
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Warning Indicators
Although we are skeptical of Bhutto's ability to
overthrow Zia and force new elections, there are
several key indicators that would accompany a rise in
her prospects for coming to power:
? Violent unrest spreads from Sind to Punjab
Province.
? Opposition rallies attract larger support in Punjab.
? Police and Army troops exhibit reluctance to
suppress opposition violence.
? Bhutto successfully calls for labor strikes and
bazaar shutdowns in urban areas.
? Members of the provincial and national assemblies
defect to the People's Party.
? Islamabad dismisses local governments in troubled
provinces and replaces them with direct federal
rule.
? Local assemblies in troubled provinces replace the
Chief Minister.
? Kabul steps up its terrorist campaign in the North-
West Frontier Province, and antirefu gee feeling
increases.
? The economic situation deteriorates, and
unemployment among returning expatriates rises.
Other Scenarios
A less likely scenario would have the government call
snap national elections before 1990 in the belief that
public antipathy to the opposition's violent tactics
would produce an impressive Muslim League victory.
A government victory would probably neutralize
Bhutto as a threat to Zia and Junejo for the next
several years. We believe, however, that in light of the
recent antigovernment agitation, such elections could
not be called soon because it would appear as if Junejo
and Zia were caving in to Bhutto's demands.
Moreover, snap elections would assume a certain
daring on the part of the government that has been
uncharacteristic of the usually cautious Junejo and
Zia.
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Bhutto and her party might pursue peaceful protests,
register with the government, and run in the 1987
local elections in the hope that a strong nationwide
showing would shake public confidence in the Muslim
League, force Junejo's resignation, and increase
popular pressure for early national elections. The
Army would be unlikely to take action against Bhutto
if she follows a legal path. Moderates within her
movement have probably urged her to adopt this
course. But on balance, we believe Bhutto will reject
these tactics because they risk the defection of radical
party members and allied leftist parties.
An even less likely prospect, in our opinion, is
opposition agitation spreading from Sind into Punjab
Province, with Bhutto successfully calling for labor
strikes and defections of Muslim Leaguers to her
People's Party. She would then expect the Army to
intervene, replace Zia and Junejo, and hold new
elections that the People's Party would win.
US Embassy reporting suggests that the military is
glad to be back in the barracks and would act only if
the civilian government proved incapable of dealing
with instability that had spread to Punjab. Under a
military rule scenario, the new leaders, made up of
senior Army generals, would probably declare their
intention to hold new elections, but we believe they
would maintain power for a considerable period in the
belief that Pakistani politicians are incapable of
providing stable government. Zia would probably be
forced to resign from both the presidency and the
Army because he would be perceived as having failed
in his attempt to establish civilian rule.
Implications for the United States
Both the government and the opposition will be
seeking US endorsement for their political objectives
in coming weeks. Islamabad was stung by US
criticism of the government crackdown?the US
Ambassador was called in to receive an official
Pakistani protest on 21 August. Bhutto, on the other
hand, was probably encouraged by the US statement
because she wants US support for early elections. In
conversations with US officials, she has endeavored to
present herself as moderate, reasonable, and desirous
of good relations with the United States.
Secret
Future high-level endorsements by US officials of
Zia's presidency would probably lead Bhutto to
believe that the United States had taken sides against
her. Concurrently, anti-US sentiment among People's
Party radicals would also increase. Bhutto has
recently asserted publicly that the United States was
involved in the 1977 overthrow of her father, Prime
Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.
The government's preoccupation with the unrest will
hinder US efforts to persuade Islamabad to expand
overt cooperation in support of the Afghan resistance
and to take a tougher stand on narcotics, in part
because we believe that Islamabad does not want to
give Bhutto issues to arouse public support. Islamabad
may be more reluctant, for example, to punish poppy-
growing farmers for fear of arousing antigovernment
protests in the North-West Frontier Province as well
as in Sind. Zia and Junejo also are leery of heightened
domestic unrest providing new opportunities for
Soviet and Afghan troublemaking. Continued unrest
in Sind is likely to trigger Pakistani charges of Indian
meddling, further setting back the improvement in
relations with New Delhi that the United States has
sought to foster.
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Sri Lanka: The Return of
Sirimavo Bandaranaike
On 1 January 1986 Sri Lankan President
Jayewardene restored the civil rights of his political
archrival, former Prime Minister Sirimavo
Bandaranaike. Since returning to the public arena,
she has spearheaded the Sinhalese opposition party's
efforts against most of Jayewardene's political
initiatives and has been particularly nettlesome
during the peace negotiations with Tamil moderates.
We expect both she and her party will continue efforts
to block the peace talks, perhaps even fomenting
increased communal tensions and violence. Without a
consensus within the Sinhalese community,
Jayewardene will find it difficult to produce a lasting
solution to Sri Lanka's ethnic crisis.
Background
The national election of 1977 marked a landslide
victory for the United National Party (UNP) of
President Jayewardene over the incumbent Sri
Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP), led by then Prime
Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike. Following the
victory, President Jayewardene appointed a
Presidential Commission of Inquiry, which charged
Bandaranaike with election irregularities and misuse
of power during her seven-year administration from
1970 to 1977. Based on the commission's findings, she
was expelled from Parliament in October 1980 and
stripped of her civil rights for seven years.
Although Bandaranaike was prohibited from public
political action, she remained the driving force within
her party, working behind the scenes and through
other family members to oppose the UNP
government. Her son, Anura, was named to fill her
vacant parliamentary seat?although he had been
part of an SLFP dissident group opposing his
mother?and became leader of the opposition in
Parliament.
In a move that suprised his Cabinet, the Sinhalese
electorate, and the opposition, Jayewardene
announced in early 1986 a full pardon for
Bandaranaike and full restoration of her civil rights,
45
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Sirimavo Bandaranaike
including a return to Parliament.
Jayewardene may also have been trying to set
the stage for a united Sinhalese effort to negotiate a
political settlement with dissident Tamils.
Revitalizing the Oppposition
Following restoration of her rights, Bandaranaike has
embarked on a high-pressure campaign to restore the
political fortunes of her party. She has not reclaimed
her seat in Parliament but has redoubled her public
efforts to revitalize the SLFP. She called for a new
general election immediately after her pardon,
claiming that Jayewardene's National Referendum in
1982?which extended the term of the majority UNP
Parliament for another six years without a national
election?was unconstitutional. Bandaranaike was
also highly critical of Colombo's January 1986
repatriation agreement with India, which granted Sri
Lankan citizenship to some 95,000 stateless Tamils of
Indian origin living in Sri Lanka. In February she
announced a new SLFP platform, which included a
break from the unsuccessful socialist economic
policies of her previous administration.
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Anura Bandaranaike
The SLFP, traditionally the party of Sinhalese
chauvinists, has launched a public-relations campaign
to mobilize its electorate. The party is organizing
seminars and public meetings in Sinhalese areas
throughout the island to protest the government's
initatives for peace with Tamil insurgents.
Bandaranaike has sent party representatives to meet
influential leaders of the Buddhist clergy to brief
them on the party's criticism of Jayewardene's plan.
She is also courting votes from the Muslim
minority?an important voting bloc for both major
Sinhalese political parties because of its strategic
location in the contested Eastern Province. The SLFP
has long supported Arab countries, and
Bandaranaike's new platform includes an oblique but
unmistakable pledge to expel the Israeli interests
section from Colombo.
The SLFP hopes to foment islandwide agitation
against the government and force Jayewardene to call
an election before 1989. The party has recently
established links to a proscribed radical Marxist
Sinhalese party?the People's Liberation Front
(JVP)?which has actively opposed the President's
peace efforts, according to US Embassy reporting.
This group may have been responsible?possibly with
SLFP backing?for the early September bombing of
a Colombo rally supporting the communal
negotiations, injuring at least 50 people.
Secret
The SLFP also has links to some middle-level Army
officers who are disenchanted with Jayewardene's
handling of the government's counterinsurgency
effort and probably also with some rightwing
members of the President's own UNP. We believe the
SLFP links to radicals and hardliners are causing
concern in Colombo about the possibility of a coup by
one or more of these groups, possibly including
members of Jayewardene's government.
Implications
SLFP links to radical groups and Sinhalese hardliners
suggest there will be increasing antigovernment
activities between Tamils and Sinhalese and within
the Sinhalese community. SLFP exacerbation of
communal tensions and continuation of Sinhalese
chauvinist rhetoric could spark widespread communal
rioting reminiscent of the disturbances of May 1983,
in which an estimated 1,000?mostly Tamils?were
killed. The radical JVP has perpetrated violent
antigovernment activities in the past, and we believe it
will step up its attacks against Jayewardene
supporters, contributing to a worsening internal
security situation.
Although SLFP affiliations with leftists and
hardliners are primarily for political convenience, we
believe there is a chance of a united effort by elements
of the SLFP and other Sinhalese chauvinists to
replace Jayewardene's government with hardliners on
the communal question. We believe some members of
Jayewardene's Cabinet might support such a move, at
least indirectly, particularly the Prime Minister and
the National Security Minister, both of whom have
been lukewarm in support of the peace negotiations.
Bandaranaike and her party are likely to continue to
obstruct the peace initiative and to demand a new
general election. Jayewardene is unlikely to order an
election before the scheduled 1989 date. We believe
Bandaranaike will continue efforts to discredit
Jayewardene and his handling of the ethnic problem
and will step up the party's chauvinist Sinhalese
rhetoric to rouse the electorate against the President.
Lacking a Sinhalese consensus, Jayewardene will find
it difficult to implement a lasting peace with Tamil
dissidents.
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India's Space
Satellite Worries
India has asked the West European government
consortium, Arianespace, to launch its INSAT-1C
television, telecommunications, and weather satellite
following the canceled launch of the US space shuttle
and Washington's refusal to make available an
expendable launch vehicle. India wants INSAT-1C in
orbit soon to guard against the failure of its current
satellite, INSAT-1B. The INSAT satellite is crucial
to India's television broadcast, communications, and
weather forecasting systems and serves as a symbol of
New Delhi's great power aspirations. The US decision
to offer an expendable launch vehicle to Indonesia
ahead of India will reinforce longstanding Indian
worries about US reliability as a source of
sophisticated technology.
The INSAT Program
New Delhi is trying to keep its INSAT satellite
program on track. The program was set back by
Washington's indefinite postponement of the
September 1986 launch of INSAT-1C by an Indian
payload specialist on the space shuttle and the recent
US decision to deny India the one slot available on an
early Delta expendable launch vehicle in favor of
Indonesia. The Indians want to orbit INSAT-1C as
soon as possible to provide a backup in case the
orbiting IN fails and to increase their
telecommunications and weather forecasting
capabilities. Because India's first INSAT satellite?
INSAT-1A?failed in orbit in 1982, the program?
designed to be a two-satellite system?is not fully
operational.
47
The INSAT-1 satellites are unique because they
combine television broadcasting to remote stations,
telecommunications relay, and meteorological
functions. Designed by US and Indian engineers, the
satellites were an outgrowth of the NASA-Indian
Space Research Organization's SITE project in the
1970s, which demonstrated the feasibility of a
nationwide television system without a landbased
network. India's television broadcasting system is
completely dependent on the INSAT satellites for
national coverage. The satellites also provide
telecommunications services and weather imagery
unavailable from Soviet or Western satellites to
Indian civilian and military customers.
The INSAT program has important domestic and
international political dimensions for New Delhi. The
ruling Congress Party has used the television
broadcasting capabilities to influence India's
linguistically and geographically diverse population.
After Indira Gandhi's assassination in 1984, for
example, pictures of Rajiv Gandhi at the funeral and
swearing in as Prime Minister were an important
element in the smooth transition and restoration of
civil order. Indian political and scientific officials also
have publicly acclaimed the INSAT program as a
major development project leading India into the 21st
century. We believe they view the INSAT satellites as
a steppingstone toward an ambitious civil and military
space program.
INSAT Launch Alternatives
India has informed Washington it will use the West
European Ariane rocket to launch INSAT-1C.
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Communication
Meteorology
An artist's impression of INSAT-1
Television broadcasting
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New Delhi is likely to keep its payload specialist at
NASA on standby for a future shuttle flight?
perhaps to launch the INSAT-1D satellite scheduled
to be ready in 1988. The Indians have asked the
United States to substitute INSAT-1D for
INSAT-1C in the queue for shuttle payloads.
If Washington
cannot meet India's expectations, New Delhi would
probably turn to Arianespace to launch IN
and possibly future Indian satellites
If an Ariane or a US launch vehicle is unavailable,
we doubt the Indians would approach the Soviets.
We believe the Indians calculate that, because
INSAT-1D was built in the United States,
Washington will not waive COCOM restrictions to
grant a license to export the satellite to the USSR.
The Soviets have launched Indian remote sensing
satellites; another launch is pending using a Soviet
vehicle. India will pay for the next launch, unlike
three previous occasions when the Soviets provided
free launch services. We do not believe the Soviet
cost-free launches of remote sensing satellites set a
precedent for involvment with the INSAT satellites.
The Indians have not considered using Chinese launch
services, Beijing has
explored establishing a joint commercial launch
service with Western firms and has declared a
willingness to launch foreign satellites on its CZ-3
vehicle. We doubt the Indians would pursue this
option. We believe New Delhi will be reluctant to give
Beijing?which it views as its long-term Asian rival?
the propaganda advantage associated with such a
launch.
The
Japanese H-1 launcher, which flew successfully for
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the first time in August, uses a US-built first-stage
rocket and could put the satellite in orbit. Tokyo,
however, would need the United States to waive the
restrictions that prohibit the Japanese from using this
rocket to launch non-Japanese-owned satellites.
INSAT Satellite Alternatives
No single satellite could replace the INSAT-1B's
combination of high-powered television broadcasting,
telecommunications relay, and meteorological
functions in the event either the INSAT-1C launch or
the orbiting INSAT-1B fails. New Delhi, however,
could take stopgap measures to restore each of the
three functions of its orbiting satellite.
The telecommunications relay function of INSAT-1B
would be readily replaceable by substitute satellites.
India could negotiate with INTELSAT to lease
unused transponders on the Indian Ocean
INTELSAT-4A or INTELSAT-5 satellites to handle
India's telecommunications traffic. Following the
failure of INSAT-1A in April 1982, New Delhi used
both INTELSAT and Soviet satellites as substitutes
for relaying telephone traffic. Because India found its
leasing arrangement with the Soviet Union
unsatisfactory, we doubt New Delhi would turn again
to the Soviets for help.
New Delhi could also replace the telecommunications
function by purchasing or leasing transponder space
on the Canadian Anik C-1 or Anik D-2 satellites. The
Canadians are interested in selling or leasing
transponders on both satellites launched in 1984.
Telesat Canada recently offered a 75-percent
reduction in the price for leasing transponders. The
Aniks have a seven-year design lifetime, but we
expect the lifetime would be reduced to five years
with the expenditure of fuel required to move the
Anik to a position over the Indian Ocean.
The meteorological functions of INSAT-1B woukl
be harder to replace with alternative satellites. No
geosynchronous meteorological satellites in their
current orbits could fully compensate for the loss of
the INSAT-1B imaging system. Weather forecasting
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in India requires that the entire subcontinent and
surrounding waters be seen. The Japanese
Himawari-3, which images the eastern half of the
subcontinent for Japanese weather forecasting
purposes, would only permit monitoring of typhoons in
the Bay of Bengal.
The West European Meteosat 1-F2 could perform
INSAT-1B's weather forecasting functions if it were
moved to a location suitable for imaging India. The
European Meteorological Satellite Organization may
be willing to move Meteosat 1-F2 for India by
mid-1987 if Ariane successfully launches a new
Meteosat.
New Delhi might also consider using the imagery
from either US or Soviet low-altitude polar orbiting
weather satellites as a substitute for INSAT-1B
meteorological functions. The absence of a wide field
of view in the cameras, however, would degrade
India's ability to identify typhoons sufficiently far
from land to provide adequate emergency warnings.
New Delhi would have only one option for replacing
the television broadcast function of the INSAT-1B?
leasing another nation's existing satellite system. This
option would require India to reconfigure its S-band
(2.5 GHz) television-receive-only ground stations to
receive in the C-band (6/4 GHz) or Ku-band (14/11
GHz) used by the rest of the world's television
broadcasting satellites. The reconfiguration would
cost at least $50 million and substantial time?one
day for a technical team at each of 160 ground
stations.
Implications for Indo-US Relations
New Delhi's decision to seek an Ariane launch of
their satellite is unlikely to impair relations between
NASA and the Indian Space Research Organization.
India's decision to substitute INSAT-1D for 1C
indicates New Delhi recognizes the difficulties NASA
faced in rescheduling the INSAT-1C launch.
Moreover, the Ariane launch may indirectly benefit
Indo-US relations by keeping Rajiv Gandhi's high-
technology agenda on track and eliminating the
possibility that a failure of Indian television,
telecommunications, and weather forecasting would
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be blamed on the United States. If Ariane runs into
difficulty, the United States has the option of waiving
its restrictions on a Japanese launch to demonstrate
its willingness to help New Delhi.
The recent US decision to offer an expendable launch
vehicle to Indonesia ahead of India, however, will
reinforce longstanding Indian worries about US
reliability as a source of sophisticated technology and
as a friend. Gandhi may look to Washington for
additional help in the areas of computers or
telecommunications technology to deflect domestic
criticism of his turn toward the United States.
In the event that the United States excludes all
foreign payloads from future shuttle flights, New
Delhi probably will give priority to timing and cost
considerations in selecting an expendable launch
vehicle for INSAT-1D and the follow-on INSAT-2
series. We expect New Delhi would press the United
States to lift restrictions on alternative foreign launch
options if those offers were timely and less expensive
than US expendable launch offers from either
commercial or government vendors.
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India's Attempts To Meet
Its Rural Energy Needs
New Delhi's programs to boost agricultural output
and encourage local small-scale industry have
increased rural energy demand. Firewood and crop
wastes are India's main source of rural energy, and
the increase in demand for energy has led to extensive
deforestation. To reduce the demand for firewood,
New Delhi is expanding electricity generation to
many rural areas and trying to take advantage of
alternative energy sources, such as solar, wind, and
biogas power. Although alternative sources alone will
not solve India's rural energy problems, they can
provide power where other sources are impractical or
inadequate. The government has boosted this year's
budget allocation for nonconventional energy
development from about $8 million to just under $40
million, according to press reports, and New Delhi is
particularly interested in developing the countrys'
wind and solar energy potential. To develop
alternative energy systems, New Delhi will have to
import the technology, most likely from the West.
Increasing strains on India's foreign reserves,
however, may prompt New Delhi to restrict its
equipment purchases and limit its acquisitions to
technology transfers.
Rural Energy Problems
India's rural population, which accounts for about 65
percent of the nation's 783 million people, has long
depended on crop and animal wastes and firewood for
fuel. As the population has grown, these sources have
been increasingly diverted to such uses as fertilizer,
animal fodder, and building materials. In addition,
widespread deforestation?according to government
officials, India loses about 1.5 million hectares or just
under 5 percent of its total forest land annually?has
brought about severe soil erosion.
New Delhi's approach to meeting the rural energy
demand is varied:
? In the 1960s the government initiated a rural
electrification plan that is still active and involves
connecting rural areas to the country's main electric
51
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power grids. The main grids, however, also supply
India's large urban and industrial areas and are
inadequate to meet both urban and rural needs,
resulting in constant power interruptions.
? To supply rural areas with constant and adequate
sources of power, New Delhi is trying to develop
local energy supplies. In particular, the government
is pushing projects that promote the use of small
hydropower stations and biogas pits that use human
and animal wastes to provide methane gas for rural
cooking and heating.
? The government is implementing projects that
promote energy conservation. For example, New
Delhi is funding a project to increase the efficiency
of cooking equipment.
India's attempts to supply rural areas with alternative
energy sources have been moderately successful. As a
result of the rural electrification plan, 63 percent of
the country's villages have access to electricity, up
from 60 percent in 1985. In addition, 110 small
hydrostations?each with a capacity of up to 12
megawatts?have been established, most in the last
eight years. Although biogas use also enjoys some
success, it provides less than 1 percent of rural energy
needs. Traditional fuels still account for 50 percent of
overall energy supplies and about 70 percent of rural
consumption, according to Indian Government
statistics. Deforestation remains a serious problem.
Moreover, the changing needs and living standards in
the countryside are widening the gap between rural
energy demand and supply. Farmers are diverting
more organic material toward fertilizer and using
more energy to power irrigation systems to boost
agricultural output. Furthermore, the success of the
green revolution, especially in Punjab, Haryana, and
Uttar Pradesh, has raised rural income and demand
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Status and Plans for Nonconventional Energy Use
Crop Wastes and Firewood?India embarked on an
ambitious nationwide forest replenishing program in
1980. Over 1.6 million hectares were planted during
1980-85, exceeding the government's target of 1.4
million hectares. New Delhi is also trying to improve
the efficiency of bioenergy consumption. The
woodstoves (chulhas) used in over 112 million homes
are extremely inefficient, supplying only 2 to 10
percent of the energy produced; the rest is lost to the
atmosphere.
The government launched a National Project on
Demonstration of Improved Chulhas in 1983. The
improved cookstoves have a thermal efficiency
ranging from 15 percent upwards. By the beginning of
1986, more than 300,000 of the stoves had been
installed. The net annual saving in firewood by their
installation is about 247,000 tons, according to
government statistics.
Small Hydrostations?India's 110 small hydro-
stations provide an estimated 1,300 megawatts (MW).
The potential for micro- and mini-hydro generation
in India is about 5,000 MW. An alternative energy
research center has been set up for developing
technologies to tap the low capacity potential.
Wind Power?Under the wind energy program, about
1,000 water-pumping windmills have been set up so
far, a wind data land book was published in 1983,
and four pilot projects and one monitoring system
have been initiated in Gujarat, Orissa, Maharashtra,
and Tamil Nadu states. In addition, public notices
have been issued for procurement of stand-alone wind
electric generators in the range of 10 to 25 KW.
Solar?Photovoltaic technology, which facilitates
direct conversion of solar energy into electricity, is
considered to have significant potential in India,
where there is plenty of sunshine and a great need for
electrical energy. The advantages of a photovoltaic
power system include the absence of moving parts,
resulting in ease of installation and maintenance, and
a long lifespan. These features make the system most
suitable for installation in remote and isolated areas,
forest and hilly areas, and desert locations. Among
the applications that have been demonstrated in the
country so far are water pumping for irrigation and
drinking water, street lighting, community television
and radio sets, offshore oil platforms, and medical
refrigeration. In addition, New Delhi introduced a
national-level extension program late last year on a
variety of solar thermal systems for domestic,
agricultural, and industrial applications.
Biogas?India now estimates it has slightly over
94,000 biogas pits and hopes to increase the number
by 60,000 by the end of next year. Methane pits are
basically limited to warmer regions. Biogas is used
mainly as a supplemental source of fuel for heating
and cooking.
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for energy-using consumer goods and appliances, such
as motor scooters, refrigerators, and washing
machines. New Delhi's policies to develop local small
industry also have helped to create a growing rural
industrial sector whose demand for coal, oil, and
electric power is steadily growing.
According to our analysis of Indian statistics, about
45 percent of India's rural energy needs are still not
met. Furthermore, despite New Delhi's best efforts,
we expect rural energy demand will continue to grow
at a much faster pace than supply. We estimate that
in the next five years commercial energy sources will
satisfy roughly 45 percent of demand compared with
the current 55 percent.
Seeking Foreign Assistance
Indian officials are seeking Western cooperation in
developing technologies in alternative energies that
are easy to use and maintain, that are cost efficient to
build and use on a scale suitable for rural operation,
and that India can eventually indigenously
manufacture:
? New Delhi is currently involved in two joint
windpower development projects with West
Germany, and Gujarat state officials are engaged in
a windpower development project with Denmark.
? India is considering Japanese proposals for the
development of solar-generated electricity.
Photovoltaic equipment, however, is prohibitively
expensive.
? A 25 KW solar power generating system under an
Indo-US development program is nearing
completion.
Outlook
Alternative energy sources will, at best, offset only a
fraction of expected rural energy shortfalls by the end
of the century. As a result, India will have to continue
relying on conventional commercial and traditional
energy sources.
Reverse Blank 53
Government Role in Nonconventional
Energy Development
The Department of Nonconventional Energy Sources
was set up in 1982 to assess energy problems and
initiate research and development programs. In
addition, New Delhi provides subsidies against the
capital cost of nonconventional energy projects. Press
reports indicate that some state governments have
also set up rural energy organizations, and New Delhi
has apparently authorized them to deal directly with
foreign governments. Most contacts with foreign
companies, however, have been carried out by
national-level ministries.
We believe that Western nations, especially West
Germany, France, Denmark, and the United States,
will have an edge in India's alternative energy market
for the next few years because their windpower
technologies are already feasible. Japan could capture
a larger share of the market if it can develop solar
energy at a competitive cost. In any case, the Indian
market is likely to be small, and budget and foreign
exchange restraints probably will limit India's
purchases mainly to prototypes and technology
transfer agreements, unless potential partners are
willing to extend generous credit or trade terms.
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Gorkhaland:
Creating Tensions
in India's Northeast
After signing accords ending the Mizo and Assam
rebellions, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi is facing new
separatist activity in India's northeast. The Gorkha
National Liberation Front (GNLF), founded in 1980,
has been increasingly active in the West Bengal hill
district since early spring. GNLF supporters seek
recognition of their special status as Indian citizens of
Nepalese origin and believe that only through a
separate state?Gorkhaland?can they guarantee
their rights and privileges. Although GNLF leader
Subash Ghising advocates a nonviolent approach to
resolving the problem, others within the movement
are likely to press for a more militant response if the
government ignores their demands.
Background
The Gorkhas?approximately 500,000 in all,
according to Indian Government estimates?are
ethnic Nepalis who live in the Darjeeling district of
the state of West Bengal. Many came to the region
long before the partition of India in 1947 and have
become Indian citizens. More recent immigrants who
still hold Nepalese citizenship also live in the area.
The Gorkhas are well known throughout the world for
their service in the British and Indian armies and are
considered highly skilled soldiers.
The Gorkhas have long complained that the West
Bengal state government is neglecting the economic
development of the hill areas in which they live. They
also claim they face discrimination in educational and
job opportunities. Gorkha leaders argue that the West
Bengalis treat all Gorkhas as outsiders, failing to
distinguish between those who are Indian citizens and
those who are still Nepalese citizens. The Gorkhas
partly blame the 1950 Indo-Nepalese Friendship
Treaty for the problem. Clause 7 of the treaty grants
to citizens of both countries the right to live and own
property, participate in trade and commerce, and
travel without restrictions.
55
Gorkha efforts to gain recognition of their plight were
launched at least 20 years ago but drew little
attention until 1979. At that time, a remark by then
Prime Minister Desai referring to Nepalese as a
foreign language sparked the first direct call by the
Gorkhas for a separate homeland. A year later,
Subash Ghising formed the Gorkha National
Liberation Front.
Despite a growing sense of alienation among Gorkhas
in India, Ghising had little success recruiting
followers until this spring, when the Indian
Government summarily evicted about 7,000 Nepalis
from a neighboring state. Ghising has used the
incident to underscore the need for a separate state to
guarantee Gorkha rights as Indian citizens despite
their Nepalese roots.
The GNLF Program
The GNLF has based its movement on three basic
demands:
? The establishment of a separate state called
Gorkhaland that would be part of the Indian Union.
Press reports indicate they envision the state
encompassing Nepali-speaking areas of West
Bengal and include the towns of Darjeeling,
Kalimpong, Kurseong, Mink, and parts of Siliguri
and Jaipaiguri.
? Recognition of Nepalese as an official language in
the Indian Constitution.
? Revocation of Clause 7 of the 1950 Indo-Nepalese
treaty.
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Subash Ghising, Head of the Gorkha National
Liberation Front
Frontline 0
Ghising, the 50-year-old, frail-looking leader of the
GNLF, devoted his early years to writing. He has
published a collection of poems and 21 other books,
mainly novels. He also served in the 8th Gorkha
Regiment of the Indian Army during the 1950s.
Ghising first demonstrated in support of Gorkha
rights in the early 1960s. At that time he headed a
youth organization?Tarun Sangh?t hat was
responsible for the first violent activity associated
with the movement.
Ghising moved into the political limelight in 1979
when he called for a separate Gorkhaland state. After
organizing the GNLF in 1980, Ghising spent several
years unsuccessfully campaigning to build the group
whose popularity blossomed last spring. According to
press accounts, he dominates GNLF rallies and
meetings and jealously guards his position by not
allowing others to compete with his authority within
the organization.
Ghising has introduced a program of agitation to
achieve GNLF goals. The program began with a
demonstration on 13 April 1986, the Nepali New
Year, and continued with a ritual burning of the 1950
treaty. The burning sparked police firing on the crowd
and resulted in the death of at least 13 people. The
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GNLF responded to the killings with a weeklong
bandh (strike) in the major trade centers throughout
Darjeeling district. The GNLF has used the bandh
several times over the last few months and has found
it to be an effective means of drawing attention to
Gorkha concerns.
Ghising seems willing to give the government time to
respond to GNLF demands. He originally planned
demonstrations for 15 August?Independence Day in
India?but on 14 August, he announced a 30-day
moratorium on GNLF activity. If the government
fails to respond?as is likely?other phases of the
program will be carried out. These will include
blockades of timber, a major export of the state;
boycotts of elections and national celebrations; and
the refusal to pay taxes.
Ghising's Base of Support
Many in both the central and state governments have
been surprised by Ghising's rising popularity and the
growing support for the Gorkhaland movement. Press
reports indicate Ghising's backing has expanded from
a small group of unemployed youths to a broad
spectrum of Gorkhas resident in the hill district. He
still seeks the support of Gorkhas living in the West
Bengali plains region. Ghising has had some success
in weaning Gorkha supporters from the state's ruling
party, the Communist Party of India-Marxist
(CPI-M), particularly in the tea gardens around
Darjeeling, a traditional stronghold for the party.
Press commentaries attribute Ghising's success to a
sense among tea workers that the state government is
neglecting the development of the gardens and
jeopardizing their livelihood.
Ghising claims to have the backing of Gorkha
servicemen, particularly those in retirement. Sources
of US Embassy officials say ex-Gorkha servicemen
are training GNLF members in guerrilla warfare and
that the GNLF receives ammunition from Army
camps in border districts.
over the years has noted that retired Gorkha
so remain fiercely loyal to Nepal even after their
career in the Indian Army.
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Welcome to Gorkhaland
A Foreign Hand at Work?
Indian officials are frequently suspicious of foreign
interference in domestic concerns, and they see this in
the Gorkhaland movement as well. The CPI-M in
West Bengal over the last several months has accused
Nepal, Sikkim, China, and the United States of
interfering. They have even suspected missionaries
working in the area.
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sensitive to Indian concerns. In late August they
closed a Nepalese newspaper after it devoted an entire
issue to the Gorkhaland movement, even suggesting in
one article that the King was involved in providing
financial aid. 25X1
The CPI-M in West Bengal has accused the US
Embassy in Kathmandu of funding the movement and
claimed to have "definite information" about the
involvement of the US Consul General in Calcutta.
These accusations sparked a demonstration against
the US Consulate in Calcutta in late August. About
1,500 people belonging to the Student Federation of
India (CPI-M) attempted to force the main gate at the
Consulate and failing that, vandalized property
outside the consulate grounds, including smearing the
walls with slogans such as "CIA?Hands Off India."
State?Central Government Response to Movement
West Bengal state officials initially believed they
could counter GNLF activity in the area by imposing
curfews and assigning large police contingents to
GNLF demonstrations. They also conducted a
"cassette campaign" to discredit Gorkha claims.
Recent press interviews with the West Bengal Chief
Minister indicate, however, that the CPI-M realizes it
had not taken the Gorkhaland movement seriously
enough. It admits it was surprised by Ghising's ability
to engender emotional responses among the Gorkhas
and is particularly troubled by his success in
traditional CPI-M strongholds such as the tea
gardens.
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movement is with a united state-center position
against Gorkha demands, but they have been
disappointed by New Delhi's equivocation toward the
trouble in Darjeeling. The state has even suspected
Congress Party officials of ignoring the movement in
an effort to undermine the state's leftist government
for its own political gain. Only recently did the central
government come out officially against the GNLF's
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call for the creation of Gorkhaland within the Indian
Union and revocation of the Indo-Nepalese
Friendship Treaty.
Outlook
Violence in West Bengal is likely to increase over the
next several months. Supporters of the CPI-M have
already responded to GNLF demonstrations by taking
action into their own hands. In one instance they
attacked Gorkhas watching a volleyball game and
took six of them hostage. Press reports indicate that
young members of the GNLF are not satisfied with
Ghising's nonviolent approach and are pressing for a
more militant stand against the state's efforts to end
Gorkhaland agitation.
Rajiv probably will find Gorkhaland agitation
creating unwanted political tensions, particularly if he
is forced to interfere in state affairs. Although he is
likely to hear arguments against a conciliatory
approach, Rajiv may decide to make some
concessions, such as recognizing Nepali as an official
language, in the hope of ending the problem quickly.
He may calculate, however, that there are fewer risks
in avoiding the issue. Involving the central
government, particularly in a crackdown on the
movement, may breed a more serious and violent
movement and even encourage Gorkha servicemen to
support it. He also would open his Congress Party to
Communist blame for any intensification of the
problem. Both the CPI-M and the Congress parties
are likely to exploit the Gorkhaland issue to
strengthen their political position in West Bengal for
elections scheduled for February 1987.
Secret
Increasing violence by either GNLF or state
government supporters would have a significant effect
on the economic well-being of West Bengal state. The
principal industries of the Darjeeling district are tea,
timber, and tourism, and all three are already feeling
the pinch. Businessmen in the hill district have told
US Embassy officials that the most notable
consequence of the trouble has been a reduction in
tourist bookings?possibly by as much as 70
percent?during the past season. Businessmen and
traders also note a loss of approximately $3.3 million
in revenue for the tea industry and claim that many
gardens are on the verge of collapse. One estate was
forced to close because Nepali workers were fleeing
the area. Moreover, Ghising plans to prevent timber
from being cut or moved out of the hill district.
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Declining Health
Services in Iran
The provision of health .services in Iran is
deteriorating because of the war, severe shortages of
foreign exchange, and Islamic doctrine. Except for the
wealthy and politically privileged, lower-quality
health care affects practically all Iranians and is
starting to breed discontent among lower- and middle-
class supporters of the regime. The doctors' strike in
Tehran in mid-July underscores the tension between
medical professions and regime leaders but represents
only one of many problems in Iranian health care.
Others include major shortages of doctors and nurses,
acutely low supplies of pharmaceuticals, an increase
in sanitation-related diseases and deaths, a shortage
of hospital beds, and an increased incidence of mental
illness. There are no indications that Iran's health
care will improve, and most Iranians have little choice
but to endure.
Impact of the Revolution on Medicine
The institution of the Islamic regime in 1979 caused
fundamental changes in Iran's health care. At least
half the estimated 15,000 doctors and thousands of
other medical personnel left the country after
Khomeini came to power. Most sought to escape a
regime they considered intolerable. The shortage of
female nurses probably became even worse than that
of doctors because the government enforced Islamic
doctrine prohibiting women from treating men. Most
trained registered nurses were assigned to female
wards or demoted to nonnursing positions.
Iran also suffers an acute shortage of
pharmaceuticals, including vaccines, because of
government policies and the medical demands of the
war. Shortly after the revolution, the regime closed
many pharmaceutical factories, the first step toward
controlling the industry. Many were later reopened to
meet the demand for drugs, but most skilled
technicians and managers had either been fired or
fled the country. They were replaced with poorly
trained regime supporters. Quality control throughout
the industry dropped sharply, and the production of
several medicines ceased because of manufacturing
59
problems. In addition, a government decision to allow
only generic names for medicines rather than use the
names employed by foreign chemical suppliers has
resulted in widespread confusion among doctors and
patients. The incidence of many diseases has
increased because of vaccine shortages.
in some areas outbreaks of malaria
and tuberculosis have reached serious proportions.
The Khomeini regime appears less concerned about
sanitation than its predecessor, viewing excessive
interest in personal hygiene as a sign of Western
decadence. This attitude is largely responsible for
large increases in disease and infection. Filling
medical jobs with poorly or partly trained personnel
has worsened the problem.
the mortality rate from major surgery
or serious illness has greatly increased since the
Shah's reign.
Deaths due to cholera
and other gastrointenstinal diseases have jumped 50
percent since the revolution,
and the incidence of relatively minor
ailments like scabies and conjunctivitis has risen as
well.
Effects of the War
The war with Iraq has worsened Iranian health care
problems. The need to treat large numbers of
wounded soldiers has frequently depleted supplies of
blood, blood plasma, medicines, and hospital beds.
The war is probably responsible for a reported
increase in the incidence of mental illness, including
suicides,
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Having a Baby in Iran Has AIDS Come To Iran?
Shortages of vacant hospital beds, properly trained
medical personnel, and pharmaceuticals make having
a baby in Iran particularly difficult.
suspected cases of AIDS have been
reported in Iran. The low quality of health care and
high demand for blood supplies because of the war
could make Iran susceptible to a rapid spread of the
disease. The government blames existing cases on
blood transfusions abroad and has organized several
medical conferences to discuss AIDS.
The war's drain on shrinking oil revenues and other
foreign exchange has limited imports of
pharmaceuticals and food, as well as the hiring of
foreign medical personnel. The types of imported
medicines have been cut from thousands to hundreds
in recent years. The supply shortfall has become so
critical that the National Iranian Industrial
Organizaion recently listed pharmaceuticals ahead of
bread, eggs, and meat in its priority list of imports.
Food shortages also have been cited as a cause of
medical problems. Iranian physicians recently
complained about insufficient food rations and
attribute the increased incidence of stillbirths and
birth defects to a general decline in nutritional levels.
To meet the demand for medical personnel, doctors
from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Philippines
have been hired, but foreign physicians have been
insufficient to fill current needs.
Political Repercussions
Those medical professionals who have remained in
Iran are increasingly upset not only by the worsening
status of health care, but also by regime policies such
as mandatory military service. They also are angered
by government maneuvers designed to limit their
political influence. All physicians under 55 are
required to serve one month a year at the front, but
many bribe officials to avoid military service. The
doctors' strike in mid-July?the second this year?
was a protest against regime efforts to assume control
of the Iranian Medical Council (IMC), an
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independent governing body similar to the American
Medical Association. The doctors were further
incensed by the arrest and reported torture of the
IMC's former leader before he was replaced by the
former Minister of Health, Dr. Hadi Manafi. The
regime apparently seeks to control the IMC through
Manafi and the Ministry of Health and thus weaken
the power physicians derive from their badly needed
skills.
Inadequate medical care is causing complaints among
military personnel and civilians but does not threaten
the regime. Some Army personnel are upset that
Revolutionary Guards receive preferential medical
treatment. According to an Iranian refugee, only
wounded Guard personnel?not regular armed forces
members?are sent to Europe when sophisticated
medical care is required. There also have been reports
of injured Army troops going without medical care
because of the pervasive shortage of doctors and
supplies. The two-tier medical care system that
existed during the Shah's reign?one quality level for
the rich and another for the poor?continues,
Many Iranians
have found, however, that the low-quality services
once widely available are hard to find.
Reverse Blank
61
Outlook
The economic drain of the war, low oil revenues, and
shortages of doctors and medicines point to a further
deterioration in health care. Private physicians almost
certainly will be ordered to make additional sacrifices
for the war effort, and the regime will use force if
necessary to attain compliance. As a result, discontent
over medical issues almost certainly will increase. The
badly needed skills of doctors will provide them with
some leverage, but their influence is insufficient by
itself to threaten the government. Iranian leaders will
continue to deflect criticism by blaming medical
problems on the Iraqi regime for starting the war and
on self-serving doctors.
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Near East and
South Asia Brief
Tunisia Economic Reform Efforts
During the past month, the Tunisian Government has instituted a currency devalua-
tion and other economic reforms to eliminate mounting deficits and curry favor with
the international donor community. In addition to the 15-percent devaluation
announced in mid-August, Tunis has:
? Indirectly increased bread prices by reducing the size of loaves sold.
? Raised prices for local staples of couscous and pasta.
? Announced the first sale of public enterprises in the construction, textile, and
tourism sectors.
? Furloughed nearly 1,000 public-sector workers.
? Adopted budget cuts totaling about $70 million.
? Inaugurated a "national loan" program with the objective of raising $25 million
through individual donations.
The government also approved further reforms to be implemented in the next few
months, including price increases for milk, sugar, and cooking oil and layoffs of an
additional 3,000 workers. Tunis, however, ruled out rescheduling any of its nearly $1
billion in debt service payments due this year.
Internal opposition to the reforms has been muted. Nevertheless, the Bourguiba
government is concerned about the need for a steady stream of foreign aid to
maintain domestic stability. Tunis is hoping the IMF team visiting the country will be
impressed with the reforms to date and approve a pending $180 million standby loan.
The government also hopes to impress the World Bank before talks begin in
Washington later this month on a $125 million agricultural-sector loan. Moreover,
Tunis is counting on its newly adopted austerity measures to sway Western
governments?particularly the United States and France?to provide immediate
balance-of-payments support. Tunisian reserves now cover less than four days' worth
of imports.
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Secret
NESA NESAR 86-021
12 September 1986
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