NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05S02029R000300900003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 21, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: March 27, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Near East and
South Asia Review
Seerct
NESA NESAR 87-008
27 March 1987
Copy 3 2 8
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Near East and
South Asia Review) 25X1
Articles Iran-Iraq: Dim Light at the End of the Tunnel) 1 25X1
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Iraq has encouraged several diplomatic initiatives to negotiate an
end to its six-year-old war with Iran, but, as long as Tehran
continues to call for the ouster of Iraqi President Saddam Husayn as
a precondition for peace talks, it is unlikely that any negotiations
will develop
Indian Reactions to A. Q. Khan's Press Intervie
Prime Minister Gandhi ordered a government reassessment of
Pakistan's nuclear capability but has not publicly endorsed an
Indian nuclear weapons program in the wake of the claim made by
A. Q. Khan, director of Pakistan's Khan Research Labs, that
Pakistan has built a nuclear bomb.
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India's Vulnerable Muslim Minority I 11 25X1
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India's Muslims will continue to look to the secular Congress Party
for leadership and protection from the country's vast Hindu
majority. Prime Minister Gandhi courts Muslims, but the upsurge
in Hindu chauvinism he faces could force him to mollify Hindus at
the expense of India's Muslim minority.
Opium and marijuana production remains high in Afghanistan in
part because of the disruptions caused by more than seven years of
war. Although most resistance leaders have denounced drug activity
publicly, on occasion they have had to moderate their stance to
maintain popular support.
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NESA NESAR 87-008
27 March 1987
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Israel: Shamir's Report Card-Economic Grades Trickle In
Since Yitzhak Shamir took over as Prime Minister last October, he
has failed to advance economic stabilization efforts begun under his
predecessor, Shimon Peres. Moreover, Shamir's unwillingness to
provide strong leadership in economic decision making hurts efforts
to implement needed reforms that address the economy's long-term
needs
Muscat's goal of Omanization-to replace expatriate workers with
Omanis-is progressing slowly, but Oman will continue to depend
heavily on foreign labor in nearly all sectors of the economy and the
armed forces, with British expatriates maintaining significant
influence over Oman's defense policy into the 1990s
Libya's Mercenaries-Which Way to the Front?
Libya has a longstanding policy of accepting foreigners into its
Armed Forces, both to fill out existing Libyan units and to build
new formations. Tripoli has spent a great deal of time, money, and
effort to train and house these recruits and has used them in combat,
but overall the return on this investment has been negligible.
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Algeria: Outcome of Legislative Election
SRCrpt
Results of the recent election for the National Assembly indicate
that President Bendjedid faces further struggles in trying to bring
about economic reform through expansion of the country's small
private sector. The election revealed widespread disgruntlement over
economic problems articular) arisin from new austerity
measures.
Mauritania faces new threats to its national security because of
recent trends in the Western Sahara conflict. Morocco's strategy
and the likelihood of intensified fighting will make it more difficult
for the fragile military re ime of President Taya to remain aloof
from the war
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Some articles in the Near East and South Asia Review are preliminary views of a
subject or speculative, but the contents normally will be coordinated as
appropriate with other offices within CIA. Occasionally an article will represent
the view of a single analyst; an item like this will be designated as a
noncoordinated view.
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Near East and
South Asia Review
Iran-Iraq: Dim Light at the End
of the Tunnel
Iraq has encouraged
negotiations will develop.
several diplomatic initiatives to negotiate an end to its
six-year-old war with Iran. Baghdad has focused its
efforts on members of the UN Security Council and
Iraq's Middle Eastern allies and has pressed them to
work for a comprehensive peace settlement. Iraqi
officials have recently visited France, Italy, Japan,
China, and the Soviet Union to bolster support for a
cease-fire and sanctions against Iran. Turkey and
Algeria have expressed interest in mediating the war,
but the likelihood that either will succeed depends on
Iran's willingness to drop its preconditions for
negotiations. As long as Tehran continues to call for
the ouster of Iraq's President Saddam Husayn as a
precondition for peace talks, it is unlikely that any
of the war.
UN Efforts
The UN Security Council has attempted to bring the
two parties to the negotiating table since the
beginning of the war, but Iranian intransigence has
impeded all its efforts. Since 1985, UN Secretary
General Perez de Cuellar has tried to negotiate a
peace settlement between Iran and Iraq but with little
success. In March 1985 he presented both sides with a
proposal that would reduce the scope and intensity of
the war but not create a cease-fire. Iran was willing to
discuss the proposal because it did not impede its
ability to carry on a ground war. Iraq, on the other
hand, rejected the proposal because it did not call for
a cease-fire, withdrawal to international boundaries,
or negotiations leading to a comprehensive settlement
Iran's occupation of Al Faw in February 1986
prompted the Security Council to issue a renewed
appeal for an end to the war. On 24 February it
unanimously adopted Resolution 582 that called on
both sides to observe an immediate cease-fire, to
withdraw to internationally recognized borders, and
to immediately submit all aspects of the conflict to
mediation or other means of peaceful settlement. Iran
criticized the resolution because it failed to condemn
Iraq as the aggressor
Initial Iranian gains during its recent offensive near
Al Basra seem to have heightened UN interest in
ending the war. In January the five Security Council
permanent members began to discuss adoption of a
resolution ordering an immediate cease-fire. The
members agreed that, to be effective, the Security
Council would have to back up this demand with
sanctions if either Iran or Iraq rejected the cease-fire
order. As the threat to Al Basra subsided, the move
for strong UN action stalled. To revive peace efforts
Iraqi officials have visited several countries, including
France, Italy, Japan, China, and the Soviet Union, to
urge them to adopt a strong resolution to end the
fighting and possibly initiate an arms embargo
against Iran.
The Iraqis are seeking a comprehensive cease-fire, a
withdrawal of forces monitored by international
observers, an exchange of prisoners, and assurances of
compliance by both sides. As in the past, Baghdad
says that it will reject any settlement that resembles
previous UN resolutions, which favored Iran by
limiting the cease-fire to the Persian Gulf and called
for a step-by-step settlement rather than an overall
end to the war. Iraq may believe that the UN
initiative has a good chance of passing because
Security Council members are worried about Iranian
advances near Al Basra. Although we doubt that the
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27 March 1987
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Iraqi Conditions
Iraq has expressed a willingness to negotiate an end
to the war since the early stages of the fighting.
Originally, Iraq sought absolute guarantees
concerning sovereignty over the Shatt Al Arab and
over land that belonged to Iraq but Iran had seized.
Baghdad based its claims on the agreements of
1913-14 that put the frontier on the eastern bank of
the Shatt as opposed to the 1975 Algiers accord that
fixed it at the deepwater channel. In July 1981 the
Iraqi Foreign Minister said publicly that settlement
of the conflict should be based on the following
principles:
? The inadmissibility of using force in resolving
disputes and the restoration of all rights taken by
force from their legitimate owners.
? Mutual respect for sovereignty and noninterference
in the internal affairs of other countries.
? Freedom of navigation in the Gulf and the Strait of
Hormuz.
By April 1982 declining Iraqi military fortunes had
led Baghdad to seek arbitration of the dispute, and in
October 1984 the Iraqi Foreign Minister told the
press that Iraq would accept international arbitration
of all territorial questions, including the Shatt Al
Arab dispute, accQrdine to the s of
international law.
In a message addressed to the Iraqi people on 14 June
1985 in connection with a temporary halt to the
bombing of Iranian towns, Saddam Husayn listed the
following conditions for ending the war:
? A comprehensive cease-fire on land, sea, and air.
? A pullback to international borders.
? A comprehensive exchange of prisoners of war.
? Direct negotiations based on mutual respect of each
side's integrity and noninterference in each other's
internal affairs.
? A correlation of these basic points so that the
violation of one would be deemed a violation of
them all.
Iranian Conditions
Iran's primary demand for ending the war has been
the ouster of Saddam Husayn and the Bath
government in Iraq. Iranian leaders have sometimes
hinted that they would be satisfied with the removal
of Saddam Husayn, but Tehran's official position
continues to call for the removal of the Ba'thist
regime. The principal Iranian demands in the early
stages were unconditional Iraqi withdrawal and
international condemnation of Iraqi aggression. By
October 1981 Iran's demands were as follows:
? Iraqi withdrawal from Iranian territory.
? Identification and condemnation of the aggressor by
a competent international tribunal.
? Implementation of the 1975 agreements.
? Payment of reparations by the aggressor
Tehran eventually dropped the third condition, but in
June 1982 another was added: the return of refugees
to Iraq. By February 1983, when Iraq had withdrawn
from most of the territory it occupied, the principle of
Iraqi withdrawal became less important, and the
most important conditions became the removal of the
Ba'thist regime, reparations, and condemnation of the
aggressor.
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United Nations will impose political or economic
sanctions against Iran, Baghdad probably hopes that
a strong resolution would help isolate Iran and
possibly promote an effective arms embargo.
A senior Iraqi official told US diplomats that
Washington's support for Iraq's proposals,
particularly an arms embargo, is a critical test of US
good will following disclosures of US arms sales to
Iran. In a meeting with a US Congressman in early
February, Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz called for
President Reagan's active support for a renewed arms
embargo against Iran. The Iraqis are pleased with the
President's recent statement on the war in which he
held Tehran responsible for continuing the fighting
and called for a withdrawal to internationally
recognized borders. The Iraqis, however, may be
overestimating the US ability to persuade other
Security Council members to support an effective
arms embargo against Iran
The Soviet Stance
The Soviets have taken an active role in recent
Security Council consultations on the war and have
expressed a willingness to work for a cease-fire. The
Soviet news agency TASS has reiterated Moscow's
interest in finding the quickest negotiated end to the
war and reported that Soviet officials endorsed UN
efforts to achieve a cease-fire. Soviet Foreign Minister
Shevardnadze has noted the importance of the Iran-
Iraq agreement not to attack civilian targets as a
necessary step toward a cease-fire and stressed that
continuation of the war provided a pretext for outside
intervention in the Gulf
Moscow used the recent visits of the Iranian and Iraqi
Foreign Ministers to project an image of peacemaker
in the Gulf, to ensure that Soviet interests in the
region are protected, and to capitalize on revelations
of US arms sales to Iran. According to US Embassy
officials in Moscow, the Soviets were careful to
provide the same access to both Foreign Ministers to
demonstrate their willingness to treat both countries
equally. At the same time, Moscow used the visits to
criticize Tehran's continued belligerency and to
underscore Soviet support for Iraqi efforts to find a
peaceful settlement to the war. The Soviets are likely
to continue to be active in UN deliberations and to
maintain contact with both Baghdad and Tehran. By
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any developing UN negotiations and strengthen their
credentials with the Arab world as a peacemaker in
the region.
Efforts by Other International Organizations
The Arab League and the Islamic Conference
Organization also have tried to mediate the Iran-Iraq
war but have been unsuccessful primarily because
Iran suspects that both are fronts for Iraqi and
moderate Arab interests. Following an emergency
session of the League's Committee of Seven in
Baghdad in early February, Arab League Secretary
General Chedli Klibi met in Tunis with the
ambassadors of the five permanent Security Council
members to garner support for Iraqi and Arab efforts
in the United Nations. The thrust of Klibi's message
was that the League fully supported Iraqi efforts to
secure a UN resolution condemning Iran and calling
for a comprehensive peace settlement. According to
US Embassy officials in Tunis, the Arab League
members hope this approach will force the United
States and the USSR to actively participate in UN
efforts to impose a settlement.
The Islamic Conference Organization passed a
resolution on the war during its summit meeting in
Kuwait in January. The resolution called on Iran to
accept UN Resolutions 582 and 588, as Iraq had
done, and to declare its willingness to end the war
peacefully. It thanked the Islamic Peace Committee
for its efforts to bring about a settlement but failed to
instruct the committee either to continue its work or
to cease its existence. The summit meeting's final
communique, however, called on the Islamic
Conference Organization's secretary general to follow
up on the resolutions adopted in Kuwait "by all
possible means and in accordance with evolving
circumstances."
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Kuwait-deeply worried about the war just across its
border-will try to breathe new life into an Islamic
Conference effort that bypasses the moribund Islamic
Peace Committee. A Kuwaiti official told US
Embassy officials that Kuwait, as Islamic Conference
chairman for the next three years, would do what it
could in conjunction with the Peace Committee and
Islamic Conference Secretary General Pirzada. A
direct role for Kuwait is difficult, given Iran's
perception that Kuwait is firmly aligned with Iraq.
The Kuwaiti official revealed that Kuwait had
contacted Iran during the summit meeting to ask for
Tehran's cooperation with a scaled-down committee.
Iran said it would cooperate only if it could approve
the summit meeting's final communique and
resolution concerning the war. Nevertheless, the
summit meeting participants agreed that Kuwait,
Pirzada, and the full Peace Committee should
Algeria may be
interested in renewing its efforts to end the conflict,
but, given Iranian intransigence, the prospects for
success are slim. Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz
visited Algeria in January to press the Algerians to
ascertain current Iranian thinking on the war. Aziz
expressed concern that, in the face of Iran's recent
military successes, support for Iraq among some of
the Arab Gulf states might be wavering. The Iraqis
also were concerned that Syria and Libya were
preparing a resolution for presentation at the Islamic
Conference summit meeting that would condemn Iraq
without criticizing Iran.
Aziz's trip to Algiers in January broke no new ground
on the subject of reviving Algeria's dormant efforts to
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continue their efforts with Tehran despite its
intransigence.
Pirzada recently returned from Moscow, where he
met with Soviet officials to discuss Soviet-Islamic
Conference Organization relations and possibilities
for mediating an end to the war. The Soviets told
Pirzada that, on the basis of their discussions with
Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati, Iran was not
interested in making peace with Iraq. Furthermore,
the Soviets said they saw little hope that the United
Nations could bring about an end to the fighting and
that, in their view, the Islamic Conference had the
best chance of ending the war, given its recent
mediate the war,
During meetings between Aziz and Bendjedid, the
Algerians were fairly candid about their frustration
over being unable to help resolve the conflict and were
pessimistic that any mediation efforts would move the
Iranians into negotiations. The Algerians reminded
Aziz that, at the beginning of the war, the Iraqis had
turned down Algerian requests to be more
accommodating toward Iran. Now it was Tehran's
mandate to try to mediate a peace settlement.
Algerian Efforts
Algeria is one of the few Middle Eastern countries
maintaining relations with Iran since the revolution,
and it has offered to mediate since the early days of
the war. Algeria's role in the 1975 Iran-Iraq
agreements makes it well qualified to mediate, but,
despite numerous contacts
with both sides, Algeria has been no
more successful than others in bringing the two
countries to the negotiating table. In 1984-85 the
Algerians were largely inactive because they
perceived that the Iranians were unwilling to talk, and
Algeria did not want to risk damaging its relations
with Tehran. An Algerian attempt to revive mediation
They promise to explore
future mediation possibilities but were pessimistic
that this could be accomplished in the near future.
Turkey's Role Limited
Turkey repeatedly asserts its neutrality in the Iran-
Iraq war while continually calling for a quick end and
offering its services as a mediator. Ankara maintains
good relations with Iran and Iraq, Turkey's two
leading trade partners in the Middle East. Economic
in February 1986 was rebuffed.
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ties, coupled with a long standing policy of seeking
accommodation with its hostile neighbors, restrict
Turkey's political manueverability and contribute to
its unwillingness to risk confrontation.
Other Arab states believe that Turkey can help
mediate an end to the war, and at January's Islamic
summit meeting in Kuwait they pressed Turkey to
take a more active role. Iran, however, has repeatedly
resisted Ankara's efforts, and relations recently have
been strained by two Turkish attacks on
Ankara faces a dilemma. It would like to see an early
end to the war, but not at Iraq's expense. The Turks
probably tilt toward Iraq because their economic
stakes in Iraq are larger and because they are nervous
about the repercussions of a clear Iranian victory.
Wishing to remain on good terms with Iran, however,
and to preserve its perceived role as a moderating
force in the region, Ankara probably will continue to
offer its services as a mediator.
Prospects
Iraq probably will continue to press for a strong UN
resolution calling for a comprehensive end to the
fighting, but the likelihood of achieving a peace
settlement, at least in the near future, is slim. Barring
an Iranian defeat or the death of Khomeini, it is
unlikely that Tehran will lessen its preconditions for
negotiations, particularly its call for a change of
regime in Baghdad. Tehran has linked the success of
the revolution to its ability to topple the Ba'thist
regime, and ending the war short of victory would call
into question Iran's political credibility and claim of
religious invincibility.
Algeria, Turkey, and the Islamic Conference
Organization will continue to explore the possibilities
of bringing the two sides to the negotiating table, but
their efforts are likely to be blunted by Iranian
intransigence. If Iran's position changes, Algeria
probably has a better chance of playing the role of
mediator, given its successes in the past.
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Indian Reactions to A. 0. Khan's
Press Interview
Prime Minister Gandhi ordered a government
reassessment of Pakistan's nuclear capability but has
not publicly endorsed an Indian nuclear weapons
program in the wake of the newspaper interview on
1 March of A. Q. Khan, Director of Pakistan's Khan
Research Labs, in which he said Pakistan has built a
nuclear bomb. We believe Western press reports and
Indian intelligence assessments were more important
than the interview in provoking the investigation.
Pressure from the Indian Parliament almost certainly
ensures that the nuclear issue will receive high
government priority through the spring legislative
session. Khan's assertions and the impending US
Congressional vote on aid to Pakistan have occasioned
a spate of articles and commentaries blaming the
United States for making possible Pakistan's nuclear
achievements and arguing that India should start a
nuclear weapons program. Public opinion mirrors the
press's hawkish stand.
The Government Response: Restrained
In our view the Indian Government's response to the
A. Q. Khan interview has been restrained. The
government's restraint is probably an effort by New
Delhi to cultivate the appearance of deliberately
weighing Indian nuclear options in the face of both
the Khan statements and Western press reports that
Pakistan has made significant progress in its nuclear
weapons program. A Foreign Ministry spokesman
announced four days after the publication of Khan's
interview that Gandhi was ordering the Defense and
Foreign Ministries to reassess Pakistan's nuclear
capabilities, but he rebuked a Pakistani journalist who
questioned if the interview would lead India to "reveal
its own atom bomb." According to the Embassy, New
Delhi may have had time to prepare its response in
advance because of the five-week interval between the
interview and its publication.
Gandhi's personal statements reflect his government's
calculated response. He said publicly that Pakistan's
clandestine nuclear program had hampered bilateral
relations. He also obliquely but unmistakably tied the
United States to Islamabad's weapons program,
claiming that Pakistan "gained momentum" with
help from "certain countries." In the past he has
stated publicly that India could build a nuclear
weapon within several months after receiving
compelling evidence of a Pakistani nuclear weapon.
We believe Indian officials regard Khan's statements
as genuine, but it is only part of the evidence that is
leading New Delhi to reassess Pakistan's nuclear
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Khan's statements were the catalyst for the review of
Pakistani weapons capabilities. the 25X1
review was actually provoked by Indian intelligence
assessments of Pakistani nuclear weapons progress.
The Indian Foreign Ministry publicly characterized
the Khan interview as part of a chain of evidence that
Pakistan's nuclear program had a weapons
orientation. We believe that Western press reports
that Pakistan was "two screwdriver turns" away from
a weapon also helped spur the Indian move. 25X1
The US Embassy in Islamabad discounts rumors that
Kuldip Nayyar, the Indian journalist who interviewed
Khan, worked with the Indian Government and
intentionally delayed publication of the interview until
US Congressional aid hearings on Pakistan were
under way. According to the Embassy, Nayyar is
considered a friend of Pakistan and has better access
in Pakistan than most Indian journalists. Instead, the
Embassy attributed the delay to the fact that Nayyar,
who entered Pakistan on 22 or 23 January and
apparently interviewed Khan shortly after arriving,
did not return to New Delhi until sometime between
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In our judgment, some Indian security planners
perceive China, not Pakistan, as the key long-term
strategic threat to India. According to the Embassy,
Indians still rankle at their humiliation by China in
1962 and see the Chinese as opposed to India's rise as
a South Asian power. India also almost certainly
worries that its lack of a nuclear deterrent against
China, coupled with a Sino-Pakistani strategic
alliance, would limit India's nuclear options against
Pakistan. According to the Embassy, India measures
its technological achievements in part against those
of the Chinese. For example, both have set goals of
10,000 megawatts of nuclear power by the year 2000.
12 and 14 February, thus delaying the interview's
publication in the London Observer to 1 March.'
The Press Response and Public Opinion:
"Make Bombs, Not War"
The majority of postinterview Indian newspaper
articles and commentaries favor an Indian nuclear
weapons program. Some argue that having nuclear
parity with Pakistan, such as exists between the
superpowers, is the only way to guarantee peace.
Others claim nuclear weapons superiority is the only
way to control Pakistan's behavior. A few journalists
opposed to an Indian nuclear weapons program argue
that only improved bilateral relations can guarantee
peace, while some deny Pakistan has the capability to
build a nuclear bomb despite Khan's statement and
warn India against being pushed into acquiring
nuclear weapons.
' Amidst the furor over his article Nayyar stood by his story that
the interview was prearranged but said the London Observer had
done a poor job editing the interview. Nayyar emphasized that
Khan had not actually said Pakistan possessed a nuclear weapon,
but that "what he fKhanl told me should be enough testimony."
Segments from articles in four major Indian
newspapers exemplify the views being presented in the
press on the nuclear weapons issue:
? Times of India, 28 February. "History shows that
the development of nuclear weapons capability
among nations having an adversarial relationship
has led to stability; this has happened in Central
Europe and on the Sino-Soviet border. Political
wisdom lies in accepting the inevitable and planning
for safeguarding our national security and interests
in the light of that inevitability."
? Indian Express, 3 March. "The immediate and
urgent question for New Delhi now is to reconsider
its nonconventional security strategy."
? The Statesman, 4 March. "If Pakistan can make a
bomb and claims it is for peaceful purposes only,
India, too may be under pressure to manufacture a
bomb, even only for display."
? Hindustan Times, 5 March. "There is a view
gaining ground in the country that it should not
bother if Pakistan does not renounce its nuclear
weapons program and that India must exercise its
own nuclear option."
Anti-US Reactions
Most of the Indian press and public were convinced
that Pakistan had a weapon before the Khan
interview, according to the Embassy and press
surveys. But the interview has dredged up anti-US
feelings in India, where it surfaced in the midst of
concern about Pakistan's possible acquisition of
AWACS aircraft from the United States. According
to US diplomats in Bombay, prominent Indians there
have blamed the United States for making Pakistan's
nuclear weapons achievement possible and argue for
an accelerated "countermove" from New Delhi. One
state legislator from the ruling Congress Party said
that continued US aid to Pakistan would impel India
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How Urban Indians View a Nuclear
Weapons Program
India's Sunday Observer recently published a 4-5
March survey of Bombay and New Delhi residents'
views of Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons
programs. The questions were posed to a cross section
of 627 literate adult men and women. The results
were:
? 69 percent believed Pakistan has a nuclear weapon.
? 82 percent believed that, in view of reports that
Pakistan had developed a bomb, India should also
develop a bomb.
? 32 percent believed foreign reports that India
already possessed a bomb.
? 68 percent believed that India should develop a
nuclear weapons program regardless of the cost.
? 75 percent believed that, in the event of an Indo-
Pakistani war, Pakistan would use a nuclear
weapon first.
? 79 percent believed that India and Pakistan should
sign a treaty banning the use of nuclear weapons
against each other.
? 45 percent believed that India should bomb the
Pakistani uranium enrichment facility at Kahuta;
46 percent said no.
? 52 percent believed that India's recent hike in
defense expenditures was due to the fact that India
knew Pakistan had developed a nuclear weapon
to seek shelter under a Soviet "nuclear umbrella."
Another Indian observer likened the incident to the
presence of the USS Enterprise in the Bay of Bengal
during Bangladesh's 1971 war of independence, which
Indians still point to as evidence of US support for
Pakistan in times of crisis.
Some Indian observers have used Khan's statements
as fuel for criticism of US arms sales to Pakistan and
allege that these sales occurred despite US knowledge
of the military orientation of Islamabad's nuclear
program. In his interview A. Q. Khan stated that the
CIA knew everything about the Pakistani program,
and many journalists and politicians have emphasized
this point. Articles by press commentators range from
allegations that the United States aided the Pakistani
program to accusations that the United States simply
tolerated it. For example, a former member of
Parliament compared US policy on Pakistan's nuclear
developments to the Iran problem and said "both are
double-faced and hypocritical." He claimed there was
a "clear understanding between the United States and
Pakistan over the latter achieving nuclear capability."
Some commentators have taken a wait-and-see
attitude, arguing that for India the real test for US
nonproliferation policy will occur during the
Congressional hearings on aid to Pakistan.
Outlook
We believe New Delhi's public statement that it is
reassessing Pakistan's nuclear program is in part an
effort to prepare the Indian public should the
government decide to begin an overt nuclear weapons
program. If India has decided on an overt weapons
program, we expect that before announcing its
decision New Delhi will try to gain the moral high
ground over Pakistan by portraying itself as a
reluctant nuclear participant seeking only to defend
against a threat initiated by Pakistan. As part of this
program, we expect continued Indian suggestions that
the US failure to press Islamabad to scuttle its
nuclear weapons program played an indirect role in
pushing India to counter with a weapon of its own.
If he does not announce an overt nuclear weapons
program, Gandhi will continue to counter the nuclear
threat from Pakistan by stating that India could
quickly produce a weapon of its own. At the same
time, the government will continue to play on
parliamentary and press interest in the issue to label
Pakistan as the aggressor.
We do not believe press support for an Indian nuclear
weapons program can by itself significantly influence
the outcome of India's nuclear debate. We believe
Gandhi and a few senior advisers determine nuclear
policy in India, and we doubt the Indian press has
enough influence to mold government opinion. We
believe, however, that the press has enough power to
influence the direction of public debate, and we
expect Parliament's spring session will ensure
continued heavy media coverage of the nuclear issue.
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Muslim Minority
India's Muslims will continue to look to the secular
Congress Party for leadership and protection from the
country's vast Hindu majority. Their participation in
the Congress Party has enabled the Muslim
community to exert leverage on the national
government on issues such as Muslim personal law.
Some Muslims, however, wary of growing Hindu
militancy, question the Hindu-supported Congress
Party's commitment to preserving their religious and
cultural rights. Prime Minister Gandhi courts
Muslims, but the upsurge in Hindu chauvinism he
faces could force him to mollify Hindus at the expense
of India's Muslim minority. At the same time, state
politicians with large Hindu constituencies often place
little emphasis on placating minority Muslim
communities.
The Muslim Agenda
Since independence in 1947 India's Muslims
generally have focused their political energies on
protecting their cultural and religious rights. They
reacted to the postindependence rise of Hindu
nationalism and the abolition of the British Raj's
special Muslim electorates by relying on the secular
Indian Constitution and the tolerance of the Congress
Party for protection.' Legal recognition of Muslim
personal law has been a major benefit of Muslim
political leverage, but other grievances remain largely
unanswered. Muslim demands include:
? Guarantees of the legal supremacy of Muslim
personal law in Muslim households.
? Protection against anti-Muslim rioting.
? Protection of the status of the Urdu language and
Arabic script. Although these are recognized in the
Constitution, only Jammu Kashmir and several
outlying areas give Urdu special recognition.
? More Muslim employment in government and
nationalized service posts and in public- and private-
sector industries.
' The Indian Councils Act of 1909 established separate Muslim and
Hindu electorates. The act gave Muslims some political
representation but isolated them from Hindus, and both groups
remained subservient to the British viceroy. In 1930 one Muslim
leader told a British negotiator, "Divide and rule is the order of the
? Concessions ensuring greater representation of
Muslims in higher education
Muslim Influence at the National Level
The Indian Muslim community has no exclusively
Muslim political organization at the national level.
Muslims lost their most effective leaders when
Muhammad Ali Jinnah and much of the Indian
Muslim leadership took Pakistani citizenship after
Pakistan's formation. The departure of the Muslim
elite left a less educated core of Muslims that could
not afford to leave India and has yet to fill the
postpartition Muslim leadership vacuum
Many Indian Muslims regard the Congress Party as
their secular protector at the national level and vote
for it in proportions approximately equal to those of
other communities, according to academics. These
scholars say Muslims calculate they reap more
rewards by working within the Congress Party than
by risking isolation by working outside it. Muslim
support for the Congress Party began in 1947, when
they backed Jawaharlal Nehru because he
represented the ideal of a secular India where the
overwhelming Hindu majority would respect
Muslims' individual rights. Muslims have since served
as a Congress Party vote bank-a pool of voters the
party could count on for support-backing every
Congress Party Prime Minister (except during the
Janata Party's electoral victory in 1977) since
independence. The Congress Party recognizes the
importance of wooing the potentially crucial Muslim
minority and routinely includes Muslims on national
party committees and in the federal Cabinet.[ 25X1
Muslim voters who do not support the Congress Party
are split between other national or regional parties
and Muslim parties. In West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh,
and Bihar, for example, two secular parties-the
Communist Party of India (Marxist) and the Lok Dal
Party-fared well in the 1980 general election among
Secret
NESA NESAR 87-008
27 March 1987
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India's roughly 80 million Muslims are the world's
fourth-largest Muslim concentration-behind
Indonesia, Pakistan, and Bangladesh-and make up
India's largest minority religious group, about 11
percent of the country's population. Muslims are
spread throughout most of India, with the largest
concentration in Jammu and Kashmir, the only state
where they are a majority. The northern and eastern
states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Assam, and West
Bengal all have 10 to 20 percent Muslim minorities.
New Delhi also has a large Muslim population.
The spread of Islam through northern India began in
the 8th century, when Muslim merchants first filtered
into India's southwestern Malabar coast, and an
Arab military expedition entered Sind in present-day
Pakistan. In 1206 Muslim invaders established a
sultanate in Delhi. Three centuries later a Muslim
from Central Asia conquered the sultanate and began
two centuries of rule by the Mughal Empire. The
empire and Islamic rule fell to armies of tribal
Maratha Hindus in the early 18th century, but the
Marathas lost control of India in the late 18th and
early 19th centuries to the British East India
Company.
The account of a British visitor to India in the 1820s
offers a glimpse of how little Muslim-Hindu violence
has changed over the years:
The fury which actuated both [Hindus and
Muslims] was more like that of demoniacs than
rational enemies.... It began by the
Mussalmans breaking down a famous pillar,
named Siva's walking-staff, held in high
veneration by the Hindoos. These last [the
Hindus] in revenge burnt and broke down a
mosque, and the retort of the first aggressors
was to kill a cow and pour her blood into the
sacred well. In consequence every Hindoo able
to bear arms, and many who had no other
fitness for the employment than rage supplied,
procured weapons and attacked their enemies
with frantic fury wherever they met them
Muslim voters in their respective areas of strength. In
the 1984 general election voters in Jammu and
Kashmir backed the Muslim-led National Conference
Party, long a powerful political force in the Muslim-
dominated Kashmir Valley.
We believe widespread Muslim-Hindu rioting is a
major concern for Gandhi and gives Muslims some
leverage at the national level.
between Muslims and Hindus-who together
comprise over 90 percent of India's population-
would dwarf the nationwide security threat now posed
by Sikhs, who make up only about 2 percent of India's
population
During the past year the Muslim community has used
its leverage to press Gandhi to support the retention of
Muslim personal law and steamroll Congress Party
members of Parliament to support a conservative
Muslim women's bill, according to the Embassy.
Some observers suggest that Gandhi changed his
stand on the bill to stem Muslim desertions from the
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National Issues and Hindu-Muslim Riots:
Two Case Studies
In our judgment, Muslim-Hindu riots over the past
several years have resulted from growing Hindu
militancy and the ensuing Muslim fears that their
communities and faith are threatened by India's 600
million plus Hindus. India's Muslims often react
violently to catalytic national events they regard as
threatening to the status of Islam in India. On the
Hindu side, senas-private religious armies-
regularly instigate such rioting by methods such as
routing their religious processions through Muslim
neighborhoods. Some issues-such as questions of
the legality of Muslim personal law and Hindu
assertions that Muslim mosques built over Hindu
temples should revert to Hindu control-earn
immediate national attention and spark Hindu-
Muslim riots throughout India.
The Shah Bano Case. In April 1985 an Indian court
contradicted Muslim personal law and ruled that
Shah Bano, a Muslim divorcee, was legally entitled
to maintenance from her former husband. Although
liberal, educated Muslims-including senior officials
in Gandhi's government-supported the decision, it
provoked strong dissent and rioting among more
conservative, less educated Muslims. Gandhi
eventually changed his stance on the issue, and a
parliamentary bill later reversed the court's decision
and supported Muslim personal law.
The Ayodhya Temple Controversy. During the 16th
century, India's first Mughal emperor constructed a
mosque on what Hindus have claimed for over a
century is the site of the Ayodhya Temple, the 2,000-
year-old birthplace of the revered Hindu deity Rama.
The question of which religious group should control
the site languished in India's courts for 35 years, but
a court ordered in January 1986 that the mosque
revert to a Hindu temple and has yet to consider a
writ challenging the order. Coming on the heels of the 25X1
Shah Bano decision, the timing of the ruling seemed
ill advised, but the Embassy reported that the state's
weak chief minister may have forced a resolution to
the problem to curry favor with his Hindu
constituency. The decision sparked Muslim-Hindu
riots and, according to the Indian press, over 50
deaths
Congress Party in impending elections and to protect
the party's broad appeal by reaffirming its
commitment to protecting the rights of religious
minorities]
Muslims and Regional Politics
Muslims often lose out in state politics to the interests
of local majority groups, especially Hindus, and to
other minorities. An academic study shows that
Muslims form less than 20 percent of the population
in over 85 percent of parliamentary districts. Because
Muslims are spread so thinly, state leaders in those
districts regularly ignore them to pursue the immense
Hindu vote. At the same time, casteless Hindus, low-
caste Hindus, and tribals get a larger share of
attention and funds from states because they rank
lower socially than do Muslims. The Indian
Constitution gives special consideration to improving
the plight of selected minority groups that have
traditionally suffered from discrimination, but the list
does not include Muslims.
Local elections can nevertheless serve as fertile
ground for Muslim constituencies to squeeze
concessions from ruling state parties by delivering
crucial swing votes, especially in the approximately 14
percent of parliamentary constituencies where
Muslims account for over 20 percent of the vote. In
Kerala, for example, Muslims and Christians can
heavily influence the state's ruling coalition because
they hold the balance between Hindu voting blocs
split between the Communist Party of India and the
Congress Party. The ruling coalition in Kerala, for
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example, played to Muslim interests in the Shah Bano
case to lure a splinter Muslim party from the
Regional Islamic organizations and Muslim leaders
periodically gain national notice, although their
influence remains regional. Recent instances include:
opposition
Because Muslims constitute a majority in Jammu and
Kashmir, they can play a greater role in state politics
than do their coreligionists elsewhere in India. Most
of the state's chief ministers have been Muslims, who
dominate state political parties. Candidates from the
Muslim-backed National Conference (F) Party, which
runs the state government in coalition with the
Congress Party, hold most assembly seats in the
overwhelmingly Muslim Kashmir Valley.
India also has a vocal minority of Muslim leaders-
often spiritual figures-who have gained largely local
followings by arguing that the government does not do
enough to protect Muslim interests. Both the head of
India's main mosque and the spiritual leader of
Kashmiri Muslims sparked Muslim protests after the
Ayodhya Temple and Shah Bano controversies last
year. The Assam Accord, signed by Gandhi and
Assamese youth leaders, infuriated Muslim leaders in
the state who claimed it discriminated against Bengali
Muslim immigrants. Finally, some Muslim
fundamentalists in Jammu and Kashmir-frustrated
with state Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah because
they regard him as New Delhi's stooge-have turned
to Islamic fundamentalist organizations not because
of their conservatism but because they see such
groups as the only alternative to New Delhi.
? The Jamaat-i-Islami (Islamic Society), an orthodox
religious/cultural organization that has mobilized a
limited following in Jammu and Kashmir by
advocating Pakistani acquisition of Kashmir,
promoting Islamic orthodoxy, and supporting
Hindu-to-Muslim conversions. The Jamaat
encouraged Muslims to hoist Pakistani flags this
year on India's Independence Day. It recruits
university students through its youth wing, the
Jamaat-i-Tulaba. The Jamaat is the main
constituent of the Muslim United Front, a state-
level umbrella group of Islamic nationalism
organizations.
? The Shahi Imam, head of India's main mosque (the
Jama Masjid), who has organized a private Muslim
militant organization, the Adam Sena, and has used
the group to dramatize Muslim grievances through
street demonstrations. Liberal Muslims criticize the
Shahi Imam for using his post as a political
platform.
? Farooq Abdullah, chief minister of Jammu and
Kashmir and head of the main faction of the state's
National Conference Party, who took power in
December after he forged an alliance with Rajiv
Gandhi. Although he has strong popular support in
his Muslim-majority state, Muslim leaders from
other regions and parties in India have told the
Embassy that they regard him as a spokesman only
for Kashmiri Muslim concerns.
? Syed Shahabuddin, a Janata Party member of
Parliament, who in early January 1987 called for a
national Muslim boycott of Republic Day
celebrations to bring attention to the Ayodhya
Temple controversy. Other Janata Party members
and leading Muslims in the central government
criticized him for misrepresenting his party and
provoking questions about the patriotism of
Muslims.
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Syed Shahabuddin, Janata
member of ParliamentF_
Impediments to Muslim Unification
We believe the wide distribution and variety of
Muslim communities has undermined their ability to
forge a national political coalition despite their
common goals. According to one academic, Muslims
are affected by Sunni-Shia differences despite the fact
that about 90 percent of them are Sunni. Many rely
on primary languages other than Urdu, such as Hindi
and Bengali. Muslims also recognize distinct class
lines, and India's Muslims have adapted to their
culture the caste distinctions of the subcontinent.
Regional differences in dress and religious practices
also fragment the Muslim population.
We believe the threat of Hindu violence also hinders
Muslim unity. According to an Embassy source,
Muslims risk "political irrelevancy" by stirring up
Hindu concerns about Muslim unification and the
threat it poses to India's integrity. Muslims clearly
understand Hindu suspicions about the intentions of
the Islamic countries surrounding India; Islamic
"expansionism" and conversions of outcaste Hindus to
Islam; and the danger of Muslims becoming Pakistani
spies and a "fifth column" that might support
Islamabad in the event of another war. In the face of
another cycle of rising Hindu militancy, many
Muslims have revived the belief that politization of
Muslims spurs Hindus' fears of Islamic separatism in
India and stimulates Hindu chauvinists to further
unify as a militant bloc. This reasoning has prodded
Muslim politicians and senior Muslims in the federal
government to publicly call for their coreligionists to
reject Islamic revivalism, to integrate socially and
politically in India, and to support the Indian ideals of
constitutionally mandated secularism. For example,
when Syed Shahabuddin called for a boycott of
India's Republic Day, both his fellow party members
and Muslim government officials roundly condemned
his suggestion as "antinational" and contributing to
anti-Muslim sentiment in India. They also accused
him of using the party as a national platform to fan
Muslim communal fires.
Outlook
Muslim-Hindu violence probably will continue to be
characterized by sporadic riots spurred by what
Muslims perceive as Hindu-sponsored affronts to
Muslim rights. Without a major catalytic event or a
series of moves Muslims perceive as anti-Islamic-
such as repeated conversions of contested mosques
into Hindu temples-the short-term prospects for
sharply increased violence or the emergence of
national Muslim political organizations will remain
limited.
Instead, Muslims will probably continue to ally with
the Congress Party, despite their fears that Gandhi
will sacrifice Muslim interests to win Hindu votes.
For his part, Gandhi will probably continue to use the
Congress Party's political muscle to assuage Muslim
fears and stave off drastic disaffection with
government and party attitudes toward Muslim
grievances. Gandhi will probably seek to influence
Parliament to favor conservative Muslims when he
sees popular sentiment stirring behind sensitive
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Areas of Poppy Cultivation and Major Military Activity
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Scattered or suspected
poppy cultivation
Major military activity
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0 100 200 Kilometers
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Afghanistan: Drru>rsand
the Resistance
Opium and marijuana production remains high in
Afghanistan in part because of the disruptions caused
by more than seven years of war. Antidrug programs
are a low priority for all sides. The various groups in
the Afghan resistance alliance have found themselves
responsible for the administration of sections of the
country, including many regions of high drug
production. Although most resistance leaders have
denounced drug activity publicly, on occasion they
have had to moderate their antidrug stance to
maintain popular support. We do not believe drug
activity provides a significant source of funds for any
of the Afghan resistance groups. Individual insurgent
commanders in some areas, however, derive a portion
of their income from drug production and trafficking
to meet local needs.
Regardless of the outcome of the war in Afghanistan,
we believe the drug issue will remain a difficult
problem for any national administration. If hostilities
end, resistance leaders are unlikely to support
unpopular measures to limit the country's drug
output. Opium and cannabis growing is likely to
continue to be a major source of foreign exchange in
an economy that will be under great pressure to make
up the shortfalls resulting from nearly a decade of
war.
The Resistance and Drug Trafficking
Insurgent military successes have often been in
eastern Afghanistan's prime drug-growing region,
where farmers traditionally have grown both opium
and cannabis as a cash crop. Despite widespread
fighting and refugee flight from these areas, drug
production has remained high because:
? These areas are the homelands of several Afghan
tribes with long histories of drug activity.
? The areas straddle several main smuggling trails.
? The depopulation of the region by the war increases
local farmers' desire to plant crops with high
economic return, such as poppies and cannabis,
Increasing Opium Production:
Economic Motivations
Although cannabis and poppy growing have been a
source of income for tribal Afghans for centuries,
cultivation has increased in recent years, in part
because of the disruptions of the war. Although
reliable official figures are unavailable, US
diplomats in Kabul estimate that illicit drug
production has increased steadily for the past several
years. US estimates of the annual opium production
for 1984 were between 140 and 180 metric tons. This
estimate was raised to nearly 300 tons for 1985. The
most current projection for 1986 suggests that overall
opium output will remain near 300 metric tons.
From an economic viewpoint, opium yields a large 25X1
cash return relative to other crops, and cultivation
costs are low. In a country where much of the
population has fled as refugees and road and
irrigation systems have deteriorated because of
combat activity and poor maintenance, opium poppies
are an ideal cash crop. Drug cultivation earns a
greater cash return per volume than alternative crops,
can be grown with or without irrigation, and can be
adapted to a wide range of terrain. In addition,
processed opium is easy to transport, resists spoilage,
and can be stored indefinitely. Because of its many
uses-various parts of the poppy plant can be used as
food, fuel, or medicine-opium poppy cultivation is
highly valued. Increasingly, processed opium is used
instead of cash as a means of exchange. 25X1
? Soviet and Afghan regime forces in the area either
ignore or support production and marketin of raw
o ium and hashish,
Secret
NESA NESAR 87-008
27 March 1987
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Afghan farmer harvesting poppy pods. Pods have
been scored and scraped previously for opium
All parties of the alliance adhere to a form of Islamic
ideology-ranging from militantly fundamentalist to
moderate-and all base their condemnation of drugs
on Islamic principles. In at least one case,
with village spokesmen over the village's decision to
continue growing opium poppies.
although most insurgent
commanders could not eradicate drug activity in areas
under their control, they tried to curb farmers from
making excessive profits by taxing overproduction.
many commanders
exacted harsh penalties from their own men found
using drugs.
rick Incino Inca] cnnnnrt by attemntina to damn not
insurgent commanders have had to reach a modus
vivendi with local farmers in areas where drug
production presents a major source of cash.
some local insurgent comma
have been involve in complex kickback schemes with
Soviet and regime authorities to protect their drug
crops and trafficking activities.
in early 1987
more Afghan farmers turned to drug production
because:
? Drought throughout much of the area has reduced
the output from food crops and disrupted livestock
grazing.
? A reduced labor supply and rising security concerns
have forced them to turn to more remunerative cash
crops.
? Even with food and cash subsidies from resistance
groups, many farmers would be forced to flee as
refugees to Pakistan if they did not grow drugs.
? Farmers often hope to send at least one family
member to fight with the resistance and therefore
need a relatively high-profit, low-labor crop such as
Leaders of the seven major resistance parties in
Pakistan have made repeated public statements
against the growing, trafficking, and use of drugs,
including orders to shoot known drug traffickers on
sight Field
commanders affiliated with these parties, however,
have had to temper these views in light of the
prevailing political situation in areas under their
control. insurgent
control of the drug situation is complicated by
common drug traffickers who masquerade as
members of resistance groups to cover their illicit
activities.
drugs.
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Economic Factors
Seven years of war have disrupted the traditional
agriculture-based economy in some areas of
Afghanistan, leaving the local population increasingly
destitute. Where resistance groups previously could
depend on the civilian population to supply them with
food and clothing, many civilians are now forced to
look to the insurgents for economic support. Rising
costs for food and transportation have placed an
additional strain on insurgent finances. Although
most commanders receive some support from one of
the resistance parties in Peshawar, many complain
that this assistance is not sufficient to meet their
needs. In our judgment, faced with rising expenses
and limited sources of revenue, some insurgents have
turned to drug production and smuggling to make up
the shortfall. some
local insurgent commanders accept cash or drugs to
guarantee the security of drug and contraband
caravans through their territory
In our view, income from the production or smuggling
of drugs does not represent a significant source of
finance for the Afghan resistance as a whole but may
be an important source of funds for some groups at
the local level. We see little evidence to suggest that
the resistance parties based in Peshawar derive
financial benefit from the drug industry.
individual
commanders or insurgents in some areas depend on
profits from drug production or trafficking to meet
some of their needs
Some insurgents use income earned through
involvement in drug trafficking for basic necessities
for themselves and the civilian population under their
control. some
insurgents have also become involved with drug
trafficking to earn money to support their families in
refugee camps in Pakistan
some commanders rely on
narcotics production and smuggling to fund weapons
purchases and military operations. Hashish and other
drugs are sometimes used to bribe Soviet soldiers-
many of whom have become drug abusers while
serving in Afghanistan-to provide information, sell
arms, or allow insurgent vehicles to pass through
security checkpoints
Hashish, opium, and heroin 25X1
are also increasingly used as mediums of exchange
and can be traded for necessary items such as
gasoline,
Soviet and Afghan Regime Response
Both the Soviets and Afghan regime authorities have
been inconsistent in addressing the problem of
insurgent involvement in drug activity. We believe
that numerous regime local commanders tax the
movement of drugs and other contraband through
their areas of control. Individual commanders and
some local Soviet military officials also apparently
have organized limited marketing of raw opium and
heroin in some prime growing areas
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commander in Qandahar oversees the marketing of 25X1
opium, arranges for its transport to heroin refineries
in Pakistan, then trucks the heroin to distribution
points along the Iranian and Soviet borders. UN 25X1
antinarcotics officials have reported recent increases
in both legitimate-although unreported-purchases
of Afghan opium by Moscow and of clandestine
trafficking of Afghan drugs to the Soviet Union.'
We believe the Soviets cannot and will not undertake
significant antidrug programs in Afghanistan because 25X1
of the current military and political chaos. Until the
hostilities end, both the Soviets and the Kabul regime
will place a low priority on drug issues. In our
judgment, Soviet efforts to control drug activity will 25X1
be limited to attempts to reduce drug abuse among
Soviet troops and to disrupt the trafficking networks
that run drugs into the Soviet Union from
Afghanistan. According to recent reports in the Soviet
press, Moscow is concerned that troops returning 25X1
' According to the provisions of the 1961 Vienna Single Convention
on Drug Control, Afghanistan, like other traditional producers of
opium, must report all international sales of opium to the drug
board. These sales must be limited to opium seized in
antitrafficking operations within the country. The recent decline in
such reports of sales to the Soviet Union, Kabul's only legitimate
opium buyer, suggests the regime's probable noncompliance with
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from Afghanistan spread drug abuse through other
Soviet military units. In our judgment, there is
growing Soviet concern that recent increases in the
volume of drugs trafficked through the country
highlight potential border control problems and a
disturbing rise in official corruption
Islamabad: Balancing Insurgent and Drug Concerns
Pakistan's relations with the Afghan resistance groups
based in Peshawar are complicated by charges that
the insurgents are actively involved in the drug
business both in Afghanistan and on Pakistani soil.
Islamabad provides shelter and support to more than
3 million Afghan refugees. In the last several years,
the Zia government has come under increasing
pressure from Western states to reduce Pakistan's
drug production and trafficking. Islamabad cannot or
will not pursue investigations of Afghan refugee or
resistance leaders who might be involved in cross-
border drug trafficking. Moreover, the Pakistanis
have not been able to break up the well-structured
transport rings that move drugs from Afghanistan to
Karachi and other Pakistani ports
Prospects
Regardless of how the struggle for political control of
Afghanistan is resolved, any Afghan regime will face
strong resistance to reducing drug trafficking.
Reintegrating the more than 5 million refugees who
have fled the country-3 million in Pakistan and more
than 2 million in Iran-will be an enormous task, and
problems of reducing Afghanistan's role as a major
drug producer and trafficker in the region are likely to
receive a low priority.
Any Kabul regime, however, will come under
increasing international pressure to improve its
performance on antidrug issues. Afghanistan will
require massive amounts of foreign aid to restore the
national economy, thus providing aid donors with
significant leverage to improve Afghanistan's
antidrug efforts
We believe that resistance leaders consider drug
trafficking a marginal issue and will not respond to
US concerns at this time. In our judgment, the
current political situation also precludes serious
discussion of bilateral or regional antidrug efforts
involving the Soviets or the current regime in Kabul.
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Israel: Shamir's Report Card-
Economic Grades
Trickle In
Since Yitzhak Shamir took over as Prime Minister in
the National Unity government last October, he has
failed to advance economic stabilization efforts begun
under his predecessor, Shimon Peres. Moreover,
Shamir's unwillingness to provide strong leadership in
economic decision making hurts efforts to implement
needed reforms that address the economy's long-term
growth needs. With the next election less than two
years away, Shamir faces an uphill struggle in
attempting to match former Prime Minister Peres's
more active and effective management style.
Shamir's Major Failure-The Government Budget
Reducing government expenditures and the budget
deficit are crucial to the overall success of the
government's plan to achieve stable, long-term
growth. Former Prime Minister Peres made a good
start by lowering the budget deficit from about 14
percent of gross national product in the Israeli fiscal
year ending in March 1985 to about 3 to 4 percent,
the lowest level in the 1980s, when he left office in
October 1986. Accounting for this drop were across-
the-board spending reductions by government
ministries, especially in funding cutbacks for the
defense budget from domestic resources.
Prime Minister Shamir's initial goals for economic
reform were unrealistic. His initial plan for the fiscal
year beginning on 1 April 1987 proposed spending
reductions totaling almost $300 million, including
cuts of about $110 million in the defense budget. The
plan mandated reductions in social programs as well.
Subsidies were to be slashed by $65 million, and the
budgets for the Ministries of Health and Education
were each to be cut by $18 million. The proposal put
additional demands on labor by seeking to prohibit
negotiated wage increases and to postpone about half
of the annual cost-of-living adjustment-the first half
will be added to workers' paychecks this month-until
April next year.
spending cuts. Objections poured in from powerful
interest groups, including the Ministry of Defense and
Histadrut-the national labor federation-
demanding annulment of the budget cuts. Other
affected ministries, including Health and Education,
jumped on the bandwagon against spending cuts.
Shamir even failed to win partisan support as Likud
members joined the Labor Party in criticizing various
aspects of the spending cuts. The proposals drew fire
from the Knesset Finance Committee, the body that
must agree to the budget submission before the entire
Knesset can enact it into law.
Additional objections almost certainly will surface
that will contribute to defeating Shamir's now scaled-
back recommendations. Before final approval, the
budget must undergo additional Knesset debate with
fresh opportunities for political wheeling and dealing.
The likely result for Shamir will be a failure to trim
spending within the guidelines of economic austerity.
Policy Drift: Inflation
Lowering inflation received top priority under the
National Unity government's economic stabilization
program due to the effects of high inflation on
investment decisions. Peres inaugurated a
comprehensive package of wage and price controls
and an informal freeze of the exchange rate vis-a-vis
the dollar-after an initial 19-percent devaluation-
to break the high inflation cycle. As a result, the
annual inflation rate during Peres's tenure fell from
about 500 percent to about 27 percent. The high-
inflation cycle was broken, and, more important, the
public's inflationary expectations were reduced.
In contrast, Shamir appears unable to steer the
economy into the single-digit inflation rate prevailing
in West European countries-the goal of Israeli
inflation policy. In fact, inflation appears to be
The public's loss of enthusiasm for continued
economic austerity was evident in the immediate and
almost universal opposition to Shamir's proposed
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moving in the opposite direction, edging up to about
35 percent on an annual basis. Furthermore, the
recent 10-percent devaluation of the shekel and the
Bank of Israel's mid-February increase in the prime
interest rate-which raised the effective annual
interest rate for borrowing from 19 percent to 31
percent-may lead to higher inflation in the coming
months while increasing the public's inflationary
expectations.
Unemployment
After the implementation of the economic
stabilization program in July 1985, the
unemployment rate increased from 5.9 percent to 7.8
percent by the end of September. Contrary to past
responses-in which increases in the unemployment
rate led to an exodus of Israelis and stirred up
considerable public animosity-public reaction to the
higher unemployment levels was muted. Most Israelis
evidently realized that, to achieve long-term economic
stability, temporary increases in unemployment would
have to be tolerated.
When Shamir took office in October, the
unemployment rate had fallen to slightly over 7
percent, and it has stabilized near that level since
then. Prospects for further reducing unemployment to
the 5- or 6-percent rate prevailing before the
stabilization program appear dim because of a lack of
measures to encourage long-term economic growth.
Trade Deficit
The trade deficit, which has long been chronic and
has averaged about $3.4 billion in the 1980s,
improved slightly under Peres. In 1985 the trade
deficit fell by $100 million to $3.1 billion. The deficit
fell further to $2.4 billion in 1986-influenced by
positive developments in world oil markets-which
helped Israel reduce the drain on its foreign exchange
reserves.
The gains made in reducing the trade deficit,
however, appear to be short lived as the deficit has
started to edge up. The upward trend during Shamir's
first four months in office involved a 13.8-percent
increase in imports and only a 4.1-percent increase in
exports compared to the same period a year ago. The
worsening trade data are mainly due to exchange rate
developments that have increased the relative price of
Israeli exports, along with a surge in private
consumption expenditures-especially for imported
consumer goods.
Tax Reform
Both Peres and Shamir receive failing grades for their
inability to implement a sorely needed overhaul of
Israel's tax system. Peres, while recognizing the need
for a sweeping overhaul to restore work incentives and
spur economic growth, failed to formulate such a
plan. As such, he missed an important opportunity to
capitalize on the public's heightened sense of concern
over the economy's health by encouraging reform. In
effect, tax reform was shelved as the government
created a number of temporary one-year taxes to
reduce the budget deficit while easing pressure to
deeply cut government spending.
Shamir must be given credit for formulating a tax
reform plan, even though it was poorly planned. As
outlined by Finance Minister Nissim in early
February, the tax plan embodied several reform
measures, at the heart of which were reductions in
income taxes. Under the plan, personal income tax
rates for upper income levels were to be slashed and
the number of exemptions that taxpayers may claim
were to be reduced. Corporate tax rates-which
effectively tax businesses at a rate of 61 percent for
undistributed profits-were to be cut to 45 percent.
The plan falls short of the comprehensive tax reform
needed, however, since it ignores reform for other
taxes including the value added tax (currently 15
percent), the purchase tax (a sales tax levied on
certain goods and services at different rates), property
taxes, the employers' tax (a 7-percent tax on business
payrolls), the betterment tax (a tax on the profits from
the sale of real estate at rates from 0 to 50 percent),
and the travel tax (imposed on Israelis traveling
abroad). Ignoring reforms in such taxes prompted a
cacaphony of protests from special interest groups
that also seek a piece of the tax reform pie. Histadrut
attacked the proposed reductions in tax rates for
upper-income levels, claiming the end result would be
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ECONOMIC REPORT CARD a
Peres' Tenure Shamir's Tenure
Progress made
in reducing--
-
Government
Expenditures &
-'
-{-
-
Budget Deficit
Inflation
~-
-
Trade Deficit
+
-
Unemployment
Private Consumption
-
I -
Expenditures
Interest Rates
+
! -
Progress made
in implementing--
Tax Reform
-
-
Capital Market
Reform
-
~ -
Progress made in--
Stimulating
_
Investment
Overall Rating
l +
-
a a plus(+) sign indicates where progress has been made, whereas, a
negative(-) sign indicates no progress or a worse performance
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a more regressive tax structure unfairly hurting
lower-income individuals. Moreover, Finance
Minister Nissim's failure to aggressively lobby for the
tax reform plan-and properly package it-have all
but killed a comprehensive tax reform for 1987,
making only a partial tax reform likely. Partial
reform, however, may generate problems for the
government if it reduces government revenues-a
prospect that may worsen the already troublesome
budget deficit outlook.
Outlook
Peres' achievements were supported by two external
developments that are unlikely to prevail during
Shamir's tenure:
? The lowered price of imported oil. Israel's imported
oil bill fell from $1.2 billion in 1985 to an estimated
$750 million last year, a decrease of about 37
percent.
? US supplemental economic assistance. The
additional $750 million in aid received in 1985 and
1986 allowed Israel to slow the growth of debt while
adding a cushion to foreign exchange reserves.
Peres was also fortunate in that, by serving first as
Prime Minister in the National Unity government,
economic policy successes were more likely given the
economy's ailing condition.
With US supplemental economic assistance ended
and oil prices edging up, Shamir will find it
increasingly difficult to place the economy on the
long-term growth track. Shamir's efforts in the near
term will also be hindered by his apparent apathy
about making economic policy decisions, a fact that
special interest groups will almost certainly seek to
exploit.
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Omanization: A Slow
Process
Muscat's goal of Omanization-to replace expatriate
workers with Omanis-is progressing slowly, but
Oman will continue to depend heavily on foreign labor
in nearly all sectors of the economy and the armed
forces. The complexity of the economy has grown
faster than the country's capability to educate and
train native Omanis to replace expatriates.
Omanization has moved most slowly in the military,
and Oman's heavy reliance on British military
expertise will allow British expatriates to maintain
significant influence over Oman's defense policy into
the 1990s.
Prosperity Breeds Problems
Even though Sultan Qaboos has publicly promoted a
policy of Omanization, the country's dependence on
foreign labor has risen in recent years. Despite
progress in building a vocational school program,
economic development has outpaced the growth in
education for native Omanis. In 1985 an estimated
300,000 foreigners worked in Oman, accounting for
about 25 percent of the country's population and a far
higher share of the labor force employed in the
modern sector. Approximately 250,000 of them are
from the Indian subcontinent, working in
construction, agriculture, commerce, and the medical
professions. Teachers come mainly from Egypt and
Jordan-the only significant Arab presence in
Oman's labor market. The Philippines supply a
growing number of technicians. The West,
particularly the United Kingdom, has been the major
source of engineering and managerial expertise.
Muscat probably hopes that the new $315 million
Sultan Qaboos University will train a generation of
Omanis to replace the expatriates. According to press
reports, the university will specialize in teaching the
skills most needed in Oman, including medicine,
agriculture, engineering, science, and education.
Nonprofessional occupations will probably be harder
to fill. Younger Omanis, raised during the years of
relative prosperity resulting from high oil prices, will
probably be reluctant to work as laborers in jobs
previously held by expatriates
Sultan Qaboos believes Omanization is a desirable
objective, but he does not want it implemented so
hastily that it interferes with the country's efficiency.
The growing nationalist element in Oman, however, is
pressing Qaboos to move now to protect local cultural
and social values that they believe the large foreign
presence in Oman is eroding. Its concerns appear well
founded. The availability of better paying jobs in
Muscat has drawn many Omani men away from their
villages to work in the city. With their higher salaries,
they can afford to bring in laborers from the
subcontinent to work the family land. The US 25X1
Embassy reports that even the Bedouin are hiring
Indians to tend their camels.
The growing economic burden of such a large
expatriate community is compounding the social
costs. Outward remittances reached a high of nearly
$1 billion in 1985-20 percent of oil export
earnings-adding to Muscat's difficulties in
maintaining its foreign exchange reserves. Declining
oil revenues will probably lead to austerity measures
that will prompt Muscat to quicken the pace of
Omanization.
The Armed Forces: Still a British Show
Omanization has moved most slowly in the military,
which depends on British military expertise to sustain
its performance. British military expatriates dominate
key command positions in the Omani armed forces
despite the promotion of several Omanis to senior
positions. Omani military officers nominally 25X1
command the Sultan's Land Forces and its major
units, but British expatriates continue to fill 400 of
the 1,000 officer positions,
Omanis fill the number-two spots in t e
Sultan's Navy and Air Force, but British fill 134 of
238 naval officer billets and 275 of 500 Air Force
officer slots.
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NESA NESAR 87-008
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Candidates for Chief of Defense Staff
wants to appoint another British officer to
an officer in the Royal Guard Brigade. He has not
attended any staff courses abroad. Information on his
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succeed Brigadier General Watts as Chief of Defense
Staff when he leaves Oman. Should Qaboos bow to
the increasing pressure to appoint an Omani, he is
likely to choose one of the following senior officers.
Yusuf'bin Khalfan al-Busaidi
Commander, Northern Oman Brigade
Brig. Yusuf bin Khalfan al-Busaidi'sfamily ties,
leadership qualities, and recent performance make
him the prime Omani candidate for the Chief of
Defense Staff position. He is a member of the royal
family, has the personal trust of Sultan Qaboos, and
retains a close working relationship with Land Forces
Commander Nasib Ruwayhi. He also enjoys the
respect of fellow officers and soldiers for his fairness
and straightforward manner,
During his previous tour as
Southern Brigade commander (1984-85), he handled
Oman's southern border problems effectively.
his late 1985
appointment to command the Northern Brigade was a
prelude to assuming a new, highly responsible
position in the Chief of Defense Staff's office, possibly
in preparation for becoming Chief of Defense Staff.
Although Busaidi's relatively junior brigadier rank
could pose a drawback, his higher ranking rivals for
the job are either close to retirement or have serious
liabilities)
In addition to his brigade command posts, Busaidi
has led the Sultan's Training Regiment and served as
The Omanis continue to rely almost entirely on
expatriate military personnel-about 7,000 men-to
operate and maintain their most sophisticated
military equipment. As of late 1986 there were only
eight jet-qualified Omani pilots for the Air Force's 22
Jaguar fighter-bombers. Most of the Air Force and
Navy maintenance billets are filled by British and
Pakistanis, and Omani
naval personnel are incapable of independently
maintaining the Exocet missiles on Oman's guided-
missile patrol boats
age is not available.
Nasib bin Hamad al-Ruwayhi
Commander, Sultan of Oman's Land Forces
Maj. Gen. Nasib al-Ruwayhi is the highest ranking
Omani candidate to succeed Watts. The first native
Omani to head a major armed service, Ruwayhi
replaced Watts as commander of the Land Forces-
the sultanate's most Omanized service-in 1985. A
capable and respected officer, Ruwayhi is popular
among his troops because of his commitment to
promoting Omanis to key positions and his
willingness to lobby Qaboos and Watts for a greater
budgetary share for the Land Forces. Ruwayhi also
has tried, apparently with some success, to curb
British dominance of Oman's arms purchases system,
and he generally supports US-Omani military ties.
Ruwayhi's drawbacks have diminished the chance
that his reported imminent transfer from command of
the Land Forces will be to the Chief of Defense Staff
position. His superiors perceive that he lacks
ambition, and he has been unable or unwilling to
minimize tribal strains between Land Forces officers,
Ruwayhi's military career began with his enlistment
in the Northern Frontier Regiment in 1960. He was
commissioned a second lieutenant in 1968 and fought
against antigovernment guerrillas in the Dhofar war.
In 1974 he transferred to the Royal Guard Brigade as
British expatriates also control Omani military
planning and decisionmaking. Sultan Qaboos
nominally heads the Omani armed forces but has
delegated most military decision making to British
Brig. Gen. Johnny Watts, Chief of the Defense Staff.
Watts exercises significant control over all aspects of
Omani defense policy, including weapons purchases
and training.
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a squadron commander and assumed command of
the Sultan's Training Regiment in 1978. He is about
50.
All Rashid al-Kilbani
Deputy Chief, Sultan of Oman's Land Forces
Brig. Ali Rashid al-Kilbani is a darkhorse candidate
to replace Watts as Chief of Defense Staff despite
reports that he will be transferred later this year to a
Ministry of Foreign Affairs position. He has
extensive military experience as commander of the
Southern and then the Northern Omani Brigades
(1983-84) and as deputy chief of the Land Forces
since 1984. Moreover, Kilbani belongs to one of the
largest and most powerful families in Oman. His
appointment as Chief of Defense Staff would boost
the Sultan's support throughout Oman,F-
Like Busaidi, Kilbani's brigadier rank is an
important obstacle in his path to Oman's top military
post. Moreover, Kilbani's tendency to back his fellow
tribesmen in military decisions would probably, in
the view of Watts and Qaboos, undercut Kilbani's
ability to unify the multiethnic armed forces.
A member of the Sultan's Desert Regiment from at
least 1976, he became commander of that unit in
1977. Information on his age is not available
senior Omani officers are being considered to succeed
Watts, who is due to retire this year, but Qaboos
apparently is reluctant to name an Omani as Chief of
Defense Staff at this time and probably will persuade
Watts to remain in the post for one more year. British
personnel also conduct most of the tactical planning
and logistic coordination for Oman's major military
operations, probably including Peace Shield 87, the
Gulf Cooperation Council military exercise that was
held in Oman in mid-March
Many senior Omani military personnel have been
poorly prepared to assume command positions in the
Sultan's Land Forces, where Omanization has been
most strongly promoted. Most senior Omani officers
have had little command experience and have been
forced to rely heavily on expatriate staff officers,
appointed Omani officers also have to contend with
growing tribal bickering among Land Forces
personnel that has factionalized the command up
through the senior leadership.
reluctance of British expatriates to promote effective
training programs that would accelerate their
replacement by competent Omani military personnel.
he Air Force will not
have a cadre of competent Omani aircraft mechanics
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before 1990, and Omani naval personnel recently 25X1
complained that they are not being trained to perform 25X1 1
maintenance on some of the Navy's more complex
shipboard weapon systems. Budget cuts in Air Force
flying time,
are also likely to reduce flight training
opportunities for Omani pilots. Omani Land Forces
officers continue to rely heavily on their British
logistic and administrative support
economy
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Outlook
The process of Omanization will progress slowly, but 25X1
a substantial reduction in the number of foreign
workers is unlikely for some time. Even with gains in
education and training, Oman will continue to depend
heavily on foreign labor in nearly all sectors of the
Oman will probably continue to rely on the military
expertise of British expatriates to operate and
maintain its more technically sophisticated military
equipment-particularly in the Air Force and
Navy-through the mid-1990s. Oman's reliance on
British expatriate manpower may even increase,
particularly if Muscat purchases another advanced
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Oman's strong reliance on British military
expatriates has been reinforced by the Sultan's
unabashedly pro-British views. Qaboos graduated
from Britain's prestigious Sandhurst Military
Academy in 1962, where he was strongly impressed
by British military expertise and professionalism.
Regular British forces were instrumental in helping
Qaboos to crush the Dhofar insurgency in the mid-
1970s. Although regular British forces subsequently
were withdrawn from Oman, Qaboos continued to
rely on the services of several hundred British
military personnel, most of whom are retired veterans
of the Dhofar campaign or active duty British
personnel seconded from the British armed forces.
London has maintained close military relations with
Qaboos on a personal and an official level. Qaboos
has visited London as an honored guest several times
to attend graduation ceremonies at Sandhurst and
other British military academies. Last year 5,000
British Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel
deployed to Oman for Swift Sword, Britain's largest
out-of-area military deployment since the 1982
Falklands campaign.
weapon system such as the Tornado fighter-bomber.
Further cuts in military spending may undermine
Omani efforts to train a sizable nucleus of competent
Omani pilots, technicians, and mechanics.
diminish their own influence. While
acknowledging the legitimacy of US security interests
in Oman,
They will
also urge Qaboos to purchase British military
equipment while pressing the United States to provide
more economic aid in return for US pre-positioning
rights in Oman. British expatriates also will
encourage Oman's continued participation in bilateral
exercises with the United Kingdom such as Swift
Sword, even if it means Muscat must forgo
participation in US or GCC military exercises such as
Bright Star or Peninsula Shield
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remains the primary po rtica
decision maker. Although the Sultan is likely to
accelerate the Omanization of his officer corps,
focusing on promoting Omanis to senior positions,
British expatriate officers probably will retain a vital
advisory role in the Omani armed forces through
1990. Qaboos may try to placate Omani nationalists
by appointing an Omani Chief of Defense Staff in the
next two years, but he probably will continue to rely
on a senior British military officer to provide at least
behind-the-scenes guidance on major defense policy
decisions.
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Libya's Mercenaries-
Which Way to the Front?
Libya has a longstanding policy of accepting
foreigners into its Armed Forces, both to fill out
existing Libyan units and to build new formations.
Over the years, Tripoli has spent a great deal of time,
money, and effort to train and house these recruits
and has used them in combat several times. The
return on this investment, however, has been
negligible. After 10 years, foreign mercenaries have
yet to make a noticeable contribution to Libya's
fighting capabilities.'
Tripoli's first efforts to bring foreigners into the
Libyan military occurred in 1975. Young
Palestinians, Syrians, and Jordanians enlisted in the
Libyan Army,
as part of Qadhafi's effort to increase
significantly the size of his forces. The program was
accelerated after the 1977 Libyan-Egyptian border
war, when Tripoli issued a public call in Muslim
capitals for volunteers to join the Libyan Arm . B
late summer of that year,
I enough volunteers had arrived to form
separate units manned entirely by foreigners but
commanded by Libyan officers.
the volunteers were generally attracted by the
$680 monthly salary and the potential for action
against Egypt.
Tripoli has repeated its public call for foreign
volunteers several times over the years, often refining
its pitch according to the needs of the moment. In late
1980-when Libyan aircraft were active in Chad and
were regularly encountering US planes in the central
Mediterranean-Tripoli issued a call for Arab airmen
and technicians no longer in the service of their home
countries to join the Libyan Air Force.
' The term "mercenaries," as used in this article, refers to non-
Libyan individuals recruited into military service in Libya. It does
not include representatives of companies with which Tripoli has
contracts or servicemen sent by their home governments for duty in
During the US-Libyan tensions in early 1986 that
culminated in the US air raids, Tripoli initiated an
advertising blitz in Third World countries from West
Africa to South Asia. The plea this time was for
seamen, airmen, and technicians with specified
qualifications, "especially Muslims," to volunteer for
the Libyan armed forces, while "any and all kinds of
volunteers" were sought for the newly founded
International People's Front to confront "imperialism,
US aggression ... and Zionism." The campaign 25X1
prompted over 2,000 applications for service among
Sudanese, A good 25X1
many of these almost certainly ended up in military
training centers in Libya, although the existence of
the International People's Front has not been
confirmed as a formal organization outside of Libyan
propaganda.
Complementing this overseas recruiting campaign
have been the activities of press-gangs in Libya's
foreign communities.
since the late 1970s, Sudanese,
Nigerian, Tunisian, and other foreign workers have
been impressed into training camps for political
indoctrination and basic military training. During the
past four years, Chadians have been particularly
vulnerable as Tripoli tries to fill out the ranks of the
Libyan-backed Chadian rebel forces. Reports
reaching the US Embassy in Nigeria just after
Libya's invasion of Chad in 1983 indicated that
"thousands" of young Chadian workers were trying to
flee Libya to avoid being dragooned into military
service.
Integration or Segregation?
Depending on the individual's qualifications and
Tripoli's priorities of the moment, a foreign recruit
could find himself fully integrated into a regular
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Libyan military unit or a member of a distinctly
foreign unit. Some general trends are identifiable:
? Arabs with technical military skills are likely to be
assigned to Libyan units and treated more or less as
Libyan for the period of service. For example, at
least a handful of Palestinians fly in Libyan fighter
squadrons and have taken Libyan citizenship,
? Recruits from countries that Qadhafi has targeted
for subversion are likely to be placed in camps
reserved for their compatriots. Separate camps for
Sudanese, Tunisians, and Chadians have been
reported frequently over the years. Once trained,
units from these camps can be reserved for
subversive activity in their home country, or they
can support operations of the regular Libyan
military.
? Recruits from Western nations probably are treated
individually. Valued for advanced technical skills, a
handful of Westerners almost certainly is well paid
to perform maintenance on advanced Western
systems, fly transport aircraft, or serve as
instructors.
? Third World recruits that fall into none of these
categories probably are posted to catchall units,
manned by foreigners but led by Libyans. These are
available as intervention units in Qadhafi's regional
adventures and for contingency use in the event of
another Arab-Israeli wart
such amalgamated units
include Malians, Mauritanians, Togolese,
Senegalese, and many others. We speculate that
these units are generally lightly equipped, perhaps
supported by a few armored vehicles and rocket
launchers.
Reporters generally tend to label any foreign-manned
military unit in Libya as being part of the "Islamic
Legion." The Libyans themselves are not known to
use the term except in recruiting posters. Rather, we
believe recruits are assigned to foreign-manned units
of varying size that have individual designations, are
probably subordinate to the local Libyan military
district, and have no formal relationship to any larger
body of foreigners known as the Islamic Legion. In
this respect, Qadhafi-who has never denied Libya's
recruitment of foreign Islamic troops-was probably
sincere when he denied to French journalists the
existence of an "Islamic Legion."
Libya's Mercenary Units in Combat
Libya's mercenary units in Chad have performed
poorly in combat. In 1983 a large Sudanese unit was
sent into Chad to support the faltering insurgency of
the pro-Libyan Chadians. The Sudanese unit engaged
in combat before the Libyans themselves intervened
in force and was easy prey for the forces of Chadian
President Habre.
at least 130 of these Sudanese were
captured by Habre's troops.
most of them had been forcibly conscripted by Li yan
press-gangs, minimally trained, and kept from
deserting by threat of execution.
pulled its Sudanese out of Chad in late 1983, probably
because of desertion. It had been easy for them to
abandon their garrison in Chad and make their way
back to Sudan.
After three years of stagnation, the war in Chad has
again grown hot, and again Tripoli has shown its
readiness to put its foreign units in harm's way. Last
January the Libyan People's Bureau in Benin began
processing young Cameroonians, Nigeriens, Central
Africans, and Congolese for military training in Libya
and eventual combat in Chad
Government
forces captured 18 Mauritanians and Malians in a
battle in northern Chad in February.
These most recent examples indicate that Tripoli
continues to find its mercenaries useful despite their
generally low-combat capabilities.
Tripoli is sensitive to the potential or a
popular Libyan backlash over the heavy Libyan
casualty toll in Chad. At best, from Tripoli's point of
view, sending the mercenaries to the front could ease
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the combat burden on Libyan troops. At least, the
mercenaries would draw fire and smoke out Chadian
Government positions, facilitating engagement by the
Libyans.
The mercenaries also occasionally are a means by
which Tripoli can exert military pressure while
retaining a degree of deniability regarding its own
involvement or convey the appearance of international
support for Libyan causes. Qadhafi continues to deny
publicly the presence of Libyan forces in Chad and
tries to support this fantasy by using surrogates. For
example, Tripoli has sent its Chadian clients but not
its own units south of the 16th parallel, the
demarcation in Chad that Paris has labeled a tripwire
for French combat intervention in the event of a
significant Libyan crossing. In addition
a Libyan military convoy
that has been in western u an, possibly intending to
cross the border to the rear of Chadian Government
troops, is largely manned by so-called Islamic
Legionnaires.
Impact of Libya's Mercenaries
None of the three basic types of mercenaries
identified in this article have had a significant impact
on Libya's military capabilities. The dispatch of
foreign-manned units into combat has never
noticeably contributed to Libyan success in the field.
The employment of the other two types of
mercenaries-Arabs incorporated into Libya's
regular Armed Forces and Westerners with advanced
technical skills-has been more difficult to detect.
Western Experts. The fact that the presence of
Western experts is detected only infrequently suggests
that their number is small and their impact probably
limited. Libya's difficulty in obtaining sophisticated
Western weaponry has increased over the past five
years, obviating the need for some of the Western
instructors and technicians. For those systems it has
obtained, it has also generally managed to get after-
delivery support by the selling company. In addition,
as Libya has gained experience over the years in most
warfare specialties, the increasing competence of its
brighter servicemen probably makes most Western
mercenaries dispensable.
Arab Integrees. If 5 percent of Libya's military ranks
are filled by other Arabs-and this seems high,
judging from the infrequent reporting on their
activities-their number would not be enough to offer
Qadhafi military options he would not otherwise have.
Numbering less than 100,000, Libya's Armed Forces
have few offensive options against Libya's strongest
neighbors-Algeria and Egypt. In contests against
other neighbors, such as Tunisia, the balance favors
Libya by a margin much greater than the 5 percent
postulated here. Meanwhile, in limited applications of
force by Libya, such as the mining of the Red Sea and
the bombing of Sudan in 1984, adequate numbers of
trained Libyan nationals have always been available.
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Algeria: Outcome of
Legislative Election
Results of the election on 26 February for Algeria's
National People's Assembly (APN) indicate that
President Chadli Bendjedid faces further struggles in
trying to bring about economic reform through
expansion of the country's small private sector.
Although the vote gave the President an opportunity
to put into office more youthful and technically
trained legislators who probably will be more
amenable to his plans for economic reform, reelected
party cadres will resist change. The election also
revealed widespread public disgruntlement over
economic problems, particularly shortages due to new
austerity measures. Bendjedid probably will need to
show improvement in the economy if he hopes to
deflect this criticism as well as the pressure from
opponents within the government and party to
continue the country's socialist policies.
The Role of the National Assembly
The APN traditionally has had little importance in
Algerian politics. According to the US Embassy in
Algiers, the Assembly's essentially passive role is
reflected in the fact that the previous legislature
proposed only five laws in its five-year existence. All
of the 885 candidates who competed for the 295 seats
in the APN were chosen by the only legal party, the
National Liberation Front (FLN). Election
campaigns, therefore, produce little enthusiasm
because they are devoid of political debate. Real
power is wielded at the senior levels of the FLN and
the Army. The ruling political and military elite of
Algeria view the legislature as a vehicle for rewarding
persons who have given their country faithful service.
Nevertheless, Bendjedid probably hoped to use the
election as a step toward shaping a government more
supportive of his policies. The only significant role the
previous APN played was its rejection last year of a
government proposal to allow greater foreign
investment in Algeria, and the President almost
certainly wanted to prevent similar occurrences in the
future, especially since less than half of the
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increasingly frustrated by his inability to push
economic liberalization through the Algerian
bureaucracy, and he saw the election as a chance to
change the economic life of the country.
that Bendjedid was experiencing difficulties in
bringing forward new personnel.
Benjedid's efforts were foundering because of strong
resistance from FLN leftists.
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it was likely that the new APN would have the same
balance between ideologues and technocrats as the
outgoing Assembly. The US Embassy also reported
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which probably reflected intense competition during
the nomination process-and questioning of the
FLN's control of the nomination process by a
magazine supportive of the President's political views.
Election Results Mixed
The balloting produced many positive results for
Bendjedid and his supporters. Claimed voter
participation was larger than in the previous elections.
Eighty-seven percent of eligible voters voted in the
latest ballot, as compared with 72 percent in both
1982 and 1977. The Embassy reports a shift in the
composition of deputies. Over 50 percent of those
elected are under 40; over 70 percent attended
universities; and the number of bureaucrats and party
cadres in the APN has been reduced
On the other hand, the vote represented a strong
protest against severe economic conditions, which
stem from the government's attempts to reduce
consumption in the aftermath of falling revenues due
to the drop in international petroleum prices. The US
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Occupational Background of
Past Members of Algeria's
National People's Assembly (APN)
First APN Second APN
1977 1982
Embassy reports that 13 to 30 percent of the ballots
were spoiled. Voters defaced ballots by listing
grievances and demanding goods such as butter that
are in short supply or not available. Embassy sources
claim the protest was as high as 40 percent in some
districts. We believe the continuation in office of
incumbent APN leaders may also make it difficult for
the President to push his desired changes through the
legislature.
Implications
In our view, the election, despite its secondary
importance in Algerian politics, will have a
pronounced effect on government policy. The US
Embassy reports that, within a few days of the vote,
the Cabinet met to discuss the distribution of
consumer goods. Commerce Minister Benamar
announced afterward that the government would
allocate additional resources for imports and that
small- and medium-size industries, essentially in the
private sector, would face fewer import restrictions. In
addition, a government announcement of a price
increase for coffee made that commodity available for
the first time in months
These initiatives may prove to be only stopgap
measures designed to provide goods for the Ramadan
holy month. Longer term economic problems such as
inefficiency, bureaucratic lethargy and inertia, and
lack of incentives will almost certainly continue to
stymie economic growth and plague the government.
The election probably presages further attempts by
Bendjedid to bring in new officials more favorably
disposed to his policies. It also could lead to more
infighting within the eovernment over the course of
economic reform.
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The War Moves Closer
Mauritania faces new threats to its national security
because of recent trends in the Western Sahara
conflict. Morocco is constructing a new earthen berm
that will bring its military forces to the southern
frontier of Western Sahara, adjacent to Mauritania.
This activity will further restrict military operations
in the territory by Morocco's adversary, the Algerian-
based Polisario Front guerrillas, whose obvious
alternative is expanded use of Mauritania for staging
attacks on Moroccan troops. Morocco's strategy and
the likelihood of intensified fighting will make it more
difficult for the fragile military regime of President
Taya to remain aloof from the war. Indeed, these
developments could eventually bring down the
government.
Nouakchott's Saharan Diplomacy: Falling Off
the Fence
Mauritania's principal foreign policy challenge during
the past decade has been balancing its relations with
its two more powerful northern neighbors, Morocco
and Algeria, especially with regard to the Western
Sahara war. Both countries have endeavored to win
Mauritania's support. Nouakchott has periodically
succumbed to this pressure, and the results have
behind the bloodless coup in late 1984 by Taya, who
Algiers suspects was backed in his bid by Rabat.
Taya Casts His Lot With Hassan
We believe the Taya regime is more favorably
disposed toward Rabat, despite its continuation of the
previous government's neutrality toward the
belligerents. Although Nouakchott retains its
membership in its pact with Algiers and Tunis and
technically recognizes the SDAR, the regime has
largely ignored the spirit of these accords.
Nouakchott refuses to accredit SDAR diplomats, and
Mauritania's contacts with Algeria and Tunisia are
limited.
There are indications, moreover, that Taya is shifting
decisively toward Morocco. Contacts between the two
countries have increased.
proved disastrous.
After Spain abandoned Western Sahara in 1976,
Mauritania agreed with Morocco to divide the colony,
and it fought with Moroccan forces against Polisario
insurgents for control of the territory. Successful
Polisario attacks on Mauritania, however,
precipitated a military coup in 1978, ending 18 years
of civilian rule since independence. The succeeding
regime of President Haidallah gradually sought to put
distance between itself and Rabat in order to placate
Algiers and the guerrillas, but it went too far.
Mauritania joined Algeria and Tunisia in a treaty of
cooperation in 1983, recognized the Polisario's
Saharan Democratic Arab Republic (SDAR) in 1984,
and largely ignored Polisario military transits through
its territory. This shift, in our view, was a factor
We believe Morocco's construction of the new berm in
February compelled Taya to move closer to Rabat. F-
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With an Eye Toward Algiers
We believe Taya will continue to move cautiously and
discreetly in his dealings with Morocco. His
government probably would not allow a sizable
Moroccan military presence unless the Polisario and
Algeria resumed military operations against
Mauritanian troops. Mauritanian leaders probably
fear Morocco covets their territory, given
longstanding irredentist sentiment in Morocco that
Western Sahara, Mauritania, and parts of southwest
Algeria belong to the kingdom. Taya almost certainly
is aware of the potential for Moroccan subversion that
will follow expanding military cooperation. Reporting
from the US Embassy in Nouakchott also indicates
some Mauritanian exasperation with Morocco's
military strategy. According to the Embassy, one
senior military official views the Moroccan berm
extension as a mistake because it is an impediment to
Libya.
These concerns give reason for continued
Mauritanian political and economic dealings with
Algeria. In early March, Mauritania and Algeria
agreed to cooperate in the areas of energy, fisheries,
and road construction. Algiers, unlike Rabat, has
been a source of economic aid for the hard-pressed
Mauritanians. Algeria, for example, provides
assistance in the running of the country's only
petroleum refinery. Taya probably hopes his efforts to
stay on good terms with Algiers will avert Algerian
attempts to use espionage, financial pressure, or
military blackmail to force a change in Mauritanian
policy. Nouakchott might also calculate that good ties
to Algeria represent a hedge against meddling by
Outlook: High Risks of New Entanglement
The new phase of the Western Sahara conflict
represents the gravest threat yet to the Taya regime.
There are increasing signs of expanded hostilities and
a likelihood that fighting will shift southward in the
region, potentially drawing Mauritania into the fray.
The construction of a new berm prompted the
Polisario in late February to launch its largest
offensive in several years. We believe the outlook is
poor for a political settlement of the dispute in the
near term, and that the Taya regime will face
continuing political. economic. and military pressures
from the north
the peaceful resolution of the conflict
Moroccan and Algerian moves in the war could
ultimately bring down the regime. Although Taya's
tilt toward Rabat is a pragmatic choice, given
Morocco's military gains in the dispute, the President
runs the same risks as his predecessors. Any misstep
by Taya or foreign interference could seriously
undermine the government and prompt another coup
attempt.
The timing of these developments could not be worse
for the Taya regime, given its domestic political and
economic agenda. The US Embassy in Nouakchott
reports that trends in the war will complicate Taya's
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struggle to cope with serious economic problems due
both to food shortages and drought and to social
tensions attributable to animosity between the ruling
white Maurs and the numerically superior and
disfranchised blacks.
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