SOVIET ACQUISITION OF MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT WESTERN TECHNOLOGY: AN UPDATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05T00280R000300240001-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Soviet Acquisition of
Militarily Significant
Western Technology:
An Update
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Soviet Acquisition of Militarily Significant
Western Technology: An Update
In recent years, the United States Government has learned of a massive, well-
organized campaign by the Soviet Union to acquire Western technology illegally
and legally for its weapons and military equipment projects. Each year Moscow
receives thousands of pieces of Western equipment and many tens of thousands of
unclassified, classified, and proprietary documents as part of this campaign.
Virtually every Soviet military research project-well over 4,000 each year in the
late 1970s and over 5,000 in the early 1980s-benefits from these technical
documents and hardware. The assimilation of Western technology is so broad that
the United States and other Western nations are thus subsidizing the Soviet
military buildup.
Western products and technology secrets are being systematically acquired by
intricately organized, highly effective collection programs specifically targeted to
improve Soviet military weapon systems. The Soviet intelligence services-the
KGB, the GRU, and their surrogates among the East European services-and
Soviet trade and scientific organizations are actively involved in obtaining this
technology. Targets include defense contractors, manufacturers, foreign trading
firms, academic institutions, and electronic data bases. Only recently has the full
extent of illegal Soviet technology collection efforts become known.
The purpose of this paper is to reveal in detail the structure of these Soviet
programs, and to give examples of Soviet requirements and successes. Understand-
ing the Soviet effort is a critical first step in protecting Western technology and
preventing it from being turned against the West.
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Overview of Two Soviet Programs 2
The VPK Program: Raising the Technical Levels of Weapons 4
and Manufacturing Equipment
Ministry of Foreign Trade 20
The Trade Diversion Program: Building and Expanding Industries 24
Participants in the Second Program 25
Prospects for Stemming Losses
28
Several Hundred Examples of Soviet Military Equipment and
Weapons Benefiting From Western Technology and Products
31
1.
Key Organizations Involved in Managing Military Research
and Manufacturing and the Acquisition of Western Technology
3
2.
Examples of VPK Requirements, Mid-1970s-Early 1980s
5
3.
Rank Ordering of Soviet Industries by VPK
Requirements Fulfilled, by Rubles Saved, and by
Hardware Received, 1976-80
4.
Technical and Time Benefits to Thousands of Soviet Military
Research Projects From Western Technology
11
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5. Ruble Savings From Only a Part of Soviet Western Technology 12
Acquisitions
6. Rank Ordering of Industries by Soviet Military Research Projects 13
Benefiting From Western Technology, Early 1980s
7. Soviet Military Requirements Satisfied by Principal
Collection Agencies in the Overall VPK Program, Late 1970s and
Early 1980s
8. Most Significant Acquisitions Satisfied by Principal
Collection Agencies, Late 1970s and Early 1980s
9. Selected US Universities Identified by the Soviets as Sources 22
of Needed Applied Technology
10. Soviet Needs for Applied Science and Technology From 23
Selected US Universities Compared With Number of Visiting
Soviet Bloc Scientists, Early 1980s
11. Soviet Acquisitions of More Than 2,500 Pieces of Western 25
Microelectronics Manufacturing Equipment, Early 1970s-Early
1980s
1. Summary of Results of the VPK Program, Late 1970s and 6
Early 1980s
2. Selected Worldwide Soviet Acquisitions, Military Applications, and 9
Collectors of Western Documents, Military Hardware, and
Dual-Use Products
3. Rank Ordering of Top 100 US Defense Contractors of 1983 18
Compared With Their Rank Ordering by Approximate Frequency
of Soviet Identification for Needed Technology, Selected Periods in
Late 1970s and Early 1980s
4. Selected Successful Soviet Bloc Espionage Operations Against US 20
and Other Western Defense Contractor Targets
5. Examples of Dual-Use Equipment and Technology Likely To Be 29
Targeted by the Soviets
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Soviet Acquisition of
Militarily Significant
Western Technology:
An Update
Overcoming considerable technological inferiority
over the past several decades, the Soviets have built
the largest military industrial manufacturing base in
the world and a massive research establishment to
complement it. Their objective is to achieve military-
technical capabilities that are at least equal, if not
superior, to those of the West.
Their resource commitment is enormous by any mea-
sure; it has enabled them in recent years to narrow the
Western lead in nearly all key technological areas,
particularly microelectronics. In materials, explosive,
and sensor technologies applicable to deployed tacti-
cal forces such as tanks, artillery, and antitank and
surface-to-air missiles the Soviets' technology level is
roughly equal to or slightly better than that of the
West. They are the world's leaders in a few significant
fields, such as chemical warfare and in some areas of
laser research for future "star wars" applications.
Nevertheless, in spite of the several decades of mas-
sive investment in indigenous research and develop-
ment, the prospects are small that the Soviets can
reduce their dependence on a large variety of Western
products and technology in this decade and the next
without allowing the technological gap to widen. The
main reasons for this continuing need are endemic to
the Soviet system: the lack of adequate incentives,
inflexible bureaucratic structures, excessive secrecy,
and insularity from the West. Even if there were some
major Soviet economic or managerial reforms, no real
lessening of the Soviet dependence on Western inno-
vation is anticipated as long as the USSR perceives
the need for military-technological parity with the
West, or the need for superiority.
Soviets, however, because of new technological leader-
ship that the West has supplied them. Their depen-
dence is essentially for innovation-where they will
continue to look to the West-not for maintaining
adequacy, which they have achieved in nearly all
important military technologies. But today's adequa-
cy will be tomorrow's obsolescence if technology Jails
to keep pace.
In May 1982 the US Congress was given a report'
identifying a massive and global Soviet program to
acquire Western militarily significant technology.'
That report described the Soviets' successes in supple-
menting their military research and manufacturing
capabilities and in narrowing the technology gap with
the West, thereby eroding the technological superior-
ity on which US and Allied security depends.
The identification of this Soviet program led the West
to undertake greater efforts in counterintelligence and
export control. Since then, it has become even more
evident that the magnitude of the Soviets' collection
effort and their ability to assimilate collected equip-
ment and technology are far greater than was previ-
ously believed.
This update of the 1982 report defines the scope of the
Soviet effort. It outlines how the Soviets go about
acquiring Western technology and identifies examples
of specific technologies they seek. It highlights details
and statistics of Soviet successes-much more detail
than could be revealed previously. This information
was obtained directly by the United States and Allied
countries. Understanding the Soviet effort is critical
in designing ways to protect Western technology from
being acquired and used against Western security
interests.
The impact of this dependence could be even more
important in the 1990s than it is today. The USSR
has been compelled to follow Western direction in
technological change, and thus far it has been able to
do this satisfactorily because of a mature technologi-
cal base. The next decade is less certain for the
'Soviet Acquisition of Western Technology, April 1982. Exhibit
No. 1. Hearings Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investiga-
tions of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States
Senate, Ninety-Seventh Congress, Second Session, 4, 5, 6, 11, and
12 May 1982.
2 Western technology (hardware, documents, and know-how) in-
cludes that of Japan as well as other Free World countries.
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A basic question is why do Soviet weapon designers
and Soviet manufacturers need to copy design con-
cepts embodied in Western equipment and associated
documents? In general, Soviet weapons have histori-
cally reflected a commitment tofunctional designs
that can be easily manufactured in labor-intensive
factories and readily maintained in the field with a
minimum of technical skill. There has always been a
struggle between Soviet design simplicity and techni-
cal complexity. Soviet weapon designers have not had
to face the competitive pressures that drive Western
designers to press the state of the art.
Building on a mature research sector and on lessons
learned from past performances of weapons in battle,
the Soviets are placing more of a premium on techni-
cally complex systems. Western system and equip-
ment characteristics increasingly are used as yard-
sticks against which Soviet technical capabilities are
judged. Every major civilian or military project is
compared with the best Western technology before it
is approved for development. Once in development,
Soviet standards mandate the comparison of the
quality and technical level of hardware, at different
design stages, with foreign counterparts.
With their access to many details of Western weapons
and dual-use equipment designs and concepts, Soviet
designers are, in effect, competing with Western de-
signers. That competition, supported and encouraged
by the Soviet leadership, is probably pressuring the
military research establishment to pay increasing
attention to technically complex systems. Counter-
vailing pressures for design simplicity are being ap-
plied by the manufacturing sector, which is less
responsive in adapting to technological change. All of
these forces indicate continuing Soviet programs to
acquire Western military and dual-use hardware and
technical data.
Since 1982 it has become clearer that the Soviets have
two programs to acquire Western hardware and
documents:
? First, Moscow has a program to raise the technical
levels of weapons and military equipment as well as
to improve the technical levels of manufacturing
processes. This program is managed by the most
powerful organization in defense production-the
Military Industrial Commission (VPK) of the Pre-
sidium of the Council of Ministers (figure 1). Main-
ly, although not exclusively, through intelligence
channels, the VPK seeks one-of-a-kind military and
dual-use hardware, blueprints, product samples, and
test equipment to improve the technical levels and
performance of Soviet weapons, military equipment,
and defense manufacturing equipment and reduce
any dependency on advanced Western products.
This is done in large part by exploiting and adapting
design concepts embodied in acquired equipment
and associated documents.
? Second, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Soviet
intelligence services administer a trade diversion
program to acquire relatively large numbers of dual-
use manufacturing and test equipment for direct use
in production lines. This program seeks export
controlled microelectronics, computer, communica-
tions, machining, robotics, diagnostic, and other
equipment to increase the throughput of weapon-
producing industries.
These two programs, which apparently are adminis-
tered separately, are the hub of the Soviet effort.
The VPK program is principally, but not exclusively,
an industrial security and counterintelligence concern
for the West. It involves espionage by hostile intelli-
gence officers, overt collection by Bloc officials, ac-
quisition by scientific exchange program participants,
and illegal trade-related activity. The trade diversion
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Figure 1
Key Organizations Involved in Managing Military Research and
Manufacturing and the Acquisition of Western Technology
Military policy, research, manufacturing, and
the principal requesters of Western technology
Collectors of Western technology
Chief Intelligence
Directorate (GRU)
Military Industrial
Commission (VPK)
Key, ddefense
manufacturing
ministries
A via tionl industry
Tare Btd1
X tefense i'ndustry
General Machine
Building
Communications
Equipment Industry
Radio industry
Medium Machine
Building
Shipbuilding Industry
lectronics industry
C"`hemical' indttstry
Electra l Equipment
.industr'y
Petroleum l fi Ling
snd Petry remical
Indrustr^y
Committee for
State Security (KGB)
East European
intelligence services
The Military Industrial Commission (VPK) coordinates the devel-
opment of all Soviet weapons as well as the Soviet national-level
program to acquire Western technology. The VPK is the most
powerful organization in the defense-research establishment, com-
prising the top executives of the key defense manufacturing minis-
tries (industries). Requests for Western documents and one-of-a-
kind hardware from military equipment designers in each of the 12
industries shown above are called requirements (see figure 2).
To satisfy these requirements, the VPK controls a national
State Committee for
Science and
Technology (GKNT)
Ministry of
Foreign Trade
tither defense
manufactu ing
ministries
State Committee for
Foreign Economic
Relations (GKES)
fund, amounting to some half a billion rubles each year (roughly
$1.4 billion in 1980 purchase power equivalents). Once approved by
the VPK, requirements are selectively levied among the KGB, the
GRU, and at least four other national-level collection agencies, as
well as surrogates among the East European intelligence services.
The State Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT)
acts as a collector and as the central processor for the national-level
program. It also monitors the absorption and assimilation of
Western technology by the defense industries.
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program principally involves export control and inter-
national compliance issues. Characteristics of these
programs overlap, further complicating the design of
adequate countermeasures:
? Both programs sometimes seek the same products.
? Soviet industrial ministries request technology and
equipment through both programs.
? The collection channels overlap and in some cases
the same Soviet individuals (intelligence officers and
others) are involved in each program.
The VPK Program: Raising the Technical Levels of
Weapons and Manufacturing Equipment
The VPK includes the top executives of most of the
key Soviet defense manufacturing ministries shown in
figure 1. Full VPK membership is given to the
Ministers of Aviation, Machine Building (projectiles
and explosives), Defense Industry (armor and electro-
optics), General Machine Building (strategic missiles
and space), Communications Equipment, Radio (ra-
dars and large-scale computers), Medium Machine
Building (nuclear weapons and high-energy lasers),
Shipbuilding, and Electronics. It is a small but power-
ful group, responsible for centrally overseeing the
research, development, and production of all Soviet
weapon systems. It coordinates developments between
its chief customer, the Ministry of Defense, and the
key suppliers, the defense-industrial ministries. As the
expediter for weapons development projects, it is the
principal Soviet military instrument for eliminating
or circumventing the inefficiencies characteristic of
the Soviet economic system.
As part of its responsibility to enforce schedules and
to ensure that technical and performance specifica-
tions are met, the VPK translates requests for West-
ern hardware and documents, principally by the de-
sign bureaus of 12 industries (figure 1), into lists of
collection requirements. In the late 1970s alone about
one-half billion rubles (roughly $1.4 billion in 1980
purchase power equivalents) each year was reserved
for purchases of one-of-a-kind Western hardware and
documents.
Three examples of specific requirements from the
VPK lists are shown in figure 2. The first deals with
the IBM 370 computer, used by the Soviets as the
model for production of their own version, "Ryad,"
which is a copy of the IBM 370 architecture and
functions. The second deals with a cruise missile
computer. The VPK apparently assigned it a high
priority because of major efforts under way at that
time to develop long-range strategic cruise missiles,
which require large-capacity digital memories for
onboard navigation. The Soviets historically have had
reliability and other problems in developing such
computers. The third example is a US Fairchild
Instrument Corporation/Xincom semiconductor
memory tester. It is a good example of the one-of-a-
kind dual-use product requested and acquired through
the VPK program. Design concepts embodied in the
hardware and associated documentation of the tester
were copied to develop a Soviet counterpart. The
original tester also could be used to help copy or
reverse-engineer Western integrated circuits.
Requirements for documents alone can command
amounts as considerable as hardware; examples in-
clude over 50,000 rubles (roughly $140,000 in 1980
purchase power equivalents) for documents on the US
shuttle orbiter control system and over 50,000 rubles
for high-energy laser developments. Over 200,000
rubles ($560,000) was approved for acquiring selected
research documents on US antimissile defense
concepts.
Each year the VPK publishes a report based on the
evaluation of the individual ministries. It includes
aggregate statistics on numbers of technical docu-
ments and samples (hardware) obtained, gross ruble
savings, and the numbers and priority of requirements
satisfied. This report is sent to the Chairman of the
Presidium of the Council of Ministers and to the
Central Committee of the Communist Party. Copies
also are sent to headquarters elements of the collec-
tion organizations.
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Figure 2
Examples of VPK Requirements, Mid 1970s - Early 1980s
Requester (responsible for producing mainframe computers)
Desired technology
Organization charged with collection
Origin or location of technology -
1. Ministry of the Radio Industry
2. Technical documentation on IBM 370 computer models 145, 158, 168
and operating system data, not earlier than 1974. Information about
new IBM projects.
3. KGB
4. US: Documents from the IBM firm.
Joint requirement. Priority code A-I indicates technology needed for-
potential solutions of a problem in producing a future weapon system
Desired technology
1. Ministries of Aviation, Communications Equipment, and Electronics
Industries, A-I, Most Critical
2. Electronic components and programing devices for cruise missile
digital computer memory. Samples and documents desired.
3. 170,000 rubles
4. KGB
Code B-I indicates substantial reduction in time and expenditure
in production of new weapons
Desired technology
2. Xincom monitoring and metering equipment for static and
functional testing of semiconductor memory units. Sample
and documents desired.
3. 4,500,000 rubles
4. Ministry of Foreign Trade, KGB
The mid-1970s VPK requirement shown above targets IBM equip-
ment for Soviet military research and development. The Soviets
copied the architecture of the IBM 360 and 370 systems to develop
their Ryad series of computers. The late 1970s requirement is a
very high priority for three reasons: it is identified as "most
critical"; it is needed to solve problems in producing a future
weapon system; and three ministries would benefit technically,
economically, and jointly from its acquisition. The early 1980s
requirement, for a Fairchild/Xincom semiconductor memory test
system, is a perfect example of the one-of-a-kind dual-use product
(sample) and associated documentation requested for copying as
well as for volume purchases for direct use in production lines. This
tester was in fact acquired, and design concepts were copied, saving
several hundred man-years of Soviet developmental effort.
Soviet requirement data also include the firms and sometimes
the names of persons who have the desired hardware and docu-
ments. Some 3,000 to 5,000 new, amended, and reapproved require-
ments for hardware, documents, or both are now issued by the
Soviets each year.
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Table I
Summary of Results of the VPK Program,
Late 1970s and Early 1980s
? An average of over 5,000 Soviet military equipment and weapon
system research projects per year in the early 1980s benefited
from Western hardware and technical documents. Over half of
these projects were in the electronics and the armor and electro-
optics industries.
? Innovation, new concepts, new directions, higher technical levels
of research, accelerated development of more advanced weapons,
and the avoidance of major pitfalls are some of the key benefits to
Soviet military scientific research projects.
? About 60 percent of that portion of document and hardware
acquisitions considered to be the most significant to the Soviets
was of US origin, although not necessarily collected in the United
States.
? About 70 percent of the documents and hardware acquired in the
10th and so far in the 11th Five-Year Plans, which were judged
by the Soviets to be the most significant to their military research
projects, probably were export controlled, embargoed, classified,
or under some control by Western governments.
? In the early 1980s more than 3,500 requirements were levied each
year for specific Western hardware, documents, or both, with
roughly one-third satisfied each year; the other two-thirds still
targeted.
? Some half a billion rubles are maintained each year for potential
collections against these requirements (roughly $1.4 billion in
1980 purchase power equivalents).
? During the 10th Five-Year Plan (1976-80), over 3,500 require-
ments were fully satisfied worldwide-roughly 60 to 70 percent of
these being fulfilled by the Soviet intelligence services (the KGB
and the GRU) and surrogates among the East European intelli-
gence services. Requirements fully satisfied during the 11th Five-
Year Plan will exceed 5,000.
? Of the 3,500 satisfied requirements approximately 5 to 10 percent
were judged by the Soviets as the most significant to military
research projects. The Soviet intelligence services and surrogates
among the East European services fulfilled about 90 percent of
these most significant requirements each year.
? About half of all VPK requirements fulfilled in the 10th Five-
Year Plan (1976-80) and thus far in the 11th Five-Year Plan
(1981-85) were for two industries: electronics and communica-
tions equipment.
Successes and Benefits
The VPK program is a Soviet success story (table 1).
Over 3,500 specific collection requirements for hard-
ware and documents were satisfied for the 12 industri-
al ministries for just the 10th Five-Year Plan (1976-
80). About 50 percent of more than 30,000 pieces of
Western one-of-a-kind military and dual-use hard-
ware and about 20 percent of over 400,000 technical
documents collected worldwide in response to these
requirements were used to improve the technical
performance of very large numbers of Soviet military
equipment and weapon systems. The benefits and
distribution by industry of the fulfilled requirements
are shown in figure 3.
? About 50 percent of the 6,000 to 10,000 pieces of hardware
acquired annually and 20 percent of the 100,000 documents
acquired annually are used by the Soviets in transferring Western
technology into their military research projects.
? In the late 1970s about 700 embargoed dual-use manufacturing,
diagnostic instrumentation, and other dual-use products were
acquired each year for copying embodied designs, reverse-
engineering, and probably for selected direct use as key equip-
ment in Soviet military production lines.
? From 1976 to 1980 the greatest savings in research project costs,
almost one-half billion rubles (the 1980 dollar cost of equivalent
research activity would be $800 million), were realized by two
ministries-the Ministry of the Defense Industry (armor and
electro-optics) and the Ministry of the Aviation Industry. The
Soviet manpower equivalence of these savings alone translates
roughly into over 100,000 man-years of scientific research. These
savings, however, may be biased. The ruble figures probably
reflect operating costs-salaries, bonuses, and sometimes savings
in elimination of, for example, test range activity, but not capital
costs. Although Soviet managers generally tend to inflate savings
to enhance their role, the savings estimated in the VPK program
appear to be conservative.
According to the Soviets, about one-third of the VPK
requirements are totally or partially fulfilled annually,
strongly suggesting that Western industrial security,
counterintelligence, export controls, and other efforts
do have an effect. But each year the number of VPK
requirements grows by about 15 percent. This is a
strong indication that the expanding Soviet military
industrial program continues to rely on Western
technical solutions and advances. It also indicates
increased collection success and user expectation.
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Figure 3
Rank Ordering of Soviet Industries by VPK Requirements Fulfilled,
by Hardware Received, and by Rubles Saved, 1976-80
Rank by requirements
fulfilled 0
Electronics
Communications
Aviation
Radar and computers
Chemical
Shipbuilding
Nuclear industry and
lasers
Projectiles and
explosives
Petroleum and
petrochemicals
4/3
6 /2
8/5
2/10
11/7
9/8
10/1
5/12
7/11
12/6
3/9
About 50 percent of the VPK requirements that were fulfilled
during the 10th Five-Year Plan for Western hardware and docu-
ments were satisfied on behalf of two defense industries-electron-
ics and communications. These are key areas where the Soviets'
need for militarily significant technology and the West's need for
better controls are greatest.
The four industries receiving the most Western military
hardware and dual-use products were electronics (over 6,000 pieces
of equipment, a large percentage involving microelectronics), chem-
ical (almost 4,000 pieces), petroleum/petrochemicals (over 1,500),
and communications (over 1,500), ranked in that order.
400
The top four industries saving the most rubles in research
project development costs in terms of manpower and other re-
sources were the armor and electro-optics industry (almost 20
percent of the 1.4 billion rubles saved in research project costs) and
the aviation, communications, and electronics industries. These four
industries consistently appear to be the Soviet leaders in requesting,
absorbing, and generally getting the most use out of Western
hardware and documents. In some cases, such as in the armor area,
the Soviets are using Western technology not to catch up, but to
enhance a capability that already is equal to or better than that of
the West.
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Five Years Gained in Developing the Next Generation
of Fire-Control Radars for Soviet Fighter Aircraft
The Soviets estimated that by using documentation
on the US F-18 fighter their aviation and radar
industries saved some five years of development time
and 35 million rubles (the 1980 dollar cost of equiva-
lent research activity would be $55 million) in project
manpower and other developmental costs. The man-
power portion of these savings probably represents
over a thousand man-years of scientific research
effort and one of the most successful individual
exploitations ever of Western technology.
The documentation on the F-18 fire-control radar
served as the technical basis for new lookdown/shoot-
down engagement radars for the latest generation of
Soviet fighters. US methods of component design,
fast-Fourier-transform algorithms, terrain mapping
functions, and real-time resolution-enhancement
techniques were cited as key elements incorporated
into the Soviet counterpart.
Moreover, F-18 and F-14 documentation served as
the impetus for two long-term research projects to
design from scratch a new radar-guided air-to-air
missile system. The documentation also was instru-
mental in formulating concrete specifications to de-
velop new Soviet airborne radar countermeasures
equipment against the F-18 and F-14.
Significant acquisitions of Western technology in-
clude documents on fire-control radars for the F-14,
F-15, and F-18 and documents on US ballistic missile
defense concepts (table 2). In terms of broad defense
programs, Soviet strategic missiles, air defense, tacti-
cal forces, and weapons manufacturing capabilities
have benefited the most from the VPK program. The
annex has several hundred examples of specific Soviet
weapons and military equipment benefiting from
Western technology.
Western technology collected each year in the late
1970s and early 1980s aided Soviet military industries
principally in four ways. Ranked by priority, the VPK
program:
? Redirected Soviet technical approaches in about a
hundred projects each year for ongoing weapon
systems and key military equipment, or resulted in
the improvement of the weapons manufacturing
processes.
? Initiated several hundred new short-term and long-
term research projects each year on technical topics
that had not been under consideration.
? Raised the technical levels of several thousand
developmental projects each year involving military
equipment, manufacturing, or design procedures.
? Eliminated or shortened phases of more than a
thousand military research projects each year. This
contributed to a substantial reduction-in a number
of cases, two to three years-in time needed to
produce more technically advanced weapons and
military equipment.
The benefits vary from project to project. Western
technology has assisted the Soviets in reducing their
weapon acquisition cycle by up to two years for
research projects in an advanced status. Acquisition of
Western documents, for example, helped the Soviets
cut by two years the time spent on researching a new
generation of fuzes for munitions with a large kill
radius and for self-aiming aviation cluster munitions.
For projects in an earlier stage of research, the cycle
can be reduced as much as five years. This considera-
bly shrinks overall research time, reduces the amount
of resources devoted to weapon system research, and
allows diversion of those resources to other Soviet
military research projects.
A wide range of Soviet data demonstrates that bene-
fits to military research projects have increased signif-
icantly from the late 1970s to the early 1980s (figure
4) and have applied to thousands of research projects
in all key defense industries. Measured in rubles, the
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Table 2
Selected Worldwide Soviet Acquisitions,
Military Applications, and Collectors of
Western Documents, Military Hardware,
and Dual-Use Products
Western Technology Acquired
Documents on Cruise Missiles Using Radar
Terrain Maps
Documents on Heat Shielding Material for
Reentry Vehicles
F-14, F-15, F-18 Documents on Fire-Control
Radars
US Phoenix Missile Documents
Infrared Radiometer
Fiber-Optics Systems
Aircraft Carrier Steam Catapult Design
Documents
US MK 48 Torpedo Documents
Acoustic Spectrum Analyzer
Powerful Acoustical Vibrator
Serniactive Air-to-Air Missile
KGB
Reduced Infrared Signature Aircraft
KGB
Aircraft and Missile Onboard Communication
Systems
GRU
Aircraft Launching System for New Aircraft
Carrier
GRU
Antisubmarine Torpedo
Nuclear Submarine Wake-Detection Trailing
System
GRU
Submarine Quieting
GRU
Submarine and Ship Sonars
GKNT, GKES, Academy of
Sciences
Documents on Systems and Heat Shielding of the
US Space Shuttle
Transit Naval Navigation Hardware
High-Energy Chemical Laser Documents
System 101 Processing Equipment
International Radar Conference Documents
Ground Support Equipment for US TOW Anti-
tank Guided Missile
US Copperhead Laser-Guided Artillery
Documents
Laser-Guided Missile Documents
Infrared Imaging Subsystem Designs
Millimeter Radar Documents
First-Generation Space-Based Naval GRU
Radionavigation System
Digital Signal Processing for Counterpart Others
Satellite System
Space-Based Laser Weapon KGB
Digital Processing and Video for Space-Based Others
Reconnaissance; Missile, Bomb, and Remotely
Piloted Vehicle Command Guidance
Synthetic Aperture Radar for Aircraft Detection GRU
Countermeasure System GRU
Fire-Control System of Future Tank KGB
Antitank Missile GRU
Advanced Modeling for New Artillery Projectiles KGB, GRU
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Table 2
Selected Worldwide Soviet Acquisitions,
Military Applications, and Collectors of
Western Documents, Military Hardware,
and Dual-Use Products (continued)
Western Technology Acquired
Complete Set of Manufacturing Equipment for
Printed Circuit Boards
Copied for 11 Production Assembly Lines for
Strategic Missile, Armor and Electro-Optics, and
Radar Industries
Ministry of Foreign Trade
DTS-70 Printed Circuit Board Testing System
Military Microelectronic Production System
KGB
Fiberglass Manufacturing Technology
High-Pressure Airtanks for Submarines
KGB, GRU, Ministry of
Foreign Trade
Computer Disk Memory Systems
Military Ryad Series Disk Drives
KGB
Bubble Memory Technology
Tactical Missile Onboard Memories
Others
Technical Documents on Tests of
Cold-Rolled Steel
Improved Structural Protection of Warships
KGB
High-Accuracy Three-Dimension Coordinate
Measuring Machine
Ministry of Foreign Trade,
GKNT, GKES, Academy of
Sciences
savings doubled between 1976 and 1980 (figure 5) and
still are expanding in the 11th Five-Year Plan. The
statistics on benefits also point to a massive diffusion
of Western technology into Soviet military equipment
and weapons. Figure 6 shows how the more than
5,000 military research projects benefiting in the
early 1980s were distributed by industry. According
to these rough indicators, the electronics, armor and
electro-optics, and aviation industries are benefiting
the most from Western technology.
Overall, the acquisition of Western technology per-
mits the Soviets to field more sophisticated, versatile,
and effective weapons. The basic time for fielding
these advanced Soviet weapons, though, remains
about the same. It also provides new military capabili-
ties and allows additional resources to be used for the
development of additional advanced weapons con-
cepts. The acquisitions also serve to lighten somewhat
the burden of continuing growth in Soviet research
and defense spending.
Soviet copying and reverse-engineering of Western
military and dual-use equipment are major character-
istics of the VPK program. Indeed, the majority of
VPK requirements for "technology" appears to be for
hardware only. In the late 1970s alone, the Soviets
acquired about 700 embargoed one-of-a-kind dual-use
products each year principally in the area of manufac-
turing, inspection, instrumentation and test equip-
ment, including key microelectronics production and
test equipment. These products were used for making
Soviet counterparts or possibly were for use as key
manufacturing or test equipment that completed pro-
cess lines. Examples included computer-controlled
integrated circuit testers, aircraft engine vibration
control systems, and narrow-band analyzers for sub-
marine quieting.
These practices indicate Soviet deficiencies are in the
design, testing, and integration of technologically
advanced military systems, not in basic research and
applied science. They fall short in the engineering of a
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Figure 4
Technical and Time Benefits to Thousands of Soviet Military
Research Projects From Western Technology
Late 1970s
Total= over 4,000 Projects whose technical
approaches were redirected
Projects whose research
stages were eliminated or
shortened
New research
projects started
Projects whose technical
levels were raised
The benefits to the Soviet military research establishment from
acquisitions of Western technology are far greater than previously
believed. Virtually every Soviet long- and short-term research
project for military systems-well over 4,000 in the late 1970s and
well over 5,000 in the early 1980s-is benefiting from the docu-
ments and hardware of at least a dozen Western countries. (See
figure 6 for a breakout of how these projects were distributed by
industry.)
device, technologically advanced by Western stan-
dards, into a useful piece of militarily applicable
hardware producible in large quantities.
The profile of the VPK program (as well as the trade
diversion program) can be used to better define
militarily critical technologies as well as better ways
to counter Western losses. Both appear principally
aimed at acquiring products and technical data. Both
show that protecting dual-use products is just as
important as protecting the related design know-how.
Equipment sales divorced from the transfer of know-
how do have long-term significance for the Soviets.
The evidence indicates that equipment transfers, both
large batch acquisitions and individual samples used
Early 1980s
Total= over 5,000
Projects in the VPK program are divided into the four major
categories shown above. Projects with redirected technical ap-
proaches and new projects represent the most significant benefits
through adoption of innovations and new directions for military
systems. Major pitfalls are thus avoided. Projects whose technical
levels were raised and those whose stages were eliminated or
shortened represent improvements in the military state of the art of
the Soviet Union and an acceleration in the time when more
advanced subsystems are ready for new and future weapons.
for copying embodied design concepts and for reverse-
engineering, generally outstrip acquisitions of "tech-
nology" in quantity and are of more immediate value
to the Soviets.
VPK Collectors and Sources
Analysis of reliable data indicates that in the VPK
program the Soviet Bloc intelligence services (the
Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB), the Chief
Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet General Staff
(GRU), and their surrogates among the East Europe-
an intelligence services) are the collectors most often
tasked and the most successful.
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Figure 5
Ruble Savings From Only a Part of Soviet
Western Technology Acquisitions
Million rubles
At least 1.4 billion rubles in savings on selected
projects during the 10th Five-Year Plan
Soviet collectors have easily acquired many types of
Western integrated circuits (ICs) for reverse engineer-
ing. Indeed, most Soviet ICs can be traced to a
Western original. One of the best examples is their
KR580IK80A microprocessor, which is a modified
version of the Intel Corporation 8080A 8-bit micro-
processor used in many US military systems. In this
case, the Soviets even copied the equivalent US part
number to avoid confusion (note the KR5 80 IK 80A
versus the US 8080A).
Furthermore, the evidence clearly shows that Soviet
ICs known as LOGIKA-2 and series 133/155 were
The above savings generally are conservative estimates by the
Soviets resulting from the elimination of stages of military research
and design projects, the reduction in time to carry them out, and
the adoption of new technical approaches. The savings are not
cumulative. That is, a 20-million-ruble annual saving from the
acquisition of US and other Western fiberglass plastics production
technology used in manufacturing high-pressure air tanks for
submarines was counted for one year only, the year of acquisition.
Roughly 400 million rubles ($640 million) were saved in 1980
for only a portion of the Western technology acquired. Most of
these savings were in long-term military research projects for
weapons of the late 1980s and early 1990s. They therefore were
most likely given in terms of manpower savings. By this measure
several tens of thousands of Soviet man-years of scientific research
effort were saved in 1980.
During the late 1970s and early 1980s the Soviet
intelligence services acquired, through their own ef-
forts and those of the surrogate East Europeans,
about 60 to 70 percent of all materials collected in the
overall VPK program each year (figure 7). More
important, these intelligence services were involved in
collecting worldwide about 90 percent of the informa-
tion judged by Moscow as most significant and used
directly copied from the Texas Instruments
5400/7400 family. These ICs have been used in
Soviet strategic and tactical military systems since
the mid-1970s to provide important qualitative im-
provements. The more advanced Western fabrication
equipment acquired by the Soviets in recent years has
been used to produce copies of sophisticated Western
ICs for their latest generation of weapons. If the
Soviets succeed in acquiring the next generation of
materials, equipment, and parts, their military capa-
bilities will continue to improve in the area that is the
major strength of the West-quality.
The USSR's practice of reverse-engineering, however,
may soon run into problems. As US and Japanese ICs
become more complex, reverse-engineering will re-
quire: (a) tracking hundreds of thousands of connec-
tions; (b) understanding how they all fit together; and
(c) mastering the complex processing steps used in
production. Thus, copying such circuits will require
not only much more sophisticated Western equipment
but also much more time to duplicate each circuit,
causing their overall microelectronics gap with the
West to widen.
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Figure 6
Rank Ordering of Industries by Soviet Military Research Projects
Benefiting From Western Technology, Early 1980s
Electronics
Armor and electro-optics
Aviation
Missiles and space
Projectiles and explosives
Communications
Chemicals
Radars and computers
Electrical equipment
Shipbuilding
Nuclear industry
and lasers
Petroleum and
petrochemicals
P
h
h
i
l l
l
rojects w
ose tec
n
ca
eve
s
were raised
Projects whose research stages
A
r
were eliminated or shortened
Projects whose technical approach
were redirected plus new research
projects started
The assimilation of Western technology into Soviet industries
conducting military research is considerable. The greatest benefi-
ciaries were the electronics and armor and electro-optics industries,
which accounted for over 50 percent (equaling thousands) of all
military research projects benefiting from Western technology in
the early 1980s.
The general distribution points out the rather broad effect that
Western documents and hardware have just on raising the technical
levels of Soviet military research. This is particularly true for the
top three industries, where advanced technology and innovative
design concepts play a significant role in weapon developments.
es
14 35 40
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Figure 7
Soviet Military Requirements Satisfied by Principal Collection Agencies in
the Overall VPK Program, Late 1970s and Early 1980s
GKNT, GKES
Academy of Sciences
Ministry of
Foreign Trade
The distribution shows that the KGB and the GRU (and their
surrogates among the East European intelligence services) were the
main collectors in the overall VPK program. They were involved in
satisfying roughly 60 to 70 percent of all VPK requirements
completely fulfilled during the late 1970s and early 1980s. (Per-
centages do not add to 100 because several agencies contributed to
fulfilling some of the same requirements.)
Although not evident from the above data, both the KGB and
the GRU significantly increased their efforts in the early 1980s
in many hundreds of military research projects (figure
8). Both the KGB and the GRU levy some of the VPK
requirements on surrogates among the East European
counterpart services. The KGB probably owes a high-
er percentage of its collection to these East European
civilian intelligence services than does the GRU to its
East European counterparts. All use human assets
worldwide.
because the average number of requirements fulfilled so far in the
early 1980s (11th Five-Year Plan) increased about 50 percent over
the late 1970s.
The State Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT)
and associated collectors surprisingly were the third main collecting
entity, satisfying a relatively large percentage. Figure 8 shows,
however, that they were credited with satisfying about 5 percent of
a selected subset of acquisitions, those judged by the Soviets to be
the most significant to their military research projects.
Coordination with the East European services is con-
ducted through the liaison functions at both KGB and
GRU headquarters as well as through KGB and GRU
advisers in the various Warsaw Pact intelligence
services. Since the mid-to-late 1970s the surrogates
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Figure 8
Most Significant Acquisitions Satisfied by Principal Collection
Agencies, Late 1970s and Early 1980s
The KGB and GRU were involved in collecting about 90 percent of the
Western acquisitions judged by the Soviets to be the most beneficial to their
military development projects (late 1970s and early 1980s.)
Average yearly percent of acquisitions judged by the Soviets to be the most significant
Ministry of
Foreign Trade
GKNT, GKES
Academy of Sciences
In contrast to figure 7, which shows results for the overall VPK
program, this figure shows the main collection agencies for a
selected subset of acquisitions-those judged by the Soviets to be
the most significant to their military research projects for the
periods indicated. The Soviet intelligence services and surrogates
are the key collectors in the VPK program. Their approximate 90-
percent association with the most significant acquisitions (100
percent less the percentages from the categories labeled "nonintelli-
Single agency acquisitions
KGB and GRU
M KGB and GRU with others
O Nonintelligence service involvement
gence service involvement" and nonintelligence "single agency
acquisitions") indicates the West has a counterintelligence and
industrial security challenge.
About 60 percent of the acquisitions were of US origin (but not
necessarily acquired in the United States). The several hundred
acquisitions for each period in the statistics above are a small subset
of those acquisitions shown in the statistics for the overall VPK
program.
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among these services have played a major role in the
overall VPK collection program, often in return for
Soviet economic concessions to their countries. The
intelligence services of East Germany, Poland, and
Hungary are among the most successful in acquiring
Western classified data and export controlled
products.
During the late 1970s and early 1980s the GRU
probably fulfilled two to 10 times as many VPK
requirements as the KGB for the important defense-
industrial ministries of:
? Communications Equipment Industry (defense and
satellite communications systems)-10 times.
? Machine Building (projectiles and explosives)-five
times.
? General Machine Building (strategic missiles and
space vehicles)-five times.
? Medium Machine Building (nuclear industry and
lasers)-two times.
? Radio Industry (radars and large-scale comput-
ers)-two times.
The GRU probably is more successful because of its
overall scientific orientation, its bolder operational
style, its increased collection opportunities that reflect
a wider variety of technology-related cover positions
overseas, and its clearer understanding of collection
objectives.
The KGB. The First Chief Directorate (foreign intelli-
gence) of the KGB conducts science and technology
collection operations through its headquarters compo-
nent known as Directorate T. Directorate T probably
has approximately 1,000 officers, with nearly 300 on
foreign assignment. The officers on foreign assign-
ment are organized into components known as Line
X, and most of them are scientific specialists by both
academic and professional training. The largest KGB
complements are probably in Bonn, Cologne, London,
New York, Tokyo, and Vienna. (Paris was one of the
largest until mass expulsions in 1983.)
Line X officers abroad typically occupy such cover
positions as science attaches in a Soviet embassy or
equivalent positions in the commercial or economic
sections of Soviet missions or an international organi-
zation. Other preferred cover positions for these offi-
cers are as officials in various Soviet trade missions or
as members of scientific or other academic exchanges.
Such positions provide easy access to the types of
information targeted by the VPK or to foreign person-
nel who could provide such access. Cover as an
"acceptance engineer" at a company with a Soviet
contract is also a preferred way to acquire proprietary
secrets.
The GRU. The Chief Intelligence Directorate of the
Soviet General Staff has emphasized the collection of
military scientific data since the earliest days of
Soviet military intelligence. Unlike the KGB, the
GRU has no headquarters component specifically
charged with managing scientific collections; rather,
this function is part of the overall responsibilities of
four geographic operational directorates. GRU head-
quarters does, however, have a scientific information
analytical directorate that supports scientific collec-
tion efforts.
The GRU does not have a separate cadre of career
scientific specialists in the field; instead, most GRU
officers have technical backgrounds and education as
well as years in a military specialization. Approxi-
mately 1,500 GRU officers serve outside the USSR.
For all of them, scientific collection is an integral part
of their responsibilities and a high priority.
The GRU probably has a higher percentage than the
KGB of officers with cover positions that provide
more access to Western scientific targets and more
methods of transporting export controlled products
and technical data to the Soviet Union. Some of these
positions similar to those of the KGB's scientific
specialists are in scientific or commercial sections of
Soviet missions or international organizations and
various foreign trade offices. In addition, the GRU
officers often have positions in Aeroflot (the Soviet
airline) and Morflot (the Soviet merchant marine). All
Soviet military attaches are GRU officers, of course.
The GRU, however, does not seem to use cover
positions in academic and technical exchanges to the
same extent as does the KGB.
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Selected Sources.
US Defense Contractors. Moscow views US and
Allied defense contractors with their proprietary and
government security controls as difficult targets. Ac-
cordingly, the KGB, the GRU, and their surrogates
among the East Europeans are the collectors primari-
ly tasked to operate against them. Of the top 100 US
defense contractors for 1983, nine of the 10 most
frequently cited by the Soviets as sources of needed
technology were in the aerospace industry (table 3).
The next group most frequently identified was the
chemical and petrochemicals industries.
Although the Soviet Bloc intelligence services are the
primary collectors of scientific and technological in-
formation in the VPK program, it is estimated that
about 90 percent of the roughly 100,000 documents
acquired each year worldwide are unclassified. About
10 to 20 percent of these unclassified documents are
either under proprietary corporate, export, or other
government controls. The Soviet intelligence services
and their surrogates among the East European ser-
vices probably provide Moscow with about 10,000
technology-transfer-related classified documents each
year from the West. Analysis and operational obser-
vations indicate that only a small percentage of these
are collected through Soviet intelligence service oper-
ations in the United States.
Analysis of hostile intelligence activities indicate that
in recent years the surrogates among the East Europe-
an intelligence services possibly have been more suc-
cessful than Soviet intelligence against priority de-
fense technologies in the United States. East
European services have had considerable success not
only in the United States, but elsewhere because:
? They are generally perceived as a lesser threat than
the Soviets.
? They often may not be perceived as operating in a
surrogate role.
? In some countries, including the United States, they
operate under less severe travel restrictions.
? Some, especially the Czechoslovaks and the East
Germans, probably find it easier to operate in the
West European cultural and commercial climate.
Recent examples of Soviet Bloc espionage operations
against US and other Western defense contractor
targets are presented in table 4.
As a result of various coproduction arrangements and
contract bidding among foreign firms, the availability
of much US defense contractor technology overseas in
US subsidiaries and in other firms has increased. This
enables Soviet Bloc intelligence to seek priority US
technologies in many countries around the world.
Commercial Data Bases. Unclassified technical docu-
ments from all countries-including engineering ana-
lyses and research results-are targeted by Soviet
intelligence and other collectors because of their value
to Soviet engineers seeking creative designs and alter-
native engineering approaches. For example, from the
mid-1970s to the early 1980s, NASA documents and
NASA-funded contractor studies provided the Soviets
with their most important source of unclassified mate-
rial in the aerospace area. Soviet interests in NASA
activities focused on virtually all aspects of the space
shuttle. Documents acquired dealt with airframe de-
signs (including computer programs on design analy-
sis), materials, flight computer systems, and propul-
sion systems. This information allowed Soviet military
industries to save years of scientific research and
testing time as well as millions of rubles as they
developed their own very similar space shuttle vehicle.
The individual abstracts or references in government
and commercial data bases are unclassified, but some
of the information, taken in the aggregate, may reveal
sensitive information concerning US strategic capa-
bilities and vulnerabilities. Numerous unclassified US
Department of Defense and contractor documents are
sought by the Soviets from the Commerce Depart-
ment's National Technical Information Service. Doc-
uments dealing with design, evaluation, and testing of
US weapon systems-the Sidewinder air-to-air mis-
sile, the F-15, the Redeye shoulder-fired antiaircraft
missile, the B-52, and others-are in the data base.
The public and private document clearinghouses-
established to efficiently index and disseminate the
results of government and government-sponsored mili-
tary-related technical research-are a fertile ground
for KGB, GRU, and other collectors. In recent years,
the growing use of electronic data bases has provided
the Soviets with an even more efficient means of
identifying and procuring such unclassified technical
information needed by Soviet designers.
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Table 3
Rank Ordering of Top 100 US Defense Contractors of 1983
Compared With Their Rank Ordering by Approximate
Frequency of Soviet Identification for Needed Technology,
Selected Periods in Late 1970s and Early 1980s
Dollar
Company
Soviet
Dollar
Company
Soviet
Value
Identification
Value
Identification
Rank
Rank
Rank
Rank
3.
Rockwell International
4
42.
Harris
32
4.
General Electric
1
43.
Todd Shipyard
5.
Boeing
2
44.
Eaton
31
6.
Lockheed
3
45.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber
17
7.
United Technologies (Pratt & Whitney)
11
(Goodyear Aerospace)
8.
Tenneco
31
46.
Guam Oil & Refining
. .
9.
Hughes Aircraft
15
47.
Atlantic Richfield (ARCO)
31
11.
Grumman
21
49.
Waterman Marine
12.
Martin Marietta
7
50.
Signal Co. (Garrett)
19
13.
Litton Industries
20
51.
Royal Dutch Shell Group
23
14.
Westinghouse Electric
6
52.
Motorola
25
15.
IBM
19
53.
North American Philips (Magnavox)
27
16.
LTV
24
54.
E Systems
17.
FMC
30
55.
Hercules
24
18.
RCA
27
56.
Morrison Knudsen
19.
TRW
26
57.
Mobil
20.
Sperry
17
58.
Ogden
21.
Honeywell
12
59.
Morton Thiokol
22.
Ford Motor (Ford Aerospace)
22
60.
Gould
23.
General Motors
14
61.
Congoleum
24.
AT&T
..
a
62.
Caterpillar Tractor
32
23
16
34.
Hughes Helicopters
35.
General Tire & Rubber (Aerojet)
15
36.
ITT
31
37.
Standard Oil of California
30
38.
Teledyne
27
39.
Motor Oil Hellas
...
69.
Fairchild Industries
70.
HBH (Hughes Air/Bendix/Holmes)
71.
MIT
72.
Burroughs
24
73.
Pacific Resources
74.
Johns Hopkins University
32
75.
Oshkosh Truck
..
76.
Gulf Oil
30
77.
Ashland Oil
31
a An ellipsis indicates that no targeting for specific technology or hostile targeting of those companies. Other companies not among
hardware was noted during the sampling period to rank these the top 100 are known to have been identified by the Soviets for
companies; this is not a complete indication that there was no needed technology.
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Table 3 (continued)
Dollar Company Soviet
Value Identification
Rank Rank
82. Reynolds Industry 29
83. Duchossois Thrall Group (Chamberlain) 29
84. NI Industry (Norris)
85. Sam Whan
86. Computer Science
87. Xerox
In the VPK program the Soviets issue general guidance to collec-
tors to acquire selected information on, for example, a system (the
US Space Shuttle) or a subsystem/technology (electro-optical
guidance techniques of the US Maverick or TOW missiles). They
follow up this guidance with specific "requirements" and allocate
funds for particular pieces of hardware (MK 46 torpedo: more than
1,250,000 rubles (more than $3.5 million), or a U-2 aircraft radio:
more than 50,000 rubles), or a document (K-250K-D gyroscope:
more than 20,000 rubles), or a dual-use product (excimer laser:
more than 20,000 rubles). The government agencies, companies, or
One solution appears to be to thoroughly screen all
candidate data base entries and keep sensitive govern-
ment information out of the public data bases or limit
its availability to US and Allied defense contractors.
Unfortunately, this may also inhibit the United
States' own national research effort by restricting the
ready availability of such information.
Scientific Conferences. Collection of information from
professional and academic conferences on applied
science and technology has also contributed to the
success of the Soviet program. At least 35 conferences
worldwide were identified in the VPK program as
potential sources of specific data in the late 1970s to
assist in solving military research problems. These
included conferences on materials, missiles, engines,
lasers, computers, marine technology, space, micro-
electronics, chemical engineering, radars, armaments,
Dollar Company Soviet
Value Identification
Rank Rank
contractors that have such information or products are specified.
The rank ordering in this table is representative of the number of
times a company was specifically identified as a source of needed
information and hardware during a selected period. Duplicate
numbers beginning with Soviet rank 15 indicate ties in the number
of times identified. The data available give a rough indication of
large Soviet ongoing needs for innovation in specific aerospace
design concepts and hardware as well as for chemical technology
and manufacturing equipment.
and optical communications. The Soviets judged some
of the data acquired from these conferences to be
among the most significant contributing to their
military projects. Conferences in the late 1970s and
early 1980s (and Soviet evaluation of the data) ranked
in order of significance were the:
? International Radar Conference (improved circuit
designs for synthetic aperture satellite radars and
aircraft over-the-horizon radars)-Collector: GRU.
? Conference on Integrated Optics (assisted in identi-
fying ways to produce a qualitatively new Soviet
category of integrated optical devices for fiber-
optics communications).-Collector: KGB.
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Table 4
Selected Successful Soviet Bloc Espionage
Operations Against US and Other Western
Defense Contractor Targets
Hostile
Service
Dates
Operated
William Bell
SB Poland
1978-81
Dieter Gerhardt
GRU
1964-83
James Harper
SB Poland
1971-81
Manfred Rotsch
KGB
1967-84
Access
US citizen. Radar specialist, Hughes Air- Saved the Soviets several tens of millions
craft Company. Worked on advanced US of rubles in research efforts; advanced
radar systems, experimental radar sys- Soviet technology by about five years by
tems, and air-to-air and surface-to-air permitting them to implement proven de-
missiles. sign concepts.
South African naval officer who had at- Passed information on various antiaircraft
tended the British Royal Navy College missiles.
and served at the Embassy in London.
Later was a scientific research staff
officer.
US citizen. Electronics engineer. Through Provided dozens of documents on potential
his girlfriend/wife he had access to Ballis- US ballistic missile defense programs,
tic Missile Defense Advanced Technology ICBM basing modes, and related technol-
Center contracts at Systems Control Inc., ogy. Afforded Soviets a unique look at
California. potential US future systems concepts.
West German. Head of the Planning Passed information on the "Tornado" air-
Department of the aviation firm craft produced by the European Panavia
Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm (MBB). consortium.
? Conference of the Aerospace and Electronic Sys-
tems Society of IEEE (helped technical solutions to
existing problems and improved the characteristics
of a low-altitude target detection radar)-Collector:
KGB.
? International Conference on Radar (assisted devel-
opment of signal processing for passive jamming
suppression methods and for radars to detect distant
aircraft targets)-Collector: GRU.
? International Conference on Nontraditional Energy
Transformation Systems (refined directions of re-
search on space-based nuclear reactors)-Collector:
KGB.
? Conference on Millimetric and Submillimetric
Equipment (assisted in design solutions for millime-
ter wave proximity fuzes)-Collector: KGB.
? Symposium on Solar Energy Conversion (increased
efficiency and decreased costs for electron beam
deposition of coatings on solar components for space
vehicles)-Collector: GRU.
According to Soviet estimates, the information ob-
tained by the KGB and GRU from these conferences
alone, particularly the first three, produced savings of
millions of rubles in long-range military research
projects-savings roughly equivalent to 100 man-
years of effort. The fact that numerous professional
and scientific conferences are specifically identified as
valuable sources in advance by the VPK indicates
their exploitation is not fortuitous, but carefully
planned.
Ministry of Foreign Trade. The Soviet Ministry of
Foreign Trade administers and operates hundreds of
foreign trade organizations and firms around the
world. This global presence and the ministry's official
duties related to technology and transportation make
it a practical cover organization for hundreds of KGB
and GRU officers involved in technology acquisition
efforts. These officers conduct overt and covert collec-
tion operations and channel the results through their
respective intelligence organizations for accountabil-
ity in the VPK system.
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In addition to providing cover for intelligence officers,
the Ministry of Foreign Trade is also a major inde-
pendent collector in the VPK program and attempts
to pursue most of its assigned VPK requirements on
an overt basis. During the late 1970s and early 1980s,
it helped fulfill about 15 percent of all fully satisfied
VPK requirements (figure 7). More important, it
fulfilled 9 percent of those satisfied requirements
identified as "most critical." Also during that period
its role was specialized, focusing largely on the acqui-
sition of microelectronics manufacturing equipment
and communications dual-use products. In view of
this, it is not surprising that throughout the 10th and
thus far in the 11th Five-Year Plans the Ministry of
Foreign Trade was assigned to collect the largest
percentage of samples (a yearly average of approxi-
mately 30 percent) as opposed to documents. The
ministry also has a major role in the illegal trade
activities discussed later in this report.
Overt and Academic-Related Collectors. The Soviet
Academy of Sciences is another collector in the VPK
program. So too are the State Committee for Science
and Technology (GKNT) and the State Committee
for Foreign Economic Relations (GKES). Although
these organizations are involved principally in overt
collection of information for nondefense industries,
they also are involved in worldwide overt collection of
information and technical data in response to specific
VPK tasking for military research projects. Some-
times they are tasked jointly with the KGB and other
collectors to satisfy these requirements.
These three collection agencies, especially the Acade-
my of Sciences and the GKNT, operate in the West in
a milieu of scientific, academic, and business confer-
ences. They and others help send approximately 2,000
Soviet Bloc citizens to the United States each year in
a nontourist status. A portion of those visiting proba-
bly respond to high-priority VPK requirements. Addi-
tionally, many Soviet scientific personnel have been
co-opted to some degree by the Soviet intelligence
services to provide assistance to VPK and other
collection activities.
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, Soviet scientif-
ic collection directives identified numerous universi-
ties worldwide that had needed information. Perhaps
as a vote of confidence in US academic research, the
number of US academic centers targeted has in-
creased from about 20 to over 60 during this period.
The universities cited as sources for both applied
military-related technology and for civilian scientific
data include some of the finest in the United States
(figures 9 and 10). The majority of information sought
at universities for the VPK program was applied
technology and engineering, and not fundamental or
basic research.
Carnegie-Mellon, Cincinnati, Kentucky, Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology (MIT), Michigan, and
Wisconsin were among those universities (as well as
defense contractors) identified in the VPK program as
sources for information on new high-strength, high-
temperature alloys, such as titanium, on lightweight
structural alloys, and on powder metal processing.
California Institute of Technology, Harvard, and
MIT were targeted for techniques, methodologies,
and results for evaluation of strategic concepts on
space, aviation, and missile systems. California Insti-
tute of Technology and MIT were also cited as
sources for transonic, supersonic, and hypersonic
aerodynamic research, as were the Polytechnic Insti-
tute of New York (Brooklyn), Princeton, and Stan-
ford. Kansas, MIT, Ohio State, and Penn State were
identified for data relating to electrohydraulic control
systems applicable to aircraft, helicopters, and the
Soviet version of the US Space Shuttle. Research
applicable to future high-energy laser and particle
beam weapons was sought from MIT, Denver, and
Princeton.
As illustrated in figure 7, the three overt and academ-
ic-related collectors rank third in the overall VPK
program, satisfying about 20 percent of those require-
ments that were completely fulfilled by all collectors.
On the other hand, figure 8 shows that while their
overall contribution to Soviet military research collec-
tion is large in volume they accounted for about 5
percent of the technology judged most significant by
the Soviets during the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Acquisitions included information on developing and
manufacturing composite materials for missiles and
space systems; automated control designs for highly
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Figure 9
Selected US Universities Identified by the
Soviets as Sources of Needed Applied Technology
Various Periods During the:
? 1970s
1980s
A 1970s and 1980s
A Wyoming,
Iowa
Nebraskao State A
Colorado,
state A Colorado Denver Kansas
Over the past decade or so about 40 percent of the US universities
shown above were identified in the VPK program as sources of
applied science and technology principally for Soviet military
aerospace developments. The State Committee for Science and
Technology also issues requirements against US universities, but
principally for fundamental research for both Soviet military- and
civilian-related science developments.
Wisconsin
l western
?Chic
o
g
Illinois Ohio Carne
1e n Pen
Purdue
o
Tech A State, A A Mel
Dayton, Pittsburgh
Johns
ASA Ohio, A Hopkin
Indiana ACincinnati WVa
~^- FIgrida
n,
t?
ew York City Area
A Columbia
A NYU
A Polytechnic Inst
Brooklyn
o American
A GWU
A Maryland
Known Soviet collectors at US and other Western universities
include those from the intelligence services, scientists within the
Academy of Sciences, and scientists from the State Committee for
Science and Technology who come to study in the United States.
Many of these collectors are also involved in spotting and assessing
US scientists for potential recruitment as agents.
Boston Area
? Brandeis
A Harvard
nsselaer,
Cornell Mass'
Michigan Yaleo
LehAhPrin
o Penn State
_77t~~t7
A Kentucky
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Figure 10
Soviet Needs for Applied Science and Technology From Selected US
Universities Compared With Number of Visiting Soviet Bloc
Scientists, Early 1980s
Total number of visit
applications (early 1980s)
Massachusetts Institute 374
of Technology
Carnegie-Mellon 62
University
Harvard University
123
University of Michigan
112
California Institute
of Technology
76
Actual visits by Soviet Bloc scientists with
backgrounds related to Soviet needs for
information for high-priority military
research projects
The above US universities, as well as Stanford, California at the number of VPK-identified military research needs and the
Berkeley, Cornell, and the Illinois Institute of Technology, were number of visiting Soviet Bloc scientists with backgrounds related
identified by the Soviets more often than others during the early to those technical areas. There is, however, little data indicating
1980s as sources of technology needed for high-priority military that specific scientists were tasked to acquire information for Soviet
and civilian research projects. There is a rough correlation between military research projects.
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accurate coordinate-measuring machines for quality
control of weapon components and subassemblies;
information on automatic control systems for optimiz-
ing rolling mills; acoustical data for developing low-
frequency sonars for submarines; and information on
aerial photography, magnetic recording systems, and
lasers.
The Trade Diversion Program:
Building and Expanding Industries
Numerous sources and data indicate the existence of a
program separate and administratively different from
the VPK program, but comparable to it in scope. This
second program is characterized not by requirements
for one-of-a-kind equipment, but by illegal and legal
acquisitions of relatively large numbers of dual-use
products for Soviet military programs. These products
are requested by the defense industries for direct use
in manufacturing lines to increase the throughput or
output of plants or for designing future equipment.
Often manufacturing cells, complete production lines,
or even entire plants are sought from the West. Much
of this equipment and technology falls into the areas
of computers, microelectronics, numerically con-
trolled machine tools, robotics, and material
fabrication.
This second Soviet program is probably less struc-
tured than that of the VPK, but just as rigidly
monitored because of the large amounts of hard
currency necessary. This is the Soviet program that
appears to be largely responsible for orchestrating and
managing most of the worldwide trade diversions,
particularly in the areas of computers and
microelectronics.
Computers and Microelectronics
Major Soviet diversion efforts are targeted at micro-
electronics fabrication equipment and computers;
nearly half of detected trade diversions fall into these
categories. Using unscrupulous Western traders who
employ license falsifications, deceptive equipment de-
scriptions, dummy firms, false end users for illegal
purchases, and smuggling, as well as assistance from
intelligence operations, the USSR has acquired at a
minimum several thousand pieces of major microelec-
tronics fabrication equipment during the last 10 years
(figure 11). The equipment acquired through these
efforts is largely responsible for the significant ad-
vances the Soviet microelectronics industry has made
thus far, advances that have reduced the overall
Western lead in microelectronics from 10 to 12 years
in the mid-1970s to four to six years today. Western
microelectronics manufacturing equipment has been
applied throughout the entire production process-
from materials preparation to the final testing appara-
tus needed for sophisticated production lines. In fact,
total design and fabrication lines may have been
acquired from single diversion operations.
Volume purchases, legal and illegal, characterize the
second Soviet program. Examples of microelectronic
products that the Soviets illegally acquired from the
United States, Japan, and other countries in one year
during the early 1970s include 30 sophisticated crys-
tal pullers, 99 diffusion furnaces, three integrated
circuit (IC) testers, and 10 mask aligners. The next
year they diverted 24 crystal pullers, 64 diffusion
furnaces, three photorepeaters, three pattern genera-
tors, three epitaxial reactors, and an IC tester. Such
purchases have been used directly in assembly lines
for military production. In the future, large quantities
of test equipment for sophisticated very-large-scale
integrated (VLSI) circuits will be a major target.
Volume purchases of materials are also part of the
second program. Before 1980, the Soviets purchased
hundreds of tons of electronics-grade silicon (not
under export controls at that time). This is the raw
material needed for integrated circuits for both mili-
tary and civilian uses. The silicon originated primarily
from the United States, West Germany, and Japan.
After the sale of electronics-grade silicon to the
USSR was restricted, Soviet acquisitions continued
through worldwide diversions. Future acquisitions of
silicon very likely will begin to concentrate on the very
high-quality silicon produced in the United States,
West Germany, and Japan for use in producing VLSI
circuits.
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Figure 11
Soviet Acquisitions of More Than 2,500 Pieces of Western
Microelectronics Manufacturing Equipment, Early 1970s - Early 1980s
Oxidation, lithography,
and etching
Doping
Packaging
Testing
Over the past few years the Soviets have virtually completed their
entire building construction program for manufacturing military
microelectronics components. To equip many of these buildings
with advanced production equipment, they acquired more than
2,500 pieces of major Western controlled and uncontrolled micro-
electronics fabrication equipment covering the entire spectrum of
manufacturing operations. They acquired this equipment from the
Integrated circuits intended for direct use in Soviet
systems are usually acquired from the United States
and Japan by trading companies in various parts of
the world, and then shipped in huge numbers to Soviet
and East European destinations. As many as 100
million circuits may be shipped in this manner every
year.
In direct monetary value, volume acquisitions through
illegal trade probably far exceed those of the VPK-
directed effort. The Soviets have diverted thousands
of different items of high technology in the past two
decades, totaling perhaps billions of dollars in hard-
ware value alone. Most of these illegal acquisitions
have been facilitated or conducted autonomously by
unscrupulous traders. The manufacturers of high-
technology production equipment have rarely been
knowingly involved in diversions; indeed, they have
often been victims.
700 800 900
United States, Japan, and Europe, and diverted it through many
parts of the world. Years of illegal acquisitions of large numbers of
dual-use products through worldwide trade diversions have enabled
the Soviets to narrow the microelectronics technological gap with
the West from 10 to 12 years a decade ago to about four to six
years today.
The Soviets have arranged most diversions through
Europe, but their use of Asia as a diversion route is
growing. Over 300 firms in more than 30 countries
have been identified as engaged in diversions. Many
more companies probably exist-some involved in
only a few operations and quitting or disbanding
before becoming well known or vulnerable.
Participants in the Second Program
The Soviet intelligence services and the Ministry of
Foreign Trade are involved in various ways with most
of this illegal trade, some of which is conducted
through ostensibly normal trade channels. The Minis-
try of Foreign Trade and industrial ministries operate
a large network of foreign trade organizations, com-
mercial offices, joint companies, and foreign procure-
ment offices whose staffs know the hardware markets
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and act as ready contacts for technology traders and
diverters who may volunteer their services to the
Soviets. They are also quite adept at spotting opportu-
nities for diversions and obtaining controlled Western
products. These functions are performed by legitimate
Soviet trade officials, intelligence officers under trade
cover, and trade officials working directly for intelli-
gence officers. Many of the 141 Soviets expelled from
25 countries during 1983 were assigned in some
capacity with the Ministry of Foreign Trade.
The Soviet illegal trade program appears to be admin-
istered and managed in the trade ministry's Main
Engineering and Technical Administration (GITU).
Although it is a component of the ministry, GITU is
staffed and managed largely by intelligence officers,
organized into separate KGB and GRU groups by
their respective headquarters. Its subordinate Depart-
ment for Technical Cooperation with Foreign Coun-
tries is similarly staffed and managed. GITU report-
edly exercises some supervision over all technical
Soviet foreign trade organizations and all technical
joint trading companies.
The GITU staff has grown from about 12 in 1970 to
about 70 in 1983. Its subordinate Department for
Technical Cooperation with Foreign Countries num-
bers over a hundred. The intelligence officers assigned
to GITU, and to the Ministry of Foreign Trade in
general, blend into a number of roles in carrying out
their assignments. Soviet intelligence service person-
nel (as well as their East European surrogates) are in
embassy commercial sections, trade missions, consul-
ates, commercial organizations, and joint stock com-
panies in the West. Moreover, intelligence officers
have been identified as employees of foreign trade
organizations in the Soviet Union and their offices
elsewhere in the world.
Although GITU is largely a Soviet intelligence service
domain (with the GRU probably filling most cover
positions), that does not mean that all trade diversion
operations are conceived of and supervised on a daily
basis by intelligence officers. Some evidence indicates
that the GRU is involved with more trade diversion
operations than the KGB, but it is unknown if this is
by design or rather a practical manifestation of the
high proportion of foreign-trade-related GRU cover
positions. Legitimate Soviet trade officers in Warsaw
Pact countries are also involved in trade diversions,
and not merely as intelligence co-optees.
Use of Diverters-for-Hire
One of the most effective and secure trade diversion
methods used by the Soviets is the contract or broker
diverter. Contractor diverters work for set or negotiat-
ed fees; broker diverters receive a commission, usually
a percentage of the equipment purchase price. Both
are individual traders or businessmen with some
affiliation to high-technology manufacturing or trade
circles. They are very knowledgeable of high-technol-
ogy markets and product availability and either vol-
unteer their services to the Soviets or are spotted by
Soviet assets in the West or in the USSR. Some have
global expertise and connections; some specialize in
operations in a few countries or a few technology
product lines. In some cases, the Soviets have used
diverters with known track records of trading almost
exclusively, or in high volume, with the East
Europeans.
Whether a volunteer or selected by the Soviets, a
potential contract or broker diverter is generally
screened to determine the scope and depth of his
contacts, range of trade abilities, and access to perti-
nent high-technology markets and manufacturers. In
some cases such an assessment may be a rigorous one,
in others perhaps only superficial. A most important
quality, however, is the ability to deliver goods as
scheduled, for close to the agreed prices, without
complications or risks to the Soviet customer.
Although many Soviet intelligence officers are in-
volved with negotiating and contracting with di-
verters, this procedure is not a classic intelligence
operation and is analagous to an intelligence "recruit-
ment" in timing only. The diverter does not accept
intelligence discipline as would an "agent." Indeed it
makes little or no difference to diverters if they are
dealing with intelligence principals as opposed to
trade officials, save for the need to avoid the suspi-
cions of espionage. Additionally, most diverters proba-
bly do not enter into a permanent relationship with
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their Soviet principals, but rather into one that is only
for the duration of one or a series of formal or
informal contracts for specific products or services.
Although there are dissimilarities among contract or
broker diversion operations, there are some character-
istics that seem consistent:
? The Soviets incur minimal, if any, risk or legal
liability. Many, if not most, contracts are scheduled,
briefed, signed, or verbally agreed to in Moscow or
another convenient denied area or are obscured by
the conduct of legitimate overt business.
? Little or no contact is maintained with the diverter.
This seems especially true of diverters operating on
behalf of a Soviet intelligence service.
? For the most part, the diverter has autonomy in
operational decisions, including arranging front or-
ganizations, product availability, purchase, ship-
ping, storage, and delivery. At times diverters also
perform initial professional setup, testing, and ser-
vicing of equipment. In so doing they rely exclusive-
ly on professional overt and covert colleagues.
? Fees are negotiable. The Soviets will pay lucrative,
but not outrageous prices. Fees can also be raised
during the course of the diversion if more costs or
risks are entailed by the diverter.
? Payment is generally through letter of credit depos-
ited by the Soviets to the diverter's bank account.
The use of contract or broker trade diverter opera-
tions by the Soviets minimizes, if not obviates, the risk
to their intelligence residences and trade officials
while simultaneously assuring the application of pro-
fessional business and trade diversion know-how to
the technology acquisition task. Because of the low
Soviet profile in these operations, more vigorous law
and trade control enforcement may be more effective
in stemming contract diversion than counterintelli-
gence responses, although both efforts clearly have an
important role.
Richard Mueller, a West German citizen, is wanted
in that country and in the United States for many
cases involving illegal exports of COCOM-controlled
computers, microelectronics, and other products to
the USSR. His involvement with illegal technology
acquisition on behalf of the Soviet Bloc dates back to
the early 1970s. By 1978 Mueller's deals were made
almost exclusively with Soviet foreign trade officials;
some of these officials were intelligence officers under
cover. For his network, Mueller uses numerous dum-
my and front firms and meets with his Soviet princi-
pals in Moscow to mask his activities. At one time he
had more than 75 firms operating in Austria, France,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States,
and West Germany.
Between 1978 and 1983 Mueller delivered to the
Soviets advanced computers, peripherals, and micro-
electronics manufacturing equipment worth at least
several tens of millions of dollars. Perhaps Mueller's
best known operation was his attempted diversion to
the USSR in late 1983 of seven large US Digital
Equipment Corporation VAX computers and related
hardware and software. The VAX series of super
minicomputers are valuable to the Soviets because of
their computer-aided design (CAD) applications for
microelectronics fabrication. This equipment was
purchased in the United States for Mueller's dummy
firms in South Africa and West Germany. Much of it
was seized by Sweden and West Germany enroute to
the Soviet Union.
Other Diversion Methods
Soviet foreign trade officers also attempt to make
small Western firms dependent on Soviet legal orders
over a period of years. For such firms, who are not
contract or broker trade diverters, the occasional
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Soviet request for illegal purchases or a support role in
a larger illegal trade operation appears difficult if not
impossible to refuse. Indeed, some firms may even be
drawn into complicity or support for Soviet diversion
operations unwittingly or gradually. It has long been a
concern in the West to limit the expansion of Soviet
foreign trade organizations abroad because of the
opportunities they offer for this type of diversion
activity. Although it has become more difficult for the
Soviets to conduct this type of activity, Moscow
continues to keep these diversion channels open.
The Soviets also acquire technology to modernize
manufacturing through another mechanism, the so-
called acceptance engineers. They are assigned as
quality inspectors on a long-term basis, usually a year
or longer, to Western firms engaged in manufacturing
items for Soviet end users. These may be intelligence
officers or Soviet personnel who are co-opted to steal
proprietary production or technical data. They also
use this opportunity for agent spotting for immediate
or future exploitation. Use of acceptance engineers for
collection is especially practical in countries with
advanced manufacturing technology. Companies in
Western Europe and in Japan have been targeted with
this approach.
The West needs to better organize to protect its
military, industrial, commercial, and scientific com-
munities, keeping two objectives clearly in view:
? First, it must seek to maintain its technological lead
over the Soviets in vital design and manufacturing
know-how.
? Second, it should strictly control key dual-use prod-
ucts, including computer-aided design and manu-
facturing systems, large volumes of automatic test
and inspection equipment, and, most important, the
automatic test equipment that can alleviate acute
Soviet qualitative deficiencies in the manufacturing
of weapons and military equipment.
The ultimate goal should be to deny the Soviets access
to Western documents, hardware, and technologies
that will accelerate their military programs and si-
multaneously cause Western defense efforts and costs
to increase. Soviet dependence on the West for tech-
nological innovation in military research and develop-
ment and in modernizing Soviet production industries
is broad. It is particularly important in microelectron-
ics and computers, and extends to key areas that
include command, control, communications, and in-
telligence (C'I), computer-integrated design and man-
ufacturing, and materials fabrication (table 5).
The United States and many other Western govern-
ments have begun to better recognize that their
military and dual-use equipment and technologies
have been improving the performance capabilities and
manufacturing standards of Soviet weapons. Several
positive steps have already been taken by the United
States, Western Europe, and Japan, including selec-
tive expansion of the COCOM ' list to deny the
Soviets key items. Although the emphasis has varied
among countries, most have undertaken individual
programs to stem diversions and losses that include
some of the following:
? Increased awareness programs, highlighting the
magnitude, tactics, and detriment to Western secu-
rity of the Soviet efforts.
? Improved export control efforts and enhanced law
enforcement capabilities.
? Counterintelligence programs specifically targeting
the technology transfer activities of hostile intelli-
gence services and their Soviet co-optees and agents.
? Industrial security awareness programs conducted
jointly by counterintelligence services, security ser-
vices, and corporate security professionals.
? Soviet Bloc scientific visitor controls designed to
screen high security risk visitors and, in the process,
strengthen the spirit and integrity of academic
exchanges.
? Better review of government open publications in
the prepublication or predistribution phases.
In general, a more difficult operational environment
for Soviet intelligence has resulted worldwide.
'The Coordinating Committee (COCOM) was established in 1949
to serve as the forum for Western efforts to develop a system of
strategic export controls. It is composed of the United States, the
United Kingdom, Turkey, Portugal, Norway, the Netherlands,
Luxembourg, Japan, Italy, Greece, France, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Denmark, Canada, and Belgium.
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Table 5
Examples of Dual-Use Equipment and Technology
Likely To Be Targeted by the Soviets
? Advanced Integrated Circuits
- GaAs Devices
- Memories
- Microprocessors and Peripherals
- Very-High-Speed Integrated Circuit (VHSIC) Devices
? Automatic Integrated Circuit and Printed
Circuit Board Testers
? Chemical Vapor Deposition (CVD) Equipment, Especially Metal-
Organic CVD Systems
? Computer-Aided Design (CAD) Systems
? Integrated Optics
? Ion-Beam and Plasma Etchers
? Ion-Implantation Equipment
? Lithography Equipment, Especially Electron-
beam, Ion-beam, and X-ray Systems
? Molecular Beam Epitaxy (MBE) Systems
? Semiconductors
- III-V and II-VI Compounds
- Heteroepitaxial Materials
- Specialized Crystal Pullers
- Quality Silicon for Very-Large-Scale Integrated (VLSI)
Circuits
? Array-Transform Processors
? Artificial Intelligence Systems
? Data Display Equipment
? High-Density Disk Storage Systems
? Internal Memories
? Software Development Systems
? Stand-Alone Mainframe Computers
? Supercomputers
? Superminicomputers
? C'I Software
? Computer Networking Systems
? Telecommunications
- Fiber-Optics Transmission Systems
- Digital Switching Systems
- High-Speed Modems
- Satellite Communications Systems
- Terminal Displays
? Computer-Aided Design Software, Methods, and Equipment
? Computer-Aided Manufacturing (CAM) Software
? Computer Numerical Controls for Metalworking Machines
? Coordinate Measuring Machines
? Finite Element Analysis
? Flexible Manufacturing Systems (FMS)
? Plant Control Software
? Robotics
? Metals and Alloys
? Composites
- High-Strength Fibers and Filaments
- Carbon-Carbon Manufacturing
? Ceramics
? Materials Processing
- High Temperature Resistant Coatings
- Isostatic Presses
- Lasers for Surface Conditioning and
Material Processing
- Material Joining and Bonding Equipment
- Nondestructive Test and Evaluation Equipment
- Precision Shapers and Formers
- Vacuum Furnaces, Including Those for Single Crystal
Growth
The worldwide diffusion of advanced products and
high technology, however, clearly has increased Soviet
collection opportunities. To take advantage of this, the
Soviets can be expected to intensify operational acqui-
sition efforts by:
? Expanding their use of contract diverters on a global
basis.
? Increasing their dependence on surrogates among
the East European intelligence services; increasing
use of client states such as Libya, Vietnam, and
North Korea.
? Increasing their exploitation of any vulnerable US
and Western defense weapon system coproduction
arrangements in Allied countries.
? Relying more on third-country espionage operations
targeting US personnel and technology (mostly han-
dling covert assets in areas outside the United
States).
? Exploiting Third World trade entities dealing with
US high technology (the Soviets contend that corpo-
rations, officials, and security services in those
countries can be easily victimized).
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? Attempting broader online access to US and other
Western data base systems directly from the Soviet
Union.
For effective countermeasures to keep pace with the
evolving Soviet acquisition programs, in particular the
highly effective operations of the KGB, the GRU,
their surrogates among the East Europeans as well as
unscrupulous traders, the West should accurately
anticipate Soviet tactics. Western countries should
continue to improve and modify their responses. In
particular, the West needs to improve and refine its
knowledge of Soviet military-technical needs and
factor this knowledge into meaningful and practical,
multilateral export control lists. Most important, how-
ever, must be increased multinational coordination of
Western programs-for example, a systematic pro-
gram among the Western customs services aimed at
preventing the illegal export and diversion of militari-
ly significant equipment in the face of what clearly
will be a geographically expanding Soviet acquisition
threat.
Much can be done to stem losses because much is
known about Soviet efforts; it is not an insurmount-
able problem. But the Soviets' appetite for Western
technology will continue to be voracious. They will
continue to exploit any weaknesses in Western export
controls, as well as policy differences among the
COCOM countries, to acquire the technologies need-
ed by their military programs for the late 1980s and
beyond.
This effort is more difficult and costly for them than
at any time in the past. The stakes are high and the
Soviets know it; they will devote whatever resources
and manpower are required to fulfill their most
critical military collection requirements. The West
can do no less if it is to succeed in protecting itself as
well as frustrating their efforts. All in the West-
governments and private industries-will need to
participate.
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Projectiles and
Explosives
Armor and
Electro-Optics
Several Hundred Examples of Soviet Military Equipment and
Weapons Benefiting From Western Technology and Products
There are hundreds of examples of Soviet military equipment and weapons of the
1980s and 1990s that have benefited or will benefit from the technologies and
products of at least a dozen different Western countries. New and advanced
technical directions will be incorporated into some of the weapon systems,
subsystems, and equipment in each industrial area given below. The equipment in
many projects will have their technical levels raised or project completion dates
shortened principally because of the copying of design concepts embodied in
Western technical documents, one-of-a-kind military hardware, and dual-use
products.
Four New Fighter Aircraft Reusable Space Shuttle
New Tactical Fighter of the 1990s Air-to-Air Missile (US Phoenix-Like)
A Supersonic Aircraft Fire-Control System for Three Fighters
Ground Attack Aircraft Gas Turbine Engine
Airborne Command Post Ramjet Engine
Reduced-Infrared-Signature Aircraft
Four Transport Aircraft
100-mm and 152-mm High-Explosive
Shells
203-mm Artillery Shell
Sabot Design for Armor-Piercing Tank
Round
Armor-Piercing Tungsten Penetrator
Shell
23-mm Gun
Aviation Cluster Bomb
Remote Mining Shell Delivered by
Artillery, Rockets, and Aircraft
Large Caliber Artillery Shell Casing
Small Caliber Ammunitions
Noise-Detonated Fuze
Microelectronic Radio Fuze
Millimeter-Wave Proximity Fuze
High-Efficiency Proximity Fuze for
Mass Munitions
Antisubmarine Torpedo
Antisubmarine Missile
Munitions Testing Equipment
Thermal Decoy Target
Protective Blast Structure
Solid Propellant
Unmanned Target Plane Equipment
Space-Based Photoreconnaissance
System
Infrared Space Reconnaissance System
Space-Based Missile Launch Detection
System
Space-Based Infrared Image Processor
Synthetic Aperture Radar for Space
Reconnaissance
T-55 Tank
T-64 Tank
T-64A Tank
T-64B Tank
T-72 Tank
T-80 Tank
125-mm Tank Gun
Industrial Gas Laser
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP05T0028OR000300240001-9
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP05T00280R000300240001-9
Aerial Frame Camera
High-Altitude Aerial Camera
Coordinate Measuring Machine
Portable Antiaircraft Missile System
Advanced Night Vision Device
Small-Arms Night Sight
Holographic Fire-Control System
Laser-Guided Artillery Shell
Laser Gyro
Optical Computer for Tactical Ballistic
Missile
Diamond Turning Device for Mirrors
for Future Laser Weapons
A New ICBM
A New SLBM
Maneuvering Reentry Vehicle (MaRV)
Strategic Cruise Missile
Reusable Space System (Shuttle)
Navigation Satellites
Manned Space-Based Orbital Station
Reentry Vehicle
Laser Rangefinder
Antitank Missile
Countermeasure Against US Antitank
Guided Missile
Automatic Gun Barrel
New Artillery Gun Barrel
Sniper Rifle and Machinegun
High-Strength Gun Barrel from
Electroslag Steel
Automated Rolling Mill for Military
Production
Carbon-Carbon Nosecone for Reentry
Vehicle
Missile Motor Case Material (Based on
DuPont Kevlar 49)
Surface-to-Air Missile
Missile Fuel Tank
Cryptographic System
Telemetry System
Radars and
Computers
Aircraft-to-Submarine Communica-
tions System
High-Altitude Video Reconnaissance
System
Video Processor for Space
Reconnaissance
Reconnaissance Radio Receiver
Strategic Aircraft and Cruise Missile
Communication System
Fiber-Optics Communications System
Electronic Countermeasure Station
Signals Intelligence Equipment
ABM Radar System Design
Space-Based Oceanographic Radar
Three-Dimensional Phased-Array
Radar
Over-the-Horizon Radar
Shortwave-Band Aircraft Radar
High-Capacity Computer
Narrow-Band Signal Analyzer
Cryptographic System Scrambler
Magnetic Recorder
Fiber-Optical Cable
Microcomputer for Communications
Programmable Oscilloscope
Digital Processor
Printed Circuit Board Production
Equipment for Communications
Correctable Aerial Bomb
Remotely Piloted Vehicle
Electronic Page Teleprinter
Disk Drives for Ryad Computer
Computer Software
BESM-6 Computer
Magnetic-Bubble Computer for
Onboard Missile
Computer Matrix Processor
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Nuclear and
High-Energy Lasers
Nuclear Weapons Safety System
Space-Based Nuclear Reactor
Nuclear Reactors
Naval Nuclear Reactor
Water-Cooled Power Reactor
Process for Reactor-Grade Zirconium
High-Sensitivity Mass Spectrometer
for Uranium Enrichment
Isotope Separation Process
Space-Based Microprocessor for a
Detector
Radiation Detector
Airborne Military High-Power Carbon
Dioxide (CO2) and Carbon Monoxide
(CO) Laser Weapon
High-Power Gas Dynamic Laser
Space-Based High-Energy Chemical
Laser Weapon
Electronics and
Microelectronics
New Aircraft Carrier Catapults for
High-Performance Airplanes
New Submarine
Submarine Quieting Equipment and
Techniques
Antisubmarine Torpedo
Telecontrolled Torpedo
Torpedo Missile
Laser Submarine Wake-Detection
System
Radioactive Submarine Wake-
Detection System
Hydrophone for Aircraft-to-Submarine
Communications
Photolithography System
Photomask Equipment
Microelectronics Tester (Fairchild
Corporation SENTRY-7 Design)
LSI IC Circuit Mask Fabricator
Microelectronics for Onboard Weapon
Systems
Large-Scale Integrated Circuit Tester
Microprocessor (Motorola MC 10800
Series Design)
16-Bit Microcomputer
Computers (Digital Equipment
Corporation PDP Series Design)
Micro- and Mini-computers for
Military Purposes (AM 2900,
LSI-11 M, PDP 11 /70 and REDAC
Designs and Hardware)
Memories for Onboard Radar Fire
Control Systems
Computer Memories
New Semiconductor Thyristor for
Military Equipment
Magnetometer
Surface Warship
Warship-Based Multitarget Radar
Fire-Control System
Sonar System for Nuclear Submarine
Sonar for Surface Ship
Sonar for Ships and Helicopters
Sonobuoy
Radiowave Underwater Communica-
tion System for Diver-Scouts
Ship Demagnetizer
Gyrohorizoncompass for Naval Ships
Naval Gun
Charge Coupled Devices
Traveling Wave Tube for Military
Satellite Communications
Space-Based Laser Communication
System
High-Power Microwave Tube for
Onboard Radar Against Low-
Flying Targets
Laser Communication, Detection, and
Ranging System (Hughes Aircraft
Company 3800 Design)
Infrared TV System
MIG Aircraft Centimeter Waveband
Radar with Onboard Digital
Processing
Compact Analog-Digital Converter
Quartz Resonator
Crystal Grower
Power Generator
Communication and Telemetry System
Microwave Generator
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 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP05T00280R000300240001-9
Hybrid Ramjet Engine for Cruise
Missile
Solid Rocket Propellant for Strategic
Missile
Polyethylene Production System
Color Aerial Photographic Film
Photographic Film for Air and Space
Reconnaissance
Photographic Film for Space Recon-
naissance (Kodak 3414 Film)
Antistatic Photoreconnaissance Film
Low-Density Polyethylene
Photoresist System for Microelectronic
Photolithography
Polyamide Composite Materials for
Aircraft and Tank Industries
Carbon Fiber Production for Aerospace
Applications
Radiation Hardening Paint for Radio-
electronic Equipment
Bonding Material for Spacecraft
Ion-Exchange Resins
Laser Systems for Remote Chemical/
Biological Reconnaissance
Fillers for Deep Sea Vehicles
New Gas Mask
Petroleum and
Petrochemicals
Space-Based Turbogenerator
Tank-Mounted Infrared System
Sodium-Sulfur Battery for Missiles,
Space, Tanks, and Submarines
Electric Step-Motors for Aviation
Weapon Systems
New Fuel for Strategic Cruise Missiles
New Jet Engine Fuel
Polyurethane Binders for Solid Rocket
Fuels
New Zeolite Catalyst for Motor Fuels
Synthetic Motor Oil for Tanks in
Arctic Areas (Mobil Oil Company)
Synthetic Lubricant for Aerospace
Equipment
Radiation-Resistant Additives to
Lubricants for Space
New Lubricant-Coolant for Motor
Vehicles
Power Sources for Missile Installations
Space-Based Solar Power Cells
Spacecraft Temperature Control
System
Ship Electrical Supply System
Batteries for Naval Ships
Rubberized Fabric Inflated Seal for
Supersonic Military Aircraft
Industrial Rubber for Aerospace and
Armored Vehicles
Industrial Rubber Seals
High- and Low-Temperature
Fluoroelastomer for Aerospace
and Armored Vehicles
Improved Protective Gear for
Astronauts and Pilots
Radar-Absorbing Camouflage Coating
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP05T00280R000300240001-9