ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER INTERVIEWED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05T00644R000100040007-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2009
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: February 8, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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RADII TV REPORTS, INC.
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20015 656-4068
February 8, 1981 7:00 PM
STATION V! D V t-I T V
CBS Network
Admiral Stansfield Turner Interviewed
Washington DC
DAN RATHER: Seldom, if ever', is a reporter let into
the world of spies and counterspies, intelligence and counter-
intelligence, a country's most closely guarded secrets. But last
week the man who ran the CIA for the last four years agreed to
share some of his world with us. A career naval officer, Admiral
Stansfield turner was plucked from obscurity by a fellow class-
mate of'his at Annapolis, a man named Jimmy. Carter. At times he
must have wished he were back at sea. For under Turner s regime
the CIA came under vigorous attack, particularly for allegedly
failing to accurately assess the developing situation in Iran.
We talked to Admiral Turner at his home in Virginia.
Now, does Iran stand as an intelligence failure? Not
just during your tour at the Central Intelligence Agency, but
for American intelligence as a whole, does it represent a failure?
ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER:. I don't really think so.
I think that s an oversimplification of the issue. And I m not
trying to be defensive here. I think that intelligence in this
country, over a long period of time, generally kept the policy-
makers aware that there were problems developing in Iran. When
you come to predicting an actual revolution or coup that's ano-
ther thing and it's much more difficult, much more problematic.
But the real, fundamental issue is were we telling
the policymakers that there were difficult situations in Iran
that were going to cause trouble in the future? And I think we
,generally were.
RATHER: But the House Intelligence Committee disagrees
with Admiral Turner. It published a report in January 1979 accu-
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sing the CIA of failing entirely to note the gravity of recent
popular disturbances in Iran. Said the committee, "The CIA pub-
lished two studies one in August 1977 and another a year later,
that said the Shah will be an active participant in Iranian life
well into the 1980s, and that Iran is not in a revolutionary or
even a pre-revolutionary situation.'
ADMIRAL TURNER: The report you're talking about is
not a CIA report. I've had that quoted to me before. That was
a draft which never saw the light of day, and it is not the CIA
position that you've quoted.
RATHER: It was not the CIA position at that time.
ADMIRAL TURNER: It was not the CIA position.
RATHER: Well let s set the record straight about that.
You know the source of that. It's a congressional source which
describes it as a. CIA report. And what you're saying it s a draft --
it was a draft and not a report.
ADMIRAL TURNER: That s correct. And I personally re-
jected that draft. and so I know it is not true.
RATHER: Well, during that time, what was -- in general
what was the CIA telling American policymakers?
ADMIRAL TURNER: We were telling them that there were
all kinds of opposition to the Shah, some on cultural, some on
religious, some on economic, some on political grounds-
What we did not predict was that all of these forms of
opposition would coalesce under the aegis of a 78-year-old cleric
who had been an expatriate for 16 years and would become more than
the Shah could handle, when he had large military and police powers
to back him up. In short, we thought that when the crunch came
and these dissident groups rose to greater power, the Shah would
step in at the right time and knock it down. He didn't.
Dan, I still don t know why. I suspect it may have had
something to do with his illness.
RATHER: One of the most important questions to me about
Iran -- and it's one that you would know about -- is. was the take-
over of the U.S. Embassy in Teheran something done by local mili-
tants and students, or was it something planned and done on a
larger scale? Were outside terrorists involved?
ADMIRAL TURNER: My best estimate at this point -- and
we have a few fragments from the hostages who have just returned is that it really was an Islamic student movement. Clearly, any
movement like that gets infiltrated over a period of time, to some
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extent. I don't believe it ever got infiltrated to the point
it was controlled by outside terrorist-type people..
RATHER: The best available information indicates. what,
if any complicity by an international conspiracy?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Very little, or none. I don't have
any indication of that.
RATHER: You have no indication of that.
ADMIRAL TURNER: No.
RATHER: That would include the PLO?
ADMIRAL TURNER: That's correct.
RATHER: And the Soviets?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Now. that does not mean that there
weren't students in there who had been trained by the PLO, had
been to PLO camps, and one thing, in the course of their life.
But as far as directing and having a major influence on that, we
don't the believe the Soviets or the PLO did?
RATHER: The new Secretary of State, General Alexander.
Haig whom I believe you know reasonably well, said at his first
news conference that the Soviet Union is fostering and supporting
an expanding international terrorism throughout the world.
ADMIRAL TURNER: When the Soviets are willing to supply
arms to a country like Libya, which is obviously causing problems
in terrorism and many other ways all around the world -- it's a
real. troublemaker -- you have to associate the Soviet Union with
that type of activity. They are in complicity with the Libyans.
I think he's right that the Soviets have encouraged
revolutionary movements in many countries that have ended up with
some form of terrorism the PLO and others. But Ind rather let
him buttress his own argument.
RATHER: Is this a fact based on hard intelligence,
what you consider to be hard intelligence, that the Soviets have
helped to sponsor the Palestine Liberation Organization?
ADMIRAL TURNER: I think there's reasonable intelli-
gence that there have been lots of contacts between the two.
And there's certainly hard intelligence on the strong Libyan
connection with the Soviets.
RATHER: Now how much about that -- how much of that
can you tell me? I mean what is the connection between the Sov-
iets and the Libyans, and Libyan sponsorship of terrorism?
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ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, the connection between the Sov-
iets and the Libyans is in the supply, or the sale of excessive
amounts of military equipment; far beyond what the Libyans can
possibly use on their own. And therefore the Soviets must cer-
tainly realize that the Libyans are going to put this to nefarious
employment.
RATHER: Where has most of their activity been centered?
In Africa itself?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well no. Its worldwide. Not just
terrorism, but their interference. They're causing problems in
Central America. They're funding the Muslim liberation groups in
the Philippines. They're all over the world, causing difficulties.
RATHER: It comes as news to me that the Libyans are in-
volved in any way in Central America.
ADMIRAL. TURNER: Well, the critical thing going on in
Central America today is the internationalization of revolution
down there; the outside support that is coming to all these revo-
lutionary movements in Nicaragua and El Salvador and Guatemala;
and so on. And I think this is a very dangerous trend for the
United States, and one that's right on our back doorstep.
RATHER: Well, again how much can you tell me about
that? You say the internationalization. How does that-manifest
itself? '
ADMIRAL TURNER: Well, I think you certainly recognize
that it's the Cuban hand in funneling much of this equipment to
the revolutionaries that has been much of the cause of the prob-
lem. Now, the Cubans don't have the resources to provide much
of anything to anybody. Their economy is in very bad condition.
They're getting that from the Libyans. from the Soviets, from
others.
RATHER: From an intelligence-community standpoint,
does the future look as dark in Central America as it does to
many of us outside the intelligence community?
ADMIRAL TURNER: Yes, I think it does. I think it's
a very serious prospect for the United States.
RATHER: What is that prospect?
ADMIRAL TURNER: The prospect is foreign-, Cuban or
Soviet, dominated regimes in some of those Central American coun-
tries. And the danger that poses to our friends, the Mexicans
to the north, let alone to South America to the south.
RATHER: During his term in office, Admiral Turner came
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under and avalanche of criticism, not only from Congress which
insisting on controlling espionage activities; but from agency
insiders demoralized by what they regarded as arbitrary dismis-
sals of key personnel. Said one CIA veteran, Cord Meyer, By
the summer of 1980, a. clear consensus had emerged in Washington
that Turner should be replaced.`
You know that you ve been criticized for presiding over
the demoralization of the Central Intelligence Agency. Let me
put that in quotation marks. That you dismissed a few hundred
employees. One CIA chief overseas was recently quoted in print
as saying, quote, Turner has gutted the agency and created a
disastrous morale problem.' Unquote.
How do you respond to that?
ADMIRAL TURNER: The morale was very serious when I
got there because of all the public criticism. The agency was
in a state of shell shock. The reductions I made were on the
recommendation of the agency. They weren t my idea. In fact,
I cut the recommendation by a third and reduced the number who
were to be dismissed. And it in no way gutted the agency. In
fact, only 17 people were actually asked to leave.
Morale today is very good at the Central Intelligence
Agency. I think we had to take it, as I said earlier, through a
period of shock and change, adaptation to the new environment of
intelligence. And we have done that. The foundation is there
for the future today. It's on a good solid course, and its a
happy organization.
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