Q&A S AMHERST SMITH VASSAR WILLIAMS ALUMNI CLUBS OF WASHINGTON D.C.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05T00644R000100150001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 20, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 17, 1980
• Content Type: MISC

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Q&A's
Amherst, Smith, Vassar, Williams
Alumni Clubs of Washington,.D.C.
17 September 1980
Q: Could you just outline. for us the way the Central Intelligence Agency
(I believe there is a Defense.Intelligence Agency, National Security
Agency--I don't know whether there are still intelligence branches of
the various Armed.Forces, and the information-gathering functions of
the State Department and the Department of Commerce and God knows how
many others there are) how these all fit together?
A: How big is this octopus called the Intelligence Community? I have two
jobs. I am the Director of Central Intelligence, established by law in
1947, to coordinate.all of-the intelligence activities, what-we call the
national intelligence activities, of our country. The law also provided
that the Director of Central Intelligence would always be the head of
the Central Intelligence Agency.--one_2of the components of the Community.
There are two kinds of components in the community--there are those who
collect information and .there are those-who use it and analyze it. The
CIA does both, but primarily-collects our human. intelligence. The National
Security Agency collects signals intelligence There are other components
that collect photographic intell...igencespread around the community. 'The
State Department and a.number-of'other organizations like the Federal
Broadcast Information Service, collect open intelligence, unclassfied
intelligence, and so on. One of my key jobs, and one that President Carter
has strengthened in his term-of'office, is to coordinate all that collection
as I indicated to you was important to do so. It is also important to you
and me for our pocketbook. There is a lot of-money in these expensive
technical systems, and we don't want too many, we don't want them over-
lapping, we don't wantthem.underlapping--failing to get what needs to be
collected. So I have had strengthened authority over those agencies; I
control what we,call their ".tasking"--what they go out and collect. It's
my responsibility. I control their budgets.. Now the other side of the
house is.a.nalyzi.ng intelligence. There is a Defense Intelligence Agency,
a large organization'here called the National Foreign Assessment Center
which is part of the CIA, there. is the State Department Bureau of Intelli-
gence and Research,. there are small intelligence organizations in Energy,
Commerce, and so on: 'We all work together and 1 am-nominally their boss
but I say nominall eiause we want:-competitive, differing analyses to
come forward. We/ RHt one individual to be able to'tell anybody, suppress
that.view. That is a crazy idea you've got'here. We let it all bubble
up. I then do have to make decisions what is my advice as senior intelli-
gence advisor:to the President, but-if there is a strong dissenting view
like from'DIA, I will feel it'incumbent'upon me to present that as an
alternative, if you'see what I mean. So we try on the one hand to have a
DCI who does ride strong on the collecting agencies who organizes and
brings together the analytic agencies, but not with a strong control over
them. The money is not'very big here, comparatively speaking, and the
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importance of having different centers of thinking, different centers of
interpretation is very keen to our overall objective.
Q: Do you think it is possible for the Director of the CIA to properly
balance'for intelligence and analysts (inaudible).
A: Can a Director of Central Intelligence combine the roles of being
intelligence interpreter and a policy advisor, particularly a strong-
willed one and he graciously named somebody else. I don't have a very
strong will just as long as we do things my way around here. Seriously,
the usual question, and I'll answer It first, and maybe it's part of
yours or not, :iscan I be the head of CIA and run all the other intelli-
gence activities fairly because in. some sense there is competition there
particularly in the budget area. And It is difficult to not have two
masters, but to be two bosses I guess, but.I believe it can be done
and in point of.fact, particularly in my.case, because I have such a
superb deputy, Ambassador Frank Carlucci,, I am really'able to turn the
running of the CIA over to my deputy and I` make major policy decisions
risk -taking decisions,.andtry to be as much DCI as I can rather than
CIA. But can I be intelligence chief and a policy advisor--let me make
it clear that one of:'the ethics:of intelligence is to stay out of the
policy business; because if I start advocating that we ought to have a
SALT treaty, SALT II treaty, will the Congress or you believe me when I
testify on how well I can verify.the SALT II Treaty? So, we don't pick
policy positions. Now-' '-we have to stay very close to the policymakers
because if. we're not producing intelligence on what they are making policy
on, we are here for naught. So I'm very well abreast of what policy
decisions the .President and others are trying to make. But I am very
scrupulous in not'letting'inteliigence advocate one position or another.
Now clearly, some of the..things we'come up withscotchor support a policy
preference or at least have a major impact. on it, but because we want
those to be appreciated 'as being non-biased, we'very carefully try to
stay out of the policy process: ':Fora strong-willed person It's a hard
thing to sit there In the National Security .Council and hear everybody
advocating something you know %s just wrong. And not'speak up, but
L,do'.tr..y. And do.
Q: Admiral Turner, we've heard a. good' deal this evening. about some of. the
activities of the CIA-- intelligence=gathering, covert action' activity'
(by that I understand now you"to mean an attempt to influence affairs
in another country without that country being aware of. where the'
influence comes from. I wonder if you'woul.d comment for us, compare
for us the very effective role of''the CIA in Chile,*both in its intelli-
gence gathering and in its covert activities which resulted in the murder
of Allende, and that of',the,CIA's role in Iran, which.seems--to have a great
deal of difficulty attached'to It, both in terms of:its ability to convey
information to the American . Congress and the President as.to what was
about to happen and It seems, obviously in terms its current covert activity
which 'I understand or would assume is going on*atthi:s:very minute:.
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A: Would I compare our intelligence success in Chile with our intelligence
failures in Iran? I am not asked the question in quite those terms, but
it's a good one. We in both Chile and Iran, undertook covert actions.
In Iran way back in 1953 and in Chile in 1970. Let me emphasize
that in some sense the one in Iran was successful in 1953 and it achieved
what the country asked us- to do. The country did not ask us to murder
Allende and we did,not'do that in Chile, but generally speaking, I do not
think we were successful in achieving what the country wanted in Chile.
But, I would only.empha size to you in both cases the covert action activi-
t es of this-Agency in-those' countries were..authorized by the President.of
this country, checked by the National Security Council and we.-were conforming
with the.national policy'in those regards. Now, as to the so-called failure
in Iran in 1978, when the Shah, actually fell in early 1979 but he began
to lose power in 1978; we have been'accused of an intelligence failure
here, and we would like to have done better there. Let me just:say this
in our self-defense without trying to be too defensive, but.the most
difficult part of intelligence is the-political side, particularly the
side of'predicting coups, revolutions, changes.like this that come about,
suddenly. Now in this instance, throughout 1978, beginning in January,
we were reporting to'the President that there were a lot of problems in
Iran. There was a lot of undercurrent of unrest. We~saw"it.from people
who were dissatisfied with their'economic status, dissatisfied because.they
did not have a role in the political process, dissatisfied because their
Islamic traditions or practices were being profaned and dissatisfied because
there was graft and corruption, and so on.. What we did not forecast was.
that these various centers of dissatisfaction would coalesce around a 78-year
old cleric who had been an expatriate for 17 years and would become a force
of greater strength than the Shah could handle and right up to October'I
personally, while seeing this building, felt that because the Shah had such
strong police and military forces; that he was going to step in at a critical
moment and take con'trol'and suppress this. He did not do so-for reasons that
I'm sure we will probably never understand, indicative in part that not even
the Shah understood'the strength ahd'the- welling up of'these forces: and
their coalescence;''What happened. in Iran is what we term a "societal change"
not a revolution I't.is a lot'easier in many ways to predict a revolution,
an organized activity, something where you-can infiltrate it with a spy
and find out what they are going to do.' This was, in fact, a true revolu-
tion, a change 'in the society brought -about by these many centers' of
dissatisfaction that managed'to bring themselves together and topple the
Shah on a program that was strictly anti-Shah. A lot of the chaos we have
seen and which is frankly getting worse in that country today is that that
kind of a.cement between a group 'of different does not.hold very well.
Once the Shah is 'gone they haven't been'able to find that same motivating
factor. They. are'work.ing it around their religion, but there are great
differences within the country over that* today.. And we have a Situation
in'Iran where there are so'many different power centers in.the country today
that it is tending . towards. chaos'.
Q; Right now-, sir, what is the parity of'our intelligence effort vis-a-vis
Russia and Western Europe?*
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A: What's the parity compairson'of our intelligence effort capabilities
with Europeans and the Russians. An interesting question. Because
today there are only two countries in the world that have a full intel-
ligence capability--ourselves and the Soviets. You see, technical
systems have becoie'so expensive that there is no other country that
.has the full range of them that we and the Soviets do. Now that does
mean the Europeans are not'good'in intelligence. I'm just saying that
they have limitations that we do hot'because of our greater breadth
of intelligence:capabiliti'es. As fa the Soviets are concerned, we
are.definitely ahead of them in the/ ~b P~ical collection that I described
to you because of:.superior Ameri'can'technology. On human intelligence
they are much bigger than we,, it's very hard to measure, but I'm not
dissatisfied, I think .that we're more clever and do just as capable a
job with a smaller-number of people. But that, of course, is a disputable
issue. It'svery hard to tell. Finally, the other half of intelligence is
analysis and I':believe we have a great advantage over the Soviets here.
because I do not think you could -do as good analysis when you're in a
very structured,-authoritarian society where you.'may lost-your job and your
head if you come up with the-:wrong conclusions. I can go to the President
and say I think-"you're wrong, boss and I'm''not sure,my counterpart, Mr.
.Andropov, canget-awaywith that-.'I-.think that inhibits good analysis.
I think we have a.-great'
.-great advantage anthem there.
Q: (Inaudible)
A: We've got a couple of big issues here. I' hope you're prepared to stay
a while. Does covert'action'contravene-the principles and ethics of
our country in essence is part of the question: And don't we need both
public and Congressional oversight to ensure that covert action doesn't
go off and do things as unsuccessful as what we did in Chile. First of
all, if it's a covert action, hy:definItion, you can't have public over-
sight. Now you can have Congressional oversi'ght'on.a classified basis
and what I'm saying to you and asking the Congress is not to reduce or
eliminate Congressional oversight, I'm trying to reduce the number of
people on Capitol Hill who have to know this and thereby reducing the
probability of leaks. Let me emphasize to you, please, I do not mistrust
the Congress for leaks anymore than I mistrust anybody else in the intelli-
gence world,'but the danger of a leak is geometrically proportional to the
number of people who know'it, in a broad sense. We want oversight; we want
oversight of the covert action process but two committees, on which are
represented' the other 6 committees, Ibelieve is adequate''for public
assurance that the covert action is being undertaken in an'authorized and
a proper way. And we don't even go-up-and start'a covert action unless
it has been signed-off in writing by the President of the United States.
So, I think it's under very tight control: Is'it against our ethic, is it
against our country's morays-to undertake-covert action? Let me give you
an example of'a covert action. We want to influence another country to
take a certain positton'i'n the.United Nations'on:-the Camp David Accords.
Now our foreign minister, our Secretary of'State.can go to their foreign
minister'and say, Joe'we really think you-ought to do so,and so on this
position'in the United Nations. Now what's Joe'going to think? The first
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thing he is going to say is, is Mr. Muskie telling me that because it's
good for the United States or'tt's good for my. country? So, if we want
to be'effective with that Foreign Minister, we may find that it's better
to have'someone else suggest to him that the best thing for him to.do is
to take a certain position'in the United Nations about the Camp David
Accords. And I believe there is quite a role for that kind of thing.
Now you're much more concerned with assassinations, paramilitary,. over-
throws of governments and so on. To begin with, we have an Executive
Order that forbids anyone in our government considering assassination,
any assassination'effort. So We have drawn a very clear and unequivocal
line there;on military support, overthrowing governments, I can only say
to you that if that is ever undertaken, it is undertaken with the approval
of the National Security Council, the President of the United States and
at least two, and today 8, committees of the Congress. So it has to, in
some sense, reflect the will of the people. Rather than pass a law and
say you won't do any covert action, I think it is better to trust these
organs of the country which are constituted under the Constitution to
reflect the will of the people in these regards.
Q: (Inaudible)
A: Top Secret? No, I'd rather not discuss that because the President simply
has to be able to get advice from his advisors without it all coming out
that Joe'said this and Bill said that and Pete said this; because if it
really does all fall out in the press as it does so often, people get wary
about this and pretty soon the President is deprived of this kind of advice.
Looking at both Iran and Nicaragua,-we've come up with the Ayatollah and
the Sandanista guerrillas (inaudible). Is there any guidance within the
USG at this point not only binding on your Agency, but also on the State
Department and others that when we some dictator,' some in control about
to go down, that we do something to promote getting someone in position
to take over power who is friendly to our interests?
A: That's a very difficult question to answer. It's one.that transcends
intelligence and gets into broad policy. It is one on which if I could
share the-innermost thought that I have wouldn't entirely satisfy you-
because we do things pretty much on an ad hoc basis country-by-country.
Let me come back to this. other question which relates to it.* One of the
ways to do just exactly what you are suggesting, and it. is a. good suggestion,
and I would like.toanswer you.yes, wenalways do it, but I can't in all
honesty; is to undertake,a.covert action years in-advance.of that crisis.
That i's, to covert subsidize and work with people who stand for moderation
for freedom, for democracy, so that when the country collapses around a
dictator, we are able to help bring to the-fore the kind of people who
stand for'the kinds of'things we stand for.' That is one of the things
that it is covert action. You see, covert'action is not, when anything
I do that isn't collecting intelligence, collecting information and
analyzing it, is defined as covert action. If I'm out-'supporting the
democratic elements-in a 'country of the right: or the left, I'm doing a':
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covert action and I need to have.that freedom'to do just what you
suggest.
(Inaudible.)
not
A: Why didit/work in South Korea? Either we hadn't tried a covert action
or we didn't do it well. I'm sorry to be somewhat facetious. We , it's
a very difficult'-thing to do. I'm suggesting we should try, but I
certainly' guarantee you '100% success.if I'm asked to do this.. You have
to have some moderate elements from which to build to begin with and
I can tell you, we have declined i'n recent times. We have declined to
undertake a covert action'for that very reason, that we did not think
there was an adequate moderate base upon which to build in a particular
country, and we felt we'would:be deluding our decisionmakers if we under-
took*what...they- were suggesting we might want to do. See what I mean?
.There.was such a low..probabtlity of our being able to build a base of
support that we'said, really., you're just kidding yourselves if you'
think you're going to accomplish something through us in this particular
country.
Q: What portion of your efforts are describable as military intelligence
as opposed to political or"civil or did Brezhnev sleep well last night?
A: It's: very hard. to put numbers on'tt, but I would say to you*that
intelligence on -the Soviet Union'is:probably 70% o.f our effort, the
whole Soviet Communist'Bloc ; that within that, better than half is.
military-related; and those are very broad numbers because you just
can't do it by a timeclock.;.that isn't the only factor here, but yes,
we still -have a very- high percentage of our effort on military affairs,
particularly Soviet military affairs. And. it's one of my big problems..'
First of all,.it's' hard to change'any institution of this.size.and
change 'its direction. Secondly, you asked me. what military intelligence
would I cut out in order to do more econom cs--it's a very difficult
decision because we are under a very definite military threat today.
We pare a little here and hope to get some more from the Congress and
we add a little there. But it's not easy.
As DCI at the time you started working for the CIA, there was a document
you'had.to sign, to say if after your employment at the CIA if you were
ever to make comment on international affairs you had to submit them to
a CIA Board of Review-. Now you'have a predecessor by the name of George
Bush who is presently running for. Vice'President, who apparently signed
the same.-document, except-has'not fallen under this requirement. Why?
A: If I can get through the next 40 days without too many more questions
like this I'll be in great.shape. Mr. Bush signed a secrecy agreement
with us; he has indicated to us that-he will live up to %t, including
his activities during the campaign. 'The agreement.does not'say.everything
we w.rite, publish or'commenton'after we'leave the CIA must be submitted
for review. It says that which deals with the intelligence process, that
which'deals with what we learned about or in the intelligence business
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here must be clear, it's not censored;. it's cleared for security reasons
only. Mr. Hetu is the Chairman of the Publications.Review Board that.
does that. The point being that every someone as knowledgeable as Mr.
Bush may not know three or four years after the fact whether something
is still or be inimical to'the interest:of the country if it were disclosed.
Q: (Inaudibl.e.)
A: That is a very perceptive question and I glossed over that. I do become
an advocate of policy to some extent when:I suggest a covert action
solution. Let me say this .in mitigation. We only originate covert. actions
suggestions here as a supplement to existing policies. Only is a strong
word, but I don:t.know'of a case when it hasn't been:that way. That is,
I.don't think.we would come along and say there's country over here and
we think we ought to start a whole new thrust in there. What we say to
ourselves is, in our base in the National Security Council, I hear them
saying they would like to try to get country x to stop doing this. I'll
come back to my staff here and I'll say, this is the direction the country
wants to. go. The Secretary of State wants,to go. The President wants to
.. go.and has endorsed it. Can we help? If so, we.develop a proposal and
send it down for the review-of.the National Security Council. But it
is getting us into the policy'.business in that one sphere. For that reason.;,
some people suggested get'covert action out of here. Not unreasonable.
Let me suggest one reason you may not want to-do that. Right now, covert
action is part of the CIA and we have people who go into the covert action
,department and they spend 2, 3, 4, 5 years there and they work and they
come back and they go into other parts of the CIA and they move around.
If you take and you create a whole new-Agency-for covert action, what are
going to.get. You'get a lot of pressure for covert action. You've got a
bureaucracy dependent upon the flourishing of`covert action. So they are
going to generate it. If my covert action people today don't get any business
for the next two-years and they didn't'for:a number of years practically
around here, they're. not really worried about their job anymore, anyway,
because they. are going to go back into other departments of the Agency.
In short, it is not afull-time profession for people in this organization
and, therefore, it does not generate a constituency. Lastly, let me say
that it.woul:_d be very expensive to duplicate because many of the same
.individuals carry out our intelligence collection'to do the covert action.
See what I mean. You.have an agent overseas. Today he's giving, you
information about what that foreign minister is thinking, tomorrow he's
talking .to the foreign minister saying, hey, why don't you vote in the
United Nations? Lastly, the two relate together very much--intelligence
collection and covert action, because again, if you support a democratic
politician tn:a foreign country before he comes into power, he's your friend
afterwards. One time you're working covert:,acti,on with him, the next time
you're working intelligence.
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Address by Admiral Stolfield Turner
Director of Central Intelligence
to the Amherst, Smith, Vassar, Williams
Washington, D.C. Alumni Clubs
17 September 1980
0
Good evening.. Welcome to the CIA, Amherst men, Williams men, Vassar
and Smith ladies. I guess maybe it hasn't gotten.into the extracurricular
side on the alumni yet has it? I don't know whether we've got ladies from
Amherst here yet or not, but if you are, welcome.
I guess I'm with you tonight-for a couple of reasons. One is an enduring
gratitude for having had the privilege of an education, at least part of an
education--I left at the end.of two and a half years in-a small, New England
liberal arts college; one of-the.-great institutions in our country, I believe,
is private, small-colleges dedicated-to the-liberal arts. And I'm'-always
pleased to be with others who have-shared that kind of an opportunity,-but
I also know that you, as leaders of this community, this country, help shape
the public opinion in our country and I'm anxious to share with you our views
on the Central Intelligence Agency, on'the_intelligence function of our country
tonight because I know it's important for you and the country to understand
that. We're in the midst of'some important changes, some important swinging
of the pendulum in this country with--respect-to intelligence and I would like
to give you a few-of my views on why I believe intelligence is important,
perhaps of growing` importance to Our.nation'.and~what it takes-to have a-good
intelligence.-capability in this country:--
Let me start-by saying that I sincerely -believe that '-the .decade :of the
1980's is going to more precarious for-our country than the decade of the
70's or the 60's.- Several reasons I would say that. One, this will he the
decade in which :we face _the first leadership-in 'the Soviet-Union .that does
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not feel militarily inferior to the United States. Now that's important.
It is important to how we conduct our relations with the Soviet Union. We
cannot bully them. We cannot feel superior to them in this regard. And
first we must decide what we want to do about this with respect to our
military posture ourselves, but regardless of what we do there, I would
say to you that throughout most of the decade of the 1980's, there is no way
we can change this perception of near parity in military forces between our
two countries. Therefore we must and will have to adapt our diplomacy under
these circumstances. It doesn't mean we're going to lose, it doesn't mean
we are too weak to handle it, but=it means we have-.to be more-astute. We
have to be more foresighted._ We have to have-good information.
A second reason the.80's will. be precarious is that the developed
countries of the free world cannot expect the same continued-high rates of
economic growth in this decade-that we have experienced :in the last several.
Why? We estimate in the-Central Intelligence Agency'that~the total amount of
energy available to the developed-nations of the world in this decade will
increase by only a percent or. two per year. And that's-our optimistic side.
One or two percent growth'-of .ener.gy available wil'l - not -sustain 5 or 6% rate
of growth of gross national product='of' our countr.tes: And :therefore we have -
a different'economic outlook and.that affects our relationships all around the
world. And so, _too, will. the 'fact ._%n the energy field -that.?i.n 1980 -.the OPEC
countries will siphon';off of, world trade about $110 billion; ;that. is, that
will be tkeir.net return after they have bought everything they are going to
buy from us and after they have sold everything they are-going to sell to us.
None of us know-' What b.i:l-l ions _of' dol Tars are, but last year it was '$63 bill ion
they took' off; 2 years- ago At was $2 bill ion. Now the 'difference' between $2
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billion and $110 billion is enough to change the world economic prospect.
Why? Why is it so different? Because in 1974 they increased the price of
oil by 4a times. By 1978, their benefit from doing that had decreased to
$2 billion;-first, because they were buying much more from us, the West,
but secondly, because we had eaten up their profits by inflation. You don't
have to lecture to anybody in America-today to say that-the OPEC is not going
to let us eat their'profits up by inflation in the next four years as we did
in the first four years of'their price rises. They are now indexing;'they
are going to raise the price of*oil as rapidly as we inflate. So we have a
different problem in front,of`us. One hundred ten billion. dollars over a few
years gets to earn enough interest to Where you'are almost~maki.ng $110:bi.llion
in interest-every year.- It's a b.ig:and a different problem for us.
And thirdly, the decade of::the-80's will be different and more precarious
because the traditional mechanisms for handling these military, political and
economic problems that we facet-arenotgoing to Work the-same Bray in the 1980's -
as they had.before. Our NATO allies, .economically prosperous, politically stable,
they want, they demand a stronger vbite in the councils of the Alliance. The
underdeveloped countries of the world,"as you'read every-day-in the papers, are
more and more independent,-Iaggres'sivel.Y.:tndependent, particularly those-that
produce raw material.s.. And in the--'80 ',.s--they are going to produce the quantity,
the type of raw materials:that?suits their economic needs:,-not.,ours. Sometimes-
those are coincident but they need not'.hecessarily be. Now I'm not predicting
that our alliance is going to be weaker; I'm not:suggesttng:that we are going
to be in a total head-on'clash with-the lesser develop-ed:couhtrtes throughout
the decade; I'm simply suggesting..to you.that the traditional-mechanisms; the
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traditional ways of working in these organizations will not necessarily be
effective in the 1980's as they have been in the past. We must adapt. We
must be more subtle, I believe. We must be more understanding of other
people and their cultures, their.'economic problems, their political issues
and so.on.
And.again, I come back to saying that I believe this means for us in the-
intelligence world,..that we must do a better Job of keeping our policymakers.
in this country well informed. Ca'n.we'do that? What-does it take? It is
going to be more difficult. in the years ahead than it has?in those behind.
It is more easy. It's easier to find ways-to counter intelligence-activities
today; people are more soph.isticated;. people are more alert; there:are.more
countries.-'weneed to gather intelligence on. It is a more difficult task.
To be effective in the 80's-we are going to have to change our ways of doing
business and we are going to have to have - some. legislative support. _Let me
touch those two*thi.ngs quickl.y'.
One reason we have to change our ways is that the.means of collecting
intelligence today are quite different than'they'were a decade or a decade
and ahalf.ago. Thanks to the wonders of'Americantechnology. Our:-technical
systems for collecting intelligence informat ton'. have just-burgeoned;=we get
much more Information today than we ever expected-we would-from our-means of
listening to signals, from'our means-of taking photographs of what.-As going
on on the surface of'the earth. Now*that'does.not'denigrate or make unusable
the traditional intelligence human spying activities. But it changes-the
character of it. You do not go out and risk the life of a spy to get. information
you can obtain from a satellite. --So we must,'today, have a very-sophisticated,:
complex
/way of integrating all of our means-:of collecting intelligence, moreso. than
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has ever, perhaps, been necessary in the past.
For.instance, if by a photograph from a.satellite we find that country X-
has a new factory out here in the countryside. We wonder what it is all about.
We then turn to the signals intelligence people and-we say, "Why don't you find
out if the network.of commun tcati.ons from-that factory to the capital. goes to
the Ministry of Nuclear Materials, or to the Foreign Ministry." And if it
goes to the Mi.nistry.of Nuclear Materials,..we will then go and find a human
agent and well say, now what we want to know is not what is in that factory,
but s:ome.specific element of'the nuclear relationship which we will define
for him and put him to work in a very -targeted-, speci:f_ic. way. It can be much
more effective, but it takes much'more teamwork..- And It's a'fascinating
challenge for us.
The second side of intelligence'ts taking all.-this informatton that'you
have gathered and doing. something with it ..'Turning it into analyses that are
useful to our policymakers in the Executive Branch, to our legislators on the
Hill, and to some extent,..when. -we can do it inan -unclassified form, to the
American public. The challenge-;.the'change that we'have'to face today on. the
analytic side of our.'house-is'equally- great because today the number of countries
we are concerned with, Is just so much greater than it was. twenty or.thirty years
.ago. There is. hardly-a country in the world'not.impacted by the-major decisions.
of this country and there'-is hardlya country'-tnthe:world that does:.something
important on its own that isn't of interest-and concern'to us'.Ate'have to know
what i_s going on. And the areas of:academic expertise that we'.have to be able-
to work in are growing also- 'a great challenge to us.. We are not only
interested in.the' technology.ofmtssiles.and tanks'.and shtps,:we' are tnterested
in the-health and psychology-.of' foreign leaders:;:__we:ar_e.interested in Soviet'
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is ?
grain harvest this year and next; we are interested in the flow of narcotics
on the international market; we are interested in international terrorism;.
we are interested in the gross national product and the types of products.
and the profusion of technology across-the world in many, many countries.
And it goes on and on.: There is hardly an academic discipline in any of our
colleges or even the universities of -this country which we do not employ here
in the Central Intelligence Agency. We have to change. We have to be able
to spread ourselves into many more areas than in the past.
Still another reason for change is the disinstitution`the Central Intelli-
gence Agency and: the Intelligence'_Community in general,-,has - become- a -much
more public institution in our country today.than it ever has been-.before.
Or that any intelligence service_.has- ever. been -in history.- This:-came about
as a result of the ' accusations,` the- charges., the invest.igationsof .the Intelli-
gence.Community in the '.75-'77 time -frame. It is a fact of life;-ire cannot turn
the clock back; we have now established new sets ofcontrols in the Executive
Branch, on Capitol Hill, in the Legislative Branch. We are working well under
those controls. I believe we can handle it. I,believe.that these.changes.are
acceptable. But partly as a side effect of these changes-of becoming amore
public institution; but partly also--is a side effect, of.Vietnam,-of'the Pentagon
Papers, Watergate,.we have 1ost:.something- that we cannot afford:'to lose in .the.
intelligence business--that..is.the: capability to keep our.- necessary- secrets..:_._
We cannot be a secret intelligence service`: if everything we'learn'is spewed out
into the public domain. We are today-:then;-as-king the-Congress=for legislative'
help in this. area. Now sometimes you read.i:n the press.that..:what.we are asking
for and. what' we need is to be unleashed, to b.e'put under I ess-control. .That is
inaccurate; that Is facile misunderstanding of what i'n:.fact'we-need:; what, in
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fact, we hope the.Congress will give us-. What we want is protection for our
ability to keep our secrets.
Several pieces of legislation we have in`mind. The first concerns
something called covert action. Covert action isn't strictly intelligence.
Covert action is the attempt to influence the events in a foreign country
without the source of that influencing being known. It has always been
assigned to the Central Intelli.gence Agency by Presidents'as the place where
it will be carried out. It used to be just three years ago that it was almost
unconscionable to talk about undertaking covert action. It was very unpopular.
Today even in the..-media, as.well as in conversations with Americans, I find.
people saying is there not something we can do,between just~.talking with other
countries and sending in the Marines? And yes, there is. Covert-action does
have a place in our diplomatic portfolio: In 1974 the Congress- passed the
Hughes-Ryan Amendment which requires.that.,.1f.we are to undertake-a--covert
action, on direction of the President, we must notify up to eight committees
of the Congress. Now that "is something in the-neighborhood of 200 people.
I can assure you I find it very difficult . to go out and recruit..others to go
risk their lives on behalf of doing a covert action for us if I have. to confess.
to them that maybe only 200 people on'Capitol'liill will know.-About it.
Now, I don't want to be critical because T.think in 1974--the Hughes--Ryan
Amendment may.--have been necessary. It may, have been a good- idea;... 'Tt was the
beginning of establishing controls over the intelligence.mechanisms through.
the Congress--controls.which had existed but withered and:now were-bei.ng
reinstituted. But, today, we do not.need th4t same control because-We have
a very effective set of tntelligence.committees:in each...chamber-of the Congress
and they do and are ..only to do:oversight.,of'the intell.igencecommunity; and
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? ? '
they do a very effective job of it and we want. and are asking the Congress,
and I think you.will find that tomorrow we'are going to make some progress
on this I hope....to pass a law that will limit this. information on the
covert.actions to.these two oversight committees: Please note that on those
two committees, there are at least two representatives from.each of the other
committees that.we are not going to'inform. So,'in effect, we are not cutting
the numbers. of-committees- that will know this any, we are cutting.the number
of people. So:if.the Foreiign-Affairs. Committee, which under our hope, will
not have thi.s..information in the.future.,-needs.to have-it.-there will be two
members on it who do have that-information_and;raisetheir hand in a-Foreign
Affairs Committee debate and say-:there- is something. i.n the' intelligence field
that is germane to Our . debate.: Let's.stop'and~.get the intelligence people in
here and we, of course, would come-and--inform than.
A second area where we,.need:help is in what we call identities legislation.
I am in the difficult spot*today-of'ask_fng-.Americans.to. go overseas, serve
their country as Central' Tntell i.gence' Agency officers, under cover; that is,
not acknowledging that they?work-for'us, -into countries where terrorism is
quite popular, into countries where-their security cannot'be assured by the
host country very well. And r have. .to do that while confessing to these. people
that this country Fias not:ye.tbeen-w%11N to do anything.-against those American
citizens..wh.o:=-Cal Iously-and, -in my opinion;-traitorously,: deliberately go out
and try -to disclose the identities'of'these-men and women.. You all know that
In 1975, after-Mr. Agee did this. with'respect'to our people in Greece, our
Chief of Station there was murdered. ;Yo.w'may all -remember that in July of this
year'after Mr. Agee's cohort,'Philip.Wolf, went to Jamaica and went on.television
and said here are the pictures'of'15 members of`the'United States Embassy who
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work for the CIA, here are their addresses, here are the telephone numbers,
here are their.license plate-numbers, the house of one of those 15 men was
his
shot up two nights' later.. Had/daughter had been there and in her bed we might
not have her with us today.
We have a bill before the Congress and it, too, tomorrow and the next day,
i.s. goi.ng to make progress. And it makes it a crime and in a repeated pattern
of activity and with deliberate intent to destroy the intelligence activities
of our country, disclose the names of'our'undercover people or'our foreign
.agents overseas. There is a great deal of,controversy'in the press who claim
that this-is unconstitutional, who-fear'this_is going to bring them into court.
Let me assure you'.that'we have painstakingly crafted.-this.l_egislation with the
Congress to avoid that. The Attorney General, 'former'Solicitor'General, Robert
Bork, have said that this legislation -isconstitutional: And-they area better
source of opinion in my mind 'than' the, Washington Post or 'the New York Times on
that suub,ject. And only if people 'carry-out t hese'activities over a pattern and
over a period of'time'and only if they do so with a demonstrated intent to destroy
our intelligence'capability, can people 'he prosecuted: We believe it is most
esssential_to our-peoples' welfare, our peoples' morale, that we have some
protection `-and this:-bill is very, carefLlAy -designed '- to. give -them -that without
intruding-on the constitutional rights of_'our-:citizens.-
F nally, :we have a bill with respect'-to What is lknown.r.as the-Freedom of
Information Act. -Th.is problem is really one:of'perception'.rather-than fact.
Perception'i.n this sense. if I" am going to: somebody overseas. and saying will
you risk.-your life for'our country,`. and he.looks'me in'the eye and says,_but
do you 'haye to' under .the Freedom=;of' Information "Act' rel ease -my, name- -if they
cal l for 'it? - I wil l tel l him no. 'But true -answer, if he' presses -me, . J.-% that
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I have never been required to do so yet; I :have been challenged in the courts
repeatedly and we have always won. But are you going to stick your neck on -
the line on the hope that we will win the next one when your name is the issue
at stake. Not very likely. -So we want to exempt from the Freedom of Information
Act, the information in our files about our sources of information; not about
information that could be in our files about'Amerioan citizens or others--we
really don't keep.that, but we want the public to be assured that the Freedom
of Information.Act will still apply to their legitimate interests in what
may be in our files. We hope. that this-wall,-pass this session of Congress also
.because it.wtll be.a great hoon'.to changing .thts.perception, this overall
perception that this country cannot.keep'its.secrets,,therefore its intelligence
services cannot be trusted by those with whom we must work overseas.
In sum, you, I,-this country faces a.dtlemma.wfith respect to intelligence.
We want our country to be as-open, as free.as it. can be and we want our govern-
mental institutions to exemplify that openness. At the same time, I think we
all recognize that a secret .i'ntelli:gence'.service'is necessary for our country
s.o that we are not caught unawares, so that other people cannot take advantage
of us in the international arena. The issue, the problem-that we have is can
we have both?. Can we have the ideal of:opennes-s'; can we have the necessity
of some level of secrecy: T belieye.we can;:I believe we can do both.,-And
we must..' I believe we can have controls on'.the:%nte11_igence-apparatus-of our-
country -that still allow us- to be effective.. On the one hand, those controls
today are.tn the Executive Branch..through.the President and his Executive Orders
that govern us. On the other hand, they-'are to the Legislative Branch through
the Committees of:th.e Congress and L.helieye.these: two.sets of-controls give.the
'public of this country reason'to be ' confident: that. the intelligence activities -
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are being conducted in accordance with national policy and under the supervision
of the elected representatives of the people.
On the other hand, I am very grateful that over the last.two years or so,
I can just feel the swing of this pendulum in terms of American public support
for a good intelligence service. It.-iscoming back and we are very,-,very
grateful to have it.. And with some:help from the Legislature such as I have
been describing to you tonight, I-believe we 'can, with the 'support of the
people, with some good legtslati'on,.continue to be as effective as this Agency
has been over its .32-year history.
Final 1y,'.then ; let-me just say I.belteve these trends are all moving in
the right direction'and that we are shaping a new kind of intelligence for.our
country. We are not yet there; we continue to need your support and Idon't
mean just your support for these legislative initiatives that I have mentioned
to you tonight, your support for'-the.fact'.that this country must in the decade
of the 1980's,-a decade I.belieye will be a`precarious one, must have a-capa-
bil:ity to look*. overseas, -and- learn what--is happening to foretell events,-so that
we can keep.our policymakers-as`well informed as possible and they can-make
the. best decisions -possible for* you, for our-country and, in effect, for the
entire Free World. Thank you.
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 Amherst, Smith, Vassar, W'Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7
Alumni Clubs
1910-2010, Wednesday, 17 Sep '80
CIA Auditorium
onight - talk about
1) Why good intell esp important for US in 1980's and
2) What.we must do to ensure it will be,
ecade of '80's more precarious than '60's or '70's
Soviet leadership - not feel inferior
- Econ growtth no longer a given
* Avail energy - dev indust countries - 1-2%
during decade
* OPEC drain $1106 in 1980 versus $2B in 1978 -
125% increase in price
- Political/Econ mechanisms to adapt - changing
* Past formulas not always help
hange in pattern of relationships means:
Must be more forte esi2hted - astute
- Need good information
- Good info harder to get - others more aware intel
methods - less trusty of U.S.
?ans for Intelligence?
Can do
But requires ch antes in way we go about business,
J4-0v- /"
1) Tremendous tech
2) HUMINT Meld
4) More Rublic institution
3) Analysis - expand'areas - disciplines
a.
Page 2
Side effect .rrPdijrtinn n abilit..
_
to
undermining
Need Legislative support
Talk about unleashing CIA'- facile - inaccurate
- Not what we want or need - nor will happen
I*
Today need legislative remedies in 4 areas - widely
misunderstood
1) Covert Action
- 3 yrs ago any CA heinous
- Today press/public ask - can't do something
between just talkie --and sending in Marines?
CA has place in diplomatic portfolio.
------------
Hughes-Ryan
* 8 committees/+ 200
* Can't get volunteers for risks
* May be good in 1974 - not today
* Congressional Oversight
- Reduce to 2
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- USSR same FOIA rights as you
- Agents/liaison
- Keep winning in courts?
- No blanket exempt - protect sources and
methods only.
Identities
Callous-disclosure
Unreasonable ask live overseas - climate of
terrorism give no protection
Agee - Athens - Welsh
Wolf - Jamaica
No sense - call for better intel - the
62prote e oing
4) Graymail - call for irrelev t or peripheral
classified info in open court. Gov't withdraws
rather than increase damage. Bill will provide
for:
Pretrial rulin s on issues of relevancy
Provide court w/alternatives short of
dismissing case.
ro sum up
All Americans caught in dilemma:
* All strive toward ideal.- open society
Page 4
Yet, recognize can't be caught unawares - need
intell service inherently secret
Can't have both? Think can - Think must.
Issue not unleashing/leashing CIA
* Issue is can we equip intel agencies w/tools to
Ina
be effective and at same time adhere to legal
and ethical norms? Yes - believe can do both.
One hand - oversight - works well - justifies high
degree upon your confidence l S
Other hand legal reme4ies I described are reasonabl.e_
and necessary.
Moving in right direction.
Need strong intel for precarious decade '80's lies
ahead.
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FOIA
- Prob is perception
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V ?
Last time - Mak h - talk
Amherst, Smith, Vassar, Williams
Alumni Clubs
1910-2010, Wednesday, 17 Sep '80
CIA Auditorium
- Ingredient intelligence work
- Impact of ch ged environment
(i e., second generation - family business to more corporate management)
on i telligence today.
Tonight - talk about
1) Why good intell esp. important for U.S. in 1980's and
2) What we must do to ensure it will be.
Decade of '80's morcarious than '60's or '70's
- Soviet leadership - not feel inferior
- Econ growth no longer a given
* Avail energy -.dev. induct. countries - 1-2% during decade
pr.~ ws
OPEC drain $11 in 1980 versus $RB in 1978 - 125% increase in price
- Politica'I/Econ mechanisms to adapt - changing
* Past formulas not always help
* USS b der
* Econ re tionships less predictable
Change in pattern of relationships means:
- Must be more foresi hte - astute
- Need good lnformaticLn
- Good info harder to get - others more aware intel methods - less trusty of U.S.
Means for Intelligence?
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 2) Result of rue - less flexibility - maybe less willing take risks
49
But requires changes in way we go about business, and
- R s 1 a su permi to f ' p.-~--y~,~s ,
Let me describ changes ~-
1) Restrain on al ops involving Americans Z,
e.g., \arcics ~traffickers
e. 3
g..,. mi onary,
~
- AG's nd m legal staffs - Constitutional issues?
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Complex legal'tandards - non-lawyers in field - danger overcauticn?
- Still, wortht if protects rights of Americans
- redducti n in ability to key, secrets - undermining
Talk about unleashing CIA fact e - inaccurate
- Not what we want or need - nor will happen
Today need legislative remedies in 4 areas - widely misunderstood
1) Convert A
- -3 yrs ago any CA heinous
- Today press/public ask - can't do something between just talking--and sending
in the Marines? CA has place in diplomatic portfolio.
- Hughes-Ryan
* 8 committees/+ 200
* Can't get-volunteers for risks
* May be good in 1974 - not today
* Congressional Oversight
Reduce to 2
2) FOIA
- Prob is perception
- USSR same FOIA rights as you
- Agents/liaison
- Keep winning in courts?
- No blanket exempt - protect sources and methods only.
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3) Identities
- Callous disclosure
- Unreasonable ask live overseas - climate of terrorism - give no protection
- Agee - Athens - Welsh
- Wolf Jamaica
- No sense - call for better intel - then don't protect people doing it.
Graymail - Call for irrelevant or peripheral classified info in open court.
Gov't withdraws rather than increase damage. Bill will provide for:
- Pretrial rulings on issues of relevancy
- Provide court w/alternatives short of dismissing case.
To sum up
All Americans caught in dilemma:
* All strive toward ideal - open society w/gov't reflects that openness
* Yet, recognize can't be caught unawares need intell service inherently secret
Can't have both? Think can - Think must.
Issue not unleashing/leashing CIA
* Issue is can we equip intel agencies w/tools to be effective and
at same time adhere legal and ethical norms? Yes - believe can do both.
One hand - oversight - works well - justifies high degree upon your'confidence
Other hand legal remedies I described are reasonable and necessary.
Moving-in right direction.
Need strong intel for precarious decade '80's lies ahead.
3
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