Q&A S AMHERST SMITH VASSAR WILLIAMS ALUMNI CLUBS OF WASHINGTON D.C.

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CIA-RDP05T00644R000100150001-7
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RIPPUB
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K
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24
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December 21, 2016
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April 20, 2009
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1
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September 17, 1980
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MISC
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Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 Q&A's Amherst, Smith, Vassar, Williams Alumni Clubs of Washington,.D.C. 17 September 1980 Q: Could you just outline. for us the way the Central Intelligence Agency (I believe there is a Defense.Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency--I don't know whether there are still intelligence branches of the various Armed.Forces, and the information-gathering functions of the State Department and the Department of Commerce and God knows how many others there are) how these all fit together? A: How big is this octopus called the Intelligence Community? I have two jobs. I am the Director of Central Intelligence, established by law in 1947, to coordinate.all of-the intelligence activities, what-we call the national intelligence activities, of our country. The law also provided that the Director of Central Intelligence would always be the head of the Central Intelligence Agency.--one_2of the components of the Community. There are two kinds of components in the community--there are those who collect information and .there are those-who use it and analyze it. The CIA does both, but primarily-collects our human. intelligence. The National Security Agency collects signals intelligence There are other components that collect photographic intell...igencespread around the community. 'The State Department and a.number-of'other organizations like the Federal Broadcast Information Service, collect open intelligence, unclassfied intelligence, and so on. One of my key jobs, and one that President Carter has strengthened in his term-of'office, is to coordinate all that collection as I indicated to you was important to do so. It is also important to you and me for our pocketbook. There is a lot of-money in these expensive technical systems, and we don't want too many, we don't want them over- lapping, we don't wantthem.underlapping--failing to get what needs to be collected. So I have had strengthened authority over those agencies; I control what we,call their ".tasking"--what they go out and collect. It's my responsibility. I control their budgets.. Now the other side of the house is.a.nalyzi.ng intelligence. There is a Defense Intelligence Agency, a large organization'here called the National Foreign Assessment Center which is part of the CIA, there. is the State Department Bureau of Intelli- gence and Research,. there are small intelligence organizations in Energy, Commerce, and so on: 'We all work together and 1 am-nominally their boss but I say nominall eiause we want:-competitive, differing analyses to come forward. We/ RHt one individual to be able to'tell anybody, suppress that.view. That is a crazy idea you've got'here. We let it all bubble up. I then do have to make decisions what is my advice as senior intelli- gence advisor:to the President, but-if there is a strong dissenting view like from'DIA, I will feel it'incumbent'upon me to present that as an alternative, if you'see what I mean. So we try on the one hand to have a DCI who does ride strong on the collecting agencies who organizes and brings together the analytic agencies, but not with a strong control over them. The money is not'very big here, comparatively speaking, and the Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 i ? importance of having different centers of thinking, different centers of interpretation is very keen to our overall objective. Q: Do you think it is possible for the Director of the CIA to properly balance'for intelligence and analysts (inaudible). A: Can a Director of Central Intelligence combine the roles of being intelligence interpreter and a policy advisor, particularly a strong- willed one and he graciously named somebody else. I don't have a very strong will just as long as we do things my way around here. Seriously, the usual question, and I'll answer It first, and maybe it's part of yours or not, :iscan I be the head of CIA and run all the other intelli- gence activities fairly because in. some sense there is competition there particularly in the budget area. And It is difficult to not have two masters, but to be two bosses I guess, but.I believe it can be done and in point of.fact, particularly in my.case, because I have such a superb deputy, Ambassador Frank Carlucci,, I am really'able to turn the running of the CIA over to my deputy and I` make major policy decisions risk -taking decisions,.andtry to be as much DCI as I can rather than CIA. But can I be intelligence chief and a policy advisor--let me make it clear that one of:'the ethics:of intelligence is to stay out of the policy business; because if I start advocating that we ought to have a SALT treaty, SALT II treaty, will the Congress or you believe me when I testify on how well I can verify.the SALT II Treaty? So, we don't pick policy positions. Now-' '-we have to stay very close to the policymakers because if. we're not producing intelligence on what they are making policy on, we are here for naught. So I'm very well abreast of what policy decisions the .President and others are trying to make. But I am very scrupulous in not'letting'inteliigence advocate one position or another. Now clearly, some of the..things we'come up withscotchor support a policy preference or at least have a major impact. on it, but because we want those to be appreciated 'as being non-biased, we'very carefully try to stay out of the policy process: ':Fora strong-willed person It's a hard thing to sit there In the National Security .Council and hear everybody advocating something you know %s just wrong. And not'speak up, but L,do'.tr..y. And do. Q: Admiral Turner, we've heard a. good' deal this evening. about some of. the activities of the CIA-- intelligence=gathering, covert action' activity' (by that I understand now you"to mean an attempt to influence affairs in another country without that country being aware of. where the' influence comes from. I wonder if you'woul.d comment for us, compare for us the very effective role of''the CIA in Chile,*both in its intelli- gence gathering and in its covert activities which resulted in the murder of Allende, and that of',the,CIA's role in Iran, which.seems--to have a great deal of difficulty attached'to It, both in terms of:its ability to convey information to the American . Congress and the President as.to what was about to happen and It seems, obviously in terms its current covert activity which 'I understand or would assume is going on*atthi:s:very minute:. Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 .. ? A: Would I compare our intelligence success in Chile with our intelligence failures in Iran? I am not asked the question in quite those terms, but it's a good one. We in both Chile and Iran, undertook covert actions. In Iran way back in 1953 and in Chile in 1970. Let me emphasize that in some sense the one in Iran was successful in 1953 and it achieved what the country asked us- to do. The country did not ask us to murder Allende and we did,not'do that in Chile, but generally speaking, I do not think we were successful in achieving what the country wanted in Chile. But, I would only.empha size to you in both cases the covert action activi- t es of this-Agency in-those' countries were..authorized by the President.of this country, checked by the National Security Council and we.-were conforming with the.national policy'in those regards. Now, as to the so-called failure in Iran in 1978, when the Shah, actually fell in early 1979 but he began to lose power in 1978; we have been'accused of an intelligence failure here, and we would like to have done better there. Let me just:say this in our self-defense without trying to be too defensive, but.the most difficult part of intelligence is the-political side, particularly the side of'predicting coups, revolutions, changes.like this that come about, suddenly. Now in this instance, throughout 1978, beginning in January, we were reporting to'the President that there were a lot of problems in Iran. There was a lot of undercurrent of unrest. We~saw"it.from people who were dissatisfied with their'economic status, dissatisfied because.they did not have a role in the political process, dissatisfied because their Islamic traditions or practices were being profaned and dissatisfied because there was graft and corruption, and so on.. What we did not forecast was. that these various centers of dissatisfaction would coalesce around a 78-year old cleric who had been an expatriate for 17 years and would become a force of greater strength than the Shah could handle and right up to October'I personally, while seeing this building, felt that because the Shah had such strong police and military forces; that he was going to step in at a critical moment and take con'trol'and suppress this. He did not do so-for reasons that I'm sure we will probably never understand, indicative in part that not even the Shah understood'the strength ahd'the- welling up of'these forces: and their coalescence;''What happened. in Iran is what we term a "societal change" not a revolution I't.is a lot'easier in many ways to predict a revolution, an organized activity, something where you-can infiltrate it with a spy and find out what they are going to do.' This was, in fact, a true revolu- tion, a change 'in the society brought -about by these many centers' of dissatisfaction that managed'to bring themselves together and topple the Shah on a program that was strictly anti-Shah. A lot of the chaos we have seen and which is frankly getting worse in that country today is that that kind of a.cement between a group 'of different does not.hold very well. Once the Shah is 'gone they haven't been'able to find that same motivating factor. They. are'work.ing it around their religion, but there are great differences within the country over that* today.. And we have a Situation in'Iran where there are so'many different power centers in.the country today that it is tending . towards. chaos'. Q; Right now-, sir, what is the parity of'our intelligence effort vis-a-vis Russia and Western Europe?* Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 S A: What's the parity compairson'of our intelligence effort capabilities with Europeans and the Russians. An interesting question. Because today there are only two countries in the world that have a full intel- ligence capability--ourselves and the Soviets. You see, technical systems have becoie'so expensive that there is no other country that .has the full range of them that we and the Soviets do. Now that does mean the Europeans are not'good'in intelligence. I'm just saying that they have limitations that we do hot'because of our greater breadth of intelligence:capabiliti'es. As fa the Soviets are concerned, we are.definitely ahead of them in the/ ~b P~ical collection that I described to you because of:.superior Ameri'can'technology. On human intelligence they are much bigger than we,, it's very hard to measure, but I'm not dissatisfied, I think .that we're more clever and do just as capable a job with a smaller-number of people. But that, of course, is a disputable issue. It'svery hard to tell. Finally, the other half of intelligence is analysis and I':believe we have a great advantage over the Soviets here. because I do not think you could -do as good analysis when you're in a very structured,-authoritarian society where you.'may lost-your job and your head if you come up with the-:wrong conclusions. I can go to the President and say I think-"you're wrong, boss and I'm''not sure,my counterpart, Mr. .Andropov, canget-awaywith that-.'I-.think that inhibits good analysis. I think we have a.-great' .-great advantage anthem there. Q: (Inaudible) A: We've got a couple of big issues here. I' hope you're prepared to stay a while. Does covert'action'contravene-the principles and ethics of our country in essence is part of the question: And don't we need both public and Congressional oversight to ensure that covert action doesn't go off and do things as unsuccessful as what we did in Chile. First of all, if it's a covert action, hy:definItion, you can't have public over- sight. Now you can have Congressional oversi'ght'on.a classified basis and what I'm saying to you and asking the Congress is not to reduce or eliminate Congressional oversight, I'm trying to reduce the number of people on Capitol Hill who have to know this and thereby reducing the probability of leaks. Let me emphasize to you, please, I do not mistrust the Congress for leaks anymore than I mistrust anybody else in the intelli- gence world,'but the danger of a leak is geometrically proportional to the number of people who know'it, in a broad sense. We want oversight; we want oversight of the covert action process but two committees, on which are represented' the other 6 committees, Ibelieve is adequate''for public assurance that the covert action is being undertaken in an'authorized and a proper way. And we don't even go-up-and start'a covert action unless it has been signed-off in writing by the President of the United States. So, I think it's under very tight control: Is'it against our ethic, is it against our country's morays-to undertake-covert action? Let me give you an example of'a covert action. We want to influence another country to take a certain positton'i'n the.United Nations'on:-the Camp David Accords. Now our foreign minister, our Secretary of'State.can go to their foreign minister'and say, Joe'we really think you-ought to do so,and so on this position'in the United Nations. Now what's Joe'going to think? The first Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 thing he is going to say is, is Mr. Muskie telling me that because it's good for the United States or'tt's good for my. country? So, if we want to be'effective with that Foreign Minister, we may find that it's better to have'someone else suggest to him that the best thing for him to.do is to take a certain position'in the United Nations about the Camp David Accords. And I believe there is quite a role for that kind of thing. Now you're much more concerned with assassinations, paramilitary,. over- throws of governments and so on. To begin with, we have an Executive Order that forbids anyone in our government considering assassination, any assassination'effort. So We have drawn a very clear and unequivocal line there;on military support, overthrowing governments, I can only say to you that if that is ever undertaken, it is undertaken with the approval of the National Security Council, the President of the United States and at least two, and today 8, committees of the Congress. So it has to, in some sense, reflect the will of the people. Rather than pass a law and say you won't do any covert action, I think it is better to trust these organs of the country which are constituted under the Constitution to reflect the will of the people in these regards. Q: (Inaudible) A: Top Secret? No, I'd rather not discuss that because the President simply has to be able to get advice from his advisors without it all coming out that Joe'said this and Bill said that and Pete said this; because if it really does all fall out in the press as it does so often, people get wary about this and pretty soon the President is deprived of this kind of advice. Looking at both Iran and Nicaragua,-we've come up with the Ayatollah and the Sandanista guerrillas (inaudible). Is there any guidance within the USG at this point not only binding on your Agency, but also on the State Department and others that when we some dictator,' some in control about to go down, that we do something to promote getting someone in position to take over power who is friendly to our interests? A: That's a very difficult question to answer. It's one.that transcends intelligence and gets into broad policy. It is one on which if I could share the-innermost thought that I have wouldn't entirely satisfy you- because we do things pretty much on an ad hoc basis country-by-country. Let me come back to this. other question which relates to it.* One of the ways to do just exactly what you are suggesting, and it. is a. good suggestion, and I would like.toanswer you.yes, wenalways do it, but I can't in all honesty; is to undertake,a.covert action years in-advance.of that crisis. That i's, to covert subsidize and work with people who stand for moderation for freedom, for democracy, so that when the country collapses around a dictator, we are able to help bring to the-fore the kind of people who stand for'the kinds of'things we stand for.' That is one of the things that it is covert action. You see, covert'action is not, when anything I do that isn't collecting intelligence, collecting information and analyzing it, is defined as covert action. If I'm out-'supporting the democratic elements-in a 'country of the right: or the left, I'm doing a': Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 ? covert action and I need to have.that freedom'to do just what you suggest. (Inaudible.) not A: Why didit/work in South Korea? Either we hadn't tried a covert action or we didn't do it well. I'm sorry to be somewhat facetious. We , it's a very difficult'-thing to do. I'm suggesting we should try, but I certainly' guarantee you '100% success.if I'm asked to do this.. You have to have some moderate elements from which to build to begin with and I can tell you, we have declined i'n recent times. We have declined to undertake a covert action'for that very reason, that we did not think there was an adequate moderate base upon which to build in a particular country, and we felt we'would:be deluding our decisionmakers if we under- took*what...they- were suggesting we might want to do. See what I mean? .There.was such a low..probabtlity of our being able to build a base of support that we'said, really., you're just kidding yourselves if you' think you're going to accomplish something through us in this particular country. Q: What portion of your efforts are describable as military intelligence as opposed to political or"civil or did Brezhnev sleep well last night? A: It's: very hard. to put numbers on'tt, but I would say to you*that intelligence on -the Soviet Union'is:probably 70% o.f our effort, the whole Soviet Communist'Bloc ; that within that, better than half is. military-related; and those are very broad numbers because you just can't do it by a timeclock.;.that isn't the only factor here, but yes, we still -have a very- high percentage of our effort on military affairs, particularly Soviet military affairs. And. it's one of my big problems..' First of all,.it's' hard to change'any institution of this.size.and change 'its direction. Secondly, you asked me. what military intelligence would I cut out in order to do more econom cs--it's a very difficult decision because we are under a very definite military threat today. We pare a little here and hope to get some more from the Congress and we add a little there. But it's not easy. As DCI at the time you started working for the CIA, there was a document you'had.to sign, to say if after your employment at the CIA if you were ever to make comment on international affairs you had to submit them to a CIA Board of Review-. Now you'have a predecessor by the name of George Bush who is presently running for. Vice'President, who apparently signed the same.-document, except-has'not fallen under this requirement. Why? A: If I can get through the next 40 days without too many more questions like this I'll be in great.shape. Mr. Bush signed a secrecy agreement with us; he has indicated to us that-he will live up to %t, including his activities during the campaign. 'The agreement.does not'say.everything we w.rite, publish or'commenton'after we'leave the CIA must be submitted for review. It says that which deals with the intelligence process, that which'deals with what we learned about or in the intelligence business Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 here must be clear, it's not censored;. it's cleared for security reasons only. Mr. Hetu is the Chairman of the Publications.Review Board that. does that. The point being that every someone as knowledgeable as Mr. Bush may not know three or four years after the fact whether something is still or be inimical to'the interest:of the country if it were disclosed. Q: (Inaudibl.e.) A: That is a very perceptive question and I glossed over that. I do become an advocate of policy to some extent when:I suggest a covert action solution. Let me say this .in mitigation. We only originate covert. actions suggestions here as a supplement to existing policies. Only is a strong word, but I don:t.know'of a case when it hasn't been:that way. That is, I.don't think.we would come along and say there's country over here and we think we ought to start a whole new thrust in there. What we say to ourselves is, in our base in the National Security Council, I hear them saying they would like to try to get country x to stop doing this. I'll come back to my staff here and I'll say, this is the direction the country wants to. go. The Secretary of State wants,to go. The President wants to .. go.and has endorsed it. Can we help? If so, we.develop a proposal and send it down for the review-of.the National Security Council. But it is getting us into the policy'.business in that one sphere. For that reason.;, some people suggested get'covert action out of here. Not unreasonable. Let me suggest one reason you may not want to-do that. Right now, covert action is part of the CIA and we have people who go into the covert action ,department and they spend 2, 3, 4, 5 years there and they work and they come back and they go into other parts of the CIA and they move around. If you take and you create a whole new-Agency-for covert action, what are going to.get. You'get a lot of pressure for covert action. You've got a bureaucracy dependent upon the flourishing of`covert action. So they are going to generate it. If my covert action people today don't get any business for the next two-years and they didn't'for:a number of years practically around here, they're. not really worried about their job anymore, anyway, because they. are going to go back into other departments of the Agency. In short, it is not afull-time profession for people in this organization and, therefore, it does not generate a constituency. Lastly, let me say that it.woul:_d be very expensive to duplicate because many of the same .individuals carry out our intelligence collection'to do the covert action. See what I mean. You.have an agent overseas. Today he's giving, you information about what that foreign minister is thinking, tomorrow he's talking .to the foreign minister saying, hey, why don't you vote in the United Nations? Lastly, the two relate together very much--intelligence collection and covert action, because again, if you support a democratic politician tn:a foreign country before he comes into power, he's your friend afterwards. One time you're working covert:,acti,on with him, the next time you're working intelligence. Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 Address by Admiral Stolfield Turner Director of Central Intelligence to the Amherst, Smith, Vassar, Williams Washington, D.C. Alumni Clubs 17 September 1980 0 Good evening.. Welcome to the CIA, Amherst men, Williams men, Vassar and Smith ladies. I guess maybe it hasn't gotten.into the extracurricular side on the alumni yet has it? I don't know whether we've got ladies from Amherst here yet or not, but if you are, welcome. I guess I'm with you tonight-for a couple of reasons. One is an enduring gratitude for having had the privilege of an education, at least part of an education--I left at the end.of two and a half years in-a small, New England liberal arts college; one of-the.-great institutions in our country, I believe, is private, small-colleges dedicated-to the-liberal arts. And I'm'-always pleased to be with others who have-shared that kind of an opportunity,-but I also know that you, as leaders of this community, this country, help shape the public opinion in our country and I'm anxious to share with you our views on the Central Intelligence Agency, on'the_intelligence function of our country tonight because I know it's important for you and the country to understand that. We're in the midst of'some important changes, some important swinging of the pendulum in this country with--respect-to intelligence and I would like to give you a few-of my views on why I believe intelligence is important, perhaps of growing` importance to Our.nation'.and~what it takes-to have a-good intelligence.-capability in this country:-- Let me start-by saying that I sincerely -believe that '-the .decade :of the 1980's is going to more precarious for-our country than the decade of the 70's or the 60's.- Several reasons I would say that. One, this will he the decade in which :we face _the first leadership-in 'the Soviet-Union .that does Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 ? S not feel militarily inferior to the United States. Now that's important. It is important to how we conduct our relations with the Soviet Union. We cannot bully them. We cannot feel superior to them in this regard. And first we must decide what we want to do about this with respect to our military posture ourselves, but regardless of what we do there, I would say to you that throughout most of the decade of the 1980's, there is no way we can change this perception of near parity in military forces between our two countries. Therefore we must and will have to adapt our diplomacy under these circumstances. It doesn't mean we're going to lose, it doesn't mean we are too weak to handle it, but=it means we have-.to be more-astute. We have to be more foresighted._ We have to have-good information. A second reason the.80's will. be precarious is that the developed countries of the free world cannot expect the same continued-high rates of economic growth in this decade-that we have experienced :in the last several. Why? We estimate in the-Central Intelligence Agency'that~the total amount of energy available to the developed-nations of the world in this decade will increase by only a percent or. two per year. And that's-our optimistic side. One or two percent growth'-of .ener.gy available wil'l - not -sustain 5 or 6% rate of growth of gross national product='of' our countr.tes: And :therefore we have - a different'economic outlook and.that affects our relationships all around the world. And so, _too, will. the 'fact ._%n the energy field -that.?i.n 1980 -.the OPEC countries will siphon';off of, world trade about $110 billion; ;that. is, that will be tkeir.net return after they have bought everything they are going to buy from us and after they have sold everything they are-going to sell to us. None of us know-' What b.i:l-l ions _of' dol Tars are, but last year it was '$63 bill ion they took' off; 2 years- ago At was $2 bill ion. Now the 'difference' between $2 Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 billion and $110 billion is enough to change the world economic prospect. Why? Why is it so different? Because in 1974 they increased the price of oil by 4a times. By 1978, their benefit from doing that had decreased to $2 billion;-first, because they were buying much more from us, the West, but secondly, because we had eaten up their profits by inflation. You don't have to lecture to anybody in America-today to say that-the OPEC is not going to let us eat their'profits up by inflation in the next four years as we did in the first four years of'their price rises. They are now indexing;'they are going to raise the price of*oil as rapidly as we inflate. So we have a different problem in front,of`us. One hundred ten billion. dollars over a few years gets to earn enough interest to Where you'are almost~maki.ng $110:bi.llion in interest-every year.- It's a b.ig:and a different problem for us. And thirdly, the decade of::the-80's will be different and more precarious because the traditional mechanisms for handling these military, political and economic problems that we facet-arenotgoing to Work the-same Bray in the 1980's - as they had.before. Our NATO allies, .economically prosperous, politically stable, they want, they demand a stronger vbite in the councils of the Alliance. The underdeveloped countries of the world,"as you'read every-day-in the papers, are more and more independent,-Iaggres'sivel.Y.:tndependent, particularly those-that produce raw material.s.. And in the--'80 ',.s--they are going to produce the quantity, the type of raw materials:that?suits their economic needs:,-not.,ours. Sometimes- those are coincident but they need not'.hecessarily be. Now I'm not predicting that our alliance is going to be weaker; I'm not:suggesttng:that we are going to be in a total head-on'clash with-the lesser develop-ed:couhtrtes throughout the decade; I'm simply suggesting..to you.that the traditional-mechanisms; the Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 traditional ways of working in these organizations will not necessarily be effective in the 1980's as they have been in the past. We must adapt. We must be more subtle, I believe. We must be more understanding of other people and their cultures, their.'economic problems, their political issues and so.on. And.again, I come back to saying that I believe this means for us in the- intelligence world,..that we must do a better Job of keeping our policymakers. in this country well informed. Ca'n.we'do that? What-does it take? It is going to be more difficult. in the years ahead than it has?in those behind. It is more easy. It's easier to find ways-to counter intelligence-activities today; people are more soph.isticated;. people are more alert; there:are.more countries.-'weneed to gather intelligence on. It is a more difficult task. To be effective in the 80's-we are going to have to change our ways of doing business and we are going to have to have - some. legislative support. _Let me touch those two*thi.ngs quickl.y'. One reason we have to change our ways is that the.means of collecting intelligence today are quite different than'they'were a decade or a decade and ahalf.ago. Thanks to the wonders of'Americantechnology. Our:-technical systems for collecting intelligence informat ton'. have just-burgeoned;=we get much more Information today than we ever expected-we would-from our-means of listening to signals, from'our means-of taking photographs of what.-As going on on the surface of'the earth. Now*that'does.not'denigrate or make unusable the traditional intelligence human spying activities. But it changes-the character of it. You do not go out and risk the life of a spy to get. information you can obtain from a satellite. --So we must,'today, have a very-sophisticated,: complex /way of integrating all of our means-:of collecting intelligence, moreso. than Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 has ever, perhaps, been necessary in the past. For.instance, if by a photograph from a.satellite we find that country X- has a new factory out here in the countryside. We wonder what it is all about. We then turn to the signals intelligence people and-we say, "Why don't you find out if the network.of commun tcati.ons from-that factory to the capital. goes to the Ministry of Nuclear Materials, or to the Foreign Ministry." And if it goes to the Mi.nistry.of Nuclear Materials,..we will then go and find a human agent and well say, now what we want to know is not what is in that factory, but s:ome.specific element of'the nuclear relationship which we will define for him and put him to work in a very -targeted-, speci:f_ic. way. It can be much more effective, but it takes much'more teamwork..- And It's a'fascinating challenge for us. The second side of intelligence'ts taking all.-this informatton that'you have gathered and doing. something with it ..'Turning it into analyses that are useful to our policymakers in the Executive Branch, to our legislators on the Hill, and to some extent,..when. -we can do it inan -unclassified form, to the American public. The challenge-;.the'change that we'have'to face today on. the analytic side of our.'house-is'equally- great because today the number of countries we are concerned with, Is just so much greater than it was. twenty or.thirty years .ago. There is. hardly-a country in the world'not.impacted by the-major decisions. of this country and there'-is hardlya country'-tnthe:world that does:.something important on its own that isn't of interest-and concern'to us'.Ate'have to know what i_s going on. And the areas of:academic expertise that we'.have to be able- to work in are growing also- 'a great challenge to us.. We are not only interested in.the' technology.ofmtssiles.and tanks'.and shtps,:we' are tnterested in the-health and psychology-.of' foreign leaders:;:__we:ar_e.interested in Soviet' Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 is ? grain harvest this year and next; we are interested in the flow of narcotics on the international market; we are interested in international terrorism;. we are interested in the gross national product and the types of products. and the profusion of technology across-the world in many, many countries. And it goes on and on.: There is hardly an academic discipline in any of our colleges or even the universities of -this country which we do not employ here in the Central Intelligence Agency. We have to change. We have to be able to spread ourselves into many more areas than in the past. Still another reason for change is the disinstitution`the Central Intelli- gence Agency and: the Intelligence'_Community in general,-,has - become- a -much more public institution in our country today.than it ever has been-.before. Or that any intelligence service_.has- ever. been -in history.- This:-came about as a result of the ' accusations,` the- charges., the invest.igationsof .the Intelli- gence.Community in the '.75-'77 time -frame. It is a fact of life;-ire cannot turn the clock back; we have now established new sets ofcontrols in the Executive Branch, on Capitol Hill, in the Legislative Branch. We are working well under those controls. I believe we can handle it. I,believe.that these.changes.are acceptable. But partly as a side effect of these changes-of becoming amore public institution; but partly also--is a side effect, of.Vietnam,-of'the Pentagon Papers, Watergate,.we have 1ost:.something- that we cannot afford:'to lose in .the. intelligence business--that..is.the: capability to keep our.- necessary- secrets..:_._ We cannot be a secret intelligence service`: if everything we'learn'is spewed out into the public domain. We are today-:then;-as-king the-Congress=for legislative' help in this. area. Now sometimes you read.i:n the press.that..:what.we are asking for and. what' we need is to be unleashed, to b.e'put under I ess-control. .That is inaccurate; that Is facile misunderstanding of what i'n:.fact'we-need:; what, in Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 fact, we hope the.Congress will give us-. What we want is protection for our ability to keep our secrets. Several pieces of legislation we have in`mind. The first concerns something called covert action. Covert action isn't strictly intelligence. Covert action is the attempt to influence the events in a foreign country without the source of that influencing being known. It has always been assigned to the Central Intelli.gence Agency by Presidents'as the place where it will be carried out. It used to be just three years ago that it was almost unconscionable to talk about undertaking covert action. It was very unpopular. Today even in the..-media, as.well as in conversations with Americans, I find. people saying is there not something we can do,between just~.talking with other countries and sending in the Marines? And yes, there is. Covert-action does have a place in our diplomatic portfolio: In 1974 the Congress- passed the Hughes-Ryan Amendment which requires.that.,.1f.we are to undertake-a--covert action, on direction of the President, we must notify up to eight committees of the Congress. Now that "is something in the-neighborhood of 200 people. I can assure you I find it very difficult . to go out and recruit..others to go risk their lives on behalf of doing a covert action for us if I have. to confess. to them that maybe only 200 people on'Capitol'liill will know.-About it. Now, I don't want to be critical because T.think in 1974--the Hughes--Ryan Amendment may.--have been necessary. It may, have been a good- idea;... 'Tt was the beginning of establishing controls over the intelligence.mechanisms through. the Congress--controls.which had existed but withered and:now were-bei.ng reinstituted. But, today, we do not.need th4t same control because-We have a very effective set of tntelligence.committees:in each...chamber-of the Congress and they do and are ..only to do:oversight.,of'the intell.igencecommunity; and Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 ? ? ' they do a very effective job of it and we want. and are asking the Congress, and I think you.will find that tomorrow we'are going to make some progress on this I hope....to pass a law that will limit this. information on the covert.actions to.these two oversight committees: Please note that on those two committees, there are at least two representatives from.each of the other committees that.we are not going to'inform. So,'in effect, we are not cutting the numbers. of-committees- that will know this any, we are cutting.the number of people. So:if.the Foreiign-Affairs. Committee, which under our hope, will not have thi.s..information in the.future.,-needs.to have-it.-there will be two members on it who do have that-information_and;raisetheir hand in a-Foreign Affairs Committee debate and say-:there- is something. i.n the' intelligence field that is germane to Our . debate.: Let's.stop'and~.get the intelligence people in here and we, of course, would come-and--inform than. A second area where we,.need:help is in what we call identities legislation. I am in the difficult spot*today-of'ask_fng-.Americans.to. go overseas, serve their country as Central' Tntell i.gence' Agency officers, under cover; that is, not acknowledging that they?work-for'us, -into countries where terrorism is quite popular, into countries where-their security cannot'be assured by the host country very well. And r have. .to do that while confessing to these. people that this country Fias not:ye.tbeen-w%11N to do anything.-against those American citizens..wh.o:=-Cal Iously-and, -in my opinion;-traitorously,: deliberately go out and try -to disclose the identities'of'these-men and women.. You all know that In 1975, after-Mr. Agee did this. with'respect'to our people in Greece, our Chief of Station there was murdered. ;Yo.w'may all -remember that in July of this year'after Mr. Agee's cohort,'Philip.Wolf, went to Jamaica and went on.television and said here are the pictures'of'15 members of`the'United States Embassy who Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 work for the CIA, here are their addresses, here are the telephone numbers, here are their.license plate-numbers, the house of one of those 15 men was his shot up two nights' later.. Had/daughter had been there and in her bed we might not have her with us today. We have a bill before the Congress and it, too, tomorrow and the next day, i.s. goi.ng to make progress. And it makes it a crime and in a repeated pattern of activity and with deliberate intent to destroy the intelligence activities of our country, disclose the names of'our'undercover people or'our foreign .agents overseas. There is a great deal of,controversy'in the press who claim that this-is unconstitutional, who-fear'this_is going to bring them into court. Let me assure you'.that'we have painstakingly crafted.-this.l_egislation with the Congress to avoid that. The Attorney General, 'former'Solicitor'General, Robert Bork, have said that this legislation -isconstitutional: And-they area better source of opinion in my mind 'than' the, Washington Post or 'the New York Times on that suub,ject. And only if people 'carry-out t hese'activities over a pattern and over a period of'time'and only if they do so with a demonstrated intent to destroy our intelligence'capability, can people 'he prosecuted: We believe it is most esssential_to our-peoples' welfare, our peoples' morale, that we have some protection `-and this:-bill is very, carefLlAy -designed '- to. give -them -that without intruding-on the constitutional rights of_'our-:citizens.- F nally, :we have a bill with respect'-to What is lknown.r.as the-Freedom of Information Act. -Th.is problem is really one:of'perception'.rather-than fact. Perception'i.n this sense. if I" am going to: somebody overseas. and saying will you risk.-your life for'our country,`. and he.looks'me in'the eye and says,_but do you 'haye to' under .the Freedom=;of' Information "Act' rel ease -my, name- -if they cal l for 'it? - I wil l tel l him no. 'But true -answer, if he' presses -me, . J.-% that Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 I have never been required to do so yet; I :have been challenged in the courts repeatedly and we have always won. But are you going to stick your neck on - the line on the hope that we will win the next one when your name is the issue at stake. Not very likely. -So we want to exempt from the Freedom of Information Act, the information in our files about our sources of information; not about information that could be in our files about'Amerioan citizens or others--we really don't keep.that, but we want the public to be assured that the Freedom of Information.Act will still apply to their legitimate interests in what may be in our files. We hope. that this-wall,-pass this session of Congress also .because it.wtll be.a great hoon'.to changing .thts.perception, this overall perception that this country cannot.keep'its.secrets,,therefore its intelligence services cannot be trusted by those with whom we must work overseas. In sum, you, I,-this country faces a.dtlemma.wfith respect to intelligence. We want our country to be as-open, as free.as it. can be and we want our govern- mental institutions to exemplify that openness. At the same time, I think we all recognize that a secret .i'ntelli:gence'.service'is necessary for our country s.o that we are not caught unawares, so that other people cannot take advantage of us in the international arena. The issue, the problem-that we have is can we have both?. Can we have the ideal of:opennes-s'; can we have the necessity of some level of secrecy: T belieye.we can;:I believe we can do both.,-And we must..' I believe we can have controls on'.the:%nte11_igence-apparatus-of our- country -that still allow us- to be effective.. On the one hand, those controls today are.tn the Executive Branch..through.the President and his Executive Orders that govern us. On the other hand, they-'are to the Legislative Branch through the Committees of:th.e Congress and L.helieye.these: two.sets of-controls give.the 'public of this country reason'to be ' confident: that. the intelligence activities - Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 are being conducted in accordance with national policy and under the supervision of the elected representatives of the people. On the other hand, I am very grateful that over the last.two years or so, I can just feel the swing of this pendulum in terms of American public support for a good intelligence service. It.-iscoming back and we are very,-,very grateful to have it.. And with some:help from the Legislature such as I have been describing to you tonight, I-believe we 'can, with the 'support of the people, with some good legtslati'on,.continue to be as effective as this Agency has been over its .32-year history. Final 1y,'.then ; let-me just say I.belteve these trends are all moving in the right direction'and that we are shaping a new kind of intelligence for.our country. We are not yet there; we continue to need your support and Idon't mean just your support for these legislative initiatives that I have mentioned to you tonight, your support for'-the.fact'.that this country must in the decade of the 1980's,-a decade I.belieye will be a`precarious one, must have a-capa- bil:ity to look*. overseas, -and- learn what--is happening to foretell events,-so that we can keep.our policymakers-as`well informed as possible and they can-make the. best decisions -possible for* you, for our-country and, in effect, for the entire Free World. Thank you. Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 Amherst, Smith, Vassar, W'Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 Alumni Clubs 1910-2010, Wednesday, 17 Sep '80 CIA Auditorium onight - talk about 1) Why good intell esp important for US in 1980's and 2) What.we must do to ensure it will be, ecade of '80's more precarious than '60's or '70's Soviet leadership - not feel inferior - Econ growtth no longer a given * Avail energy - dev indust countries - 1-2% during decade * OPEC drain $1106 in 1980 versus $2B in 1978 - 125% increase in price - Political/Econ mechanisms to adapt - changing * Past formulas not always help hange in pattern of relationships means: Must be more forte esi2hted - astute - Need good information - Good info harder to get - others more aware intel methods - less trusty of U.S. ?ans for Intelligence? Can do But requires ch antes in way we go about business, J4-0v- /" 1) Tremendous tech 2) HUMINT Meld 4) More Rublic institution 3) Analysis - expand'areas - disciplines a. Page 2 Side effect .rrPdijrtinn n abilit.. _ to undermining Need Legislative support Talk about unleashing CIA'- facile - inaccurate - Not what we want or need - nor will happen I* Today need legislative remedies in 4 areas - widely misunderstood 1) Covert Action - 3 yrs ago any CA heinous - Today press/public ask - can't do something between just talkie --and sending in Marines? CA has place in diplomatic portfolio. ------------ Hughes-Ryan * 8 committees/+ 200 * Can't get volunteers for risks * May be good in 1974 - not today * Congressional Oversight - Reduce to 2 Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 - USSR same FOIA rights as you - Agents/liaison - Keep winning in courts? - No blanket exempt - protect sources and methods only. Identities Callous-disclosure Unreasonable ask live overseas - climate of terrorism give no protection Agee - Athens - Welsh Wolf - Jamaica No sense - call for better intel - the 62prote e oing 4) Graymail - call for irrelev t or peripheral classified info in open court. Gov't withdraws rather than increase damage. Bill will provide for: Pretrial rulin s on issues of relevancy Provide court w/alternatives short of dismissing case. ro sum up All Americans caught in dilemma: * All strive toward ideal.- open society Page 4 Yet, recognize can't be caught unawares - need intell service inherently secret Can't have both? Think can - Think must. Issue not unleashing/leashing CIA * Issue is can we equip intel agencies w/tools to Ina be effective and at same time adhere to legal and ethical norms? Yes - believe can do both. One hand - oversight - works well - justifies high degree upon your confidence l S Other hand legal reme4ies I described are reasonabl.e_ and necessary. Moving in right direction. Need strong intel for precarious decade '80's lies ahead. Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 FOIA - Prob is perception Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 V ? Last time - Mak h - talk Amherst, Smith, Vassar, Williams Alumni Clubs 1910-2010, Wednesday, 17 Sep '80 CIA Auditorium - Ingredient intelligence work - Impact of ch ged environment (i e., second generation - family business to more corporate management) on i telligence today. Tonight - talk about 1) Why good intell esp. important for U.S. in 1980's and 2) What we must do to ensure it will be. Decade of '80's morcarious than '60's or '70's - Soviet leadership - not feel inferior - Econ growth no longer a given * Avail energy -.dev. induct. countries - 1-2% during decade pr.~ ws OPEC drain $11 in 1980 versus $RB in 1978 - 125% increase in price - Politica'I/Econ mechanisms to adapt - changing * Past formulas not always help * USS b der * Econ re tionships less predictable Change in pattern of relationships means: - Must be more foresi hte - astute - Need good lnformaticLn - Good info harder to get - others more aware intel methods - less trusty of U.S. Means for Intelligence? Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 2) Result of rue - less flexibility - maybe less willing take risks 49 But requires changes in way we go about business, and - R s 1 a su permi to f ' p.-~--y~,~s , Let me describ changes ~- 1) Restrain on al ops involving Americans Z, e.g., \arcics ~traffickers e. 3 g..,. mi onary, ~ - AG's nd m legal staffs - Constitutional issues? Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 Complex legal'tandards - non-lawyers in field - danger overcauticn? - Still, wortht if protects rights of Americans - redducti n in ability to key, secrets - undermining Talk about unleashing CIA fact e - inaccurate - Not what we want or need - nor will happen Today need legislative remedies in 4 areas - widely misunderstood 1) Convert A - -3 yrs ago any CA heinous - Today press/public ask - can't do something between just talking--and sending in the Marines? CA has place in diplomatic portfolio. - Hughes-Ryan * 8 committees/+ 200 * Can't get-volunteers for risks * May be good in 1974 - not today * Congressional Oversight Reduce to 2 2) FOIA - Prob is perception - USSR same FOIA rights as you - Agents/liaison - Keep winning in courts? - No blanket exempt - protect sources and methods only. Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7 3) Identities - Callous disclosure - Unreasonable ask live overseas - climate of terrorism - give no protection - Agee - Athens - Welsh - Wolf Jamaica - No sense - call for better intel - then don't protect people doing it. Graymail - Call for irrelevant or peripheral classified info in open court. Gov't withdraws rather than increase damage. Bill will provide for: - Pretrial rulings on issues of relevancy - Provide court w/alternatives short of dismissing case. To sum up All Americans caught in dilemma: * All strive toward ideal - open society w/gov't reflects that openness * Yet, recognize can't be caught unawares need intell service inherently secret Can't have both? Think can - Think must. Issue not unleashing/leashing CIA * Issue is can we equip intel agencies w/tools to be effective and at same time adhere legal and ethical norms? Yes - believe can do both. One hand - oversight - works well - justifies high degree upon your'confidence Other hand legal remedies I described are reasonable and necessary. Moving-in right direction. Need strong intel for precarious decade '80's lies ahead. 3 Approved For Release 2009/04/20: CIA-RDP05TOO644R000100150001-7