ADDRESS TO PALM BEACH ROUNDTABLE APRIL 1980

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05T00644R000100230001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 15, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 17, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

STAT
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Admira ian~r-eru ru
Di rec'.(.. -15' Central IWr
l l igence
Addre, s- o Palm Beach Roundtable
17 Apr, 1980
Thank you Frank. Bill Webster and I look upon ourselves as "Mr. Inside"
and "Mr. Outside." He's told you about his role with the FBI and -protecting
this country from from counterintelligence, from the Colonel Hermans and
people like this inside the United States; it's our job, as Frank has just
said, to keep our eyes and ears open overseas. Clearly, this takes a lot of
close coordination, cooperation between our two agencies. I liken it to a
football team where you hand the ball from the halfback to the quarterback
or vice.versa because, as the action moves from the continental United States
to the overseas territories, Bill and I hand the ball back and forth and be
sure that nothing drops between the cracks. And yet, an important aspect of
the CIA's activities is the atmosphere, the environment within our own country
in which'we are operating. The attitude, the moray, the outlook of the people
of'this country towards our organization and our activities. And I would like
to dwell for a few moments this afternoon on the.impact of the changes of the
environment for intelligence in the United States have had on the Central
Intelligence Agency in the past five or six years.
Just five or six years ago, for instance, our activities were largely
isolated and secret--as they are in all other intelligence services around
the world--but in 1975, we had the Church Committee, the Pike Committee, the
Rockefeller Commission, and following it; new forms of oversight of the
intelligence activities of our country. Oversight from the Congress, the
White. House, and Intelligence Oversight Board. And what this has meant is
that today we are much more than ever before or'much'more than in any other
intelligence service in the world, on the front pages of our newspapers
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frequently. The result is that the intelligence professionals in our country
must adapt their profession to ways of being more open with the American
public, and yet, still being able to get their job done effectively.
There are four dimensions to this new environment and-I would like to
discuss them each with you briefly.. The first is how it changes our internal
organization and. operations. Secondly, how it effects our. relationships with
the rest of the Executive Branch of the government. The third, our relation-
ships with the Legislative Branch. And the fourth, our relationships with
the American media and, through them, with you, the American public.
Whether, in light of these changes of environment and resulting changes
in how we operate, whether we can still do the job which this country wants
and needs, is indeed rightfully an issue of'publi.c concern today. I would
like to look at these dimensions of change in light of the considerable
discussion that is going on in this country as to how freely the Central
Intelligence Agency should operate. Should it'be unshackled more, and if
so, how much. And if it is, at what risk to Our 'Constitutional rights?
First let me look at the internal dimension. Traditionally the Central
Intelligence ,Agency has had a number of'separate departments that do its.work.
And those departments have been closely compartmented from each other. They
have been compartmented in order to.restrict the flow of highly sensitive
information, even within our own Agency--it's that sensitive.. Obviously
though, there are risks when compartmentation'is too'tight. People may make
decisions without having all the facts available;'or:they make judgments
that are based on too narrow a focus. If there were mistakes 1n,CIA in the
past, I suspect it was because the Agency was taking'actions-with too'narrow
a perspective. It was not'maliciousness,'it was not'callousness,-tt was not
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that the Agency was out of control. It was not. Today, to ensure that
compartmentation does not impede good decisionmaking, we are moving to a
more corporate organizational structure. I use corporate in the sense
that we are more. consultative, more collegial, better organized for long
term decisionmaking.. I hope that we are not becoming just more bureaucratic
and inflexible. The disadvantage to this more corporate approach is that
.as you increase the number of those who know a secret activity that you
inevitably increase the risk that that activity will be compromised. To
reduce this risk then, while.increasing the number of offices that are
involved in the decisionmaking, we minimize the number of individuals within
those offices. who need to know and we minimize the amount of information they
need to have to that which is essential to their playing their individual
role.
In short, we are trying to find a happy balance between the dangers of
.isolated decisionmaking and the proliferation of.information about secret
activities to the point where it will not remain secret.
The second. dimension of change in our environment is that the CIA is
less independent externally today. We are less like asmall family business
and more like one part of a large corporate conglomerate. Within the Executive
Branch, our Board of Directors is the National Security Council. Our Chairman
is the President of the United States. I-can.assure you that today the National
Security Council plays a much more'active.role in guiding our collection of
intelligence, our analysis of intelligence'information and our covert action
activities than perhaps ever before in our country's history.
Now there are pluses and minuses'to this as well. A big plus is that it
ties us more intimately to.the policymakers and their deliberations. We can
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more effective in providing them the data they need if we know what their
concerns really are. Another really big plus is.that it encourages us to
work more closely with the FBI and this team work is absolutely essential
to our country.
A minus, however, is that even within the Executive Branch, the proba-
bility of a damaging leak is geometrically proportional to the number of
people who know the secret information. It doesn't matter much where the
people are located. For instance, even within the Executive Branch there
are misplaced loyalties, people who will, in order to better in their view
influence policymaking, leak to the press secret information. The inhibitions
of self-restraint and patriotism which prevailed in this, Icountry so well before
the Vietnam conflict, are less prevalent today ina no-holds-barred, post-
Watergate environment. I can assure that this makes the job of an American
intelligence professional much more difficult today.
The third dimension of change is in our interplay with the United States
Congress..' In years past, a few senior Senators and Representatives were kept
informed about intelligence activities. 'Thei'r basic'view, however, was don't
tell me too much. I can assure you that that attitude is long gone today.
There are pluses and minuses to it.being changed-this way. A plus is that
the advice'and the counsel of'the Congress helps us to keep in closer touch
with you, the American public; helps us to understand what is expected of us.
It also affords us a somewhat detached. insight into our activities and that
is always valuable. The primary disadvantage again, however, is-the danger
of leaks. Now .in terms of leaks the Congress is no better and is no worse
than the Executive'Branch and overall the-process-of sharing with the Congress
has worked well in the three years that I have been privileged to participate
it
iry. I want to continue that relationship with the United States Congress.
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Why then has there been controversy in your newspapers in recent weeks
over the terms of that relationship? It is because, as Bill Webster mentioned
to you, we are attempting to codify our current practices into what are
known as Charters.for the Intelligence Community. In to doing, in my opinion,
we are inadvertently attempting to establish a degree of precision about
intelligence rules that simply cannot be achieved.
Intelligence is not a science; it's a craft or maybe an art; an element
of trust is vital because without it,~flexibility will be lost and an intelli-
gence.service that doesn't have flexibility is just another bureaucracy. The
current effort then to replace some trust with all law concentrates on two
particular issues. One, is.when we tell the Congress about what we are doing
and the other is at what level.of'detail do we tell-them. The question of
how soon we notify the Congress : is. that. in essence a constitutional issue. It
the
brings up/question of what the Founding Fathers had in mind when they separated
the powers of our government--powers given tothe.Congress under the Constitu-
tion are to legislate, to appropriate money, to impeach and, in the case of the
Senate, to advise and consent on'Presidenti'al appointments. There is no
provision in the Constitution'for.prior'consultation'by the Executive with.the
Legislature on actions which'the Executive is taki.ng'under. his Constitutional
privileges.
With respect.to the question'of'the amount of'deta.il we must share with
the Congress, our concern here is less: the actual sharing with them than.the
perception of others. Outside of'theUnited States, there are-few who under-
stand why and how we bring the Congress.'so intimately into our intelligence
process. Agents of'ours.overseas and tnte.lligence*.services,'withwhom.we
cooperate know that. their effectiveness; - even their well:-being, depends upon'
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secrecy. They also know that a politician's viability depends to a large
extent'upon public relations. We cannot easily persuade these people that
if they share with us a. great deal of information about sensitive activities,
and if in turn are required to share it all with our'Congress, then it will,
in.fact, be kept private. If they are not convinced that their equities, maybe
their lives, are going to be protected when they deal with us, they will not
deal with, us and it is our loss.
In actual practice, in my three years of association with the Congress in
this regard, they have exercised extraordinarily good judgment in not pressing
us to a level of detail that was not necessary for the accomplishment of their
purposes. To by knowledge, the Congress has never complained that we have
provided them with inadequate detail 'to perform their oversight or their
legislative roles effectively.'
Finally, this greater openness has changed our relationships with the
merican -publ ic-.' We do need better public understanding.
Fourth Estate and.the American-public-.'
No important public institution'in this country can-survive over the long run
if it does not have the support and- understanding of the American people.
Accordi.ng.ly we have, in recent years, attempted'to become more open. We have
been more open in terms of declassifying and distributing our product wheneyer
that is pos.sib.le; to making more of our analyses and our studies available to
the American public, we hope to show'somevisible return on your investment in
us. At the same time, we have been-scrupulous in not-tal.ki.ng about our sources,
of information; how'we gather our intelligence. We'expect'to protect the
confidence of our sources; to use .them again and.again and to encourage others
to become our sources. In addition, we'work very hard to protect information
that is particularly valuable to our dec isionmakers.hecause'they have tt and no
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one else has it--an exclusive. Thus, our new openness is in fact a controlled
openness. It will work only if we can truly control'access to the secret
information which we have and thus- reduce the danger of leaks. That is,
indeed, the most serious challenge'to the intelligence professional in our
country today. Accordingly, we are asking the Congress of the United States
to help us in three respects.
First, there is something known as the Hughes-Ryan Amendment. This
Amendment has been interpreted to require that whenever we undertake what is
known-as.a covert action we must notify up to eight committees of the United
States Congress. Now r.eveali.ng'a covert action to more than a handful of people
can risk lives: unnecessarily and-it really mocks.the term covert. We want to
reduce that notification to the. two oversight committees; but on those two
oversight committees, there are represented each'of'the other six committees
that we now. are required to not.i:fy. 'Thus,-there would still be in those other
committees, adequate knowledge of: our covert actions when it was germane to
those committees' proceedings.
We are also asking fora very limited:relief from the Freedom'of Informa-
tion Act just as Bill has mentioned',earlier. Today It is a fact'.'that when the
Russian Embassy writes to us and asks for 'information; we. are requtred'to search
our files and determine whetherthat'can be'adduced to them. This.-problem is
again particularly one of'per.ceptions: not'so'much~of'fact.'It is the percep-
tions, of the foreign intelligence agents and the foreign intelligence services
with. whom we work that bothers us. ' 'Hoar can I ask someone to risk his life for
our country, far' our cause if he' fears and he believes that r may, fie required
by law to discl ose'.his' name. in :publ tc? '. We are still ' wi1 l ing `..u'nder the 'Freedom
of Information Act, to provide our citizens information of an unclassified
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nature about anything on them that is in our files; and we are willing to
respond to enquiries about our product. But to ensure our continued ability'
to protect our sources from disclosure, we must`have an ability to keep
information about.sources.guaranteed private.
Lastly, we are also asking for legislation to let us prosecute those
who traitorously and deliberately'disclo'se the names of our agents and officers
overseas. With acknowledged deliberateness, people like Philip Agee and others
of his ilk, are.tryi_ng to undermine a legally constituted institution of our
government--one which you and I payfor'wtth our taxes. With deliberate
irresponsibility they are making intelligence. more expensive than need be,
they are reducing our effectiveness and they are placing American lives in
jeopardy. For us to let this continue would be l.ud.icrous.
Now please note, none of~these three measures that we are asking the
Congress to change can be described as a relaxation of controls over the
Central Intelligence Agency=-they are not'an'.unleashing; they are not a
return to the "good old days-," t,hey'are simply-an attempt to restore a modicum
of essential secrecy. Today we can move in these three directions quite
safely because of the new and the effective oversight procedures that have
been established within both'the Executive and.the Legislative Branches in
recent years. Still, I recognize' secrecy, any secrecy, will always he an
anachronism in oursociety'and covert?action'.will always conflict with the
American tradition: of'-fair' play.'. But ultftately we 'must : recognize"..that in
some circumstances of international' competition, the-Marquis of*queensliury
rules are simply not appropriate. "tf.we.are to continue'to be free and to
be a world leader., we' simply must ` know what is. 'going on" in' the 'world around
us. A strong intelligence capability is clearly necessary. `Carping at
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reasonable levels of secrecy and reasonable freedom to act covertly against
hostile countries is naive and destructive. We in the intelligence profession
are the sons and daughters of this nation just as are you. We are well aware
of the nation's ethical standards and constitutional rights and your quite
reasonable insistence that they be preserved. We have no intentions of
violating your trust, nor undermining the'very values and standards that we
are dedicated to defending. We'do not'ask you simply to trust us in this
regard; we strongly endorse the continuation of the oversight process, both
within the Executive and Legislative Branches. It holds us fully accountable
yet it permits us to function effectivel.y.' Today, then, we are poised at a
balance point. A point which,'tf.it is tipped anymore in the direction of
loosening our controls over our.secrets, could very adversely effect our
ability as a secret tntelli.gence'servtce. 'We do not ask to be unshackled.
We ask to continue just as we have--successfully, over the past three years.
I know of no accusation'of illegality, impropriety or abuse, nor of any cause
for such'accusations. -I know-of'no.tnfere.nce'.that the oversight process has
not been thorough and effective during that time. We are then in the process
of constructing a new, a uniquely American model of intell.igence'. It is
tailored to American values and to,-our concepts'of'.the'rights and privileges
of the individual; yet it does- permit us-to do that needs to be done for the
security of our country. 'r ask:for*your.understanding and your support in
completi;ng.the construction'of'this bold,, new concept. Thank you y ery.much.
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