CONCENTRATED INTELLIGENCE UNWISE
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP05T00644R000200620013-1
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
1
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
June 30, 2009
Sequence Number:
13
Case Number:
Publication Date:
June 20, 1977
Content Type:
OPEN SOURCE
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP05T00644R000200620013-1.pdf | 82.69 KB |
Body:
Approved For Release 2009/06/30: CIA-RDP05T00644R000200620013-1
91 - W
THE DAILY OKLAHOMAN 6/20/77
It. Gen. Ira C. Eaker
Concentrated In elft
nce Un' W` lose''
WASHINGTON --- Lately, most. . rea, because he had consulted Rus- The, lesson from all 'this this Is, to
of the principal intelligence `~sia and Red China and each' had' make sure that all segments of the
agencies have been placed under assured him that they would not intelligence comm'vnity are free,
Navy leadership. The Central Intel- encourage or support North Korea's and in fact encouraged;-to submit
ligence Agency (CIA), the National' Kim Il Sung In any offensive adven- their views on the National li-.
Security Agency (NSA), the Defense tures. genre Es7timates: It?is-upon We Agency (which provides Do we not remember that Dr. lidity of those estimates that the'
cartography and geodesy essential Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's . President must rely to make funda-
to global targeting) - all now have , principal, national security assist- mental decisions on such critical
admirals as their directors. Also, ' ant, was assured by the Reds at the matters as defense budgets, arms
congressional committees are now Paris peace negotiations that North' sales and arms limitations agree-
talking about an intelli
Vietnam would n
ence reor
t
tt
k S
g
-
. a
o
ac
outh ? ments.
ganization
Including an "Intel"- ~ Vietnam after U
S
forces we
e
,
.
.
r
ssent-in the=in.telli Bore- cow:
gence czar. . , removed? ? mj y must ..b.e -e.nc.ouraged.-.,.n.tI
It is unwise, In fact dangerous, to. . Do we' not now know that North suppressed. Any dissenting views
permit the Navy to dominate the Vietnam was, at that very time, must also be available to the Con-
Intelligence community. It would be . secretly, moving supplies, and
equally' unwise to put all intelli- troops into forward positions from : gress and our people.-The wisdom
of this policy ..was .demonstrated in,-
Bence under Arm- v. ? Air Force .,:1 which it launched such an'attack.- . .. I
defense effort. -'
Academy classmate, Adm. Stan- have been caught by surprise, as in .
field Turner, to head the CIA. After the 1973 Arab attack on Israel, was. President Carter; I understand,
all, It has been the weak link In the . when' one agency, or individual, in I wisely has assured the Congress
intelligence community during the that case, Dr. Kissinger, dominated that no international, commitments
past decade. In the National intelli- the Intelligence community. will be kept secret fro rim that body:
genre Estimates, subsequent events,
have proven the CIA's-estimates on'
Russian military strength to have .
been too low. The CIA has admitted
this and has upgraded its estimates '
on Soviet military capability.
Dur- ing this period, the estimates'of the ,
Defense Intelligence Agency and of
the intelligence sections of the
Armed Services have proven much
wort, accurate. 0
NO now to put the Intelligence ,
ng~pSl~K~ot,lhe,.mil'Ii.aryWsery(ccs
itn.der_N,ayy_l.ca_.dership, In addition
to.the CIA, may let thhe pendulum
swing too far. It creates the possi-
bility for a dominant authority, a'
President, a secretary of state or a
secretary of defense, to say, as in
rue past, 1ms is my pecislon, now
give me an intelligence estimate.to
support it."
This concern was Intensified re-
cently ' when it, was reported that...
President Carter was justified in ' .
reducing U.S. ground forces In Ko- ?'
It Is understandable that Presi- withdrawn? VA 'WIN LtUVVIay, as .,L was ,n' u,- .
vulging the massive Russian civil
' Approved For Release 2009/06/30: CIA-RDP05T00644R000200620013-1