AGENDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05T00644R000200650001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 24, 1978
• Content Type: MISC

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24 A3ay 1975
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AGENDA
1. Increased reporting and analysis requirements competing
for limited resources.
2. Lack of uniform Automated Data Processing planning and
policy in the Agency.
3. Need to develop a capability to use new methods of analysis.
4. Uniform promotion system.
6. Perspectives on management selection.
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PROBLER~i: The increasing volume of information being collected
an managed, some of it .in real time, and the increasing
number of analytical and reporting requirements being levied
are fiercely competing for the Intelligence Community's limited
resources. The restructuring of resources to meet t}iese demands
is resulting in a decrease in the Quality anti amount of
intelligence analysis.
DISCUSSION: The increase over the years in "alI source" data
collection and management is obvious to most everyone in the
Intelligence Community. Now with the availability of near
real-time data from emerging systems, we are faced with an as
yet unanswered challenge to both our data base management and
analytical capabilities. This near real-time capability has
further heightened the demand for fast analytical response,
as well as contributed more data which has to be stored, mani-
pulated and assimilated during detailed analysis. This compe-
tition for resources is further exacerbated as new international
problems arise such as terrorism, energy, SALT, etc. This type
of problem demands in-depth study. For the future, an even
greater emphasis may be placed on data collection and manage,,lent
systems, and even more demanding analytical efforts are anticipated.
Conversely, the resources available in the Intelligence
Community to meet these growing concerns do not appear to be
increasing. As a result, the daily effort to meet these growing
demands often means the restructuring of analytical. and data
collection and management resources. All too frequently this
restructuring has inefficiently sacrificed resource. Such
restructuring manifests itself in the overemphasis on fast
response analysis to the detriment of in-depth study, the use
of analysts as data base managers, the proliferation of disparate
data bases, and data bases which are not accessible to analysts--
or even in a format they can use.
As the competition for these limited resources increases,
new ways of efficiently dividing and managing these resources
will have to be developed. Some efforts, although sporadic,
have already been made in this direction, e.g., computer-aided
analysis, increased coordination of data base information,
and greater user access to various data bases. To date, however,
such efforts seem to have been resisted, almost subconsciously,
resulting in less than adequate support and implementation.
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RECOi~11`IENDAT I ONS
1. Determine an equitable allocation bettiaeen data base
colleciton and management resources and those needed for
intelligence analysis.
2. Enforce compatible data base formats.
3. Establish systematic integration of data base infor-
mation.
4. Establish a revieia and enforcement authority "with
teeth."
5. Make data base information readily accessible and
usable to analysts.
6. Make more training in computer assisted analysts
mandatory for analysts.
7. Provide necessary support to make the above training
meaningful.
8. Provide for closer screening and prioritization of
analytical requirements.
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Agency top management has previously recognized these
problems. The D/DCI on 16 December 1976, in a memorandum to
the EAG, identified ADP issues which should be studied so that
positive steps could be taken to improve centxal management
of our total ADP pxogram. The ODP, on 15 July 1977, provided
the EAG with a paper addressing the balance that should be
achieved between centralized and decentralized ADP resources
in the Agency.
Two of the six main recommendations.included in this
paper were:
c. "Responsibility for comprehensive Agencytvide ADP
planning, both short term and long term, should be assigned.
The plan should include those decentralized components
not notiv included, and should identify clearly what has
been excluded, and why. The review and monitoring functions
should also be .assigned, and performed jointly with the
EAG. Anew component, probably at the DDCI, should be
assigned these responsibilities."
d. "Responsibility should be assigned for formulating
ADP policy for the Agency and monitoring its execution,
and for representing the Agency's interests to outside
organizations. This would cover ADP standards for Agency-
wide use and Agency participation in Community or inter-
agency ADP activities. The new component in paragraph c.
above would be the logical place for. these jobs."
In this paper, ODP recognized the many complex issues
involved.in reviewing ADP with the Agency, The paper provides
a detailed discussion of many of the problems and provides
meaningful solutions. Apparently, however, the EAG has fully
carried out only one recommendation in that paper, i.e.,
paragraph e. "The responsibility to conduct a feasibility
study of an Agency Career Service for professional ADP employees
should be assigned."
RECO'~IMENDAT I ONS :
1. Instruct the EAG to reconsider the recommendations
set forth in the ODP paper discussed above.
2. Create an Agency authority for ADP control.
This authority ~vould review proposed developments,
act as a forum for users and developers and have the responsibility
for coordinating Agency ADP resources. It must be given the
power to make its decisions stick, otherwise it will become yet
another link in the bureaucratic chain.
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PROBI~E~I: The lack of uniform ADP planning and policy in the
.agency.
DISCUSSION: The Agency's ADP equipment consists of a mix of
centralized and decentralized facilities valued at about X70
million. This large investment has been made tirithout the
benefit of a uniform policy or plan for ADP within the Agency.
Overall Agency ADP policy or planning does not noiv exist.
In addition there is no single person tvho can speak with auth-
ority on our ADP policies and procedures. The Director, Office
of Data Processing (ODP), is the Agency's representati~Te to
^ the Information Handling Committee, y ODP controls
STAT only about 50~ of our ADP resources. does give the D/ODP
~
authority for reviewing and coordinating proposals far acquisi-
tion of ADP equipment, but according to OllP this regulation has
been ineffective, both as a planning mechanism anct as a control
mechanism. The D/ODP also has no authorit over the acquisition
STAT of ADP equipment for National programs. is being revised
to strengthen the authority of ODP, yet it still tvi.ll not apply
to National programs.
Insufficient coordination of ADP systems and proposed
ADP projects is resulting in duplication of effort and an
intensified internal competition for resources. Each ADP
development is considered an individual effort. Each is vying
for its own cut of the available resources. Relationships
and commonalities between proposed and existing systems is not
an obvious issue in the review process.
First-line ADP developments may often appear to overlap
in functional areas. This is not necessarily faulty planning
or bad systems analysis. IVhat is bad, is the lack of coordi-
nation from an Agency perspective that allows mutual, areas of
processes. of common concern to be developed separately. This
duplication of effort further reduces available resources and
often results in a "reinventing of the wheel." For example,
three known ADP developments--CRAFT, SAFE, and the Operations
Center's Crisis Management Center--have many similar functional
requirements. Each is pursuing its own solutions in its own way.
A more positive approach would be the pooling of resources to
solve a common problem, or at least a sharing of information
among the participants.
The objective is not to stifle innovation but rather to
be more effective in our approach to ADP development. jYhy
waste time and effort to solve a problem that has been solved
or analyzed elsewhere? This is not to say that the Agency should
set a "mold," forcing all requirements to adhere to predeter-
mined specifications or available/existing systems or processes,
rather that there are distinct advantages to be gained from
coordinating functional system requirements.
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The responsibilities of this office would require a
staff of several members. An individual cannot hope to satisfy
the need. T}~e staff members should be experienced in systems
analysis and knowledgeable about Agency functional areas.
Staff members need not be those with stronb computer hardtivaxe
and/or software backgrounds. The responsibility of t}iis auth-
ority is to xeview and coordinate the functional c}iaracteristics
of ADP developments, not to dictate implementation methods.
This technical expertise must be available to the staff when
needed but s}iould not form the basic evaluative thrust.
If such authority were created, ADP developments could
be revie~ved for coordination not only at their inception, but
also during the development cycle to assure adherence to approved
requirements.
3. Review the policy of excluding ADP resources of National
Programs from normal Agency review proc This revielr
should determine if the requirements of can be applied
to National Programs.
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--Tlie educational background and styles of analysis of
many employees of the analytical offices axe not compatible
with these attempted approaches. Emphasis has. been on stressing
intuitive styles, and sometimes even excluding analytic styles
in some programs. It is difficult to find true experts in
some of these methodologies within the Agency.
--Managers have rewarded "superficial" ox 'show-and-tell"~
efforts rather than serious applications of methodologies.
A two-day conference in Artificial Intelligence. can receive
a lot of interest while the OGCR ERAC effort (which is a
serious attempt at improving the analytic effort.)- receives
a lot of criticism.
--There is some organizational discomfort resulting from
these attempted changes.. New ways of doing things can cause
changes in existing power structures and challenges to lines
of authority which are naturally resisted. New ways of doing
things created a need either to reeducate existing people
or replace them with others, adding to this resistance.
--Develop a group responsible for determining Agency-wide
requirements and for implementing a final deciaon. This
group could be subjected to "sunshine laws." Lt should be
composed of both "usexs" (desk analysts and their managers)
and "experts" (computer experts, modelers, etc. in equal
power balance. T}ie group needs to be headed by a dynamic and
potiverful individual.
--Develop a group (or groups) that are capable Hof doing
the work. A decision must be made whether a central pool
of experts or several pools of experts to be used by all
analytical offices would be developed.
--An effort is needed to retrain existing people and to
hire netia people with proper talents to get the right type
of experience in the Agency.
--The interactive capabilities of the CIA (office to
office communication, interoffice projects, etc.) need to be
increased.
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PROBLLAI: Need to develop a capability to use new methods
of analysis.
DISCUSSION: The changing environment of intelligence analysis
increasing amounts of data, real-time data, problems of
international scope, etc.) have created requirements .for
more complex and comprehensive analysis. Past and current
policy makers recognize t}ie need for changes in the ~vay the
do analysis. In a recent discussion, Ivir. Colby expressed
the regret that he was not in control of the CIA long enough
to incorporate new approaches in the Agency's analytical
efforts. NIr. Carlucci expressed the need to refocus a part
of analytical effort toward the longer term rather than just
this day's problems. The DoD's Joint Research and Development
Objectives Directive expresses a critical need for improved
Methods of Intelligence Analysis.
There are a number of analytic methods available that
can be used to improve our product. Some of these methods
have been around for a number of years and have been tried
in the past. These methods have tended to focus in on the
"scientific met}iod" and zeroed in on issues of lesser interest.
Other methods which are becoming available allow for the
integration of intuitive and analytical approaches. These
methods allocv us to include "feelings" and soft estimates
along with hard facts in a structure which can capture the
,essential parts of the problems of large scope that face us.
Typical of these techniques are:
System Dynamics. This is a simulation technique
whic allows the analyst to capture the dynamic (or
unfolding) nature of an intelligence situation. Several
models have been built in the CIA
Decision Analysis. This method evolved from the
ivriting~' s ~'-Jo-hn Von Neuman and allows for the capturing
of utility of factors and probabilistic elements of
the real world. The approach }gas been used in the DoD
in addressing Indications and }Varnings problems.
There are several groups in the CIA who are attempting
to use such methodologies. These attempts are sepaxate efforts
and are not united in objective. Efforts to make these
approaches an integral part of our analysis appear to be
floundering at this time. Although there are a number of
people tivithin the Agency tvlio have pushed such methodologies,
there is resistance in several of the analytical offices.
There are a number of reasons for this resistance.
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PR013LEr1: Ramifications associated with adoption of the
Uniform Promotion System.
DISCUSSION: This system would offer more formalized,., uniform
and expanded career management, increase headroom through the
exercising of existing Agency regulations regarding margl2al.
performers thus facilitating upward mobility Agencywide,
provide the employee with a better understand%ng of the
promotion criteria, and create a more receptive climate for
lateral movement among directorates.
We do perceive some potential problems with tile, proposed
system and would like to offer some recommendations.
}chile normal attrition may sustain the annual promotion
rates,, it may nevertheless become necessary in some Offices
to separate people to create headroom. The written record
(Janney $ Carlucci memos) and the statements made by the DCI
seem to conflict with respect to the lower percentile to be
considered for separation, i.e., lower 3a versus up to 10%.
RECOMI~9ENDATIONS
1. Agency should ensure that all who are vulnerable
to being cut should be notified immediately upol~ being so.
identified. '
Some offices have large numbers of. pexsonnel at the
journeyman grade levels (linguists, PI's, and commo specialists)
who spend most of their careers at those grade levells doing
productive work. Their skills are acquired over many years
at great expense to the Agency and are very difficult to replace.
While it may be possible to identify a genuinely marginal
element Wlt}11I1 the lower 3o initially, subsequent exercises
may well identify persons performing in the Valuable Contribu-
tion (VC) category. This could well mean separation of signi-
ficant numbers of persons for whom the retirement option is
several years away. This could have an adverse effect on Agency
morale and be detrimental to the recruiting program through bad
press.
2. Recognize the fact that there are in the Agency
specialists who neither desire nor are suited. for supervisory
positions, but tvho nevertheless perform adequately at the
journeyman level. Make it clear to these peogle that, as long
as they are fairly rated in the VC category, they need: not
fear dismissal in an effort to maintain pre-established flo~r-
through rates.
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While a promotion model may be a good projection
at the time it is developed, aberrations in the attrition
rate or position cuts decreed by Congress could require
modification of the model..
3. It is felt that the system should specifically incor-
porate a provision for annual xevie~,; of the promotion model
to allow refinement based on most recent data.
The irrevocable (unless overruled by .,the l)CI)
decisions by tl~e promotion panels deprive the.affice chief
of desirable flexibility as regards promotions and assign-
ments. The failure to incorporate senior management views
at the time of panel deliberations could increase the number
of appeals to the DCI for exception to the panel re.camrnendatons.
4. Views of senior management should be incorporated.
in the ranking exercises for GS-13's and above by either
including them on the panel or establishment of a senior
career board to review and validate panel recommendations.
Promoting all grades on an annual basis could result.
in undue delays in promoting new employees. For example, a
GS-07 hired 3 months before the annual promotion exercise
would have to wait 15 months before being considered for a
GS-08. In addition, a GS-09 hired 4 months after the annual
.GS-09 exercise might not be considered for promotion to GS-10'
for 20 months where minimum-time-in-grade guidelines are fol-
lowed. This could adversely affect the morale of netiv employees
since it would be difficult for managers to hold out prospects
for early promotion.
S. Schedule promotions at 6-month intervals through GS-10
ox enable managers to ignore bITG guidelines for new hires.
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PROBLEM: Past inattention to management selection and
development lzas left the Agency ill equipped to cope with
change.
DISCUSSION: In spite of a number of strong indications that
tie fortunes of the Agency are on the upswing, a current of
disquiet continues to influence attitudes at the working level.
Agency management has ignored and, in many instances, encouraged
this sentiment in a display of resistance to change, an
unwillingness to entertain new ideas, and a readiness to look
for more constraints that in fact exist.
Examples of this attitude can be found in all. directorates,
In spite of its obvious need, it is difficult to hear a word
spoken in NITC's defense, even in NFAC, despite its role in
establishing the primacy.of the analytical product_ Complaints
of overstaffing and stagnant careers have been endemic to the
DDO, and yet the people who were most frustrated now speak of
the old days as if they were ripe with opportunity. The idea
of establishing a system of stead}T and regular access to
promotions is viewed with great suspicion. Nett' legislation
and executive orders intended to clarify operational parameters
are cited as justification for inaction. The list seems endless,
These are the symptoms, the core of the problem is the
dearth of assertive, accountable leadership at all levels.
The. Agency, historically, has placed great emphasis on bench
level skills as a criteria for advancement. Chiefs in NFAC
are selected for their analytical expertise; those in the DDO
are selected far thex operational talents. Thaught~should be
given to qualities of management and leadership in selecting
supervisors; these qualities should not be the result o:F chance
or acquisition after the fact.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
The problem does not lend itself to quick solutions,
but several steps can be taken in the near term in an attempt
to develop a consensus, and in the long term tv promote
management development.
1. A course similar to the Ivlid-Career, but shorter,
should be established for the GS-15 to 16 levels. The reason
for selecting this stratum is that, in spite of its vita l
role in the management chain, its members frequently have not
been privy to developments in the Intelligence Community for
as many as 10 years. Unlike the Senior Seminar, all indivi
duals in this category would be encouraged to attend, parti-
cularly those who are based outside the iVashington area. The
course should be designed to last three weeks, address develop-
ments in the Agency, Community and world affairs, and include
a meeting with the DCI.
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2.. A concerted effort should be made to return authority
and responsibility to this same level of management, if only
in a consultative capacity. Over the years, more and more
authority over such matters as the analytical product, promo-
tions and assignments have been concentrated at the office/
division and directorate levels. The branch, field and: office
chief operates in an environment that is becoming increasingly
circumscribed, dampening initiative and promoting frustration.
3. Future reorganizations, wherever they occur in the
Agency, should encompass management control as well as analytical
and/or functional objectives. Past reorganizations have tended
to be justified on the basis of the task to be accompl:i~shed
without incorporating management control and accountability.
4. In t}ie longer run, training criteria should be
established to qualify for succeeding levels of managerial
responsibility. Present training requirements are not. taken
seriously; even when they are, they apply more to promotions
not position assignments. Anyone interested in qualifying
for management positions should know in advance what is
required to compete; training should be accomplished before
the fact.
S. Valid aptitudinal requirements should be established
for classes of management positions. Once established.,.. manage-
ment courses should be structured to contain more management
aptitude assessment, and the results made part o:E the indivi-
dual's personnel file. Present training courses require
nothing of the participants but attendance. OTR sho ld be
required to make these same courses available to tho~e sta-
tioned outside Washington, either by video tape, correspondence
courses, or regional seminars. Performance in these courses
should be considered in making future assignments.
6. There must be a top down commitment to the long.
range development of management talent. Every level of manage-
ment should be held responsible for taking affirmative action
toward this. goal, similar to EEO accountability. The present
PDP is treated by many senior managers as a paper exercise,
perhaps because it concentrates on numbers rather than sub-
stance. Performance criteria should be developed against.
which an individual would be xated for management potential.
This would require well-reasoned assessments from rating.
officers beginning at the lowest supervisory levels; im th.e
case of active supervisors/managers, their potential for
greater responsibility would be assessed against past perfor-
mance.
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