AGENDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05T00644R000200680015-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2009
• Sequence Number: 15
• Content Type: MISC

Approved For Release 2009/08/12 CIA-RDP05T00644R000200680015-3
Agenda
Issues for discussion with the DCI in the
order in which they are to be discussed:
I. Use of the Polygraph as a Clearance
Requirement
II. Creation of a National Intelligence
Operations Center
IV. Personnel Evaluation
V. Resource Allocation for Improved
Security
VI. Personnel Management
VII. Position Classification Authority
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I. Use of Polygraph as a Clearance Requirement
1) Issue - All federal government and military
services within the U. S. use E.O. 10450 and DCID 1/14
as the basic criteria upon which individuals are granted
access to classified information, with E.O. 10450 set-
ting forth the requirements for Confidential, Secret
and Top Secret access and DCID 1/14 the criteria for
access to Special Compartmented Information.
While there is unanimity in the acceptance of
these guidelines, there is no standard throughout
government with regard to using the polygraph as part
of the clearance procedure. To be specific, the CIA
and NSA are the only two agencies which use the poly-
graph in this manner, and even within these two agencies
the extent of such use varies.
If one accepts the polygraph as a valid and valuable
tool in determining one's suitability for access to
classified information, then there should be a definite
requirement that any U.S. citizen who will be granted
access to a given level of classified information must
be subjected to a polygraph every five years.
As it now stands, the CIA attempts to polygraph
all staff employees, as well as any other individual
given unescorted access to Agency facilities. Only
recently the CIA began a program to polygraph selected
contractor's employees. NSA, on the other hand, poly-
graphs all of their civilian and contractors' employees,
but does not polygraph the military personnel assigned
to NSA.
Since the purpose of the clearance process would
seem to be the prevention of a Boyce/Lee or Edwin Moore
case, it seems somewhat inconsistent that a multitude
of military and civilian employees of the federal govern-
ment are granted access to the same classified informa-
tion, despite the fact that not all of these individuals
have undergone the same scrutiny from a security stand-
point.
2) Recommendation - The DCI, as head of the Intelli-
gence Community and Chairman of the NRO, should institute
a policy which requires that one undergo a polygraph ex-
amination on a five year cycle as part of routine security
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clearance processing for access to "Secret/Top Secret"
and/or "Compartmented Information." This should in-
clude the following, in addition to those now being
polygraphed, who will have such access:
a) Staff employees of Congressional
representatives
b) Federal Bureau of Investigation
employees
c) Departments of State, Justice, etc.
d) White House staff
e) Contractors' employees
II. Creation of a National Intelligence Operations
Center
1) Background - An Intelligence Community Staff
study is currently being conducted to establish a
National Intelligence Tasking Center (NITC) to centra-
lize the various human and technical collection assets
dispursed throughout the Intelligence Community into a
more manageable, responsive mechanism for your control
as DCI.
One of the National Intelligence Tasking Center's
functions would be to provide a 24-hour tasking capability
to provide collection and exploitation resources to sup-
port you in your national responsibilities to the President
and the National Security Council Staff.
The National Foreign Assessments Center will provide
you, as DCI, with a sole producer of national intelligence
and its production analysts will be your principal source
of independent judgments.
There is, however, a necessary bridge between na-
tional-level collection and exploitation and national-
level production that has not been provided for in reor-
ganization plans to date.
That bridge is a National Intelligence Operations
Center structured along the lines of the NITC whereby
you have in one organization all departmental operations
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centers represented on a 24-hour basis to follow items
of current intelligence interest. Those officers should
have at their disposal what today is regarded as depart-
mental, proprietary traffic and the power to brief. the
appropriate NIO, NFAC analyst and you, as DCI,.on items
of current and critical interest.
There is merit in such an organization in that all
departmental organizations are represented and centrally
located, the flow of information to your national pro-
duction offices would be facilitated and the briefings.
that you receive would-be timely and complete. Moreover
.you, as DCI, would have an existing national structure
and information flow upon which to impose a National
Intelligence Task Force.during a crisis situation..
2) Recommendation.- Consider the creation ofa
National Intelligence Operations Center proximate to you,
the NIO's and NFAC analysts -- that is, at CIA Headquart-
ers -- to bridge the gap between the national collection
and national production reorganizations currently being
planned.
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 IV.
Personnel Evaluation
standards in employee evaluations.
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1) Issue - Supervisors do not apply uniform
Performance evaluations, despite the use of
dardized forms, are not well written. The narra-
dardized
section will discuss such things as appearance,
tude, aggressiveness. Long narratives will focus
-4-
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n
n
sta
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tiv
atte'
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on a description of the job instead of discussing the
strengths and weaknesses of the employee. If you do
not happen to have a good writer as your supervisor,
you are penalized for the brevity of the narrative or
the lack of specific performance description. Fre-
quently, supervisors use the language of past fitness
reports and merely comment on issues raised in the past
which have nothing to do with present performance.
2) -Recommendation - Compulsory attendance for all
supervisors but especially new supervisors at such .
courses as Performance Evaluation Workshop, Fundamentals
of Supervision and Management or Supervisory Skills and.
denial. of an employee's personnel file for use in writing
a current fitness report.
V. Resource Allocation for Improved Security
.directorate's budget to take corrective action.
1) Issue - While it is clear that the DCI's actions
with regard to rectifying problems related to industrial
security on CIA contracts has led to tremendous efforts.
on behalf of private industry to improve security, little
has been done to free. Agency monies to improve our own
security posture. As you know, based on the recent se-
curity audits of Agency contractors, each has now dedi-
cated large sums of their own-money to improve both per-
sonnel and physical security.
Within the Agency, it remains extremely difficult to
obtain funds to purchase approved safes, hire new se-
curity personnel, and to generally improve upon the
Agency's security practices. While this is not.a problem
within the Headquarters building, it is a problem when
one looks at the security stature of other CIA buildings,'
both domestically and aborad. The problem stems from a
lack of understanding of where the weaknesses are located,
but as,indicated, in obtaining money from the responsible
2). Recommendation - The DCI reaffirm to all Agency
directorates the importance of maintaining excellent
security standards, and assure each directorate that
funds will be made available to correct security deficien-
cies. As a possible vehicle for such funds, consideration
should be given to providing all funds for security to.
the Office of Security, which could then distribute the
funds without affecting an already determined directorate(s)
budget. .
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VI. Personnel, Management
1) Issue - Should Career Evaluation Panels use
position headroom (slots) to determine promotions or
overall Directorate headroom as the DDO does?
The use of overall Directorate headroom allows
a panel to reward.an employee based on performance
regardless of slot. He is competitive with all others
of that grade and not locked in. However, the categories
of the employees may not always be reasonable such as a
specialists grouping where you are comparing small numbers
of unrelated specialists based on fitness reports.
Promotions within slots follow Civil Service
Commission guidelines which state if you are doing a
job whose level of difficulty warrants a specific grade,
then you should be eligible for that grade. If you are
slot bound and outstanding then you should be given a
different position which allows headroom or the position
should be reclassified if the duties have expanded. How-
ever, this can lead to-slot manipulation by managers with
employees resloted at whim to meet a certain situation.
2) Recommendation - Study the two issues carefully
before putting the Agency under one system. Some posi-
tions may lend themselves to overall headroom and others
may not. Don't lock Directorates into one or the other.
VII. Position Classification Authority
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A recent review of selected occupational series in
CIA, in response to OMB Bulletin No. 77-11, 28 June 1977,
subject: Controlling Grade Escalation in the General
Schedule, revealed that the average grade for most series'
studied was higher than the government-wide average grade
for comparable series'. Taking into consideration the
very real differences of mission, employee mix, and in
some cases function, the study showed that some of the
occupations in CIA should be reviewed very carefully as
targets for average grade reduction.
The principle of equal pay for equal work in CIA,
whether internal or external comparisons are used, has
been eroded in some instances. Part of the reason
for this is the lack of defined classification authority.
Recommendations--
a) That the Director of Personnel, through PMCD,
exercise the authority to reclassify positions at the
time they are reviewed, if they are found to be over-
graded or undergraded.
b) That a clearly defined appeals channel be
developed through which the manager can go if he dis-
agrees with classification decisions implemented by
the Director o'f Personnel.
CONFIDENTIAL
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