CONGRESSIONAL REPORT ON TRIP TO USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05T00644R000601760003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 15, 2009
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 4, 1979
• Content Type: MEMO

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E ~i a r /
i a i D_ C H IAL
C.
4 May 1979
MEMORANDUM' FOR: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer
for USSR and Eastern Europe
Legislative Counsel
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Congressional Report on Trip to USSR
1. On the 3rd of May I attended a meeting in the White House with
Dr. Brzezinski and nine members of Congress who had recently gone to
the Soviet Union. The Congressmen were:
Lucien Nedzi
Willis Gradison
Ronald Dellums
Charles Vanik
John Brademas
Richardson Preyer
Timothy Wirtz
Matthew McHugh
Richard Gephardt
2. The tenor of the comments of this group were:
a. The Soviets received them with very warm hospitality and
great candor.
b. The Soviets were very anxious'to conclude SALT.
c. The Soviets clearly want SALT because they need the money
to improve their economy. It is obvious just looking around the
Soviet Union that they have real economic problems with roads, etc.
Several stated emphatically that the Soviets they talked to
recognized that their economy was a problem. They weren't, on
interrogation, fully persuasive in this respect. They complained
repeatedly that the U.S. kept changing its position on SALT and it
was difficult to conclude the agreement. They were worried that
if it took us this long with SALT II, we would go on forever with
SALT III while new and threatening developments were proceeding in
strategic weaponry technology. They said national technical means-
CC 9D -N. I
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were adequate on both sides but that it was the United States
who had closed off discussion of any on-site inspection.
d. The Soviets were obsessed with the threat from China.
They feel the Chinese are barbarians and their leaders immoral,
and that there is no reprieve. They really threatened that our
playing the China card would be dangerous.
e. 98.4% of all applications for emigration are approved
initially and some of the remaining 1.6% eventually.
f.. They pooh-poohed civil defense--said there were no drills,
it was nothing of significance.
g. The Congressmen felt the Soviets very clearly want to
increase trade with us. The Soviets would interpret most favored
MEN for China only as a very significant sign of US/Chinese
collusion.
h. Sakharov and a number of others were strongly against
repeal of the Jackson-Vanik amendment. It wasn't clear whether
they were against a waiver with respect to it.
i. It was clear that few people understood the decisionmaking
process in the United States and especially the Congress.
j. When asked by one of the Congressmen as to the consequence
of Brezhnev's poor health, the Soviets indicated that the policy of
detente was irreversible.
STANSFIELD TURNER
171, 17 ~ A
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RANDOM THOUGHTS ON SALT VERIFICATION
The purpose of verification is not to win legal points. It is
to'protect our national interests. This does not require that we
detect every single action by the Soviets which might constitute less
than the most precise compliance with the terms of the agreement. It
does involve:
-The prospect of the Soviets being able to unveil such a
stunning action that we would be shocked into a sense of
helplessness.
-The chance that the Soviets would try to creep up on us
without alerting us, like the tortoise.
What this means then is that we,must, with intelligence devices,
be able to provide sufficient warning that we can see trends and
indicators far enough in advance to protect ourselves. These trends
and indicators, however, are,not necessarily limited to Soviet actions
in the strategic military field.
Moreover, how fast we can react to protect ourselves, a province
of the Secretary of Defense, is an important factor in weighing this
issue.
We must always remember that we do not have to have a fully
judicial case in order to act on a possible violation, i.e., a 90%
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confidence level, is not required in order to take action,on a suspect
violation. We can act on well-founded suspicion, on ambiguous behavior,
or on developments in related fields that so change the atmosphere
that restraint on the part of the Soviets no longer seems likely.
We have a range of options as to what to do short of abrogating
the Treaty: reciprocating; demanding rectification; insisting on a
positive showing that our suspicion is in error; negotiating to clarify
ambiguity; warning that we are on alert.
We must always contend with the fact that no matter how capable
our intelligence collection systems are, there can be errors. An
error which allows-a single legalistic violation is one thing, but the
chances of an accumulation of errors such that a violation would give
strategic advantage in the near term would be far less likely.
We cannot minimize the deterrent effect of our intelligence system
upon the Soviets. He not only likely has a high respect for our national
technical means, but he must always consider our clandestine activities,
particularly should he go to some large scale plan that could really
change the strategic balancer
In considering verification, we must take the larger approach
involving not only the products of our intelligence community but the.
use of our intelligence in judging the whole picture from which a
judgment of compliance or violation can be gained--including the
international political background, other indications of Soviet foreign
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V IV
policy and defense decisionmaking, the growth and problems of the
Soviet economy, our assessment of the political, bureaucratic,
economic and social forces at work within the Soviet Union, and
whether they are likely to produce continued compliance or secret
treachery.
We must always remember that verification is a continuing process
involving recurring negotiations and discussions with the Soviets.
They must be aware that they will constantly be held accountable.
When we think about what we would do if we suspected violations,
we must recognize that we would be acting on a far broader range of
information than pure intelligence about specific strategic military
actions on the part of the Soviets. Thus, if we confine our concept
of verification to the intelligence process we may unfortunately tend
to rely on intelligence only to tell us whether verification has in
fact been effective. In point of fact, the decision on whether to
push the Soviets or even to abrogate the Treaty must rely on a broader
range of considerations than what the intelligence community is likely
to be able to produce.
In short, the verification issues we face are not solely those
that should be addressed by the intelligence community--they are
exquisitely political issues which must be approached on a larger
political scale.
We fail to recognize the shortcomings in the Washington naval
treaty because of political decisions not to react to plain facts
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that were available to an informed leadership and a reluctant public--
not because of failures in intelligence.
Our intelligence capabilities should give us confidence that they
can alert us to any Soviet program of violation of SALT II substantial
enough to secure a strategic advantage over us.
Those capabilities include our confidence in assessing the mix
of political, economic, sociological, and cultural forces at work.
We cannot use the marvels of modern intelligence as a security
blanket or the lack of their perfection as a scapegoat. Rather, we
must confront the hard political decisions about our security which
will be affected not only by Soviet strategic weapons, but by political,
economic and sociological threats to our safety.
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