PRM-10 FORCE POSTURE STUDY FROM DOD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05T00644R000601780003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 21, 2009
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 19, 1977
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2009/05/21: CIA-RDP05T00644R000601780003-0
Approved For Release 2009/05/21: CIA-RDP05T00644R000601780003-0
 Executi Approved For Release 2009/05/21: CIA-RDP05T00644R000601780003-0
this memo.
Approved For Release 2009/05/21: CIA-RDP05T00644R000601780003-0
 Approved For Release 2009/05/21: CIA-RDP05T00644R000601780003-0
770/413
1 9 MAY 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/NI
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: PRM-10 Force Posture Study from DoD
General Concept: I sensed inadequate attention in the draft paper
to the following areas:
a. Possibility of conflict in the Middle East.
b. Peacetime competition for the perception of men's minds.
c. The peacetime competition in the areas of the world
other than East Asia and Europe - what may well be the
areas of greatest competition in the years ahead since
there is a general stalemate in East Asia and Western
Europe. Whether or not military force is applicable
to the possibility of expanding competition in the
non-East Asia/Europe areas seems to deserve consideration.
d. The impact of the nuclear balance on world perceptions.
e. Conflict or competition in East Asia without corresponding
competition/conflict in Western Europe. In other words,
so, I would belie
we need to keep a military capability in the area.
f. Alternatives to military force to achieve some of our
objectives - e.g., Persian Gulf Oil - don't we have
alternatives of greater stockpiling and long-term
attrition against the Soviet submarine/bomber forces
which might attack that shipping rather than direct
protection of it, e.g., dealing with major force
asymmetrigs is not only a question of what strategic
ET
Approved For Release 2009/05/21: CIA-RDP05T00644R000601780003-0
 - r - h"M f- it- *-1 p 1 ? k
Approved For Release 2009/05/21 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000601780003-0
K
forces we have, but what type they are, how we
talk about them, etc., whereas substrategy (4)
in Annex E only addresses this in terms of U.S.
superiority.
g. Our role in PRM-10, based on this paper: it seems
to me we begin by separating the strategic issues
from the conventional.
(1) Strategic - don't we need to come up with a menu
of what we anticipate Soviet strategic capabilities
will be in the next decade with and without success
itself, e.g., what will the Soviet hard-target complex
look like and against which our strategic force posture
must be gauged?
(2) Conventional.
(a) Europe - don't we need a position on what Warsaw
Pact capabilities are likely to be, against which
the gradations in NATO capability can be gauged?
(b) East Asia - don't we need to estimate what the
potential threat to the Philippines, Korea,
Okinawa and Japan are, based on a purely military
assumption, and perhaps even the potential of the
Soviets to attack the Chinese, or vice versa?
(c) Peacekeeping in local wars: Don't we need to make
an estimate of what the Soviet capabilities are for
extending their influence to the peacetime use of
forces and/or for military intervention, in areas
noncontiguous to the Soviet Union?
c~7" -A NSFIELD TURNER
TUP SECRET
Approved For Release 2009/05/21 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000601780003-0