TILTING TOWARD BAGHDAD: GULF STATES' AID TO IRAQ

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP06T00412R000200020001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 22, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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Tilting Toward Baghdad:
Gulf States' Aid to Iraq
proved For ReleasWpCI
National
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Top Secret
January ky
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National Ton Secret
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Tilting Toward Baghdad:
Gulf States' Aid to Iraq
An Intelligence Assessment
Information available as of 24 January 1981
has been used in the preparation of this report.
This assessment was prepared b
Near East South Asia Division, Office of Political
Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and
should be directed to Chief NE A Division, OPA,
This paper has been coordinated with the Office
of Economic Research, the National Intelligence
Officer for Near East and South Asia, and the
Directorate of Operations
Top Secret
PA 81-100300
0
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Gulf rulers would like the war to end quickly with both sides weakened
militarily. Gulf leaders see a rough balance of power between Iran and Iraq
as their best protection against manipulation by either country, and they
believe a clear military victory by either side would open the way for Soviet
gains in the defeated state.
Continuation of the present military stalemate, on the other hand, carries
several risks in their view. The war adds to domestic political tensions,
disrupts the oil trade, deepens the split in Arab ranks, and risks Iranian
retaliation against those states helping Iraq. Prolonged warfare, moreover, is
likely to lead to additional Iraqi requests for help. Gulf Arabs might be able
to stall Baghdad, but they have few alternatives to compliance.
Gulf rulers will, in any case, continue to pursue flexible, low visibility
policies that maximize their options and preserve as far as possible an
opening to better relations with Tehran at a future time. Some states, like
Kuwait, may be able to translate Iraq's unprecedented requests for assist-
ance from them into Iraqi concessions in other areas, such as resolution of
longstanding border disputes.
Tilting Toward Baghdad:
Gulf States' Aid to Iraq
Key Judgments The Arab states of the Persian Gulf are helping the Iraqi war effort because
they hope a militarily chastized Iran will be less inclined to export its
revolution and because they fear the consequences of antagonizing Bagh-
dad. The aid is primarily in the form of loans, oil concessions, and provision
of safe haven for aircraft and facilities for transshipping goods. It represents
a crucial contribution to the Iraqi cause as long as Baghdad's ports are
closed by the war.
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Tilting Toward Baghdad:
Gulf States' Aid to Ira
Gulf security following the British withdrawal from
the Persian Gulf in the early 1970s was built on
informal Saudi-Iranian cooperation. Security meant
preserving the status quo, limiting outside intervention
in Gulf affairs, and preventing Communist encroach-
ment in the region. Iraq was isolated politically and
viewed as a Soviet-backed spoiler intent on-replacing
the conservative monarchies with pro-Iraqi, leftist re-
gimes.
Iraq, since its signing in 1975 of the Algiers Accord
with Iran, has made a concerted effort to alter this view
and to reduce its own isolation. Iraq's greatest success
has come since November 1978, when it successfully
brokered the first of two Arab summits following
Egypt's rapprochement with Israel and the signing of
the Camp David Accords. Former President Ahmad
Hasan al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein, who was then
Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Command
Council, presented the image of pragmatists who were
filling an Arab leadership vacuum caused by Egypt's
defection and Saudi Arabia's weakness. Despite lin-
gering mistrust, subsequent Iraqi efforts aimed at
strengthening Arab solidarity were welcomed; they
included improved relations with Jordan and the Pal-
estine Liberation Organization, sponsorship of an
eight-point pan-Arab charter calling for the elimina-
leading directly to war with Iran in September 1980.
Gulf leaders watched developments in Iran following
the Shah's ouster with growing dismay. Their concern
over the failure of the United States to sustain a
longtime ally was replaced by fear that clerical Iran
would export its brand of religious revolution to their
countries. Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait in
particular experienced an upsurge in sectarian violence
through the summer of 1979 as Gulf Shias were ex-
horted by fanatical Iranian mullahs to rise ainst
their Sunni masters.
Gulf leaders became more receptive to Baghdad's
warnings of the danger from Tehran and to the view
that Arab states must unite against it. By mid-1980,
Baghdad was seriously courting the Gulf states to
further its own regional ambitions and gain allies
tion of foreign bases in the region, and a call for an Shaykh Saqr al-Qasimi, ruler of Ras al-Khaymah-
economic program aimed at eliminating Arab finan- part of the United Arab Emirates-did not discourage
cial dependence on non-Arabs. Gulf leaders viewed Iraq from a more confrontational olic during a visit
Iraq's ambitions to leadership in the Arab world, the to Baghdad in mid-Se tember.
Gulf, and the nonaligned movement as just that-
ambitions that could be controlled and even used to
moderate Iraqi behavior to balance similar ambitions
elsewhere, and to wean Baghdad away from Soviet
influence.
Impact of the War
The event that most changed the Gulf Arabs' view of
Iraq's role was the revolution in Iran. It altered the
regional power balance and destroyed the old, informal
security system. It also led to more intense, Iranian
meddling in Iraq, thereby destroying Baghdad's ra-
tionale for signing the 1975 accord with Iran and
JTwo days later,
Baghdad announced its abrogation of the 1975 accord
and sent high-ranking envoys to Saudi Arabia, Ku-
wait, Bahrain, the UAE, Qatar, Oman and North
Yemen to seek support
The Early View
In the early days of the war, Gulf leaders believed
hostilities would be brief and the objectives and dam-
ages limited. They hoped Iraq's "lesson teaching"
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would sober Iran, but they took a neutral public stance
to avoid antagonizing the clerics in Tehran. As the war
progressed, however, the rulers of the small Arab
states began to give discreet financial and logistical aid
to Baghdad. Gulf rulers privately were sympathetic to
Iraq's announced war aims-control of Arab territory
ceded to Iran under the 1975 accord, return of the Gulf
islands to the UAE, and an Iranian pledge of non-
interference in the affairs of its neighbors. Gulf rulers,
however, maintained their public stance of neutrality.
What led the Gulf Arabs to favor Iraq at this point in
the war? The answer is part hope and part fear. The
war to some extent accelerated a development that had
begun two years earlier with President Sadat's visit to
Jerusalem. Gulf Arabs hoped that by supporting Iraq's
pan-Arab initiatives then and in the current war with
Iran they would increase their leverage with Baghdad
and encourage future cooperation on regional and local
issues. They shared Iraq's interest in presenting a
united Arab front on the issue of Arab-Israeli negotia-
tions and the future of the Palestinians. Several of the
states, in addition, hoped to ease local tensions, settle
border disputes, and end Iraq's attempts to subvert
their regimes. The Saudis, moreover, saw an opportu-
nity to encourage Iraq to put greater distance between
itself and the Soviets, an aspiration shared by Jordan's
King Hussein
it to or not. Accommodation with and discreet aid to
Baghdad was the preferred course, if it could be done
without antagonizing Tehran. Gulf leaders also be-
lieved Iraq would score a quick and easy victory over
Iran and hoped to avoid the Iraqi anger that would be
Fear was an equally strong motive. The collapse of Iran
created a power vacuum in the Gulf which Iraq would
try to fill whether the less powerful Gulf Arabs wanted
directed at them if they failed to help.
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Short-Term Consequences of the Tilt Toward Iraq
Saddam's ability to draw the Gulf Arabs closer to him
has undermined the Gulf states' protestations of neu-
trality and drawn the ire of Iran. Tehran went from
verbal warnings to military force in early November
1980 when its aircraft bombed the Kuwaiti border post
of Abdali
Iraqi leaders, on the other hand, believe the Gulf Arabs
should be giving more help in the war against the
ancient Persian enemy. They have pushed the Gulf
leaders to endorse their war aims fully and openly H
_________________________________Baghdad has
rejected Gulf Arab attempts to arrange a cease-fire,
although it has endorsed a Saudi-Algerian-Arab
League mission's proposal for Islamic Conference
mediation.
Saddam is aware of the lack of enthusiasm some rulers
have for his war with Iran and of their reluctance to
break ties completely with Tehran. He is willing to
overlook this lest he jeopardize the critical economic
and logistical assistance Gulf leaders are giving him
and further fragment the moderate Arab camp.
Saddam is also conscious of the constraints that inhibit
Gulf Arabs from openly endorsing his cause and seems
is coupled with behind-the-scenes help
satisfied, for now, with their official silence so long as it
to the war that leaves both Iran and Iraq weakened.
They hope their discreet aid to Baghdad and the
rounds of inter-Arab contacts that the war has stimu-
Outlook
Weak and vulnerable, the Arab states of the Persian
Gulf would like to avoid antagonizing either of their
more powerful neighbors and would prefer a quick end
lated will not provoke Tehran.
ence in the Yemens.
Despite the risk involved, however, Gulf Arab leaders
believe their policy of offering Baghdad limited sup-
port has won them gains. Saudi Arabia and Oman,
long concerned about Communist encroachment in the
region, believe that moderate Arab support for Iraq is
helping to wean Saddam away from the USSR and
that he will be a useful ally against further Soviet
encroachment in the region. They believe Iraqi aid
could be especially useful in weakening Soviet influ-
Gulf Arabs also believe that Arab support is
moderating ]Iraqi policies toward their countries. Iraq
has become less strident in its opposition to the Gulf
states' relations with the United States. It had already
been cutting back its support for antiregime dissidents
in several of the countries-Saudi Arabia, Oman, and
Bahrain. for example-before the war started. I
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Ton Speret
Gulf leaders are also probably gratified by Saddam's
conciliatory gestures to Sultan Qaboos of Oman.
Baghdad had warned the Sultan over the past two
years of the risks he ran in supporting Egyptian Presi-
dent Sadat's signing of the Camp David Accords and
in deciding to permit US military facilities in Oman.
The war has had one further important positive con-
sequence for the Gulf states-it has stimulated new
interest in greater security cooperation among them.
Gulf leaders were apparently not intimidated by the
Iranian air attacks on Kuwait in November, but the
war has made them more conscious of their military
weakness and of the possible benefits of mutual se-
On the negative side, the war is frustrating progress on
important pan-Arab issues. Saudi Arabia and the
smaller Gulf states believe the Iraq-Iran war has dis-
tracted attention from what they see is the central
Middle Eastern problem-the Arab-Israeli confronta-
tion. The war, especially as seen by the Saudis, has
added to disarray in the Arab world, making it all the
more difficult to present a united front against Israel or
apply pressure on the Palestinian question. Gulf Arabs
fear Israel will successfully exploit Arab disunity and
further delay addressing the Palestinian problem.
They believe failure to settle that issue, in turn, will
encourage radicalism in the Arab world and provide
further opportunities for Soviet gains in the regionr
The Gulf countries traditionally have sought to bal-
ance the power of Iraq and Iran. Support for Bagh-
dad's war effort earns Iran's enmity and ieopardizes
this policy.
Support for the Sunni Arab regime in Iraq may carry a
cost for the Sunni rulers of countries that have substan-
tial Shia populations. Bahrain, whose population is
almost 60 percent Shia, is particularly vulnerable to
Iranian-orchestrated demonstrations against the re-
gime. Kuwait and the UAE also have large minority
populations linked to Iran by their Shia religion, Per-
sian origin, or political sympathy for Iran's revolution.
Saudi Arabia's Shias make up only 5 percent of the
population but are concentrated in the vitally impor-
tant Eastern Province. Shias in these countries and in
Qatar are relatively quiet, mainly contributing money
and medical supplies to Iranian religious leaders and
relief organizations. Should Iran appear to be gaining
the upper hand militarily, however, Gulf Shias could
become much bolder and more aggressive in asserting
their views.
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The longer the war drags on, the more unpredictable
its outcome or the behavior of the antagonists becomes.
The task for Gulf policymakers is to ensure that they
can deal with whichever party emerges on top, while at
the same time protecting themselves against an expan-
sion of the war to their territory. That means keeping
open channels of communication to Iran, as low a
profile as possible on aid to Iraq, and a local arms
buildup that depends on close but discreet security
cooperation with the West, including the United
States.
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