LEBANON: EDGING TOWARD DISASTER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP06T00412R000200220001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 24, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 21, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
24 April 1981
LEBANON: Edging Toward Disaster
Key Judgments
('~4
The fighting in Lebanon reflects the growing willingness of
the Phalange to challenge foreign dominance of the country.
Bashir Jumayyil is the driving force behind Christian
assertiveness. His ultimate goal is to control the central
government in Beirut.
The Syrians reacted to Jumayyil's challenge at Zahlah
because it threatened their control over the access to Beirut and
the main avenue of approach for an Israeli flanking attack into
Syria.
Jumayyil is trying to force Western intervention and is
probably prepared to risk a new civil war to achieve it. He
seems to believe this strategy is working.
Assad is prepared to risk a war with Israel rather than lose
control over events in Lebanon.
Jumayyil is counting on the Israelis to bail him out should
Syrian pressure on him become too great. They probably will.
Continuing escalation would generate intense pressure on the
US by the Arabs to force Israel to pull back. Tel Aviv's
resistance would quickly lead to a major US-Israeli
confrontation, and the US would thus have alienated both our
Israeli and Arab allies.
This memorandum was prepared by of the Nea26X1
East South Asia Division, Office of Political Analysis.
Questions and comments m be addressed to Chief, Near East South
Asia Division 25X1
25X1
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The Soviets are using the turmoil to argue for their own
involvement in international efforts to contain the violence.
They will not support any plan that threatens to undermine
Damascus' influence in Lebanon.
ALL parties to the conflict accept Sarkis as representing
the legitimate authority of the state. He and the Army are the
best hope for an acceptable mechanism to monitor and enforce any
agreement. But no short term "solution" will hold for Long while
Bashir JumayyiZ controls Phalange policy.
Discussion
The heavy fighting which has wracked Lebanon over the past,
three weeks reflects the growing willingness of the Phalange--
Lebanon's largest and most powerful Christian faction--to
challenge Syrian and Palestinian--that is, foreign--dominance of
the country. In a deeper sense, however, the Phalange is acting
out the frustrations of the Lebanese Christian community over the
lack of progress toward finding a solution to the country's
sectarian problems and toward ending Lebanon's role as a pawn in
the Arab-Israeli dispute.
Bashir Jumayyil, the 33-year-old son of the Phalange Party's
aging leader and head of its 20,000-man militia, is the driving
force behind Christian assertiveness. His ultimate goal is to
expel the Syrians and the Palestinians and to create and dominate
a Christian region sufficiently powerful to control the central
government in Beirut. He has moved forcefully over the past year
to consolidate Phalange control over the Christian heartland and
more recently has sought to extend it to Christian groups on its
periphery, such as those in Zahlah.
Syria did not interfere with these efforts as long as they
did not directly involve its interests or were limited to
Christian groups over which Damascus did not in any case have
much influence. The Syrians reacted to Jumayyil's challenge at
Zahlah because it threatened their control over the central Bekaa
Valley which controls access to Beirut and is the main potential
avenue of approach for an Israeli flanking attack into Syria.
The Phalange Strategy
The Phalange is pursuing a confrontation strategy aimed at
creating a level of tension great enough to force outside
intervention. Jumayyil appears convinced that only major
outbreaks of fighting in Beirut and elsewhere can draw the
necessary worldwide, especially Western European and US,
attention to the plight of the Christian community in Lebanon and
motivate intervention on its behalf. He is probably prepared to
risk a new civil war to achieve Western intervention.
Jumayyil seems to have used Zahlah to test his strategy and
there is some evidence that he believes it has worked. Although
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he has lost the military battle to the Syrians he believes he has
scored a propaganda victory in the West, particularly in the US,
for his cause by, in a sense, martyring Zahlah. This is likely
to embolden him to seek further such "triumphs" by baiting the
Syrians elsewhere.
Jumayyil is counting on Israel to bail him out should his
strategy fail and Syrian pressure on him become too great. They
probably will. Israel's aim is to prevent Lebanon from becoming
a confrontation state responsive to Syria. It considers support
of the Phalange and Major Haddad's southern Christian militia
basic to this strategy and provides them with military training,
advice, weapons, supplies, and other support. Senior Israelis,
including Prime Minister Begin and Chief of Staff Eitan, are in
direct touch with Jumayyil and have met with him during the
current crisis. Although they may have urged him not to provoke
a massive Syrian attack, they undoubtedly also reaffirmed
Israel's unshakable support for the Christians' fight against the
Syrians and Palestinians.
The increased Israeli raids into Lebanon and the tough
public rhetoric by senior Israeli military officers reinforce
Jumayyil's intransigence. Moreover, Jumayyil is heartened by
what he perceives to be the new US administration's more
receptive attitude toward Christian concerns and its more active
anti-Soviet and pro-Israel policy.
The Syrians
President Assad has on the whole moved cautiously against
the Phalange, seeking to avoid a confrontation with Israel while
attempting to neutralize Jumayyil politically and militarily.
Assad's basic strategy is to maintain Syria's dominance over
Lebanon while allowing a controllable level of tension there as
an additional bargaining lever in eventual Arab-Israeli peace
negotiations.
Syria will not give in to Phalange pressure to limit its
freedom of movement in Lebanon, however, nor will it agree to any
international force there that would have a similar impact.
Assad's still somewhat shaky domestic political situation and his
isolation in the Arab world reinforce his conviction that Syria
cannot afford to lose ground in Lebanon.
Assad is nevertheless prepared to risk a war with Israel
rather than lose control over events in Lebanon. If Israel
intervened directly in support of the Phalange, Assad would
challenge Israeli forces and it is-not at all certain that he
would not allow the confrontation to spread outside Lebanon to
force Soviet and US intervention. A confrontation with Israel
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would help him break out of his isolation in the Arab world and
might also serve to rally domestic support for his minority
Alawite regime.
The Soviet Position
Moscow's main concern over the present situation is the
challenge it presents to the Syrian position in Lebanon. The
Soviets will not support any plan that threatens to undermine
Damascus' grip. Syria is the Soviets' most important Middle
Eastern ally and the only Arab confrontation state with which
they have good relations. The Soviets, moreover, rely on Assad
to remain adamantly opposed to the Camp David peace process and
to continue to pressure other Arab states--notably Jordan--to
maintain their opposition. They also probably calculate that
bilateral ties--symbolized by last October's Friendship Treaty--
will help ensure a Soviet role in any future Middle East
negotiations.
Moscow is also using the present turmoil to argue for its
own direct involvement in international efforts to contain the
violence. The Soviets may also exploit the situation to lend
more urgency to President Brezhnev's 23 February proposal for an
international conference on the Middle East with Soviet
participation.
Lebanese Muslims have so far largely avoided being drawn
into the Syrian-Phalange conflict but this may happen if the
fighting drags on. The Syrians are actively recruiting the
Muslims for participation in their contingency plans for a multi-
front campaign against the Phalange. Moreover, Israeli raids,,
Tel Aviv's provocative pro-Christian statements, and Haddad's
shelling of Muslim towns in the south contribute to a growing
polarization in Lebanon along Christian-Muslim lines, threatening
to tear the cabinet and the Lebanese Army apart.
The Palestinians, too, have largely stayed out of the
fighting, with the exception of the Syrian-controlled Palestine
Liberation Army contingent in Beirut. But PLO head Arafat is
under strong pressure from radical Palestinian groups to increase
terrorist operations against Israel and to respond vigorously to
Israeli preemptive attacks. This leads to a cycle of violence in
southern Lebanon that only fuels the tension in Beirut and
elsewhere in the country and, in turn, increases the risk of
direct Syrian-Israeli hostilities.-
Implications for the US
If left to their own devices there is little to prevent the
Phalange and the Syrians from heading down the path of continuing
escalation in the fighting, ultimately bringing direct Israeli
intervention to bail out Jumayyil. This would generate intense
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pressure on the US by the Arabs--vigorously supported by the
Soviets--to force Israel to pull back. Tel Aviv's resistance to
US pressure to refrain from doing what it considers vital to its
regional security interests would quickly lead to a major US-
Israeli confrontation and the US would thus have alienated both
our Israeli and Arab allies.
President Sarkis and his government are too weak to control
events but nevertheless represent the only vehicle for a way out
that all parties could conceivably accept--given sufficient
pressure on them. The other Arabs see no effective way to
moderate the conflict and are therefore reluctant to incur
political costs by pressing the Syrians. Although Kuwait has
called for a conference of all parties to the conflict, it has no
idea of how to bridge the gap separating them.
All parties to the conflict accept Sarkis as representing
the legitimate authority of the state. Building on this might
serve as the fig leaf required to force agreement on a face-
saving 'compromise that would at least serve to prevent a major
explosion. Because the Syrian's maintain that their presence is
a legitimate extension of the Lebanese central government's
authority, they might be vulnerable to US and international
pressure on them to increase their support for Sarkis' ongoing
efforts to foster a dialogue among the parties and to expand the
government's presence through the use of the Lebanese Army in a
peace-keeping role. He and the Army represent the best hope for
an acceptable mechanism to monitor and enforce any agreement.
But no short term "solution" is likely to hold while Bashir
Jumayyil controls Phalange policy.
The Lebanese Army is still largely Christian-led and many of
its officers are Phalange sympathizers. Jumayyil might accept an
arrangement whereby some of these units would replace Palestinian
troops along the confrontation line in Beirut, for instance.
Damascus might be pressured into accepting such an arrangement,
provided no Syrian troops were replaced.
Any solution would, however, prove very unstable and require
close monitoring by the US and continuing strong support for
Sarkis. Jumayyil would continue to probe Syrian and Palestinian
defenses and deliberately seek to keep tensions high to provoke
outside intervention. A more lasting solution is possible only
in the context of progress toward a settlement of the Arab-
Israeli dispute.
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SUBJECT: Lebanon: Edging Toward Disaster
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - D/NFAC
1 - DD/NFAC
1 - NFAC/Registry
4 - IDCB
4 - D/OCO
1 - D/OPA=
2 - OPA/PS
1 - C/OPA/NESA
3 - OPA/NESA/ISL
NFAC/OPA/NESA/ISL 24Apr81)
14 0
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