SYRIAN INTENTIONS IN LEBANON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP06T00412R000200410001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM FOR: D/NFAC
7E44
HQS
NFAC_ X ~ -F I
Attached is a copy of the memorandum we
prepared on Syrian intentions in Lebanon
in response to the request from the NSC.
It and a Special Analysis by
on the subject published in the 21 August
NID were sent via LDX to the NSC on
Saturday. Also attached are some extra
copies if you wish to forward An the DCI.
Attachment:
PAM #81-10350
H lene L. Boatner
Director
Political Analysis
Date 8 September 1981
FORM USE PREVIOUS
5-75- __ 0-t LDWOKSr - i
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
5 September 1981
SYRIAN INTENTIONS IN LEBANON
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I ~f
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Syria does not appear to be planning a major military move
against the Christian Phalange in Lebanon in the near future.
We believe the tough statements by Syria and its Lebanese sur-
rogates prior to the Arab Conciliation Committee meeting in
Beirut on September 3-4 were meant to set the stage for that
meeting rather than for an imminent move against the Phalange
Syria has just. obtained Phalange agreement to two of its
key demands and this development probably will temporarily 25X1
ease tensions in Lebanon. Phalange militia chief Bashir
Jumayyil has acquiesced to a Syrian-inspired plan by the Arab
Conciliation Committee to form a group to monitor the Lebanese
coast and ports to ensure that no military supplies from Israel
reach the Phalange. The two sides also agreed cease media
attacks against each other.
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Syrian efforts in the next few weeks will be focused on
establishing the monitoring group, which will include repre-
sentatives of Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the
Arab League, in the hope of inserting some Syrian military
observers in Christian--controlled ports along the Lebanese
coast. There almost certainly will be delays in implementing
this arrangement because the Christians are likely to stall
and insist that the group's mandate be broadened to include
monitoring of arms shipments across the Syrian border--a major
resupply route for Palestinian and Lebanese Muslim factions.
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This memorandum was prepared by the Israel-Levant Branch,
Near East South Asia Division, Office of Political Analysis,
National Foreign Assessment Center, in response to a request
from the National Security Council. It was coordinated with
the Office of Strategic Research. Information available as
of 5 September 1981 was used in its preparation. Questions
and comments are welcome and may be addressed to Chief, Near
East South Asia Division,
PAM 7181- 10350
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Over the past year, Syrian President Assad has moved
cautiously to counter the growth of Phalange influence and
assertiveness, while avoiding steps that would provoke a
major confrontation with Israel. Assad will nonetheless
continue to use a variety of political and military pressure
tactics in an attempt to neutralize the Phalange-Israeli con-
nection and gradually reduce Phalange influence in Lebanese
politics. This strategy includes using surrogates such as
former President Franjiyah in northern Lebanon or leftist
Muslim groups in west Beirut to increase tensions per' -
cally and maintain military pressure on the Phalange. 35X1
We assess that Syria is unlikely to attempt to seize the
ports through which the Phalange receives military supplies
from Israel. Assad and other Syrian leaders know that the
major military offensive needed to seize the ports would pro-
voke an inevitable and quick Israeli military response. We
believe Assad will continue to use incremental steps designed
to whittle away Phalange influence and minimize the risk of
Israeli intervention. An assessment of.Assad's Lebanese
strategy that recently appeared in the National gence
Daily is attached for your perusal. 25X1
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SYRIA-LEBANON: Assad's Strategy
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President Assad appears increasingly concerned that the Arab
Conciliation Commit-tee on Lebanon will urge him to surrort a solu-
tion of the crisis there that will commit Synia to a phased with-
drawal of its troops. He will oppose any plan that threatens
Damascus's preeminent political influence in Lebanon. At a minimum
he will maintain Syria's military presence in the Bekaa Valley2 X1
Assad probably. believes that a controlled level of
tension in Lebanon will enable him to maintain Syrian
leverage there and force the US and other Arabs to take
Syria's interests into account. He knows that the
Lebanese Government will continue to rely on Syrian forces
to intervene in the fighting among the heavily armed fac-
tions in Lebanon. 25X1
To strengthen Syria's hand in Lebanon, including its
leverage over the PLO, Damascus has created a new militia--
the Arab Cavalier Force--backed by Assad's brother Rifaat
and led by officers from Rifaat's elite Defense Companies.
The group recently clashed with Palestinian-supported Mus-
lim factions in Tripoli. It may be used soon to intimidate
Palestinian and Lebanese Muslim factions in Beirut into co-
operating more closely with the Syrians. 2X1
Strains With Palestinians and Christians
Syrian relations with PLO leader Arafat are again
strained. The Syrians lost credibility in Palestinian
eyes by not responding with military force to Israeli
strikes against Palestinian positions in Lebanon last
month. 25X1
The Syrians in turn are unhappy with Arafat for ac-
ceotinc a cease-fire without consulting them. 25X1
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Damascus also is keeping the pressure on the
Christian Phalange Party. The Syrians apparently have
demanded that the declaration last month committing the
Phalange to sever any ties with Israel be upheld by moni-
toring the Lebanese coastline for Israeli arms shipments.
In addition, they demanded that the Phalange turn over its
Israeli-supplied arms to Lebanese authorities. Phalange
radicbroadcasts claim the Syrians are instigating clashes
northern Lebanon to reduce Phalange influence there.
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Strategic Considerations
Lebanon is militarily important to the Syrians, who
believe that control of the Bekaa Valley is necessary to
guard against an Israeli flanking attack on Damascus from
the west. The Syrian military presence in Lebanon also
gives Assad the means to rein in Arafat and to keep him
from negotiating without Syrian approval. Assad knows
that he must retain special influence over the Palestinians
because they constitute his principal leverage in any
future negotiations fo2 eace settlement and the return
of the Golan Heights. 25X1
Syrian influence in Beirut also helps to reduce the
possibility that Lebanon might reach an unacceptable
agreement with Israel directly. Periodic low-level clashes
with Israeli forces in Lebanon, moreover, enable Assad
to strengthen his credentials as the major Arab staZ5X1
confronting Israel while minimizing the risk to the
Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement on the Golan.
Assad remains suspicious of US intentions in the
region and will oppose any initiative on Lebanon unless
Syria has been consulted in advance. He probably is
concerned about press speculation that a settlement of
the Lebanese problem could provide an opening for a new
initiative on the Palestinian question. Despite his
wariness of the US, Assad wants to be included in any
new negotiations and would like the US to come to him
with alternatives for a comprehensive peace.
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Tcp Secret
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21 August 1961
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SECRET
SUBJECT: Syrian Intentions in Lebanon
Distribution:
Original - LDXd to NSC
1 - D/NFAC
1 - DD/NFAC
1 - NFAC Registry
1 - D/OSR
1 - OSR/CAD
1 - OSR/CA/N
1 - C/NIC
1 - NIO/NESA
4 - OCO/ICDB
1 - D/OPA
2 - OPA/PS
1 - OPA/NESA
3 - OPA/NESA
NFAC/OPA/NESA/ISL (5Sep8l)
Aooroved For Release 2007/05/31: CIA-RDP06TOO412R000200410001-3