SUDAN S NIMEIRI: MORE PROBLEMS AND FEWER OPTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP06T00412R000200540001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
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• Content Type: REPORT

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National secret
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Fewer Options
Sudan's Nimeiri:
More Problems and
An Intelligence Memorandum
Secret
NESA 81-10036
November 1981
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Sudan's Nimeiri:
More Problems and
Fewer Options
Summary Since mid-1981 there has been a significant increase in Libyan efforts to
bring down the Nimeiri regime. These have included plans to assassinate
Nimeiri and other senior Sudanese officials, sabotage and terrorism
operations, and efforts to create unrest in outlying areas, principally the
west and the south. It is such Libyan-sponsored subversion that constitutes
the greatest immediate threat to Nimeiri's continued rule rather than the
possibility of a conventional attack by Libyan troops.
Given the intensity of Libya's anti-Sudanese effort and the possibility that
some plots to kill Nimeiri have gone undetected by Sudanese security, the
chances that the President could be assassinated have increased. If Nimeiri
should be killed or forced to leave office during the next few months
because of ill health, he would probably be succeeded by First Vice
President Abd al-Majid Khalil. Under Khalil, Sudan's pro-Western and
pro-Egyptian foreign policy would change very little. Khalil, however, lacks
Nimeiri's skill in dealing with Sudan's various contending groups and
might soon be replaced by another military leader.
The danger to the government may have been reduced temporarily by the
arrest in recent weeks of several thousand refugees and unemployed
Sudanese in the Khartoum area. In addition, the domestic opposition is
divided, and no opposition leader is acceptable to all of Sudan's disparate
political and tribal groups. More important, there is no evidence of
widespread dissatisfaction in the military, Nimeiri's principal power-base.
Consequently, Nimeiri appears capable of surviving the present challenges
Over the longer term, the survival of the Nimeiri regime depends on the
ability of the government to reverse the nation's economic decline. The
austerity measures required under the terms of an International Monetary
Fund reform program carry significant political risks. Many Sudanese,
especially those in urban areas, hold the regime responsible for what they
regard as intolerable living conditions. Further increases in the prices of
basic commodities could lead to widespread public disorder that would test
the loyalty of the military to the regime
This memorandum was written byl (Arab-Israeli Division, Office of Near
East - South Asia Analysis. It has been coordinated with the National Intelligence Officer
for Africa, the Directorate of Operations, the Office of African and Latin American
Analysis and the Office of Central Reference. Information as of 4 November 1981 was used
in its preparation. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief
Arablsraeli Division, Office of Near East - South Asia Analysis,
Secret
NESA 81-10036
November 1981
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Sudan's Nimeiri:
More Problems and
Fewer Options
President Gaafar Nimeiri has been in power since May 1969, longer than
any other Sudanese leader since the country gained independence in 1956.
The 51-year-old former Army officer has survived three major coup
attempts and widespread antigovernment demonstrations in August 1979.
His long tenure is due largely to his ability to maintain the loyalty of the
military and to the considerable political skill he has demonstrated in
dealing with Sudan's disparate political and tribal groups. His low-key,
unpretentious leadership style has led many Sudanese to prefer him to
more controversial figures on the national scene, none of whom is
acceptable to all the major opposition groups.
A stroke forced Nimeiri to curtail his activities last year and fueled
speculation about his continued ability to govern. He underwent surgery in
June 1980, however, and by early 1981 he was able to resume his full
schedule of activities.
Initially an adherent of leftist Arab socialism of the Nasirist variety,
Nimeiri abruptly moved Sudanese policies to the right following an
abortive, Communist-led coup in July 1971. Since that time he has become
a moderating force in the region and an obstacle to the expansion of Soviet
influence. Nimeiri's endorsement of the Camp David accords in September
1978 led Libyan leader Qadhafi, who had backed rightist coup attempts in
1975 and 1976, to resume financial support and military training for
Sudanese dissidents. Sudan's role in early 1981 as the leader of a
diplomatic campaign to force Qadhafi to withdraw his troops from Chad
and public calls by Nimeiri for the Libyan leader's removal led to a further
intensification of Qadhafi's anti-Nimeiri activities.
Nimeiri has permitted the use of Sudanese territory as a safe haven and
supply base for the forces of Chadian dissident Hissein Habre. Habre's
forays into Chad generated a number of Libyan airstrikes on his staging
areas in Sudan between early September and mid-October. The Libyan
withdrawal from Chad, begun in early November, should ease Sudanese
concerns about Qadhafi's intentions. The Sudanese have responded to the
withdrawal by asking Habre to cease his operations from Sudanese
territory. Libya's withdrawal of its troops from Chad, however, is the result
of Tripoli's desire to avoid further international censure and concern over
possible US, French, and Egyptian actions. It does not signal a change in
Qadhafi's anti-Nimeiri stance.
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Despite Sudanese claims in early October that Libyan forces were about to
launch a military attack across Sudan's border with Chad, the greatest
immediate threat to the Nimeiri regime appears to be Libyan-sponsored
subversion. Libyan leader Qadhafi's efforts to topple Nimeiri have includ-
ed plans to assassinate the Sudanese President and other government
officials, the sabotage of key economic installations, terrorism, and possibly
raids from Chad into western Sudan by Libyan-trained Sudanese dissi-
Sudanese concern over these efforts has been heightened by the
assassination of President Sadat, Nimeiri's principal ally in the Middle
East.
The conclusion of the Libyan-Ethiopian-South Yemeni friendship agree-
ment in August 1981 has prompted speculation that Ethiopian leader
Mengistu might cooperate with Qadhafi against Nimeiri, a development
that would place Sudan between hostile neighbors. Both Nimeiri and
Mengistu have benefited from the Sudanese-Ethiopian rapprochement
reached in early 1980. Nimeiri has limited Sudanese and Arab support for
the Eritrean insurgents, and Mengistu has kept Sudanese dissidents in
Ethiopia under tight control. In late August and early September the
Sudanese, at least in part out of a desire to mollify Mengistu, disarmed and
expelled elements of the Eritrean Liberation Front after fighting between it
and the stronger Eritrean People's Liberation Front spilled over into
Sudanese territory. Mengistu, however, may have decided that the finan-
cial rewards of cooperation with Libya outweigh the benefits of continued
cooperation with Sudan and may permit Libya to use the Sudanese
dissidents in Ethiopia for subversion in Sudan
Domestic Opposition Nimeiri's skill in balancing the various groups seeking power has prevented
the development of broad opposition to his rule. Through his policy of
reconciliation with conservative opponents, which he initiated after the
coup attempt in 1976, he was able to persuade the two major opposition
groups-the Ansar religious sect and the Muslim Brotherhood-to aban-
don their efforts to overthrow the government. At the same time he has
used the Army and security forces to neutralize those groups that continue
openly to oppose his regime-the National Unionist Party, the Baathists,
and the Sudanese Communist Party
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Although considerably weakened after its defeats by Nimeiri, the Ansar
Muslim sect, whose adherents constitute approximately one-fifth of Su-
dan's 18 million people, is a significant force on the Sudanese political
scene. Its ability to exert influence, however, has been eroded by factional-
ism. The principal Ansar leader, Sadiq al-Mahdi, returned from exile in
1977 under the terms of the national reconciliation, but he has been
frustrated by Nimeiri's refusal to give him a meaningful role and has
withdrawn from direct participation in the government. A small group
headed by Sadiq's cousin, Wali-ad-Din al-Hadi al-Mahdi, never accepted
reconciliation with Nimeiri and continues to oppose the regime.
The Ansars could be used by Qadhafi in his efforts to destabilize the
present government. Reflecting the historic Ansar distrust of Egypt, Sadiq
is at odds with Nimeiri over his close alignment with Cairo. He has also op-
posed Nimeiri's decision to resist the Libyan presence in Chad and Sudan's
offer of military facilities to the United States.
Since the initiation of Nimeiri's national reconciliation policy, the Muslim
Brotherhood has actively participated in the government, but it is almost
certainly maneuvering to place itself in a favorable position if Nimeiri is
forced out. The most conservative of all organized Islamic groups in Sudan,
its primary base has been the faculty and student body at the University of
Khartoum. Despite its small membership-estimated at between 60,000
and 300,000 nationwide-the appeal of the Brotherhood's militant brand
of Islam and its willingness to use intimidation to achieve its ends have
made it a formidable political force. The Brotherhood operated as a
clandestine organization from 1969, when Nimeiri banned all political
parties, until 1977, when it accepted Nimeiri's offer of reconciliation.
Although its leader, Hasan al-Turabi, serves as Attorney General, Sudan-
ese security officials regard the organization as a threat to the regime and
closely monitor its activities.
The National Unionist Party is the most important of those groups actively
seeking to overthrow Nimeiri. It reflects the views of the better educated
and more secular merchants, civil servants, and professionals who oppose
the conservative forces represented by the Ansars and the Muslim
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Brotherhood and resent the dominant role of the Army. In the past the par-
ty drew much of its strength from the pro-Egyptian Khatmiyyah Islamic
sect, the principal rival of the Ansars. The party now appears to have split
into two factions. The Khatmiyyah sect headed by the Mirghani family
does not share the leftist sentiments of Sharif al-Hindi, the present leader
of the National Unionist Party
Al-Hindi, who is in exile, has received aid from both Libya-his principal
backer since 1980-and Iraq. Recently, however, the Libyans apparently
have been disappointed by al-Hindi's failure to win support inside Sudan;
they reportedly have decided to divert their assistance to a former
Sudanese Army officer who is training Sudanese dissidents in Libya.
The Sudanese Communist Party was at one time the largest Communist
party in Africa. It has been seriously weakened by government repression
since the disorders in August 1979, in which the Communists played a
significant part. The party, nevertheless, has considerable assets in the
labor movement and among students. Although it can no longer mount a
direct challenge to the regime, it probably can still stimulate unrest.
The Sudanese Baath Party has only a few hundred members and does not
constitute a serious danger to the Nimeiri regime. Active primarily in the
University of Khartoum, it is closely monitored by security officialsi
The Role of the The Sudanese armed forces constitute Nimeiri's principal power base. The
Military Army helped Nimeiri come to power in May 1969, and it proved loyal to
him during the conflict with the Ansars in 1970 despite the fact that many
members of the armed forces nominally belonged to that sect. It was Army
support that enabled Nimeiri to regain power following the abortive,
Communist-led coup in July 1971.
Morale in the military appears to be a major factor in its willingness to
support the regime. Although pay appears to be a key factor in maintaining
morale, the acquisition of new equipment from the United States will
probably also have a positive effect throughout the armed services. The
continued inability'of the government to improve overall economic condi-
tions, however, could induce dissatisfaction with Nimeiri.
During the Ansar-led, Libyan-supported coup attempt in 1976 some
officers joined the rebels, and only a few off-duty enlisted men reported to
their units. Since then the regime has striven to ensure military loyalty. Be-
cause an estimated 60 percent of the enlisted ranks came from western
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Sudan, the homeland of most Ansars, recruitment of northerners and
easterners has been emphasized. This policy, however, has left the military
below strength-probably less than 60,000 as opposed to an authorized
strength of 71,000-because civilian pay is higher in the northern and
eastern regions of the country.
Security officials pay particularly close attention to the "young majors"-a
group in the armed forces that has been identified as not fully supporting
the regime. These are officers who graduated from military college shortly
after the 1969 revolution and before the abortive coup in July 1971. These
military classes were particularly large (300 to 700 in each class instead of
the normal 100 to 200) and therefore faced reduced chances for rapid
promotion over the next few years.
Units stationed in the capital area are positioned to respond rapidly to any
coup attempt and are specially trained to counter threats to the regime.
The 600-man Republican Guard is the first line of defense in guarding the
palace. The Airborne Brigade has its headquarters in Khartoum, and one
paratroop battalion is stationed in north Khartoum. Two other battalions,
an airmobile and a ranger battalion, are located 65 kilometers south of
Khartoum. The 10th Infantry Brigade, located at Shendi, 160 kilometers
northeast of Khartoum, is known to have a contingency mission to deploy
to the capital in the event of "problems." The 1st Brigade, at El Obied, 340
kilometers southeast of Khartoum, is believed to have a similar mission.
Ethiopia and Libya pose the greatest external threats to Sudanese security.
The Sudanese are concerned that these militarily well-equipped countries
will, either alone or in concert and with Soviet support, attempt to exploit
Sudan's relatively weak defenses to topple the Nimeiri regime. On the
Ethiopian front Sudanese military planners fear large cross-border oper-
ations against the numerous Eritrean base camps and refugee concentra-
tions in eastern Sudan. A military confrontation on the border, if
accompanied by airstrikes against Khartoum, Port Sudan, and other key
cities and installations, would weaken the regime by demonstrating its
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inability to defend the country. The recent Libyan airstrikes inside Sudan
against the forces of Chadian dissident Habre underscored this point.
Sudan's ability to defend itself against an Ethiopian or Libyan attack is
questionable given the steady deterioration of its military equipment, the
lack of funding to purchase new hardware, and weaknesses in training,
leadership, and organization. Sudanese artillery consists primarily of
obsolete British and Soviet equipment, for which spare parts and ammuni-
tion are not available. Air defense consists of four nonoperational SA-2
surface-to-air missile batteries at Port Sudan and a variety of 37-mm and
smaller caliber antiaircraft guns scattered throughout the country. More-
over, only about 10 percent of Sudan's Soviet-manufactured radars are
operational, and only two airfields-Wadi Seidna and Khartoum Interna-
tional-are suitable for fighter aircraft. Despite the acquisition of six
C-130 transport aircraft in 1978, the military cannot transport food, fuel,
and ammunition to its forces promptly and in sufficient quantities.
To date, only the United States has offered Sudan any substantial military
assistance, and the majority of this aid depends on Saudi financing which
has not been forthcoming. Saudi Arabia tentatively agreed in 1978 to
finance a $200 million purchase of 12 F-5 fighter aircraft and support
equipment and six long-range air defense radars. But it did not follow
through. The United States recently agreed to provide eight Vulcan self-
propelled antiaircraft artillery guns, 12 155-mm towed howitzers, and 20
M-60A2 medium tanks. The howitzers and tanks will be diverted from US
stocks and delivered by the end of the year. The most badly needed
equipment, however-aircraft, air defense radars, and antiaircraft artil-
lery-will require 24 to 36 months for delivery. Until this equipment is
received, the Sudanese probably will be unable to turn back a concentrated
Libyan or Ethiopian attack.
Regional Problems In attempting to subvert the Nimeiri regime, Libya has tried to exploit
longstanding resentment by western and southern Sudanese against the
central government. Inhabitants of both regions have long considered
themselves victims of discrimination and neglect by Khartoum. The
decentralization program, which has created five new regions in addition to
the southern region and transferred some powers from the central govern-
ment to the regions, could eventually ease some strains between Khartoum
and outlying areas of the country. The program, however, is unlikely to
reduce the susceptibility of the south or the west to Libyan subversion for
some time.
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Many westerners who live near the Chadian border and who have close
links with their fellow tribesmen in Chad could be influenced by Libyan
propaganda. In addition many westerners travel to Libya in search of
employment,
The north-south cleavage, however, is the most serious division in Sudanese
society. Relations between the two areas were relatively tranquil between
February 1972-when the Addis Ababa agreement that ended the 17-year
civil war was signed-and early 1980. But traditional southern distrust of
the north has since intensified. Southerners have long believed that they
have not received their fair share of development funds. In addition, the
predominantly black, non-Muslim southerners have been concerned for
some time over efforts by northern Muslims to give Sharia law greater
force.
Southerners see the choice of Kosti in the north as the proposed site of a
small refinery-rather than Bentiu in the south which is closer to recent oil
discoveries-as a deliberate effort to deprive the south of its natural
resources. Some southerners have threatened to use force to prevent oil
from being moved to Kosti. Arguments by northerners that Kosti is a
better location for communications and processing have not been persua-
sive. Although southern officials have reluctantly endorsed a compromise
whereby the central government and the Chevron oil company would
increase development investment in the south, provide training in the oil in-
dustry to southerners, and improve the distribution of oil products to the
south and the west, protests over the refinery location are likely to
continue
Some southerners are also unhappy over the dissolution in early October
1981 of the southern regional assembly and the replacement of the
southern executive council by a military administration. The action
appears intended to resolve a dispute over partitioning the south into three
regions. New elections and a referendum on the issue are scheduled to be
held in six months. The division of the southern region is favored by many
northerners because it would weaken the south. It is also supported by
some southerners because it will reduce the dominant role of the Dinka
tribe. Partition, however, could lead to greater tribal conflict and further
increase southern resentment against the north.
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The Faltering Sudan's precarious economic situation poses a serious threat to the regime.
Economy The foreign financial picture is particularly grim. Sudan is far behind in
paying foreign debts and has scant prospects for any near-term increases in
earnings. The country will require generous foreign assistance in the years
ahead as well as additional debt reschedulings, but dealing with the foreign
payments problem will not be enough. Tough economic reforms that have
been long postponed will be necessary if the economy is to regain
momentum. Imposing austerity to right the economy raises the danger of
unrest that could threaten the Nimeiri government.
Real economic output has fallen for three straight years, and recovery is
expected to be slow. Agricultural difficulties are largely to blame. Produc-
tion of cotton, Sudan's most important export crop, has been particularly
hard hit; last year's output was only 45 percent of the level three years ear-
lier. Other major crops have not fared much better because of maintenance
and pest control problems in Sudan's irrigated farmlands and government
policies that hinder incentives. The small industrial sector also has had
difficulties stemming from power cuts, labor disputes, emigration of skilled
workers, and lack of foreign exchange for imported spare parts and other
materials.
Sudan's economic decline has caused the government serious domestic
financial difficulties. In the recently completed 1980-81 fiscal year, the
government deficit shot up 60 percent over the previous year. Expenditures
continue to increase as the government attempts to provide services and
pay for public sector wage hikes, while tax revenues are suffering from low
levels of domestic output and exports. Domestic borrowing for government
spending and expanded credits to money-losing public sector firms-have
resulted in a rapid monetary expansion. In the fiscal year ending 30 June,
the money supply increased 44 percent, more than double the rate of the
previous fiscal year. In the absence of economic growth this monetary
expansion is fueling strong inflationary pressures. Especially sharp price
increases in July and August caused the government to attempt exhorta-
tion and then to resort to "price courts" staffed by military personnel that
meted out floggings and jail sentences for price control violators.
Sudan's domestic economic problems are more than matched by the
magnitude of its foreign payments difficulties. The country is saddled with
roughly $3 billion in foreign debts, including $1 billion in debt arrearages
primarily owed private lenders. This enormous debt resulted from overam-
bitious efforts in the 1970s to become the breadbasket of the Middle East.
Although unused arable land and recent oil discoveries provide some
optimism for the longer term, it will be several years before these resources
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can be developed. In the meantime, with no significant new sources of
foreign earnings in sight and with imports already cut to the bone, Sudan
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In the year ending 30 June Sudan received about $1 billion in economic aid
and International Monetary Fund loans. Under Sudan's three-year ex-
tended fund facility, the IMF provided $300 million. Saudi Arabia was the
largest bilateral donor with $150 million in economic aid and was followed
by the United States, which provided slightly more than $100 million. In
the current fiscal year Sudan will need an even greater amount of foreign
assistance. It faces a foreign exchange shortfall of at least $200 million in
the year ending June 1982, given likely aid levels and assuming that Sudan
receives $230 million from the IMF under a recently negotiated one-year
standby agreement. Khartoum will look primarily to Saudi Arabia and the
United States for additional funds.
Sudan's teetering foreign payments situation presents the government with
a considerable dilemma. If the government fails to secure major foreign
assistance and IMF loans, it will exhaust its foreign exchange and be
forced to cut imports of essential foods and fuel even further, which will be
highly unpopular. But in order to secure funds from the IMF and meet de-
mands by foreign donors and private creditors to pursue policies that will
right the economy, Khartoum will also have to take economic austerity
measures that risk political unrest. For example, under the terms of the
one-year standby agreement with the IMF, the price of government-
supplied imported powdered milk and medicines would increase immedi-
ately by at least 80 percent while petroleum prices would rise 35 percent.
Bread prices would rise by 33 percent next April. Prices of other imported
goods also would increase, although by lesser amounts, as a result of
devaluation and the imposition of higher import duties. Apparently in
accordance with the IMF agreement, Nimeiri announced on 9 November
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Policy changes that result in such price hikes could easily cause a repeat of
the disorders that followed sharp increases in petroleum prices in 1979.
Labor unrest similar to the railroad strike in June 1981 also could occur.
Although that strike did not spread and was put down by the government, a
new occurrence may not turn out so well. The imposition of austerity also
risks undermining military support for the government. Although military
personnel can be protected from the impact of austerity, their extended
families are not, and profuse public complaints could raise questions in the
military about Nimeiri's continued suitability to rule.
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Under Khalil or a government in which he had the strongest voice,
Sudanese policies probably would change very little. Sudan probably would
maintain its pro-Western and pro-Egyptian orientation. Khalil lacks
Nimeiri's skill in dealing with the opposition and probably would be
inclined to treat domestic critics of the regime more harshly than Nimeiri.
This approach could end the uneasy truce between the government and its
conservative opponents created by Nimeiri's national reconciliation cam-
paign.
The greatest threat to the survival of the regime over the longer term is the
possibility of civil unrest as a consequence of commodity shortages or high
prices. We believe that the Army is wiilling and able to put down most pub-
lic disorders. The Army's resolve, however, might falter during an extended
period of public unrest. Such an uprising could occur spontaneously given
the extent of public dissatisfaction over the declining standard of living.
If the government should change as a result of a popular uprising, the
successor regime would most likely be another military or military-backed
government. It is possible that Sadiq al-Mahdi or another opposition leader
might come to power. Such an event would require the broad acquiescence
of the military, and this would occur only if the military's commanding role
on the national scene were not threatened.
If military officers sympathetic to more conservative elements in Sudanese
society, especially the Ansars and the Muslim Brotherhood, were to control
or have a significant voice in a successor government, the new regime's
foreign policy would shift from the present pro-Western stance toward a
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more nonaligned position. Such a government would abandon its alignment
with Egypt in favor of closer ties with the conservative Arab states,
especially Saudi Arabia. Sudanese-US relations probably would be less
close, but correct.
In the unlikely-but not impossible-event that officers sympathetic to the
goals of Libya or other radical Arab states controlled a successor
government, US interests in the region would suffer a serious setback, and
Sudanese ties to the USSR and its allies could be expected to increase dra-
matically
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