EGYPT: ISLAMIC CULTS CRISIS AND POLITICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP06T00412R000200960001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 8, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
Crisis, and Politics
Egypt: Islamic Cults,
State Dept. review
completed
Secret
NESA 82-10462
August 1982
Copy 2 5 0
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Crisis, and Politics
Egypt: Islamic Cults,
Chief, South Asia Division, NESA
queries are welcome and may be addressed to the
The author of this paper isl of the
Office of Near East-South Asia Analysis. It was
coordinated with the National Intelligence Council
and the Directorate of Operations. Comments and
Secret
NESA 82-10462
August 1982
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Secret
Crisis, and Politics
Egypt: Islamic Cults
We expect the Islamic fundamentalist movement to be a potentially violent
opposition force to the Egyptian Government through the 1980s. We
believe, however, that the fundamentalists' fragmentation and lack of
leadership will prevent them from overthrowing the government in an
Iranian-style revolution.
The Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic extremist groups such as Takfir wal-
Hijra and Al-Jihad represent a common type of religious-political move-
ment that has sprung up around the world in reaction to political,
economic, and social stress. Such movements, called "crisis cults" by
anthropologists, are driven to fanaticism by a leader or prophet who
interprets his hallucinatory visions as a call for revolutionary change. The
Muslim Brotherhood and the extremists in Egypt have followed the
predictable pattern of crisis cults, which develops from early militancy to
later moderation.
The Muslim Brotherhood, violent from the late 1940s to the mid-1960s,
has evolved to a politically moderate position. The Brotherhood supports,
with reservations, the Mubarak regime while advocating its own long-term
goal of building a truly Islamic society. It criticizes the radical policies of
the extremist groups. We expect the Brotherhood to continue to offer a less
violent approach to an Islamic society than the extremists.
The Muslim extremist groups, born in the social and political crisis that
followed Egypt's defeat in its war with Israel in 1967, condemn the
Westernized policies that the government follows and call for its replace-
ment, by violence if necessary, by an Islamic institution. We expect the ex-
tremist groups, despite the imprisonment and execution of many members,
to continue to recruit in the military as well as among rural migrants to the
cities and to retain clandestine cells and strike out at the government from
time to time with violent acts. Judging from the life cycles of crisis cults
and the lack of leadership of most Egyptian extremist groups, we expect
many of them to dissipate quickly and others to evolve to a more moderate
philosophy in a pattern similar to that of the Muslim Brotherhood. New
groups may emerge, however, in response to further social stresses.
Information available as of 6 August 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.
iii Secret
NESA 82-10462
August 1982
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The student Islamic societies, which emerged as more moderate alterna-
tives to the extremist groups after Egypt's "victory" in the war of 1973, are
likely to attain the fanaticism of true crisis cults only with the emergence
of prophetic leaders. We therefore do not expect them to jell into an
independent political threat to the government over the next few years.
Government policy, together with how well the government is able to
combat deteriorating social and economic conditions, is inextricably linked
to the course of Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt. Such government
policies as repression of the fundamentalists, increased Westernization, and
the forging of closer ties to the United States and Israel will inflame the
passions and intensify and prolong the militancy of the extremists. The
Mubarak regime, however, can reduce the risk of violent confrontation
with extremist groups by normalizing relations with the Arab world,
putting greater distance between itself and the United States and Israel,
and resisting excessive Westernization and corruption.
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Egypt: Islamic Cults,
Crisis, and Politics
The assassination in October 1981 of Egyptian Presi-
dent Anwar Sadat by a small group of Islamic
extremists capped a decade and a half of growth in
Islamic militancy in the country. The assassination of
Sadat, who had been criticized by the Islamic funda-
mentalists for his pro-Western policies, raised the
specter of an Iranian-style Islamic revolution in a
country that is crucial to Western interests in the
Middle East)
response to individual and social stress.
Although the revival of Islamic fundamentalism has
called attention to the often violent reaction of socie-
ties whose traditional religious institutions and values
are threatened by the penetration of Western influ-
ences, religious revival is not confined to the Muslim
world. A return to more fundamental religious values
is developing in many other areas of the world in
Anthropologists theorize that common causes underlie
this widespread return to religion. In Third World
countries they include the rapid cultural change im-
posed from outside as well as rising and unfulfilled
economic expectations. These causes, in turn, contrib-
ute to a perception of society as morally decadent and
to a sense of loss of personal and national identity.
Unsettled social and economic conditions provide an
environment in which religious revival movements,
called crisis cults, thrive.
Historically, the periodic revivals of Islamic funda-
mentalism in Egypt appear to have been born of and
driven by just such social and economic crises. Politi-
cal and social instability after World War I gave rise
to the Muslim Brotherhood. Islamic extremist groups
such as the Takfir wal-Hijra (Repentance and Holy
Flight) emerged after Egypt's humiliating defeat at
the hands of Israel in 1967. The student Islamic
societies arose when victory in the 1973 war with
Israel failed to bring prosperity and opportunity for
the emerging generation of educated Egyptians.
The Egyptian fundamentalist groups do not form a
monolithic movement but are fragmented into a mul-
tiplicity of groups with similar goals but differing
philosophies on how to achieve them. The Muslim
Brotherhood and the student Islamic societies (Ja-
ma'at Islamiya) are relatively moderate forces that
pursue evolutionary methods to transform Egypt into
a true Islamic society. The extremist groups, typified
by the Takfir wal-Hijra, advocate violent revolution to
establish a religious state. 25X1
The common goal of the movements-a true Islamic
order in which religion underlies all institutions-
springs from their shared crisis-born origins. Their
differing strategies for achieving this goal reflect their
relative positions in the life cycle of crisis-driven
religious movements. 25X1
Crisis Cults: The Bridge From Religion to Politics'
Use of anthropological theory gives a unique cross-
cultural and historical perspective to the contempo-
rary Islamic resurgence in Egypt. Anthropologists
have developed a model, the crisis cult, to describe the
types of religious activism that have developed in
various processes of cultural change. We believe
applying the crisis cult model to Muslim societies
helps explain the behavior of Islamic fundamentalist
movements (figure 1). 25X1
Even though the frustrations that breed the crisis cult
may fester within the society for years, the cult does
not appear until an individual articulates the crisis
and offers a new set of ideas-claimed to be a new
code sent by God-that better fits contemporary
' Anthropologists range widely in their definition of a crisis cult. In
this paper we define it as a religious reaction to stress caused by a
drastic social change with which normal routines, secular or sacred,
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Figure 1
Life Cycle of a Crisis Cult
1. Steady State ) II. Crises
Cultural change moves Rapid cultural change
at a rate acceptable to pushes society out of
the society. equilibrium.
Disillusionment
widespread. High
levels of stress.
VI. Toward a New
Steady Stage.
Code hardens. Cult
becomes militant
toward non-participants
who are labeled traitors
or enemies of the cult.
~ III. New Code
An individual receives
hallucinatory vision
from God containing
code to build new and
orderly social order.
New code and cult
threaten status quo.
V. Maintenance and Survival ( IV. Militancy E
Cult eventually loses
momentum. Withdraws
from aggressive tactics to
insure survival of the
movement.
needs. These cult leaders invoke age-old religious
symbols to bridge the gap between past and present,
religion and politics, and to sanctify their authority.
In Muslim societies, in particular, the political mes-
sage of the cult is couched in the familiar and
powerful language of traditional religion, which facili-
tates the rapid spread of the message.
The codes of the cults are designed to alleviate
frustrations and conflicts in one of three ways:
? By rejecting all outside influences and returning to a
state of society thought to have been the Golden
Age.
? By retaining portions of the culture and incorporat-
ing selected elements of another culture.
? By rejecting entirely the old cultural system and
replacing it with a new system believed more appro-
priate to the current social and political situation.
25X1
The Iranian Islamic revolution is a good example of a
crisis cult in the broadest sense-a societywide reli-
gious "cult,"' brought forth largely in reaction to
Westernization and secularization. Khomeini ap-
peared in exile as the prophet-the spokesman for the
12th or Hidden Imam of the Shia sect-trumpeting
the ills of Iran and the need to revitalize the nation by
building the Islamic state. He bridged the gap be-
tween the past-the Muslim state at the time of
Muhammad and his immediate successors-and the
present, and between religion and politics. His new
code, a mixture of Shia Islam and revolutionary
rhetoric, outlines the model fora new and holy social
order. It contains the usual elements of a radical
religious movement, including puritanical morality,
austerity, and fanatical determination.
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Figure 2
Life Cycles of Egyptian Islamic Fundamentalist Movements
Crisis Militancy
New Code Maintenance and
Survival
The Muslim Brotherhood: Crisis Cult at Full Cycle
The Muslim Brotherhood, active in Egypt since 1928,
is a religious movement nearing the end of its develop-
ment cycle (figure 2). It has evolved through all stages
common to crisis cult movements: an incubation
period of sustained stress following World War I;
formation after a visionary, Hassan al-Banna, claimed
to receive a message from God; a period of militancy
and violence after World War II and during the Nasir
era; and a maintenance and survival phase under
Sadat and Mubarak.2
Rise and Fall of the Muslim Brotherhood
In the decade following the founding of the Brother-
hood, Hassan al-Banna preached its code and recruit-
ed members from the ranks of civil servants, students,
workers, and peasants. By the early 1940s the move-
ment had grown rapidly in power and numbers and
Hassan al-Banna extended his influence to include the
Free Officers. Led by Jamal Abd al-Nasir, they
ousted King Farouk in 1952. 25X1
The Militancy Stage. The Brotherhood entered the
militancy stage of the life cycle of a crisis cult in the
late 1940s. By then it had grown into a political force
rivaled only by the ruling Wafd Party. It had formed
a paramilitary arm and used violence and intimida-
tion in an effort to impose its ideology on the govern-
ment of King Farouk. The government banned the
Brotherhood following the murder in 1948 of Prime
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Minister Nuqrasha Pasha by a Muslim Brother.
Shortly after the Brotherhood was disbanded, govern-
ment agents assassinated Hassan al-Banna. Although
disorganized and weakened by the death of its
founder and leader, the Brotherhood reemerged under
new leadership to continue the fight against the
government.
The Brotherhood remained critical of government
policies after the Free Officers ousted King Farouk.
Nasir's government, always wary of the Brotherhood's
power, pounced when Brotherhood members attempt-
ed to assassinate him in 1954. The government hung
seven Brothers and imprisoned many others for their
roles in the plot. Although Nasir failed to eliminate
the Brotherhood, government persecution forced it
underground until it emerged again in 1964. Security
forces uncovered another plot to assassinate Nasir in
1966; it led to the hanging of three more Brothers-
including Sayyid Qutb, whose writings later were to
form the philosophical foundation of the Islamic
extremists-and the imprisonment of many others
who were implicated in the plot. Nasir's crackdown
once again weakened the Brotherhood and forced the
remaining leaders to adopt a more moderate political
position that would enable the movement to survive.
The Maintenance and Survival Stage. The Brother-
hood moved into the maintenance and survival stage
after Sadat replaced Nasir as President. The Brother-
hood, which Sadat saw as a force that could be
manipulated against Nasirism and the left, drew back
from confrontation in favor of a policy that advocated
nonviolent change to achieve an Islamic society. The
new policy has emphasized education to prepare youth
25X1 for the future Islamic society.
The maintenance and survival phase of the Muslim
Brotherhood is reflected in its middle class values and
in its efforts both to work with the government and to
put distance between its policies and those of the
Despite its pledge of cooperation to Mubarak, the
Brotherhood leadership shies away from fully endors-
ing him, probably because it is unsure of the direction
of his policies
Brotherhood leaders have been puzzled by what they
perceive to be contradictory government policies.
They were pleased by Mubarak's moderate course
toward the fundamentalists as exemplified by his
release of many of those detained in Sadat's crack-
down last September.
leaders also were encouraged by the prospects of
improved relations with other Arab states. But they
undoubtedly were dismayed by Mubarak's subsequent
switch to a harder policy against the extremists and
are wary of the leftward tilt implied by strengthened
ties with the Soviet Union
Despite its current tacit support for the government,
the Brotherhood most likely will take a harder line if
the regime fails to remedy deteriorating social and
economic conditions.
it maintains a small,
secret militia known as Al-Katiba (Battalion) to guard
against repression and the rise to power of a leftist
regime opposed to the Brotherhood's ideals. Although
the militia is unarmed, it has
easy access to weapons through stolen army stores or
the black market.
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Ideology: Code of the Muslim Brotherhood
On specific issues, a study by an Egyptian political
scientist claims that Brotherhood ideology espouses:
? Government: the government's role is to implement
and defend the system sent from God; legislators,
chosen from the ranks of the ulama (religious
scholars), should pass laws in accordance with the
sharia (Islamic law) and serve as a check on the
executive and judiciary; the judiciary should inter-
pret laws so that they conform with the sharia.
? Politics: Islam is under attack by a conspiracy
between the United States (singled out as most
dangerous), the Soviet Union, and Israel; the Broth-
erhood condemns the Camp David Accords and
other overtures to Israel; it agrees in principle with
Khomeini's revolution because he reasserted the
supremacy of Muslim law over the Shah's secular
policies.
? Economy: the economic system should be based on a
profit-sharing arrangement that circumvents the
Koranic prohibition of usury; the zakat, an alms tax
believed to be more beneficial and less complicated
than an income tax, should supply funds to operate
the government.
? Women in Society: the women's liberation move-
ment is yet another manifestation of malevolent
Western influence in Egypt; the Brotherhood seeks
strict separation of men and women in educational
institutions and in all public gatherings; birth con-
trol is particularly repugnant to the Brotherhood,
which sees it, along with the West's disapproval of
polygamy, as part of a Western conspiracy to
destroy Islamic society.
Islamic Extremists: Crisis Cults in the Militancy
Stage
Defeat and Demoralization: Birth of the Extremists
The Islamic extremist groups, which threaten the
Mubarak regime as they did the government of
Anwar Sadat, represent crisis cults that have ad-
vanced quickly from the crisis mode to the militancy
stage. They fermented in the caldron of defeat-in
the turmoil and in the social and political introspec-
tion following Egypt's humiliating military defeat by
Israel in 1967. 25X1
According to newspaper accounts, many Egyptians,
from President Nasir on down, sought religious
rationalizations for the defeat and spiritual comfort
for the humiliation. President Nasir, in his first
speech after the war, said that the defeat had been a
"predestined event to test the moral strength of the
Egyptian people" and implied that Egypt had lost the
war because Egyptians had turned away from their
traditional Islamic values. Some Egyptians sought
solace by turning to Sufism, a mystical and ascetic
Islamic lifestyle. Others believed that they had been
sent messages from God. Thousands of Egyptians,
Muslims and Christian Copts alike, believed that they
had seen a vision of the Virgin Mary at a small Coptic
church in a Cairo suburb 25X1
From this supercharged religious atmosphere emerged
individuals-future extremist leaders-who believed
themselves ordained to overthrow the system that had
caused Egypt to fall from God's grace. They recruited
members from the universities and the armed forces,
formed small cells, and produced new codes along
traditional religious lines designed to revitalize Egyp-
tian s 25X1
Reign of Violence
Although the extremist groups had violent confronta-
tions with the government earlier, the year 1977
marks the beginning of heightened violence-the mili-
tancy stage-against the government as well as
against Egypt's approximately 6 million Copts. A
bloody confrontation between the Takfir wal-Hijra
and the government in that year signaled the change.
The militants kidnaped a former Minister of Reli-
gious Endowments to secure the release of imprisoned
comrades, then carried out their threat to kill the
Minister when the government refused to meet their
demands. The subsequent crackdown by the govern-
ment left several Takfir members dead and others
wounded.
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Interaction between the militants and the government
over the past five years, in our view, has stoked the
zealots' fires. In the years following 1977 the militants
continued to threaten government leaders and to
attack the Copts and bomb their churches. Govern-
ment repression following each act of violence appar-
ently confirmed the evils of government policies in the
eyes of the extremists. According to testimony at their
trial, for example, the extremists charged with killing
Sadat viewed the crackdown in September 1981 as
validation of their charge that the regime was corrupt
and anti-Islamic. They believed it their duty to God to
strike down an enemy of Islam.
The Current Situation: Down but Not Out
Academic studies, news reports, and official sources
show that extremist groups, unlike the Muslim Broth-
erhood, are neither monolithic nor the creation of a
single individual, nor do they have a broadbased
appeal within Egypt. They comprise a large number
of small, distinct groups with a total membership
recently estimated by Egyptian officials to be between
10,000 and 20,000 (table 1). Their lack of a dominant
leader or central authority in our view has led to
infighting and splintering into ever smaller groups and
to continuously shifting memberships. Government
liquidation of one extremist group usually results in
The government has reversed its previously lenient
policy toward the fundamentalists imprisoned in Sep-
tember and October 1981. It has asked for the
execution of 299 of the 302 members of the Al-Jihad
al Jayyid (The Just Struggle) group' charged with
masterminding the assassination of Sadat and the
deaths of 80 people in attacks on a police station in
Asiyut~
The government's indictment accuses the Al-Jihad
defendants of other crimes, including using force to
try to overthrow the government, forming an illegal
paramilitary organization, armed robbery, and sabo-
taging public property. The government, according to
US Embassy observers, will also indict 870 persons
involved in the assassination conspiracy whom the
prosecutor calls "inactive" members of Al-Jihad
The Interior Ministry claims that Al-Jihad has been
decimated by the arrests, but a prominent Egyptian
sociologist estimates that the security forces have
managed to arrest no more than 30 to 40 percent of
the membership. Although we lack evidence, we
believe the members who have escaped arrest are
meeting privately to reorganize, recruit, and plan for
future confrontations with the government.
Ideology: Code of the Muslim Extremists
The political code of the extremists, according to the
Egyptian sociologist previously cited, is more utopian
than utilitarian; it fails to address the realities of
running a complex modern state. In an ideology that
parallels that of the Muslim Brotherhood, the extrem-
ists regard all nom-Islamic social, political, and eco-
nomic systems-including capitalism and Commu-
nism-as incompatible with God's teachings. 25X1
The extremists, in interviews with Egyptian scholars,
state that it is their duty to install an Islamic regime
in Egypt even if violence must be used. They believe
that the first step in bringing about the perfect
Islamic society must be to rid society of all Western
influences, including leaders whom they see as sympa-
thetic to the West and, therefore, anti-Islamic. They
see the Mubarak government, like the Sadat govern-
ment before it, as badly tainted by Westernization,
morally corrupt, and politically inept.
Recruitment: Conversion to the Extremist Code
The Muslim extremists said in interviews that they
have been most successful recruiting young people
who have recently migrated to the cities where their
traditional values are offended by the seemingly
dizzying pace and blatant consumption of Western-
ized urbanites. They said they usually recruit at
mosque services by seeking out and befriending those
youths who appear most devout. They meet with these
prospective recruits and stress the merits of their
cause, point out the villains who they claim are
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Approximate Date of -Estimated Ideology Comments
Formation Member-
ship
Shabab Sayyidna
Muhammad (Youth of
the Lord Muhammad)
Takfir wal-Hijra
(Repentance and Holy
Flight)
Violent during late 1940s through mid-
1960s; changed policy with Sadat regime;
now emphasizes evolution to an Islamic
state; little evidence of close connections to
extremists.
Unknown Moderate Split from Muslim Brotherhood over issues
of mysticism; probably more influential
with Islamic extremists than with
Brotherhood.
Unknown Moderate Ideology similar to Legal Society, but
smaller membership.
than 800 arrested in September
crackdown; funds apparently come from
remittances from members working abroad
and robberies.
1,000+ Extremist Members also involved in Sadat
assassination; appear to be group most
directly involved in violence agaist Coptic
Christians.
Unknown Extremist Shia group banned in 1979 for advocating
Khomeini-style revolution; may have
connections with Iranian religious leaders;
no recent reports of activities.
Jama'at Quwwat al-
Quran (Forces of the
Koran)
Unknown
Extremist
Early-to-mid-1970s
Unknown
Extremist
Al-Jihad al-Jayyid
Probably
Extremist
(The Just Struggle)
exceeds
1,500
Believed
Extremist
to be small
No record of violence and no recently
reported activity.
Calls for Iranian Islamic-style revolution;
members primarily students in scientific
disciplines or workers and engineers in
factories; no recent reports of activity and
no record of violence.
Umbrella name used by members of Takfir
and older Al-Jihad groups that allegedly
took part in assassination. Groups also
believed responsible for postassassination
attacks in Asiyut when 80 police officers
and men were killed and another 120
wounded. More than 1,200 arrested in
ensuing roundup.
More than 60 arrested in postassassination
sweeps. Not considered to be internal
security threat by government.
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The armed forces are a natural target for recruitment
by Islamic revolutionaries. In our opinion the success
of Iranian fundamentalists in neutralizing the Shah's
armed forces probably has made a deep impression on
extremists in Egypt. The military is the institutional
power base for the civilian government, and the
extremists would have to gain some direct support
from the military or, at a minimum, neutralize it in
Extremist More than 90 recently arrested. Not
considered threat to government at this
time. Named after Muslim Brotherhood
leader and author who was executed for
seditious activity during Nasir's
presidency.
Extremist Violent toward those who violate Koran
and traditions of Muhammad. Engage in
pamphleteering.
25X1
the event of a broad social revolution. The military,
moreover, is a source of arms and could carry out or
train others in subversive terrorist operations 25X1
Extremists, in our opinion, have identified junior
officers as their prime target for recruitment. We
believe they are more susceptible to extremist rhetoric
than senior or middle-grade officers for a number of
reasons:
? Disillusionment with career prospects.
? Inability to cope with inflated living expenses.
? Idealism.
The first two factors could also apply to enlisted men
and noncommissioned officers who receive lower pay
and few of the erquisites of regular officers. Their
lower educational level and lack of social mobility,
moreover, probably increase their frustration and,
hence, their attractiveness as targets for extremist
recruitment
Iran: Islamic Catalyst
The Iranian Islamic revolution in our view is likely to
remain the model for Egyptian extremists. We believe
Khomeini's defeat of the Shah and his US backing
has eclipsed at least for the moment the theological
differences between Egypt's Sunni Muslims and
Iran's Shias. We expect each Iranian victory in the
war with Iraq to narrow those differences further and
to be seen by Egypt's Muslim extremists as proof of
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Tanzin al-Qutbiyun 1981-82
(Supporters of Sayyid
Qutb)
responsible for Egypt's deteriorated spiritual condi-
tion, and outline their plans to install an Islamic
government.
25X1
Extremists in the Military
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The following profile is based on a small sampling of
militants imprisoned in the 1970s:
Young: Twenties or early thirties.
Rural or small town origins: Although urban, the
extremists are not urbane. Most were born in rural
areas or small towns and were recent arrivals in the
large cities.
Middle or lower middle class backgrounds: About
two-thirds had fathers who were from the middle
grades of the civil service. Others came from profes-
sional or farm families.
Traditional family backgrounds: Most came from
"normal" cohesive families-no divorce, separation,
or death of either parent.
Although we have no evidence that the student Islam-
ic societies, collectively known as Jama'at Islamiya,
have been inspired by claimed revelations from God,
we believe that they have the potential to evolve into
true crisis cults with the emergence of prophetic
leaders who could articulate the students' frustrations.
Continued economic downturns and decreased em-
ployment opportunities could produce enough stress
among the students for them to identify with the
teachings of a charismatic self-appointed nronhet
25X1
High achievers, technical educations: A large major-
ity were university graduates or students-largely in
the fields of education, engineering, medicine, or
science.
the righteousness of Khomeini's revolution. The ex-
tremists could interpret an Iranian victory over Iraq
as a signal of God's approval of revolutionary Islam.
Such a "divine" message could spark renewed vio-
lence by Egypt's extremists. On the other hand, we do
not believe that the collapse of the Revolutionary
Government in Iran would have a commensurate
negative impact on the extremists.'
' Religious cults, according to scholarly analysis, tend to rationalize
untoward events or failed prophecies to suit their purposes. Failed
prophecies frequently strengthen rather than weaken the sects'
The student societies, like the extremist crisis cults of
the late 1960s, were formed in a period of stress and
frustration-in their case caused by the unfulfilled
expectations that followed the "victory" in the war of
1973 and the advent of Sadat's "open door" economic
policies. The students believed, according to an Egyp-
tian social scientist, that the new economic policies
brought riches only to foreign investors and Egyptian
entrepreneurs and that few of the benefits trickled
down to the students. The growing numbers of univer-
sity graduates meanwhile were forced into the highly
competitive private sector, had to wait as long as two
years for low-paying government jobs, or had to leave
Egypt to work in Europe or in the Gulf states. We
believe that, despairing of their own uncertain futures
in contrast to those of the rich who they charged
flouted traditional Islamic values, the students formed
Islamic societies as more moderate alternatives to the
extremist groups. Despite the stresses of the period,
however, no prophets appeared to convert the student
frustration into the passions of a crisis cult.
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Lacking the philosophical commitment of the crisis
cults, the student societies have instead concentrated
more on appearances-on enforcing their version of
Islamic morality, which opposes alcoholic beverages,
dancing, Western arts and attire, and advocating
sexual segregation in university classrooms and in
public transport. To promote their cause they have
disrupted and closed campus events that have dis-
played Western art, films, and literature. Banned and
forced underground by the crackdown in September
1981, the student groups began to reappear earlier
this year. An Egyptian social scientist says that the
students are selling Islamic posters and devotional
recordings and once again wear the full beard or the
veil-symbols of their allegiance to the Islamic move-
25X1 ment
We believe that if the student movement remains
without a divine charter or a Khomeini-style leader-
hallmarks of true crisis cults-the student groups will
continue to lack the fanatical drive of the extremists
and will dissipate more rapidly than either the ex-
tremists or the Muslim Brotherhood. But even though
the societies may dissolve, we believe their ideals are
likely to remain with individual members and to have
an impact in Egyptian affairs as the members move
into influential positions
Outlook: Future Course of Egyptian Islamic Cults
Judging from the emerging policies of the Mubarak
regime, the pattern of crisis cult development, and the
current composition and lack of leadership of the
Islamic groups, we believe that the fundamentalists
are unlikely to evolve into a group capable of seizing
power over the next few years. We expect Mubarak to
try to keep his promises to implement policies viewed
favorably by the fundamentalists such as rapproche-
ment with other Arab states and a crackdown on
corruption. If he does, he will help to push the cults
into the more moderate stage of their life cycle. But if
he fails to make headway on issues important to the
fundamentalists and adopts more repressive measures
against them, he will prolong the lifespan of the cults
and ensure continued trouble from them.
25X1
We expect the Muslim Brotherhood, which is current-
ly the strongest and most cohesive of the fundamen-
talist groups, to continue to move toward the center of
the Egyptian political spectrum as it evolves through
the culturally and politically acceptable phase of the
cult cycle. If Egypt's economic and social conditions
worsen far more rapidly than we expect, however, the
Brotherhood's continued movement toward political
moderation could be arrested by the rise to power of
younger Brotherhood leaders who may be more eager
to confront the regime over economic and social
issues.6 Under such circumstances, the Brotherhood
could serve as the nucleus for opposition to the regime
much as it did in the food riots of 1977.
Although we believe that the extremists have little
chance to launch an Iranian-style revolution so long as
they lack a charismatic leader, we expect that they
will continue to harass the government with terrorist
attacks and possibly even with attempted assassina-
tions. So long as the government is responsive to the
fundamentalist cause, however, we expect that terror-
ist incidents will not coalesce into widespread unrest.
The extremists, unlike the Brotherhood, are too fanat-
ical and fractured to consolidate opposition against
the government coming from other religious or secular
groups or even. from other extremists. The extremists'
time in the militancy stage of the crisis cult cycle will
be determined largely by government policies and
prevailing social and economic conditions.
It is unlikely, in our opinion, that a prophetic leader
will emerge in the near term who could convert any of
the student Islamic societies into true crisis cults or
who could unite the diverse student groups into a
major opposition force. We therefore expect the stu-
dent societies to continue to be more of a nuisance
than a serious threat to the regime.
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Secret
Conditions Likely To Extend or Reduce Extremist Militancy
Continuation of "open
door" economic policy
Rising unemployment,
particularly among
university graduates
Continued close
association with United
States
Continued
rapprochement with
Israel
Continued government
endorsement of birth
control program
Reduction or
cancellation of basic
subsidies
Emergence of
charismatic extremist
leader
Government fights
corruption
Mubarak continues
simple lifestyle
Egypt normalizes
relations with moderate
Arab world
Islamization of
government policy along
model advocated by
extremists
Following period of relative tolerance,
Mubarak has pursued harder line
against extremist groups.
Mubarak has pledged to continue
policy begun by Sadat.
More students in universities than
economy can absorb.
Mubarak backing away from Sadat's
visibly close ties with US.
Government-sponsored program under
way since 1960; Mubarak, unlike
Sadat, has endorsed program as high
priority issue.
Government subsidizes basic food
prices; announcement that government
intended to cancel subsidies resulted in
rioting in 1977.
Currently too fragmented to unite
behind single leader.
Mubarak has launched program to
fight corruption; current focus is on
petty corruption that has pernicious
effect on day-to-day lives of people.
Although Mubarak not an openly pious
person, he is not likely to abuse
perquisites of office.
Initial stages of normalization under
way.
Adoption of Islamic political and
economic institutions imply total
government upheaval.
Renew attacks against the government and
the Coptic Christians; create disturbances
in universities; and increase recruitment
efforts.
Charge Mubarak with encouraging
Westernization of Egypt.
Create student frustration which is likely to
increase vulnerability to extremist rhetoric.
Links still close enough to offend
extremists.
Accords perceived by extremists as sellout
of Islam.
Extremists charge birth control is part of
Western plot against Islam.
Extremists would probably see reduced
subsidies as part of Western plot.
A Khomeini-like leader could unite groups
into potent political force.
Extremists laud government's efforts, but
likely to criticize meager results.
Extremists will find it difficult to build case
that Mubarak is anti-Islamic even if he
does not appear to be devout Muslim.
Extremists have criticized policies toward
Israel, which have isolated Egypt from rest
of Arab world.
Extremists, who contend Islamic law is
only legitimate political-economic system,
would laud any moves toward Islamization
of government institutions.
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Although the life cycles of even the most militant
cults will move into a moderate phase with time, new
groups are likely to arise in response to further social
stresses. The fundamentalists' message will leave its
mark on Egyptian society as well as on the govern-
ment. Longer term changes will probably move Egypt
toward a more Islamic way of life than it exhibits
today. We expect these changes to occur as the
government makes concessions to moderate funda-
mentalism and as the Muslim Brotherhood and stu-
dent Islamic society members assume responsible
positions in the government, military, and professional
communities. A more Islamic Egypt would probably
remain linked to the United States, but the intensity
of the bond would be reduced from what it is today.
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Annex: Sadat's Policies
Toward the Fundamentalists
Long before he cracked down on his political and
religious opponents in September 1981, President
Sadat recognized the need to moderate his modernist,
Western image with more traditional pro-Islamic
policies in order to check fundamentalist passions. He
implemented policies to deflect criticism and to divide
the religious opposition:
? The sharia (Islamic law), incorporated into the
Egyptian constitution as a major source of legisla-
tion after Sadat took office in 1971, was made the
sole source of legislation in 1979.
? Provincial governors were given more control over
local issues in 1980 in response to demands from
religious opponents to decentralize the government.
? "Outside agitators" were blamed for sectarian
strife. The CIA was blamed for skirmishes between
Copts and Muslims in 1972, but the Soviets took
most of the heat thereafter.
? Accommodation was reached between the govern-
ment and the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brother-
hood agreed to appeal for nonviolence, to encourage
other Muslim dissident groups to adopt moderate
stands, and to avoid preaching on political issues.
Sadat, in return, permitted the Brotherhood to
operate as a nonpolitical organization.
The policies were generally effective. Although many
critics were dubious of the "outside agitator" charges,
the charges lifted much of the blame for domestic
unrest from the religious opposition; the governors,
who now shouldered more responsibility for local
issues, were forced to ride herd on religious extremists
in order to keep their positions; and the accommoda-
tion with the Muslim Brotherhood paid off when the
Brotherhood exerted a moderating influence during
the religiously based disturbances in Cairo, Asiyut,
and Minyah in 1981
In September 1981 Sadat dramatically reversed his
policy of accommodation and took a hard line against
his religious and secular opponents. The change in
policy apparently was prompted by what Sadat saw as
a broad and pervasive conspiracy between the Islamic
fundamentalists and his political opposition aimed at
destroying his domestic and foreign policies. We
suspect the two developments that triggered the Sep-
tember crackdown were the high casualties in the
three-day riot in a Cairo slum in June and Sadat's
alarm over the ease with which the fundamentalists
peacefully marshaled 100,000 supporters in Cairo's
Abdin Square for a prayer meeting in August.
In line with Sadat's claims of a conspiracy between 5X1
fundamentalists and his political opponents, more
than 80 percent of those arrested in the crackdown
were affiliated with the political opposition and were
not members of fundamentalist groups. The Muslim
revolutionary groups and the university-based Islamic
societies were the principal targets. About 470 mem-
bers of Takfir wal-Hijra were arrested along with 235
members of the extremist groups and about 150
leaders of the student Islamic societies. Sadat threw
both secular and religious leaders into prison-includ-
ing Umar al-Talmasani of the Muslim Brotherhood
and former Al-Ahram editor Muhammad Hasanayn
Haykal. He ordered the closing of the opposition
press-including the Socialist Labor Party's Al-
Shaab and the Muslim Brotherhood's Al-Da'wa. He
also moved to tightly control activities and to ban
political sermons in Egypt's 40,000 private mosques.
25X1
By lumping his secular opposition with the religious
extremists, Sadat alienated those who would have
supported a harder line against the religious militants.
Sadat-sensing mounting criticism of the crack-
down-attempted to deflect it by charging that the
Soviets were plotting to stir up religious strife in
Egypt 25X1
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Reactions to the September suppression of the reli-
gious opposition were predictable: most Egyptians,
more concerned with economic than with political
issues, probably either agreed with or were apathetic
to Sadat's actions. The Muslim extremists, fortified in
their opposition to Sadat and his policies, withdrew to
regroup for their campaign against him. A small
group, associated with Takfir wal-Hijra and Al-Jihad,
continued their plans to kill the entire government
leadership, take over government broadcasting facili-
ties, and foment an Iranian-style revolution. The
assassins chose 6 October to act because the celebra-
tion of the anniversary of the 1973 war presented an
opportunity to kill the leadership as the first step in
the revolution. The Muslim Brotherhood adopted a
wait-and-see stance; Brotherhood leaders, who feared
that the Communists might move in if Sadat were
overthrown, instructed members to refrain from vio-
lence and not react to government moves. Many
members of the student Islamic societies shaved their
beards and donned Western-style clothing.
Secret 14
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