ISRAEL AND THE ARMY OF SOUTH LEBANON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP06T00412R000505690001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 4, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 27, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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SUBJECT: Israel and the Army of South Lebanon
NESA M#86-20100
Distribution:
External
1 - Dep Asst Sec Suddarth, State/NEA
1 - Mr. Richard Soloman, State/Policy Planning
1 - Mr. Aaron Miller, State/Policy Planning
1 - Ms. April Glaspie, State/NEA/ARN
1 - Mr. Philo Dibble, State/NEA/ARN
1 - Mr. Philip Wilcox, State/NEA/IAI
1 - Mr. George Harris, State/INR/NESA
1 - LtCol Fred Hof, OSD/ISA/NESA
1 - Mr. Dennis Ross, NSC
1 - Mr. Howard Teicher, NSC
Internal
1 - DIR/DCI/DDCI Exec Staff
1 - DDI
1 - ADDI
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - C/PES
1 - PDB Staff
1 - NID Staff
6 - CPAS/IMD/CB
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
1 - C/NESA/PPS
-t2 nN &A/PPS
1 - C/NESA/SO
1 - C/NESA/IA
1 - C/NESA/PG
1 - C/NESA/AI
3 - NESA/AI/I&L
DDI/NESA/AI
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Central Intelligence Agency
27 June 1986
Israel and the Army of South Lebanon
SUMMARY
One year after Israel drew down its forces in
southern Lebanon, the security zone along the border
manned by the Tel Aviv-supported Army of South Lebanon
(ASL) has proven to be a relatively effective
anti-terrorist buffer. The ASL and the Israeli Defense
Force have antagonized the local Lebanese community,
but have kept northern Israel free from serious
security problems. As a result, Israel has no
incentive at present either to abandon the ASL, or to
withdraw its own 600-1,000 advisers and troops from the
security zone.
The ASL has its own political agenda--it seeks to
control all of the Christian areas of south Lebanon
inside and out of the security zone and represent the
southern Christian community in national politics--and
has retained a measure of freedom in its daily
operations. Its long-term existence, however, is
dependent on continued Israeli logistic, intelligence
and financial support.
The Army of South Lebanon (ASL), headed by General Antoine
Lahad, is located in the section of southern Lebanon that
includes Israel's self-proclaimed security zone. This section
This memorandum was prepared by the
Israel-Jordan-PLO Branch and the Levant Branch,
Arab-Israeli Division, Office o Near Eastern and South Asian
Analysis. Information as of 27 June 1986 was used in its
preparation. Questions and comments should be, addressed to
Chief, Arab-Israeli Division,
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serves as a buffer between the settlements of northern Israel and
the violence of southern Lebanon. ASL units in the zone sustain
most of the casualties and bear the brunt of the
fighting--minimizing politically unacceptable Israeli losses.
According to a recent statement by an Israeli Army spokesman, six
Israeli soldiers have been killed, two kidnapped, and 29 wounded
as a result of more than 1,100 hostile operations during the past
year. During the same period, ASL casualties amounted to 45
killed and 160 wounded. ASL casualties are not extensively aired
in the Israeli media and have little impact on public opinion.
Moreover, according to a recent UNIFIL assessment, hostile
incidents in the 7nna haves de rearmed to about half the level of
last summer.
Perhaps even more compelling--particularly to residents of
Israel's northern settlements--Israeli casualties on the Lebanese
border in the past year have declined substantially compared to
before the Lebanon war. Between June 1985 and May 1986, no
Israeli civilians were killed, and only 10 were wounded. Between
June 1981 and May 1982, 15 Israelis were killed and 132 wounded;
between June 1980 and May 1981, 11 were killed and 114 wounded.
Israeli leaders would like to broker a deal with Amal and
Syria to preserve security in the south, but believe that such a
deal is unlikely. As a result, Israel views the ASL's presence
in the security zone as the only viable nearterm defense against
terrorist attacks on its northern settlements.
Background
The ASL militia was formed in 1976--with Israeli assistance
and urging--to protect the interests of the southern Christians
after the collapse of Lebanon's central government in the civil
war. Following Israel's withdrawal from the south after
Operation Litani in 1978, control of a small area north of the
Israeli-Lebanese border passed to the ASL, then commanded by
Lebanese Army Major Sa'ad Haddad. Without Israeli assistance,
the Christians would have been unable to fend off the much larger
and more powerful Palestinian and leftist Lebanese forces.
Haddad--an extreme rightist, a Greek Catholic, and a native
of Marjiyun in South Lebanon--was the major Lebanese figure in
the formation of the ASL. Haddad operated independently of the
Beirut government despite efforts of various Christian parties to
control him. The Phalange and Chamun's National Liberal Party
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sent him reinforcements from time to time, but neither group
could control him. Half-hearted attempts by the Lebanese
government to remove him were fended off.
Lahad--a former Lebanese army officer--was chosen by the
Israelis to head the militia after Haddad's death in 1984. He
faced an unenviable task--presiding over an organization
perceived by most of the area's Shias--75 percent of the security
zone's population of 150,000--as an Israeli stooge. He has
failed in his efforts to increase the size of his militia to
about 6,000 fighters: we currently estimate that the ASL numbers
about 2,100-2,500.
Strong Israeli Ties
Israel's control over the ASL is pervasive. Israel trains,
equips, advises, resupplies, and pays the salaries of Lahad's
troops. Additionally, Israeli troops fight alongside ASL
militiamen during sweep operations, and Israeli
armaments--particularly helicopter gunships--are used to support
the ASL. The ASL's primary role in the south purportedly is to
protect the Christian villages, but priority is given to securing
Israel's northern border by patrolling the security zone,
preventing infiltration of terrorists, and uncovering and
confiscating arms intended for use against Israel's northern
settlements.
In the event of a total pullout of Israeli troops from
Lebanon, we believe the ASL would quickly collapse. Lahad's
weapons--Israeli-provided tanks, artillery, and armored personnel
carriers--would become inoperable without Israeli maintenance
support and Lahad's spare parts and fuel stocks would be quickly
exhausted. Lahad could sustain military operations for no more
than a few weeks until he depleted his ammunition--which the
Israelis provide on a piece-meal basis to limit indiscriminate
shelling.
Lahad's Agenda
Lahad is a much more ambitious figure than was Major Haddad,
who despite occasional rhetoric never sought a national Lebanese
political role. Lahad, however, seeks not only to control the
border zone but all the predominately Christian areas of south
Lebanon. Indeed the most important base of Lahad's political
effort is the Christian town of Jazzin which is north of the
security zone. Most ASL armor and artillery is deployed near
Jazzin which, with about 25,000 inhabitants, is the largest
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Christian town in south Lebanon and a traditional stronghold of
the Chamunist National Liberal Party (NLP) with which Lahad has
long been linked. The NLP actually recommended Lahad to the
Israelis as Haddad's replacement in 1984. 25X1
We believe Lahad ultimately hopes to exploit Israeli backing
and ties with other Christian elements in Lebanon to strengthen
his hold over the southern Lebanese Christian community.
According to press accounts, Lahad envisions 25X1
regaining control over Christian villages east of Sidon which
fell to Shia militias after Israel's withdrawal last year. He
would like to launch an assault to regain them in cooperation
with the fighters from the NLP. 25X1
In our judgment an attack launched by Lahad without Israeli
approval and extensive logistic, intelligence, and combat
support--which would likely not be forthcoming--would fail.
Moreover, Lahad's control over some of his own troops is
questionable. The Shia members in the ASL probably would not
follow orders to attack Palestinian or Muslim strongholds outsidE25X1
the ASL's current area of operations. Although Shias represent
less than than 15 percent of the ASL militia, they lend
credibility to the claims of Lahad and Israel that the ASL is a
Lebanese militia representing the south's population.
In addition to these military plans to expand the ASL's area
of control, Lahad has also energetically sought to strengthen his
economic position in the south. The US Embassy in Tel Aviv
reports that the ASL is involved in a casino just north of the
Israeli border. The ASL with Israeli support has also improved
port facilities at Naqurah. Lahad also has expanded on Haddad's
invitation to fundamentalist Christians in the United States to
use south Lebanon as a base for broadcasting via the Voice of
Hope radio and television stations to the entire Levant. 25X1
Lahad is aware that these steps will never make him free from
dependence on Israel, but he seems to harbor ambitions to make
the ASL-dominated areas another Christian canton similar to but
smaller than the Christian canton north of Beirut. The southern
Christians would thus join the ranks of Lebanon's other
confessional groups in carving out a protective mini-state of
their own in the absence of a viable central authority. Of
course, Lahad's canton would be imposed on the Shia majority by
the Christian minority--in contrast to Lebanon's other defacto
cantons which are more homogenous. Lahad probably envisions that
this southern Christian canton would remain an Israeli
protectorate, but also develop improved ties with the Maronite
Christian entity in central Lebanon. 25X1
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In the unlikely event that Israel reaches a security
arrangement with Amal or Syria for the south in which Lahad's
role as head of the ASL is scuttled, Lahad would have to shelve
his ambitious political goals. We do not believe that he could
strongly resist an Israeli offer of early--and likely well
paid--retirement. He says he is willing to step down but only if
the security of the southern Christians is guaranteed. 25X1
Lahad's Room to Maneuver
Despite Israel's strict supervision, Lahad has retained a
measure of tactical freedom in determining his militia's daily
operations. Israeli attempts at curbing Lahad's unruly troops
from exacting revenge against residents of the south are not
always successful. The ASL apparently was responsible for most
of the incidents of brutality during Israel's last major sweep
operation beyond the security zone in February. Israeli advisors
are assigned to each armor and artillery company,
but have been unable to stop indiscriminate
firing against targets outside the zone.
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Lahad recently announced that the ASL holds approximately 200
Shia fighters in a southern Lebanese prison near Al Khiyam.
Lahad has fended off Israel requests--in response to frequent
International Red Cross (IRC) entreaties and Washington's urging
--to allow the IRC access to the detainees. Israeli efforts have
probably been half-hearted--in our judgment Israel has sufficient
leverage over Lahad to force him to comply with these requests.
Relations With Other Lebanese Groups
Other Christians
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Lahad is a Maronite and wants to establish closer ties to the
Christians of Central Lebanon.
Lahad met recently with Samir Ja'Ja, the leader of the
Lebanes e Forces militia, the military arm of the Christian
Phalange Party and NLP leader Dany Chamun, son of former
President Camile Chamun, in south Lebanon. This meeting may be
an indication that prospects for cooperation between the various
Christian communities are improving. The ASL and the LF share a
common interest: protecting Lebanese Christians from
Syrian-backed militias, the pro-Iranian Hizballah, and returning
Palestinian fighters. 25X1
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The deep-seated rivalries that plaque the Christian
population, however, will make progress very slow. Moreover, the
two groups are geographically separate, making military
cooperation very complicated. Resupply of materiel or movement
of troops in either direction would be a logistical nightmare and
almost certainly would require Israeli assistance.
The Druze Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) controls most of
the area between Lahad and the northern Christians and therefore
influences their efforts to cooperate. Although the Druze have a
tacit understanding with Lahad over his control of Jazzin they
have been reluctant to aid a Christian linkage. The rise of the
Hizballah--which poses a threat to Druze and Christians alike
--however, may encourage the Druze to accommodate the Christian
efforts to develop closer ties. Walid Jumblatt noted in recent
discussions with US Embassy officials that the PSP regard recent
Shia activities in southern Lebanon as a potential threat to
their community, and have quietly supported the ASL's activities,
particularly in Jazzin. 25X1
The Druze also have an interest in good ties with Lahad to
maintain contact to the Druze community in southeastern Lebanon
around Hasbayya, a Druze holy site. The ASL forces in this area
include a few Druze in their ranks, according to press reports,
and Druze villagers pass via Jazzin between the two Druze
communities. Ties with Lahad and his Israeli patrons also allows
the PSP to maintain important ties to the large Druze community
on the Golan Heights. 25X1
Prospects for UNIFIL-ASL cooperation in the event of a total
Israeli withdrawal are bleak. Current relations between UNIFIL
and the ASL range from non-cooperation to open hostility and
would likely erode unless UNIFIL reverses its current policy and
accords the ASL the same quasi-official status as it gives other
Lebanese militias. UNIFIL and ASL posts in the south regularly
deny each other passage through their respective areas of
control, and exchanges of fire between the two forces are
becoming increasingly frequent.
UNIFIL's departure would have little impact on the Army of
South Lebanon, in our view. Lahad would like to expand the ASL's
zone to areas now occupied by UNIFIL north of Israel's security
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zone. But unless he recruits a large number of new militiamen--a
prospect we judge as unlikely--he will be unable to do more than
make limited territorial gains. We estimate that Lahad would
have to come close to his original goal of 6,000 troops to expand
his influence significantly north of the current zone. Israeli
leaders, moreover, are unlikely to support Lahad's expansionist
designs. They would be unwilling to augment IDF troop leves
following an ASL move to occupy areas evacuated by UNIFIL.
Outlook
Israeli leaders would like Syria and Amal to agree to
preserve security in the south--in return for which Israel would
incrementally withdraw its troops from selected portions of the
zone after six months of relative calm. Israel, however, insists
on a role for the ASL to provide security for Christian areas
following an Israeli withdrawal; Amal and Assad want Lahad's
force disbanded.
Short of an agreement, Israel is very unlikely to risk
unilateral withdrawal from the security zone. The Israelis
believe growing numbers of Palestinian fighters are returning to
the south and that the Shia and Amal are becoming increasingly
radical, making an already volatile region more dangerous. The
Israelis believe that the security zone--patrolled by the ASL and
relatively small numbers of IDF troops--is the best way to stem
cross-border violence and they are likely to rely on this
arrangement for the foreseeable future.
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The Partition of Lebanon
A canton is an area in which one
concessional group is politically
and militarily dominant.
Lebanese
Shia I '-~-
Contested
Army of Southebano ~
,. operating area outside
An Nabatiyah H ?ba`yy3
Marji'yun ? ?AI Khiyiim
(ASL HQ)
Shia security zone,
canton Metullaa?
~ ~
t
Golan
Heights
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
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Iq
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