THE AFGHAN REGIME: PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL CONSILIDATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP06T00412R000606410001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
The Afghan Regime:
Prospects for
Political Consolidation
NESA 86-10046
December 1986
Copy 3 2 5
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
The Afghan Regime:
Prospects for
Political Consolidation
This paper was prepared by
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Analysis, with contributions from
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Office of Leadership Analysis, and
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NESA.
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Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South Asia Division, NESA,I
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Secret
NESA 86-10046
December 1986
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The Afghan Regime:
Prospects for
Political Consolidation
Key Judgments The failure of the Soviet and Afghan regimes to build durable political and
Information available military institutions in Afghanistan makes it highly unlikely that the USSR
as of 25 November 1986 will be able to reduce its troop strength significantly any time soon, barring a
was used in this report. political decision by Moscow to abandon the Kabul regime. For nearly seven
years, Moscow has tried unsuccessfully to overcome the problems that have
plagued the Afghan regime: a seriously divided ruling party, a weak and
unreliable military, lack of control over much of the countryside, and the
unpopularity both of Marxism in a staunchly Islamic country and of any
leader so dependent on foreign backing.
Since late 1985, the Afghan regime has redoubled its efforts to develop its
institutions. This intensified Afghan strategy-which the Soviets de-
signed-has several major elements:
? A campaign to enhance Kabul's legitimacy and increase its popularity.
This focuses on making the government more representative of Afghan
society by appointing nonparty members to government posts; minimizing
the role of Marxist ideology; writing a new constitution that promises to
increase the power of non-Marxist organizations; and intensifying the
courtship of traditional religious and tribal elites.
? A campaign to strengthen the party and the armed forces, including a
Gorbachev-style anticorruption drive in the party and another major
conscription campaign to increase the size of the armed forces.
? A campaign to diversify responsibility for security by developing military
and paramilitary groups. This campaign focuses on forming tribal militias
and securing their loyalty.
At the same time, the regime is expanding its use of subversive techniques
against its enemies in Pakistan and inside Afghanistan. In Pakistan, the
Afghan regime has launched a destabilization program aimed at dividing
the Afghan resistance from its most important external supporters. In
Afghanistan, the regime's intelligence services are improving their ability to
penetrate insurgent groups, gain intelligence on insurgent plans, and
counteract insurgent intelligence networks in the government. To the extent
that effective military targeting of insurgent convoys is a result of better
intelligence collection, these successes are feeding insurgent concerns and
making it more difficult for the insurgents to resupply their fighters and
civilian supporters.
Secret
NESA 86-10046
December 1986
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These programs have made little headway. Party factionalism increased
dramatically after Najib replaced Babrak Karmal as party secretary
general in May. The regime's effort to broaden its support is widely
regarded by Afghans with suspicion, and the stepped-up conscription for
the armed forces is meeting opposition and is unlikely to improve the
caliber or numbers of reliable troops. Longstanding and bitter rivalries
within the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and differ-
ences between Kabul and Moscow over how far "national reconciliation"
should go will prevent the creation of an effective party apparatus at the lo-
cal level for many years to come.
Moscow and Kabul's respective agendas will probably increasingly diverge
as the Soviets readjust their counterinsurgency strategy, a process that has
already begun. In seeking at least a token broadening of the regime and re-
placing Babrak, the Soviets are contributing to palpable uneasiness in
Kabul over Moscow's reliability as an ally. One antiregime party has
already been created from disgruntled Babrak supporters calling for the
ouster of the Soviets.
As demonstrated by long-term education programs that send Afghan
elementary students for a decade of instruction in the USSR, Moscow
probably believes it can outlast its opponents. It intends, along with Kabul,
to press those measures that hold the most promise of breaking the
resistance's or Pakistan's will in the near-to-middle term. These will
include programs aimed at dividing the insurgents from their civilian
support network, increasing pressure on resistance supply routes, imple-
menting diplomatic measures to improve the legitimacy of the Afghan
regime at the expense of the resistance alliance, and increasing sabotage
within Pakistan. Countering this strategy will require sustained, substan-
tial external support for the insurgents-including sanctuaries; arms, food,
and other logistic support; and more aggressive public diplomacy on their
behalf.
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Contents
Key Judgments
An Evolving Strategy for Political Consolidation
1
Najib's Emerging Agenda
Depending on KHAD
6
Seeking Government Credibility
8
Aiming Abroad
8
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Figure 1
Ethnic Groups in Afghanistan and Neighboring Pakistan
Sov1et Union
Boundary representation Is
not necessarily eutaoritstive
n J yn, zm
Qandahar
KBpi sltonarha
sa )
p-t7, in
Fed.
Admin
Tribal
Nort
ISLA
istal
Ethnic Groups
Pashtun Turkmen
Baluch Uzbek
Q Tajik Chahar
1 ~1 Flazara Aimak
Turi Selected tribe
- Province-level boundary
150 Kilometers
150 Miles
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The Afghan Regime:
Prospects for
Political Consolidation
An Evolving Strategy for
Political Consolidation
Since 1985 the Afghan regime has redoubled its
efforts to enhance its political legitimacy and increase
its popularity. The Soviets have played a key role in
designing and pushing this policy.'
In addition to focusing on institution building in the
party and government, the regime's approach aims at
neutralizing support for the insurgents and exploiting
their weaknesses using a variety of political and
military techniques. The Afghan Ministry of State
Security, better known as KHAD, has been at the
forefront of this effort.' Najib was head of KHAD
before assuming his current post as general secretary
of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA).
Babrak's Efforts To Consolidate
Political Control
The image-building campaign began in earnest last
November, when then party head Babrak Karmal
sought to reinvigorate efforts to improve the regime's
international standing and legitimacy. The govern-
ment publicly minimized its Marxist-Leninist ambi-
tions and stressed its commitment to traditional Af-
ghan politics and values. Speeches by Babrak and
other key Afghan officials portrayed the government
as pluralistic and the party as only one of a number of
organizations governing Afghanistan.
In November 1985, Kabul provided the theoretical
basis for the shift in emphasis, one that almost
certainly was prompted by Moscow's loss of patience
' Because Westerners cannot travel freely in Afghanistan, we know
very little about the extent of the Afghan regime's political
presence outside the capital, its ability to implement programs
mentioned in the official press, or the popularity of these programs.
Many of the judgments in this paper should be read as tentative,
based largely on inferences drawn from the official pressF
'The Afghan intelligence service (KHAD) was renamed the Minis-
try of State Security in January. In this assessment, KHAD will be
with the regime's problems. In a major speech outlin-
ing the regime's much touted campaign to broaden its
support, Babrak underlined Kabul's willingness to
expand talks, contacts, and understanding with those
elements "unconsciously taking a hostile position
against the revolution or those repenting their coun- 25X1
terrevolutionary deeds." The speech also revealed the
broad outlines of a policy-referred to as the 10
theses-aimed at improving the regime's popularity
and neutralizing support for the resistance.
We believe the 10 theses speech was an admission-
by Kabul and Moscow-that the Communist regime
lacked popular appeal. The speech promised that all
social groups-tribes, ethnic groups, religious groups,
capitalists, entrepreneurs, and peasants and middle
landowners-would be represented in the government. 25X1
The new approach emphasized respect for Islam,
relying on traditional tribal councils to neutralize
support for the resistance in the strategic eastern
provinces and on economic incentives-land reform,
rural economic aid, and the encouragement of private
investment-to build popular support. Nonparty orga-
nizations such as the National Fatherland Front, the
Democratic Youth Organization of Afghanistan, and
the national women's organization were to play a
greater role in government.
In subsequent months, Kabul announced other mea-
sures to broaden support for the government: 25X1
? Fourteen nonparty members were appointed to Cab-
inet and sub-Cabinet posts.
? Three nonparty members were made provincial
governors.
? Seventy-nine additions were made to the govern-
ment's Revolutionary Council-the rubberstamp
legislature. Most were not members of the party.
? A new constitution, now in draft form, was being
written to put the regime on a sounder legal footing.
? Local elections, which began in August 1985, were
scheduled for all provinces of Afghanistan.
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On 9 November 1985, Babrak made a major policy
address before the Revolutionary Council that pro-
vided the theoretical basis of Kabul's widely publi-
cized "broadening campaign." The objectives of the
Afghan revolution were specified in the form of 10
theses, paraphased below:
? The revolutionary process is a long and difficult
one.
? The essence of state rule stems from the national
and democratic character of the revolution. This
rule considers the right of broad participation of all
true patriots. These include representatives of all
social strata and groups of the country-workers,
peasants, and middle landowners; artisans and
intellectuals; armed forces staff; private investors;
capitalists; spiritual leaders; and "credible social
personalities "from all nationalities, tribes, and
clans. The new approach regarding the expansion of
the social pillars of the revolution includes broad-
ening of leading state bodies-including the Revo-
lutionary Council and the Council of Ministers-
with credible representatives of the people. Power
will not be monopolized by the party.
? Greater attention is to be paid to providing econom-
ic support for and improving production in agricul-
ture. Just solutions of land and water questions are
promised.
? The interests of the private sector in transport
industries, services, and trade are to be taken into
consideration in the financial, taxation, loan, cus-
toms, and pricing policies of the state.
Babrak put particular emphasis on winning support
from Pashtun tribes astride the most important insur-
gent supply routes on both sides of the border with
Pakistan. According to the US Embassy in Kabul, in
1985 the regime convened two councils or jirgas to
demonstrate support for the regime. The Loya
? The interests of intellectuals and skilled workers
are to be protected by promoting education and the
sciences.
? The government promises to maintain and promote
the development of national minorities and border
tribes and to provide just representation for all
tribes and clans in the state, social, central, and
local authorities and in Vational Fatherland
Front. Authorities will re ect the traditional cus-
toms of assembly and aid the Pashtun and Baluch
tribes along the border.
? The government will strive to consolidate the Na-
tional Fatherland Front and other social and mass
organizations, such as trade unions and the "demo-
cratic" organizations of youth and women. Other
such groups will be allowed as long as they agree to
work with the regime.
? Religious leaders and respect for Islam will be
valued by the state. No one will be allowed to
mistreat Islam.
? The Soviets will depart Afghanistan as soon as
foreign armed interference ceases and its nonrecur-
rence is guaranteed. The armed forces, including
the police forces, KHAD, the militia, tribal groups,
and revolutionary self-defense groups, will be
strengthened.
? The aim of the government's foreign policy is to
consolidate peace for all.
Jirga-a national council that traditionally had the
role of acknowledging or rejecting any new govern-
ment in Kabul-was held with much fanfare in April
to give the government a stronger legal basis. The
tribal jirga, held in September, attracted many dele-
gates from the Pakistani side of the border.
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Notice to recipients of DI Intelligence Assessment NESA 86-10046, 25X1
In the box on page 2, the second bullet in the second column should read:
? The government promises to maintain and promote the development of national
minorities and border tribes and to provide just representation for all tribes and
clans in the state, social, central, and local authorities and in the National
Fatherland Front. Authorities will respect the traditional customs of assembly
and aid the Pashtun and Baluch tribes along the border.
December 1986, The Afghan Regime: Prospects for Political Consider- 25X1
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We do not believe these measures garnered the regime
much new popular support. Most of the nonparty
appointees had been affiliated with the regime for
years, and the jirga delegates were well paid for their
attendance. According to the US Embassy in Kabul,
most Kabulis regarded the local elections as a sham.
despite the regime's
best efforts, the National Fatherland Front-which
the regime claims has 800,000 members-consists of
a few hundred members and has virtually no organi-
zation outside the capital.
Najib's Emerging Agenda
The resignation of Babrak Karmal as party chief and
his replacement by state security chief Najib in May
1986 came after numerous indications in the Soviet
media that Moscow had grown dissatisfied with Ba-
brak's leadership. At the 19th plenum of the PDPA
Central Committee in July, Najib announced an
ambitious-and, in our view, unrealistic-agenda.
The agenda aimed, according to regime media ac-
counts, at ending the insurgency by the 10th anniver-
sary of the Communist takeover, that is by April
1988. Like Babrak's efforts, Najib's program relies
heavily on creating the appearance of reconciliation
with some of the regime's opponents, while using a
mixture of military pressure, tribal policy, and subver-
sion to crack down on insurgent infiltration and erode
Pakistani support.
Najib's ascension, in our view, was a reward for his
success as intelligence chief in orchestrating the regi-
me's tribal policy and developing KHAD into what we
believe is the regime's only effective political institu-
tion. We believe Moscow also hoped that Najib's
Pashtun heritage would better suit him for pacifying
the predominantly Pashtun tribal areas in the east
than Babrak, who is a Tajik.
Tribal Policy. Najib's tribal policy-like Babrak's-
is designed to increase support for the regime and
hinder resistance movement through tribal areas. It
also aims at raising Islamabad's fears about Kabul's
ability to foment unrest among the restive border
tribes by encouraging the establishment of an inde-
pendent Pashtunistan. We believe Kabul's tribal poli-
cy is, in part, an implicit indictment of the Afghan
armed forces. To a large extent, the regime is
counting on the policy to make up for the failure of
the armed forces to provide for local security. Broadly
defined, the policy consists of:
? Bribing local tribal leaders with arms, money, and
positions in order to convince them to deny the
resistance transit through selected border regions 25X1
and to increase the number of tribal militias armed
by and loyal to Kabul.
? A destabilization campaign-including bombings, 25X1
sabotage, and cross-border air raids-in Pakistan's
tribal border region aimed at unsettling the Paki-
stani Government and creating tension between
local Pakistanis and the roughly 3 million Afghan
refugees located there.
? Exploiting discontent in Pakistan with Islamabad's
interference in the Pashtun and Baluch tribal areas
over such issues as narcotics control.
Najib's rise to head of the party signaled a more
aggressive tribal policy.
the Afghan Ministry of Nationalities and
Tribal Affairs ordered in June that three new tribal
militia posts be established opposite the Mohmand
Agency in Pakistan. According to the US Embassy in
Islamabad, Kabul Radio also began a propaganda
blitz into Pakistan obviously aimed at sparking vio-
lence between Pakistani Government and tribal au-
thorities, reducing tribal support for the insurgents,
and turning Pakistanis against the Afghan refugees.
Although the regime vigorously denies any destabili-
zation activity inside Pakistan, in late August Najib
reiterated the regime's longstanding and traditional
friendship with the Pashtun and Baluch tribes, and
Kabul celebrated "Pashtunistan Day" on 31 Au-
gust-an obvious bid to encourage separatist senti-
ment in the region. Resistance leaders have also
complained to US officials about Kabul's efforts to
manipulate "leftist" Baluch tribes in Pakistan.
Inside Afghanistan,
policy's spotty success. In a recent incident,
a tribal leader approached Kabul
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Najib: Old Wine in a New Bottle?
Najib has much to offer Moscow as general secretary
of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan.
Staunchly pro-Soviet, he has demonstrated vigor,
determination, and unquestioned loyalty to the Sovi-
et cause. We believe his tenure as head of KHAD
proved his mettle and drew him closer to the KGB.
Although Najib spent nearly 11 years in medical
school, his main interest has always been politics. He
became involved in a Communist youth group during
high school and joined the PDPA soon after its
establishment in 1965. When the party split in 1967,
he joined Babrak's Parchami faction and spent his
latter years in medical school as a student organizer.
Najib eventually became president of a Parchami
student group and a member of its central committee.
Upon his graduation in 1975, Najib served briefly in
the military before becoming a full-time politician. In
1977 he was appointed to Parcham's liaison commit-
tee with the USSR,
After the Communist coup that brought a
reunited PDPA to power in 1978, Najib became a
member of the Revolutionary Council and served
briefly as Deputy Minister of Interior. As party unity
cracked and the Khalqis consolidated their power,
Najib was exiled as Ambassador to Iran. He fled to
Prague later that year with the Embassy's funds
when the Khalqi leadership dismissed and exiled
leading Parchamis.
Najib's spectacular rise to power began after the
Soviet invasion in 1979. He immediately returned to
Kabul and became a full member of the Central
Committee. Two months later, he became head of
KHAD, with the military rank of lieutenant general,
and was reappointed to the Revolutionary Council. In
1981 he was appointed a full member of the Politburo
and became a secretary in the Central Committee. By
November 1985, with his appointment to the Central
Committee Secretariat where he was responsible for
all of the regime's security services, he became a
serious candidate to succeed Babrak Karmal as party
general secretary and did so in May 1986.
We believe that Najib has been aided in his ascent to
power by his ties to party leaders, Soviet confidence
in his ability, and ruthlessness. His links to leading
Parchamis stem from his diplomatic exile in 1978,
where he became close to fellow exiles Nur Ahmad
Nur, Anahita Ratebzad, Mahmud Baryalai, and
Babrak Karmal. After fleeing Tehran, Najib joined
Nur and Baryalai in Eastern Europe to recruit
supporters and plot the overthrow of the Khalqis.
Najib is thoroughly devoted to the Kremlin and
Soviet ideology and looks to Stalin as a role model.
Najib has used brutal
methods, including torture and assassination, to
achieve his goals.
Najib, 40, claims to speak Dari, Russian, German,
French, English, and Urdu, in addition to his native
Pashtu. His father was a political agitator in Paki-
stan during the Daud government's efforts to create
the ethnic state of Pashtunistan in the mid-1970s.
Married, he has three daughters.
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for help in providing local security; he was subse-
quently put in charge of a 200-man security force.
the Hazara and Turi
tribes recently agreed to raise militias of 5,000 and
2,000, respectively, to patrol the Afghanistan-
Pakistan border. the resistance
is facing difficulties because of improved government
militia performance in northern Konduz Province.
These militias receive food and monetary support
from the government in exchange for guiding regime
been successful. Early this year,
Nuristani's efforts to raise a proregime
tribal militia were being resisted by local mullahs who
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forces to insurgent locations.
Perhaps the most significant success for the regime's
tribal policy is occurring in the Qandahar area, where
insurgents say tribal militias are the mainstay of the
regime. The militias serve under the direction of
former insurgent leader Ismatullah Achakzai, who
defected to the regime in mid-1985.
insurgent resupply in the Qandahar area has
been made much more difficult since Ismatullah
established security posts along a major insurgent
supply route outside the city. In at least one instance,
Ismatullah succeeded in persuading another insurgent
commander to defect to the regime.
The tribes elsewhere have proved unable or unwilling
to impede resistance transit. Former Afghan army
officer Sarwar Nuristani's efforts to block the strate-
gic insurgent supply route through Nuristan have not
transit the area believe that this supply route is
impossible to block because it covers a fairly wide
expanse and cannot be sealed by establishing one or
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Although it is unlikely to alter Islamabad's Afghani-
stan policy any time soon, the subversive aspect of
Kabul's tribal policy is making it costlier for Pakistan
to support the insurgents. According to the US Em-
bassy in Islamabad, civilian support for Pakistan's
Afghan policy-especially in the North-West Fron- 25X1
tier Province-is eroding, and the political left has 25X1
been handed a new issue. Sabotage is frequently
conducted by oper- 25X1
atives sent into Pakistan as refugees. We believe these 25X1
agents not only create ill will against the refugee 25X1
community-which is blamed for the violence-but
also penetrate resistance groups to gather intelligence
and foment divisions among their leaders.
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In Pakistan, regional experts disagree over how dura-
ble Kabul's efforts to buy tribal loyalty will prove to
be. Tribal leaders are notorious for playing one side 25X1
against another in their bid to preserve local autono-
my. At the same time, the tribes-traditional fence- 25X1
sitters-want to be on the winning side. If they 25X1
perceive the resistance edge to be slipping, one Paki-
stani scholar argues, many groups-particularly the 25X1
weaker clans-would do more for Kabul. 0 25X1
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Depending on KHAD. As part of its tribal policy and
destabilization campaign, the government is increas-
ingly using its intelligence service, commonly known
as KHAD, against the insurgents.
KHAD is demonstrating
increasing skill at penetrating resistance organiza-
tions, fueling factionalism and suspicions between
various groups, and exploiting tribal divisions. Ac-
cording to the US Embassy in Kabul, KHAD is now a
ubiquitous, powerful, disciplined, and feared organi-
zation that in many areas is more influential and
useful to Moscow than the PDPA.
KHAD's collection efforts against resistance bands-
most for years have paid almost no attention to the
need for secrecy-have hurt the resistance's ability to
evade ambushes and larger attacks.
KHAD has dramatically improved its
recruitment efforts in Nangarhar Province, with
agents in virtually every village of the province by
early 1986.
supply caravans. To the extent that effective military
targeting of insurgent logistic convoys is a result of
better intelligence, KHAD is feeding these concerns
and making it more difficult for the insurgents to
resupply their fighters and civilian supporters.
Strengthening the Armed Forces. At best, the estab-
lishment of tribal militias and the more aggressive use
of KHAD can be only stopgap measures, in our view,
to buy the regime time to build military forces
capable of ensuring the country's security. Najib has
publicly admitted the serious deficiencies in the
armed forces. Kabul is trying desperately-and with
little success, in our view-to expand significantly the
size of the army and limit desertions.
the government last De-
reached 60,000 by March,
cember ordered the size of the army increased from
about 50,000 to 140,000, army strength had not even
The government continues to try to increase the
army's size. In mid-June the regime began a stepped-
up conscription drive that eliminated student draft
deferments, offered "amnesty" to returning deserters,
and, relied
heavily on pressgangs for implementation.
As part of an apparent effort to allow the Afghan
army to assume more of the burden of fighting the
war, Kabul late last year began giving more static
security reponsibilities to civilian paramilitary groups,
military units of KHAD, and the police:
We believe KHAD's successes, although insufficient
to compensate for the armed forces' weaknesses, may
be having an impact on resistance morale-at least
indirectly. Although the situation has improved since
then, earlier this summer resistance leaders com-
plained about more effective interdiction of insurgent
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the regime began
late last year to form "party battalions" composed
of youth recently trained in the USSR. These
battalions guard government offices and radio sta-
tions, and they occasionally participate in offensive
operations alongside army units,
? We believe KHAD military personnel are used
primarily as "watchdogs" in Afghan army units to
prevent defections and to conduct Kabul's campaign
of subversion in Pakistan. Some KHAD offensive
counterinsurgency units also may exist,
In an apparent effort to improve the reliability of local
security forces, Najib announced in July that "de-
fense councils" had been set up in the provinces.
the coun-
cils are composed of provincial party chiefs, provincial
government leaders, and representatives from the
militia. These councils will probably involve the party
directly in supervising local security.
Party oversight of the army is apparently also being
stepped up. In late August, Najib assumed responsi-
bility as commander in chief of the armed forces.
Previously, Babrak Karmal as president of the Revo-
lutionary Council had this role. According to Najib,
80 percent of the officer corps are either party
members or members of the Democratic Youth Orga-
nization of Afghanistan, a regime-sponsored youth
group that serves as a party recruitment mechanism.
We believe efforts to improve the performance of the
armed forces will have only marginal impact. Previous
attempts to upgrade performance via conscription
failed because the recruits generally are ill trained,
have poor morale, and defect at the first opportunity.
The party battalions, for example, were poorly trained
and suffered morale problems,
efforts
to increase the size and the effectiveness of the armed
forces were not working because of high desertion
rates and heightened factionalism in the military after
Babrak's removal.
Figure 2
Afghanistan: Rocket Attacks in Kabul, 1983-86
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Soviet efforts to have the Afghan armed forces take
the lead in combat have had little impact. The Afghan 25X1
army scored a major success in capturing a large
insurgent base camp in April, but during the summer
the insurgents held the initiative. Afghan troops have
played a secondary role in major military campaigns
since April and have been hard pressed to deal with
insurgent attacks. The insurgents destroyed two major
ammunition dumps in the Kabul area,
and demonstrated a capability to infiltrate
Herat and Qandahar despite the regime's tougher
perimeter security measures.
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Seeking Government Credibility. Najib-more force-
fully than Babrak-has emphasized the need to seek
popular support for the government. At the 19th
Central Committee plenum in July he claimed that
elections at the local level had been held "in most
provinces." In a subsequent press conference he ad-
mitted that elections in 10 of the country's 29 prov-
inces were still in the preparatory stages, although the
regime claims they have since been completed. Selec-
tion of a State Council-a bicameral legislature
consisting of an appointed council of nationalities and
an elected council of representatives-scheduled to
take place by the end of October, has not yet oc-
curred, an apparent victim of party feuding over how
to choose candidates, according to the US Embassy in
Kabul.
Blaming the party for popular dissatisfaction with the
regime, Najib excoriated the PDPA cadre for inept
performance, factionalism, slackness, lack of princi-
ple, and malfeasance during the July plenum. He
hinted broadly at demotions, sacking, and punishment
of incompetent or corrupt officials, including mem-
bers of the Cabinet and Politburo. The election of new
members to the Central Inspection Commission of the
Central Committee-responsible for, among other
things, investigating complaints to the party-sug-
gests that an anticorruption drive will be given teeth.
Although the anticorruption drive may simply provide
an excuse for eliminating Najib's enemies
-several provincial party
leaders have already been removed.
Najib has reiterated the regime's intention to use
economic incentives to achieve its ends. At a Politburo
meeting in July, he warned that Cabinet members
unable to meet economic targets would be dismissed.
He said the state's first five-year plan envisaged
preferential treatment to tribes and nationalities who
are in a "more difficult situation"-presumably under
greater insurgent pressure. He also instructed party
members to take more interest in economic develop-
ment issues and to encourage private investment.
we believe the regime
is not making headway at winning popular support.
The so-called local elections-held mostly in provin-
cial capitals under the watchful eye of security
forces-often required regime officials to draft candi-
dates who were then elected by a show of hands. In
November, Najib admitted that even in Kabol Prov-
ince elections were conducted in fewer than one-third
of the villages. According to the US Embassy in
Kabul, most politically aware Afghans view Kabul's
efforts toward more representative government as a
charade.
We believe the regime's reliance on coercion almost
certainly works against its political gestures toward
Afghans siding with the resistance. Analysis of other
insurgencies shows that counterinsurgency programs
with a harsh, imprecise coercive component almost
never work, even when accompanied by sound civic
action programs. In Afghanistan, where revenge is a
strongly held cultural value, attacks against home and
family are doubly felt. Consequently, we doubt that
Kabul will get much beyond gaining the acquiescence
of those Afghans driven by fighting to move to the few
urban enclaves where regime control is relatively
good, such as Kabul, Jalalabad, and Mazar-e Sharif.
Aiming Abroad. We believe the regime's so-called
broadening program is aimed almost exclusively at a
foreign audience. Kabul may be calculating that
efforts to broaden the base of the regime, while
unconvincing inside Afghanistan, will be well received
in Pakistan among opposition groups who criticize
Islamabad for not trying hard enough to reach a
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People "elect" representatives
to local government in Kabol
political solution to the war. Similarly, minimizing the
Marxist character of the regime appears aimed at
bolstering Afghanistan's so-called nonaligned creden-
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tials.
Najib's July address to the Central Committee
warned of a heightened campaign of public diplomacy
timed to coincide with the UN General Assembly
session and the summit meeting of the Nonaligned
Movement. Najib urged that "propaganda and coun-
terpropaganda" be stepped up, particularly during the
period before the Nonaligned summit in Zimbabwe in
September and the General Assembly session shortly
thereafter. Kabul has aggressively sought to establish
diplomatic relations with various Third World coun-
tries. It has obtained agreement in principle from
Zimbabwe-current chairman of the Nonaligned
Movement-to do so, although Harare has since
indicated it will not establish relations until a political
solution to the Afghan conflict is reached. Kabul also
tried to gain the Asian Group's endorsement for its
candidacy for one of the UN General Assembly vice
presidencies.
As part of this offensive, the regime is trying to woo
credible exiles in the refugee community and some
frequently invited skilled expatriate Afghans to return
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Despite these efforts, Kabul's inability to negotiate
successfully-after repeated efforts-with many of
the most effective insurgent commanders and political
leaders makes it difficult to form the type of coalition
government that might gain it genuine popular sup-
port. the government is 25X1
no longer willing to negotiate with fundamentalist
leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar or Panjsher Valley
commander Masood-who would in any case be
unwilling to deal with the Kabul regime. In press 25X1
interviews, Najib admitted that the regime is
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Party General Secretary
Najib (left) meets with re-
ligious leaders in Kabul. Prov-
ing its Islamic credentials is
very important to the regime.
"decisively determined to eliminate the (resistance)
leaders ... who sold out." Abandoning its unsuccess-
ful efforts to establish truces with the more dedicated
resistance commanders, the regime conducted a series
of trials in July that condemned to death in absentia a
half-dozen major insurgent leaders, including Masood
government ministries occurred,
and delayed for several weeks the 19th
The leadership change further eroded the military's
effectiveness and reliability, in our view.
armed clashes occurred be-
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and Herat's Ismail Khan.
Party Problems
In our view, intensified factionalism within the PDPA
since Babrak's removal in May will hamper the
regime's efforts to build even a facade of public
support and force Najib to spend much of his time
over the next year seeking to consolidate his position.
Najib's reputation for ruthlessness and his record of
anti-Khalqi behavior made his ascendance controver-
sial and convinced many of Babrak Karmal's support-
ers that their days were numbered.
Immediately after Babrak's ouster, infighting intensi-
fied between the rival Khalqi and Parchami factions,
and within the Parchami faction among supporters of
Babrak, Najib, and Prime Minister Keshtmand.
Public protests, hundreds of resignations from the
party, anti-Soviet outbursts, and work slowdowns in
tween Babrak and Najib supporters in Afghan army
units, arrests of pro-Babrak officers in the army and
in the intelligence services had begun, and the expec-
tation of further purges in the armed forces was
causing considerable unease.
Najib's history of anti-Khalqi behavior and hints of
further purges will sustain party unrest, in our view.
Of the seven ministers Najib criticized by name in
August for failing to meet first-quarter economic
targets, three were Khalqis. According to the US
Embassy, these warnings and the dismissal of other
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~ecrew
Underlying Weaknesses in the Party
The split in the People's Democratic Party of Afghan-
istan dates back almost to the party's founding in
1965, and by 1967 Khalq and Parcham became
separate factions. Each took its name from its party
newspaper. Differences over political tactics were an
important factor in the original Parcham-Khalq
schism, according to Western political observers, with
the early Khalqis favoring revolutionary extremism
and the Parchamis favoring more moderate tactics.
We believe that the differences also have social and
ethnic roots. Parchamis tend to come from urban and
middle- or upper-class backgrounds and Khalqis
from the rural lower class. Nearly all Khalqis are
Pashtun, while nearly all Parchamis are from some
other ethnic group. (Najibullah, a Pashtun Parchami,
is an exception.) Subfactions based on personal fol-
lowing, family ties, tribalism, or ethnicity also exist.
In 1977 the two factions united under Soviet pressure
but only papered over their differences. These diJ.fer-
ences reappeared in mid-1978, soon after the party
came to power. In the next few months the Khalqis
exiled or jailed most important Parchamis and domi-
nated the Communist movement. Since December
1979, when Soviet troops overthrew the Khalqis and
installed a government in which both factions were
represented, the Parchamis have gained slowly at
Khalqi expense. Nevertheless, the preponderance of
Khalqis in the Ministries of Defense and Interior
means that they still wield considerable influence.
Moscow has been unable to heal the party's serious
rifts despite repeated efforts to do so, and it will have
to pay a price for choosing one faction over the other.
Eliminating Khalqis, for example, would weaken
considerably the effectiveness of the security forces,
while abandoning the Parchamis would mean losing
an educated class of administrators.
Despite repeated party recruitment drives, building
party membership is a perennial problem. The party
routinely inflates and readjusts its membership fig-
ures. It claimed 50,000 members in 1979, 120,000 in
1984, 134,000 in July 1985, and 150,000 in 1986.
The party apparently recruits heavily from the na-
tional youth group, the Democratic Youth Organiza-
tion of Afghanistan. According to official statistics,
half of the new party members in 1985 came from
this group. Of the 120,000 members the party
claimed in 1984, more than 70 percent were under 30,
suggesting that the party may be having considerable
difficulty recruiting older members.
committed to, Marxist theory.
We believe the latest data grossly exaggerate the size
of the party. Most Western observers, for example,
estimated party size in the early 1980s at less than
half of what the regime claimed it to be. Moreover,
many citizens, particularly in urban areas, undoubt-
edly have a party card because it is necessary to
obtain jobs or government-supplied goods. Even if the
party had grown at the pace suggested by official
government figures, members would hardly have had
time to be sufficiently indoctrinated in, much less
officials are creating the impression that Najib's quest go.' In departing comments to diplomats in Kabul,
for power is leading him to strike out at all potential Soviet Ambassador Tabeyev complained of "extreme
opponents. leftists" in the PDPA. Najib's warning to party cadre
Najib faces resistance to power sharing from party
ideologues-a problem Babrak identified as early as
November 1985-who probably also disagree with
Moscow over how far the regime's so-called broaden-
ing and national reconciliation policies should
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to party cadre to give "real power" to "mullahs,
clergy, elders, and prestigious leaders of tribes and
nationalities" who have been elected to local councils
suggests that the party is plagued by a small, but
worrisome, group of ideologues that is undermining
regime programs.
Despite these problems, Najib has made progress in
consolidating his control of the party:
? He removed Babrak from his remaining posts on the
Politburo and as nominal head of state at the 20th
Central Committee plenum in November, although
Babrak remains in Kabul and his supporters have
not been completely defeated.
? Soon after Najib's appointment, he obtained the
backing of important Khalqi leaders such as Interior
Minister Gulabzoi and Defense Minister Nazar
Mohammad-support that we believe will help him
cement his control over the military. The apparent
co-optation of the Khalq, however, poses consider-
able risk for Najib should Khalqi acquiesence prove
to be merely a tactic designed to exploit Parchami
disarray and reestablish Khalqi control of the party.
? At the 19th and 20th Central Committee plenums,
Najib appointed several of his supporters to the
Politburo and roughly doubled the size of the
Central Committee in a bid to staff it with people
who would approve future leadership changes aimed
at cementing his rule. The incorporation of two
previously independent leftist labor unions into the
party is also probably designed to dilute the influ-
ence of the pro-Babrak wing and swell the party's
ranks with people beholden to Najib for their
positions.
? In August, Anahita Ratebzad-a Politburo member
and Babrak supporter who organized public protests
against Najib-was relieved of her duties as head of
the national women's organization.
? By September, the regime media were identifying
Najib as commander in chief of the armed forces.
Najib must see his most important near-term goal as
one of convincing Moscow that it did not make a
mistake in selecting him to replace Babrak. We
believe Moscow was surprised by the level of opposi-
Moscow, in allowing Najib to remove Babrak from his
remaining posts in the party and government last
month, apparently decided to side with Najib in an
effort to end Parchami feuding, which it believed was
undercutting the regime's consolidation program. Ac-
cording to the US Embassy in Kabul, major govern-
ment decisions, such as publishing the new constitu-
tion, selecting the bicameral legislature, and
convening the National Fatherland Front congress,
had been casualties of factional disputes over power
sharing. Nevertheless, Babrak's supporters on the
Politburo retain their posts-an apparent signal by
Moscow that widespread purges would not be tolerat-
ed. As long as factional strife remains high, the
Soviets will probably caution Najib to move slowly in
removing Babrak's remaining supporters from posi-
tions of power in the party.
Outlook and Implications
We doubt that Najib or any other Communist leader
will be able to build an effective party apparatus with
nationwide influence and support for many years to
come-at least not while broad international support
for the resistance remains firm:
? Divisions within the PDPA may be deeper now than
at any time since the Communist coup in 1978 and,
given the deep historic, social, and ethnic roots of
the party's factions, are likely to persist.
? Building a reliable political cadre at the local
level-where regime officials make easy insurgent
targets-will be virtually impossible without a much
more pervasive and effective military presence in
the countryside.
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Politburo of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, as of November 1986
Age
Faction
Date of
Appointment
Keshtmand, Soltan Ali
50
Parcham
December 1979
Prime Minister; probably sided with Najib against
Babrak.
Laeq, Solayman
56
Parcham
July 1986
Appointed candidate member of Politburo,
November 1985; close to Najib.
Nur, Nur Ahmad
49
Parcham
December 1979
Anti-Khalqi plotter 1978-79; may be jealous of
Najib.
Ratebzad, Anahita
55
Parcham
December 1979
Strong Babrak supporter; rumored to be his mistress.
She organized public protests against his removal
and participated in work stoppages.
Watanjar, Mohammad
Aslam
40
Khalq
June 1981
Enemy of Najib, but fellow Pashtun.
Ziray, Saleh Mohammad
50
Khalq
April 1978
Yaqubi, Ghulam Faruq
42
Parcham
November 1986
Close friend and confidant of Najib; his deputy
(1980-85) and successor as head of the intelligence
service; appointed candidate member of Politburo,
July 1986.
Baryalai, Mahmud
42
Parcham
December 1979
Babrak's younger brother; anti-Khalqi coup plotter,
1978-79.
Karwal, Mir Sahib
Parcham
July 1986
Longtime party workhorse, ethnic Pashtun.
Mohammed, Nazar
58
Khalq
November 1985
Defense Minister.
Razmjo, Abdul Zohur
34
Parcham
December 1982
Longtime Babrak supporter; now in Najib camp.
Mazdak, Farid Ahmad
29
Parcham
November 1986
Secretary, Democratic Youth Organization of
Afghanistan.
13 Secret
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Figure 3
Afghanistan: Ethnic Composition of PDPA Central Committeea
Original Committee
(81 full and alternate members)
New Committee(as of July 1986)
Percent (146 full and alternate members) Percent
Turkmen-1 Nuristani-I
Baluch -1 \ \ - Other minorities 1
Other minorities-1 Hazara-1 - r--Unkn nknown-1
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? The regime's "quick fix" approach to upgrading
significantly the size and quality of the armed forces
is unlikely to work, given the public opposition to
the regime's conscription program and the con-
scripts' penchant to desert.
? We believe the unpopularity of Marxism-however
thinly disguised-in the traditional Islamic culture
of Afghanistan will continue to hinder the regime's
efforts to attract either a loyal political cadre to
administer government policies at the local level or a
motivated military to protect the security of the
state.
We believe Moscow's and Kabul's respective agendas
will increasingly diverge as the Soviets readjust their
counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan-a process
that already has begun, in our view. In seeking at
least a token broadening of the regime in Kabul and
replacing Babrak Karmal, we believe the Soviets are
contributing to a growing and palpable uneasiness in
Kabul over Moscow's reliability as an ally. Soviet
insistence that Kabul minimize the role of the party,
seek participation of resistance figures, and assume
more of the burden of fighting the war has not found
broad acceptance among the PDPA leadership, in our
view. The open warfare among the ruling elite-the
regime's most dedicated supporters-over Soviet-
mandated leadership changes strongly suggests that
anti-Soviet sentiment is a problem even in the ruling
party Moscow installed.
a new political party created by Babrak supporters in
August has called, among other things, for the ouster
of the Soviets.
Because of these problems and the Soviet and Afghan
regimes' failure to build durable political and military
institutions in Afghanistan, the Soviets will not be
able to reduce their military presence significantly
without risking the collapse of the regime. Moscow
still appears to believe it can outlast its opponents, but
Najib's failure to produce progress might eventually
force the Soviets to replace him.
Looking to the Long Term: Educating the
Next Generation a
The Soviets, who have proved unable to build a
reliable political cadre in the major political institu-
tions of the Afghan regime-KHAD, the armed
forces, the party, and the National Fatherland
Front-are now looking to the next generation of
Afghans. They have recently begun to send 7- to 9-
year-old Afghans for a decade of instruction in the
USSR. during the last
four months of 1984, more than 700 youths departed
Kabul for Tashkent, and 300 more left for the Soviet
Union in August 1985. Most of these students are
children of party members or come from regime-
controlled orphanages. Approximately two-thirds of
those who left in late 1984 were from Kabol and
Nangarhar Provinces. The regime, probably realizing
the need for greater influence in the rural areas,
approved a plan in early 1985 to send to the USSR
some 600 youths from Afghan tribes near the Paki-
stani border and Shia minority groups from central
Afghanistan,
Training of postsecondary and technical students in
the USSR has been going on since at least 1972,
although their numbers increased dramatically after
1979 and steadily since then. These students go to the
Soviet Union to escape military service, attend higher
quality programs than those available at home, and
enjoy a higher standard of living when they return.
The regime has more than enough applicants for the
approximately 3,000 scholarships available each year
to study in the USSR.
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In the near term, Moscow is likely to continue to focus
on the international arena, press the destabilization
campaign in Pakistan, and push those military tactics
that they hope will break the resistance's or its
supporters' political will. These include wearing down
the resistance's civilian support base, infiltrating resis-
tance groups, and keeping steady pressure on logistic
routes.
The insurgents, in our view, will require sustained,
substantial external support-including weapons,
communications, food and other supplies, and more
aggressive diplomacy on their behalf-to counter this
strategy. This summer's fighting shows that the insur-
gents can still retain the tactical initiative and cause
the Soviet-Afghan side a good deal of pain.
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