UNREST IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP06T00412R000707380008-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 28, 2013
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: February 2, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized CoovAooroved for Release 2013/10/28:
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Talking Points for ADDO's HPSCI Briefing
2 February 1988
Unrest in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
The eight-weeks of violence in the West Bank and Gaza--touched
off by an ordinary traffic accident in early December--has
surprised most observers by its duration and intensity.
--The unrest was fueled by the Palestinians' frustration
with the Israeli occupation and hopelessness about
prospects for the future. The US-Soviet summit and the
Arab League meeting in Amman last November--neither of
which addressed the Palestinian issue in detail--
reinforced the Palestinians' perception of the world's
indifference to their plight.
--This climate allowed rumors about the traffic accident
in which an Israeli truck driver caused the deaths of
four Gazans to be distorted into allegations that it
was a deliberate attack against 7lestinians by
Israelis.
The intensity of the unrest has varied since its outbreak on
9 December.
--Violent demonstrations occurred daily for the first two
weeks--resulting in 21 Palestinian deaths--but subsided
just before Christmas.
--The second wave of protests, in which 18 more
Palestinians died, followed the deportations-of four
Palestinians to Lebanon in early January. These more
intense and wide-spread disturbances were aggravated by
Israel's strategy of beating demonstrators.
A third cycle of violence may be underway now as scattered
protests flared up in Gaza over the weekend, shattering the
relative calm of the previous week. Two Palestinians were killed
Monday as sporadic disturbances continued in East Jerusalem and the
West Bank.
--An Israeli settler was seriously wounded when his car
was firebombed near Ram Allah in the West Bank.
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New Palestinian Leaders Emerging
The militant students, Muslim fundamentalists, and street
gangs at the forefront of the protests have pushed traditional
Palestinian leaders--mayors, clan chiefs, and local PLO stalwarts--
into the background and may give rise to new groups of local
leaders.
--The PLO has tried to exploit the unrest and still is
the single strongest focus of political allegiances in
the occupied territories; but West Bankers and Gazans
appear to be frustrated with the exiled PLO leadership,
which they see as neither responsive to nor
representative of their needs and aspirations.
Fundamentalists have been the prime force behind
demonstrations and other protest activities in Gaza.
--The most prominent fundamentalist leader is Shaykh
Ahmad Yasin, who heads the Mujama', an organization
associated with the Muslim Brotherhood that is very
popular with university students and that has not
advocated anti-Israeli violence.
--The more radical Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which is
not related to Shia extremists in Lebanon, has been
active organizing demonstrations and also has
apparently tried to kill Israeli soldiers and civilians
in Gaza.
The Impact in Israel
The Palestinian disturbances have not prompted many Israelis
to reassess the urgency of moving on the peace process in order to
address underlying Palestinian grievances.
--Israeli hardliners associated with Prime Minister
Shamir's Likud and other right-wing parties point to
the Palestinian violence as evidence of the intolerable
security threat Israel would face were it to withdraw
from the territories.
--For Labor and supporters of territorial compromise, the
violence highlights the demographic problem Israel
faces if it does not disengage from the territories,
but territorial compromise is seen by Labor Party chief
Peres as a negative political issue in an election year
and in the absence of a viable peace process.
The Israeli Army is sharply divided over the effectiveness of
beatings to control Palestinian demonstrations.
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--Commanders in the northern West Bank reportedly believe
the protests have gained too much momentum for harsh
tactics to be effective and that Israel should adopt
nonviolent measures, such as demanding immediate
collection of unpaid taxes unless Palestinian merchants
agree to end their strikes and promise to stop the
street violence.
Outlook
The unrest in the occupied territories will not dissipate in
the nearterm as long as underlying Palestinian grievances are not
addressed.
--The intensity of the violence will continue to vary,
and we expect the periods of relative calm to become
more brief.
--There is evidence of limited attempts to organize
ongoing protests at neighborhood levels, which will
help to fuel future demonstrations.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/10/28: CIA-RDP06T00412R000707380008-8
SUBJECT: Unrest in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
Distribution:
1 - ADDO
1 - DDI
1 - ADDI
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
1 - NESA/AI
1 - NESA/AI/I/Chrono
1 - NESA/AI/I/gk
DI/NESA/AI/Ii
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