ALGERIA: FOREIGN POLICY DYNAMICS AND US INTERESTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP06T00412R000707980001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 3, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/26: CIA-RDP06T00412R000707980001-9
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
3 June 1988
Algeria: Foreign Policy Dynamics and US Interests
Summary
The socialist government of President Chadli Bendjedid has
taken several diplomatic actions this year that we judge are
at odds with US and Western interests. We also believe that
during his nine years of rule Bendjedid has crafted a foreign
policy that can be characterized as a pragmatic pursuit of
national interests consistent with his country's traditional
leftist ideals and principles. Enduring domestic and foreign
factors -- a revolutionary legacy, a pro-Soviet socialist
opposition to the President within the military and ruling
party, and a military supply dependence on the Soviet Union --
will inhibit far-reaching changes in Algerian foreign policy.
Under Bendjedid, Algeria probably will continue to seek the
role of intermediary between radical and moderate Arab states.
Longer-term prospects for improved relations with the United
States and the West are enhanced by internal economic and
administrative reforms that are underway and the need for
advanced technology, but Algeria's outreach to Washington will
remain motivatediMJav_oonortunism than a convergence of
political views.
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This memorandum was prepared by
of Near
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Office
Eastern and South Asian Analysis.
Comments and queries are
welcome and
may be addressed to th Chief, Arab-Israeli
Division, NESA
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r
NES? M 88-20055
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Algeria has been especially active on the diplomatic front this
year:
--The Algerians are sponsoring an Arab League Summit scheduled to
begin on 7 June in Algiers. Although Algeria ostensibly is not
opposed to current US peace efforts, the Summit has the potential
of adopting resolutions that will harden the positions of Arab
moderates on the modalities for a peace conference under
international auspices.
--In April, Bendjedid gave the hijackers of a Kuwaiti airliner safe
transit out of the country as a condition to help secure the
release of hostages.
--In addition, the Algerians continue to offer facilities to
radical Palestinians involved in terrorism as part of an ongoing
effort to foster reconciliation in the PLO and to support
Palestinian operations against Israel.
--For much of the past year Algeria made intense efforts to draw
Libya into a regional treaty organization that we believe would
have been detrimental to the interests of pro-Western Morocco and
Tunisia.
--Bendjedid also has worked behind the scenes in the OAU to support
Libya's position in the Chad conflict.
These actions stand in contrast to Algeria's official position
against terrorism, its hostility toward Libyan leader Qadhafi, its
previous tilt toward France in Chad, and its low-key position within the
Arab League in recent years on the issue of the Middle East peace
process.
At the same time, Bendjedid has taken steps that demonstrate his
flexibility and willingness to adopt moderate positions. In mid-May,
Algeria renewed diplomatic ties with Morocco, its main adversary, after
a 12-year hiatus. The Algerians heretofore had adopted a hard line,
demanding concessions from King Hassan on the Western Sahara dispute as
a precondition for an exchange of ambassadors. In addition, press and
Embassy reporting indicate that Bendjedid is moving to restore ties with
Egypt, even though Algiers officially remains opposed to the Camp David
accords that led all Arab states to break with Cairo.
What is Bendjedid Up To?
Foremost among Bendjedid's motives is the enhancement of Algeria's
security. His courtship of Libya was designed to settle longstanding
border problems, to neutralize potential subversion by Qadhafi, and,
most importantly, to isolate Morocco in the Maghreb with the hope of
gaining concessions from Hassan on the Western Sahara dispute. To show
good faith, Bendjedid has supported Libya against Chad and encouraged
renewed relations between Libya and Tunisia. Bendjedid probably
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reversed course and decided to restore diplomatic relations with Morocco
because of Libya's unwillingness to join a pact against Rabat. We
believe Bendjedid now hopes that cooperation with Morocco will prove
more effective than military pressure to achieve a political settlement
of the low-level war over Western Sahara, which increasingly appears to
be a losing cause for the Algerian-backed Polisario Front insurgents.
The Algerians probably decided to get involved with Hizballah's
hijacking of the Kuwaiti airliner hoping to achieve a quick resolution
and credit for saving lives. Once involved, their self-confidence in
dealing with radicals may have led them to believe they could strike a
broader deal regarding the Dawa prisoners in Kuwait and Western hostages
in Lebanon. Bendjedid has been searching for a diplomatic coup as a
backdrop for his nomination to a third. flve-year term in office and
election early next year.
The President probably hopes the Arab League Summit, and its focus
on the Palestinian uprising, will provide such a foreign policy success.
Renewed ties with Morocco induced King Hassan to attend the meeting in
Algiers. Bendjedid almost certainly is seeking Egyptian attendance as
well to ensure the presence of other moderate Arab states and to claim
credit for unifying Arab ranks. Algeria's support for Palestinians of
all persuasion stems mainly from the high value Algerians place on their
traditional self-image as reconciler of Arab disputes. As the only Arab
people to fight a bitter, revolutionary struggle for independence,
Algerians have reacted strongly to the Palestinian uprising in Israel --
the methods used by Tel Aviv to quash Palestinian protesters are similar
to those employed by the French army and colonialists in Algeria.
The Algerians question recent moves by Washington that appear to
them to be insensitive to Algerian and Arab interests. The government
believes that the latest US peace effort is designed to help the
Israelis restore order in the occupied territories, that Washington
bears partial responsibility for the April assassination of the PLO's
Abu Jihad in Tunis, and that US officials have been unfairly critical of
Algiers' success in freeing the Arab hostages aboard the hijacked
Kuwaiti airliner. Algerian suspicions of the United States are also fed
by concern over strengthened US-Moroccan military ties since King Hassan
abrogated his treaty with Libya in 1986.
Old Restraints Versus New Demands
Algerian foreign policy almost certainly will follow the current
pattern over the next year. In our view, internal divisions among
Algeria's ruling elite will inhibit far-reaching changes in foreign
policy. The regime, for example, still includes an important faction of
leftist hardliners, largely within the country's ruling National
Liberation Front but also within the Army, who oppose Bendjedid's
attempts to promote domestic reform, to weaken military ties with the
Soviets, and to begin a political dialogue with Morocco, the United
States, and other Western states. Although Bendjedid gradually has
consolidated his authority over the military, party, and government, he
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does not have the power to force compromise on key issues such as
Morocco and the Western Sahara conflict.
Algeria's vital military and economic ties with the Soviet Union
work to the advantage of Bendjedid's opponents. The President and
Algerian military leaders want to become less dependent upon the Soviets
for weaponry, but economic problems have reduced the funds available for
more expensive Western arms. Despite Bendjedid's visit to Washington in
1985 -- the first by an Algerian leader -- the value of Soviet sales has
increased. Algeria's financial debt of about $2 billion to Moscow and
its reliance on about 800 military and 2,000 civilian advisers, gives
the Soviets political leverage in Algiers. As part of the political
price for favorable terms for military sales and debt repayments,
Algiers consistently supports the Soviets in the United Nations on
Afghanistan and Cambodia, allows Soviet naval port calls, and permits
Soviet military overflights to points south in Africa, such as Angola.
Economic problems, dissatisfaction with the socialist economic
model, and gradual modernization of the country, however, are improving
the long-term prospects for Algerian relations with Western countries.
Even many of Bendjedid's critics recognize that the regime must
undertake significant reform of the heavily state-controlled
agricultural and industrial sectors if the country hopes to reverse its
economic decline, address problems associated with rapid population
growth and urbanization, and promote efficiency in the bureaucracy.
Bendjedid's solution is partial privatization of the state enterprises,
and limited decentralization of government. The Algerian need for
quality goods and services and technical assistance will provide
opportunities for greater Western access and influence.
Implications for the United States
Despite recent bilateral strains, we believe Bendjedid wants to
maintain firm ties with the United States and pursue joint cooperative
ventures. The approach of Bendjedid and other Algerian leaders toward
the United States, however, will continue to be based on utilitarian
motives rather than shared beliefs. They view the United States as a
source of technology, an alternative to France for cheap food, and a
ready market for gas. They probably also believe that good ties are
necessary to ensure that Washington will maintain its official
neutrality toward the Western Sahara dispute. We believe Algeria will
remain selective in its support of US diplomatic interests to protect
Algiers' broader, primary diplomatic equities with the Soviet Union,
with other Arab states, and with France.
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MESA Mit 88-20055
Algeria: Foreign Policy Dynamics and US Interests
External Distribution:
1 - Ms. Mary Ann Casey (State)
1 - Mr. William Burns (NSC)
1 - Colonel Douglas Menarchik (Office of the Vice President)
1 - Mr. Michael Ussery (State/NEA)
1 - Mr. Charles Duelfer (State)
1 - Mr. Edward W. Gnehm, Jr. (Pentagon)
1 - Lt. Col. Jacques Rondeau, USAF (ISA/NESA)
1 - Colonel Jeffrey Levy (Pentagon)
1 - Mr. Roger Pajak (Treasury)
1 - Mr. George S. Harris (State)
1 - Mr. Kim Fitzgerald (Commerce)
Internal Distribution:
1 - DIR/DCl/DDCI Exec
1 - DDI
1 - ADDI
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - NIC/Analytic Group
1 - CPAS/ILS
6 - CPAS/IMD/CB
1 - C/DO/NE,
1 - DO/NE
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
1 - C/PPS/NESA
2 - PPS/NESA
1 - C/PES
1 - PDB Staff
1 - MID Staff
1 - NESA/AI/D
1 - NESA/PG/D
1 - NESA/SO/D
1 - NESA/IA/D
1 - NESA/AI/M/Chrono
1 - NESA/AI/M,
DDI/NESA/AI/M
Staff
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