SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR SCC MEETING ON MIG'S IN CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP06T01849R000100030012-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 10, 2012
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: November 16, 1978
• Content Type: MEMO

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP06T01849R000100030012-9
NATIONAL. SECURITY COUNCIL.
WASHINGTON. O.C. 20508
TOP SECRET (XGDS)(B)(3)
November 16, 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR
NSC - 6841X
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for
SCC Meeting on MIG's in Cuba
Attached is the Summary of Conclusions for the
SCC Meeting on MIG's in Cuba held November 13, 1978.
This Summary should be held closely and distributed
only to those persons in your department/agency with
a strict need to know basis.
/ /
/
,/14C
Christine Dodson
Staff Secretary
Attachment.
TOP SECRET (XGDS)(8)(3)
TS 780138
cy#
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/11: CIA-RDP06T01849R000100030012-9
SPECIAL COORDINATION COMMITTEE MEETING
November 13, 1978
TOP SECRET (XGDS)
Time and Place:
Subject:
Participants:
State
Ambassador David Newsom
George Vest
Defense
Secretary Harold Brown
Charles Duncan
Stanley Resor
TOP SECRET
9:30 - 11:00 a.m., White House
Situation Room
MIG's in Cuba
JCS
General David Jones
Lt. Gen. William Y. Smith
White House
Zbigniew Brzezinski
David Aaron
NSC
Robert Pastor
Reginald Bartholomew
CIA
Admiral Stansfield Turner
Robert Bowie
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
1. Purpose of the Meeting. To determine the kind, number, and
capabilities of MIG's currently in Cuba as well as those (MIG-25's)
which are expected to be delivered soon; to determine whether the
escalation in weaponry constitutes a threat to the U.S. and a
violation of the 1962 and 1970 understandings between the U.S.
and the USSR; and to recommend a strategy for dealing with the
introduction and future delivery of these weapons.
2. Evidence. Present evidence indicates that there may be
12 MIG-23's in Cuba--one or two MIG-23 D/F have been sighted
and possibly as many as 5-9 are present. We do not know
whether the general attack MIG-23's are F (normal export model)
or D (30% of which are apparently used by the Soviets for nuclear
missions). There was a consensus that both D and F represent a
significant jump in offensive capabilities for Cuba in that both
are specifically designed for air-to-ground attack. The D
represents an additional issue in that its nuclear capability
and previous deployment only with Soviet forces raises questions
about ultimate Soviet intentions. MIG-23 B/E (of which Cubans
TOP SECRET (XGDS)(B)(3)
Classified by Z. Brzezinski
Tnp SFERFT
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IP- I I UF ULURLt
have at least three) and MIG-25's which the Cubans claim
they expect to receive soon) are interceptors, designed pri-
marily for air-to-air attack, though all of these represent
a decidedly enhanced capability for Cuba over the MIG-21's
which they presently have.
3. Threat. All of the planes can be modified to carry
nuclear weapons, and all can reach the U.S., though the
D/F's have the widest range (600-800) miles).
There were three hypotheses suggested as to why the
MIG-23's were deployed now: (1) natural upgrading of Cuban
air force capabilities; (2) a deliberate act designed to
test the 1962 and 1970 understandings; or (3) to increase
the capabilities of Cuba's air force so that they could use
the weapons in Africa.
While no one thought that the reason the Soviets intro-
duced the weapons was to deliberately thwart the understandings,
there was a consensus that the introduction of offensive
weapons (defined as air-to-ground attack aircraft--MIG-23
D/F) did constitute a violation of the two understandings.
4. Objective. There was a consensus that our objective
should be to seek a halt on further deployment of MIG-23
D/F, and if possible to obtain their withdrawal.
5. ApFoach. The consensus was that we should approach
the Soviets, preferably Secretary Vance to Ambassador Dobrynin,
inform them we are following the recent deployment very
closely, and register our concern with the introduction of
MIG-23's. (Tole should not make a distinction between D's and
F's.) We should inform them that we view MIG-23 D/F's as
offensive weapons, that their deployment in Cuba constitutes
a violation of the 1962 and 1970 understandings, and that
their deployment will affect our relationship and could
jeopardize ratification of the SALT treaty by calling into
question Soviet adherence to past understandings. We would
express our willingness to indicate a capacity to rationalize
the presence of one or two MIG-23's temporarily, but no
more.
6. Congressional Consultations. State will forward recommen-
dations on who to consult in Congress and what to say. We
would not consider any public stateMent until that time.
7. Consultations with Latin Americans:
most Latin Americans are likely to view this as a U.S.
problem, but at some future point, Colombia, Venezuela,
Brazil, Mexico and Argentina shoula probably be briefed and
consulted.
TOP SECRET (XGDS)(B)(3)
2S-5
TOP SECRET
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