SOVIETS DEFEND GROUND ATTACK ROLE OF MIG-23

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP06T01849R000100040021-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 17, 2012
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: November 30, 1978
• Content Type: CABLE

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PAGE 001
TOR: 301958Z NOV 78
00 RUEATIB
ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH
TSTUO37
00 RUEHC
DE RUEHUB 03904 3341900
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
0 3018242 NOV 78
FM USINT HAVANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE NASHDC IMMEDIATE 4120
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMRASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0335
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
BT
N
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MILI, CU, JR
SUBJECT: SOVIETS DEFEND GROUND ATTACK ROLE OF MIG-23
1. SUMMARY: SOVIET ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN HAVANA ACKNOWLEDGES AND DEF-
ENDS GROUND ATTACK ROLE OF MIG-23. ARTICLE REITERATES, HOWEVER, THAT
AIRCRAFT IS NOT NUCLEAR ARMS "CARRIER". END SUMMARY,
2. SOVIET SPANISH LANGUAGE NOVOSTI PRESS BULLETIN RELEASED IN HAVANA,
NOVEMBER 29, PUBLISHES ARTICLE ACKNOWLEDGING AND DEFENDING GROUND
ATTACK ROLE OF MIG-23'S IN CUBA. ARTICLE IS PUBLISHED UNDER TITLE
"ANOTHER ATTEMPT rO IMPEDE SALT II CONVERSATIONS". (WE ARE REPORTING
ARTICLE BECAUSE OF SIGNIFICANCE OF ITS PUBLICATION IN SPANISH LANGUAG
IN CUBA AND IN EVENT IT HAS NOT APPEARED IN MOSCOW.)
3. 3. ARTICLE DESCRIBES MIG-23 AS "FIGHTER AND BOMBER" AIRCRAFT.
AIRCRAFT CAN BE JSED, ARTICLE SAYS, "TO PROTECT GROUND FORCES IN
REPELLING AG;RESSION AND TO PROTECT AIRSPACE OF CUBA." THESE TWO ROLE
S
ARE DESCRIBED AS "DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS" WHICH "DO NOT OFFER ANY DANGE
R
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TO THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES." ARTICLE MAINTAINS THAT, ACCORD
ING TO CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENT TENDENCIES IN ALL COUNTRIES, ANY NEW
MILITARY AIRCRAFT IS DESIGNED TO HAVE "COMPLEMENTARY POSSIBILITIES TO
PROECT THE AIRSPACE OF A SOVEREIGN STATE AND THE GROUND FORCES."
ARTICLE SAYS THAT, "IT IS VERY NATURAL FOR CUBA TO BE INTERESTED IN
HAVING A MULTIPLE (PURPOSE) AIRCRAFT THAT IS CAPABLE OF REPELLING THE
AIR AND GROUND ENEMY". (COMMENT: ARTICLE, THUS, APPEARS TO ACKNOWLEDG
GROUND ATTACK ROLE OF MIG-23 - EITHER CERTAIN MODELS OR WHOLE GENRE.)
4. ARTICLE UEFENDS DECISION TO SUPPLY MIG-23 TO CUBA BY STATING THAT
THE SOVIET AIR FARCES, AS WELL AS AIR FORCES OF "US, BRITISH, AND
OTHER COUNTRIES," ARE CONSTANTLY DEVELOPING. THUS, "FRIENDS OF SOVIET
UNION ARE INTERESTED, NATURALLY, IN BUYING FROM USSR SIMILAR WAR MAT-
ERIAL SO THAT THEIR ARMED FORCES ARE NOT LEFT BEHIND..." ARTICLE ADDS
THAT, "IT WOULD BE ILLOGICAL FOR CUBA TO BE SUPPLIED WITH ANTIQUATED
MATERIAL IN THE FACE OF A PERFECTLY ARMED NEIGHBOR."
5. SOVIET ARTICLE STATES, HOWEVER, THAT MOSCOW HAS NEVER SUPPLIED CUB
WITH MILITARY AIRCRAFT NUCLEAR ARMS "CARRIERS" (PORTADORES). (COMMENT
THE TERM "NUCLEAR.CAPABLE" IS NOT USED.) SUCH A SUPPLY, ARTICLE SAYS,
WOULD BE VIOLATION OF NPT, AND TREATY OF TLATELOLCO, AND WOULD CONTRA
?DICT SOVIET UNGA PROPOSAL ON REINFORCING SECURITY GUARANTEES TO NON-
NUCLEAR STATES. (COMMENT: PRESUMABLY, BY INTRODUCING NUCLEAR WEAPONS
WHERE THEY HAD NOT BEEN BEFORE. ARTICLE MAKES NO MENTION OF 1962
US-SOVIET "UNDERSTANDING" ON "OFFENSIVE WEAPONS" IN CUBA.)
6. ARTICLE ADDS THAT SOVIET ARMS EXPERTS CONSIDER THAT ACCUSATIONS
MADE BY WASHINGTON POST THAT "THE FORM (FORMA) OF MIG-23 PERMITS
TRANSPORT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS" ARE "COMPLETELY UNFOUNDED". ARTICLE
.SAYS THAT THE Two VERSIONS OF THE US PHANTOM ? RECONNAISANCE AND
"CARRIER" (PORTADOR ? THAT IS, NUCLEAR DELIVERY MODEL) - HAVE SAME
CONFIGURATION (CONFIGURACION). IT IS "PRACTICALLY IMPOSSIBLE",
ARTICLE SAYS, "TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT IT CAN CARRY NUCLEAR
WEAPONS WHEN IT IS IN FLIGHT." ARTICLE SAYS, "FOR THIS REASON (POR
ESO) THE CONFIGURATION OF THE MIG-23 DOES NOT GIVE ANY BASIS FOR
DEDUCING THAT IT IS A CARRIER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS." (COMMENTS SOVIETS
APPEAR TO BE SAYING THAT THERE IS NO WAY TO DISTINGUISH VISUALLY
MIG-23'S WHICH CAN OR CANNOT CARRY NUCLEAR WEAPONS.)
CONFIDENTIAL
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7. ARTICLE CONTINJES THAT "RIDUCULOUS VERSION OF SOVIET THREAT TO US
FROM CUBAN TERRITORY" IS BEING ARTIFICIALLY RAISED TO TRY TO SHOW
THAT USSR IS NOT SINCERE ABOUT SALT II AND TO "PLACE IN DOUBT
POSSIBILITY OF SIGNING THIS MOST IMPORTANT SOVIET-AMERICAN AGREEMENT.
ARTICLE STATES THAT MIG-23'S WERE SUPPLIED A LONG TIME AGO AND US
"PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN" IN WHICH "HIGH OFFICIALS" ARE TAKING PART IS
JUST BEING RAISED NOW WHEN PARTIES ARE COMING CLOSE TO SIGNATURE OF
SALT II TREATY. JS. HOWEVER, ARTICLE SAYS, "CANNOT IGNORE FACT THAT
CUBA HAS NOT BEEN SUPPLIED WITH ANYTHING MORE THAN DEFENSIVE
EQUIPMENT."
8. SOVIETS CONCLJDE THAT "THOSE WHO WISH TO EXPLOIT CURRENT CAMPAIGN"
SHOULD BE REMINDED THAT IT IS THE USSR THAT HAS REAL BASIS TO BE
CUNCERNED GIVEN FACT THAT US AIR FORCE IN JAPAN, TURKEY, AND SOUTH-
KOREA, "IN IMMEDIATE PROXIMITY OF USSR, ARE SUPPLIED WITH EQUIPMENT
CAPABLE OF DELIVERING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. NOT TO MENTION NATO MEANS OF
DELIVERY IN EUROPE."
9. BEGIN COMMENT: SOVIET ARTICLE IS FIRST ADMISSION HERE, EITHER
PUBLIC OR PRIVATE, OF PRESENCE OF GROUND ATTACK VERSIONS OF MIG-23
OR, ALTERNATIVELY, GROUND ATTACK CAPABILITY OF ENTIRE GENRE (AS WELL
AS FIRST CONFIRMATION THAT SOVIET AND CUBAN DEFINITION OF "DEFENSIVE
OPERATIONS" INCLJDES GROUND ATTACK AS WELL AS AIR DEFENSE ROLE.) AS
SUCH, ON FACE OF IT, ARTICLE WOULD APPEAR TO BODE ILL FOR POSSIBILITY
OF NITHDRAWAL OF ANY GROUND ATTACK VERSIONS HERE - ALTHOUGH, CONCEIV-
ABLY, PORTRAYAL OF ALL MIG-23'S AS GROUND ATTACK-CAPABLE COULD SERVE
TO PROVIDE COVER UNDER WHICH SPECIFIC GROUND ATTACK MODESL COULD BE
REMOVED WITHOUT UNDULY EMBARRASSING CUBANS.
10. APPARENT SOVIET AFFIRMATION THAT NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AND NON-NUCLEAR-
.CAPABLE MIG-23'S CANNOT BE DISTINGUISHED VISUALLY PRESUMABLY IS EFFOR
T
TO BLUR SALIENCE OF DISTINCTION BETWEEN INTERCEPTOR AND GROUND ATTACK
AIRCRAFT HERE - AGAIN AN INDICATION THAT SOVIETS ARE RELUCTANT TO
SINGLE OUT GROUND ATTACK AIRCRAFT FOR REMOVAL. WHILE US OVERFLIIGHT
ISSUE IS NOT RAISED, SOVIETS MAY HOPE THAT AFFIRMATION OF INDISTING-
UISHABILITY ELIMINATES REASON FOR ANY SUCH OVERFLIGHTS.
11. SOVIETS PRESUMABLY ALSO HOPE THAT RAISING OF SPECTOR OF US AND
ALLIED FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS ISSUE (PARA 8) WILL INFLUENCE US TO
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/16: CIA-RDP06T01849R000100040021-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/16: CIA-RDP06T01849R000100040021-8
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CEASE AND DESIST ON MIG?23 ISSUE. END COMMENT.
LANE
END OF MESSAGE
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/16: CIA-RDP06T01849R000100040021-8