NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT DEFENSE SPENDING: TRENDS AND PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP07G00258R000100150002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 31, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 1, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

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~~~~
tVational
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Foreign
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Assessment
Center
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~1on-Soviet Warsaw Pact
Defense Spending:
Trends and Prospects
An Intelligence Assessment
-sue
SR 80--0088
July 1980
~y 2 3 i
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National
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Defense Spending:
Trends and Prospects.
Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact
An Intelligence Assessment
Information available as oj30 May 1980 has been used
in the preparation ojthis report.
Analysis and the National Intelligence Officers for
USSR-Eastern Europe and General Purpose Forces.
Questions and comments may be addressed to the
Chief, Military-Economic Analysis Center, OSR,
Strategic Research (OSR), and was coordinated
with the Offices of Economic Research and Political
Military-Economic Analysis enter, Office of
This paper was prepared. by
Secret
SR 80.10088
July 1980
~__..,,~--.r._.,
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Defense Spending:
Trends and Prospects
Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact
Key Judgments From 1970 through 1979, the announced defense budgets of the non-Soviet
Warsaw Pact (NSWP) countries increased. The average annual rates of
growth in current prices were about 7 percent in East Germany and Poland,
6 percent in Romania, 5 percent in Hungary, and 4 percent in Czechoslova-
kia. (Bulgaria has not reported its defense expenditures since 1970.) These
rates reflect inflation as well as real growth, but only in Hungary and
Poland-the most inflation-prone NSWP countries in the 1970s-is the
growth of the defense budgets likely to have been appreciably lower in
constant price terms than in current prices. In these two countries, the real
growth in spending may have averaged as little as 2 or 3 percent a year from
1970 through 1979.
The growth in the NSWP defense budgets allowed some expansion of the
armed forces and the replacement of obsolescent weapons and equipment
with more modern systems. The pace and scope of military modernization
varied from country to country. East Germany's armed forces probably
experienced the most improvement during the 1970-79 period.
The Soviet Union has been pressing the NSWP countries to accelerate the
growth of their defense spending and to modernize their forces more rapidly
in the coming five-year period (1981-85). East Germany has given some
indication that it may comply. But because of economic problems, most
NSWP countries probably will not fully satisfy the Soviet demands.
Romania has publicly rejected the Soviet call for more defense spending.
Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia will have difficulty even matching
the past decade's average growth in spending for the armed forces.
Soviet pressure and NSWP attempts to remedy current force deficiencies
probably will lead to real growth in the defense budgets of all the NSWP
countries. Overall, however, the average real growth in NSWP spending for
the armed forces through 1985 is unlikely to exceed that achieved in the
1970s, and the pace of military modernization is likely to fall short of Soviet
goals.
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Secret
Contents
Key Judgments
Introduction
The Announced Defense Budgets
Defense Spending in the Northern Tier
Czechoslovakia
East Germany
Poland
Defense Spending in the Southern Tier
Bulgaria
Hungary
Romania
Factors Affecting Future Defense S
pending
Deficiencies of the NSWp Armed Forces
Soviet Pressure To Increase the Growth of Defense Spendin
Economic Problems g
Prospects for Future NSWp Defense S
pending
Page
iii
1
Figure
1.
Tables
1.
2
Indexes of Growth in Announced Defense Expenditures of
Hungary and East Germany
Announced Defense Expenditures in the NSWp Countries
Estimated Military Personnel Costs as Shares of Announced
Defense Expenditures in the NSWp
Announ Countries
ced D
2
2
efense Expenditures as Shares of GNP in the
NSWp Countries
Estimated g
Avera a A
4
nnual Rates of Inflation in NSWp Countries
4
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Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact
Defense Spending:
Trends and Prospects
Introduction
In the late 1960s the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact
(NSWP) armed forces were given larger, more active
roles in Soviet plans for war in Europe. In place of the
Warsaw Pact attack scenario allowing for prior
reinforcement from the western Soviet Union, an
unreinforced attack was postulated. This shift entailed
much greater reliance on the NSWP armed forces, and
the importance of expanding and modernizing those
forces increased. This paper examines one measure of
the expansion and modernization of the NSWP forces
in the past decade: spending for the armed forces. It
reviews the trends in announced NSWP defense
budgets during the 1970s, relates these to the develop-
ment of the NSWP forces, and discusses the prospects
for future defense spending in the light of the economic
problems of the NSWP countries.
ere are also uncertainties about the
coverage of the NSWP-announced defense budgets
and the real growth that they reflect which argue for
caution in interpreting them. But the NSWP-
announced defense budgets apparently include most
military activities and thus are useful general indica-
tors of the allocation of resources to defense. Also,
some sense of the inflation reflected in their growth can
be gained from data on price changes in the civilian
economies. Consequently, the NSWP-announced de-
fense budgets are also useful for assessing general
trends in real defense expenditures.
The Announced Defense Budgets
Like the Soviet Union; the NSWP countries reveal
very little about their defense expenditures. Czechoslo-
vakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Romania limit
their disclosures of defense spending to single-line
entries in their annual state budgets. Poland's annual
budget law includes two defense spending entries-one
under "current outlays" and another under "invest-
ment." (Defense "investment," as reported by Poland,
consists of housing and amenities for armed forces
personnel rather than weapons purchases and weap-
ons-related construction.) Bulgaria has not published a
defense budget since 1970 25X1
The announced NSWP defense budgets (table 1),
however, are much more useful and informative than
their Soviet counterpart. Unlike announced Soviet
spending for defense, which grossly understates total
expenditures .for the armed forces, the announced
NSWP defense budgets appear large enough to covP*
the costs of manning and operating the national 25X1
military establishments, procuring weapons and equip-
ment, and constructing military facilities. This can be25X1
seen when estimates of NSWP military personnel cost.,
(pay, allowances, and subsistence of uniformed person-
nel) are expressed as shares of the announced defense
expenditures (table 2). In every instance the shares are
small enough to leave substantial room for other
operating outlays and for defense procurement and 25X1
construction.) 25X1
Unlike announced Soviet defense spending, which 25X1
declined during the Soviet military buildup of the
1970s, the announced NSWP defense budgets grew
during this period. Allowing for the complicating
factor of inflation, the differences in growth over time
and from country to country reflect the differences
observed in the expansion and modernization of the
armed forces. In Hungary, for example, the movement
of the announced defense budget reflected the military
cutbacks known to have occurred in the early 1970s
and the stepped-up weapons purchases and increased
level of defense activities observed later in the decade
Similarly, in East Germany the growth of the an- 25X1
nounced defense budget reflected the continuous and
substantial modernization experienced by the armed
forces in the 1970s (figure 1). 25X1
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Average Annual
Growth Rate
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1970.79 (Percent)
Q
'These expenditures include spending for internal security forces. In
the state budgets for 1977-79, East Germany also reported its
defense expenditures net of spending for internal security forces:
1977
1978
1979
Billion marks
7.9
8.3
8.7
Percent change from previous year
-
5.1
4.8
Estimated Military Personnel Costs as Shares of
Announced Defense Expenditures in NSWP Countries
' Announced defense expenditures include expenditures for internal
security forces.
2 For 1977 East Germany also reported its defense expenditures net
of spending for internal security forces; estimated military personnel
cysts account for 14 percent of these anndunced defense
expenditures.
The estimates of NSWP military personnel cysts include pay,
allowances, and subsistence of regular armed forces,,militarized
border guards, and militarized security troops. Estimates for 1978
and 1979 are not yet available. These estimates are from Alton,
Lazarcik, Czirak, and Bass, Estimates 4l Military Expenditures in
Eastern Europe (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, 1973~revised and updated through 1977.
25X1
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Indexes of Growth in Announced
Defense Expenditures of Hungary
and East Germany
(Calculated from data iu current prices; 1970=100)
Defense Spending in the Northern Tier
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland are the
most important NSWP countries in terms of the
missions assigned to them in the event of a war with
NATO. They also have better equipped and more
capable armed forces than the other countries and are
the top three NSWP countries with respect to the
shares of gross national product accounted for by
announced defense expenditures (table 3). There are,
however, significant differences among the armed
forces of these three countries. In the 1970s the growth
of their announced defense budgets differed as well.
25X1'
The announced defense budgets of the NSWP coun-
tries probably do not include all defense-related
outlays
forces and the share of economic output which these.
activities consume. Their value is increased when they
are viewed in the light of known changes in the NSWP
armed forces and other economic and financial statis-
tics. 25X1
In current price terms Poland's announced defense i
expenditures grew at an average rate of about 7
percent a year from 1970 through 1979. East Ger- I~
many's defense budget grew at a slightly slower rate,
just under 7 percent growth a year. Czechoslovakia's 25X1
defense budget grew at an average annual rate of about 25X1
4 percent. 25X1
ast ermany, Poland, and Romania, military
RDT&E probably is large enough to make this a
significant omission. In addition, expenditures for
NSWP civil defense activities might be charged to the
civilian agencies responsible for their execution rather
than to the national ministries of defense. Also, all the
NSWP armed forces provide services to the civilian
economy. Payment received for such services might
constitute an extrabudgetary source of funds for the
armed forces
Care must be taken in comparing the announced
NSWP defense budgets and analyzing their growth.
There are known differences in their coverage,2 and
they reflect inflation that varies from year to year and
country to country. Yet, the announced defense
budgets can convey an informative picture of the
overall growth in the activities of the NSWP armed
' In Czechoslovakia's budget, for example, and in the pre-1977
budgets of East Germany the defense entry also includes expendi-
tures for internal security forces. But there are no indications that
the costs of internal security forces are included in the announced
When inflation is taken into account, however, the
ranking of the three countries with respect to the
growth of their defense budgets probably differs from
the ranking in current price terms. There are no
generally accepted measures of price change in the
defense sectors of the NSWP economies. Conse-
quently, it is difficult to determine how much of the
growth in the announced defense budgets resulted
from real changes and how much resulted from
inflation. Western estimates of inflation in the NSWP
civilian economies (table 4) may provide some guide to
the impact of price changes on NSWP defense
spending. But tight government control over the wages
of military conscripts is likely to have limited the effect
of inflation on defense spending. Also, the purchase of
military equipment from the Soviet Union on the basis
of multiyear agreements probably resulted in stable
prices for a substantial portion of defense procurement.
For these reasons, the inflation reflected in the growth
of the NSWP defense budgets probably is less than
that estimated for the civilian economies.
25X1
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O
Announced Defense Expenditures ~~.:..,,..._, . _____ _ _ .
-- ------- ?- ~?.- ..? .,.~ t?~?.r a.uunmes ? of Inflation in NSWP Countries
Annual
Average
1970 1974 1978 1970-1978
Bulgaria , 2.4 NA NA NA
Czechoslovakia 3.5 = 3.3' 3.3' 't a =
East Germany 4.6 = 5.0 = 5.4 = 5.0 =
3.9'
Consumer Prices
(1970-78)
Machinery and
Metalworking
Czechoslovakia
2
2 (1970-77)
East Germany
1
3 (1970-75)
Hungary
4
5 (1970.76)
Poland
7
7 (1970-76)
Hungary 2.8 2.2 2 2 Sources: Alton, Bass, Lazarcik, Stoller, and Znayenko, Working
2'9 Papers 4/'the Research Protect on National Income in East Centro!
Poland 3.7 2.7 2.4 2.8 Europe (New York: L.W. Financial Research, Inc., September 1978
Romania 2.4 2.1 2 4 2 2 and September 1979).
' Calculated from data in national currencies and current prices.
= Includes expenditures for internal security forces.
' Excludes expenditures for internal security forces (information
available only since 1977).
N~-Not available.
O
In East Germany and Czechoslovakia, where the
inflation experienced in the civilian economies was
slight, the real average annual growth in the an-
nounced defense budgets probably was close to the
reported growth in current prices (7 percent and 4
percent). In Poland, however, where inflation was a
more serious problem in the 1970s, the real growth in
the defense budget probably was appreciably less than
the growth in current price terms. The estimates in
table 4 probably overstate the average annual rate of
inflation in Polish defense costs by 2 to 3.percentage
points. Still, in constant price terms the growth of
Poland's defense budget may have averaged as little as
Czechoslovakia. In Czechoslovakia the announced
defense budget grew at an average of almost 6 percent
a year from 1970 through 1975, but .the growth rate
was only about 2 percent a year from 1975 through
1979. The more rapid growth of the early years
reflected the move to reverse the decline in the number
of armed forces personnel in the late 1960s as well as
the faster pace of military modernization. After 1975
modernization of the Czechoslovak forces slowed, and
from 1976 through 1978 the absolute level of an-
nounced defense spending was almost constant.
The modernization process, while unevenly paced over
the 1970s, resulted in the acquisition of a broad variety
of equipment for the armed forces. For the ground
forces the equipment upgrading included the replace-
ment of T-34 tanks with T-SSs, the acquisition of BMP
infantry combat vehicles, 122-mm self-propelled how-
itzers, new antitank guided missile launchers, multiple
rocket launchers, and SA-4 and SA-6 surface-to-air
missiles. The key features of Air Force modernization
were the acquisition of late-model Fishbeds for both
counterair and ground attack regiments and, after
January 1978, the acquisition of Flogger Bs.
East Germany. The growth of East Germany's defense
budget was accompanied by both expansion and
modernization of the armed forces. Expansion was
most evident in the ground forces, where divisional
artillery holdings were increased, organic artillery was
added to motorized rifle regiments, and more tanks
and fire-support weapons were deployed. Equipment
upgrading occurred throughout the East German
armed forces. In the ground forces its effects were far-
reaching. The BTR-60PB and BTR-SOPK armored
personnel carriers and the BMP infantry combat
vehicle became the standard troop carriers, replacing
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of obsolescent ships with more modern units
vehicles of older vintage. New air defense systems were
deployed, and 122-mm and 152-mm self-propelled
howitzers entered the inventory. By the end of the
decade the T-72 tank was being introduced, although
only in small numbers. The air forces also benefited
from the modernization effort. Newer model Fishbeds
were deployed, and one interceptor squadron was
reequipped with the MIG-23 Flogger B. The
capabilities of the naval forces for coastal patrol and
minesweeping were improved through the replacement
Poland. In Poland the real growth in defense spending,
while probably more modest than in East Germany,
allowed for some notable expansion and modernization
of the Polish armed forces. In the ground forces, troop
air defense was substantially improved with the
acquisition of self-propelled antiaircraft artillery
and increasing numbers of modern Soviet SAMs.
More T-55 tanks were added to the inventory, replac-
ing T-54s and T-34s. A few T-72s were also acquired
for familiarization and cadre training. In the air forces
the counterair regiments were reequipped with newer
Soviet interceptors.and one ground attack regiment
acquired Fitter Cs. The Polish Navy remained the
largest and best equipped naval force in Eastern
Europe but changed very little in the 1970s.
Defense Spending in the Southern Tier
Because of Bulgaria's total secrecy on defense spend-
ing since 1970, there are less data on defense spending
for the southern tier NSWP countries than for those of
the northern tier. The data that are available suggest
that Hungary and Romania, and in 1970 Bulgaria,
allocated smaller shares of their economic resources to
defense than did Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and
The differences in the growth of the defense budgets in
the northern and southern tier countries are less clear.
Hungary's announced defense budget grew at an
average of about 5 percent a year from 1970 through
1979, and Romania's grew at an annual average rate of
about 6 percent. But both average growth rates reflect
inflation as well as real growth, and the inflation
involved is difficult to quantify. Western estimates
indicate that Hungary experienced average annual
inflation rates of 4 percent in consumer prices and
5 percent in machinery prices in the 1970s (table 4).
For the same reasons noted in our discussion of the
northern tier countries, these estimates probably
overstate the impact of inflation on Hungary's defense
spending. Still, Hungary was one of the most inflation-
prone NSWPcountries in the 1970s. In Hungary, as in
Poland, growth in the announced defense budget may
have averaged only about 2 percent a year when
corrected for inflation. Price increases in the civilian
sector were less frequent in Romania than in Hungary,
and inflation almost certainly had less impact on 25X1
defense spending. But there are no good estimates of
price change in Romania in the 1970s. 25X1
Bulgaria. Were Bulgarian defense spending figures
available, they probably would show only modest
growth. In the 1970s the Bulgarian ground forces
acquired new APCs and artillery, but not in great
numbers, and equipment substitutions generally
proceeded at a moderate pace. In the Navy the
introduction of a small number of newer units into the
inventory resulted in a slight expansion of the force. In
the air and air defense forces there was some modern-
ization, but the exchange of obsolescent equipment for
more modern systems was s1ow.0 25X1,
Hungary. Hungary's announced defense budget was 25X1
roughly constant in the early 1970s. Little was done to
replace the largely obsolescent equipment of the armed
forces, and training activities actually decreased. But,
as the decade progressed, the defense budget grew
much more rapidly. At Soviet urging, the Hungarians
moved to reduce some of the disparities between their
own armed forces and those of Czechoslovakia, East
Germany, and Poland. Hungarian participation in
joint Warsaw Pact exercises increased, as did partici-
pation infield training with the Soviet Southern Group25X1
of Forces. Substantial upgrading of troop air. defense
occurred with the acquisition of Soviet-produced
SAMs and self-propelled antiaircraft guns.
25X1~~
Romania. The growth of Romania's defense budget
reflected Bucharest's efforts to modernize a military
force that was among the most poorly equipped in the
Warsaw Pact at the outset of the 1970s. In keeping
with Romania's attempt to steer an independent course
within the Pact, special emphasis was placed on
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f
Factors Af ec -ng
By the end of this year NSWP planners must complete
their five-year plans for 1981-85, including plans for
defense. Although the details of the overall economic
plans will be publicized widely, no detail will be
provided on the five-year plans for the armed forces.
Because of this secrecy it is difficult to judge the
prospects for defense spending in the 1981-85 period.
Still, the factors most likely to influence the resource
allocation decisions of NSWP planners are easily
identified. Analysis of these factors and other
evidence allows us to estimate how NSWP defense
spending is likely to change in the coming five-year
decade's end-a small number of T-7 tan
t' Future Defense Spending
1970s were SA-6 SAMs, interceptor ~rcr ~~
domestic arms production. Domestically produced
items deployed in BTR 60PB-othee armored vehicles
copy of the Soviet
(including a modified T-55), small arms, ammunition,
and bridging equipment. For other items, Romania
relied on imports, chiefly from the Soviet Union.
Among the Soviet-produced equipment procured tat
period (1981-85).
Soviet Pressure To Increase the Growth,ol'D?fense
Spending. Another-and a more important factor that
NSWP defense planners must take into account in
formulating plans for 1981-85 is Soviet pressure to
increase the growth of defense expenditures. Since at
least the-time of the meeting of the Warsaw Pact's
systems in the Soviet inventory.
D~ciencies ojthe NSWP Armed Forces.. The current
deficiencies of the NSWP armed forces are certainly a
factor of which national defense planners are aware
and which is likely to affect their formulation of goals
for the coming five-year period. In the southern tier
countries, these deficiencies are especially serious.
Much of the equipment in military inventories is
obsolete, and the armed forces lag far behind those of
the other NSWP countries in the level and quality of
their training. In the northern tier countries, the
deficiencies of the armed forces are less striking, but in
some instances still are serious. Poland's forces still
must rely on a good deal of obsolescent equipment. The
Czechoslovak and East German armed forces are
better equipped, but they lack many of the newer
Secret
Political Consultative Committee in November 1978, 25X1
the Soviets have reportedly been calling for more
weapons spending by the NSWP states. Despite the
growth in defense spending achieved by these countries
in the 1970s, the Soviets are dissatisfied with the pace
of military modernization and are pressing for an
accelerated effort. As the dominant force in the
an important
l
l
ay
p
Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union wil
role in shaping NSWP defense plans, but much will
depend on how insistent the Soviets prove to be on th25X1
defense spending issue.
Economic Problems. Current and prospective eco-
nomic problems are also likely to influence the
tion of
ll
oca
decisions of NSWP planners on the a
resources to defense. In the 1970s all the NSWP
countries experienced an economic slowdown that
worsened as the decade progressed. By 1979 the
economic performance of the NSWP countries ranged
from lackluster to dismal. The causes of the economic
slowdown were many. Systemic inefficiencies pices for
major role in the slowdown. So too did rising P from
energy, raw materials, and imports of technology
the West. In several instances the economic situation
was aggravated by mounting hard-currencyrformar~P
of-payments deficits and continuing poor pe 25X1
by the agricultural sectors.0 5X1
The East European economies are likely to experience
further slowdowns in the early 1980s, and NSWP
living standards will stagnate or decline. Only in
Hungary does the government appear determined to
press forward with economic reform, but even there
reform alone will not solve the economy's problems.
Throughout Eastern Europe resource constraints will
worsen and prices of critical materials will increase.
The growth of the working age population will decline
in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland in 25X1
1981-85, and there will be absolute decreases in
Bulgaria and Hungary. 25X1
These gloomy economic prospects give NSWP plan-
ners added incentive to restrain the growth of defense
expenditures. In the 1970s the announced defense
budgets accounted for between 2 and 5 percent of
GNP in the NSWP countries. But in the 1980s slower
economic growth is likely in these countries. If the
.,!-
,~..A.~,~s,-s- -_ ._ .F.~._. _ _.
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negative consequences.
defense budgets were to continue to grow at the pace
maintained from 1970 to 1979, they probably would
account for increasing shares of economic output in
most NSWP countries during 1981-85. Even then,
their share of overall economic output would be small
in comparison with the 12-14 percent of GNP now
allocated to defense by the Soviet Union. But their
claim on the increment in output would be substantial
and would impinge upon other pressing claims on
NSWP economic growth. An acceleration in the
growth of the defense budgets would have even more
Prospects for Future NSWP Defense Spending
In making their resource allocation decisions for the
coming five-year plan, NSWP leaders must weigh the
requirements for development of their armed forces
and Soviet pressure to increase weapons spending
against the needs of the civilian economy. The quality
and quantity of evidence regarding the weight assigned
to these competing factors varies from country to
country. Romania's President Ceausescu has publicly
rejected Soviet calls for more defense spending and has
not retreated from this position despite public Soviet
criticism. His public statements are a good indication
of Romania's likely behavior in the comin five-year
period Poland
and Hungary are also opposed to increasing the growth
of their defense spending because of their economic
difficulties.
Czechoslovakia is also reported to be opposed to
increasing the growth of its defense snendine.
ea ership has publicly resisted Soviet demands (for
example, more Czechoslovak production of nuclear
power equipment for CEMA) that would burden the
economy. Also, since 1975, as the economy has slowed,
the average annual growth in Czechoslovakia's defense
budget has been the lowest in the NSWP. The slowing
of the defense budget's growth may signal Czechoslo-
vakia's defense spending behavior in the future.
East Germany apparently allocates more of its
GNP to the armed forces than any other NSWP
country, and its armed forces are probably the best
equipped in Eastern Europe. Thus, it has the most
reason to complain of the burden of defense and the
least need to increase defense expenditures. But East
German Party Chief Honecker and Defense Minister
Hoffmann have publicly stated that NATO's decision 25X1
to deploy new medium-range missiles requires their
country to increase its defense capability. This sug-
gests some East German willingness to comply with
Soviet wishes.
Bulgaria's pressing priorities in agriculture and energy
and its apparent determination to continue its policy of
rapid industrialization militate against accelerated
growth in defense spending. But because of Bulgaria's
complete secrecy about defense spending, it is difficult
to determine past expenditures, much less future
spending.
In summary, the evidence suggests that during the
early 1980s the NSWP countries are unlikely to fully
satisfy Soviet demands for accelerated growth in
defense spending and more rapid military moderniza-
tion. Romania has publicly resisted Soviet pressure to
increase its defense spending and shows no sign of
abandoning its resistance. Hungary and Poland are
unlikely to do more than maintain the past decade's
average rate of growth in their defense budgets.
Czechoslovakia's defense budget also is unlikely to
grow more rapidly than in the 1970s. Only East
1
25X1
25X1
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Germany has indicated that it may comply with Sovi25X1
wishes on the defense spending issue. 25X1
25x~
-
Soviet pressure and NSWP attempts to remed
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y
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~,
current force deficiencies probably will lead to real
-growth in the defense budgets of all the NSWP
countries. Overall, however, the average real growth in
NSWP spending for the armed forces through 1985 is
unlikely to exceed that achieved in the 1970s, and the
pace of military modernization is likely to fall short of
Soviet goals.
25X1'
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