THE MOROCCAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE WESTERN SAHARA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08C01297R000100090001-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 4, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 12, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE MOROCCAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE WESTERN SAHARA
The Moroccan leadership views the annexation
of Morocco's portion of the former Spanish Sahara
as a matter of vital national interest. The annex-
ation, supported by all segments of the country's
population, has a deep historical and religious
basis with fundamental implications for the polit-
ical stability of the regime. It is also linked
directly to Morocco's ability to face its primary
geopolitical competitor, Algeria. As a result, it
is inconceivable at this time that King Hassan
can afford to back down on the issue of Morocco's
sovereignty over its Saharan territory. If he
were to do so, he would risk a loss of legitimacy.
Morocco's Claims to the Western Sahara
To understand the strength of Morocco's fixa-
tion on the Western Sahara, it is important to
examine the situation there from the Moroccan
perspective, particularly in view of the legal
case that has been formulated against the manner
in which Morocco and Mauritania have annexed the
territory. To interpret Moroccan policy as a land
grab motivated by the need to assure Morocco's
domination of the international phosphate market
is inaccurate. Rather, Morocco's claim extends
deeply into the nation's history.
Prior to the colonial period, Moroccan
rulers exercised varying degrees of control over
much of northwest Africa. From the 10th through
the 17th centuries, Moroccan influence penetrated
the Western Sahara, Mauritania, southwest Algeria,
and even Mali. Since independence Morocco has
argued, with some validity, that during the
colonial period it was stripped of large tracts
of its rightful patrimony. It was not until 1970
that Rabat abandoned its claims to all of Mauri-
tania and not until 1972 that it negotiated
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REPORT NO. 892
December 12, 1977
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a treaty (not yet ratified) with Algeria defining Morocco's
southeastern border with that country. Despite the occa-
sional resurfacing of irredentist sentiment for a "Greater
Morocco," a majority of Moroccans have accepted the loss of
much of Morocco's pre-colonial territory as a fait accompli.
The Western Sahara, however, is the notable exception: since
the early 1970's, a powerful current of irredentism has
focused on the former Spanish Sahara, seen by Morocco as
its last chance to recover some of its "despoiled" territory.
Morocco's claim to the Sahara is not based on a Western
definition of sovereignty. (An October 1975 advisory opinion
of the International Court of Justice determined that the
ties of allegiance between the area's various tribes and
Morocco and Mauritania at the time of Spanish colonization
in 1885 were insufficient to establish territorial sover-
eignty.) Rather, Morocco's claims are of a historical and
cultural nature deeply rooted in Islamic concepts of a popu-
lation's sworn allegiance to the sovereign and are linked to
Morocco's fluctuating pre-colonial control over the region.
The more modern concepts of nationalism and national
"honor" have reinforced these historical claims. As a
result, virtually all segments of the Moroccan population,
modern and traditional, have overwhelmingly supported the
justness of Morocco's Saharan policy.
The Western Sahara issue has also had deep implica-
tions for Moroccan political stability. The campaign to
reclaim the "despoiled" provinces began with a deeply
divided Morocco unsure of King Hassan's leadership. By
seizing the lead in the drive for the Sahara, however, the
King defused the opposition on this issue and co-opted the
opponents into the government's service. Leaders of all
parties--from the traditional nationalist Istiqlal to the
Communists (the Party of Unity and Progress)--traveled the
world to solicit support for Morocco's claims. The old
sense of malaise, which had characterized Moroccan politics
since the mid-1960's, evaporated as the country seemed to
regain a sense of national purpose, as witnessed by the
mobilization during the November 1975 Green March. National
support for the King's Saharan policy has remained remark-
ably high despite heavy costs and an increasing number of
military casualties.
The Sahara question thus is viewed by the Moroccan
leadership as crucial from a domestic political standpoint.
Should Hassan attempt to back down on Morocco's Saharan
claims, he would face a loss of legitimacy. Potentially
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serious internal challenges could open the way for another
coup attempt by the military. Though it is impossible to
predict whether this would cost King Hassan his throne,
the resulting tension could result in the termination of
Morocco's political liberalization and its promising
experiment in democracy.
Geopolitical Stakes in the Sahara: Morocco vs. Algeria
The Sahara issue has also become a vital element in
Morocco's geopolitical competition with Algeria. President
Boumediene, who apparently acquiesced to any Moroccan and
Mauritanian agreement on the Western Sahara at the Arab
summit held in Rabat in 1974, reassessed Algeria's position
in 1975. In the wake of the Moroccan and Mauritanian take-
over of the Sahara, Algeria turned on its neighbors and has
since waged an effective proxy war, using the Saharan
nationalist movement as a tool of its policy.
Algerian Aspirations. Although Algeria's ostensible
reason for supporting the Polisario is the principle of
self-determination, its historical competition with Morocco
for predominance in northwest Africa is its primary motiva-
tion. Algeria's objective in the dispute is the establish-
ment of an independent Saharan republic, in which it expects
to have a predominant influence. This would deny to Morocco
the territory's significant economic resources and stymie
Moroccan efforts to restrict future Algerian access to the
Atlantic. Boumediene, in short, opposes Moroccan assimila-
tion of the Western Sahara because it would challenge
Algeria's aspirations to dominance in North Africa.
Moroccan Strategic Perceptions. The Sahara is viewed
by the Moroccans as strategically crucial. The creation
of an Algerian puppet state in the Sahara and the toppling
of the pro-Moroccan regime in Mauritania would, from the
Moroccan standpoint, permanently tip the balance of power
in North Africa in favor of Algeria. It would also, the
Moroccans believe, threaten the existence of their regime.
In more specific terms, Moroccans feel they cannot afford
to abandon their Saharan claims for the following reasons:
--The creation of an Algerian-dominated mini-state
would place a noose around Morocco, cutting it off
from its Mauritanian ally and the rest of Africa.
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? 4 --
--A radical Saharan republic would serve as a subver-
sive base for revolutionary Moroccan groups, some
of which may already have established links with
the Polisario Front.
4681_, --The loss of the Sahara
rs)
cf-r73
vast phosphate wealth,
over the longer run of
natural gas earnings.
would cost Morocco the area's
the country's principal means
keeping pace with Algeria's
The struggle between Morocco and Algeria has strong
ideological overtones. Statements by Moroccan leaders have
viewed the confrontation as a competition between two
widely divergent political systems: the open, pluralist,
moderate Moroccan form of government pitted against the
"repressive," radical, authoritarian regime in Algeria. The
Moroccans also view the struggle in the context of the
ongoing attempts to radicalize the African Continent by
Cuba, Libya, and Algeria, all armed by the Soviet Union.
Morocco's commitment to resist this radicalization goes
beyond rhetoric, as witnessed in its intervention on behalf
of Zaire. While Moroccan allegations of grandiose Soviet
schemes in Africa may be overdrawn for the benefit of the
US, Moroccan leaders do perceive the ongoing radicalization,
as exemplified by Algeria's Saharan policy, as a threat to
Morocco and all of the moderate regim s on the continent.
yc )2e,
The Outlook for Morocco's Saharan Policy
Morocco will not give up its claims to sovereignty
over the Western Sahara. The combination of factors noted
above--the "righteousness" of Morocco's historic/religious
claims to the region,the negative implications for domestic
policy, and Morocco's geopolitical competition with
Algeria--have made the Sahara issue a vital national inter-
est, one that has virtually become a national obsession.
Morocco, therefore, will be most unlikely to agree to any
settlement formula that jeopardizes its claims to sover-
eignty over the Sahara, although it is likely to be flexible
concerning other aspects of a possible settlement (joint
exploitation of the Sahara's resources, guaranteed access
to the Atlantic for Algeria, amnesty for Polisario guerril-
las, etc.).
Morocco is fully prepared to ignore diplomatic and
political pressures from the international community calling
for Saharan self-determination. Morocco is also prepared
to resist US pressures for a settlement that risks compro-
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mising Moroccan sovereignty over the Sahara. Over the
short run (18 months or so), the Moroccan leadership will
probably adopt the following strategy:
--It will order the Moroccan military to dig in its
heels in the Sahara, accepting continued heavy
losses if necessary.
--It will support Mauritania to the extent possible,
including the dispatch of additional military units
and the encouragement of a more active French role in
the defense of its ally.
--It will continue and, whenever possible, accelerate
its arms modernization program.
Continued French cooperation and Saudi financial support,
which appear assured, are necessary for the success of
Morocco's short-term plans.
Over the longer run, one cannot rule out a more aggres-
sive Moroccan military posture with respect to Algeria--
which Morocco's decided inferiority in military equipment
has thus far precluded. Though it seems unlikely that
Morocco would initiate a full-scale war against Algeria
(which would undermine strong Arab backing Morocco has
striven to maintain), the pressures on the Moroccan leader-
ship for some form of punitive operation against the
Polisario on Algerian territory will grow, especially if
the military's Saharan losses continue at their present
heavy rate. While it is unlikely that Morocco would "win"
a war against Algeria, the mood in Morocco is such that
military risks might eventually be taken to make Algeria
pay for its "treacherous games" in the Sahara.
Prepared by
Approved by
Brian Flora
x21889
P. H. Stoddard
x28397
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