THE PARACEL'S/SPRATLYS DISPUTE AND ITS POTENTIAL FOR RENEWED SINO-VIETNAMESE ARMED CONFLICT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08C01297R000300180003-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 84
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 15, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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rr4 144S
Asian 750
August 1982
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The Paftcets./Sp'atl'ys Dispute and Its
Potential for Renewed Sind-Vietnamese Armed Conflict:
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Pam
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . .
PART I. A GEOGRAPHICAL OVERVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Paracel Archipelago
The Spratly Archipelago
PART II. A HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE CONFLICTING CLAIMS . . .
17
Chinese Claims to the Paracels
Vietnamese Claims to the Paracels
Chinese Claim to the Spratlys
Vietnamese Claims to the Spratlys
Philippine Claim to the Spratlys
The Malaysian Claim to the Spratlys
Discussion
PART III. THE ISLANDS' IMPORTANCE: STRATEGIC OR ECONOMIC . . . ,
?40
Stretegic Consideration
China and Offshore Oil
Vietnam and Offshore Oil
PART IV. THE MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE CLAIMANTS . . . . . . .
53
Naval Power
China
Air Forces
China
Vietnam
The Soviet Military Presence
PART V. THE POTENTIAL FOR RENEWED SINO-VIETNAMESE ARMED
CONFLICT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Recent Incidents in the South China Sea
Possible Ways to Resolve Some Conflicting Claims
Some Future Courses of Action for China
A possible Sino-Vietnam Conflict
Conclusion
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INTRODUCTION
On 19-20 January, 1974, a sharp armed clash took place between
naval, air, and ground forces of the People's Republic of China (PRC)
and the Republic of Viet-Nam (RVN) in the XiSha (Paracel) Islands,
located approximately 350 kilometers southeast of Hainan Island, in the
South China Sea. (Fig. 1)1
According to the PRC, this battle was precipitated by RVN naval
units' harrassment of Chinese fishing vessels in the Paracels on
January 15-19, which resulted in several Chinese fishermen killed or
wounded.2
In response, the PRC sent at least 1.1 naval units to the area,
including 2 Yulin-based destroyers armed with the 22-mile range SS-N-2
"STYX" surface-to-surface naval missile. The RVN naval force consisted
of an unknown number of destroyer escorts, coast guard cutters, and
patrol boats.3 During the naval action on January 19, the RVN claimed
to have sunk one Chinese ship and badly damaged a second. The RVN
apparently. lost a frigate, reportedly sunk by a "STYX" missile, while
three other ships, including two destroyers, were damaged either by
missiles or missile fragments.4
Meanwhile, Chinese troops landed.on Duncan Island (Dao gan qun dao)
(Fig. 2)' and forced the small RVN regional forces contingent to withdraw
to Robert Island (Gan quan dao). A half-company of RVN sailors was
divided between Money island (Jin-yin-dao) and Pattle Island (Shan-hu dao).
On the following day, January 20, a Chinese force (possibly of battalion
strength), supported by MIG-21 fighter-bombers, overran the Vietnamese
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1100
PECPLL'S 9?_FUCLIC OF Cii1;1,1'
/ -'
"laccler=~cld 1k,1 '+ah-p,n !lock (Suzon
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1 )
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.1. Islands in the South China Sea
'.Stor;:>-
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?,:(Sp: atly )
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Kuang-rein I. !
Ch err -har.9 j.
Duncan 1.
Fig.2. The Region Where Fighting Took Place on January 19.and 20, L974:
The Crescent Group (Paracei Islands) Scale: 1 cm = approx. 2 km
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positions on all three islands,6 capturing 48 RVN military personnel
and one United States-civilian. 7 five ."sick and wounded" South
Vietnamese were released to the International Red Cross in Hong Kong
within one week,8 and the remaining 43 South Vietnamese and 1 American
were released to I.R.C. officials on February 17.
This two-day armed clash could hardly be described as- a "major
conflict," but the Chinese action was significant in three respects.
.First, the PRC demonstrated its ability to project its naval power
.beyond Chinese shores, as well as the ability to conduct joint air-
sea-ground offensive operations.10 Second, the PRC demonstrated that
it was both willing and able to back up territorial claims with armed
force, lest anyone forget the lesson of the China-India border war of
1962. And third, the Chinese action in the Paracels served as a warning
to Southeast Asian nations contesting Chinese claims to the Nansha
(Spratly) Archipelago. As a result, attention was suddenly focused on
the subject of the controversy, the islands themselves. How strong
are the claims of the various claimants? What value do these islands
have which could warrant the use of armed force to take and maintain
them? Could tension among the claimants erupt into regional conflict,
and if so, how would such a conflict affect regional stability?
In the following paper, I will first present a geographical
overview of the Paracel archipelagoes, followed by a historical review
of the claims by the principal claimants. I will then attempt to
explain the newly awakened interest in these islands which led to the
1.974 hostilities. After examining the strategic and economic significance
of the islands, I will briefly review the military capabilities of the
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principal claimants and assess the ability of each to use such forces
in support of their respective claims.
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1. Chia, hung-dah, Chinese Attitude toward Contiliental Shelf and Its
Implication on Delimiting Seabed in Southeast Asia, (B ltimore,
University of Maryland, 1977 ,overleaf.
2. Morrow, Michael, "Today Hsisha, Tomorrow .?", Far Eastern
Economic Review, Vol. 83, No. 4 (January 28, 1974), p. 32.'
3. Sardesai, .D.R., "Vietnam's Quest for Security," in Changing Patterns
of Security and Stabilityl,in Asia,(New York, Praeger: 1980),p, 233.
4. News Review on China, Mongolia, and the Koreas (hereafter called
News ReviewT, New Delhi: Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses),
February, 1974), pp. 121-123.
5. Heinzig, Dieter, Disputed Islands in the South China Sea, (Wiesbaden:
Institute of Asian Affairs, Hamburg, 1976), p. 51.
6. News Review, (January, 1974), pp. 70-71.
7. News Review, (January, 1974), p. 183.
8. Vietnam Report, (15 February, 1974), p. 4.
9. News Review, (March 1974), p. 183.
10. Pollack, Jonathan D., "China as a Military Power," in Military
Power and Policy in Asian States: China, India, Japan,\Bou2.Jer,
Colo.:. Westview Pr?ess,1980, pp. 67-68.
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Part I: A Geographical Overview
The semi-enclosed South China Sea covers about 3,685,000 square
kilometers and is of the utmost strategic and economic importance. On
the southwest, it communicates with the Indian Ocean through the vital
Malacca-Singapore Straits and on the northeast with the Taiwan Strait
and the East China Sea. It represents a major portion of the navigation
route between the Pacific and Indian Ocean for the United States and
Soviet navies as well as a vital trade link, especially for Japanese
merchant marine vessels and oil tankers.'
Scattered across the South China Sea are more than 170 islets,
=shoals, coral reefs, banks, sands, cays, and rocks which are grouped in
four mid-ocean coral archipelagoes: the Pratas Reef, the Macclesfield
Bank, the Paracel Islands, and the Spratly Islands (Fig. 3.).2 The
ownership of the Pratas Reef and the Macclesfield Bank, both situated-
.closer to China than to either Vietnam or the Philippines, has not been
contested; these are Chinese.3 However, ownership of the two larger
archipelogoes, the Paracels and Spratlys, has been contested by China
and Vietnam for some 180 years, and in recent years three other govern-
ments, the Republic of China,.the Republic of the Philippines, and
Malaysia, have declared their claims to one or more of the Spratlys.
The Paracel Archipelago
The Paracel archipelago comprises 15 islets and more than one-dozen
partly or temporarily submerged reefs and banks, scattered over an area
forming a large oval with a maximum diameter of about 200 km. Its center
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Yu ON
1~HO CHI NINNH
CITY
PARACEL S
i.~
PRATAS
N'ACCLESF ELD
[.LANK
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SPRATL Y.
V 500 KM /'.;
Archipelagoes in the South China Sea
TAIYVAN
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is approximately midway between the southern coast of Hainan Island
(about 350 km southeast of Yulin) and the central Vietnam coast (about
400 km east of Da Nang). 4
The Paracels are generally subdivided into
two principal groups, the Amphtrite Group, located in the northeastern
part of the archipelago and comprising seven islands, eight cays, and
one reef (Fig. 4)5, and the Crescent Group which is located in the
southwestern part of the archipelago and comprises eight islands, four
partly submerged reefs, and a and cay (Fig. 5).6 Since the'Paracels
are claimed by both the PRC and the SRV, most of the islands have three
names. The chart in Fig. 6 lists each by its English, Chinese, and
Vietnamese names as well as its size (where known).9
The Spratly Archipelago
The Spratly.Islands are an archipelago in the South China Sea
composed of more than 100 islands, shoals, reefs, banks, and cays,
stretching over an area of 180,000 sq. km.7 The center of the group is
located approximately 1,450 km. southwest of Taiwan, 1,000 km. south of
Hainan Island, 700 km.. south of the Paracels, 500 km. southeast of
Vietnam, and 400 kni. west of Palawan Island in the Philippine-s, Me
principal regions in the Spratlys, with their islands, reefs and cays
are detailed in Fig. 710 and shown on map in Fig. 8.11
All of the islands are located in the tropical zone. The average
annual temperature in this region varies between 15 and 28? C. Annual
rainfall averages 2,500 mm. The islands' flora consists primarily of
pineapple, coconut palms, tung oil, , quince, and banana trees,
The islands have been, and still are, economically important as
bases for fishing vessels and as sites of valuable guano deposits,
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xidAl~l.
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Fig.4. The Amphitrite Group (Paracel Islands)
10
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rig.5. The Crescent Group (paracel Islands) Scale: 1 cm = approx. 2) kmm
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Fig.8. The Spratly Islands - The numbered circles
refer to the islands listed in Fig.7.
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Guano, which on some islands has accumulated to a height of up to one
meter, is used in the manufacture of high-quality fertilizers. The
South China Sea is rich in a variety of edible fish, sea turtles
(valuable for their shells), cuttlefish, trepang, shellfish, and oysters.
On the islands, fisherman collect swallows' nests, the basic substance
of a soup in great demand throughout East and Southeast Asia.12
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1. Feeney, William R., "Dispute Settlement, the Emerging Law of the
Sea, and East Asian Maritime Boundary Conflicts," Asian Profile,
VIII, (December, 1980), p. 584.
2. 'Siddayao, Corazon M., The Off-Shore Petroleum Resources of South-
East Asia, (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1978 , p. 85.
3. Chiu, Hungdah and Park Choon-ho, "Oil and Asian Rivals," in
Hearings before the Subcommittee on'Asia and'Pacific,Affairs of the
Committee on orei n Affairs, House of Representatives; 3rd
Congress, 1st and 2nd Sessions, (Washington, D.C.: USGP , 1974),
p. 428.
4. Heinzig, Dieter, Disputed Islands in the South China Sea, (Wiesbaden:
Institute of Asian Affairs Hamburg, 1976), p. 16.
8. Feeney, p. 585.
9. Heinzig, p. 18.
10. Heinzig, pp. 17-19, and National Foreign Assessment Center, The
}?' South China Sea: 'The Soviet Factor, Washington D.C., 1981.
5. Ibid., p. 52.
6. Ibid., p. 51.
7. Ibid., p. 15.
Heinzig, p. 53.
11.
Heinzig, p. 15.
' 12.
16
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Part II: A Historical Review of the Conflicting Claims
Chinese Claims to the Paracels
From of old, the Hsisha Islands have been
our territorial waters
These islands are covered with our forefathers'
footprints
Countless generations
Of fishermen cast their nets here
The fleets of countless dynasties
Moored in their baysl
Since the mid-19th century, the Paracels have been claimed and
temporarily occupied by the Ch'ing Empire, France, Indo-China, the
Republic of China,'Japan, the Peoples' Republic of China, and the
Republic of Viet Nam (RVN). Since the end of Word War II, the princi-
pal claimants have been the PRC and Viet Nam (first as the RVN and
later as the SRV.) Until 1974, no party had claimed permanent occupation
of any one of the islands. The historical claims, generally implicit
ones, rely on the discovery of, temporary or repeated occupation of,
or the maintenance of relations with the islands.
The Chinese claim to have discovered the Paracels in the 2nd
century B.C. during the time of Emperor Wu Ti. Geographical features
of the islands were first described in "Nan Zhou Yi Wu Zhi" (Strange
Things of the Southern Provinces) by Wan Zhen and "Fu Nan Zhuan"
(An Account of Fu Nan), by Kang Tai, both written during the Three
Kingdoms period (220-265),2 Over the next 1,000 years references to
the islands and accounts of voyages to them appear in various works
of the Song, Yuan,' Ming, and Qing dynasties. In recent years, Chinese
coins, the oldest dating back to the rule of the Emperor Wan Mang
(3.B.C.. to 23 A.D.), reportedly have been found in the Paracels.3
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fft
Further, there have been recent archeological finds in the
Paracels of ruins of living quarters, pottery and porcelain utensils,
iron knives and cooking pots, and other items of daily use dating,from
the Tang and Song dynasties.4
The "Wu Jing Zong Yao" (Outline Record of Military Affairs) of the
Northern Song records that the Northern Song court ordered Chinese
naval patrols to the Paracels. These patrols were to be based in
Guangdong province and equipped with sea-faring warships capable of
reaching the Paracels in seven days (with a fair east wind).5 This
would indicate that a) the islands were already considered Chinese,
b) Guangdong province exercised some sort of military or administrative
responsibility over them, and c) the Chinese planned to provide a
e
military presence, whenever required.
Still another important indication of early Chinese control is
reflected in a chronicle written during the Sung period which refers
to the Song emperor's intention to escape the advancing Mongols by
sea, by sailing to Indochina via the Paracels. This course would hardly
have been contemplated had not the islands been under'firm Chinese
military control.
In 1279, the famous astronomer and Deputy Director of the Astro-
nomical Bureau, Guo Shou Jing, was directed by the emperor to perform
-astronomical observations in the South China Sea. The official History
of the Yuan Dynasty shows that the observation point Guo chose was in
the Para cels.6
In 1293, Gen. Shi Bi touched on the Paracel Archipelago enroute to
Java, as did the eunuch,,Jeng Ho, during his seven voyages through the
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South China Sea during the period 1403-1433. It is during this time
that the two island groups of the Paracels are first referred to by the
names Yung Le and Xuan De, referring to the titles of reign of the
`Ming Emperors Ching Zi (1403-1424) and Xuan Zong (1426-1435), respec-
tively.7
In 1876, the Qing Ambassador to Britain, Guo Song Tao, kept a
detailed record of the voyage to his post. When abeam the Paracels, he
-recorded, "Nearby to the left were the Paracel Islands (the Xisha
Islands) . . . . These islands belong to China."8
The first clear case of a Chinese government taking possession of
parts of this region was in 1902 when the Manchu government, believing
it had discovered signs that France intended to occupy the Paracels by
mounting an attack from bases in Indochina, sent Vice-General Wu Jing-.
yung and Admiral Li Ju with three warships to carry out an inspection
of the islands. The expedition hoisted flags and erected a stone
tablet on North Island reading, "commemorating the inspection in the
28th year of the reign of Guang Xu (1902) of the Great Qing Empire."9
In 1911, the Guangdong provincial government announced that the
Xisha Islands would be placed under the administration of Yaxian County,
Hainan Island.10
In 1921, the first practical steps toward developing and exploiting
the Paracels on a large scale were taken by the "Paracel Archipelago
Company for Industry and Commerce." The head of the company, a Canton
merchant named He Rui Nian, was issued a license for;the exploitation
of natural resources and marine products. In 1927 or 1928, the license
was withdrawn when it was.discovered that He Rui Nian was merely fronting
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for the Formosa Monopolies Authority, a Japanese group, and that a
sizeable proportion of the island's resources were being shipped
secretly: to Japan. The Guangdong government then established a new
development plan.11
In May, 1982, the Guangdong provincial government sent a study
group consisting of military and civil officers, scientists, and tech-
nicians to make an investigation of the Xisha Islands. The group
submitted a detailed report on the results of their investigations to
the provincial government.12
Between 1930 and 1946, the Chinese government appeared to be
powerless to do anything but lodge ineffectual protests as first the
French, then the Japanese occupied the Paracels. A strange feature of
the Japanese occupation is that they, too, placed the islands under
"Chinese" administration, but under the administrative jurisdiction of
the port authorities of Kaohsiung, Taiwan.13
Following World War II, on December 9, 1946, the Nationalist
government sent two warships to the Paracels to take possession of the
islands. In January, 1947, the Chinese embassy in Paris issued a
.communique announcing the re-occupation of the Paracels and asserting
Chinese claims to the archipelago. France, which had sent a small force
to re-occupy the Paracels in the spring of 1946, withdrew its troops in
January. The Chinese communique went on to say that the islands had
always been governed by the Guangdong provincial authorites.
The Paracels were evacuated by the Nationalists in May, 1950, and
were occupied by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) almost immediately.
During the next decade, the Paracels appear to have been roundly ignored
both economically and militarily by the Beijing government. By 1959,
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F
the PRC was apparently no longer in complete military control. There
are-numerous reports of armed incursions, and outright raids, by South
Vietnamese warships, overflights by South Vietnamese aircraft, and
vandalism by Japanese fishermen. These events apparently moved the
:Chinese Communist Party Central Committee to begin a campaign in the
spring of 1959 to induce Hainan Island farmers and fishermen to settle
in the Paracels, especially on Woody Island (Yung Xing dao), and consid-
r
erable construction was begun, especially on Woody Island. 15
In March, 1959, the Hainan Administrative Area of the Guangdong
government set up an "Office of the Xisha, Nansha, and Zhongsha Islands"
on Woody, Island, making it the administrative center for all the South
China Sea archipelagos, with the exception of the Pratas. In March
1969, this office was renamed the "Revolutionary Committee of the Xisha,
Zhongsha, Nansha Islands of Guangdong Province." 16
In 1971, United States reconnaissance aircraft observed frequent
convoys of PRC ships transporting construction materials to the Paracels,
and by the end of that year, a naval complex consisting of a ship
berthing area, a jetty, more than 50 buildings, and other facilities,
had been constructed. Newly-built radar installations in the Paracels
-now formed the first line of early warning against air attack. A New
China News Agency report of March 13, 1974, said that Yunghsing (Woody)
Island had become a "strong bastion on China's South Sea frontier."17
In January, 1974, for reasons which will be discussed later in this
paper, the RVN unwisely placed troops on several islands in the Crescent
Group. The PRC responded quickly with military force, overwhelmed the
South Vietnamese, and firmly established through occupation, its claim
to the archipelago.
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Vietnamese Claims to the Paracels
It is ironic that the SRV has been forced to "borrow" documentary
evidence, vis-a-vis its claim to the Paracel Islands from the archives
of its former arch-rival, the RVN.
In early 1975, the RVN published a diplomatic white paper on its
claims. to the Paracel and Spratly Islands, in which was stated that,
"the Republic of Vietnam fulfils (sic) all the conditions required by
international law to assert its claim to possession of these islands. ,18
The RVN white paper cites evidence in an atlas compiled by Do Ba
around 1630-53, which described Vietnamese salvage operations in the
Paracels,19 as well as foreign sources such as the Dutch Journal of
Batavia which described Dutch negotiations with the Vietnamese over
shipwrecks and salvage procedures in the Paracels.20 The Vietnamese
mandarin Le Qui Don recorded detailed descriptions of the flora and
fauna of the Paracels in his "Phu Bun Tap Luc" (Miscellaneous Records
on the Pacification of the Frontiers),21 Don also described visits to
the islands by members of the "Hoang Sa Company," who spent eight
months of each year in such activities as fishing and salvage work,
on the islands.22
According to official RVN sources, a "Doi Hoang Sa" or Hoang Sa
Society had been formed as early as 1700 for commercial exploitation
of the Paracel archipelago. The first Ngoyen emperor, Gia Long,
reactivated the society in 1802; in 1816 had the Vietnamese flag
raised over the Paracels.23
From the 18th century, the Vietnamese cite the 1701 diary of a
French missionary aboard the ship "Amphitrite" in which he described
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the hazards encountered around the Paracels, and stated that the islands
belonged to Vietnam.24 The Vietnamese also cite French Admiral
d'Estaing's reports, noting Vietnamese military (naval) activity in the
Paracels in 1768, and the fact that many cannon in the Vietnamese shore
defenses were removed from British and Portuguese wrecks in the Paracels,
as proof that by the mid-18th century, the Paracels already figured
prominently in Vietnam's defensive plans.25 Lord MacCartney in his
book, A Voyage to Cochin China, published in 180626 also mentioned
Vietnamese economic ties to the Paracels.
In 1836, the Vietnamese Ministry of Public Works requested that
Emperor Minh Mang-send yearly missions to fully explore, survey, and
map the islands, since they were "of great strategic importance to our
maritime borders." Both the Paracel and Spratly groups were included
in the "Detailed Map of the Dai Nam," in 1838, although neither was
correctly located.27
After 1883, all Vietnam became a French protectorate, and today
the Vietnamese claim that the French not only preserved but reinforced
the Vietnamese title to sovereignty over the Paracels.28 They further
1938.30
claim that it was a.1925 French scientific mission which proved the
existence of a continental shelf reaching out in platforms from the
Vietnamese coast, with the Paracels resting on one of these platforms.29
In 1932, the French made the Paracels an administrative unit of
Thua Thien Province, an act which was confirmed by Emperor Bao Dai in
In October, 1950, France formally turned over the defense of the
Paracel Archipelago to the Vietnamese (although French troops garrisoned
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the islands until 1956.)31 The following year (1951) Vietnamese Premier
Tran Van Huu attended the Japanese Peace Conference in San Francisco,
where he affirmed the RVN's rights over both the Paracels and Spratlys
In 1961, RVN President Ngo Dinh Diem signed a decree transferring the
Paracels from the jurisdiction of Thua Thien province back to Quang
:Nam Province. The entire archipelago was given the status of a "xa"
(village). Hence, in 1969, they became part of the mainland village
of Hoa Long in Quang'Nam province.32 Over the next five years, the
RVN carried out phosphate exploitation and operated a weather station
on Pattle Island in the Crescent Group.
When, in 1974, the PRC wrested control of the Crescent Group from
the RVN and consolidated its control of the entire Paracel Archipelago,
neither the SRV nor its southern client, the Provisional Revolutionary
Government (PRG) made any protest; however, shortly after the fall of
the RVN in 1975, the SRV occupied several islands in the Spratly
archipelago and publicly "assumed the mantle" vis-a-vis claims by the
defunct RVN to both the Paracels and the Spratlys.
Chinese Claim to the Spratlys
The earliest reference to a Chinese presence in the Spratlys dates
back to 1867, when the crew of a British surveying ship met Chinese
fisherman from Hainan on the largest of the Spratly Islands. In accor-
dance with what those fishermen had said, in their Hainan dialect, the
British called the island "Itu Aba," a name still used on Western charts.
~`4 In Chinese, the Spratlys were referred to as "tuan slia qun dao" until
shortly after World War II, when the name "Nan Sha" was used,33
C
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The PRC insists that many Hainan fishermen began to "settle on
the Nan Sha {Spratly) islands long ago, and in addition to fishery,
developed horticulture, reclaimed land, raised poultry, and engaged
in mining phosphate areas.34 The Chinese cite Japanese sources who
recorded evidence at the beginning of this-century, of Chinese wells,
'tombs, and temples on Bei Zi Reef, Xi Yue, Zhong Ye, and Tai Ping
Islands. The Chinese also point to descriptions of life in the Nan
Sha. Islands made by both French and Chinese observers during the
period of French occupation.35
Until the 1930s the Chinese claim to both the Paracels and Spratlys
appeared to be unchallenged and was, in fact confirmed by several
international and Chinese domestic acts. In 1883, the German govern-
ment tried to survey the Spratlys but ceased when China protested.
After Vietnam became a protectorate of France in 1884, on June 26,
1887, a convention respecting the Delimitation of the Frontier between
.China and Tongkin (Vietnam) was signed, Article III of which provided
that, "the islands lying east of a line from 105? 43'E long running
north-south through the eastern point of Tra-Co island;" are Chinese.
r
Those west of the line were regarded as part of Vietnam.36 Both the
Paracels and Spratlys lie east of that line.
In July, 1933, when the French government announced it had occupied
nine of the Spratlys, it also noted in its official gazette that the only
persons found on the islands were Chinese.37.
In April, 1939, Japan announced that it had placed both the Paracels
aMid Spratlys under the jurisdiction of Kao-hsiung County of Taiwan,
then a territory of; the Japanese Empire.38
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In November, 1946, the (Nationalist) Chinese government sent a
naval contingent, with officials from the Ministry of Internal Affairs
and the Guang dong Provincial Government, to take over the islands.'
This group surveyed each of the major islands, stationed garrison forces
on several, and erected Chinese territorial. stone tablets on Itu Aba,
along with weather and radio stations. In March 1947, the islands were
temporarily placed under the administration of the Chinese Navy. On
December 1, 1947, the Ministry of Internal Affairs publicly announced
new names for each island and since then, all Chinese maps have so
inscribed them in the territorial scope of China. At that time, no
country protested..the Chinese takeover, the new names, or the inclusion
within the territorial scope of China.39
In May 1950, after the fall of Hainan Island, the Nationalists
withdrew their forces from the Spratlys and in September, 1951, at
the Japanese Peace Conference in San Francisco, Japan renounced its
claim to the Spratlys. While the PRC was not invited to that conference,
PRC Foreign Minister Zhou En-lai said on August 15, 1957 that no decision
made at the conference would alter the PRC's "invoilable sovereignty
over Nanwei Island (Spratly Island)," although the Republic of China
interpreted the Japanese renunciation as the transferal of the Pescadores,
Paracels and Spratlys to Taiwan.40
In 1956, when a Filipino, Tomas Cloma, announced his "discovery"
.of the Spratlys and claimed the establishment of the "Free Territory of
.,~ Freelandia," both Beijing and Taiwan reacted quickly;, the former with
a. note of protest, the latter with a naval contingent, Although the
Filipinos were found to have departed, Taipei established a garrison on
Itu Aba which is was since maintained,41
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The Taipei government has also actively protested claims or
occupation by the Vietnamese, both under the RVN and the SRV. It has
periodically sent military contingents to re-supply and re-garrison
Itu Aba, and until around 1974, sent joint teams from the Navy and
Ministry of Internal Affairs to inspect the islands and re-erect
Chinese national boundary tablets. As late as 1972, a Chinese patrol
boat temporarily apprehended a Japanese trawler entering its territorial
sea around Itu Aba.42
The Taipei government has otherwise been content to restrict its
claims of sovereignty to a continued presence at international carto-
graphic conferences and diplomatic protests or representation to the
RVN or the Philippines rejecting their challenge to Chinese sovereignty
over the islands.
The PRC, on the other hand, made bellicose rumblings in 1974 when,
after the RVN defeat in the Paracels, the RVN occupied several of the
Spratlys. After 1975, the PRC made similar moves toward its former
Vietnamese allies when the SRV promptly took over the RVN bases, The
PRC has also fumed periodically over drilling operations in the Reed
Bank sponsored by Manila.
Vietnamese Claims to the Spratl s
As early as 1802, Emperor Gia Long of the Nguyen dynasty sent the
Peking court a map defining the limits of his kingdom, which clearly
showed the Spratly Islands under the jurisdiction of Hue.43 However,
the Vietnamese have been unable to present any hard evidence of a
continued, or even intermittent, presence in the area over the following
130 years, The Saigon white paper merely states that, "unlike the case
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of the Hoang Sa (Paracel) Islands, the former emperors of Vietnam did
not have the time to strengthen these contacts through the organization
of an administrative jurisdiction."44
;A circa 1838 map by Phan Huy Chu expressly mentioned the Spratlys,
under the name "Van Ly Truong Sa," as a part of Vietnamese territory;
however,-the archipelago was not correctly located.45
In April 1930, the French gunboat "Le Malicieuse" reconnoitered
the waters surrounding the Spratlys and apparently occupied , one island.46
In the spring of 1933, a three-ship French expedition occupied the two
principal islands, Itu Aba and Spratly, as well-as seven other islands
of the Spratly archipelago. Paris publicly announced their annexation
on July 26, 1933,47 Itu Aba became the "administrative capital" where
all services were centered. The RVN white paper states that because of
the isolation and hardship involved in living in the Spratlys, only
volunteers were sent there; if none could be found, private citizens
(Europeans only) were hired as "contract officials."48
Three months after the official incorporation of the Spratlys, the
archipelago was made a part of Ba-Ria province. This .organization was
confirmed by the RVN in 1956, and in 1973, the Spratlys were attached to
a village of the same province, now called Phuoc Thuy.49
In 1938, a meterological station was set up on Itu Aba; however,
according to the RVN white paper, "State activities on the Spratlys were
necessarily restricted, because the islands were uninhabited and
situated too far away from the mainland." The RVN claimed that by
operating the weather station and undertaking geographic and geologic
studies" on behalf of Vietnam," the French "substantiated" the right to
sovereignty over a territory."50
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From 1956 on, the RVN navy began to launch various operations to
reassert control over the Spratlys. They erected "sovereignty steles"
and conducted flag-raising ceremonies on numerous islands.51
In August or September of 1973, (for the first time) the RVN sent
'troops to the Spratlys. Initially, less than 100 men were garrisoned
on Nam Yit island, but their strength was increased to several hundred
during the following months and especially after the battle in the
Paracels in January, 1975. The GVN garrisoned at'least five islands,
r .
reefs, or cat's, with headquarters on Nam Yit. In May, 1975, Radio Hanoi
without going into detail reported the occupation of "various islands
of the Spratly archipelago" by Communist troops.52 The SRV armed
forces are now believed to occupy six islands: Nam Yit, Sand Cay, Spratly
'Island, Amboyna Cay, Pearson Reef, and Sin Cowe Island.
Philippine Claim to the Spratlys
The Republic of the. Philippines,. as mentioned, claims ownership
of only a few islands which were "discovered" by Tomas Cloma. On
May 15, 1956, Cloma'-s group raised the Philippine flag on one of the
unoccupied islands and formally staked a claim, calling the islands
"Kalayaan," or "Freedom Islands." The PRC, Taiwan, and the RVN reacted
angrily to the claim, and Taiwan sent troops to the Spratlys. On
Itu Aba Island, the Chinese removed markers placed by Cloma's group,
Since about 1957, the Philippines has based its claim to the
Spratlys on four arguments: that the islands were unoccupied and there-
fore available for economic exploitation and settlement by anyone; that
and in October 1956, there was an armed. clash, following which, the
Philippine claim to Spratly Island (Nan wei dao) was withdrawn.53
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the Spratlys had been turned over to the Allies by Japan under the terms
of the 1951 Peace Treaty signed in San Francisco, but a final disposition
had never been determined; that the Spratlys were used as a springboard
for the invasion of the Philippines in 1941, and that Taiwan's occupation
of Itu Aba constituted a threat to Philippine national security; and
that the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf gave the
Philippines certain rights to explore for oil in waters off Palawan
Island.54
On July 10, 1971, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos declared
the Spratlys derelict and disputed, and ordered. occupation of three
islands by Philippine marines. In early 1974, the Philippine government
sent a diplomatic note-to Saigon and Taipei protesting Vietnamese and
Nationalist Chinese displays of force over the issue of the Spratlys
and suggesting referral of the issue to either the U.N. or the World
War II allies. In that note, Manila claimed that: the islands occupied
by its troops had been acquired by right of occupation; the islands did
not form a part of the Spratly Island Group, as they were located about
"200 miles to the northeast" and were only 250 miles directly west of
Puerta Princesa, the capital of Palawan province; the sovereignty over
the islands which were abandoned and unoccupied, had been acquired by
occupation; and the islands were strategically important to national
security.55 At present, Philippine armed forces reportedly occupy
eight islands: Northeast Cay (Payola), Thitu Island (Pagasa), West
York Island (Likas), Loai to Island (Kuta), Lam Kiam;Cay (Panata),
Nanshan Island (Lawak), Flat Island (Patag), and Commodore Reef
(Rizal Reef).
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 The Malaysian Claim to the Spratlys
The 1978, a senior Malaysian official visited a number of places
in the southern Spratlys and claimed these for his government. In 1979,
Malaysia published maps in which the "continental shelf" claimed by
Kuala Lumpur included Amboyna Cay, Mariveles Reef, and Commodore Reef.56
However,-Malaysia has had no physical presence whatever in the area and
has not actively pressed its claim. When Manila protested the 1979 claims,
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Kuala Lumpur declared its willingness to resolve all, disputes by
.negotiation.57
Discussion
In,-reviewing the claims of China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan,
and Malaysia, several points become apparent.
None of the disputed islands lie on the "continental shelf"
of any claimant. The Philippines has asserted that the Reed
Bank area lies on its continental shelf; however, the bulk are
more than 250 miles from Palawan, and a deep trench runs between
Palawan Island and Reed Bank;58 therefore, the claim is generally
regarded as specious.
Both China and Vietnam could conceivably claim parts of the
Paracel Archipelago to be within their respective 200-mile
economic zones.. The Philippines and Malaysia could likewise
claim major portions of the-Spratly Archipelago. However,
neither China nor Vietnam could so claim any portion of the
Spratlys.
? In September 1958, China formally declared a 12 nautical mile
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territorial sea. At that time China also declared that "this
 t
provision applies to all territories of the People's Republic
of China, including . . the Nansha Islands (Spratlys) and
all other Islands belonging to China which are separated from
the mainland and its coastal islands by the high seas ."59 Not
one nation protested the announcement.
Both the PRC and Taiwan base their claims on historical posses-
sion by China from the time of the Yuan Dynasty.
In reviewing the specific claims of China and Vietnam'ta the Paracel
and Spratly archipelagoes, "China" would appear to have a stronger claim
to both groups through discovery, settlement and government-sponsored
commercial exploitation.
Vietnam's case is weakened by its late entry as a claimant; the
earliest documented claims originate in the early 19th century. Vietnam
also claims the islands on the basis of prior occupation by its former
colonial master, France, which did occupy both the Paracels and the
Spratlys, and conquest is still a valid method of transferring territory
under international law. However, the Japanese conquered the Spratlys
from France, and then, after World War II, yielded them without any
specification as to whom the islands were to be yielded; therefore,
the status of the islands is undetermined. Since the United Nations
has never acted on the question (a Soviet attempt to award them to
China was vetoed), the islands would in theory become "terra nullius,"
subject to occupation by any state.60 This is the basis of the
,f~'Philippine claim to the Spratlys,61 although Taiwan views them as
belonging to "China" and has reoccupied Itu Aba accordingly, Vietnam
would have the right, under either the RVN or SRV flags, to those islands
it has occupied since 1956.
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In picking up the historical threads after World War II, no
real territorial dispute occured between China and Vietnam throughout
the 1950s and 1960s, primarily because during that time, Vietnam was
engaged in a war, first with France and then with the United States,
t and depended on China for aid and support,. 62
China is quick to point out that Vietnam recognized Chinese
sovereignty over the two archipelagoes on numerous occasions during
this period. On September 14, 1958, in response to a Chinese declaration
stating that the territory of the People's Republic of China "includes
the Chinese mainland and its coastal islands . , , the Xisha (Paracel)
Islands... . , the Nansha (Spratly) Islands . . . ," Vietnamese Premier
Pham Van Dong sent a note to Zhou Enlai stating, "the Government of the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam recognizes and supports the declaration
of the People's Republic of China on China's territorial sea made on
September 4, 1958" and that "Vietnam respects this decision ,,,63
And on May 9, 1965, referring to the United States declaration
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.of the Gulf of Tonkin as part of the "combat zone," the DRV said,
#'1 ... "U.S. President Lyndon Johnson designated the whole of*Vietnam and
th_e adjacent waters which extend roughly 100 miles from the coast
Vietnam and part of the territorial waters of the People's Republic
of China in its Xisha (Paracel) Islands . . ,,,64
indifferent. However, once Saigon began attempts to,assert sovereignty
Over the'islands, Hanoi became reluctant to take the opposite stand
so as not to appearjto side with the historic enemy of the Vietnamese
peopl e,.65 , i
acquisece in'Chinese claims as long as Saigon remained more or less
 e
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In early 1959, Saigon landed troops on one of the Paraceis,
kidnapped dozens of Chinese and destroyed the Chinese flag. RVN
gunboats also harrassed Chinese fishing in the Paracels. In 1961,
Saigon announced the incorporation of the Paracels into Quang Nam
province, and in 1973 the incorporation of,the 11 main islands in the
Spratlys into Phuoc Thuy province. All of these incidents drew strong
Chinese protests, but neither Hanoi nor its client Provisional Revo,
lutionary Government (PRG) in South Vietnam expressed a word of support
for China.66
In 1974, when China expelled RVN troops from the Paracels and
Saigon occupied five of the Spratlys, no othernation's government
supported the claims of the RVN. The DRV and PRG both avoided the
choice between denying Vietnamese sovereignty on the one hand and
supporting Saigon against Beijing, on the other.67 Only after the
fall of the RVN in 1975, and Hanoi's occupation of the islands in the
Spratlys formerly held by the RVN, did Hanoi and the PRG begin to
assert that "the frequently complex disputes over territories between
neighboring countries demand careful and circumspect examination.
Countries involved should settle such disputes by negotiation . .
By the words "complex disputes," previous Vietnamese recognition of
Chinese claims was implicitly withdrawn, and in late 1975, a new
territorial map of the reunited Vietnam for the first time included
the Paracels, as well as the Spratlys, as part of Vietnam.69
In June 1977, Chinese Premier Le Xian Nian reminded Pham Van Dong
of Hanoi's past statements of support and admonished him on Vietnam's
,,68
change of mind after 1974. Dong reportedly described Hanoi's previous
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position as a "matter of necessity" as part of the "resistance to
U.S. imperialism."70
Hanoi and Beijing would now appear to be in an unbreakable impasse
'over these territorial claims. The conflicting claims to the Paracels
'and Spratlys are actually only one aspect of a broader conflict which
also involves conflicting claims over the Sino-Vietnamese land border
as well as the demarcation of the Gulf of Tonkin.
On March 5, 1979, immediately after the Sino-Vietnamese border
war, Vice-Premier of the PRC, Li Xian Nian, declared that China was
prepared to make concessions on the contested land areas if Vietnam was
"reasonable on other territorial issues," i.e., on the Gulf of Tonkin
and the ownership of the South China Sea islands.71 This statement
can be interpreted to mean that the issues involving territorial waters
and the islands in them are far more important to both parties than
the demarcation of a common border.
t..,.
yr 4. cj
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.1
NOTES
36
1. Chang Yung-mei, Battle of the Hsisha Archi ela o (Reportage in
Verse),'(Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1975), p. 4.
Institute of Asian ffairs, Hamburg, 1976) pp. 21-22.
4. BR, No. 7, p. 16.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Heinzig, pp, 22-23.
8. BR, No. 7, p. 17.
9. Chang, p. 4.
10. BR, No. 7, p. 17.
11. Heinzig, p. 27.-
2. , "China's Indisputable Sovereignty over the Xisha
and Nansha Islands," Beijing Review (hereafter called BR), No. 7,
(February 18, 1980), p. 15.
3. Heinzig; Dieter, Dis uted Islands in the South China Sea (Wiesbaden:
BR, No. 7, p. 17.
Heinzig, pp. 28.
Heinzig, p. 31.
Heinzig, p. 33
BR, No. 7, p. 19.
17. ?Ghosh, S.D., "Rivalry in the South China Sea," China Report, Vol. 13,
(March-April, 1977), p. 6.
18. White Paper on the Hoang'Sa Paracel)and Truon Sa
S rat is ands, Saigon:, Ministry of Foreign. ffa-irs, 1975),
p? .
19. Ibid., p. 16.-
20. 'Ibid., pp. 18-19.
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Ibid., p. 19.
Ibid., p. 20.
'27.
Heinzig, p. 24.
White Paper, pp. 23-24.
Ibid
Ibid
Ibid., p. 26.
} 28. Ibid., p. 31.
29. Ibid., p. 36.
30.' Ibid., p. 43.
31. Ibid., p. 47.
32. Ibid., p. 52.
33. Heinzig, pp. 23-24.
34. Shih Ti-tsu, "South China Sea Islands, Chinese Territory Since
Ancient Times," Peking Review, No. 50 (December. 12, 1975),
pp. 13-14.
35. Ibid
36. Chiu Hung-dah and Park Choon-ho, Oil and Asian Rivals, Hearings
before the.Subcommittee'on Asia'and Pacific Affairs of Committee
on Foreign Affairs, House of Re resentatives,'93rd Congress, 1st
.and 2nd Sessions, Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 19-74T, pp. 440-441.
'38.-'-'Ibid., p. 444.
" it 37. ? 'Ibid. , p. 443.
?39.'`Ibid
x;40' Ibid., pp. 445-446.
41. +Ibid, p. 446.
1:,;Ibi?.P. 448-449.
43. Thong Duc, "A Picnic of Sorts," Vietnam' Report, Vol. III, No, 4
',;(February 15, 1974), p.? 3.
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44. White Paper, p. 67.
45. Ibid, p. 64.
46. .,Heinzig, p. 78 and Ibid., 70.
zs:.47. Heinzig, p.: 78.
48.' White Paper, p. 76.
49. Ibid., p. 78.
'50. Ibid. , pp. 78-81.
451.-Ibid., pp. 81-82.
! 52. Heinzig, pp. 36-37.
53. Siddayao, Corazon M., The Offshore Petroleum'Resources of'Southeast
Asia, (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 88-89.
54. Ibid., p. 89.
55. Ibid
56. Jenkins, David, "Trouble over Oil and Waters," Far Eastern Economic
Review, Vol. 113, No, 33 (August 7, 1981), p. 30.
57. Ibid., p. 33.
58. Tasker, Rodney, "Stake-out in the Spratlys," Far'Eastern'Economic
Review, Vol. 99, No. 8 (February 24, 1978), P. 12.
59. Rajan,-H.P. "China on the Law of the Sea," China Report, Vol. 10,
No. 3 (May,-June 1974), p, 23.
60. Katchen, Martin H., "The SpartlyIslnds and the Law of the Sea:
'Dangerous Ground' for Asian Peace,"'Asian'Survey, Vol, 17,
No. 12 (December 1977), pp. 1179-80.
61. Ronquillo, Bernardino, "Manila's Quest for Securit ," Far Eastern
Economic Review, Vol. 83, No. 8 (February 25, 1974), p. 28.
62. Chang, Pao-Min, "The Sino-Viethamese Territorial Dispute," Asia
Pacific No. 8, (Spring 1980), p. 134.
...; 63. "The Truth about the Sino-Vietnamese Boundary
ues ion, a jing Review, Vol. 22, No. 21 (25 May 1979), pp. 24-25.
64. , "Hanoi Goes Back on Its Word," Beijing*Review,
Vol. 22, No. 3.4, (August 24, 1979), p. 24.
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65. Chang, p. 136.
66. Ibid
67. "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation," China
Quarterly, No. 58, (April-June 1974), p. 431.
68.', Chang, pp. 137-138.
1p69. Chang, p. 140.
,, t !' 1
x30. Chang, pp. 144-145.
71.. Chang. p. 153.
1'?
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40
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Part III: The Importance of the Islands: Strategic or Economic?
In assessing the importance of the Paracel and Spratly archipelagoes
to China and Vietnam, all observers immediately identify two important
factors: their strategic geographical position in the South China Sea,
and the potential presence of large deposits of oil. I would suggest
that while China sees the islands in terms of both these considerations,
Vietnam's primary interest is in the latter.
Strategic Consideration
A quick glance at a map of Southeast Asia confirms that the Paracel
and Spratly archipelagoes sit astride the main sea lanes through the
South China Sea.I These lanes are used by international shipping
moving from the oil fields-of the Middle East, through the Indian Ocean
and the Malacca Strait enroute to East Asia. This is Japan's oil life-
line, and it is estimated that every 10 minutes, a tanker bearing crude
oil from the Persian Gulf transits the Malacca Strait enroute to
Japanese refindries.2 The Japanese recognized the strategic importance
of these islands when during World War II they used the Paracels as an
advanced submarine base.3 Even today, anchorages, supply depots,
defensive monitoring and intelligence-gathering stations could be
established in either or both archipelagoes, to provide a critical
strategic advantage.4 China has already so fortified the Paracels.5
These same sea lanes are also the main line of movement for Soviet
submarines and surface ships of the Soviet Far East fleet between?the
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Indian Ocean and Far East Fleet Headquarters at Vladivostok. Soviet
naval units also use these waters enroute to and from the newly-
acquired naval and air bases at Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam.
Under.existing international law, the coastal state which occupies
the islands in an archipelago could conceivably apply the archipelagic
principle and claim, in addition to the immediately adjacent waters,
;a 200-mile economic. resources zone around the entire archipelago,
determined from the outermost point of each island. Any state in control
of the Paracels and Spratlys could place a substantial part of the South
China Sea under its jurisdiction. The coastal state would have sovereign
,rights within the zone for the purposes of exploiting, conserving,
and managing the resources of the seabed, subsoil, and the seas above,6
All the claimants in this case, i.e., China, Vietnam, Taiwan, the
Philippines, and Malaysia, realize that when technologically poor
nations cannot exploit ocean resources, the only benefit is to stake
a claim7 and manage the exploitation.
It is expected that within this economic zone, a large proportion
.of the traditional high seas will remain; freedom of navigation and
overflight will be preserved.8 However. there are niceties which could
be applied to impede or even prohibit certain naval traffic, For
f;? example, should the PRC control the Spratlys, it could cite environ-
i mental safeguards to prohibit Soviet nuclear-powered vessels from
C transiting the waters. It could also invoke that portion of the doctrine
,~..of innocent paStage which gives a coastal or archipelagic state the
tight to "suspend temporarily the innocent passage of foreign ships if
such suspension is essential for the protection of its security."'
41
L i_``. , ;~ it f .L, G ..
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"Acts prejudicial to security" would include: 1) threat or use of
force, 2) exercises with weapons, 3) launching or taking aboard air-
craft, and 4) research or survey activities of any kind.9
In the summer of 1979, shortly after signing agreements with four
U.S. oil companies for joint prospecting for offshore oil in the Gulf
of Tonkin., China reiterated its claim to the Paracels and then
announced four "danger areas'.! adjacent to Hainan Island and the Paracels,
closing them to both naval and air activity, the latter to include all
altitudes between 1,000 and 20,000 meters. While the Chinese gave no
reason for this action, there was speculation that it was a bid to
achieve international acceptance of territorial claims.10
Thus, possession-of the two archipelagoes would give China the
potential to control movement in the South China Sea, and enable China
to break the Soviet Union's military encirclement of China. China
might conceivably even be able to force the Soviet fleet to go around
Indonesia and the Philippines in order to reach Vladivostok.11,Po.ss'ess.i.on
of the Spratlys by the SRV, on the other hand, would indirectly provide
those same economic and strategic benefits to the Soviet Union to be
used against Japan, China, Korea, or the United States.
China and Offshore Oil
Although the average depth of the South China Sea is about 1,600
meters, the northern portion (the China.Basin) averages about 4,300
meters and the Palawan Trough averages from nearly 3,000 meters to a
iiidi1mUiri depth of over 5,000 meters off Palawan Island 12
IL
Both the Paracel End Spratly Islands are situated in the deep basin
area,13 with average depths of almost 1,000 meters around the Paracels
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on drilling technology, even that inherited from the Russian presence
1i in the 1950s, is especially rudimentary. This is attested by the con-
b
J e s capa ilIty to exploit.
In addition to greath depths, environmental factors (i.e., wave frequency
.and height, bottom conditions,-surface currents, and wind/typhoon
exposure) greatly complicate drilling operations. The PRC's offshore
and about 3,000 meters around the Spratlys.14 Generally speaking,
those portions of the South China Sea which lie beyond China's continental
' " -I5a
shelf are for the present he~ond th PRC'
tinuing imports of.oil-drilling, extraction, and transportation equipment
from Japan, Romania, the USSR, and the United States.16
However, since the late 1950s, the PRC has shown increasing interest
in the South ChinaiSea and its potential bonanza of offshore oil.
Beginning in 1968, scientists from the Institute of Oceanography on the
South China Sea began investigations around the islands claimed by the
PRC. According to the Chinese press, "these investigations included
marine gravity, magnetism, hydrography, meterology, biology, chemistry,
and geology with the aim of helping exploit the resources in the South
} China Sea and develop marine science." 17
.-
However, although the work was ultimately postponed, it was the
DRV which took the initiative in exploring the area when it informed
the PRC in late 1973 of its intention to prospect for oil in the Gulf
of Tonkin.
In 1977, the PRC announced that a "scientific investigation ship"
.. had t veyed areas between the Paracels and Spratlys,during a 58-day,
4;926 nautical mile voyage for the Institute of Oceanography on the
South China Sea under the Chinese Academy of Sciences. The same news
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release announced that five other voyages had been made to the Paracels
and Spratlys "within the last ten years."20
In November 1978, at least three oil rigs were in place west""
of Hainan Island and light crude oil was found there.21
During the early 1970s, China's oil exploration activity in the
"South China Sea was constrained not only by the technical difficulties
,and cost involved, but,also by political uncertainties. China's oil
planners are now'aware that many of the promising areas in the South
China Sea are now, including areas near the Paracel and Spratly archi
pelagoes, within the reach of drilling technology, or will be by the
late 1980s.22 However, many of these areas appear likely to remain
b A
2
eyon estern production techniques until perhaps the 1990s.
3 There-
fore, an interim goal is to acquire Western technology, gain experience
in all phases of managing joint-ventures in oil exploration and production,
and most importantly, secure recognition of China's territorial claims
by the time technological advances make possible.the full exploitation
of China's oil resources.
Beijing's stated plan is to double oil production.by the year 2000.
,This will be done almost entirely by massive exploitation of China's
offshore oil reserves, estimated in 1981 to be nearly 74 billion barrels,
,'which could make China the world's fourth largest producer of oil.24
By 1986, exploration costs in the South China Sea alone are expected
to reach US $250-300 million per year. Plans call for the drilling
,, of 110 Wildcat exploratory wells and 100 evaluation and confirmation
wd1ls in areas of the Pearl River Estuary, the Yinggehai Basin, and
the Gulf of Tonkin.25
44
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Given all these expectations it is unlikely that China will
relinquish claims to territories which possibly contain-oil deposits,
and highly probable that the PRC will take any action necessary,
including the military option, to protect those claims.
Vietnam af1d'Offshore Oil
During the French colonial period in Vietnam, an active interest
was sustained in searching for oil throughout Indochina,.especially
' after the Dutch discoveries in Indonesia. However, nothing came of .
these attempts, which ceased in 1945 with the collapse of French
authority. 26
In 1967, using U.S. Navy oceanographic ships, the United Nations
;?Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) mapped the
region extending from the Sea of Japan south along the coast of China
and around the Indochinese peninsula into the Gulf of Siam. While
the initial findings were discouraging, the geologists did find a
desirable drilling area on the continental shelf, southeast of South
.Vietnam containing a projected 140,000 cubic statute miles of oil
sediments'. A larger area is said to extend from southwest of the
F$ tISpratly Islands, looping around toward the Sarawak coast, south of
t',the Spratlys',27
`Magnetic field survey data fromProject MAGNET of the U.S, Naval
Oceanographic Office, was analyzed by the German Geological Survey for
a geophysical interpretation, and two large sediment-filled basins
were Identified; namely, the Can Tho and Ca Mau basihs of the Mekong
Delia'. 28
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According to Dr. K. O. Emery, a marine biologist of the Woods
.Hole Oceanographic Institute and an advisor to ECAFE, the Asian coastal
area is equal in potential to the Middle East or to the oil fields of
Venzuela and the Gulf of Mexico combined,29 more significantly, the
basin off South Vietnam is particularly desirable because local oil
sediments there are'low in sulphur.30
During 1969 and 1970, with the permission of the RVN government,
a detailed survey of the Vietnamese southeastern continental shelf was
carried out by a consortium of private oil companies. The results were
sufficiently-encouraging by mid-1973 for the RVN to solicit bids.
Thirty-eight companies from six nations responded and four U.S. oil
companies and a Candian group were granted exploration rights on
Vietnam's continental shelf.31 The security situation in the Mekong
Delta precluded any exploration/exploitation activity.
The first well was begun in August 1974, and by March 1975, the
exploration program had made significant progress and was continuing
to gain momentum. However, in April, because of the deterioration of
the military situation, all the oil rigs were towed away and the
personnel were withdrawn.32 The extent of the deposits remains unknown.
The former RVN had placed great hopes on the discovery of offshore
oil as being one of the solutions to the country's economic woes. The
oil could have provided a source of badly needed hard currency-if only
to offset a portion of the nation's costly oil imports. Vietnam had
few other mineral resources and agricultural development was either
retarded or destroyed by the war. Additionally, after the American
withdrawal in 197333 the RVN faced an ever-dwindling flow of U.S.
economic and military support.
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The early stages of the oil exploration program did indeed
contribute significantly to the RVN economy in the form of taxes
and fees levied against concessionaire companies.34 Unfortunately,
the dream of oil riches might also have touched off a spark of nationalism
which re-ignited regional territorial disputes between Vietnam and
Cambodia, and Vietnam and.Indonesia, and might also have been the reason
behind the RVN move on, the Paracels in January 1974. Finally, oil
may have been an added element in convincing the North Vietnamese to
seek a final victory on the battlefield, fearing that oil discoveries
might become?a critical factor in determining the course of the Vietnam
War, i.e.., a fresh source of economic support for the Thieu regime.35
In 1973, the DRV*was also taking steps toward exploration for
=oil. According to Japanese sources, prospects for oil in North
Vietnam are also bright. Two Japanese oil companies competed with
French and Italian companies for bids on offshore exploration in the
Gulf of Tonkin;36 however, so as not to annoy China, Hanoi reportedly
later abandoned the idea,.
Immediately after the conquest of South.Vietnam, Hanoi invalidated
oil contracts signed with the RVN government, an action which cost
U.S. oil companies, whom Hanoi had accused of "plundering" Vietnam's
resources, some $50 million invested in exploration and a comparable
figure in'distribution facilities.38 However, in August 1975, Hanoi
created a cabinet-level national oil and gas agency and officially
.:,.announced-its willingness to renegotiate the terms for offshore oil
exploration with any foreign oil company ready to participate in the
country's search for oil, Negotiations were initiated with Norwegian,
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Japanese, and Algerian companies for various forms of help in exploration.-
The French began negotiations for a contract to construct a logistics
base at the seaport of Vung Tau, and Norway agreed to provide an off- ;
shore drilling rig and technical training in its use. The PRG even
approached American companies and invited them to return; however, the
t
United States trade embargo against Vietnam brought that effort to a
standstill.39
In 1976, Hanoi hired a French company to conduct seismic surveys
in the offshore areas near south Vietnam which had previously been
explored by the RVN.40 Since that time, seismic and exploration
contracts have been awarded to Canadian, Italian, and West German concerns.
Vietnam's entrance into COMECON, coupled with the U.S. trade embargo,
have paved the way for an agreement with five COMECON partners, the
Soviet Union,'Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, to aid
Vietnam in surveys for oil in projects running from 1981 to 1990.41
Judging from the speed with which the SRV has entered into the
"oil game,".it would appear that, like the RVN, the SRV is also antici-
pating the discovery of offshore oil in order to rescue its economy,
r
which eight years after the war, remains in disarray due in part to
Vietnam's Cambodian war, the costs of rebuilding both North and South,
and general mismanagement of the entire economy. According to United
States State Department estimates, by, the end of the fiscal year
.ending in June 1980, the Soviet Union had poured $1 billion of
economic and military aid into Vietnam, and that aid/continues at a
rate of Over $3 million per day.42
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In July 1981, Vietnam and the Soviet Union signed an agreement to
establish a joint enterprise to survey and explore for oil and gas on
the continental shelf of South Vietnam. According to Do Muoi, Vice-
Chairman of the Council of Ministers, "thousands of Soviet cadres and
,.among observers as to how'much Moscow would be able to achieve in off-
shore exploration, given its own technical weaknesses in this field,
Hanoi appeared optimistic that with Soviet aid,. it could begin to
exploit offshore oil reserves by 1983 .4
Given the PRC's renewed drive for oil exploration in the Gulf of
Tonkin, (the delineation of which is still contested by the SRV),
China's on-shore discoveries in the Paracels (which Vietnam also
claims), and Vietnam'.sintention to explore for oil in offshore areas
close to the Spratlys (claimed by China but several islands of which
are SRV-occupied), it would appear that the quest for oil could
= experts are now cooperating with us in oil-exploration and exploitation
along the continental shelves in an effort to help our country quickly
obtain oil and natural gas."43 Although there was considerable skepticism
f
eventually lead to renewed armed conflict between China and Vietnam.
a: E
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NOTES
Chiu, Hung-dah, "South China Sea Islands: Implication for Delimiting
the Seabed and Future Shipping Routes," China Quarterly, No. 72
.Black, Edwin F., "Dangers Facing Thailand," Hono1ulu'Star-Bulletin,
(N
e
b
1
ov
m
er 3,
981), p. A-14.
Ghosh, S. K., "Rivairy'in the South China Sea
" China Report
Vol
13
,
,
.
,
No. 2-(March-April 1977), p. 6. -
Feeney, William R., "Dispute Settlement, the Emerging Law of the
Sea, and East Asian Maritime Boundary Conflicts,"'Asian'Profile,
Vol. .8,-No. 6 (December 1980), p. 585.
5. Qang, Zhong-pu, "Visit to the Xisha Islands," China Reconstructs,
Vol. 29, No. 9 (September 1980), pp. 22-28.
Lee, Yong Leng, "Offshore Boundary Disputes in Southeast Asia,"
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1 (March 1979),
p. 178.
";- -Dangerous Group for Asian Peace " 'Asian' 'Sure, Vol 17 N 12
Copper, John F. "China's Claim to South China Sea Islands," China
'Report, Vol. 10, No. 3 (May-June 1974), p. 11.
Lee, p. 178.
; ;9. Katchen, Martin H., "The Spratly Islands and the law' of 1-he Sea
(December 1977), p. 1174-5. .
'?+ 10. Chanda, Nayan, "Same Show, New Theatre," Far Eastern Economic'Review,.
4,1 '-,Vol. .105, No. 38 (September 21, 1979), pp. 13-14.
r 11. Copper, p. 13.
``'' j 12. ''Chiu, p. 758.
,13. Feeney, p. 584.
14. Chiu, p. 756.
15. Hardy, Randall W,, China's Oil Future: A'Case of Modest ' Expectations,
(Bou der, Co.: Westview Press), 1978, p. 21.
16. Smi1, Vaclov, China's Energy, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976),
p. 180,
' 50
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"South China Sea Investigated," Beijing Review,
Vol. 21, No. 5 (February 3, 1978), p. 30.
18. Harrison, Selig S., China, Oil, and Asia: Conflict Ahead? (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1977 , p. 283, n. 59.
19. Feeney, p. 586. .
20. , "South China Sea Investigated,"' Peking' Review,
Vol. 21, No. 5 (February 3, 1978), p. 30.
21. Parker, Guy J., "The Security Implications of Regional Energy and
Natural Resource Exploitation" in Asian Security in'the 1980s,
Richard H. Solomon, ed., (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1979),
p. 243. -
22. Harrison, p. 54.
23. Harrison, pp. 193-194.
24. "China Sea Holds Vast Oil Reserves," Honolulu Star-
Bulletin, April 5, 1982), p. A-11.
25. Rivers, Clarence, "China's 10-Billion-Tonne Offshore Oil Bonanza,"
Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 114, No. 41 (October 2, 1981),
pp. 57-58.
26. Brown, David G., "Vietnam's Petroleum Resources," Asian Survey,
Vol. 16, No. 6 (June 1976), pp. 553-554.
27. "A Special Correspondent," "Of Oil and Island,"'Vietnarh Report,
Vol. 3, (February 15, 1974), p. 13.
-.28. Brown, p. 558.
29. Adie, Ian W.A.C., "China's Oil Boomerang," Asia Quarterly, 1976,
No. 2, p. 105.
30. 'Special Correspondent, p. 13.
31. Brown, p. 559.
32. Brown, p. 560.
33. Brown, p.. 562,
34. 'Ibid.
35. Harrison, Selig S., China Oil and Asia: Conflict Ahead? (New York:
Columbia University Press, 197 j, p, 190,
51
,r' c a b,i i
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4 .1
36. Cao, A.D., "Vietnam: Investment and Trade Opportunities," Asia
uarterl , 1977, No. 2, pp. 123.
37. Chanda, Nayan "Sam Show, New Theatre," Far Eastern Economic Review,
Vol. 105, No. 38 (September 21, 1979), p. 13.
38. Brown, pp. 567-568.
39. Woodard, Kim, The International Ener Relations of China, (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 1980), p. 164.
40. Ng Shui Meng, t'Vietnam:.-A Year of Peace," Southeast Asian Affairs,
(1976), p. 4831.1..
41. Lacriat, George and Liu, Melinda, "Pouring Trouble on Oily Waters,"
Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 105, No. 39 (September 20, 1979),
p. 20.
42. Black, Edwin'F., "Dangers Facing Thailand," Honolulu Star-Bulletin,
.(November 3, 1981), p. A-14.
43. Long, Ton, "An Embrace for the Bear," Far Eastern Economic Review,
Vol. 113, No. 35,-(August 21, 1981), p. 48.
44. Gray, Denis D., "Vietnam's Economy Improves," Honolulu Star-Bulletin,
(March 16, 1982), p. A-15. -
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Part IV: The Military Capabilities of the Claimants
During the 1974 clash in the Paracels, for several reasons, the
PRC had a decided advantage over the RVN forces. First, the Chinese
"reaction" was a carefully-planned and coordinated, well-executed
combined arms operation, involving aircraft, ships, and infantry. The
Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) had employed such tactics against
Hainan and Quemoy in 1949-50, Yikiangshan and the Tachens in 1954-55,
and Quemoy again in 1958. The RVN forces had n.o such experience.
Reportedly, the PLA used its Canton Military Region Headquarters as the
command post for the operation, and therefore had a trained battle-
operations staff and well-established command and control communications
throughout the course of the battle.
The PLA also had the advantages of nearby airbases on Hainan
island and radar on nearby Yung-Xing (Woody) Island,3 while almost all
the RVN's F-5 fighters were based at Tan Son Nhut airfield, near Saigon.
Further, no Vietnam Air Force (VNAF) fighter pilot had ever seen aerial
combat and had little or'no experience working with the controllers at
the Tactical Air Control Center North Sector (TACC/NS) outside of
Danang, who would have had directed the fighters. None of the controllers
had ever performed an actual ground-controlled-intercept (GCI).
On the sea, the Chinese had a similar advantage. The RVN coast-
guard cutters, destroyer escorts, and patrol boats were clearly no match
for the Chinese task force which included at least four destroyers and
a number of short-range missile-firing, fast attack craft (FAC's).4
Militarily and psychologically, RVN military commanders were more
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concerned with holding off the Vietnamese Communist threat than they
were a Chinese attack from which the Vietnamese had emerged with only
light losses and only the loss of island territory, the defense of which
was not militarily feasible.
And finally, the northern half of Vietnam was then the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam, China's ally, and was hardly in a position to
speak out against an attack on its enemy, the Thie-u regime, let alone
come to their defense. One year later, the situation had -changed
drastically. The RVN had been toppled by the DRV in a lightning-swift
final offensive, and the Vietnamese people were. now, theoretically,
unified and by 1979 would revive their traditional anti-Chinese brand
of nationalism to challenge Chinese claims to the Paracels and Spratly
groups.
Naval Strengths
After 1974, the PRC increased its military presence in the South
China Sea. In July 1976 and August 1977, it held joint air-sea-amphibious
maneuvers along the southeast coast,5 and embarked on a program to
strengthen the `navy overall. The South Sea Fleet, with some 600 vessels
deployed from Dong Shan to the Vietnam frontier, received its due share.
In May and June, 1980, an 18-ship task force made a 35-day, 8,000 nautical
mile foray into the South Pacific, accompanied by new ocean-going supply
ships, and one year later, a destroyer-led flotilla from the South Sea
Fleet made an operational cruise into the South China Sea.6 On the
surface, it would appear that China at last has a "blue water" navy,
i.e., one capable,of a greater role than that of coastal defense.
If China intends, as it obviously does, to continue to press claims
to the islands in the South China Sea, especially the Spratlys, and to
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assert complete control over a 200-mile economic zone for its continental
as well as island territories, then a long-term development program
oriented toward a "blue water" navy is exactly what China requires.7
But how effectively can China utilize this naval force to enforce its
territorial claims? Fig. 9 8 shows a comparison of the PRC and SRV
navies in the types of naval craft required for such operations. As
with most aspects of the Chinese military machine, numbers alone are
not entirely indicative:
Although one single unlocated nuclear attack submarine would be
of great concern to any surface fleet, China would probably
be loath to.risk detection of either of the two HAN-class nuclear
submarines by_the Soviet TU-95F anti-submarine patrol aircraft
operating out of Da Nang and Cam..Ranh Bay,9 and Chinese diesel
patrol submarines have only a 7,500 mile maximum cruising range
and can remain at sea only 35-45 days.10
The missile-equipped destroyers are armed with an obsolete
missile, and have no effective surface-to-air-missile (SAM)
system, a primitive anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability,
and no`over-the-horizon (0TH) radar.11
While the fast attack craft (FAC) were very effective in the
1974 Paracels action, these are strictly short-range boats.
This is probably one reason, along with inadequate air cover,
why the Chinese in 1974 did not mount a similar operation
against RVN garrisons in the Spratlys.12
The Chinese mine warfare capability has not yet been tested but
could prove to be of great value in either an offensive or
defensive role, simply because the Vietnamese have virtually
no capability for laying or sweeping naval mines.
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C
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giy !: Comparison of PRC and SRV Navies
T e Shi
Nuclear attack submarine'
Ballistic missile submarine
Diesel attack submarine
Missile-equipped destroyers
Frigates
Corvette/patrol escort
r
Fast attack craft (missile)
Fast attack craft (torpedo)
Fast attack craft (gun)
Fast attack craft (patrol)
Large patrol craft
Mine warfare craft
Ocean minesweepers
Landing ship, tank (LST)
Landing ship, mechanized (LSM)
Landing craft (various types)
C
SRV
0
0
0
0
6
2
2 HAN-class
1 GOLF-class
92 ROMEO/WHISKEY/MIND
12 (w/CSS-N-2 SSM)
16 (8 w/CSS-N-2)
9
188
255
376
24
21
80
23
15
16
475
(w/CSS-N-2)
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Although the Chinese have a large number of landing craft, the
vast majority could not operate on the open sea. China is build-
ing a new Alligator-class amphibious landing ship, but at present
the Chinese Navy would be hard-pressed to move more than one infan-
try division with light tanks (12,700 men, 3T-62/63 light tanks, 32
T-59 medium tanks),:arid this'could only be done over an unopposed
,beach or pier.13 The absence of a large-scale amphibious capability
indicates that there is little chance in the near .future for PRC
military planners to attempt to mount a major invasion.14
.Finally, although some destroyers are equipped with SAMs for air
defense, Chinese ships are generally vulnerable to air attack, relying
primarily on anti-aircraft cannon and machine guns.15
Air Forces
Fig. 1016 shows the principal types of bombers, fighters, transports,
and helicopters in the PLAAF inventory, while Fig. 11 shows operational
envelopes from Hainan island, using the combat radii for the major aircraft
types. As can be easily seen, the PLAAF would have no problem putting
bombers, fighter-bombers, or interceptors over the Paracels; however,
only one fighter, the MIG-19 is capable of operating over the Spratlys.
PLAAF aircraft have never operated at such a great distance from the
.mainland, and even if these could be kept under positive control (i.e.,
given optimum weather and communications), the MIG-19 would be at the
extreme end of its combat radius with little or'no fuel to engage enemy
.aircraft.
Similarly, the TU-4, TU-16, and IL-28 could all be used over-the
.Paracels, but only the TU-4 and TU-16 could actually deliver bombs on
targets in the Spratlys. The TU-4 is a copy of the World War II U.S.
? r
r'4 11 -ti`, , ,, I . . 57
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Fig. 10: PRC Air Force (PLAAF)
Aircraft
Role
Radius
(NM)
Payloads (lbs)
TU-16/BADGER
Intermed-range bomber
1,650
6,600
TU-4/BULL
Intermed-range bomber
1,550
10,000
IL-28/BEAGLE
Medium-range bomber
550
2,200
TU-2/BAT
Medium-range bomber
570
3,300
{
MIG-15/FAGOT-:
Fighter-bomber
150
Cannon, 2-550# bombs
MIG-17/FRESCO
.Interceptor
280
-Cannon, 2-550# bombs
MIG-19/FARMER
Interceptor
530
Cannon,2-550/1 bombs, msl
MIG-21/FISHBED .
-Interceptor
360
Cannon,2-550I bombs, msl
F-9/FANTAN
Fighter-bomber
430
Unknown
LI-2/CAB
Short-range transport
550
27 troops
IL-12/COACH
Short-range transport
650
32 troops
IL-14/CRATE
Short-range transport
550
26 troops
AN-12/CUB
Medium-range transport
910
100 troops
AN-24/COKE
Short-range transport
650
38 troops
AN-26/CURL
Short-range transport
650
80 troops
MI-4/HOUND
Medium helicopter
130
14 troops
MI-6/HOOK
Heavy helicopter
165?
90 troops
MI-8/HIP
Medium helicopter
115
24 troops
SA-32/SUPER FRELON
Heavy assault helicopter
220
30 troops
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