IRAN: THE PERSIAN GULF ISLANDS DISPUTE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08C01297R000500120001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 1, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/02 : CIA-RDP08C01297R000500120001-5
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Iran: The Persian
Gulf Islands Dispute
A Research Paper
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oae National to secret
Foreign 25X1
Assessment
Center
Iran: The Persian
Gulf Islands Dispute
A Research Paper
Research for this report was completed
on 4 May 1980.
The authors of this paper are
the Iran Task Force, Office of Political Analysis,
and Office of Geographic and
Cartographic Research. It was coordinated with the
National Intelligence Officer for Near East and
South Asia.
Top Secret
PA 80-10219J
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Bandar-e
'Abbas
Bandar-e
Lengeh
Jezireh-ye
Tonb-e KOchek
unb 0
Jezireh-ye
Bozorg
(Greeter Tunb)
Persian Gulf
Umm al?Oaywayn
'Ajman
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Abu Dhabi
Ash Sharigah
(Sharjah)
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Tan Secret
Oman
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Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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4 4,
Abu Musa
and
the Tunbs
O 25 50 Kilometers
o 25 do Miles
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Overview
Iran: The Persian
Gulf Islands Dispute
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Iran's occupation of three small Persian Gulf islands?Greater and Lesser
Tunbs and Abu Musa?has emerged as a major source of friction between
Iran and its Arab neighbors, especially Iraq.
The islands occupy a strategic position at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz.
Iran first took over the islands when the Shah's troops occupied them on
30 November 1971. In late March this year, President Bani-Sadr told Arab
journalists that the new regime plans to hold onto the islands despite Arab
requests that they be turned over to the United Arab Emirates 25X1
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Iraq has been the most vocal advocate of the Arab cause. In early April
Baghdad publicly demanded that the islands be returned to Arab
sovereignty, and Baghdad radio has kept up a steady stream of attacks on
Tehran for holding onto the islands. Baghdad's ulterior motive is to rally
Arab support for its campaigmagainst Iran.
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Iran: The Persian
Gulf Islands Dispute
Historical Background
The three small Persian Gulf islands?Greater and
Lesser Tunbs and Abu Musa?are located at the
mouth of the Strait of Hormuz, the entrance to the
Persian Gulf. All claims to the islands are tenuous,
although history seems to give the Arabs the stronger
case:
? In the late 18th century and for most of the 19th
century the islands were under the control of the
Shaykh of Lengeh, a port on the northern side of the
Persian Gulf. Tehran bases its claim on the fact that
when Persia seized the port in 1887, it also claimed
the dependent islands.
? The British?as the protecting power in the Trucial
States?occupied the islands on the grounds that the
Shaykh of Lengeh was an Arab whose family lived in
Sharjah and Ras al-Khaymah, and the islands were
part of that holding. Iranian troops landed on the
islands on several occasions seeking to assert
Tehran's claim, but never established a permanent
presence.
? When in 1968 the British announced their intention
to withdraw from the Gulf, the seven shaykhdoms
that constituted the Trucial States formed the
United Arab Emirates (UAE) and pressed their
claims?Ras al-Khaymah to the Tunbs and Sharjah
to Abu Musa.
? The Shah negotiated an agreement with Sharjah on
29 November 1971 that stated that neither would
give up claim to Abu Musa. Iran would exercise
full jurisdiction over one portion of the island, which
the Shah's troops would occupy, while Sharjah would
exercise jurisdiction over the island's police
station. No agreement was reached with Ras
al-Khaymah.
The Iranian occupation of the islands on 30 November
1971 led to a short, sharp outbreak of anti-Iranian and
anti-British sentiment in the Arab world. Libya seized
British oil assets, and the UAE took the issue to the
UN without success.
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Existing Military Facilities on the Islands
The Iranian military facilities built during the Shah's
regime on Abu Musa, and to a lesser extent on Greater
Tunb, can support only limited military operations.
These meager facilities were intended to assist the
Shah in maintaining security in the immediate Gulf
area. The small number of Iranian ground and naval
forces stationed on Abu Musa and Greater Tunb
represent more a psychological threat than a defense
force against disruptions to Persian Gulf security and
Iranian shipping interests. Since the Shah's fall, a
contingent of Iranian military forces has continued to
occupy the two islands. 25X1
The small airfields on Abu Musa and Greater Tunb
are both suitable for handling light transport aircraft,25xi
such as Aero Commanders. The Greater Tunb airfielG
located on the southeastern portion of the island, has
runway 932 meters long and 36 meters wide and a
parking apron at the southwestern end of the landing
strip. There are no support facilities at the Tunb
airfield. 25X1
The Abu Musa airfield is larger and has a sand surface
runway 1,666 meters long and 32 meters wide. The
runway ends with a small earth parking apron on the
western end. Helicopter landing pads on Abu Musa are
located at the military facility, the local village a short
distance south of the facility, and at the western end of
the airfield.
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The naval docking facility on Abu Musa consists of a
small jetty on the northwest coast. It can handle small
freighters and patrol and landing craft. Just south of
this area, in the "civilian" portion occupied by the
islands, a small harbor is located where native craft
can be beached. 25X1
Like Abu Musa, Greater Tunb has a small natural 25X1
harbor at the village on the south coast. There are
several other spots for small craft to land. Of these, the
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best landing site is on the beach north of the
southeastern coastal protrusion on the island.
What appears to be a communications antenna is
located on Jabal Halwa, which, with a 116-meter
elevation, is the highest hill on Abu Musa. No use of
this structure has been confirmed.
Physical Features
Terrain. All three islands are small. With an area of
11.6 square kilometers, Abu Musa is the largest.
Greater Tunb, roughly circular in shape, is approxi-
mately 10.3 square km in area. Lesser Tunb, 11 km
west of Greater Tunb, is only 1 square km in area.
Water. The quality of the fresh water on the islands is
generally poor. Although well water is available on
Abu Musa and Greater Tunb, the Iranians transport
fresh water to their military facilities. Some water
shortages have been occurring, however, because of
irregular deliveries.
All three islands consist of low rocky hills interspersed
among flatter patches of land. The less barren areas
allow for some agriculture, including date palms and
small citrus groves.
Some of the hills on Abu Musa contain iron oxide
deposits. Throughout the 1950s a British mining
concession exported iron ore from Abu Musa, which
was then claimed to be one of three areas in the world
with deposits of pure iron oxide.
The islands' beaches are subject to heavy surf during
onshore winds. At times, gusty offshore winds trouble
the local fishermen. Small boat landings on the islands
are hampered by high cliffs and smoothfaced, under-
water rocks, although landings generally are possible
along some of the sandy beaches.
Roads. A road system on Abu Musa supports the
island's limited military role. A two-lane, hard-
surfaced road leads from the military complex on the
west coast to the village a short distance south. Two
similar roads connect the jetty and airfield to the
complex. Loose-surfaced roads lead to other parts of
the island.
A two-lane, loose-surfaced road on Greater Tunb runs
from the airfield in the southeast, past what appears to
be a military area west of the airfield, and on to the
village. Additional tracks extend throughout the
island.
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Population. Only Abu Musa and Greater Tunb are
inhabited. in 1972
there were about 800 natives on Abu Musa and about
200 on Greater Tunb. Lesser Tunb is believed to be
without resources and apparently has had little attrac-
tion for human habitation; its infestation by poisonous
snakes makes it doubly uninviting.
The civilian population on Abu Musa and Greater
Tunb is primarily Arab, although a few unskilled
Iranian laborers arrived after the Iranian occupation in
1971. The Arabs are descendants of the Qasimi tribe,
whose Shaykhs ruled along the Trucial Coast states of
Sharjah and Ras al-Khaymah, both now part of the
UAE.
Abu Musa and Greater Tunb are home for the
islanders most of the year. Many "vacation" in the
UAE, however, during the hot and arid summer
months of June through October. The chief source of
income is fishing, but smuggling via Abu Musa has
become profitable over the last few years.
The islanders' continued residence on Abu Musa has
sometimes been as much a matter of controversy
between Iran and the UAE, specifically the emirate of
Sharjah, as has the sovereignty issue. While the UAE
has attempted to increase the number of Abu Musans,
Iran has tried to pressure residents to leave. During
1977 the ruler of Sharjah, Shaykh Sultan, started a
campaign to encourage and finance Arabs who were
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willing to move to Abu Musa. The Shaykh hoped in
this way to maintain his influence over the island and
keep his hand in the offshore oil production near the
island, whose profits Iran and Sharjah share
Iranian efforts to discourage the Arab presence on Abu
Musa have included requiring fishermen to obtain
licenses from Iran. The traditional summer migration
of the residents was halted in 1977 by the Iranian
Government. The increasing Iranian military presence
on Abu Musa disturbed many island residents, who as
of 1978 had begun leaving to settle in the UAE.
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The oil conflict between Sharjah and Iran was resolved
in November 1971 under the Abu Musa accord. An
agreement between the two provided for the sharing of
revenue derived from any mineral discoveries, includ-25X1
ing oil, around the island. This agreement is still in 25X1
effect. 25X1
In late 1972, the first oilfield, Mubarak, was discov-
ered 12 km east of Abu Musa. Production from the
field began in early 1974. Mubarak is one of the
deepest oil-producing reservoirs in the Persian Gulf.
Depth and high well pressure problems have hampered
oil production. Approximately 16,000 barrels of oil per
day are currently extracted from the Mubarak field.
Sharjah pays 30 percent of its income from this field to
Umm al Qaywayn and apparently 6 percent to Ajman25X1
indirectly involved in the earlier oil dispute. 25X11
Khomeini and the Islands
Many Arabs hoped that the fall of the Shah would lead
to the return of the islands to Arab control. 25X1
Oil: Fuel for the Fire
The prospect of oil being discovered off Abu Musa
added fuel to the territorial dispute between Iran and
Sharjah. In 1970 offshore oil exploration was to have
begun near the island. The already tense political
situation was complicated still further by claims to the
area of drilling by two emirates?Sharjah and Umm al
Qaywayn.
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Iran's position on the islands rapidly became entangled
with its overall Persian Gulf relationships. Militant
Iranian leaders frightened most of the Gulf's Arab
rulers with promises of exporting the revolution to the
deprived and oppressed in the Arab monarchies on the
Peninsula. Some Iranians even revived Iran's claim to
Bahrain?a long-standing claim abandoned by the
Shah in 1971. 25X1
Tehran does not intend to return the islands to the
UAE. The Iranians see little reason to give up the
strategic advantages they offer and see no ideological
rationale for returning the islands to a monarchy. Iraqi
demands for the islands' return only increase Tehran's
suspicions that the Arabs want the islands to improve
their own military position 25X1
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Baghdad's Position
Iraq has never claimed the islands for itself, but it seeks
to advance the Arab claim.
Tehran has been alarmed by Iraq's comments on the
islands and probably believes that Baghdad has
considered using force to seize them.
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