SOVIET RULE IN EASTERN POLAND, 1939-1941

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08C01297R000500160034-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 5, 2012
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: January 23, 1943
• Content Type: REPORT

f I i, A ,
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/05: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500160034-5
Confidential
T Document 228
January 23, 1943.
SOVIET RULE IN EASTERN POLAND,
1939 - 1941
I. THE FOURTH PARTITION
OF POLAND
1. The Invasion of
Poland
On September 18, 1939 the Moscow press published a
communique of the Soviet General Staff announcing that dur-
ing the early morning of September 17 the Red Army had
crossed the frontier into Poland on a vast front running
from the Soviet-Polish-Latvian border as far as the Soviet-
Polish-Rumanian border. Although the invasion had been
preceded by extensive military mobilization, the Soviet
'.population was struck with amazement and dismay by the
offensive action thus undertaken. In his radio address
delivered. on the first day of the invasion Molotov failed
to clarify the relation of the operations of tie Red Army
to those of the German Army. I/ Limiting himself to a
brief outline of Soviet policy toward. Poland, he explained
that a situation had arisen in that country which demanded
of the Soviet authorities especial concern for the security
of the Soviet state, particularly since "Poland had become
a convenient field for any contingency and. surprises which
might create a menace to the Soviet Union"; and conse-
quently the Red Army had been instructed to cross the
Polish frontier and to take under its protection-the
lives and property of the population of. Western Ukraine
and Western White Russia". He continued to the effect
that the Soviet Government could not "remain indifferent
to the fate of the kindred Ukrainians and White Russians
living in Poland,. who even previously were nations without
any rights and who now have been entirely abandoned to
their fate".
2. Justification of
the Invasion from the .
Soviet Point of View
As for his note addressed to the Polish Ambassador
in Moscow, which had ventured the view 'tthat the Polish
State and its government have virtually ceased to exist",
Pravda, September 18, 1939.
Molotov
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/05: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500160034-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/05: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500160034-5
Mmtotov quoted it as d.eclaring.'that the Soviet Government
"intends to . take every. measure to deliver the Polish people
from the ill-fated war into which it has been plunged by
its unwise, leaders and to give them _. the...opportunity to
live a pAaceful life". The ;l.ib:erati'on -of th.e Ukrainian,
White Russian end. Polish pebo1'es in Poland was to be ef-
by the Red Army which, he boasted, "this time, too,
fected
will display its combativ-e migh',:-:cla.'ss 'consciousness,
and discipline" and will perform its great emancipatory
task with new feats of. heroism and glory.,'. 2/
3. German--Soviet
Relations
As the.: German Army .swebt: swiftly to ~ard- .the Soviet
frontier ,while the Red Army 'advanced sl.oi,,rly -but st"eadily?
toward the-.west nanic..spread to suc i n extent among the
Sovie.t masses that Molotov was:?:obligedin :hi.e radio address
-of September 17 to warn '.'that from 'these _ e.xc.e,ssive purchases
of food: and goods only those will suffer i4ho. go in for this
and hoard unnecessary supvlies.".: The general confusion
was not . les?ened by. a run on., the savings barks ?in the large
cities,. and .at. last the Kremlin-. was .obliged.'. to recognize
that the Soviet masses ?ha.d, n.ot yet fully oriented themselves
to the idea of - Soviet-German ?coaper'etion; Conseouently,
..on the day followwwing the' invasion .*the follo?.-i.ng joint
Soviet-German c'oinmunique?.was issued; 31
In ' order.' to avoid' any type of, un'founde'd:' :,
rumors with regard to the 'taGTs off'-?th_e Soviet:
and 'Germen trooos._.w+whicb :;aro' operating. in Poland,
the Government' of .the ?U:.:S.S. R. end. the Govern-
.men t..:of''.Germany declare that the onerations of.
the troops are- not in pur'suance' of. any aims con-
trary -to'',the 'inter.ests.. of 'Germany or of the
Soviet Union, nor contrary to the letter and
spirit of the, non-aggression pact concluded be-
tween Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics. On the contrary,'the task of.the
troops is to restore in Poland the order ':e.nd
calm which was disrupted. by the disintegration
of the.Polish state, and. to assist. the. popula-
tion of Po19nd . in. re.orgafti zing the . "conditions -
of ;it-ss existence.
Bolshevik, No. 17, September 1939._
Pravda, September 19,. 1939,.
The
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/05: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500160034-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/05: CIA-RDP08CO1297R000500160034-5
4. The First Demarcation
Line
By the time of the Red Army's Invasion, the Wehrmacht
had plunged deep into eastern Poland; it had encircled
Lwow, captured Lublin, and reached a line running in gen-
eral from Bialystok to Brest-Litovsk, Wlodzimierz and
Lwow, thus practically completing the destruction and
capture even of isolated remnants of the Polish Army. On
September 18 units of the Red Army and the German Army
met for the first time, but aside from a minor incident
at Lwow no untoward events took place. Such incidents,
however, were feared, and since both armies were accompanied
by vast arrays of members of the G. P. U. and Gestapo, by
party-workers and propagandists, it was thought best to
reach an agreement on the extent of the joint operations.
On September 20.a group of German Army officers left Berlin
for Moscow, w,,where, after a conference with their Soviet
counterparts, a joint'statement was issued., on September 22,
to the effect that a demarcation line between the two armies
had been drawn up. 4/ This preliminary line ran from the
East Prussian frontier at Kolno south along the Pisa River
to its mouth on the Na rew River; it then followed the Narew
to its junetu"re with the Bug River, thence along the Bug to
the Vistula, south along the Vistula through Warsaw to
Sandomierz, and then southeast along the San River past
Przemy Il to the Uzoner Pass in the Carpathian mountains on
the Hungarian frontier. This line cut through the city of
Warsaw, giving the suburb of Pragr to the Soviets. The
German Army, which had penetrated more than 150 miles be-
yong the line of demarcation, now begn.n to retire.
5. The Second Demarcation
Line
While the drawing of such P. line well in advance of
t1^e Red Army was undoubtedly designed to rrevent too close
contact between the two forces, 5/ it is not unreasonable
to speculate that Berlin was encouraging Moscow to move
the Red Army farther westwards than the Kremlin had in-
tended, with th.e aim of drawing the Soviet Union deeper
into the German orbit. In this sense a large part of Poland
proper was to serve Berlin as hostage for future Soviet co-
8peration. In the end., however, Stalin held the Red Army
east of a front not differing greatly from the Curzon line.
Upon
Pravda; September 23, 1939.
Despatch from Moscow No. 130, October 30,' 1939.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/05: CIA-RDP08CO1297R000500160034-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/05: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500160034-5
Upon von Ribbentrop's second visit to Moscow, on September 27
and 28, a definitive line was drawn, which gave to the
Soviet Union considerably less Polish territory than Hitler ?
apparently was prepared to cede. The new line ran due west
from the'tip of Lithuania to the frontier of. East Prussia,
giving Germany the city and district-of Suwalki, a wedge
between Soviet and, Lithuanian territory which was later to
serve so usefully as a springboard for the German-advance.
The line continued along the East Prussian frontier to
Ostrolenko; hence southeast to the Bug River, along the
Bug via Brest-Litovsk to the town of. Kristinopol, situated
somewhat north of. Lwdw, and thence almost due west to the
San River and. along the latter to its source on the border
of Hungary (Ruthenia).
The new line, according to the map published in Party
Structure for September 1939', established. "the frontier
between the respective state interests of the U.S.S.R. and
Germany on the territory of the former'Polish.state".
Furthermore, according to the Treaty of Friendship con-
cluded between the Soviet and German governments on
September 28, "the frontier between the respective state
interests" of the two powers was recognized a.s "final" and
designed "to eliminate any interference with this decision
by third powers".
II. SOVIET EXPANSION
IN THE BALTIC
Although the Kremlin stressed ethnic affinities as
one of the principal motives for the annexation of Eastern
Poland and showed reluctance to extend its control to re-
gions of Poland in which White Russians and Ukrainians did
not predominate, nevertheless it now hastened to gain con-
trol over the Baltic States, where no ethnic justification
could be advanced. It is understood that when von Ribbentroc
and Stalin met in Moscow on August 23, 1939, their conversa-
tion did not touch upon Lithuania; at least, it was tacitly
assumed, from the nature of the specific territorial com-
mitments agreed uoon in respect to Estonia,.: Latvia and
Bessarabia, that Lithuania did not fall clearly within the
sphere of Soviet interests. 7/ Rather than advance deeper
into Polish territory, Stalin apparently looked: upon
Lithuania as a, more valuable prize and hastened to conclude
A. treaty of mutual assistance with that country twelve days
.6/ Bolshevik, No. 18, September 1939..V-+
7/ Based on secret information obtained in 1939 from the
German Embassy in' Noscotww.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/05: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500160034-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/05: CIA-RDP08CO1297R000500160034-5
after the signature of the Soviet-German Treaty of Friend-
ship. B/ This step apparently produced. the first violation
of the spirit, if.not the letter, of the Soviet-German
understanding.
In return for the cession to Lithuania of the city and
district of Vilna, Stalin obtained the right to maintain
a considerable Red Army force on Lithuanian territory and
thus prepared the ground..for the Soviet occupation in.
June 1940.. At this time Molotov declared that Vilna,
"forcibly.separated by Poland from Lithuania.", would, be re-
turned-to the latter, "not because Lithuanians predominated
there", but because "it was connected on .the-one -hand. with
the historic bast of the Lithuanian State and, on.the other
hand., i~,ith the national aspirations of the Lithuanian peo-
ple". At the same time, in return for "mutual assist-
ance", Stalin obtained similar rights in respect to Estonia
and Latvia. _9/
III. THE SOVIET
CONCEPTION OF THE
GERMAN- SOVIET
.
AGREEMENT .
While Moscow exoressed its ,jubilation over the expan-
sion,of.Soviet territory, it by no means lost sight'of
the"wider benefits which might ensue from the Soviet-German
pact of non-aggression, as well as from the treaty of
friendship. The joint Soviet-German. declaration of friend-
shin, is.sued at the time of the signing of the treaty, af-
firmed.that "a solid foundation for enduring peace in
Eastern Europe" had .been created. Bolshevik LOJ expressed
great srtisfaction over the view that, "while in the west
commerce was more and more dying out, in the east of Europe
economic co6oeration was expanding and being strengthened ,
the best example of "a. brood program of economic cooperation
between the U.S.S.R. and Germany being 'tire considerable
expansion of trade between the U..S.'S.R. and. Estonia", from
Bolshevik, No.'19, 1939.
9/ Molotov's speech at the Session of the Supreme Soviet
of. the Soviet Union on October 31, 1939: Bolshevik, No. 20,
October 1939.
10/ Bolshevik, No. 193, September 1939.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/05: CIA-RDP08CO1297R000500160034-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/05: CIA-RDP08C01297R000500160034-5 ? ?
which the Kremlin had just secured military privileges.
At the session Of the Supreme Soviet of. the-Soviet
Union, on October 31, 1939, Molotov also revealed that the
Kremlin held a. broad conception of tie Soviet-German agree-
ment. 11" He 'ventured the view that we always were of
the opinion that a strong Germany is the necessary condition
for durable peace in?Euro're",.and proceeded violently to
attack the British and French imperialists as well as the
Versailles settlement. Touching upon the question of
Poland,, he e,xllained''that "it is. not necessary to prove
that at the moment of the complete downfall of the Polish
state our Government was obligated to extend a helping
hand to our brother Ukrainians and our brother-White Russians"
since "it did so", a.n explanation which.. drew ."tumultuous,
prolonged applause" and. 'brought the deputies to their feet
for an ovation. He added that "the Red Army entered these
regions with the complete sympathy of the Ukrainian' and
White Russian population, which met our troops as. its lib-
erators from the yoke of the 'oan.ie', the yoke of the Polish
landlords and capitalists".
About.a. month later, at "the triumphant session of
the Moscow Soviet", held on November 6, Molotov delivered
another speech relating inter alia to the fourth partition
of Poland. 12/ Blaming the war on the capitalist world
which, "according to Lenin", was rotten and dying and iehich
recently had been forced to "retreat" before the Red Army
and censuring severely the'British and French "imperialists"
for not calling. a. halt to their selfish war with the Nazis,,
Molotov boasted tha.t:
Soviet White Russia has almost doubled its terri-
tory and population -and has created a state with
a population of ten millions, which many European
States do'not possess. An end ha.d been put hence-
forth to the splitting up of the White Russi