ISSUES IN GULF OF VENEZUELA DISPUTE EXPLAINED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08C01297R000700050011-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 28, 2012
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: October 9, 1975
• Content Type: MISC

...%?1.5ecfgifitedCan7dApprovedForRelease2012/09/28:CIA-RDPO8C01297R000700050011-0
9 6c,),--7,5-7- ? NTYN,fu ( tjAtitr-0-04. v
tk --5N" 1..4
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS
ISSUES IN GULF OF VENEZUELA DISPUTE EXPLAINED
Bogota EL TIEMPO in Spanish 17 Aug 75 p 8-A
[Excerpts] Negotiations between Colombia and Venezuela to delimit the marine
and underwater areas of their common border have been going on for almost 10
years, but there are still many people in both countries who do not know what
the discussion is About. ,
The maps reproduced below can be explained as follows:
Map 1--A Swiss arbitration award made Castilletes the limit of the land fron-
tier between Colombia and Venezuela, and this was later ratified in the bound-
ary. treaty of 1941. Since then there have been no disputes concerning land
frontiers. Both the award and the treaty are considered valid by both coun-
tries. But those agreements made no mention at all of the extension of the
frontier beyond the coastline, among other reasons because the subject was
of no great importance at the time.
Awareness of the importance of the marine and underwater areas is so recent
that there are no treaties or even universal doctrines to fadilitate the
boundary delimitation. In the case of Colombia and Venezuela, the Venezuelan
politicians complained to President Raul Leoni's government in 1965 that
Colombia was granting underwater petroleum rights in zones. which they con-
sidered Venezuelan. That was the signal for the negotiations to begin.
Specialists in maritime law have maintained two extreme theses with respect
to marine and underwater frontiers. Some maintain that those frontiers
should be the extension in a straight line of the land frontier. This would
be Line A'in,Map 1, and it obviously favors Venezuela. Others feel that a
line perpendicular to the mast should be drawn at the spot where the land
frontier ends. That would be Line B.
The shaded area in Map 1 shows. graphically the area open to dispute if one
upholds one or the other of the two extreme theses. Between those two ex-
tremes there are several variants arrived at through _complicated topographi-
cal measurements. One of the most wiely. accepted variants results in a
line almost exactly' halfway between the two extremes.
1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/28: CIA-RDP08001297R000700050011-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/28: CIA-RDP08001297R000700050011-0
Key:
Basic Positions
Map 1
1. Line A 2. Line B
Map 2--This map shows the positions adopted by Venezuela and Colombia in the
negotiations which preceded the proposal by President Lopez MiChelsen on
20 July 1975.'.
Line 1-17-The "Castilletes parallel," south of which all the waters in the
Gulf of Venezuela are inland waters. Venezuela does not Agree to any nego-
tiatiOn concerning this area.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/28: CIA-RDP08001297R000700050011-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/28: CIA-RDP08001297R000700050011-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/28: CIA-RDP08001297R000700050011-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/28 : CIA-RDP08C01297R000700050011-0
Line 2-2-2-2--This represents the Venezuelan thesiS of the "extension of the
land frontier." Opposite the tip of La Guajira, it intersects with the "ter-
ritorial sea" of Los Monjes (4).
Line 3-3-3--This represents the Colombian "maximum" thesis, called the Boggs
line after the American geographer who-marked it out. Its basis is the "
"median line" and it makes no allowance for the Los Monjes Archipelago, on
the grounds that a few uninhabited keys do not create a territorial sea.
4. Los Monjes and the 12-mile territorial sea claimed by Venezuela. This .
territorial sea is superimposed on the territorial sea of La Guajira (shaded
area) in a small strip of water which would have to be negotiated.
5. The Colombian territorial sea generated by La Guajira.
6. The Venezuelan territorial sea off the Paraguana Peninsula, north of the
Castilletes parallel.
7. The Aruba territorial sea (12 miles), superimposed on a small strip, of-
Venezuelan territorial sea: That strip of sea is an object of dispute be-
tween Aruba and Venezuela.
Condominium Area
Map 3--This map, which was published by RESUMEN, attempts to interpret the
geographical area of the "condominium" proposed by President Lopez Michelsen
on 20 July. It takes as its basis the maximum and minimum alternatives set
by the Venezuelans.
1-1--The Castilletes parallel, south of which all the waters are Venezuelan
inland waters. '
2-2--The Point Espada-Point Macolla line, the "minimum" entrance line for
the Gulf of Venezuela.
3-3--The Point Gallinas-Cape San Raman line, the "maximum" entrance line for
the Gulf of Venezuela.
4. Territorial sea Of the Colombian coast (12 miles).
5. Territorial sea of the Venezuelan coast (12 miles).
6. Territorial sea of Los Monjes.
7. Territorial sea of Aruba (the black triangle would be the confluence of
this territorial sea with the entrance line of the gulf).
8-A--The area covered by the possible condominium if the minimum entrance
line for the Gulf of Venezuela is adopted.
4
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/28: CIA-RDP08C01297R000700050011-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/28: CIA-RDP08001297R000700050011-0
5
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/28: CIA-RDP08001297R000700050011-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/28 : CIA-RDPO8C01297R000700050011-0
8-A + 8-8--The area covered by the possible condominium if the maximum en-
trance line for the Gulf of Venezuela is adopted.
9. The territorial sea of area 8-A + 8-B (the territorial sea of area 8-A
would be approximately equal to area 8-8).
10. The area of coincidence between the territorial sea of the most exten-
sive condominium area and the territorial sea of Aruba.
Venezuelan Minimum Base
Map 4--The shaded area, south of the so-called Castilletes-Point Salina paral-
lel, is what the Venezuelans call the minimum base. They consider the waters
south of that line to be a Venezuelan "inland sea." Colombia has not ac-
cepted this thesis, because it "bites off" a piece of the median line (Map 2)
from the possible extension of the frontier.
Map 4
Key:
1. Point Salina
2. Venezuelan minimum base
6
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/28: CIA-RDP08C01297R000700050011-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/28: CIA-RDP08001297R000700050011-0
"Historical Bay"
Map 5--This map is from the magazine PESUMEN. The Venezuelans consider that
the only possible zone to which the condominium suggested by President Lopez
could be applied is the area situated between the Castilletes [sic; presumably
Point Espada intendedl-Point Macolla parallel and the Point Gallinas-Cape San
Roman parallel. This would be the "historical bay."
Key:
Map 5
1. Point Gallinas 4. Point Macolla
2. Cape San Raman 5. The "historical bay"
3. Point Espada
Is There Petroleum?
Map 6--Is there petroleum in the Gulf of Venezuela? Geologists do not know
where petroleum is. But they do know where it cannot be. The studies show
unmistakably that nowhere in the maximum area sought by Colombia is there
any possibility of geological formations capable of containing hydrocarbons.
In this map, the broken lines indicate the geological basins, while the
shaded areas show the zones where there is the greatest probability of lo-
cating petroleum. (Map.and text. from RESUMEN.)
7
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/28: CIA-RDP08001297R000700050011-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/28: CIA-RDP08001297R000700050011-0
Map 6
Basic Dictionary of the Dispute
High seas: any expanse of the sea open to free navigation. On the high seas,
for example, ships are subject only to warships of their Own nationality, ex-
cept when suspected of piracy, the slave traffic, culpable concealment of
their true flag, and so on.
Territorial sea:. the strip of'sea bordering on a country's coasts. Sover-
eignty is exercised as though on dry land. There are certain limitations,
such as the "innocent passage" of ships and so on. Its extent is variable
(3 miles, 12 miles, or mote). There is no universally accepted norm or
authority for imposing it.
Inland waters: These are seas, lakes, or waterways within the territory of
a state or closely associated with it:for geographical, economic, and even
"historical" reasons. A state's sovereignty over its inland waters is abso-
lute.
Territorial waters: the combination of territorial sea and inland waters.
Contiguous zone: This is the zone contiguous to the territorial sea. States
exercise jurisdiction in these zones for purposes of surveillance and policing,
but without sovereignty.
8
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/28: CIA-RDP08001297R000700050011-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/28: CIA-RDP08001297R000700050011-0
Ratrimonial sea: This is the zone adjacent. tO the territorial sea. It ex-
tends for 200 miles (theoretically) or to the point where the rights of a
bordering state are encountered. This is a vital thesis for fishing states
such as Peru, which maintain that the 200-mile zone constitutes a "territorial
sea," and it is also very important for mankind in.order to prevent contamina-
tion and to safeguard the sea's geological resources. It also tends to safe-
guard the rights of the bordering states with respect to the possible exploi-
tation of Mineral resources on the seabed.
Continental shelf: a geological fact, which does not always coincide with
the legal conception of the overlying sea. It is the extension of the sub-
merged land to an edge called the slope, which descends to greater depths
as far as the sea or ocean bottoms. According to the law of the sea, the
shelf begins not at the coast but at the limit of the territorial sea. Its
depth has been set at the isobath (line of depth) of 200 metera, although
actual exploitability tends to be the dominant criterion. The legal problem
is complex, since the criteria which seemed valid and equitable at one time
as far as mineral resources are concerned are not easily applied to fish,
mollusks, and so on. For example, there is one set of rules for fishing,
and there is another for petroleum.
Bay: (Article 7 of the Geneva Convention) "...A bay is any well-defined in-
dentation whose penetration into the land, in relation to the width of the
entrance, is such that it contains waters surrounded by the coast and con-
stitutes somewhat more than a simple irregularity in the coastline. However,
the indentation will not be considered a bay if its area is not equal to or
greater than that of a semicircle whose diameter is the entrance to the said
indentation."
Gulf: similar to S bay but larger in size, although there is no general rule
in the matter.
Historical bay: There are many definitions included in the doctrine of inter-
national law, in its practice, and in decisions and arbitration awards, but
they can all be reduced to three basic characteristics: A) the bordering
state must invoke its authority over the area in a sovereign manner; 2) the
bordering state must in fact exercise and have exercised its sovereignty
for a sufficiently long period of time; and 3) the exercise of that sover-
eignty during that time must have been peaceful and continuous, with the
acquiescence of the international community (L. J. Bouchez).
Condominium: joint sovereignty by two states over a particular area. There
are several examples, the most interesting being the case of the Gulf of
Fonseca between El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. In case Colombia and
Venezuela decide to declare a particular zone in the gulf a condominium, the
two countries would have to agree on limitations to navigation by third
parties and decide on the conditions for its surveillance and patrolling.
(Data taken from the magazine RESUMEN of Caracas.)
11798
CSO: 3010
()
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/28: CIA-RDP08001297R000700050011-0
-N--DecIla-s-s=ndApprovedForRelease2012/09/28:CIA-RDPO8C01297R000700050011-0
t CA-N.\ - -5
GOVERNMENT DEFINES FIVE-YEAR PLAN
BOLIVIA
La Paz PRESENCIA in Spanish 11 Sep 75 pp 1, 11
53347 The government has concluded the definition of the "directives for
intermediate-range economic and social management" which will serve as the
political framework for the preparation of the five-year plan and to which
the choice of development projects, the priority allocation of resources for
project implementation and the orientation of the industrial growth of the
country will be subordinated.
In a message sent to the minister and high executives of the public sector,
the President of the Republic, Gen Hugo Banzer, says that these directives ,
"constitute the economic and social doctrine of the government of the armed
forces" and that they were prepared on the basis of the governmental statute
of 9 November 1974 and the presidential messages of 31 December of that year
and 6 August of this year.
The governmental document notes that in order to achieve the long-range na-
tional objectives, it is essential to delineate a medium-range policy (five
years). As a previous and necessary condition, however, it supports the need
for finding 4 satisfactory solution to the landlocked status, which, itsays,
"las represented and represents the principal obstacle to national development."
This objective will receive maximum priority within intermediate-range govern-
mental action.
On the socioeconomic level, emphasis will be given to increasing the per ca-
pita gross national product without neglecting other objectives such as fair
distribution of income, regional balance, full employment and financial sta-
bility. However, all of these will be subordinated to growth of the GNP.
The orientation of the developkent strategy will be limited to the following
aspects:
1. ,An increase in internal savings as a proportion of the GNP through ration-
alization of consumption and the adoption of mechanisms that will encourage
saving by the population.
10
? Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/28: CIA-RDP08001297R000700050011-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/28 : CIA-RDP08C01297R000700050011-0
g. Selective complementation of internal savings with appropriate external
financing.
3. Channeling of internal savings and external resources toward increased
investment, giving priority to sectors, programs and, projects that permits
The exploitation, processing and marketing, both internal and external,
of products, goods and services in which the country has .a comparative advan-
tage and/Or is able to achieve it within a reasonable period of time. Within
this framework, priority projects will be those which have high economic pro-
fitability from the national point of view because of their favorable effect
on increased per capita GNP growth, which generate or conserve foreign ex-
change at reasonable costs and that reinvest a high proportion of their sur-
pluses in new programs and projects which in turn induce greater development.
Self-sufficiency in basic foodstuffs, even though the programs or pro-
jects might not fully meet the criteria of economic efficiency above, but tak-
ing care to see that this strategic objective is met at a reasonable cost for
the economy.
A total or partial contribution toward the objectives of income redis-
tribution, regional balance and emi)loyment, to the extent that there is no
conflict with the criterion of economic profitability and the consequent pri-
mary objective of rapid growth in the per capita gross national product.
4. Incorporation of the peasant population into national life through inte-
grated rural development programs and projects which, within the conceptual
framework described in the previous paragraph, will permit both the socioeco-
nomic consolidation of areas with heavy population concentrations and the
redistribution of population with a view to opening new regions that offer
better development opportunities. In addition to the favorable impact which
they will have on the national integration process, these programs and pro-
jects are priority in nature because they make it possible to harmonize the
objective of increasing the per capita GNP growth with the simultaneous ac-
complishment of improved income distribution and higher employment levels.
Other Priorities
The governmental document points out that "the existing limitations with res-
pect to the availability of foreign exchange to sustain a rapid development
process" and the search for rapid growth in the per capita gross national pro-
duct make it necessary to give priority to increasing exports and to selective
substitution of imports in production sectors.
In the field of hydrocarbons, emphasis will be given to exploration programs
and an effort will be made to increase petroleum and gas production, as well
as to find solutions to the problems of hydrocarbon transportation, storage
and refining.
11
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/28: CIA-RDP08C01297R000700050011-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/28: CIA-RDP08C01297R000700050011-0
The goals include increased export volumes and market diversification. On
the other hand, the need to intensify industrialization plans that use hydro-
carbons as raw materials is noted, giving special attention to the petrochem-
ical sector.
In the mining sector, the processing of ores into metals and the establish-
ment of derivate industries will be sought. Economically profitable mining'
investments will have priority.
One of the government objectives in the field of agriculture is to achieve
.total self-sufficiency in basic foodstuffs, as well as increased production.
that could be used in agroindus try or to generate nonindustrial surpluses.
With respect to industry, the government has posed the need to strengthen
this activity, so long as it is efficient. The document says, "Experience
shows that an inefficient import substitution industry such as the current
one represents an unjustified cost to the economy and to the people. It has
been proven that tariffs' and Other protectionist instruments only increase
the profits of the companies, without any benefit for anyone."
6202
CSOI 3010
12
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/28: CIA-RDPO8C01297R000700050011-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/28: CIA-RDP08001297R000700050011-0
BOLIVIA
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR FUNCTIONS OUTLINED IN FIVE-YEAR PLAN
La Paz PRESENCIA in Spanish 12 Sep 75 p 8
Lefeag The policy outlined by the government for the next five years estab-
lishes the functions that should be carried out by the public and private Sec-
tors, opening the field of the latter to the development of directly produc-
tive and service sectors.
The document, which will serve as a foundation for governmental action until
1980 through preparation of the 5-Tear Plan, stresses the determination to
demand maximum efficiency from private enterprise and to put an end to subsi-
dies and protectionism, especially in the industrial field.
The government days, "It is essential that the development plans make realis-
tic projections of the participation of the private sector in the accomplish-
ment of the goals outlined, and that they design the tools of economic policy
that will make their effective contribution to these objectives possible."
Elsewhere, it provides that private enterprise of whatever size "must be modern
and dynamic and must be aware of its obligations to the state, paying its taxes
and debts correctly and punctually." With respect to the workers, it says
that their fair participation in the fruits of the operation must be sought.
The document says that business judgment must take account of the higher in-!.
terests of the nation, investing in projects that not only are beneficial to
the company, but also contribute to. the overall development of the country.
Public Seotor
The intermediate-range policy directives indicate that the efforts of the state
sector must be Concentrated on the overall planning task and on the adoption
of legal and administrative none; that are adequate for promoting the develop,-
sent process.
The sectors that are considered "strategic" are reserved to the state. These
include metallurgy and basic steelmaking, petrochemicals, energy, railway and
domestic air transportation, and mass visual communication through television.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/28: CIA-RDP08001297R000700050011-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/28: CIA-RDP08001297R000700050011-0
In order to achieve, efficiency in management and administration, the same
economic and business criteria applicable to private enterprise will be re-
quired.
The other objectivesrelated to the state power to complement the activity of
the private sector through the provision of the infrastructure, the creation
of mixed enterprises when combined efforts become necessary, promotion of the
formation Of Agricultural production and marketing cooperatives, and the de-
velopment of priority production activities.
In this case, provision is being made for the creation or strengthening of
development mechanisms, including principally financial development and tech-
nical aid institutions and institutions for the promotion of exports.
6202
CSOI 3010
4
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/09/28: CIA-RDP08001297R000700050011-0