COLOMBIA-VENEZUELA OFFSHORE BOUNDARY PROBLEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08C01297R000700060008-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 10, 2012
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: March 12, 1971
• Content Type: MISC

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COLOi~1BIA-VEtJEZUELA OFFSHORE BOUNDARY PROBLEM
l
At the request of the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, the
Colombia-Venezuela offshore boundary dispute iias been examined in
relation to tite bases of claims and possible solutions of the
dispute.
ABSTRACT
Offshore boundary problems nave recently placed a severe
strain on relations between Colombia and Venezuela. A
heretofore unsuccessful bilateral commission will resume
boundary talks i n Ror~~e can March 15. Much of the difficulty
encountered in the maritime boundary problem stems from the
complicated pi~ysical geography of the sea frontier. The
land boundary between the two countries terminates on the
western shore of the Gulf of Venezuela, a rectangular water
body measuring 53 nautical miles across its mouth-and
penetrating approximately 60 nautical miles into the
continent: Tire Gulf has an area of 4,750 square Nautical
miles. Colombia is restricted to approximately 9q of the
Gulf's shore while Venezuela possesses the remainder.
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This report was produced by the Bureau d0lRnsrading and
of Intelligence and Research. Aside from d8olaaait'iaatiou
normal substantive exchange with other
agencies at the working level, it hos not
been coordinated elsewhere.
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Numerous political and economic complications mitigate
against a rational and peaceful solution of the boundary issue
at this time. .Prime among these is the Venezuelan attitude
that all-past boundary solutions nave been to its disadvantage;
an immediate settlement, therefore, is not considered
desirable.
The positions of the two states towards the territorial
sea are illustrated on f4ap IVo.I. P4aps 2, 3 and 4 represent,
to our best knowledge, the Colombian and Venezuelan attitudes
toward the allocation of the continental shelf and the areas
in potential dispute. Colombian claims in the Gulf of
Venezuela are based upon the "normal" provisions of the Geneva
Conventions on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone and on
the Continental Shelf. 3eyond the Gulf, however, Colombia
would treat the Venezuelan Los Monges islands as "special
circumstances" to be discounted or reduced in importance.
Venezuela, in contrast, claims "special circumstances" within
the Gulf with vague references to "historic waters". The
Venezuelans would accord full value to the Los Monges group
in the creation of a maritime boundary.
Jhile the political climate does not appear to be favorable
for mediation, possible solutions to the dispute are offered
on hlap ivo. 5.
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On ~~1ay 23, 1970, President i?Jixon announced a new United
States oceans policy. One of the principal goals of the United
States law of the sea initiatives is to establish an interna-
tional order which would counteract the increasing tendency
of coastal states to make unilateral.-maritime claims.
~~Jith respect to the Gulf of Venezuela problem,-the United
States would undoubtedly protest any closing of those waters
based on an historic bay theory. Such an act would be considered
an urn~~arranted extension of jurisdiction contrary to the Geneva
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone and
customary international la4v. Similar protests were recently
made against Canada's fisheries closing lines.-
On the other hand, it is unlikely that the United States
would perceive any threat to its national interests if the
Venezuelans or Colombians were to claim sovereign rights to the
natural resources of the continental shelf in the Gulf if such
claims were made in accordance with international law. Since
the Gulf of Venezuela area does not exceed a depth of 200 meters,
it is probable that a solution agreed to by the concerned
parties would be in accordance with international law.
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Introduction
Offshore boundary problems have recently placed a severe strain
on relations between Colombia and Venezuela. Both the delimitation
of the territorial seas and the continental shelf boundaries of the
two countries are involved, although, at present, the problems of the
continental shelf appear to be predominant. The two boundaries are,
to a degree, interrelated and difficult to disassociate due to
similarities of language and treatment in the Geneva Conventions on
the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone and the Continental Shelf.
A Colombia-Venezuela Commission on Maritime Limits has been
established to negotiate the territorial sea and continental shelf
problems in the Gulf of Venezuela. Rome was the site of inconclasive
talks in November 1970; discussions will be resumed there on
f~arch 15, 1971.
Much of the difficulty which Colombia and Venezuela are
encountering in negotiating acceptable maritime boundaries stems from
the peculiar physical geography of the sea frontier. The land boundary
between the two countries terminates on the western shore of the Gulf
of Venezuela. the Gulf is formed by two extensive peninsulas each of
which juts nearly 100 nautical miles into the Caribbhan Sea. Guajira,
which forms the western peninsula, is primarily within Colombia but
Venezuela possesses a narrow foothold, averaging about 5 miles in
width, along the southeastern shore of the peninsula. The Los Monges
islands are situated approximately 20 nautical miles northeast of the
tip of the peninsula, beyond the limits of the Gulf of Venezuela.
They are a small group of islets (maximum length approximately 1
nautical mile) belonging to Venezuela. Poor Spanish-cartography, it '
is reported, assigned the islands to the wrong captaincy-general in
the colonial. period and this error has led to their current anachronistic
relation to Caracas rather than to Bogota. Colombia does not dispute
Venezuelan sovereignty over the islands but does not accept their
significance for the purpose of territorial sea or continental shelf
entitlement.
On the eastern shore, the Gulf of Venezuela is bounded by the
Venezuelan peninsula of Paraguana. North .of its tip, approximately
14 nautical miles seaward, lies the ietherlands-owned island of Aruba,
the western-most of the Netherlands Antilles.
The Gulf of Venezuela proper is a rectangular body which measures
about 53 nautical miles in width between its natural entrance points
of Punta Espada (Colombia) and Punta 4acolla (Venezuela). Interior
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of these points, the Gulf widens abruptly to an east-west dimension of
nearly 100 nautical miles. In the east, a distinct sub-bay--the Golfete
de Coro--nearly isolates the Peninsula de Paraguana from the mainland of
Venezuela. Due to the depth of Coro's penetration, it is excluded from
the previously stated width of the Gulf. To the south, Lake Maracaibo
extends deeply into the heart of Venezuela. Like Coro bay, Maracaibo is
considered to be a separate geographic feature and is not included in
the dimensions given for the Gulf.
Thus, the maximum penetration of the Gulf into the continent is
approximately 60 nautical miles. The water surface, excluding
Maracaibo, Amuay and Coro bays, measures about 4,750 square nautical
miles (6,295 square miles or 16,300 square kilometers) south of a line
connecting the natural entrance points mentioned above.
While Colombia and Venezuela both front on the Gulf, Colombia is
restricted to a narrow segment in the northwest. The Colombian shoreline,
measured from Punta Espada southward to the Colombia - Venezuela land
boundary terminus, totals nearly 24 nautical miles. In contrast, the
Venezuelan shore measures approximately 245 nautical miles. Thus, about
91% of the total shoreline of the Gulf is under Venezuelan sovereignty
and 9% under Colombian. (For the purposes of this review, bay-closing
lines were drawn across the mouths of Maracaibo, Coro and Amuay bays;
the lengths of these closing lines being included in the Venezuelan
coastline measurement.)
As the entire area of the Gulf is less than 200 meters deep, it
qualifies as continental shelf under the definition given in the Geneva
Convention on the Continental Shelf. The Gulf would not qualify as an
overlarge bay under the terms of the Convention on the Territorial Sea
and Contiguous Zone since the Gulf is not enclosed within the shores of
a single state..
The Territorial Sea Question
Map No. 1 illustrates the conflicting positions of Colombia and
Venezuela concerning the delimitation of their respective territorial
sea claims and highlights the maritime areas which are in actual or
potential dispute. Both states currently claim'12-nautical mile
territorial sea breadths, although Venezuela claims an additional
three-mice contiguous zone.
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Colombia, a signatory but not a party to the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, appears to follow normal
international practice, for the most part, in the delimitation of its
territorial sea claim. The breadth of its territorial sea is measured
from the standard baseline by circle of arcs with the radii of the arcs
equal to the claimed breadth of the territorial sea. In the Gulf of
Venezuela, the Colombian position reflects the notion that Venezuela
should use the identical method of delimitation. According to Colombia
the sea boundary between the states in the Gulf of Venezuela !s the lateral
line, every point of which is equidistant from the respective standard
baselines from which the breadths of the territorial seas of the two
states are measured. Peculiarly, and this may account for Colombia's
non-accession to the.Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone, the Government of Colombia refuses to"recognize that the Los Monges
islands are entitled to a significant territorial sea, although Colombia
does recognize Venezuelan sovereignty over the islands. Since the
nearest of the islands is situated more than 12 nautical miles from the
Colombian baseline, no problem would exist of the Colombian territorial
sea overlapping the sovereign Venezuelan territory of Los Monges. As
a result, there appears to be little justification for the denial of
some territorial sea claim, ep r se, for the island group.
By the terms of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone, every island is entitled to a territorial sea. The concept
is further supported by international practice. However, islands may
be considered .as "special circumstances", within the terms of the
Convention, in the context of constructing a territorial waters
boundary between adjacent or opposite states. Thus in view of the small
size and number of the Los Monges islands and their reported lack of
inhabitants, Colombia could argue that they represent "special
circumstances" which must be taken into consideration in the develop-
ment of a territorial waters boundary. While the islands might not be
denied a territorial sea, the breadth could be open, in certain areas,
to negotiation. Since Colombia has not become a party to the Convention
on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, the status of Article 10,
i.e. Islands Territorial~Sea, in customary international law might well-
arise.
Venezuela's position on its territorial sea delimitation (See Map
No. 1) is more complex and more difficult to rationalize. Apparently,
Venezuela has based its case in the Gulf of Venezuela on a claim to
historic waters.. The terms of the Geneva Convention on historic
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bays or waters are very indefinite.l However, the bases for historicity
involve the exclusive and prolonged jurisdiction of a coastal state over
a body of water; the enunciation or notoriety of a claim to historicity;
and the general acceptance of that claim by other maritime states.
(Since the major problem involves the continental shelf boundary, the
status of the historic claim is developed in a later section. However, ~~
it is not at all obvious that Venezuela has ever publicly advanced
such a claim.)
In effect, it appears that Venezuela has taken the position that
the Gulf of Venezuela from the terminus of the land frontier to Punta
Macolla is historic waters. Apparently to preserve its options, the
Government of Venezuela has not specified precisely how this closing line
was to be drawn. It has been stated that under no circumstances will
Venezuela settle for a shelf boundary south of the line drawn along the
parallel of the boundary terminus. Any delimitation north of the parallel
might be negotiable . Three methods can_ be suggested a) ~ l i ner j of n~i rlg the l and
boundary terminus with Punta Macolla; b) a line drawn on the parallel of
the boundary terminus for 12 nautical miles into the Gulf and then, in
a second segment, joining with Punta Macolla; and c) the continuation of
the land boundary.,
Conversations between Embassy officers and Venezuelan officials
indicate that method c) has been advanced at least as a beginning
proposition. The use of the continuation method, however, is fraught
with certain problems depending on definition. The Colombia - Venezuela
boundary west of the Gulf is a complicated border. Fora considerable
distance, the boundary is a series of straight lines connecting
demarcation points.. The lines are generally on the same azimuth. In the
extreir>e north, ho~?lever; the boundary arrives at a small bay, the Laguna
de Cocinetas, and then follo~~rs the old shoreline of the bay leaving the
entire ~?iater surface within Venezuela. Leaving the bay on its eastern
shore, the boundary for about 1 kilometer follows an azimuth which is
approximately 14? south of east. A continuation of this azimuth would
result in an allocation of the territorial sea and continental shelf
1. enezue a ecame a party to t e Convention with specific reservations:
"In signing the present Convention, the Republic of Venezuela declares
with reference to Article 12 [equidistant line] that there are special
circumstances to be taken into consideration in the following areas:
the Gulf of Paria and zones adjacent thereto; the area between the
coast of Venezuela and the island of Aruba; and the-Gulf of Venezuela.
Reservation made upon ratification:...with express reservation in
respect of article 12 and paragraphs 2 [limit of contiguous zone]
and 3 [equidistant line in contiguous zone] of article 24 [contiguous
zone] of said Convention.
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roughly according to the Colombian claim, if not allocating a greater
amount to Colombia. Two possible explanations of the Venezuelan position
may be advanced: 1) the planners are using small-scale maps which often
generalize the final boundary area as a northeast (and~not southeast)
trending line; or 2) Venezuela is referring to the straight line segment
of the boundary southwest of the bay. However, reliance on the concept
without specific language could produce a southeasterly line as opposed
to an east or northeasterly trending line in the delimitation of the
territorial sea boundary. It should also be noted that a continuation
of the line following alternative 2) would not intersect the boundary
terminus of the final segment of the land boundary. [This point,
Castilletes, is situated at 11? 51' 07:41 North and 71? 19' 19:'80 ~dest.
The azimuth to rsillar II is 283? 52' 20" north by east or approximate)
14? south of east in the reverse azimuth (103? 52' 20" north by east),]
For the purpose of this study, we have drawn the map illustrating
Venezuelan territorial sea claims as extending from the terminal point
of the land boundary to Punta Macolla. The amount of territorial sea
involved in the change in alignment would not be great assuming that
Venezuela does not intend to extend the line to the southeast.
The claimed territorial sea of Venezuela extends seaward from the
"closing line", whatever its position, and seaward in arcs of circles
from the shoreline beyond the closing line and from Los Monges islands.
The territorial sea measured from the closing line would not interefere
with a Colombian territorial sea drawn north of the closing line. All
waters contained within the closing line would, of course, be internal
waters of Venezuela. The closing of the Gulf can not be justified as
a normal bay closing line or as a straight. baseline within the terms of
the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone.
Claim must, as a result, stem from historicity.
Venezuela appears to accept the use of an equidistant line between
Los i~onges and the Colombian shore where the distance is less than 24
nautical miles. In its reservation concerning the territorial sea
convention, Venezuela did not agree to apply the same principle to Aruba
which has approximately the identical relationship off the tip of the
Paraguana pem nsula.
Moot questions are involved in the Venezuelan claim to historicity
and its reservations to the Convention as well as in Colombian reactions
to these particular actions. Colombian non-adherence to the Convention
on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone would appear to negate the
Venezuelan reservations and perhaps further complicate a bilateral
settlement oi: the issues.
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Colombia: Claimed Continental Shelf
The Colombian continental shelf claim, (see Map No. 2) based upon
the equidistance principle, assigns no value to base points other than
on the mainland .shores. From the terminus of the land boundary at
Castilletes, the claimed boundary would extend southeastward dividing
the territorial seas of the two states. The line would continue as a
continental shelf boundary in a general southeasterly direction for
nearly 15 nautical miles until it reached a point equally distant from
the baselines on the western shore of the Gulf and that of the southern
shore. From this point, the continental shelf boundary would change from
a line between "adjacent" states to one between "opposite" states.
The equidistant shelf boundary would extend generally northeastward
for nearly 11.5 nautical miles before turning nearly due northward to
continue to the edge of the continental shelf. The line as described
passes within 11 nautical miles of Monges del Este, the easternmost of
the Los Monges group. As with the territorial waters question, the
Colombian proposal does not assign any, or any significant, shelf to
the Los Monges group.
Even though the Los Monges islands are small in size and number
they are entitled, according to the Convention on the Continental Shelf,
to a continental shelf. Moreover, Colombia has become a party to the
Convention and made no specific reservations concerning these points.
The Colombian Government would, as a result, appear to be bound by the
provisions although the breadth of the territorial sea and the continental
shelf could be open to negotiation. The shelf convention language would
permit Colombia to treat the islands as "special circumstances",
which would, nullify or reduce their effect in the construction of an
equidistant boundary.
Gulf of Venezuela: Venezuelan Historic Waters
The fervor of the Colombian-Venezuelan dispute over the division of
the continental shelf in the Gulf of Venezuela has caused the GOV to
once again advance historic claims to the Gulf (see Map 3 and 4). Venezuela
currently argues historicity on the premises that: (1) the Gulf is a
thoroughfare for snipping in and out of Lake 1`laracaibo, and (2) the Gulf
nas long been the fishing grounds of Venezuelan fisherman. Documentation
of trle Venezuelan iii stori c cl ai rn to the Gul f i s 1 acki ng; a search of
availaul~ data i~as not revealed evidence to support the existence of a
Venezuelan historic clair~.
Venezuela did issue a special reservation concerning the Convention
on file Continental S~~~lf. Tile reservation declared that there were
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special circumstances relative to the shelf in the Gulf of Venezuela
among other places. The reservation applies to Article 6 on the use of
equidistant boundaries as they related to the Gulf.
Other than undocumented claims of historicity relative to the Gulf,
much earlier Venezuelan legislation or statements by government officials
-prior to the increased intensity of the dispute have not formalized the
historic claim to the Gulf.
In 1954, the legal advisor of the Venezuelan Forei n Office is
reported to have said (Caracas, Despatch 214 of 8-26-54~:
...the complete extent of Venezuela's interest in the
waters of the Gulf of Venezuela has never been fully defined
and declared.... Although, in the absence of legislation
under the continental shelf provision of the 1953 Constitution
and in the absence of an agreement with Colombia, Venezuelan
legislation only stipulates the three and twelve mile zones
of jurisdiction, ... {and) that Venezuela's position as to the
status of the waters of the Gulf of Venezuela should be
recognized as at present indefinite; he indicated that any
attempt by foreign-flag vessels to undertake large-scale
commercial fishing operations in the Gulf would be accorded
the most serious scrutiny of the Venezuelan Government, and
probably would be opposed by both Venezuela and Colombia.
These remarks of the legal advisor do not set forth any historic
claims. On the contrary, the last part of his statement could imply that
Colombia had claims in the-Gulf.
The "Law on Territorial Seas, the Continental Shelf and the Protection
of Fisheries and Air Space," promulgated by the President of Venezuela
on July 27, 1956, and published in Extraordinary Number 496 of the
Official Gazette on August 17, 1956, does not set forth historic claims
to t e Gu of Venezuela.
Article 8 of the 1956 Law does purport to vest the Government with
authority to control fishing, both domestic .and foreign, in undetermined
zones seaward of the territorial sea of Venezuela. This indefinite
pronouncement could conceivably be viewed by Venezuela as granting the
right to assert authority but not sovereignty in the Gulf.
In 1967, the Venezuelans acted as if the Gulf were a Venezuelan
sea when seismographic exploration zones were established .and exploratory
permits were issued to the Venezuelan Government company, Cor~oracion
Venezolana de Petroleo (CVP), Texaco, Mobil and Wbbi1 Joint. ei'~o Ty
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part of the Gulf not zoned was a narrow band extending northward along
the La Guajira peninsula from the point where the Colombia-Venezuela
land boundary meets the Gulf to the area between Los Monges and Colombia.
Results of the seismographic studies were to be exchanged between the
CVP and its Colombia counterpart ECOPETROL. The CVP President stated,
however, that the agreement had no relationship to the discussions
concerning the boundary between the two countries, and that the agreement
between the two companies would not affect whatever settlement would be
negotiated at a government level.
Pilotage, although compulsory into Lake Maracaibo, does not lend
itself to the support of a historic claim to the Gulf. The pilots are
either picked up at the entrance to the channel leading into Lake
Maracaibo or the pickup is someti~+~es made at or in the vicinity of Punta
Cardon. In any case, the pilot only operates in the Lake Maracaibo Channel.
Thus from the evidence at hand there seems to be no formal
documentation supporting the historicity claim of Venezuela relative to
the Gulf of Venezuela.
Complicating factors
Numerous political and economic complications mitigate against
a rational and peaceful solution of the boundary problem. These factors
may, in actuality, be more important than the maritime boundary problem
itself since boundary disputes often are superficial symptoms of deeper
ills. Venezuela, for example, currently has a nationalistic
political climate, which is compounded by the widespread feeling that
Venezuela has been unjustly treated in previous territorial negotiations
or boundary arbitrations. Since most arrangements of this nature involve
compromises, the Venezuelans may well believe that they have lost
"claimed" territory. The recent agreements with Guyana, which have placed
claims to the Essequibo territory in a 12-year limbo, have been
greeted by the press as a sell-out. Consequently, the Government of
Venezuela is not anxious to rush into another boundary "settlement" which
may rebound to its political disadvantage. In fact, any agreement may
be considered by the press or by the opposition party as another abdication
of sovereign rights even if the Venezuelan position is adopted in toto.
Trans-border smuggling, irresponsibly press campaigns, political
jingoism, military justifications for modernization of antiquated
equipment and the reported poor treatment of nationals, in particular
those who have entered the country illegally, all serve to foster mutual
distrust and fear.. As a consequence, the political climate necessary
for the quiet diplomacy vital to the settlement of any. territorial problem
seems to be completely lacking at present. The intrusion of a single
country or an organization as a boundary mediator would probably create
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suspicion towards the motives of the self-appointed peacemaker. The U.S.
would probably generate the most suspicion since American .petroleum
. companies would be the most likely benefactors of a~settlement.
The Boundary--Any Solutions?
~_
Given the proper state of relations, the boundary question could be
solved by submission to the International Court of Justice or by bilateral
negotiations. The ICJ has recently adjudicated the North Sea case between
Germany on one side and the Netherlands and Denmark on the other. The
iVorth Sea and Gulf of Venezuela situations are geographically similar. In
both cases the states border on semi-enclosed seas. The coastal
configurations of Germany and~Venezuela are disadvantageous for the
creation of an equitable equidistant line. The adjacency of the shelf
is a prime factor in both cases. Unlike the North Sea cases, however,
where Germany was not a party to the shelf convention; both Colombia
and Venezuela are parties although the latter has filed reservations.
Another significant and complicating difference between the cases
involves the lack of delimitation of the territorial sea boundary in the
Gulf of Venezuela. Moreover, in the Gulf"of Venezuela the: two maritime
boundary questions of the territorial sea and shelf are tied together
geographically and politically and the solution of one will directly
affect the other:
In its North Sea Decision the ICJ found:
"(1) delimitation is to be effected by~agreement
in accordance with equitable principles, and taking
account of a)1 the relevant circumstances, in such a way
as to-leave as muci~ as possible to each Party all those
parts of the Continental S;~elf that constitute a natural
prolongation of its land territory into and under the
sea, without encroachment on the natural prolongation of
the land territory of the other;
"(2) if, in the application of the preceding
sub-paragraph, the delimitation leaves to-the parties
areas that overlap, these are to be divided between them
in agreed proportions or failing agreement, equally, unless
they decide on a regime of joint jurisdiction,. users, or
exploitation for the zones of overlap or any part of them."
The Court specified that these "factors" to be taken into account
should include:
Parties)ashwellnasatheopresence~of anytspecialtorounusu
features; al
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"(2) so far as known or readily. ascertainable, the
physical and geological structure, and natural resources,
of the Continental Shelf areas involved;
"(3) the element of a reasonable degree of
proportionality, which a delimitation carried out in
accordance with equitable principles ought to bring about
between the extent of the Continental Shelf areas apper-
taining to the coastal State and the length of its
coastline,.account being taken for this purpose of the
effects, actual or prospective, of any other Continental
Shelf delimitations between adjacent States in the same
region."
This decision, while not universally binding, will certainly be a
guide in future litigations of a similar nature. Since much depends on
the evidence advanced and the nature of the special circumstances, no
two cases will be treated exactly the same. Venezuela, with a coastline
similar to Germany, could advance a plausible argument by which it would
gain nearly as .much of the Gulf of Venezuela shelf as it-now apparently
claims somewhat tenuously on historicity.
According to the three factors enumerated by the Court, Venezuela
has a geographical position in the Gulf comparable to that of Germany
in the North Sea. The "general configuration" of the Venezuelan coast
is concave which is disadvantageous in the development of an equidistant
line. The submarine geology of the region, to the extent known, appears
to trend northeastward parallel to the strike of the La Guajira Peninsula.
Hence, the floor of the Gulf would arguably be a continuation or natural
prolongation of the physical base of Venezuela. (The same argument,
however, could be used by Colombia to deny full continental shelf
entitlement for the Los Monges islands, thereby gaining one of its major
points.) Finally, regarding proportionality, Venezuela fronts on more
than 90% of the shores of the Gulf, as defined in this paper. (A change
in definition could decrease the Venezuelan proportion slightly but not
significantly.) Submission of the case to the Court could result in a
decision granting to Venezuela essentially what it claims. In essence,
the same result could be achieved by a different, more legally acceptable,
means.
Should bilateral negotiations continue and Colombia remains firm
on the need for an equidistant line, Venezuela could propose a solution
as outlined on Map (Vo. 5. The coastline of the Gulf is concave and
therefore disadvantageous. to Venezuela. To de-emphasize this aspect
and to increase the "equity" of a resulting settlement, Venezuela could
claim a system of "baselines", i.e..closures, to separate the waters
of the Gulf which are "enveloped" by Venezuela from those which are less
"landlocked" and thus more subject to a bi-national division. Examples
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of the types of lines which might be drawn are illustrated on Map No. 5.
At least two possible systems of closures can be imagined and illustrated:
(1) A baseline from Castilletes to Punta Capana on the south shore
of the Gulf. -The latter point is chosen for it is the first point on
~- the south shore which would have influence on a normal equidistant line
and, in addition, the closure marks the logical termination of the
Ensenada de Calabozo, the western lobe of the Gulf. A similar line
drawn for the Colombian coast to "regularize" it would extend from the
boundary terminus to the northeast. A bisector of the resulting angle
between the two "closures", representing the new "baselines" for the
division of the seabed of the Gulf, would in effect be an equidistant
line and apportion a major share of the shelf of the Gulf to Venezuela.
The same limit could be used, for a distance of 12 nautical miles from
the normal baselines, as the limit of the respective territorial seas.
The problem then develops as how and where to terminate this vector.
Possible solutions are: a) the use of the true equidistant line which
is illustrated, or b) the bisector of another angle created in a manner
similar to the one previously described. Several possibilities exist
but the true equidistant line has the advantage of past precedent.
(2) A second possible solution would allocate more of the shelf
to Venezuela but is more difficult to justify. It would involve drawing
the closure from Castilletes to Punta Penas and a second line from that
cape to Punta Salina on the east shore. The continental shelf limit would
then be formed by the two angle bisectors or by a combination of the
two bisectors and a segment of the true equidistant line.
The first proposal allocates approximately 90 per cent of the
continental shelf of the Gulf to Venezuela and 10 per cent to Colombia.
This allocation reflects the proportionality of their coast lines on
the Gulf as defined. The second proposal would reduce the Colombian
share by approximately one-third. (It should be noted that this type
of action has no direct precedence in international practice. Malaysia,
however, did draw very extensive straight baselines solely for the
purpose of negotiating a continental shelf poundary with Indonesia;
the latter had already promulgated straight baselines which could have
been disadvantageous'to Malaysia. The Malaysian baselines, however,
insured a more equitable division of the shelf. To apply the Indonesia-
Malaysia experience to an over-large bay or gulf might be considered
an extension of the concept. The process may be argued logically as
a combination of the positions of the two states. The suitable
environment, conducive to negotiations, remains an absolute prerequisite.)
Beyond the limits of the Gulf, the "special circumstances" of
the Los Monges group further complicates the allocation of territorial
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sea and seabed. "Special circumstances", logic and international practice
all point, within the framework of the negotiating process, to the
elimination or reduction of the Los Monges as basepoints for the creation
of an equidistant boundary. Thus, if one is constructed using the mainland
only (see Map No. 1)~ the shelf boundary would continue nearly due north
from the previously described compromise boundary within the Gulf.
However, equally demanding in principle and practice is that the Los
Monges group be allocated a. sovereign territorial sea. A 1.2-nautical
mile territorial sea, except where distances between the national
baselines are less than 24 nautical miles, would-give to Venezuela
substantially all that is claimed beyond the Gulf area. Colq~abia, however,
would gain some territory west of the equidistant line and east of the
territorial sea of Los Monges as well as a comparable area directly to
the west of Los Monges.
In a prolongation beyond the 200 meter line of the shelf, i.e. should
the exploitabi_lity criterion supersede the depth limit or should an inter-
mediate or trusteeship zone be created, Colombia would gain a considerable
extension on the seabed since Venezuela would continue to be restricted
by the 12 miles. (or other negotiated limit) of the territorial sea.
The petroleum aotential of the Gulf shelf 25X1
has been stated by Venezuela to a P~ ion 25X1
barrels. Oil companies are alleged to have told the Colombians that the
Gulf reserves would last 200 years, the latter being a very nebuhous
figure. In view of the Lake Maracaibo deposits and the. general geological
continuum of the Gulf area, it can be reasonably assumed that the
petroleum potential is there. The geological structures might indicate
that-the richest potential petroleum fields are to be found north of a .
parallel drawn from Castilletes. Venezuela has peri:ormed seismic explora-
tions in certain areas of the Gulf but has not, to our knowledge, granted
concessions. Colombian concession areas have been suspendatd pending the
solution of the offshore boundary problem. Active interest, however,
continues to be shown by a number of firms, primarily U.S. The possibility
of joint exploitation exists in the absence of granted concessions
(and implied .special interests). Such a solution, however, would still
face the allocation of royalties on an equitable basis which might prove
to be as difficult to resolve as a direct allocation of the shelf.
Summary and Conclusions
The best interests of the United States would be served by the
maintenance of peace between the two nations and by-the reasonable
settlement of the dispute without U.S. involvement when conditions
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permit. However, the current political climate mitigates against any
rational approach to the issue in the near future.
Should the climate for negotiations improve, several opportunities
for solution are available. The primary possibility, and probably best
for all concerned,`would be to submit the dispute to the International
Court of Justice which has recently acted on the similar North Sea Case.
A second possibility, however, would involve direct negotiations between
the two states, with or without an intermediary such as the Organization
of American States or a third friendly power--Spain and Switzerland have
already acted in this capacity for the land boundary--on the bases of the
P~orth Sea Cases Decision. Possible solutions have been analyzed and
ustra a in s paper based on an interpretation of the ICJ decision and
certain related international practices. These suggestions could contribute
to a settlement of the dispute under proper conditions.
On May 23, 1970, President Nixon announced a new United States oceans
policy. One of the principal goals of the United States law of the sea
initiatives is to establish an international order which would counteract
the increasing tendency of coastal states to make unilateral maritime claims.
~lith respect to the Gulf of Venezuela problem, the United States would
undoubtedly protest any closing of those waters based on an ,historic bay
theory. Such an act-would be considered an unwarranted extension of juris-
diction contrary to the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone and customary international law. Similar protests were
recently made against Canada's fisheries closing lines.
On the other hand, it is unlikely that the United States would perceive
any threat to its .national interests if the, Venezuelans or Colombians were
to claim sovereign rights to the natural resources of the continental shelf
in the Gulf if such claims were made in accordance with international law:
Since the Gulf of Venezuela area does not exceed a depth of 200 meters,
it is probable that a solution agreed to by the concerned parties would be
in accordance with international law.
RGE-INR/Geographer
uirector RDHodgson
Analysts RDHodgson/TVMcIntyre
Extension 22021
Released by: ~^~
Date ~ March 9, 1971
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Map 1
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VENEZUELA
COLOMBIA-VENEZUELA
Territorial Sea Claims
Colombia
- -Venezuela
---------Bay closing line
SECRET
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Map 2
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Map 3
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CONTINENTAL SHELF
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SECRET
~ w a
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~ ~ ~
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Colombia-Venezuela Boundary
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