ARGENTINE CLAIMS IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND ANTARCTICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08C01297R000800090022-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 46
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: March 15, 1948
• Content Type: REPORT

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ARGENTINE .0LAIMS IN THE FALKLAND
,L ISLANDS AND ANTARCTICA:
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OIR Report No:. 4606
March 159 1948
I D'EPARTIn STATE 1
REFERENCE DIVIVON
1 F1LE Copy
tITIZAM Rgnal
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Division of Research for American Republics
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Summary
? Introduction. . 000000 0000?0000
I. Argentine Claims in the Falklands . ? o 6
o
Page
3
A. Backgrohnd of the Falkland
Islands Question ...... . ?
.
?
.
?
3
B.. Review of Argentine Position
to 1934 . . . ? ? e ? 0 ?
?
o
? ?
?
3
C. Review of Argentine Position
since 1934. . ........
.
4
D. Current Argentine Policy in the
Falklands .
?
6
E. ?Future Prospects
7
II.
Argentine Claims in Antarctica
9
A. Background of the Antarctic
fluestion. ..... .....
9
B. Review of Argentine Position
to 1939 . . . . . - .
.
.
.
?
11
C. Review of Argentine Position,
1939-1948
13
1. Initial 'loves, 1939-1940
13
2. Forward 1Jovement, 1941-43. ?
.
.
.
.
16
3. Suspension of Activity under
de facto Government
17
A
4. ? Second Forw6rd Novement,
1946-date. . .
.
18
D. Current Argentine Policy
in Antarctica . . ....
22
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E.. The Chilean Position in
Antarctica .
..
..
F. Future Prospects .
O 0 0 ? 0 ? - 0 0
O 0 0 0 0 0 0 ?
Page
24
27
III. Forecast.of,Latin American Position
at Bogot6. ..... OOOO 0 0 .30
? )
A. General Considerations , 0 ? 0 0 0 0 30
B. Reactions of Non-Claimant
CoUntries ... . . . . ? 31
? APPENDIX
MaP of Territorial Claims in Antarctica,
When this study outlives its usefulness
to you, please return it to:
,Department of State
Office of. Research (CIR)
626 State Annex #1
Washington, D.C.
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SUMMARY
Argentine territorial claims in the Falkland
Islands and Antarctica challenge British possession
of the Falklands and conflict with actual or potential
claims in Antarctica by the governments of Great
Britain, Chile, and .the US. Tension between Argentina
and Britain over their conflicting claims, which
gained world attention following the dispatch of British,
Argentine, and Chilean naval units to Antarctica in
February 19489 is the outgrowth of a century-old
dispute over the Falklands and of recent changes in
world power relationships. The dispute regarding
the Falklands is an issue which remained quiet for
over a century, during which British ascendancy was
unquestioned. It now arises because Argentina can
foresee the time when it might recover the islands
by direct pressure or indirectly with the support
of the US and the inter-American system. The dispute
in Antarctica also reflects the growing ambitions
of the Argentine Government. It differs fromthe
Falklands question in that the rights of the claimants
are less well-defined and because the Antarctic area
is useful chiefly as a narado,ground.
The tension that has been built up over claims
in Antarctica and the Falklands ma v be dissipated grad-
ually, but this will depend upon the willingness of
Argentina to put the Falklands claims on a stand-by
basis and to cease provocative gestures in Antarctica
until such time as claims can be settled on an
internatidnal basis. That the Peran administration
will agree to such procedures is questionable. Although
it has made no overt move to dislodge the British from
the Falklands, it appears determind to force the,
,issue either directly or by enlisting the support of
the US and the inter-American system. As regards
Antarctica, the Argentine Government will undoubtedly
continue its operations .and may expand them. Both
the Argentine and Chilean Governments have developed
a stake inAntarctica as an inexpensive roans of
gaining Prestige at home and abroad. This barren area
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offers an unrivalled ground for aggressive activity
and it has thereby secured an importance to the
South American governments out of Proportion to its
reel value to them. In addition, unless both
governments halt operations simultaneously, their
latent rivalry will force them to continue 'a for-
ward movement in Antarctica. The Argentine Gov-
ernment must also consider the value of pressure in
the Antarctic in weakening the British position in
the Falklands.
Recourse to the International Court to settle
conflicting clairs in the Falklands and Antarctica
appears to be out of the que-tion. Although Argentine
rights in the Falklands are supported by many legal
arguments, the Per6n administretion has indicated
that it has no intention of submitting Argentine claims
to the judicial process and anticipates settlement of
the dispute on a power basis. Argentine and correlative
Chilean claims in Antarctica are an even less promising
subject for legal settlement and the two South American
-governments will avoid a court decision. Such a
decision would in any case be difficult to reach in an
area where occupation and normal exercise of sovereignty
are impossible. The Argentine Government has, however,
offered to settle Antarctic claims by the conference
method and unofficially has indicated that it might
accept arbitration. But since time works on the side
of Argentina, its government may be expected to approach
the problem of settlement in a leisurely fashion, even
though it ray eventually agree to some general Antarctic
settlement.
The British Government is finding delay in a
decision, which will relieve it of the threat of
Argentine provocation, difficult and even intolerable.
It is on the defensive in a remote area which provides
only too accessible a target for rival claimants end
British opinion has become extraordinarily sensitive
to signs of dissolution of the Empire. Surrender to
Argentine claims which cannot be rationalized as in
accordance with the new principles of self-government
and self-determination, will not be made voluntarily.
Since the British Government app-ars unable to bring
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the South American claimants into court, it can secure
relief regarding Antarctica only through a settlement
-sponsored by the US or UN. As to the Falklands, it
is not clear what constructive step the British can
take except as the US acts as honest broker.
. The dividends in prestige to the Argentine
Government from its challenge to British rights he
been gratifying. From a minor and latent issue, the
? Antarctic dispute emerged early in February of this
year with all the familiar trimmings of a nineteenth-
century incident -- and in good time for the, Argentine
elections. If the PerOn administration handles the
matter skillfully, it may secure a resolution at the
Bogot6. Conference that, would in the view of the
Latin Americans, place in an unfavorable light the
neutral attitude of the US and the defiant "imperialism"
of the British Government. Argentine expressions have
moreover been reserved enough to permit it to play a,
relatively passiv-, role at Bogot6 if the auspices are
unfavorable. The Boeotl. Conference offers only the
possibility of obtaining moral support and perhaps
of warning the US that it should back Argentina
against the UK. As such it is an inter-sting oppor-
tunity for the Peron administration, but by no mans
one to be forced at the expense of other Argentine
interests.
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-.ARGENTINE CLAIMS IN THE FALKLAND
ISL1-',NDS AND ANTARCTICA
INTRODUCTION
Argentine claims in the Falkland Islands and in
Antarctic territery cover most of the area described by
the British Government as the Falkland Islands and Depend-
encies and administered as a British colonial possession.
British possession of the Falkland Islands proper is con-
tested.only by Argentina. The Falkland island Dependencies,
including a sector of the Antarctic and certain islands ly-
ing north of this sector, are the subject of claims by
Argentina which overlap actual or potential claims of
Britain, the United States, and Chile. Against British
protests the Argentine Government is at present acting to
strengthen its position in Antarctica and the Chilean Govern-
ment is doing likewise. As regards the Falklands, Argentina
has so far done little more than keep open Its claim through
repeated formal statements of its right to the Islands -.11d
has made no overt move to dislodge the British from posses-
sion.* In a conversation of March 9, 1948 the Argentine
Foreign Minister told the American Ambassador that Argen-
tina was 'prepared to argue,' its Antarctic claims, but that
it regarded the Falklands dispute as a matter of real im-
portance which the ParOn administration was determined to
settle.
The Argentine claims in the Falklands and Ant-
arctica are interrelated in various ways although the
Argentine Government has treated them as separate and
distinct- problems. The regional and political ties between
* Various press accounts have confused the Falklands with
the Falkland Islands Dependencies. For example, both
the editors of the New York Times and Sumner Wclles have
discussed the dispute between the British and South
American Governments over Antarctic claims as though
it were a dispute over the Falkland Islands.
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Argentine and British claiMs'to the .two areas mean that
activity in one region is reflected to some degree in the
other. -Both Argentine and British claims in Antarctica
depend in. part on their respeCtive claims to the Falklands.
Conversely, the advance of the South Ateridan governments.
in Antarctica has a bearing on the Falklands question inso-
far as it adversely'affeots.the position of British terri-
tories in the .Western Hemisphere... *
The American Government has endeavored to maintain a
neutral position with regard to the Falkland Islands dispute
and has adopted sthe attitude that it is a matter involving
only:the two .parties. As to the Antarctic area as a whole,
the American Government so far has not formulated
tiveHpolicy. It has made no territorial claims but re-
serves its rights and refuses to 'recognize the claims of
other governments in the area. Neither the Monroe Doctrine
nor theestablishment of the hemisphere defense zone, which
eMbraces the area in dispute, is viewed as affecting rights
in the Falkland Islands or Antarctica, and the two'dis-
putes are regarded by the American Government as matters to
be settled on a separate basis. Recent developments in
Antarctica, however, indicate that Argentine and Chilean
policy in the region may have issue in a situation demand-
ing the consideration of the Department. As to the
Falklands the Argentine Foreign Minister onMarch 9, 1948
aTprbached the American Ambassador with the ,suggestion that
the American Government support Argentina in forcing with-
drawal of the British from possession of the islands. In
addition both the Falkland Islands and Antarctic disputes
are scheduled to be raised at Bogot6 together with the
entire question of the status of claims and possessions of
non-continental powers in the Western Hemisphere. The fol-
lowing survey is devoted toia statement of the development
of Argentine policy in the area and an estimate of the .
direction of that policy which may serve as background for
these problem as they arise.
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I. ARGENTINE CLAIES IN THE FALKLANDS
A. Background of the Falkland Islands cluestion
The dispute between the Argentine and British Govern-
ments over the Falkland Islands emerged from a series of
international incidents in the period 1831-33. Sealing
and whaling activity in the South Atlantic region and the
trade route to the East through the Drake Passage south
of Cape Horn gave the. Falklands a certain importance as a
base. The Government of the United Provinces, successor
to the rights of the Spanish Government, took possession
of the islands in 1820 and established its representatives
in the area. A dispute between the governor of the islands
and American scalers led to punitive action by the USS
Lexington in 1831, and the reduction of the islands to a
defenseless condition. This action, which was supported
by the American Government, apparently provided the setting
for British seizure of the Falklands in January 1833. -Sub-
sequent Argentine protests against the British occupation
and claims for damages against the American Government met
with no success.
;
-Argentine claims to the Falkland Islands appear- to
have considerable ,support on an historical basis. ? The
Argentine Government has also more recently advanced a claim
on the basis that the Falkland Islands are an extension of
the continental shelf. Against British rights based on dis-
covery-in 1592, occupation since 1833, and somewhat shadowy
claims asserted in the eighteenth century, the Agentine
Government hs stated its. position many times.: ''The Argen-
tine claim to those- islands is incontrovertible and all that
is, lacking for this claim to be adjusted to a juridical. pre-
cept is. that the lawful sovereignty exercised over those
islands be -completed with the actual possession which is
constantly- demanded." Or, as a .leading official of the
Argentine Foreign Office recently stated to an officer of
the?American Embassy, the British took the Falkland Islands
by force and if they did not voluntarily Surrender then,
Argentina would Some day when powerful enough tc.ko the
islands back by force.
B. Review of Argentine ,PoSition to ,1934'
For a century after the British occupation was..
effected, Argentine policy withrespect to. the Falkland
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Islands a.PP'earb not to hava developed beyond the reiteration
of national. rights by the Argentine Foreign Office_ as occa-
sion. . _ _ _
offered. Without backing from a larger poWer,
Argentina ? Was by itself too weak to force the issue against
the British Government, and such support was not forth- .
coming. In the 18801s the Argentine Goverment tried with-
out success to secure the good offices .of the American
Government on theplea that the British had violated the
Lonroe Doctrine by seizure of the islands. In rejecting
this appeal, the American Government relied upon the posi-
tion that the 1,:onroe Doctrine was not retroactive because
British claims advanced against the Spanish Crown antedated
the Doctrine, and that the latter was therefore inapplicable.
C. Review of Argentine Position since 1934
The Falkland Islands dispute in its modern :phase
dates from the early 1930's, when national claims t
.,nuestras Malvinas became a popular issue, The resentment
caused by British demands for trade and financial conces-
sions at this time furnished an especially favorable set-
ting for the active renewal of the dispute. With Foruign
Office approval, Dr. -Alfredo L. Palacios, leader of the
Socialist Party, inaugurated a campaign for tho.roturn of
the Falklands in a 'series ..of speeches delivered during the
1934 sessions of Congress. Pro-Gerl:in .elements in Argentina
subsequently took advantage of tho Falklands Issue toin-
flame anti-British feeling. ,Uc_til some time after the out-
break of. the Second -4-orld War, renewed Argentine interest
in the Falklands appears to have been largely unofficial and
the result of agitation by leftist and nationalist intel-
lectuals nnd anti-Rritish groups. The Argentine delegations
at the Panama and Habana meetings of Foreign 1.:Inisters
re-
servea national rights in the Falklands according to the
time-honored formula, but did not argue that the establish-
ment of the defense zone as such affected the Falklands
dispute.
The possibility of recovering the Falklands from
British occUbation apparently first began to receive seri-
ous official attention in 1941. The .Argentine High Seas
Fleet is reported to have sailed during this year under
sealed orders -- countermanded at the last moment -- to
occupy the Falklands. Whatever the basis for this report,
in December 1941 the Argentine Government, for the first
time since the exchange of notes in the 18801s, indicated
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a desire to secure the assistance of the American Government
in regaining the Falklands. At this time the Argentine
Foreign Minister told the American Ambassador that the
Argentine naval defense plan ?envisaged an area in the South
Atlantic including the Falkland Islands and that his govern-
ment might request the good offices of the American Govern-
ment for the purpose of inducing the British to withdraw
from the Falklands. Embassy Buenos Aires commented that
"the reason for this change in tactics is open to conjec-
ture but it may be that the Argentines feel that they can
now invite the cooperation of the United States by contend-
ing that it is necessary for the defense of Argentina as
well as for continental security to have the Falklands under
Argentine control." --However this proPosel should be inter-
preted, the course of tho war and of Argentine relations
with the US made it academic. The requirements of continen-
tal defense ceased for the time being to constitute a useful
argument for the Argentine Government against British occupa-
tion of the Falklands, and, following the Juno 1943 Revolu-
tion, other problems absorbed the energies of Argentine
policy-makers.
As a popular issue, the Falklands dispute had a
natural appeal to the Argentine Congress which took office
following the elections of February 1946. One of the
earliest acts of the new Chamber of Deputies was to pass
unenimouSly a resolution presented by an Opposition Radical
deputy that "it would view it with pleasure should the
Executive Power, opportunely and with due urgency; address
the Security Council of the United Nations affirming the
sovereign rights of the Argentine Nation over the Islas
Malvinas [-Falklands 7, claiming from England, the nation
holding them, the restitution of this territory." The '
PerOn Government did not act upon the resolution of the
Chamber of Deputies end in the United Nations limited its
initiatives With respect to the Falklands to a stock reser-
vation of rights'in connection with resolutions on colonial
areas. However, the administration took certain other in-
direct measures to strengthen Argentine claims in the
Falklands. By decree of October 9, 1946, it affirmed
national sovcreinty over the "Argentine continental
plateau" and the "Aro:entine epi-continental See, citing a
declaration of the American Government in 1945 establishing
sovereignty over the continental shelf of the United States.
This area, interpreted by both the American and Argentine
Governments as extending to a point atwhich the sea is
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more than 100 fathoms deep, included the Falkland Islands.
The insistence of the Argentine delegation that the hemi-
sphere defense zone as finally established at the Conference
of Rip de Janeiro in 1947 should include the Antarctic as
well ns the Falklands indicated that the Argentine Govern-
ment viewed the regional defense measure as a potential
source' of support for its claims in both areas (sec below,
p.15 ). In addition the Peron administration's aggressive
development of Argentine claims in Antarctica, beginning
in 1946 (see below, D.11 ), represented a new threat to
the British position ill the Falk/lands.
The most recent move of the Peron administration
with respect to the Falklands has been to revive the pro-
posal that the American Government support Argentine
efforts to regain the islands. In March 1948 the Argen-
tine Foreign Minister told the American Ambassador that
he and Peron felt thnt war with Russia was inevitable, that
Argentina would join the US on the first day of war, and
that Argentine possession of the Falklands was indispen-
sable since the islands were the only bl:se from which
Russia could operate against Argentina. In these circum-
stances, the Foreign Minister stated, he hoped that the ?
American Government would give Argentina support in making
good its claims to the Falklands.
D. Current Argentine Policy in the Falklands
The PerOn administration has made a more important
issue of the Falklands than its predecessors, but activity
in support of Argentine rights in the islands has thus
far been limited to verbal Ee :sures. This policy is dic-
t:ated by the facts of the situ tion, Argentina's interest
in the Y lhlnds is 1:,r,:;ely a mutter of prestige. The
British Government is in possession and has shown no will-
ingness to withdraw in favor of Argentina. Argentine is
not in a Position to force the issue by direct diplomatic
or military moans and might lose rather than gain prestige
from an _Atempt to do so. Although Argentina is thus
dependent upon indirect pressure to make good its claims
against the British, the Peron administration is setting
the stage for recovery of the Falklands when occasion
offers. Its forward movement in Antarctica has served to
raise the question of claims in the Falklands to a more
active status, since in connection with the Antarctic
dispute, both parties use rights in the Falklands to
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support Antarctic claims. The discussion of Argentine
claims in the Antarctic and official propaganda on behalf
of such claims also works to heighten the national sense
of grievance against British occupation of the Fulklands.
Likewise the claim to the Falklands as part of Argentina's
?continental shelf'? and the inclusion of the Falklands in
the defense zone, however poor the legal arguments on either
point, provide elements of support for Argentina's position
in the Falklands dispute.
Future Prospects
It appears unlikely that the Falklands dispute will
be decided on the merits of the case. Neither the Argentine
nor the British Government appears willing to submit its
claims to the International Court or to impartial arbitra-
tion. Since Argentina is not in a position to use force
to make good its claims, it is also unlikely that the
Falklands dispute will lead to a broach of the peace. How-
ever, Argentina may be able to substitute leverage for
direct application of force. Even if the American Govern-
ment is unwilling to force British withdrawal from the
Falklands, the Argentine Government probably hopes to exert
such leverage through the inter-American system and through
its operations in Antarctica.
On the face of things Argentina cannot seriously
affect the British position in the Falklands by raising the
issue at the Bogota Conference as it proposes to do. Inter-
American resolutions condemning the maintenance of colonial
possessions by non-continental powers within the hemisphere,
asserting the sanctity of the hemisphere defense zone, and
censuring ??aggressiono by non-continental powers in the
defense zone would have no effect on the lugal position of
the British and no direct affect on its position in general.
However, the 2eron administration may SC:6 some possibility
of maneuvering the American Government into bringing pres-
sure on the British Government. Linking the colonial issue,
the defense zone, and." who question of '?aggression by a non-
continental ;Dower, the Argentine delegation would be in a
position to exploit certain ambiguities in American policy
and to attack either directly or covertly the sincerity of
Am.erican policy on colonial possoSsions and its reservations
regarding the scope of the hemisphere defense agreement. In
securing an inter-A.Lielican resolution on the subject, Argen-
tina might not only give additional color to its Falklands
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claims, it mi,c4ht also succeed in forcing the American Govern-
ment out of its traditionally neutral position. If success-
ful in this endeavor, the Argentine Government would gain a
certaln advantage, whichever side the American Government was
made to appear to favor. If official expressions by the US
are taken as saprorting British clims, the US will be a tar-
-get for nationalist, Communist, and other anti-US groups in
the hemisphere. If Argentina could, either at the Confer-
ence or later, elicit signs of support by the US for Argen-
tine claims, this support would undoubtedly be exploited to
the fullest against tht British position in the Falklands.
The form and timing of Argentine attempts to make
good the Falklands claims will also be governed by events
in Antarctica, by the success of British resistance to
Argentine advances in that area, and by the form in which
Antarctic claims are eventually settled. In an exposition
of the PerOn administration's policy in the Falklands made
in Earch 1947, Foreign I:inister Bramuglia said: oThe prob-
lems of the Antarctic and the L-lvinas Islands are different;
they have different origins and they require different ,solu-
tions." Despite these differences, the Foreign iiinister com-
mented, the two problems have oa certain regional and politi-
cal similarity.'' This regional and political similarity,
which inheres in the fact that both Argentine and British
claims in Antarctica are to some extent based on the Falk-
lands, means that British weakness in face of Argentine ad-
vances in Antarctica may be construed as an invitation to
Argentina to move to force wi Lhdrawal of the British.from
the Falklands.
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II. ARGENTINE CLAIMS IN ANTARCTICA
94
A. Background of the Antarctic Question
International interest in the potential
resources and in the strategic and prestige value of
Antarctic territory is currently at the highest peak
since the discovery of the area. British, Argentine,
and Chilean maneuvers during the 1948 season in the
Palmer Peninsula area of Antarctica, which are only
the latest in a series of, moves made by these gov-
ernments to support claims between 200W and 900W,
have brought into focus the general problem of over-
lapping territorial claims in Antarctica. Argentina
claims a sector lying between 25?17 and 74?W, and south
of 60?S, including Palmer Peninsula, the South
Shetlandsl.South Orkneys, and other island groups.
In connection with its claims in the Pntarctic and
the Falklands, it also asserts sovereignty over the
South Georgia and Sandwich Islands which lie north
of its Pntarctic.claim. ,The Argentine claim over-
laps both the British claim between 200W and 80N
and the Chilean claim between 53?',1 and 90?W, and
is potentially in conflict with US reserved rights
in Antarctica. The American Government has so far
abstained from a formal claim to Antarctic tirritory,
but has reserved its rights in ?the area .and has
refused to recognize claims of other countries.
(See attached map)
The bases for claims already made in Antarctica
comprise discovery, assertion of sovereignty, explora-
tion, exercise of authority, oCcupation, historical
rights, contiguity and geological.affinity. Because
of the peculiar nature of Antarctic territory, legal
requirements for the establishment of valid title to
Antarctic claims cannot readily be deduoed from rules '
of internationallaw and standards applicable to the
Conditions of this area have yet to become the subject
of a ,special international agreement.- Meanwhile, the
various claimants have attempted to strengthen their
rights through activity in Antarctica. Claims ?in
Antarctica by Britain and potential claims by the US
are based chiefly on discovery, exploration, and some
type of occuPation. In addition the'British Government
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formally assertedjts.claims in 1908 and has exer-
cised a degree of supervision over the sector -
claimed from its base in the Falklands. The South
American claims depend largely upon proximity and
the questionable principle of geological continuity.*
Argentina also places heavy reliance on the fact that
it is the only power which.has maintained. permanent
occupation of any point in Antarctica over a long
period, but this occupation appears to have little
standing.at international law as the basis of a
claim.to a.wide area in the Antarctic. .Likewise
Argentine claims on the basis of expeditions,
exercise of authority, and assertions of .sovereignty
do not compare favorably-With.British claits. The
Chilean position in Antarctica vOich Tests on shadowy
historical rights, early assertions of sovereignty,
and recent occupation of a base in Antarctic -a as-yell
as the principles of proximity and geological contin-
uity, is in turn less well-founded that Argentina's
Argentina has advanced the.thesiS that the-Andes-
eXtension through the Falkland, South Sandwich,
South Georgia, South Orkney, and South Shetland
Islands to the Palmer Peninsula is a valid basis.
for its claims in Antarctica. Chile likewise
asserts the Andes extension to Intarcticaasa
basis for its claim. On the basis of sonic
soundings and geological inVestigations, ,the
intrusion of the Andes via ..the Falkland and
other:islands into the Palmer Peninsulaappears
to. be a fact. (Stanley Kemp, "The South 'Sandwich
ISlands", British Colonial Office, DiscoVerY
Reports, 'Vol. II (1931), 154,197), Thus, in the
unlikely event th.Ptgeological continuity were.
accepted as a basis for Antarctic claims and
-Argentinas,rights in the Falkland Islands werey
recognized, the Argentine Government would .be
able to assert such a claim. 'The Chilean
which appears to lack scientific confirmation,
Would not compete with the Argentine claim.
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claim,*
The American and British Governments appear
to have the,only substantial practical interest in
the yet unproven potentialities of the Antarctic.
Its strategic value exists, if at ,a11,. only in terms
of the problems of world powers; and the great powers
alone can fully exploit the scientific and economic
possibilities of the area. But Argentina and Chile
have developed a stake in Antarctica as a source of
prestige at home and abroad. This barren area offers
an unrivaled exercise ground for aggressive military
and diplomatic activity with none of the usual Penal-
ties of such activity, and has thereby secured an
importance to ?these governments out of proportion to
its real value to them. .Superficialiy 'the Argentine
forward movement and Chilean maneuvers in Antarctica
are harmless means of providing a release for nation-
alist feelings. But nationalist aspirations are being '
strengthened in the process and popular expectations
now being aroused ma Y render more difficult the
eventual settlement of Antarctic claims. Moreover,
the British Government fears that continued Arg-
entine.moves in Intarctica will eventually extend
northviard to the disputed Falkland Islands and will
adverselY affect the position of other British
territories. V ?
B. Review of Argentine Position to 1939
During the first phase of Antarctic exploration,
from 1820 to 1840 the newly-established Government of
The wider question of the standing of various
types of claims and the bases for such claims
by interested countries is dealt with at length
in OIR Report No, 4436, September 12, 1947,
Basis for Possible US Claims in Pntarctica,
Secret, and in CIA Map Report No. M-1, History
and Current Status of Claims in Antarctida
(to be issued). Secret;
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the United Provinces was satisfied to assert control
over its continental territory. At this tune it was
too weak even to resist the British occupation of the
Falklands in 1833, which. was itself a reflection of
British operations in the Antarctic region. With the
exhaustion of the seal fisheries about 1840, US and
European activity in the Antarctic almost ceased until
the last decade of the century. The development of
scientific and commercial interest in the Antarctic
then brought a revival of international activity in
the area which has continued almost without interrup-
tion to the present day.
'Argentina made its debut in the Antarctic in
1903, when the government sponsored a mission to
relieve a Swedish expedition stranded at'Hope Bay
in the Palmer Peninsula. In the following year the
governmpnt accepted from .a Scottish expedition the
offer.of its equipment and a weather station at Laurie
Island in the South Orkneys, and has continUed since
that time to maintain a year-round station on the
Island.. Although occupation of this island subsequently
has become an important element 'in Argentine claims,
the government originally made1 no formal claim of
sovereignty and when the British Government by
Letters Patent of 1908 annexed:a large Antarctic area
including the South Orkneys, the Argentine Govern-
ment failed to protest this assertion ofsovereignty.
Argentina' S first claim to sovereign jurisdic-
tion over Antarctic territory appears to ha -e been
made in 1923. In that year the Argentine Government
-registered a protest' with the Universal Postal Union
against the issuance of a British stamp for the
Falkland Islands Dependencies which showed the British
Claim as established in Letters Patent of 1917.amending
the:Letters Patent issued in 1908. Argentina, it was
stated, exorcised "territorial jurisdiction ,.'.
de lure and de. facto over ;its continental surface,
its territorial 'sea and over'the islands situated on
its sea cbast over part of the island of Tierra del
Fuegol over...the-Islands of Los Estados, Afto Nuevo,
the South Georgias',. the South Orkneys, and polar areas
which ha,-e not-been-dolimited." Again in 1928 the
Argentine Foreign Office reiterated this claiM to the
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13.
Universal Postal Union in connection with Argentina's
establishment of a radio station at the South Orkney's
base, and to the British Government which had protested
the installation of the station. These protests and
the exchange of notes with the British appear to have
had no repercussions when made and there is no evidence
that the Argentine Government made any serious attempt
to develop its claims to sovereignty in Antarctica
until more than a decade later.
C. Review of A r_g21.211./atE2aLtipal_1322=122,1.3
? lc ILIIIIELL2=a,_3,211:1212. Argentine claims in
the Pntarctic and the public statement of these claims
began to crystallize in 1939. Positive official acts
in support of Argentina's claims had been limited to
continued maintenance of the Laurie Island station and
to the protests and exchange of notes with the ,British
Government in the 1920's which were noted aboYe. Arg-
entine rights in the Falklands had become a theme of
renewed interest in 1934 in the backwash of nationalist
and anti-British feeling from economic difficulties
of the depression (see p. 6-7), but the Antarctic
attracted little or no attention. The initial stimulus
to interest appears ?to have been provided in the
uneasy summer of 1939 by the announcement of the Byrd
Expedition and Norway's move to call an International
Polar Exposition and Congress of Arctic explorers at
Bergen. By decree of July 15, 1939, the Argentine
Government set up a commission in the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs to plan for participation in the
Bergen Conference and to study "the possibility of
carrying out, on behalf of the State; thorough
exploration in that part of the Antarctic regions
which are considered most closely connected with the
Argentine Territory." The preamble to the decree .
cited Argentina's maintenance of a permanent observa-
tory in the Antarctic, naval expeditions, and geogra-
phic and geological bases for Argentine "interest"
in the region, but made no mention of "claims" or
"rights" in the Antarctic such as had been made in
the statements published in the 1920's. The
Commission was specifically charged to "make a full
study of the present state of the problems of the
Antarctic and their eventual connection with Arg-
entine interests, and it will also propose to the
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Executive Power a plan of ad-Lion comprising matters
of oceanographic and meteorologic nature, as well as
fishing and exploration such as the country may
take upon itself to make."
,
When first published on July 15, 1939,'the,
decree attracted no attention, providing a Measure
? of the absence of public interest in Argentina's
,position in the Antarctic.. But, beginning on July 24,
the entire Buenos Aired press simultaneously gave
heavy coverage to the decree, to the forthcoming
Bergen conference, to Argentine Antarctic claims,
and to the possibility that the Byrd Expedition
foreshadowed assertion of Clairds by the American
Government. Embassy? Buenos Aires reported that
the points taken up'and the phraseology used were
so similar as to warrant the belief that, despite
the expressed surprise of the Foreign Office at
the aggressive and provocative one adopted by the
press, the campaign was officially inspired. The
critical reaction abroad to the Prgentine press
. campaign brought a statement by the Argentine
'Embassy in Washington that the "Foreign Office ...',
without any intention against any friendly country,
is only considering the unquestionable interests of
Argentina in those regions within a criterion of
permanent collaboration with the other countries
who are carrying out their action in the Antarctic."
This statement appears ,to have closed the affair.
With the outbreak of wrr the gbvernment's
plans to advance Argentine "interests" at Bergen,
(which was in any case to have been a strictly
scientific conference) were forestalled by the
cancellation? of the conference. ? Anxiety.conc'err4ng
the objectives of the Byrd Expedition of 1940 was
apparently allayed by official assurances from
the US thatit was "not intended 'to prejudice in any
way the rights or interests which any American '
Republic May have in thr Antarctic regions" and would
in fact serve to safeguard hemisphere rights in
Antarctica and to prevent encroachments .by non-
hemisphere powers. Moreavrr special facilities were
provided to Argentina and Chile to permit designated
representatives .to visit the Byrd h-Dadquarters in the
Antarctic. '
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Pt the Panama meeting of Foreign Ministers of
September 1939 and subsequently the Argentine Gov-
ernment spoke in terms of Argentine "claims and
rights in the Antarctic," "possession and sovereignty
over certain Antarctic areas," "Antarctic regions
claimed bv the Argentine Republic," and so forth. But
.the language of its reservations end statemerits contin-
ued vague and general. In connection with Argentina's
standard reservation of rights in the Falklands in
the Panama Declaration establishing a hemisphere
defense zone, Foreign Minister Leolzioldo Melo stated
that .the legitimate claims and rights of the Arg-
entine Republic are reserved and maintained intact
with respect to islands such as the Malv,nas, as well
as any other Argentine lands which might be situated
within or beyond the line." (italics supplied)
In reconstituting on a permanent basis the
Commission originally established to prepare for
the Bergen Conference, the government charged it "to
centralize and take charge of the study and advice
relative to all matters connected with the protection
and development of national interests in the Antarctic
region and in the Antarctic Continent ..." and made
no specific territorial claim. The reservation of
Argentina's rights in the Falklands at the Habana
Meeting of Foreign Ministers in June 1940 again.
included a proviso on the Antarctic, which was
simply described as "other southern Argentine regions."
Moreover, when the Chilean Government, which followed
Argentina's example? in reserving rights in the Antarctic
at the Habana Meeting, proclaimed Chilean sovereignty
over the sector lying between 53 and 90 degrees west
longitude, he Argentine Government did not make a
counterclaim to a specific area, but merely stated
"that the situation created by the unilateral claims
to zones of the Antarctic made by various states, to
which Chilean claims are now added, can be satisfactorily
settled from an international point of view only by
means of a conference of the interested States and
through an agreement among them on the basis of their
just claims and rights." However, it welcomed Chile's
suggestion that the two countries meet to agree on
their rights in the Antarctic. Meetings subsequently
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held wi'h the Chileans in March 1941 were inconclusive
and wore hot resumed'as. planned, rei)ortedly because of
conditions in Argontina and in the world at large.
(For review'of'Chilean position see p.24 ).
2. Zaaallifilaraw14_1211=13. Argentine activities
in the Antarctic Passed into a more positive phase in
1941. Ps nated abovel'in this year the go-ernment mede
a tentative approach to the American Ambassador to
explore the possibility of securing a British with-
drawal from the Falkland Islands. Pt the same time
Argentina was preparing to move forward in' Antarctica
proper with the purpose of staking claims and making
new installations. The forward movement was a natural
sequel to the diplomatic demarches, .official propaganda,
and Public discussions,that began early in .1939. In
addition, conflicting and unresolved Chilean claims,
the temporary withdrawal of BritiSh stations in
Antarctica, the possibility that Britain would be
defeated by the Axis, the fact that the Drake
Passage would he an important channel if for any reason
the Pannma Canal were closed, and.th- lack of response
to Prgentina's proposal for an international conference
may ha-e contributed 'to the decision to'expand the
bases of Argentine "c1Pims and rights in Antarctica"
and to define those claims.
The Prgentine Government in November 1941
declared the ?opening of a permanent post office in
the Orkneys; 'which placed 'on a formal basis the
postal facilities maintained at Laurie Island since
'1904, and began to prepare. an expedition for the 1942
Antarotic'season. In February 1942 the Argentine
AntarCtic expeditiOn made Argentina's first 'specific
? claim-to a sector of the Antarctic: The commander
of the nPval transport Primer() de Ilavo left a '
docuffient at strategic DeCe.ptiOn IslPhd in the South
? Shetlands '"reaffirming" Argentine rights over the
sector between 2501:: and' 68034'7, south of 600S.
At the same time the Argentine representative took
formal posseSsion'of Deception Island, placing Arg-
entine markers and painting' the i'itional colors on
British installations. In May 1942 the 'Argentine
Government proceeded to install a lighthouse at
Dallman Bay, Melchior Prchipelago, southwest of the
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Shetlands. Partly as a countermove to I'rgentine
activity the British Govern,lent in January 1943 sent
a cruiser through -the South Shetlands and South -
Orkneys' with instructions to destroy Argentine
markers at Deception Island and replace them with
?Titish emblems of sovereignty. Subsequently the
British Government notified the Argentine.Foreign
Office 'of its actiOn,?ekpressing isurprise-and-regret"
at Argentina's attempt to assert possession of -
.Deception Island. In its reply of February 19,43 the
Argentine Fareiin Office reaffirmed the sector claimed
in' the dOcumentS-deposited at Deception and thereby
put the British 'Government formally on notice for
the. first time that it claimed a sector superimposed
upon the greater part of the British sector (200W
to 800W) as well as the?islands south of the Falk-
lands 'which had been the subject of previous declara-
tions. Although the Argentine 'Government expressed its
"most -formal reservations to jurisdictional acts
carried out by British officials" within the Argentine
claim, both governmentslagreed to give the episode -
no publicity. Moreover, when the Primero de Mayo,
visited- Deception Island in March 1943 on a second
survey expedition, apparently no further provocation
was offered the British, although the Argentine ,press
reported that the markers left in 1942 .had been removed.
3. SuapHns.ion of Activity undo r de, .facto Govcrnm2n .
The question of. Argentine claims in the', Antarctic
appears to have been shelved during the period
the de. facto government which assumed control in
June 1943.. The unstable character of the government
and the grave problems 'thatit faced meant that
.Argentina's claims in,Pntarctica, which had been
advanced chiefly for. their prestige value, had a low
priority. Moreover, since the de facto 'governtent
was anxious to assure continued recognition by the
British Government, its chief rival in Antarctica,'
it was in no position to ruffle British feelings -
by pressing. Argentine claims. During this period
the British Government established token settle-.
illnts in the Antarctic sector claimed by Argentina,
There is. no record that the _Argentine Government
registered a protest, and the lighthouse established
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18.
in the Helchior ATchipelago in 1942 was allowed to go
out of commission. Annual relief missions to the
Orkneys continued, but Argentine activity in the
Antarctic as in the Falklands was put on a standby
basis.
4. Second Forward Movement 1 46-date. With the
election of Per6n in February 1946 and the establish-
ment of the government on a firm constitutional basis,
Prgentina's forward movement in the Antarctic was
resumed. The new governmnt was no longer so greatly
in need of British support for its international
position; it also was ambitious to reestablish Arg-
entine prestige abroad. The Antarctic claims were
well designed for this purpose. There was little
danger that assertion of claims would lead to an
international incident. Because of the peculiar
nature of the region in dispute the government could,
send notes, protests, and expeditions almost at
will without suffering the usual consequences of such
action, and was assured of the unanimous support of
all political groups and of public opinion in general
for an aggressive policy. Thus the government could
anticipate a return from its efforts both in domestic
and foreign affairs out of Proportion to the risks
involved and the expenditure required to fit out naval
expeditions yid make new installations in Antarctica.
Moreover, as the war ended, foreign activity in the
, area was renewed in 1946 and the spur of competition
provided to Argentine policy-makers.
Less than a month after the elections which
ensured its continuation in power, the Per6n
administration reactivated the 1\itional /ntarctic
Commission by decree of March 23, 1946, a move
described as "one of the most significant ?steps taken
by the Argentine Republic initiating a great campaign
to consolidate its rights in the Antarctic region."
Under a decree of September 2, 1946, the government
prohibited publication of maps. which failed to show
all Argentine territory, including the Pntarctic
sector, and vested the Instituto Geografico Militar
with supervision over maps published. In November
1946 the Instituto issued a map extending Argentine
claims to include 250ii to 74cW instead of 680341W,
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and new stamps showed Argentine claims. In connection'
with the drive to create a "national Antarctic-
mindeness", "active journalistic propaganda by means
of systematic publications" and celebration of
Argentine anniversaries relating to the Antarctic
were promoted by the National Antarctic Commission,
The Argentine Chamber.of Deputies in July 1946
approved unanimously a motion that the government
submit the.nation's,claims to the Falklands and
.Antarctica to the Security Council .(see p. 7
The Foreign Office protested British claims as?
occasion offered. It also undertook in July 1947
to reach an agreement with Chile on a common boundary
and it renewed Argentina's proposal that an interna-
-tional conference be held to settle the problem of
the Antarctic as a whole.
The government climaxed this verbal offensive
in December 1946 by preparing an expedition to
establish new bases in the Antarctic. Unilateral
action by the various interested countries to improve
their several positions hd-already become the order
of the .day. During the 1947 season two expeditions
from the US and one from Chile visited the polar
regions, and British expeditions had already estab-
lished token settlements in.the sector claimed by
the British and Argentine Governments.. .The Argentine
expedition, as the Ministry of Marine somewhat .
extravagantly put it, would complement "the chain of
installations based. in the Orkneys ..." and would
explore ,Pntarctica as far west as 740W. The Foreign
Office rejected a British offer to asSist the
"Argentine,visitors" who mightcall at the British '
stations as "not consistent with reality, because a
visitor cannot be considered as such when he visits
his own property."
During its visit to Prgentine "property", which
received headline press treatment at.home, the 1947
expedition provided the annual relief party for
Argentina's base at Laurie'Island, receMmissioned:
the lighthouse set up at Dallman Bay, Melchior
Archipelago in, 1942, .installed several new beacons.,
and left a group. of men at a Helthier Archipelago,
station, on Gamma Island. Anchoring supply ships at
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Deception Island, it cruised down the western coast
of Graham Land to T.Targuerite Bay, conducting hydro-
graphic research and extensive chart and astronomical
,vork, and on its return to Argentina, left a ship
anchored at Deception Island. As Foreign Minister
Bramuglia summed up the work of the expedition, it
had constituted."one of the most important operations
effected thus far in the Antarctic. Our coUntry-
has the satisftotien of having. contributed to the
knowledge of that region and of he-in actually been
in its Antarctic zone with a fleet of seven ships, at
the same time that other powerful nations were 'making
similar efforts in other Darts of the southern
continent."
Renewed Argentine activity in the expedition
of 1947 conflicted chiefly with British pretensions
in the Antarctic area. The American expeditions of
that year led by Pd7iral Byrd and Commander Finn
Lonne-did not enter the "Argentine scoter". In
reciprocation for an rgentine invitation to Chilean
officers in 1943 the Chilean -expedition of 1947 had
inVited the participation of Argentine representatives.
In turn Chilean officers* accompanied the Argentine '
expedition. This spirit, of accord.- in Argentine-
Chilean relation5 in Antarctica was further signalized
by.a joint declarEtion of July 12; 1947 during
President GonzaleZ Videla's stay in Buenos Aires that
the two governments were "desirous of putting into
effect 'a friendly policy for. determining frontiers"
and "that they desire to conclude as soon as possible
an Argentine-Chilean treaty of demarcation of limits
of [;outh ,PMerican Antarctica."
The Rio Conference of tugust-September.1947
.afforded the Peron Administration a new chance to lend
color to its Pntarctic claims in connection with the
demarcation of the hemisphere defense zone. The limits
of this zone were laid down by a subcommittee of
Committee II to cover the area originally demarcated
at the Panama.Meeting of 1939, which did not overlap
ar4.tish claims in :Antarctica. . At the instance of the
Lrgentine and Chilean delegations the zone was enlarged
t.o cdver the entire area Claimed by these two countries
a.nd to blanket in all but a small .sector of the British
c-IL: L.,
CPT-PT
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"juridico-political status" of Antarctica. Fimultan-
eously the Areentine Ministry of Marine announced the
dispatch of an Argentine task force of cruisers,
destroyers, auxiliary ships, and airplanes for maneuvers
in the Antarctic and a visit to Deception Island. The
British Government replied to this move by sending the
cruiser Nigeria to show the flag in JrItrctic waters.
Similarly the Chilean Government embarked its Pres-
ident to the area to assert Chilean claims.
Recent British activity in the area has been
widely criticized by nublic opinion in the other
Ama rican republics as an "aggression" against the
hemisphere, and the minor crisis brought on by the
dispute over Anterctiaahas raised in a confused form
the largely unrelated issues of the sanctity of the
hemisphere defense zone, old-established territorial
disputes between Latin American and European countries,
and the general problem of colonial policy of the great
powers in the postwar era. The US Government has again
stated that the establishment of the hemisphere defense
zone in no way affects non-continental rights in the
hemisphere, but it remains to be seen what effect this
disclaimer will have in moderating Latin American
demands for retaliatory action against British "aggression".
(For review of Latin Imerican opinion, see p.30 )
D. Current Argentine Policy in Antarctica
The Intarctic policy of Peron has been more
aggressive than the policy followed by preceding
administrations. The change reflects the increased
stature of Argentina and the anxiety of the government
to capitalize on its relatively improved position.
The Antarctic is of little practical value to Argentina,
but the Antarctic controversy affords Peron a means of
increasing his administration's prestige at home and
abroad. The area is an appropriate stage for action
because, unlike the Falklands, it is the subject of
a number of ill-defined claims; it has not been occupied
in any real sense by competing powers; and it provides
a safe exercise ground for disrlays of force. Army,
naval, and air missions to the 1-Interctic are calculated
to impress Argentina's neighbors without gii-ing rise to
problems which are usually associated with aggression
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claim. Both cro-ernment.s r-,served'their claims to
territorieS within the znne in signing the Rio
Trieatr. Although the delegation of the US acceded
to the enlargement of. the defense zone, it stated
for the"record' that Pthe treaty of Flo' de Janeiro
has no effect upon the sovereignty, national or
international status of any of the territories
included therein." Argentine and Chilean officials,
howeveri have tended to construe the extension of the
defense zone as providing support for the claim that
the Antarctic area included within its 'hounds belongs
to the two hemisphere claimants, Argentina and Chile.
Argentine activity during the current Antarctic
open season has continued along the lines laid down
by the reconstructed National Antarctic Commission in
1946, but has secured international notice as a
conseouence of British nrotests nd moves to counter
South American claims in the "British sector." The
1948 Argentine expedition set up a radio station at
the Gamma Island station in Helchior Archipelago
and built a hut on King George Island in the South
E-Detlands. It also established radio and weather
stations at Deception Island where, as noted above,
markers left by the Araentino expedition of 1942
were ?removed by a British cruiser in 1943. On
December 13, 1947 a 2500-mile non-stop flight was
made by an Argentine naval plane which passed over
Deception Island and .Melchior Arc inelago and reached
latitude 6705 and 6807. This flight was described by
the Chief of Naval. Aviation, Rear Admiral Portillo, as
"a demonstration that the Antarctic is ours, not only
by ocean navigation, but, by air, since we are able to
arrive there at any time to resolve our problems."
The British Government formally protested
Argentine and Chilean activity in its Antarctic zone
by notes of December 17 and 23, 1947. It suggested
that the South American claimants shouldoporate under
British concessions, or, alternatively, either withdraw
or submit their claims to the International Court of
Justice. Both the Argentine and Chilean Governments
have rejected this proposal, and Argentina in its
reply of January 28 suggested that an international
conference meet in Buenos Aires to determine the
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directed toward inhabited areas. The dispatch of
the British cruiser Nigeria has aided Per6n in his
efforts to dramatize the controversy and has excited
Argentine interest in the area even more effectively
than the flood of official propaganda on Argentine
claims and acti'itis in Pntarctica. The Argentine
Government's policy in Intarctica hes, furthermore,
evoked expressions of support from many other American
republics following? the British move to counter
Argentina's advance in the area.
Argentine policy toward competing powers in
Antarctica has been defined as regards Britain and
Chile: Argentina refuses to acknowledge British
sovereignty in the region and has challenged 'the
British claim at one of its strongest points by
making installations et T)ec6ption Island and by using
the island as a center for naval maneuvers. The
dispatch of a British cruiser does not appear to
have discouraged Argentine moves to assert Anterctic
claims. The British h,'ve, demanded that Argentina
acknowledge British sovereignty, withdraw Argentine
forces, or submit the question of claims to the
International Court. Continued Irgmtine activity
and the counter-proposal that a conference be held in
Buenos hires to settle Antarctic claims indicates that
Argentina is not interested in a settl6ment of its
dispute with the British Government on any terms
that the latter would willingly accept.
Argentine policy tow-rd Chile is conciliatory;
it app(ars directed to prove that than: is no important
conflict between Argentine and Chilean claims; that
the two South American governments form a united front
against the British claimant; and that the matter of
overlapping Argentine-Chilean claims can'be settled
through negotiation. The Chileans appear to be uneasy
in their position as junior partner to Argentina, and,
although undoubtedly pleased to have Argentine support
in rejecting British claims, the Chilean Government
obviously fears that the next stages of the controversy
may find them in an inferior position to Argentina.
But under present conditions, with the dispute involving
only the South American powers and Britain, Argentina
enjoys Chilean cooperation for all public purposes in
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asserting exclusive rights to the "South American
sector" of the Antarctic and gains strength from
this cooneretion.
T1 o claims of the ur in .the area under dispute
have not been defined and Argentine policy as regards
the United States has therefore still to be settled.
The most reent exchange of notes on the subj:ct took
place,nrior to the Byrd ,E)podition and'did not commit
eithr,r government to more than the maintenance of, the
"open door" in Antarctica by the claimant powers. The
American GolTornment at that tithe announced that the
Byrd '-]xnedition was-not intendpd to affect South
American rights and claims ,in Antarctica and, the
Argentine Government in turn expressed'itS apprecia-
tion of this reassurance.
Argentina's stated policy PS regards the method
and terms of settlement has been developed within the
frame of its dispute with the British Government, and,
perhaps for 'his reason, is more uncompromising than
it mighlt otherwise have been. Prgentina has refused
adjudication by the International Court and has
offered to hold a conference in Thenos Aires to
settle the Antarctic qustion. It has announced that
Argentina will ii,sist on its right to a national
zone and that concessions from.the claim of land lying
between 251-f and 740w,will be mrde-only at the western
boundary with the Chilean claim. Prc,sumably the demand
that an extensive zone be nlaced under Argentine
sovereignty is unlikely to be Precd upon by other
claimants, end ther,fore Argentine policy as announced
to date would be a negative factor in nny attempt to
:reache settlement. That the_P-,r6n Paministration
might recede from its publicly-stat,d position is
indicated by the Foreign Minister's strt--ment in
March 1948 that Argentina is prepared to "argue" the
Antarctic question. To what extent Argentina might
eomnromise its claims and ThFt method of settlement
it would Fccept has not, however, ,eon rev?aled.
'E. The Chilean Position in Antrctica
?
' The record of Chilean intorest in intarctica
ante-dates Argentine activity in th crac, but is of
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an even more tenuous nature. Chilean claims are based
largely on succession to Spanish rights in Pntarctica,
which are contestable; on acts of authority exercised
in the region, which are unconvincing in comparison
with those of other claimants; on geological continuity,
which appears to lack scientific foundation (see
footnote, p.10); and on geographical proximity. Chile's
first expedition to the Antarctic took place in 1947
and at that time the Chilean Government established
its first Antarctic base at Greenwich Island in the
South Shetlands, an area which is also claimed by
the British and Argentine Governments.
The modern phase of Chile's interest in
Antarctica, beginning in 1939, appears to have grown
out of thr, some sot of circumstances as frgentine
interest (see p. 13). In signing the Act of Habana
in July 1940, the Chilean Delegation reserved
"the rights of Chile in Antarctica", and the Gov-
ernment nroceeded in November 1940 to fix the
boundaries of Chilean claims in Antarctica, asserting
Chilean sovereignty between 53?W and 90?W. This
decree, the Government stated, was not a claim to
sovereignty but merely formalized. undoubted Chilean
rights in the area. Of the Ameridan and interested
non-American powers whom Chile notified of its action,
the United States, Pritain, Argentina, and. Japan
reserved their rights or-refused recognition of
Chile's claim. The US suggested in its reply of
December 1940 that "it would be desirable for
representatives at least of the governments of the
American Republics that are most directly interested
in the possibility of the Antarctic regions to convene
in a friendly meeting at an opportune time to assess
their respective claims and to discuss the possible
terms of an agreement concerning these matters."
Although the Chilean Government promised to study .
the US proposal, no further official exchange took
Place on the subject of a conference between the two
governments. The Chilean Government had offered for
its part to undertake conversrtions with Argentina
in response to the Argentine reservation of rights
in Antarctica, and .preliminary convers-tions in fact
took place early in 1941. However, they were in,-
conclusive and it is possible that failure to roach
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an agreement with Argentina as well as wartime
conditions were responsible for Chile's lack of
response to the,offer of the US to confer on
Antarctic claims'e.
Argentine-Chilean cooperation in Antarctica has
developed naturally from the fact that both countries
find their chief support in the claim from geographical
proximity. Although the convers-tions held in 1941
came to nothing, the Argentine expedition of 1943
included three Chilean nr'al officers, and again in
1947 expeditions the two countries exchanged personnel.
The accord WPS formally signalized on frgentina's
initiative during the visit of President Gonzalez
Videla to Buenos Aires in July 1947, when the two
governments agreed to conclude a boundary treaty
"ns early as possible." Following Argentine and
Chilean moves against British claims in intarction
in February 1948 and the return of President Gonzalez
Videla from his mission to Antarctica early in March,
P second declaration was issued strengthening the
original declaration. The declaration of March 1948,
which apparently VIPS Plso made on Argentine initiative,
stated that the two governments would establish their
boundaries within the year and that they would "act
by common agreement in the protection and juridical -
defense of rights in South American Pntnrctical in
which territories both recognize unquestionable
sovereign rights ,.. and will continue administrative
action, exploration, vigilance and development in the
undefined boundary region in their respective Antarctic
zones in a spirit of reciprocal cooperation."
Despite the public cooperation of the two
governments, Chilean officials hae indicated to
representatives of the US that the Argentine-Chilean
accord has been more apparent than real. The Argentine
naval officers who accompanied the first Chilean
expedition of 1947 were regarded by the Chilean Gov-
ernment as an embarrassment and secret instructions
were issued to the commander of the expedition to.
prevent their presence at the formal ceremony of
annexation in order to forestall reservations of
irgentine rights. In October 1947 the Chilean
Government Was reported opposed to reaching P final
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settlement of boundaries with Argentina, and it is
noteworthy that both the joint declarations of 1947
and 1948 were the product of Irgentine initiative.'
Chilean activity in the 1948 'season apparently reflected
fear'that. Argentine pret-nsions in fntarctica were
being made good at the expense of Chile as well as
the overt rivalry with the British. In fact Chilean
assertions of sovereignty against the British were
probably more strident than they might otherwise have
been because the Chilean Government felt itself weak
as against both the frgentine and British claims.
Chilean policy as regards Antarctica must
necessarily reckon with the fact that the Chilean
Govprnment will not play a leading part in the
eventual settlement of Antarctic claims and with the
lik-lihood that it success will depend upon the
degree of Argentine success because the two govern-
ments claim on a similar basis. These two factors
make for a somewhat delicate situation. Chile must
beware of submerginc- its interests in those of
Argentina, but it must also support the lead which
Argentina is able to give because of its superior
status and resources in establishing South American
rights in Antarctica.
F. Fliture Prospects
Argentina's Antarctic policy has developed
chiefly from its dispute with the British Government
over sovereign rights in the area, and is at present
roughly- parallel to Chilean policy. Then and if the
American Government states its position, with respect
to Antarctica and its views on the appropriate method
of settling disputed claims, the position of the
present contenders will be to some extent modified.
Under present circumstances ,the stalemate between
?the South American governments and the UK could
continue indefinitely to provide a subject for
agitation. The immediate political stimulus to
activity and the scope for manPuvers have been
lessened with the conclusion of the Argentine
elections early in March and the approaching end of
the Antarctic summer season. But agitation of South
American claims in Antarctica holds continued advan-
tages for prestige purposes and may also serve as a
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28.
mean's of weakening the British position.- n,the Falk-7
The Bogota Conference will probably be used as
a forum by the Arvntine Government, either alone or
in collaboration with the Chilean GovPrnment, as an
opportunity to mobilize the support of the other
American republics for Antarctic claims, In this
case the claims will be linked with the general
question of territorial disputes between Britain and
the other. American republics, notably the Falklands
and Belize issues, and with the entire problem of non-
continental claits and "aggressions" within the
hemisphere defense ?zone. As a dramatic current issue
involving "aggression" in the defense zone by the
British Government, the Antarctic controversy will
undoubtedly supply ammunition'for irredentist claims
against European possessions in the hemisphere, and
in turn the South American claimants stand to secure
backing in Antarctica frdm countries opposing European
colonial claims,
In the matter of territorial claims of Latin
AmeriCan governments aaainst European powers the
United States has taken the position that the establish-
ment of the hemisphere defense zone does not affect
European territorial rights in the Western Hemisphere
and has indicated that such claims are problems to be
settled between the .parties directly involved. The
policy of the US may suffer in comparison with Arg-
entine policy if the Argentine deleaation points up
the contrast between its championship of Latin American
rights and the lukewarm and neutral position of the
US delegation. -Following the line of Argentine repre-
sentatives at the ITO Conference in Habana and on
other occasions, they may be able to use the comparison
to indicate that the interests of the US are at odds
with the interests of the other American republics.
It may be predicted that the Argentine Gov-
ernment will, whatever happens at the Bogota Conference,
continue to carry on operations in Antarctica. To the
extent that it expands these operations, its claims in
Antarctica will be imorovPd as aaainst those of other
governments and will become a fixed element in national
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policy. In any case it may be expected that the
Argentine Government will find time on its side
in the Antarctic dispute and will be inclined to
put off a settlement which might foreclose use
of Antarctica as an exercise ground for the
Argentine Navy and Foreign Office.
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III. FORECAST OF LATIN AMERICAN POSITIONAT.BOGOTA
The dramatic assertions of sovereignty made
by the claimant go,ernments in Antarctica and the
Belize affair evoked widespread comment throughout
Latin America. , The bulk of this comment has not been
addressed directly to the specific issues presented
by the Antarctic and Falklands disputes but rather
to the broader question of European colonial posses-
sions in the hemisphere. Because of this fact and
because the Antarctic, Falklands, and Belize issues
however diverse -- will probably be linked together
at Bogota, the following discussion deals with the
reactions of the various countries to the territorial
c'isputes as a whole as well as to Argentina's claims.
A. General Considerations
The reactions so far publicly expressed, which
have undoubtedly encouraged Latin American claimants
to hope for good support when the Conference meets,
point to certain factors which will work in their
favor. They can anticipate that many of the Latin
American governments will be influenced by the small-
country, anti-imperialist psychology already widely
evidenced in the Latin American press. Argentina can
be expected to attempt to reinforce these sentiments
by bringing pressure to bear directly on the govern-
ments or indirectly through an appeal to conform to
majority views. Such propaganda efforts will be
especially effective to the extent that the US and
Latin American delegations fail to see eye to eye on
other issues, as for example on the economic needs
of Latin America. ,Other factors, however, may weaken
the position of the Latin American claimants. Fridtion
between their governments and certain of their
neighbors will operate to reduce overall support for
the respective claims of Argentina, Chile, and Guatemala.
A desire to cooperate with the US to the degree possible
and the growing sense of responsibility in international
politics felt by some of the leading republics will have
a similar effect. Some of the go,-ernments hope to
dispose of the question of disputed territories as
rapidly as possible or to give it a low priority for
discussion either because they fear to revive latent
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inter-American border disputes or because their
Interest in other items on the agenda is paramount.
Which influences operate most strongly on the
group depends largely upon the circumstances of the
moment at which the Guatemalan or other resolutions
come to be debated and voted upon. As of mid-March
the agitation over territorial claims had diminished
considerably from the peak reached at the time British
warships were dispatched to Antarctica and Belize..
Another incident of the same order would again raise
Latin American temperatures and merely the' discussion
of the. territorial disputes at 'Bogot4 might have the
same result. In the presence of renewed agitation,
governments wishing to cooperate with the US or merely
to maintain a non-committal position would be under
heavy pressure to join the champions of hemisphere
rights and to abandon their intention of cooperating
with the US. On the other hand the world situation
may be of overriding importance. Thus the Chilean
Government itself has already indicated that, in view
of the present international situation, it will avoid
action that might embarrass the American Government,
end the Foreign Minist-r assured the 'American Ambassador
early in,March that. Chile wOuld not seek inter-American
action at Bogot6, but would merely enter its Antarctic
claim as a matter or record.
B. Reactions of 'Non-Claimant Countries
. Of the leading Latin American governments which
have not so far announced territorial claims, those of
Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, and Cuba were opposed to
agitation of: the territorial issue as of mid-March. The
Brazilian government appears best able to maintain this
position since public opinion in that country seems
indifferent to the Latin American 'claimsand the main
potential source of agitation against "imperialism",
the Communist Party, has for some months been suppressed.
The other governments named abbe would encounter more
serious problems if faced with intense'public agitation
favoring the Latin American position anci they might
well be forced to abandon a neutral position in favor
of "Latin American solidarity." However, in normal
circumstancns they can be expected to be obstructive
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or non-committal with reference to agitation of the
territorial disputes. TheUnited'States May also
secure the support of Sate .of the Central American
and Caribbean delegation, because of their dislike
? of Guatemala or because they normally 'support the US
at international gathetrihgs..
-Standing somewhere. in between these countries
.
and thechampions of hemisphere Claims is the Mexican
Government.- It has committed itself to solidarity
with Latin American claims,. but it has declared for a.
temperate approach, and will probably be governed to
large extent tyoirctmStances at the time of the
Conference ? and by the position of the majority.
Ofthe three claimants to disputed territory,
. Chile and Guatemala'ha,:e'been the most Zealous,in
seeking moral support from the US and the other
-American republics. Chile, as noted above; may
temper its policy considerably and Guatemala lacks
the'standihg to organize widespread support fOr, its
.pOsition., Argentina, which would in any case be,the
natural leader because of its prestige, will undoubtedly
be the mot -effective of the group in lobbying. for .
support of a strong resolution.on territorial disputes.
As the dominant country.in southern South America- it is
assured of the support of Paraguayand May be able to
. detach Uruguay. and Bolivia from the neutral Position
which these 'countries have so far maintained. Ecuador,
which takes a serious view. of, Latin American claims,
can be expected to respbnd-readily to Argentine
arguments. Whether Argentina can also 'obtain the
'support of Peru and of the Small Central American
?and Caribbean governments in whose countries its ,
representatives have been actively cultivating Argentine
interests is a matter of speculation. .
'Specific reactions of the Latin American .countries
who are not !-arties to' the disputes as developed to early
Mareh are discussed below.
Brazil The Brazilian Government is in complete accprd
with the neutral attitude. of the American Government
with regard to claims to disputed territory which may
be advanced at the Bogota Conference. The Foreign."
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Minister, moreover, has made positive efforts to
quiet the dispute. The Brazilian Ambassador in
Santiago was instructed to iniicate to the Chilean
Government Brazil's deep concern over agitation
tending to embarrass the UK and give aid and comfort
to its enemies and to urge the use of existing machinery
for peaceful settlement of disputes. In effect Chile
was warned against serving as a catspaw for Argentine
interests. The Brazilian Ambassador in Asuncion also
expressed disapproval of the Paraguayan Foreign
Minister's recent attempt to link latent Brazilian
claims in the Guianas to the current question.
The Brazilian Government will apparently not
be under pressure from the domestic press to alter
its stand and will not be subject to Communist-
inspired agitation. It will be sensitive to pressure
to conform to the views of its Latin American neighbors,
but not to the extent of altering its policy which is
inspired in about equal parts by a desire to play the
role of a responsible world power, by its int-rest in
cooperating with the US, and by its tendency to check-
mate Argentine pretensions when possible.
Bolivia: The Boli-ian Foreign Minister, who has
expressed complete agreement with the US position
regarding territorial disputes, indicated his neutrality
in response to requests of the Chilean and Guatemalan
governments for support of their territorial claims.
The Bolivian press has paid little attention to the
disputes. The one editorial that had appeared on the
subject as of March 10, praised the "new American
international policy" as opposed to "colonial sub-
mission' but the Bolivian Government will probably
not be open to any strong pressure of 1)ublic opinion.
On the other hand, it seems reasonable to assume that
an Argentine request for support would be difficult to
refuse in view of the close eaonomic ties between the
two countries.
Colombia The Secretary-General of the Foreign Office
infomed the American Ambassador that Colombia's
position as regards territorial disputes coincides in
general with that of the US. According to a statement
of another Foreign Office official on February 26,
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Colombia.favors? the British proposal to submit the
Antarctic dispute to the- Permanent Court. The Colombian
.Government may be sUbject to pressure of public opin-
ion, to change its. policy on, this issue. ? El Tiempo,
:right-wing Liberal' daily, declared editorially -that the
sovereign rights of Argentina and Chile in Antarctic
territories merit the supl?ort of all hemisphere
countries t' the Bogota Conference. Other Liberal
newspapers may well adopt the same line., Ex-president
Lopez?through-his organ, El Liberal, could be expected
to take an'"anti-celonial",."anti-imperialist" position
in conformity with his general philosophy.--The
aitanista faction of the Party has been flirting
with the Per6n government recently and might welcome
a chance to demonstrate support for,Argentine interests.
If the influential Liberal press as a whole adopts the
causei.the Government may'encounter?difficulty in
abstaining from support of the Latin American claim-
ants. Moreover, since Bogot4 newspapers will be read
by' many delegates, such a development would provide a
favorable environment for the Argentine delegation
operating in the conference hall lobbies. ?
Ecuador: The Ecuadoran Government will apparently
support Latin-American territorial claims at Bogota.
During a viSit to Honduras early this year the
Ecuadoran Foreign Minister reportedly proposed the
return'of?European possessions to Latin American
claimants as a subject for joint action. In March the
Foreign Office acting avowedly "in compliance with
its duties as regards solidarity which is incumbent
upon the Hispano-American states in the defense of
their common territorial, economic,- and cultural
interests 'i declared that (1) Ecuador is opposed to
all colonial systems, especially in America; (2) the
Belize and Antarctic disputes can be solved pacifically;
and (3) Ecuador is prepared to cooperate to find a
solution,. -These spontaneous expressions would seem
to place the Ecuadoran delegation safely behind the
claims of the Latin American governments.
Paraguav Probably at Argentine instigation the
Paraguayan Foreign Minister has expressed support
of Latin American territorial claims and has even
undertaken to agitate the question with the Brazilian
Embassy in Asunci6n. In a speech of March 12 he said:
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"We are with the American nations fora pacific
solution that will free the land of our countries
from the European colonial regime." There appears
to be little doubt that Paraguay is in the Argentine
camp and will support the Latin American claimants
at Bogota.
Peru: No official response to Latin American appeals
for assistance appears to hare been Made by Peru. The
leading newspaper La Prensa and the Aprista organ
Tribuna had not commented editorially on the dispute
as of March 12, although an unsigned article in the
latter supported South American claims to the Antarctic
and Falklands. ?Presumably the government will not be
exposed to any serious pressure from public opinion in
forming its policy as regards territorial disputes and
will be able to accommodate its .action at Bogota to
the. requirements Of its relations with the US, Arg-
entina, and the inter-American-system as a whole.
Uruguavg? When the Antarctic dispute first came to
public notice in mid-February, President Batlle Berres
told Ambassador Briggs that he favored an over-all
settlement and declared that Uruguay would probably
raise its 'claim against Argentina for Martin Garcia
Island if Argentina sought to enlist Uruguay's support.
Following the meeting of the Argentine and Uruguayan
Presidents on February 27 it was rumored in the Uruguayan
press (1) that they had discussed the Antarctic dispute,
and (2) that Peron had offered to transfer Martin Garcia
to Uruguay, The Presidents.' pUblished agreement involved
settlement of the common boundary in the Uruguay River.
In response to the query of the American Ambassador in
early Macch3 the Foreign- Minister.was non-committal
as to the nosition that Uruguay Would adopt at BogotA
regarding territorial disputes.
The pro-government Uruguayan press has not taken
sides in the Antarctic disputes and editorial comment
has .been confined in most cases to a review of the
background facts and an expression of hope that,the
matter will be settled peacefully and without disturbing
the traditionally friendly relations between Britain,.
Argentina! end Chile, But the opposition Herrerista
press seized upon the dispute to attack the motives and
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attitude of the LE and Britain, asserting that the
US failed to back Latin American rights because it
wished to take over British possessions in Latin
America. The Communist press has' voiced support of
the Chilean position in Antarctica and its comments
on the issue will probably parallel those df the
Nationalists. Under attack from the domestic opposi-
tion and under pressure from Argentina, the Uruguayan
Government may be expected to take a stand in favor
of the Latin American claimants at-Bogot6.
Venezuela: The -Venezuelan Governmeht has acted with
restraint:in this matter, and.its-Foteign, Office
favors the position of the. US'on'territOrial.disputes
.in general. Officials have veiced,thefear that .
they will be forced to assert Vehezuelan claims in
British,,Guiana if the colonial question .is agitated
at BegotA'and that ?in?turn:ColOmbig.may Call .for a.
revision of its border with Venezuela. Public.
agitation, however, threatens to weaken their ability
to preserve.-a.neutral. attitude. In hope of preventing
a contreVersial discussion of the various 'disputes-
by Congress and the press,. the Government issued a
communique on March .3 expressing solidarity with the.
American republics'and'at the same time ?suggested
that the disputes- be settled peacefully in accordance
with the principle's of the UN Charter. The statement
did not ha,re -the desired effect, and a few days later
the. Venezuelan Congress passed a resolution by unanimous
vote and-amidst loud applause expressing solidarity
with Argentina and .Chile in -the Antarctic dispute.
The' youth branch of the opposition party COPEI and,
students and professors of the Central Uni,-ersity in
early March voiced support of the Latin American
claimants in their.dispUtes with the British.
Venezuela's dormant claims in British Guiana,
which haN-e already been taised.by the Communist press,
will render the government.nspecially vulnerable to
accusations of betraying the national.interest if it
cooperates openly with 'the US in attempting to quint
the territorial disputes'. The Venezuelan Gevernment
will not be vulnerable'to Argentine pressure as such,
but domestic politics and the general desire not to
stray from the Latin American group may operate to
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change the government's position to one more favorable
to Argentina and the other Latin American claimants.
Cuba: The Cuban position as expressed to the Guatemalan
Government in response to the latter's circular on the
colonial question followed the general lines of the
Ecuadoran declaration but was not a declaration of
solidarity. From this it might be asSumed that the
extent to which the Cuban Government might be willing
to go on the Argentine-Chilean claims would be to
counsel a.peaceful solution of the disputes. The Cuban
Foreign :'inistor expressed the fear to the American
Ambassador that the territorial quastion might dominate
and spoil the Bogot4 Conference and, although he felt
the colonial question must be settled in the longrun,
obviously hoped that it WoUld be deferred. A
commentary in El Mundo of February 19, which paralleled
the view of the Uruguayan nationalist newspaper El Debate,
stated that Argentina fears "the United States may
become a South American power" in the proc-ess of
British withdrawal from its colonial possessions.
What general attitude the Cuban press will adopt and
whether it will operate to change the government's
policy cannot be predicted.
Mexico:- The Mexican Government, which is involved
indirectly in the Belize dispute, has indicated that
it will support the Guatemalan resolution at Bogot6
but will adopt a temperate attitude. The Mexican -
Government has not taken a stand on the Antarctic
dispute as of the end of February and was seeking a
neutral position in the matter. However, its support
of Latin American claims in general will involve support
of the South American claims in Antarctica and the
Falklands to the extent they are linked with other
claims. The Mexican Foreign Minister, like the Cuban
Foreign Minister, fears that other subjects at Bogot6
will suffer if the colonial question is seriously
agitated during the Conference. The American Embassy
reports that editorial comment on the_ Argentine-Chilean
dispute with Britain has been reserved on the whole and
it is felt that the national press will take its lead
from the administration on this and other matters
connected with territorial disputes. '
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38,
Other Countries: The Dominican and Haitian govern- .
ments have expressed views in,agreement with those
of the US although they would in general also be.
sympathetic to the transfer of EuropPan colonies to
Latin Am(rican claimants. The Honduran Foreign
Minister gave a clue to his government's general
position by his cool reception of an Ecuadoran
proposal made in January of this year that the Latin
American Governments jointly advocate transfer of
European colonies to Latin claimants. The President
of Panama, on the other hand, declared on March 2 that
all American nations should support Chilean claims in
the Antarctic in the interests of continental
solidarity. Likewise the Sal,-adoran Foreign Minister
was reported by the Guatemalan radio on March 15 to
have declared that El Salvador would support the move
at Bogot6 to put an end to European colonies in the
western hemisphere. Perhaps indicative that other
Central American countries will favor Latin American
pretensions is the unanimous press support for their
claims reported from Nicaragua late in February.
Embassy Managua commented "The unanimous and unquest-
ioning approval given to the Argentinian, Chilean,
and Guatemalan actions ... indicates that opposition
to colonialism in the western hemisphere can still rally
Latin American support, despite internecine fights
such as that between Guatemala and Nicaragua. There
is apparent here an undertone of opinion that the
United States can be forced by its hemispheric commit-
ments to support a united Latin American bloc against
Britain. It is, Perhaps, significant that the usual
nice re,Tard shown by the Liberal press and in particular
the pro-government segment, for opposing moves that
would embarrass the United States is not present here."
-
On the basis of the general considerations and
specific reactions described above, it may be predicted
that in a reasonably calm discussion of territorial
issues, the delegations at Bogot6 will be about equally
divided among support of the Latin American claimants,
maintenance of a non-committal attitude, and cooperation
with the US. Under such unfavorable auspices, the
Argentine government might well decide not to press the
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issue vigorously but to content itself with a mild
resolution. If, however, a new incident ?or the
discussion at BogotA itself brings widespread agita-
tion of the territorial issues, and in the absence of
an overriding international crisis, support of the
US position may dropconsiderably, and the Conference
may adopt a strong resolution which will provide a
new basis for Argentine pretensions in Antarctica and
the Falklands.
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