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October 3, 2012
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March 15, 1948
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090325.-31? 4 SECRET. ARGENTINE .0LAIMS IN THE FALKLAND ,L ISLANDS AND ANTARCTICA: .=4?- OIR Report No:. 4606 March 159 1948 I D'EPARTIn STATE 1 REFERENCE DIVIVON 1 F1LE Copy tITIZAM Rgnal DEPARTMENT OF STATE Division of Research for American Republics OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH SECRET 1_1:S 7r g 2O4$ Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP08001297R000800090022-3 SECRET TABLE OF CONTENTS Summary ? Introduction. . 000000 0000?0000 I. Argentine Claims in the Falklands . ? o 6 o Page 3 A. Backgrohnd of the Falkland Islands Question ...... . ? . ? . ? 3 B.. Review of Argentine Position to 1934 . . . ? ? e ? 0 ? ? o ? ? ? 3 C. Review of Argentine Position since 1934. . ........ . 4 D. Current Argentine Policy in the Falklands . ? 6 E. ?Future Prospects 7 II. Argentine Claims in Antarctica 9 A. Background of the Antarctic fluestion. ..... ..... 9 B. Review of Argentine Position to 1939 . . . . . - . . . . ? 11 C. Review of Argentine Position, 1939-1948 13 1. Initial 'loves, 1939-1940 13 2. Forward 1Jovement, 1941-43. ? . . . . 16 3. Suspension of Activity under de facto Government 17 A 4. ? Second Forw6rd Novement, 1946-date. . . . 18 D. Current Argentine Policy in Antarctica . . .... 22 SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 SECRET E.. The Chilean Position in Antarctica . .. .. F. Future Prospects . O 0 0 ? 0 ? - 0 0 O 0 0 0 0 0 0 ? Page 24 27 III. Forecast.of,Latin American Position at Bogot6. ..... OOOO 0 0 .30 ? ) A. General Considerations , 0 ? 0 0 0 0 30 B. Reactions of Non-Claimant CoUntries ... . . . . ? 31 ? APPENDIX MaP of Territorial Claims in Antarctica, When this study outlives its usefulness to you, please return it to: ,Department of State Office of. Research (CIR) 626 State Annex #1 Washington, D.C. SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 ? a ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDP0800,1297R000800090022-3 ? , SECRET SUMMARY Argentine territorial claims in the Falkland Islands and Antarctica challenge British possession of the Falklands and conflict with actual or potential claims in Antarctica by the governments of Great Britain, Chile, and .the US. Tension between Argentina and Britain over their conflicting claims, which gained world attention following the dispatch of British, Argentine, and Chilean naval units to Antarctica in February 19489 is the outgrowth of a century-old dispute over the Falklands and of recent changes in world power relationships. The dispute regarding the Falklands is an issue which remained quiet for over a century, during which British ascendancy was unquestioned. It now arises because Argentina can foresee the time when it might recover the islands by direct pressure or indirectly with the support of the US and the inter-American system. The dispute in Antarctica also reflects the growing ambitions of the Argentine Government. It differs fromthe Falklands question in that the rights of the claimants are less well-defined and because the Antarctic area is useful chiefly as a narado,ground. The tension that has been built up over claims in Antarctica and the Falklands ma v be dissipated grad- ually, but this will depend upon the willingness of Argentina to put the Falklands claims on a stand-by basis and to cease provocative gestures in Antarctica until such time as claims can be settled on an internatidnal basis. That the Peran administration will agree to such procedures is questionable. Although it has made no overt move to dislodge the British from the Falklands, it appears determind to force the, ,issue either directly or by enlisting the support of the US and the inter-American system. As regards Antarctica, the Argentine Government will undoubtedly continue its operations .and may expand them. Both the Argentine and Chilean Governments have developed a stake inAntarctica as an inexpensive roans of gaining Prestige at home and abroad. This barren area SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 ?SECRET offers an unrivalled ground for aggressive activity and it has thereby secured an importance to the South American governments out of Proportion to its reel value to them. In addition, unless both governments halt operations simultaneously, their latent rivalry will force them to continue 'a for- ward movement in Antarctica. The Argentine Gov- ernment must also consider the value of pressure in the Antarctic in weakening the British position in the Falklands. Recourse to the International Court to settle conflicting clairs in the Falklands and Antarctica appears to be out of the que-tion. Although Argentine rights in the Falklands are supported by many legal arguments, the Per6n administretion has indicated that it has no intention of submitting Argentine claims to the judicial process and anticipates settlement of the dispute on a power basis. Argentine and correlative Chilean claims in Antarctica are an even less promising subject for legal settlement and the two South American -governments will avoid a court decision. Such a decision would in any case be difficult to reach in an area where occupation and normal exercise of sovereignty are impossible. The Argentine Government has, however, offered to settle Antarctic claims by the conference method and unofficially has indicated that it might accept arbitration. But since time works on the side of Argentina, its government may be expected to approach the problem of settlement in a leisurely fashion, even though it ray eventually agree to some general Antarctic settlement. The British Government is finding delay in a decision, which will relieve it of the threat of Argentine provocation, difficult and even intolerable. It is on the defensive in a remote area which provides only too accessible a target for rival claimants end British opinion has become extraordinarily sensitive to signs of dissolution of the Empire. Surrender to Argentine claims which cannot be rationalized as in accordance with the new principles of self-government and self-determination, will not be made voluntarily. Since the British Government app-ars unable to bring SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 a Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 SECRET the South American claimants into court, it can secure relief regarding Antarctica only through a settlement -sponsored by the US or UN. As to the Falklands, it is not clear what constructive step the British can take except as the US acts as honest broker. . The dividends in prestige to the Argentine Government from its challenge to British rights he been gratifying. From a minor and latent issue, the ? Antarctic dispute emerged early in February of this year with all the familiar trimmings of a nineteenth- century incident -- and in good time for the, Argentine elections. If the PerOn administration handles the matter skillfully, it may secure a resolution at the Bogot6. Conference that, would in the view of the Latin Americans, place in an unfavorable light the neutral attitude of the US and the defiant "imperialism" of the British Government. Argentine expressions have moreover been reserved enough to permit it to play a, relatively passiv-, role at Bogot6 if the auspices are unfavorable. The Boeotl. Conference offers only the possibility of obtaining moral support and perhaps of warning the US that it should back Argentina against the UK. As such it is an inter-sting oppor- tunity for the Peron administration, but by no mans one to be forced at the expense of other Argentine interests. ? SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 SECRET 1. -.ARGENTINE CLAIMS IN THE FALKLAND ISL1-',NDS AND ANTARCTICA INTRODUCTION Argentine claims in the Falkland Islands and in Antarctic territery cover most of the area described by the British Government as the Falkland Islands and Depend- encies and administered as a British colonial possession. British possession of the Falkland Islands proper is con- tested.only by Argentina. The Falkland island Dependencies, including a sector of the Antarctic and certain islands ly- ing north of this sector, are the subject of claims by Argentina which overlap actual or potential claims of Britain, the United States, and Chile. Against British protests the Argentine Government is at present acting to strengthen its position in Antarctica and the Chilean Govern- ment is doing likewise. As regards the Falklands, Argentina has so far done little more than keep open Its claim through repeated formal statements of its right to the Islands -.11d has made no overt move to dislodge the British from posses- sion.* In a conversation of March 9, 1948 the Argentine Foreign Minister told the American Ambassador that Argen- tina was 'prepared to argue,' its Antarctic claims, but that it regarded the Falklands dispute as a matter of real im- portance which the ParOn administration was determined to settle. The Argentine claims in the Falklands and Ant- arctica are interrelated in various ways although the Argentine Government has treated them as separate and distinct- problems. The regional and political ties between * Various press accounts have confused the Falklands with the Falkland Islands Dependencies. For example, both the editors of the New York Times and Sumner Wclles have discussed the dispute between the British and South American Governments over Antarctic claims as though it were a dispute over the Falkland Islands. SECRET . Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 SECRET 2. Argentine and British claiMs'to the .two areas mean that activity in one region is reflected to some degree in the other. -Both Argentine and British claims in Antarctica depend in. part on their respeCtive claims to the Falklands. Conversely, the advance of the South Ateridan governments. in Antarctica has a bearing on the Falklands question inso- far as it adversely'affeots.the position of British terri- tories in the .Western Hemisphere... * The American Government has endeavored to maintain a neutral position with regard to the Falkland Islands dispute and has adopted sthe attitude that it is a matter involving only:the two .parties. As to the Antarctic area as a whole, the American Government so far has not formulated tiveHpolicy. It has made no territorial claims but re- serves its rights and refuses to 'recognize the claims of other governments in the area. Neither the Monroe Doctrine nor theestablishment of the hemisphere defense zone, which eMbraces the area in dispute, is viewed as affecting rights in the Falkland Islands or Antarctica, and the two'dis- putes are regarded by the American Government as matters to be settled on a separate basis. Recent developments in Antarctica, however, indicate that Argentine and Chilean policy in the region may have issue in a situation demand- ing the consideration of the Department. As to the Falklands the Argentine Foreign Minister onMarch 9, 1948 aTprbached the American Ambassador with the ,suggestion that the American Government support Argentina in forcing with- drawal of the British from possession of the islands. In addition both the Falkland Islands and Antarctic disputes are scheduled to be raised at Bogot6 together with the entire question of the status of claims and possessions of non-continental powers in the Western Hemisphere. The fol- lowing survey is devoted toia statement of the development of Argentine policy in the area and an estimate of the . direction of that policy which may serve as background for these problem as they arise. ? SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 ft Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 SECRET I. ARGENTINE CLAIES IN THE FALKLANDS A. Background of the Falkland Islands cluestion The dispute between the Argentine and British Govern- ments over the Falkland Islands emerged from a series of international incidents in the period 1831-33. Sealing and whaling activity in the South Atlantic region and the trade route to the East through the Drake Passage south of Cape Horn gave the. Falklands a certain importance as a base. The Government of the United Provinces, successor to the rights of the Spanish Government, took possession of the islands in 1820 and established its representatives in the area. A dispute between the governor of the islands and American scalers led to punitive action by the USS Lexington in 1831, and the reduction of the islands to a defenseless condition. This action, which was supported by the American Government, apparently provided the setting for British seizure of the Falklands in January 1833. -Sub- sequent Argentine protests against the British occupation and claims for damages against the American Government met with no success. ; -Argentine claims to the Falkland Islands appear- to have considerable ,support on an historical basis. ? The Argentine Government has also more recently advanced a claim on the basis that the Falkland Islands are an extension of the continental shelf. Against British rights based on dis- covery-in 1592, occupation since 1833, and somewhat shadowy claims asserted in the eighteenth century, the Agentine Government hs stated its. position many times.: ''The Argen- tine claim to those- islands is incontrovertible and all that is, lacking for this claim to be adjusted to a juridical. pre- cept is. that the lawful sovereignty exercised over those islands be -completed with the actual possession which is constantly- demanded." Or, as a .leading official of the Argentine Foreign Office recently stated to an officer of the?American Embassy, the British took the Falkland Islands by force and if they did not voluntarily Surrender then, Argentina would Some day when powerful enough tc.ko the islands back by force. B. Review of Argentine ,PoSition to ,1934' For a century after the British occupation was.. effected, Argentine policy withrespect to. the Falkland SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 SECRET 4 Islands a.PP'earb not to hava developed beyond the reiteration of national. rights by the Argentine Foreign Office_ as occa- sion. . _ _ _ offered. Without backing from a larger poWer, Argentina ? Was by itself too weak to force the issue against the British Government, and such support was not forth- . coming. In the 18801s the Argentine Goverment tried with- out success to secure the good offices .of the American Government on theplea that the British had violated the Lonroe Doctrine by seizure of the islands. In rejecting this appeal, the American Government relied upon the posi- tion that the 1,:onroe Doctrine was not retroactive because British claims advanced against the Spanish Crown antedated the Doctrine, and that the latter was therefore inapplicable. C. Review of Argentine Position since 1934 The Falkland Islands dispute in its modern :phase dates from the early 1930's, when national claims t .,nuestras Malvinas became a popular issue, The resentment caused by British demands for trade and financial conces- sions at this time furnished an especially favorable set- ting for the active renewal of the dispute. With Foruign Office approval, Dr. -Alfredo L. Palacios, leader of the Socialist Party, inaugurated a campaign for tho.roturn of the Falklands in a 'series ..of speeches delivered during the 1934 sessions of Congress. Pro-Gerl:in .elements in Argentina subsequently took advantage of tho Falklands Issue toin- flame anti-British feeling. ,Uc_til some time after the out- break of. the Second -4-orld War, renewed Argentine interest in the Falklands appears to have been largely unofficial and the result of agitation by leftist and nationalist intel- lectuals nnd anti-Rritish groups. The Argentine delegations at the Panama and Habana meetings of Foreign 1.:Inisters re- servea national rights in the Falklands according to the time-honored formula, but did not argue that the establish- ment of the defense zone as such affected the Falklands dispute. The possibility of recovering the Falklands from British occUbation apparently first began to receive seri- ous official attention in 1941. The .Argentine High Seas Fleet is reported to have sailed during this year under sealed orders -- countermanded at the last moment -- to occupy the Falklands. Whatever the basis for this report, in December 1941 the Argentine Government, for the first time since the exchange of notes in the 18801s, indicated Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 ? -? Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 a desire to secure the assistance of the American Government in regaining the Falklands. At this time the Argentine Foreign Minister told the American Ambassador that the Argentine naval defense plan ?envisaged an area in the South Atlantic including the Falkland Islands and that his govern- ment might request the good offices of the American Govern- ment for the purpose of inducing the British to withdraw from the Falklands. Embassy Buenos Aires commented that "the reason for this change in tactics is open to conjec- ture but it may be that the Argentines feel that they can now invite the cooperation of the United States by contend- ing that it is necessary for the defense of Argentina as well as for continental security to have the Falklands under Argentine control." --However this proPosel should be inter- preted, the course of tho war and of Argentine relations with the US made it academic. The requirements of continen- tal defense ceased for the time being to constitute a useful argument for the Argentine Government against British occupa- tion of the Falklands, and, following the Juno 1943 Revolu- tion, other problems absorbed the energies of Argentine policy-makers. As a popular issue, the Falklands dispute had a natural appeal to the Argentine Congress which took office following the elections of February 1946. One of the earliest acts of the new Chamber of Deputies was to pass unenimouSly a resolution presented by an Opposition Radical deputy that "it would view it with pleasure should the Executive Power, opportunely and with due urgency; address the Security Council of the United Nations affirming the sovereign rights of the Argentine Nation over the Islas Malvinas [-Falklands 7, claiming from England, the nation holding them, the restitution of this territory." The ' PerOn Government did not act upon the resolution of the Chamber of Deputies end in the United Nations limited its initiatives With respect to the Falklands to a stock reser- vation of rights'in connection with resolutions on colonial areas. However, the administration took certain other in- direct measures to strengthen Argentine claims in the Falklands. By decree of October 9, 1946, it affirmed national sovcreinty over the "Argentine continental plateau" and the "Aro:entine epi-continental See, citing a declaration of the American Government in 1945 establishing sovereignty over the continental shelf of the United States. This area, interpreted by both the American and Argentine Governments as extending to a point atwhich the sea is SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 S2CRET 6. more than 100 fathoms deep, included the Falkland Islands. The insistence of the Argentine delegation that the hemi- sphere defense zone as finally established at the Conference of Rip de Janeiro in 1947 should include the Antarctic as well ns the Falklands indicated that the Argentine Govern- ment viewed the regional defense measure as a potential source' of support for its claims in both areas (sec below, p.15 ). In addition the Peron administration's aggressive development of Argentine claims in Antarctica, beginning in 1946 (see below, D.11 ), represented a new threat to the British position ill the Falk/lands. The most recent move of the Peron administration with respect to the Falklands has been to revive the pro- posal that the American Government support Argentine efforts to regain the islands. In March 1948 the Argen- tine Foreign Minister told the American Ambassador that he and Peron felt thnt war with Russia was inevitable, that Argentina would join the US on the first day of war, and that Argentine possession of the Falklands was indispen- sable since the islands were the only bl:se from which Russia could operate against Argentina. In these circum- stances, the Foreign Minister stated, he hoped that the ? American Government would give Argentina support in making good its claims to the Falklands. D. Current Argentine Policy in the Falklands The PerOn administration has made a more important issue of the Falklands than its predecessors, but activity in support of Argentine rights in the islands has thus far been limited to verbal Ee :sures. This policy is dic- t:ated by the facts of the situ tion, Argentina's interest in the Y lhlnds is 1:,r,:;ely a mutter of prestige. The British Government is in possession and has shown no will- ingness to withdraw in favor of Argentina. Argentine is not in a Position to force the issue by direct diplomatic or military moans and might lose rather than gain prestige from an _Atempt to do so. Although Argentina is thus dependent upon indirect pressure to make good its claims against the British, the Peron administration is setting the stage for recovery of the Falklands when occasion offers. Its forward movement in Antarctica has served to raise the question of claims in the Falklands to a more active status, since in connection with the Antarctic dispute, both parties use rights in the Falklands to Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022:3 SEC= 7. support Antarctic claims. The discussion of Argentine claims in the Antarctic and official propaganda on behalf of such claims also works to heighten the national sense of grievance against British occupation of the Fulklands. Likewise the claim to the Falklands as part of Argentina's ?continental shelf'? and the inclusion of the Falklands in the defense zone, however poor the legal arguments on either point, provide elements of support for Argentina's position in the Falklands dispute. Future Prospects It appears unlikely that the Falklands dispute will be decided on the merits of the case. Neither the Argentine nor the British Government appears willing to submit its claims to the International Court or to impartial arbitra- tion. Since Argentina is not in a position to use force to make good its claims, it is also unlikely that the Falklands dispute will lead to a broach of the peace. How- ever, Argentina may be able to substitute leverage for direct application of force. Even if the American Govern- ment is unwilling to force British withdrawal from the Falklands, the Argentine Government probably hopes to exert such leverage through the inter-American system and through its operations in Antarctica. On the face of things Argentina cannot seriously affect the British position in the Falklands by raising the issue at the Bogota Conference as it proposes to do. Inter- American resolutions condemning the maintenance of colonial possessions by non-continental powers within the hemisphere, asserting the sanctity of the hemisphere defense zone, and censuring ??aggressiono by non-continental powers in the defense zone would have no effect on the lugal position of the British and no direct affect on its position in general. However, the 2eron administration may SC:6 some possibility of maneuvering the American Government into bringing pres- sure on the British Government. Linking the colonial issue, the defense zone, and." who question of '?aggression by a non- continental ;Dower, the Argentine delegation would be in a position to exploit certain ambiguities in American policy and to attack either directly or covertly the sincerity of Am.erican policy on colonial possoSsions and its reservations regarding the scope of the hemisphere defense agreement. In securing an inter-A.Lielican resolution on the subject, Argen- tina might not only give additional color to its Falklands Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 SECRET , , 8. claims, it mi,c4ht also succeed in forcing the American Govern- ment out of its traditionally neutral position. If success- ful in this endeavor, the Argentine Government would gain a certaln advantage, whichever side the American Government was made to appear to favor. If official expressions by the US are taken as saprorting British clims, the US will be a tar- -get for nationalist, Communist, and other anti-US groups in the hemisphere. If Argentina could, either at the Confer- ence or later, elicit signs of support by the US for Argen- tine claims, this support would undoubtedly be exploited to the fullest against tht British position in the Falklands. The form and timing of Argentine attempts to make good the Falklands claims will also be governed by events in Antarctica, by the success of British resistance to Argentine advances in that area, and by the form in which Antarctic claims are eventually settled. In an exposition of the PerOn administration's policy in the Falklands made in Earch 1947, Foreign I:inister Bramuglia said: oThe prob- lems of the Antarctic and the L-lvinas Islands are different; they have different origins and they require different ,solu- tions." Despite these differences, the Foreign iiinister com- mented, the two problems have oa certain regional and politi- cal similarity.'' This regional and political similarity, which inheres in the fact that both Argentine and British claims in Antarctica are to some extent based on the Falk- lands, means that British weakness in face of Argentine ad- vances in Antarctica may be construed as an invitation to Argentina to move to force wi Lhdrawal of the British.from the Falklands. Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 SECRET II. ARGENTINE CLAIMS IN ANTARCTICA 94 A. Background of the Antarctic Question International interest in the potential resources and in the strategic and prestige value of Antarctic territory is currently at the highest peak since the discovery of the area. British, Argentine, and Chilean maneuvers during the 1948 season in the Palmer Peninsula area of Antarctica, which are only the latest in a series of, moves made by these gov- ernments to support claims between 200W and 900W, have brought into focus the general problem of over- lapping territorial claims in Antarctica. Argentina claims a sector lying between 25?17 and 74?W, and south of 60?S, including Palmer Peninsula, the South Shetlandsl.South Orkneys, and other island groups. In connection with its claims in the Pntarctic and the Falklands, it also asserts sovereignty over the South Georgia and Sandwich Islands which lie north of its Pntarctic.claim. ,The Argentine claim over- laps both the British claim between 200W and 80N and the Chilean claim between 53?',1 and 90?W, and is potentially in conflict with US reserved rights in Antarctica. The American Government has so far abstained from a formal claim to Antarctic tirritory, but has reserved its rights in ?the area .and has refused to recognize claims of other countries. (See attached map) The bases for claims already made in Antarctica comprise discovery, assertion of sovereignty, explora- tion, exercise of authority, oCcupation, historical rights, contiguity and geological.affinity. Because of the peculiar nature of Antarctic territory, legal requirements for the establishment of valid title to Antarctic claims cannot readily be deduoed from rules ' of internationallaw and standards applicable to the Conditions of this area have yet to become the subject of a ,special international agreement.- Meanwhile, the various claimants have attempted to strengthen their rights through activity in Antarctica. Claims ?in Antarctica by Britain and potential claims by the US are based chiefly on discovery, exploration, and some type of occuPation. In addition the'British Government SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 SECRET. 10, formally in 1908 and has exer- cised a degree of supervision over the sector - claimed from its base in the Falklands. The South American claims depend largely upon proximity and the questionable principle of geological continuity.* Argentina also places heavy reliance on the fact that it is the only power which.has maintained. permanent occupation of any point in Antarctica over a long period, but this occupation appears to have little international law as the basis of a a.wide area in the Antarctic. .Likewise Argentine claims on the basis of expeditions, exercise of authority, and assertions of .sovereignty do not compare favorably-With.British claits. The Chilean position in Antarctica vOich Tests on shadowy historical rights, early assertions of sovereignty, and recent occupation of a base in Antarctic -a as-yell as the principles of proximity and geological contin- uity, is in turn less well-founded that Argentina's Argentina has advanced the.thesiS that the-Andes- eXtension through the Falkland, South Sandwich, South Georgia, South Orkney, and South Shetland Islands to the Palmer Peninsula is a valid basis. for its claims in Antarctica. Chile likewise asserts the Andes extension to Intarcticaasa basis for its claim. On the basis of sonic soundings and geological inVestigations, ,the intrusion of the Andes via ..the Falkland and other:islands into the Palmer Peninsulaappears to. be a fact. (Stanley Kemp, "The South 'Sandwich ISlands", British Colonial Office, DiscoVerY Reports, 'Vol. II (1931), 154,197), Thus, in the unlikely event th.Ptgeological continuity were. accepted as a basis for Antarctic claims and -Argentinas,rights in the Falkland Islands werey recognized, the Argentine Government would .be able to assert such a claim. 'The Chilean which appears to lack scientific confirmation, Would not compete with the Argentine claim. SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 SECRET claim,* The American and British Governments appear to have the,only substantial practical interest in the yet unproven potentialities of the Antarctic. Its strategic value exists, if at ,a11,. only in terms of the problems of world powers; and the great powers alone can fully exploit the scientific and economic possibilities of the area. But Argentina and Chile have developed a stake in Antarctica as a source of prestige at home and abroad. This barren area offers an unrivaled exercise ground for aggressive military and diplomatic activity with none of the usual Penal- ties of such activity, and has thereby secured an importance to ?these governments out of proportion to its real value to them. .Superficialiy 'the Argentine forward movement and Chilean maneuvers in Antarctica are harmless means of providing a release for nation- alist feelings. But nationalist aspirations are being ' strengthened in the process and popular expectations now being aroused ma Y render more difficult the eventual settlement of Antarctic claims. Moreover, the British Government fears that continued Arg- entine.moves in Intarctica will eventually extend northviard to the disputed Falkland Islands and will adverselY affect the position of other British territories. V ? B. Review of Argentine Position to 1939 During the first phase of Antarctic exploration, from 1820 to 1840 the newly-established Government of The wider question of the standing of various types of claims and the bases for such claims by interested countries is dealt with at length in OIR Report No, 4436, September 12, 1947, Basis for Possible US Claims in Pntarctica, Secret, and in CIA Map Report No. M-1, History and Current Status of Claims in Antarctida (to be issued). Secret; SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8C01.297R000800090022-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 SECRET 12. the United Provinces was satisfied to assert control over its continental territory. At this tune it was too weak even to resist the British occupation of the Falklands in 1833, which. was itself a reflection of British operations in the Antarctic region. With the exhaustion of the seal fisheries about 1840, US and European activity in the Antarctic almost ceased until the last decade of the century. The development of scientific and commercial interest in the Antarctic then brought a revival of international activity in the area which has continued almost without interrup- tion to the present day. 'Argentina made its debut in the Antarctic in 1903, when the government sponsored a mission to relieve a Swedish expedition stranded at'Hope Bay in the Palmer Peninsula. In the following year the governmpnt accepted from .a Scottish expedition the offer.of its equipment and a weather station at Laurie Island in the South Orkneys, and has continUed since that time to maintain a year-round station on the Island.. Although occupation of this island subsequently has become an important element 'in Argentine claims, the government originally made1 no formal claim of sovereignty and when the British Government by Letters Patent of 1908 annexed:a large Antarctic area including the South Orkneys, the Argentine Govern- ment failed to protest this assertion ofsovereignty. Argentina' S first claim to sovereign jurisdic- tion over Antarctic territory appears to ha -e been made in 1923. In that year the Argentine Government -registered a protest' with the Universal Postal Union against the issuance of a British stamp for the Falkland Islands Dependencies which showed the British Claim as established in Letters Patent of 1917.amending the:Letters Patent issued in 1908. Argentina, it was stated, exorcised "territorial jurisdiction ,.'. de lure and de. facto over ;its continental surface, its territorial 'sea and over'the islands situated on its sea cbast over part of the island of Tierra del Fuegol over...the-Islands of Los Estados, Afto Nuevo, the South Georgias',. the South Orkneys, and polar areas which ha,-e not-been-dolimited." Again in 1928 the Argentine Foreign Office reiterated this claiM to the SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 SECRET 13. Universal Postal Union in connection with Argentina's establishment of a radio station at the South Orkney's base, and to the British Government which had protested the installation of the station. These protests and the exchange of notes with the British appear to have had no repercussions when made and there is no evidence that the Argentine Government made any serious attempt to develop its claims to sovereignty in Antarctica until more than a decade later. C. Review of A r_g21.211./atE2aLtipal_1322=122,1.3 ? lc ILIIIIELL2=a,_3,211:1212. Argentine claims in the Pntarctic and the public statement of these claims began to crystallize in 1939. Positive official acts in support of Argentina's claims had been limited to continued maintenance of the Laurie Island station and to the protests and exchange of notes with the ,British Government in the 1920's which were noted aboYe. Arg- entine rights in the Falklands had become a theme of renewed interest in 1934 in the backwash of nationalist and anti-British feeling from economic difficulties of the depression (see p. 6-7), but the Antarctic attracted little or no attention. The initial stimulus to interest appears ?to have been provided in the uneasy summer of 1939 by the announcement of the Byrd Expedition and Norway's move to call an International Polar Exposition and Congress of Arctic explorers at Bergen. By decree of July 15, 1939, the Argentine Government set up a commission in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to plan for participation in the Bergen Conference and to study "the possibility of carrying out, on behalf of the State; thorough exploration in that part of the Antarctic regions which are considered most closely connected with the Argentine Territory." The preamble to the decree . cited Argentina's maintenance of a permanent observa- tory in the Antarctic, naval expeditions, and geogra- phic and geological bases for Argentine "interest" in the region, but made no mention of "claims" or "rights" in the Antarctic such as had been made in the statements published in the 1920's. The Commission was specifically charged to "make a full study of the present state of the problems of the Antarctic and their eventual connection with Arg- entine interests, and it will also propose to the SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 SECRET 14. Executive Power a plan of ad-Lion comprising matters of oceanographic and meteorologic nature, as well as fishing and exploration such as the country may take upon itself to make." , When first published on July 15, 1939,'the, decree attracted no attention, providing a Measure ? of the absence of public interest in Argentina's ,position in the Antarctic.. But, beginning on July 24, the entire Buenos Aired press simultaneously gave heavy coverage to the decree, to the forthcoming Bergen conference, to Argentine Antarctic claims, and to the possibility that the Byrd Expedition foreshadowed assertion of Clairds by the American Government. Embassy? Buenos Aires reported that the points taken up'and the phraseology used were so similar as to warrant the belief that, despite the expressed surprise of the Foreign Office at the aggressive and provocative one adopted by the press, the campaign was officially inspired. The critical reaction abroad to the Prgentine press . campaign brought a statement by the Argentine 'Embassy in Washington that the "Foreign Office ...', without any intention against any friendly country, is only considering the unquestionable interests of Argentina in those regions within a criterion of permanent collaboration with the other countries who are carrying out their action in the Antarctic." This statement appears ,to have closed the affair. With the outbreak of wrr the gbvernment's plans to advance Argentine "interests" at Bergen, (which was in any case to have been a strictly scientific conference) were forestalled by the cancellation? of the conference. ? Anxiety.conc'err4ng the objectives of the Byrd Expedition of 1940 was apparently allayed by official assurances from the US thatit was "not intended 'to prejudice in any way the rights or interests which any American ' Republic May have in thr Antarctic regions" and would in fact serve to safeguard hemisphere rights in Antarctica and to prevent encroachments .by non- hemisphere powers. Moreavrr special facilities were provided to Argentina and Chile to permit designated representatives .to visit the Byrd h-Dadquarters in the Antarctic. ' SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 ,SECRET 1. Pt the Panama meeting of Foreign Ministers of September 1939 and subsequently the Argentine Gov- ernment spoke in terms of Argentine "claims and rights in the Antarctic," "possession and sovereignty over certain Antarctic areas," "Antarctic regions claimed bv the Argentine Republic," and so forth. But .the language of its reservations end statemerits contin- ued vague and general. In connection with Argentina's standard reservation of rights in the Falklands in the Panama Declaration establishing a hemisphere defense zone, Foreign Minister Leolzioldo Melo stated that .the legitimate claims and rights of the Arg- entine Republic are reserved and maintained intact with respect to islands such as the Malv,nas, as well as any other Argentine lands which might be situated within or beyond the line." (italics supplied) In reconstituting on a permanent basis the Commission originally established to prepare for the Bergen Conference, the government charged it "to centralize and take charge of the study and advice relative to all matters connected with the protection and development of national interests in the Antarctic region and in the Antarctic Continent ..." and made no specific territorial claim. The reservation of Argentina's rights in the Falklands at the Habana Meeting of Foreign Ministers in June 1940 again. included a proviso on the Antarctic, which was simply described as "other southern Argentine regions." Moreover, when the Chilean Government, which followed Argentina's example? in reserving rights in the Antarctic at the Habana Meeting, proclaimed Chilean sovereignty over the sector lying between 53 and 90 degrees west longitude, he Argentine Government did not make a counterclaim to a specific area, but merely stated "that the situation created by the unilateral claims to zones of the Antarctic made by various states, to which Chilean claims are now added, can be satisfactorily settled from an international point of view only by means of a conference of the interested States and through an agreement among them on the basis of their just claims and rights." However, it welcomed Chile's suggestion that the two countries meet to agree on their rights in the Antarctic. Meetings subsequently SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 SECRET 16. held wi'h the Chileans in March 1941 were inconclusive and wore hot resumed'as. planned, rei)ortedly because of conditions in Argontina and in the world at large. (For review'of'Chilean position see p.24 ). 2. Zaaallifilaraw14_1211=13. Argentine activities in the Antarctic Passed into a more positive phase in 1941. Ps nated abovel'in this year the go-ernment mede a tentative approach to the American Ambassador to explore the possibility of securing a British with- drawal from the Falkland Islands. Pt the same time Argentina was preparing to move forward in' Antarctica proper with the purpose of staking claims and making new installations. The forward movement was a natural sequel to the diplomatic demarches, .official propaganda, and Public discussions,that began early in .1939. In addition, conflicting and unresolved Chilean claims, the temporary withdrawal of BritiSh stations in Antarctica, the possibility that Britain would be defeated by the Axis, the fact that the Drake Passage would he an important channel if for any reason the Pannma Canal were closed, lack of response to Prgentina's proposal for an international conference may ha-e contributed 'to the decision to'expand the bases of Argentine "c1Pims and rights in Antarctica" and to define those claims. The Prgentine Government in November 1941 declared the ?opening of a permanent post office in the Orkneys; 'which placed 'on a formal basis the postal facilities maintained at Laurie Island since '1904, and began to prepare. an expedition for the 1942 Antarotic'season. In February 1942 the Argentine AntarCtic expeditiOn made Argentina's first 'specific ? claim-to a sector of the Antarctic: The commander of the nPval transport Primer() de Ilavo left a ' docuffient at strategic DeCe.ptiOn IslPhd in the South ? Shetlands '"reaffirming" Argentine rights over the sector between 2501:: and' 68034'7, south of 600S. At the same time the Argentine representative took formal posseSsion'of Deception Island, placing Arg- entine markers and painting' the i'itional colors on British installations. In May 1942 the 'Argentine Government proceeded to install a lighthouse at Dallman Bay, Melchior Prchipelago, southwest of the SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 SECRET 17. Shetlands. Partly as a countermove to I'rgentine activity the British Govern,lent in January 1943 sent a cruiser through -the South Shetlands and South - Orkneys' with instructions to destroy Argentine markers at Deception Island and replace them with ?Titish emblems of sovereignty. Subsequently the British Government notified the Argentine.Foreign Office 'of its actiOn,?ekpressing isurprise-and-regret" at Argentina's attempt to assert possession of - .Deception Island. In its reply of February 19,43 the Argentine Fareiin Office reaffirmed the sector claimed in' the dOcumentS-deposited at Deception and thereby put the British 'Government formally on notice for the. first time that it claimed a sector superimposed upon the greater part of the British sector (200W to 800W) as well as the?islands south of the Falk- lands 'which had been the subject of previous declara- tions. Although the Argentine 'Government expressed its "most -formal reservations to jurisdictional acts carried out by British officials" within the Argentine claim, both governmentslagreed to give the episode - no publicity. Moreover, when the Primero de Mayo, visited- Deception Island in March 1943 on a second survey expedition, apparently no further provocation was offered the British, although the Argentine ,press reported that the markers left in 1942 .had been removed. 3. SuapHns.ion of Activity undo r de, .facto Govcrnm2n . The question of. Argentine claims in the', Antarctic appears to have been shelved during the period the de. facto government which assumed control in June 1943.. The unstable character of the government and the grave problems 'thatit faced meant that .Argentina's claims in,Pntarctica, which had been advanced chiefly for. their prestige value, had a low priority. Moreover, since the de facto 'governtent was anxious to assure continued recognition by the British Government, its chief rival in Antarctica,' it was in no position to ruffle British feelings - by pressing. Argentine claims. During this period the British Government established token settle-. illnts in the Antarctic sector claimed by Argentina, There is. no record that the _Argentine Government registered a protest, and the lighthouse established Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 SECRET 18. in the Helchior ATchipelago in 1942 was allowed to go out of commission. Annual relief missions to the Orkneys continued, but Argentine activity in the Antarctic as in the Falklands was put on a standby basis. 4. Second Forward Movement 1 46-date. With the election of Per6n in February 1946 and the establish- ment of the government on a firm constitutional basis, Prgentina's forward movement in the Antarctic was resumed. The new governmnt was no longer so greatly in need of British support for its international position; it also was ambitious to reestablish Arg- entine prestige abroad. The Antarctic claims were well designed for this purpose. There was little danger that assertion of claims would lead to an international incident. Because of the peculiar nature of the region in dispute the government could, send notes, protests, and expeditions almost at will without suffering the usual consequences of such action, and was assured of the unanimous support of all political groups and of public opinion in general for an aggressive policy. Thus the government could anticipate a return from its efforts both in domestic and foreign affairs out of Proportion to the risks involved and the expenditure required to fit out naval expeditions yid make new installations in Antarctica. Moreover, as the war ended, foreign activity in the , area was renewed in 1946 and the spur of competition provided to Argentine policy-makers. Less than a month after the elections which ensured its continuation in power, the Per6n administration reactivated the 1\itional /ntarctic Commission by decree of March 23, 1946, a move described as "one of the most significant ?steps taken by the Argentine Republic initiating a great campaign to consolidate its rights in the Antarctic region." Under a decree of September 2, 1946, the government prohibited publication of maps. which failed to show all Argentine territory, including the Pntarctic sector, and vested the Instituto Geografico Militar with supervision over maps published. In November 1946 the Instituto issued a map extending Argentine claims to include 250ii to 74cW instead of 680341W, SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 SECRET . 19. and new stamps showed Argentine claims. In connection' with the drive to create a "national Antarctic- mindeness", "active journalistic propaganda by means of systematic publications" and celebration of Argentine anniversaries relating to the Antarctic were promoted by the National Antarctic Commission, The Argentine Chamber.of Deputies in July 1946 approved unanimously a motion that the government submit the.nation's,claims to the Falklands and .Antarctica to the Security Council .(see p. 7 The Foreign Office protested British claims as? occasion offered. It also undertook in July 1947 to reach an agreement with Chile on a common boundary and it renewed Argentina's proposal that an interna- -tional conference be held to settle the problem of the Antarctic as a whole. The government climaxed this verbal offensive in December 1946 by preparing an expedition to establish new bases in the Antarctic. Unilateral action by the various interested countries to improve their several positions hd-already become the order of the .day. During the 1947 season two expeditions from the US and one from Chile visited the polar regions, and British expeditions had already estab- lished token settlements in.the sector claimed by the British and Argentine Governments.. .The Argentine expedition, as the Ministry of Marine somewhat . extravagantly put it, would complement "the chain of installations based. in the Orkneys ..." and would explore ,Pntarctica as far west as 740W. The Foreign Office rejected a British offer to asSist the "Argentine,visitors" who mightcall at the British ' stations as "not consistent with reality, because a visitor cannot be considered as such when he visits his own property." During its visit to Prgentine "property", which received headline press treatment at.home, the 1947 expedition provided the annual relief party for Argentina's base at Laurie'Island, receMmissioned: the lighthouse set up at Dallman Bay, Melchior Archipelago in, 1942, .installed several new beacons., and left a group. of men at a Helthier Archipelago, station, on Gamma Island. Anchoring supply ships at SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03 : CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 SECRET . 20. Deception Island, it cruised down the western coast of Graham Land to T.Targuerite Bay, conducting hydro- graphic research and extensive chart and astronomical ,vork, and on its return to Argentina, left a ship anchored at Deception Island. As Foreign Minister Bramuglia summed up the work of the expedition, it had constituted."one of the most important operations effected thus far in the Antarctic. Our coUntry- has the satisftotien of having. contributed to the knowledge of that region and of he-in actually been in its Antarctic zone with a fleet of seven ships, at the same time that other powerful nations were 'making similar efforts in other Darts of the southern continent." Renewed Argentine activity in the expedition of 1947 conflicted chiefly with British pretensions in the Antarctic area. The American expeditions of that year led by Pd7iral Byrd and Commander Finn Lonne-did not enter the "Argentine scoter". In reciprocation for an rgentine invitation to Chilean officers in 1943 the Chilean -expedition of 1947 had inVited the participation of Argentine representatives. In turn Chilean officers* accompanied the Argentine ' expedition. This spirit, of accord.- in Argentine- Chilean relation5 in Antarctica was further signalized by.a joint declarEtion of July 12; 1947 during President GonzaleZ Videla's stay in Buenos Aires that the two governments were "desirous of putting into effect 'a friendly policy for. determining frontiers" and "that they desire to conclude as soon as possible an Argentine-Chilean treaty of demarcation of limits of [;outh ,PMerican Antarctica." The Rio Conference of tugust-September.1947 .afforded the Peron Administration a new chance to lend color to its Pntarctic claims in connection with the demarcation of the hemisphere defense zone. The limits of this zone were laid down by a subcommittee of Committee II to cover the area originally demarcated at the Panama.Meeting of 1939, which did not overlap ar4.tish claims in :Antarctica. . At the instance of the Lrgentine and Chilean delegations the zone was enlarged t.o cdver the entire area Claimed by these two countries a.nd to blanket in all but a small .sector of the British c-IL: L., CPT-PT Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03 : CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 S7CRET. 22. "juridico-political status" of Antarctica. Fimultan- eously the Areentine Ministry of Marine announced the dispatch of an Argentine task force of cruisers, destroyers, auxiliary ships, and airplanes for maneuvers in the Antarctic and a visit to Deception Island. The British Government replied to this move by sending the cruiser Nigeria to show the flag in JrItrctic waters. Similarly the Chilean Government embarked its Pres- ident to the area to assert Chilean claims. Recent British activity in the area has been widely criticized by nublic opinion in the other Ama rican republics as an "aggression" against the hemisphere, and the minor crisis brought on by the dispute over Anterctiaahas raised in a confused form the largely unrelated issues of the sanctity of the hemisphere defense zone, old-established territorial disputes between Latin American and European countries, and the general problem of colonial policy of the great powers in the postwar era. The US Government has again stated that the establishment of the hemisphere defense zone in no way affects non-continental rights in the hemisphere, but it remains to be seen what effect this disclaimer will have in moderating Latin American demands for retaliatory action against British "aggression". (For review of Latin Imerican opinion, see p.30 ) D. Current Argentine Policy in Antarctica The Intarctic policy of Peron has been more aggressive than the policy followed by preceding administrations. The change reflects the increased stature of Argentina and the anxiety of the government to capitalize on its relatively improved position. The Antarctic is of little practical value to Argentina, but the Antarctic controversy affords Peron a means of increasing his administration's prestige at home and abroad. The area is an appropriate stage for action because, unlike the Falklands, it is the subject of a number of ill-defined claims; it has not been occupied in any real sense by competing powers; and it provides a safe exercise ground for disrlays of force. Army, naval, and air missions to the 1-Interctic are calculated to impress Argentina's neighbors without gii-ing rise to problems which are usually associated with aggression SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 . Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 SECRET 21. claim. Both cro-ernment.s r-,served'their claims to territorieS within the znne in signing the Rio Trieatr. Although the delegation of the US acceded to the enlargement of. the defense zone, it stated for the"record' that Pthe treaty of Flo' de Janeiro has no effect upon the sovereignty, national or international status of any of the territories included therein." Argentine and Chilean officials, howeveri have tended to construe the extension of the defense zone as providing support for the claim that the Antarctic area included within its 'hounds belongs to the two hemisphere claimants, Argentina and Chile. Argentine activity during the current Antarctic open season has continued along the lines laid down by the reconstructed National Antarctic Commission in 1946, but has secured international notice as a conseouence of British nrotests nd moves to counter South American claims in the "British sector." The 1948 Argentine expedition set up a radio station at the Gamma Island station in Helchior Archipelago and built a hut on King George Island in the South E-Detlands. It also established radio and weather stations at Deception Island where, as noted above, markers left by the Araentino expedition of 1942 were ?removed by a British cruiser in 1943. On December 13, 1947 a 2500-mile non-stop flight was made by an Argentine naval plane which passed over Deception Island and .Melchior Arc inelago and reached latitude 6705 and 6807. This flight was described by the Chief of Naval. Aviation, Rear Admiral Portillo, as "a demonstration that the Antarctic is ours, not only by ocean navigation, but, by air, since we are able to arrive there at any time to resolve our problems." The British Government formally protested Argentine and Chilean activity in its Antarctic zone by notes of December 17 and 23, 1947. It suggested that the South American claimants shouldoporate under British concessions, or, alternatively, either withdraw or submit their claims to the International Court of Justice. Both the Argentine and Chilean Governments have rejected this proposal, and Argentina in its reply of January 28 suggested that an international conference meet in Buenos Aires to determine the SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03 : CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 SECRET 23. directed toward inhabited areas. The dispatch of the British cruiser Nigeria has aided Per6n in his efforts to dramatize the controversy and has excited Argentine interest in the area even more effectively than the flood of official propaganda on Argentine claims and acti'itis in Pntarctica. The Argentine Government's policy in Intarctica hes, furthermore, evoked expressions of support from many other American republics following? the British move to counter Argentina's advance in the area. Argentine policy toward competing powers in Antarctica has been defined as regards Britain and Chile: Argentina refuses to acknowledge British sovereignty in the region and has challenged 'the British claim at one of its strongest points by making installations et T)ec6ption Island and by using the island as a center for naval maneuvers. The dispatch of a British cruiser does not appear to have discouraged Argentine moves to assert Anterctic claims. The British h,'ve, demanded that Argentina acknowledge British sovereignty, withdraw Argentine forces, or submit the question of claims to the International Court. Continued Irgmtine activity and the counter-proposal that a conference be held in Buenos hires to settle Antarctic claims indicates that Argentina is not interested in a settl6ment of its dispute with the British Government on any terms that the latter would willingly accept. Argentine policy tow-rd Chile is conciliatory; it app(ars directed to prove that than: is no important conflict between Argentine and Chilean claims; that the two South American governments form a united front against the British claimant; and that the matter of overlapping Argentine-Chilean claims can'be settled through negotiation. The Chileans appear to be uneasy in their position as junior partner to Argentina, and, although undoubtedly pleased to have Argentine support in rejecting British claims, the Chilean Government obviously fears that the next stages of the controversy may find them in an inferior position to Argentina. But under present conditions, with the dispute involving only the South American powers and Britain, Argentina enjoys Chilean cooperation for all public purposes in SECRET ' Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 SECRET 24. asserting exclusive rights to the "South American sector" of the Antarctic and gains strength from this cooneretion. T1 o claims of the ur in .the area under dispute have not been defined and Argentine policy as regards the United States has therefore still to be settled. The most reent exchange of notes on the subj:ct took place,nrior to the Byrd ,E)podition and'did not commit eithr,r government to more than the maintenance of, the "open door" in Antarctica by the claimant powers. The American GolTornment at that tithe announced that the Byrd '-]xnedition was-not intendpd to affect South American rights and claims ,in Antarctica and, the Argentine Government in turn expressed'itS apprecia- tion of this reassurance. Argentina's stated policy PS regards the method and terms of settlement has been developed within the frame of its dispute with the British Government, and, perhaps for 'his reason, is more uncompromising than it mighlt otherwise have been. Prgentina has refused adjudication by the International Court and has offered to hold a conference in Thenos Aires to settle the Antarctic qustion. It has announced that Argentina will ii,sist on its right to a national zone and that concessions from.the claim of land lying between 251-f and 740w,will be mrde-only at the western boundary with the Chilean claim. Prc,sumably the demand that an extensive zone be nlaced under Argentine sovereignty is unlikely to be Precd upon by other claimants, end ther,fore Argentine policy as announced to date would be a negative factor in nny attempt to :reache settlement. That the_P-,r6n Paministration might recede from its publicly-stat,d position is indicated by the Foreign Minister's strt--ment in March 1948 that Argentina is prepared to "argue" the Antarctic question. To what extent Argentina might eomnromise its claims and ThFt method of settlement it would Fccept has not, however, ,eon rev?aled. 'E. The Chilean Position in Antrctica ? ' The record of Chilean intorest in intarctica ante-dates Argentine activity in th crac, but is of 8ECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 SECRET 25. an even more tenuous nature. Chilean claims are based largely on succession to Spanish rights in Pntarctica, which are contestable; on acts of authority exercised in the region, which are unconvincing in comparison with those of other claimants; on geological continuity, which appears to lack scientific foundation (see footnote, p.10); and on geographical proximity. Chile's first expedition to the Antarctic took place in 1947 and at that time the Chilean Government established its first Antarctic base at Greenwich Island in the South Shetlands, an area which is also claimed by the British and Argentine Governments. The modern phase of Chile's interest in Antarctica, beginning in 1939, appears to have grown out of thr, some sot of circumstances as frgentine interest (see p. 13). In signing the Act of Habana in July 1940, the Chilean Delegation reserved "the rights of Chile in Antarctica", and the Gov- ernment nroceeded in November 1940 to fix the boundaries of Chilean claims in Antarctica, asserting Chilean sovereignty between 53?W and 90?W. This decree, the Government stated, was not a claim to sovereignty but merely formalized. undoubted Chilean rights in the area. Of the Ameridan and interested non-American powers whom Chile notified of its action, the United States, Pritain, Argentina, and. Japan reserved their rights or-refused recognition of Chile's claim. The US suggested in its reply of December 1940 that "it would be desirable for representatives at least of the governments of the American Republics that are most directly interested in the possibility of the Antarctic regions to convene in a friendly meeting at an opportune time to assess their respective claims and to discuss the possible terms of an agreement concerning these matters." Although the Chilean Government promised to study . the US proposal, no further official exchange took Place on the subject of a conference between the two governments. The Chilean Government had offered for its part to undertake conversrtions with Argentina in response to the Argentine reservation of rights in Antarctica, and .preliminary convers-tions in fact took place early in 1941. However, they were in,- conclusive and it is possible that failure to roach SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 SECRET 26. an agreement with Argentina as well as wartime conditions were responsible for Chile's lack of response to the,offer of the US to confer on Antarctic claims'e. Argentine-Chilean cooperation in Antarctica has developed naturally from the fact that both countries find their chief support in the claim from geographical proximity. Although the convers-tions held in 1941 came to nothing, the Argentine expedition of 1943 included three Chilean nr'al officers, and again in 1947 expeditions the two countries exchanged personnel. The accord WPS formally signalized on frgentina's initiative during the visit of President Gonzalez Videla to Buenos Aires in July 1947, when the two governments agreed to conclude a boundary treaty "ns early as possible." Following Argentine and Chilean moves against British claims in intarction in February 1948 and the return of President Gonzalez Videla from his mission to Antarctica early in March, P second declaration was issued strengthening the original declaration. The declaration of March 1948, which apparently VIPS Plso made on Argentine initiative, stated that the two governments would establish their boundaries within the year and that they would "act by common agreement in the protection and juridical - defense of rights in South American Pntnrctical in which territories both recognize unquestionable sovereign rights ,.. and will continue administrative action, exploration, vigilance and development in the undefined boundary region in their respective Antarctic zones in a spirit of reciprocal cooperation." Despite the public cooperation of the two governments, Chilean officials hae indicated to representatives of the US that the Argentine-Chilean accord has been more apparent than real. The Argentine naval officers who accompanied the first Chilean expedition of 1947 were regarded by the Chilean Gov- ernment as an embarrassment and secret instructions were issued to the commander of the expedition to. prevent their presence at the formal ceremony of annexation in order to forestall reservations of irgentine rights. In October 1947 the Chilean Government Was reported opposed to reaching P final Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 SECRET 2 settlement of boundaries with Argentina, and it is noteworthy that both the joint declarations of 1947 and 1948 were the product of Irgentine initiative.' Chilean activity in the 1948 'season apparently reflected fear'that. Argentine pret-nsions in fntarctica were being made good at the expense of Chile as well as the overt rivalry with the British. In fact Chilean assertions of sovereignty against the British were probably more strident than they might otherwise have been because the Chilean Government felt itself weak as against both the frgentine and British claims. Chilean policy as regards Antarctica must necessarily reckon with the fact that the Chilean Govprnment will not play a leading part in the eventual settlement of Antarctic claims and with the lik-lihood that it success will depend upon the degree of Argentine success because the two govern- ments claim on a similar basis. These two factors make for a somewhat delicate situation. Chile must beware of submerginc- its interests in those of Argentina, but it must also support the lead which Argentina is able to give because of its superior status and resources in establishing South American rights in Antarctica. F. Fliture Prospects Argentina's Antarctic policy has developed chiefly from its dispute with the British Government over sovereign rights in the area, and is at present roughly- parallel to Chilean policy. Then and if the American Government states its position, with respect to Antarctica and its views on the appropriate method of settling disputed claims, the position of the present contenders will be to some extent modified. Under present circumstances ,the stalemate between ?the South American governments and the UK could continue indefinitely to provide a subject for agitation. The immediate political stimulus to activity and the scope for manPuvers have been lessened with the conclusion of the Argentine elections early in March and the approaching end of the Antarctic summer season. But agitation of South American claims in Antarctica holds continued advan- tages for prestige purposes and may also serve as a - SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 SECRET 28. mean's of weakening the British position.- n,the Falk-7 The Bogota Conference will probably be used as a forum by the Arvntine Government, either alone or in collaboration with the Chilean GovPrnment, as an opportunity to mobilize the support of the other American republics for Antarctic claims, In this case the claims will be linked with the general question of territorial disputes between Britain and the other. American republics, notably the Falklands and Belize issues, and with the entire problem of non- continental claits and "aggressions" within the hemisphere defense ?zone. As a dramatic current issue involving "aggression" in the defense zone by the British Government, the Antarctic controversy will undoubtedly supply ammunition'for irredentist claims against European possessions in the hemisphere, and in turn the South American claimants stand to secure backing in Antarctica frdm countries opposing European colonial claims, In the matter of territorial claims of Latin AmeriCan governments aaainst European powers the United States has taken the position that the establish- ment of the hemisphere defense zone does not affect European territorial rights in the Western Hemisphere and has indicated that such claims are problems to be settled between the .parties directly involved. The policy of the US may suffer in comparison with Arg- entine policy if the Argentine deleaation points up the contrast between its championship of Latin American rights and the lukewarm and neutral position of the US delegation. -Following the line of Argentine repre- sentatives at the ITO Conference in Habana and on other occasions, they may be able to use the comparison to indicate that the interests of the US are at odds with the interests of the other American republics. It may be predicted that the Argentine Gov- ernment will, whatever happens at the Bogota Conference, continue to carry on operations in Antarctica. To the extent that it expands these operations, its claims in Antarctica will be imorovPd as aaainst those of other governments and will become a fixed element in national SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 SECRET 29. policy. In any case it may be expected that the Argentine Government will find time on its side in the Antarctic dispute and will be inclined to put off a settlement which might foreclose use of Antarctica as an exercise ground for the Argentine Navy and Foreign Office. SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 S7CRET 30: III. FORECAST OF LATIN AMERICAN POSITIONAT.BOGOTA The dramatic assertions of sovereignty made by the claimant go,ernments in Antarctica and the Belize affair evoked widespread comment throughout Latin America. , The bulk of this comment has not been addressed directly to the specific issues presented by the Antarctic and Falklands disputes but rather to the broader question of European colonial posses- sions in the hemisphere. Because of this fact and because the Antarctic, Falklands, and Belize issues however diverse -- will probably be linked together at Bogota, the following discussion deals with the reactions of the various countries to the territorial c'isputes as a whole as well as to Argentina's claims. A. General Considerations The reactions so far publicly expressed, which have undoubtedly encouraged Latin American claimants to hope for good support when the Conference meets, point to certain factors which will work in their favor. They can anticipate that many of the Latin American governments will be influenced by the small- country, anti-imperialist psychology already widely evidenced in the Latin American press. Argentina can be expected to attempt to reinforce these sentiments by bringing pressure to bear directly on the govern- ments or indirectly through an appeal to conform to majority views. Such propaganda efforts will be especially effective to the extent that the US and Latin American delegations fail to see eye to eye on other issues, as for example on the economic needs of Latin America. ,Other factors, however, may weaken the position of the Latin American claimants. Fridtion between their governments and certain of their neighbors will operate to reduce overall support for the respective claims of Argentina, Chile, and Guatemala. A desire to cooperate with the US to the degree possible and the growing sense of responsibility in international politics felt by some of the leading republics will have a similar effect. Some of the go,-ernments hope to dispose of the question of disputed territories as rapidly as possible or to give it a low priority for discussion either because they fear to revive latent SECRET, Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 , Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 SECRET 31. inter-American border disputes or because their Interest in other items on the agenda is paramount. Which influences operate most strongly on the group depends largely upon the circumstances of the moment at which the Guatemalan or other resolutions come to be debated and voted upon. As of mid-March the agitation over territorial claims had diminished considerably from the peak reached at the time British warships were dispatched to Antarctica and Belize.. Another incident of the same order would again raise Latin American temperatures and merely the' discussion of the. territorial disputes at 'Bogot4 might have the same result. In the presence of renewed agitation, governments wishing to cooperate with the US or merely to maintain a non-committal position would be under heavy pressure to join the champions of hemisphere rights and to abandon their intention of cooperating with the US. On the other hand the world situation may be of overriding importance. Thus the Chilean Government itself has already indicated that, in view of the present international situation, it will avoid action that might embarrass the American Government, end the Foreign Minist-r assured the 'American Ambassador early in,March that. Chile wOuld not seek inter-American action at Bogot6, but would merely enter its Antarctic claim as a matter or record. B. Reactions of 'Non-Claimant Countries . Of the leading Latin American governments which have not so far announced territorial claims, those of Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, and Cuba were opposed to agitation of: the territorial issue as of mid-March. The Brazilian government appears best able to maintain this position since public opinion in that country seems indifferent to the Latin American 'claimsand the main potential source of agitation against "imperialism", the Communist Party, has for some months been suppressed. The other governments named abbe would encounter more serious problems if faced with intense'public agitation favoring the Latin American position anci they might well be forced to abandon a neutral position in favor of "Latin American solidarity." However, in normal circumstancns they can be expected to be obstructive SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 s SECRET 32. or non-committal with reference to agitation of the territorial disputes. TheUnited'States May also secure the support of Sate .of the Central American and Caribbean delegation, because of their dislike ? of Guatemala or because they normally 'support the US at international gathetrihgs.. -Standing somewhere. in between these countries . and thechampions of hemisphere Claims is the Mexican Government.- It has committed itself to solidarity with Latin American claims,. but it has declared for a. temperate approach, and will probably be governed to large extent tyoirctmStances at the time of the Conference ? and by the position of the majority. Ofthe three claimants to disputed territory, . Chile and Guatemala'ha,:e'been the most Zealous,in seeking moral support from the US and the other -American republics. Chile, as noted above; may temper its policy considerably and Guatemala lacks the'standihg to organize widespread support fOr, its .pOsition., Argentina, which would in any case be,the natural leader because of its prestige, will undoubtedly be the mot -effective of the group in lobbying. for . support of a strong resolution.on territorial disputes. As the dominant southern South America- it is assured of the support of Paraguayand May be able to . detach Uruguay. and Bolivia from the neutral Position which these 'countries have so far maintained. Ecuador, which takes a serious view. of, Latin American claims, can be expected to respbnd-readily to Argentine arguments. Whether Argentina can also 'obtain the 'support of Peru and of the Small Central American ?and Caribbean governments in whose countries its , representatives have been actively cultivating Argentine interests is a matter of speculation. . 'Specific reactions of the Latin American .countries who are not !-arties to' the disputes as developed to early Mareh are discussed below. Brazil The Brazilian Government is in complete accprd with the neutral attitude. of the American Government with regard to claims to disputed territory which may be advanced at the Bogota Conference. The Foreign." SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 ? SECR7T 33. Minister, moreover, has made positive efforts to quiet the dispute. The Brazilian Ambassador in Santiago was instructed to iniicate to the Chilean Government Brazil's deep concern over agitation tending to embarrass the UK and give aid and comfort to its enemies and to urge the use of existing machinery for peaceful settlement of disputes. In effect Chile was warned against serving as a catspaw for Argentine interests. The Brazilian Ambassador in Asuncion also expressed disapproval of the Paraguayan Foreign Minister's recent attempt to link latent Brazilian claims in the Guianas to the current question. The Brazilian Government will apparently not be under pressure from the domestic press to alter its stand and will not be subject to Communist- inspired agitation. It will be sensitive to pressure to conform to the views of its Latin American neighbors, but not to the extent of altering its policy which is inspired in about equal parts by a desire to play the role of a responsible world power, by its int-rest in cooperating with the US, and by its tendency to check- mate Argentine pretensions when possible. Bolivia: The Boli-ian Foreign Minister, who has expressed complete agreement with the US position regarding territorial disputes, indicated his neutrality in response to requests of the Chilean and Guatemalan governments for support of their territorial claims. The Bolivian press has paid little attention to the disputes. The one editorial that had appeared on the subject as of March 10, praised the "new American international policy" as opposed to "colonial sub- mission' but the Bolivian Government will probably not be open to any strong pressure of 1)ublic opinion. On the other hand, it seems reasonable to assume that an Argentine request for support would be difficult to refuse in view of the close eaonomic ties between the two countries. Colombia The Secretary-General of the Foreign Office infomed the American Ambassador that Colombia's position as regards territorial disputes coincides in general with that of the US. According to a statement of another Foreign Office official on February 26, S7CRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 , SECRET 34. Colombia.favors? the British proposal to submit the Antarctic dispute to the- Permanent Court. The Colombian .Government may be sUbject to pressure of public opin- ion, to change its. policy on, this issue. ? El Tiempo, :right-wing Liberal' daily, declared editorially -that the sovereign rights of Argentina and Chile in Antarctic territories merit the supl?ort of all hemisphere countries t' the Bogota Conference. Other Liberal newspapers may well adopt the same line., Ex-president Lopez?through-his organ, El Liberal, could be expected to take an'"anti-celonial",."anti-imperialist" position in conformity with his general philosophy.--The aitanista faction of the Party has been flirting with the Per6n government recently and might welcome a chance to demonstrate support for,Argentine interests. If the influential Liberal press as a whole adopts the causei.the Government may'encounter?difficulty in abstaining from support of the Latin American claim- ants. Moreover, since Bogot4 newspapers will be read by' many delegates, such a development would provide a favorable environment for the Argentine delegation operating in the conference hall lobbies. ? Ecuador: The Ecuadoran Government will apparently support Latin-American territorial claims at Bogota. During a viSit to Honduras early this year the Ecuadoran Foreign Minister reportedly proposed the return'of?European possessions to Latin American claimants as a subject for joint action. In March the Foreign Office acting avowedly "in compliance with its duties as regards solidarity which is incumbent upon the Hispano-American states in the defense of their common territorial, economic,- and cultural interests 'i declared that (1) Ecuador is opposed to all colonial systems, especially in America; (2) the Belize and Antarctic disputes can be solved pacifically; and (3) Ecuador is prepared to cooperate to find a solution,. -These spontaneous expressions would seem to place the Ecuadoran delegation safely behind the claims of the Latin American governments. Paraguav Probably at Argentine instigation the Paraguayan Foreign Minister has expressed support of Latin American territorial claims and has even undertaken to agitate the question with the Brazilian Embassy in Asunci6n. In a speech of March 12 he said: SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 SECRET 35. "We are with the American nations fora pacific solution that will free the land of our countries from the European colonial regime." There appears to be little doubt that Paraguay is in the Argentine camp and will support the Latin American claimants at Bogota. Peru: No official response to Latin American appeals for assistance appears to hare been Made by Peru. The leading newspaper La Prensa and the Aprista organ Tribuna had not commented editorially on the dispute as of March 12, although an unsigned article in the latter supported South American claims to the Antarctic and Falklands. ?Presumably the government will not be exposed to any serious pressure from public opinion in forming its policy as regards territorial disputes and will be able to accommodate its .action at Bogota to the. requirements Of its relations with the US, Arg- entina, and the inter-American-system as a whole. Uruguavg? When the Antarctic dispute first came to public notice in mid-February, President Batlle Berres told Ambassador Briggs that he favored an over-all settlement and declared that Uruguay would probably raise its 'claim against Argentina for Martin Garcia Island if Argentina sought to enlist Uruguay's support. Following the meeting of the Argentine and Uruguayan Presidents on February 27 it was rumored in the Uruguayan press (1) that they had discussed the Antarctic dispute, and (2) that Peron had offered to transfer Martin Garcia to Uruguay, The Presidents.' pUblished agreement involved settlement of the common boundary in the Uruguay River. In response to the query of the American Ambassador in early Macch3 the Foreign- Minister.was non-committal as to the nosition that Uruguay Would adopt at BogotA regarding territorial disputes. The pro-government Uruguayan press has not taken sides in the Antarctic disputes and editorial comment has .been confined in most cases to a review of the background facts and an expression of hope that,the matter will be settled peacefully and without disturbing the traditionally friendly relations between Britain,. Argentina! end Chile, But the opposition Herrerista press seized upon the dispute to attack the motives and SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 , SECRET.; ' 36. attitude of the LE and Britain, asserting that the US failed to back Latin American rights because it wished to take over British possessions in Latin America. The Communist press has' voiced support of the Chilean position in Antarctica and its comments on the issue will probably parallel those df the Nationalists. Under attack from the domestic opposi- tion and under pressure from Argentina, the Uruguayan Government may be expected to take a stand in favor of the Latin American claimants at-Bogot6. Venezuela: The -Venezuelan Governmeht has acted with restraint:in this matter, and.its-Foteign, Office favors the position of the. US'on'territOrial.disputes .in general. Officials have veiced,thefear that . they will be forced to assert Vehezuelan claims in British,,Guiana if the colonial question .is agitated at BegotA'and that ?in?turn:ColOmbig.may Call .for a. revision of its border with Venezuela. Public. agitation, however, threatens to weaken their ability to preserve.-a.neutral. attitude. In hope of preventing a contreVersial discussion of the various 'disputes- by Congress and the press,. the Government issued a communique on March .3 expressing solidarity with the. American republics'and'at the same time ?suggested that the disputes- be settled peacefully in accordance with the principle's of the UN Charter. The statement did not ha,re -the desired effect, and a few days later the. Venezuelan Congress passed a resolution by unanimous vote and-amidst loud applause expressing solidarity with Argentina and .Chile in -the Antarctic dispute. The' youth branch of the opposition party COPEI and, students and professors of the Central Uni,-ersity in early March voiced support of the Latin American claimants in their.dispUtes with the British. Venezuela's dormant claims in British Guiana, which haN-e already been the Communist press, will render the government.nspecially vulnerable to accusations of betraying the national.interest if it cooperates openly with 'the US in attempting to quint the territorial disputes'. The Venezuelan Gevernment will not be vulnerable'to Argentine pressure as such, but domestic politics and the general desire not to stray from the Latin American group may operate to SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 SECRET 37. change the government's position to one more favorable to Argentina and the other Latin American claimants. Cuba: The Cuban position as expressed to the Guatemalan Government in response to the latter's circular on the colonial question followed the general lines of the Ecuadoran declaration but was not a declaration of solidarity. From this it might be asSumed that the extent to which the Cuban Government might be willing to go on the Argentine-Chilean claims would be to counsel a.peaceful solution of the disputes. The Cuban Foreign :'inistor expressed the fear to the American Ambassador that the territorial quastion might dominate and spoil the Bogot4 Conference and, although he felt the colonial question must be settled in the longrun, obviously hoped that it WoUld be deferred. A commentary in El Mundo of February 19, which paralleled the view of the Uruguayan nationalist newspaper El Debate, stated that Argentina fears "the United States may become a South American power" in the proc-ess of British withdrawal from its colonial possessions. What general attitude the Cuban press will adopt and whether it will operate to change the government's policy cannot be predicted. Mexico:- The Mexican Government, which is involved indirectly in the Belize dispute, has indicated that it will support the Guatemalan resolution at Bogot6 but will adopt a temperate attitude. The Mexican - Government has not taken a stand on the Antarctic dispute as of the end of February and was seeking a neutral position in the matter. However, its support of Latin American claims in general will involve support of the South American claims in Antarctica and the Falklands to the extent they are linked with other claims. The Mexican Foreign Minister, like the Cuban Foreign Minister, fears that other subjects at Bogot6 will suffer if the colonial question is seriously agitated during the Conference. The American Embassy reports that editorial comment on the_ Argentine-Chilean dispute with Britain has been reserved on the whole and it is felt that the national press will take its lead from the administration on this and other matters connected with territorial disputes. ' SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 SECRET 38, Other Countries: The Dominican and Haitian govern- . ments have expressed views in,agreement with those of the US although they would in general also be. sympathetic to the transfer of EuropPan colonies to Latin Am(rican claimants. The Honduran Foreign Minister gave a clue to his government's general position by his cool reception of an Ecuadoran proposal made in January of this year that the Latin American Governments jointly advocate transfer of European colonies to Latin claimants. The President of Panama, on the other hand, declared on March 2 that all American nations should support Chilean claims in the Antarctic in the interests of continental solidarity. Likewise the Sal,-adoran Foreign Minister was reported by the Guatemalan radio on March 15 to have declared that El Salvador would support the move at Bogot6 to put an end to European colonies in the western hemisphere. Perhaps indicative that other Central American countries will favor Latin American pretensions is the unanimous press support for their claims reported from Nicaragua late in February. Embassy Managua commented "The unanimous and unquest- ioning approval given to the Argentinian, Chilean, and Guatemalan actions ... indicates that opposition to colonialism in the western hemisphere can still rally Latin American support, despite internecine fights such as that between Guatemala and Nicaragua. There is apparent here an undertone of opinion that the United States can be forced by its hemispheric commit- ments to support a united Latin American bloc against Britain. It is, Perhaps, significant that the usual nice re,Tard shown by the Liberal press and in particular the pro-government segment, for opposing moves that would embarrass the United States is not present here." - On the basis of the general considerations and specific reactions described above, it may be predicted that in a reasonably calm discussion of territorial issues, the delegations at Bogot6 will be about equally divided among support of the Latin American claimants, maintenance of a non-committal attitude, and cooperation with the US. Under such unfavorable auspices, the Argentine government might well decide not to press the Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 SECRET 39. issue vigorously but to content itself with a mild resolution. If, however, a new incident ?or the discussion at BogotA itself brings widespread agita- tion of the territorial issues, and in the absence of an overriding international crisis, support of the US position may dropconsiderably, and the Conference may adopt a strong resolution which will provide a new basis for Argentine pretensions in Antarctica and the Falklands. SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/03: CIA-RDPO8001297R000800090022-3