U.S.S.R. GENERAL SURVEY

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CIA-RDP08S01350R000100090001-7
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RIPPUB
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S
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352
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December 21, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 8, 2008
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1
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Publication Date: 
March 1, 1971
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REPORT
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Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001 U.S.S.R. GENERAL SURVEY Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied Iq Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08S01350R000100090001-7 TABLE OF CONTENTS This General Survey supersedes the one dated Sep- tember 1968, copies of which should be destroyed. Page Glossary ............................................................ xi Chronology ......................................................... xii 1. Introduction ....................................................... 1 2. Geography ........................................................ 5 A. General ....................................................... 5 1. Topography ................................................. 5 2. Climate ..................................................... 7 B. Military geographic regions ..................................... 7 1. Central Plains ............................................... 7 2. Caucasus Mountains .......................................... 10 3. Caspian-Central Asian Lowlands .............................. 11 4. Southern and Eastern Mountains .............................. 11 5. Subarctic Swamp and Forest .................................. 12 6. Arctic Barrens .............................................. 13 7. Insular and Peninsular Far East .............................. 13 C. Strategic areas ................................................. 14 1. Moscow ..................................................... 14 2. Donets ...................................................... 16 3. Volga-Ural .................................................. 16 4. Leningrad .................................................. 19 5. Baku ....................................................... 19 6. Tashkent .................................................... 19 7. Kuznetsk .................................................... 20 8. Baykal ...................................................... 21 9. Far Eastern .................................................. 22 D. Internal routes ................................................. 23 E. Approaches .................................................... 23 1. Land ....................................................... 30 2. Sea ......................................................... 30 3. Air ......................................................... 32 3. Transportation and Telecommunications ............................. 37 A. General ........................................................ 37 C. Highways ..................................................... 38 B. Railroads ...................................................... 40 D. Inland waterways ............................................... 43 E. Pipelines ...................................................... 46 F. Ports ...............................................:.......... 47 G. Merchant marine ............................................... 53 H. Civil air ....................................................... 68 I. Airfields ....................................................... 70 J. Telecommunications ............................................ 79 4. Sociological ....................................................... 85 A. General ...................................................... 85 25X1 i Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08S01350R000100090001-7 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08S01350R000100090001-7 Page B. Population ..................................................... 88 1. Size and geographic distribution ............................... 88 2. Composition ................................................. 89 3. Structure .................................................... 90 4. Dynamics ................................................... 91 5. Problems and policies ........................................ 93 C. Structure and characteristics of the society ........................ 95 1. Ethnic and linguistic divisions ................................ 95 2. The family and the individual ................................ 100 3. Social structure .............................................. 102 4. Social values and attitudes .................................... 105 D. Manpower, labor conditions, and labor relations ................... 108 1. Labor force ................................................. 108 2. Wages, hours, and working conditions .......................... 112 3. Labor organizations .......................................... 114 4. Labor-management relations .................................. 116 E. Health and welfare ............................................. 117 1. Levels of living .............................................. 117 a. Diet ..................................................... 118 b. Consumer goods and services ................................ 118 c. Housing .................................................. 118 d. Attitudes of the people .................................... 119 2. Health and medical care ...................................... 119 a. General level of health and sanitation ...................... 119 b. Incidence of disease ...................................... 120 c. Medical organization and administration .................... 120 d. Medical personnel and hospital facilities .................... 121 e. Voluntary organizations .................................... 122 f. Emergency medical services ................................ 122 3. Social welfare ............................................... 123 4. Social problems ............................................. 125 a. Crime .................................................... 126 b. Vagrancy ...................... .......................... 126 c. Alcoholism and drug abuse ................................. 126 F. Religion ....................................................... 127 1. Government and religion ..................................... 127 a. The legal position of religion ............................... 127 b. Atheism .................................................. 128 2. The Orthodox churches ....................................... 129 a. The Russian Orthodox Church .............................. 129 b. The Georgian Orthodox Church ............................. 131 c. The Old Believers ........................................ 131 3. Other Christian churches ...................................... 132 a. The Evangelical Christian Baptist Church .................... 132 b. The Evangelical Lutheran Church and other Protestant groups .. 133 c. The Roman Catholic Church ................................ 133 d. The Armenian Apostolic Church ............................ 134 4. The Jewish question .......................................... 135 5. Other religions .............................................. 136 a. Islam .................................................... 136 b. Buddhism ................................................ 137 G. Education ................. ................................... 137 1. Education in national life .................................... 137 2. Government and education ................................... 140 3. Educational system .......................................... 142 a. Preschool institutions ...................................... 142 b. The 8-year school ......................................... 143 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08S01350R000100090001-7 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08S01350R000100090001-7 Page c. Middle schools ............................................ 145 d. Higher education .......................................... 146 4. Teachers ..................................................... 150 5. Youth organizations .......................................... 153 a. The Octobrists ............................................ 154 b. The Pioneers .............................................. 154 c. The Komsomol ............................................ 155 H. Artistic and cultural expression .................................. 156 1. The regime and culture ...................................... 156 2. Literature ................................................... 158 3. Music and the dance .......................................... 160 4. Art and architecture ......................................... 161 5. Minority cultures ............................................. 164 a. The Ukraine .............................................. 164 b. Belorussia ................................................ 164 c. The Baltic peoples ......................................... 165 d. The Christian Caucasian peoples ............................. 165 e. The Muslim peoples ....................................... 166 I. Public information .............................................. 167 1. The media, the regime, and the public ......................... 167 2. Press, periodicals, and news agencies .......................... 168 3. Books, libraries, and museums .................................. 172 4. Theater and motion pictures ................................ 173 5. Radio and television ......................................... 175 J. Suggestions for further reading .................................. 176 5. Political .......................................................... 183 A. General ....................................................... 183 1. National expansion ........................................... 183 2. Prerevolutionary political history .............................. 184 3. The regime of Lenin and Stalin ................................ 185 4. The Khrushchev era .......................................... 185 5. The Brezhnev-Kosygin "collective leadership" ................... 186 B. Political dynamics .............................................. 186 1. General ..................................................... 186 .2. Communist Party membership and organization ................. 189 3. Top leadership .............................................. 193 C. Structure and functioning of the government ...................... 201 1. General ..................................................... 201 2. Central government .......................................... 202 3. Lower governmental structure ................................. 205 4. Judicial system .............................................. 205 5. Electoral procedures .......................................... 206 D. National policies ................................................ 206 1. Domestic .................................................... 207 2. Foreign ..................................................... 208 a. General .................................................. 208 b. Soviet policy toward the less-developed world .............. 209 c. Soviet policy toward the West and Japan .................... 210 d. The Soviets and the Communist world ...................... 211 3. Defense ..................................................... 213 E. Police and intelligence services ..... :............................ 214 1. Police forces-MVD ......................................... 215 2. Security and intelligence-KGB .............................. 215 3. Military intelligence-GRU ................................... 216 F. Opposition, dissent, and subversion .............................. 216 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08S01350R000100090001-7 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 Page G. Propaganda programs ........................................... 217 1. Domestic ................................................... 217 2. Propaganda directed abroad .................................. 219 3. Growing contacts with non-Communist world .................. 219 H. Suggestions for further reading .................................. 219 1. Political history-general works ............................... 219 2. Party and government ........................................ 220 3. Foreign policy ............................................... 221 4. Defense ..................................................... 221 5. Judicial system .............................................. 221 6. Propaganda, intelligence, subversion ........................... 222 6. Economic .......................................................... 225 A. General ....................................................... 225 1. Introduction ................................................. 225 2. Economic growth ............................................ 225 3. Developments affecting economic organization .................. 227 4. Resource position ............................................ 228 5. International economic relations ............................... 229 B. Sectors of the economy .......................................... 230 1. Agriculture, fisheries, and forestry .............................. 230 a. Problems and policies in agriculture ........................ 230 b. Main characteristics of Soviet agriculture .................... 231 c. Fisheries ................................................... 237 d. Adequacy of food supply and diet ........................... 238 e. Forest resources and primary forest products .................. 238 2. Fuels and power' ............................................ 239 a. Primary energy ............................................ 239 b. Coal ..................................................... 240 c. Petroleum .................................................. 240 d. Electric power ............................................ 242 3. Minerals and metals .......................................... 244 a. Minerals .................................................. 244 (1) Metallic minerals ...................................... 244 (2) Nonmetallic minerals .................................. 245 b. Metals ................................................... 245 (1) Ferrous metals ....... ................................ 245 (2) Nonferrous metals ..................................... 246 4. Manufacturing, and construction ............................... 247 a. Machinery, equipment, and fabricated metal products ........ 247 (1) General .............................................. 247 (2) Production ............................................ 248 (a) Competition between civilian and military production .. 248 (b) Defense production ............................... 249 (c) Civilian production ................................ 250 b. Chemicals and allied products .............................. 253 c. Textiles and wearing apparel ............................... 255 d. Construction and construction materials ..................... 256 e. Food processing ........................................... 257 C. Government economic policy and finance .......................... 258 1. Goals and policies ........................................... 258 2. Economic control and reform ................................. 258 3. Planning ....... ............................... ........... 260 4. Finance ..................................................... 260 D. Trade ......................................................... 261 1. Domestic trade ......................................... .....261 a. Producer goods ... ........................... . ... ...... 261 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08S01350R000100090001-7 Page b. Consumer goods ........................................... 262 (1) State-controlled stores .................................. 262 (a) State stores ....................................... 262 (b) Cooperative stores ................................. 262 (2) Collective farm markets ............................... 262 2. International economic relations ............................... 263 a. Introduction .............................................. 263 b. Foreign trade policy, organization, and control ................ 263 c. Geographic distribution of foreign trade .................... 263 d. Commodity composition of foreign trade ..................... 263 e. Exchange rate and international payments position ............ 264 f. Soviet foreign aid .......................................... 265 A. General ........................................................ 267 B. Organization, planning, and financing of research .................. 267 1. Organization ................................................ 267 2. Planning .................................................... 270 3. Financing ................................................... 270 C. Scientific education, manpower, and facilities ...................... 271 D. Major research fields ............................................ 272 1. Air, ground, and naval weapons ............................... 272 a. Aerospace systems ......................................... 272 b. Ground weapons and equipment ............................ 273 c. Naval weapons ............................................ 274 2. Biological, chemical, and radiological warfare .................. 274 3. Atomic energy ............................................... 276 4. Electronics .................................................. 278 5. Medical sciences, including veterinary medicine ................. 280 6. Other sciences ............................................... 282 a. Chemistry, chemical engineering, and metallurgy .............. 282 b. Physics and mathematics ................................... 285 c. Astrogeophysical sciences ................................... 286 (1) Astronomy .............. ............................. 287 (2) Meteorology .......................................... 287 (3) Space and upper atmospheric sciences .................. 288 (4) Terrestrial geophysics . ................................ 289 (5) Geodesy .............................................. 289 (6) Hydrology, hydraulics, and coastal engineering ........... 290 (7) Oceanography ........................................ 290 A. General ....................................................... 293 1. Historical ................................................... 293 2. Defense organization ......................................... 294 a. Joint agencies ............................................. 295 b. Force components ......................................... 296 c. Operational commands ..................................... 297 d. Militarized security forces .................................. 297 3. Military manpower ........................................... 297 4. Strength trends .............................................. 298 5. Training .................................................... 299 6. Economic support and military budget ......................... 300 a. Economic support ......................................... 300 b. Military budget ........................................... 301 7. Logistics .................................................... 301 8. Uniforms and insignia ........................................ 302 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08S01350R000100090001-7 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08S01350R000100090001-7 Page B. Ground forces .................................................. 307 1. Organization ................................................ 308 2. Strength, composition, and disposition .......................... 310 3. Training .................................................... 310 4. Logistics .................................................... 311 C. Naval forces ................................................... 311 1. Organization ................................................ 317 2. Strength, composition, and disposition .......................... 318 3. Training .................................................... 318 4. Logistics .................................................... 319 5. Naval aviation ............................................... 319 D. Air forces ..................................................... 319 1. Organization ................................................ 322 2. Strength, composition, and disposition .......................... 324 3. Training .................................................... 324 a. Preoperational ............................................ 324 b. Operational ............................................... 325 4. Logistics .................................................... 325 E. Air defense forces .............................................. 326 1. Organization ................................................ 326 2. Strength, composition, and disposition .......................... 327 3. Training .................................................... 328 4. Logistics .................................................... 328 F. Rocket troops .................................................. 328 1. Organization ................................................ 328 2. Strength, composition, and disposition .......................... 330 3. Training .................................................... 330 4. Logistics ..................................................... 331 G. Militarized security forces ....................................... 332 1. Frontier troops .............................................. 332 2. Interior troops ............................................... 333 Area Brief .......................................................... 334 Page Fig. 1 Arctic tundra (photo) ...................................... 6 Fig. 2 Siberian taiga (photo) ...................................... 6 Fig. 3 Tilled field near Kiyev (photo) .............................. 6 Fig. 4 Karakum desert (photo) .................................... 6 Fig. 5 Cloudiness, precipitation, temperature, and relative humidity (chart) .................................................. 8 Fig. 6 Military geographic regions and terrain (map) ................. 9 Fig. 7 Caucasus Mountains (photo) ................................ 10 Fig. 8 Tien Shan Mountains (photo) ............................... 12 Fig. 9 Moscow strategic area (map) ................................ 15 Fig. 10 Moscow (photo) ........................................... 17 Fig.. 11 Donets strategic area (map) ................................. 17 Fig. 12 Shaft iron-ore mine at Krivoy Rog (photo) .................... 17 Fig. 13 Volga-Ural strategic area (map) ............................. 18 Fig. 14 Gas-producing field in the Volga-Ural strategic area (photo) .... 18 Fig. 15 Leningrad strategic area (map) .............................. 20 Fig. 16 Baku strategic area (map) ................................... 20 Fig. 17 Offshore oilwells near Baku (photo) ......................... 20 Fig. 18 Tashkent strategic area (map) ............................... 21 Fig. 19 Kuznetsk strategic area (map) ............................... 21 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08S01350R000100090001-7 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08S01350R000100090001-7 Page Fig. 20 Baykal strategic area (map) ................................. 21 Fig. 21 Far Eastern strategic area (map) ............................ 22 Fig. 22 Strategic areas, internal routes, and approaches (map) ......... 24 Fig. 23 Internal routes (table) ...................................... 25 Fig. 24 Land boundaries (table) ................................... 30 Fig. 25 Land approaches (table) ................................... 31 Fig. 26 Beaches in amphibious landing area near Odessa (photo) ...... 32 Fig. 27 Amphibious landing areas (table) ............................ 33 Fig. 28 Air approaches orientation (map) ............................ 35 Fig. 29 Air approaches (table) ...................................... 36 Fig. 30 Principal rail lines (table) .................................. 39 Fig. 31 Baku-Krasnovodsk railroad ferry (photo) ...................... 40 Fig. 32 Diesel-electric locomotive, Series TE-3 (photo) ................ 40 Fig. 33 Mountain road (photo) ..................................... 41 Fig. 34 Bridge over Volga at Saratov (photo) ......................... 42 Fig. 35 Inland waterway system (map) .............................. 43 Fig. 36 Krasnoyarsk port on the Yenisey (photo) ...................... 45 Fig. 37 Sormovskiy class river-sea vessel (photo) ..................... 46 Fig. 38 The CEMA pipeline (photo) ................................ 46 Fig. 39 Selected pipelines (table) ................................... 48 Fig. 40 Major ports (table) ........................................ 54 Fig. 41 Ships constructed for the Soviet merchant fleet (table) ......... 66 Fig. 42 Merchant fleet strengths by base area (table) ................. 67 Fig. 43 Aeroflot CLASSIC (11-62) (photo) ............................ 69 Fig. 44 Selected major airfields (table) .............................. 73 Fig. 45 Other important airfelds (table) ............................. 76 Fig. 46 Molniya 1 communication satellite (photo) ................... 81 Fig. 47 Total population, U.S.S.R. and United States (chart) ............ 88 Fig. 48 Population and population density, U.S.S.R. and selected countries (chart) ......................................... 89 Fig. 49 Population of union republics (table) ........................ 90 Fig. 50 Urban and rural population (chart) .......................... 90 Fig. 51 Estimated age-sex distribution (chart) ....................... 91 Fig. 52 Age and sex structure (chart) ................................ 91 Fig. 53 Age and sex structure, U.S.S.R. and United States (chart) ..... 91 Fig. 54 Vital rates (table) ............................. :........... 92 Fig. 55 Vital rates by union republic (table) ......................... 92 Fig. 56 Major nationalities and languages (table) ..................... 95 Fig. 57 Population of the union republics by nationality (map) ........ 96 Fig. 58 Class composition of the population (table) ................... 102 Fig. 59 Manpower resources, labor force, and civilian employment Fig. 60 (table) ................................................. 108 Labor force by age and sex (chart) .......................... 109 Fig. 61 Women wage and salary earners, by sector of the economy (table) 109 Fig. 62 Labor force participation rates, U.S.S.R. and United States (chart) ................................................. 109 Fig. 63 Civilian labor force by sector of the economy (table) ........... 110 Fig. 64 Occupation by branch of economic activity (table) ............ 110 Fig. 65 Specialists with higher and secondary school training (table) .... 111 Fig. 66 Nationality composition of specialists and scientific workers 112 (table) ........................... :...................... Fig. 67 Average earnings of Soviet workers, by economic sector (table) 112 Fig. 68 Soviet trade unions (table) ................................. 114 Fig. 69 Trade union structure (chart) ............................... 115 Fig. 70 Levels of living in U.S.S.R. and selected countries (chart) ...... 117 Fig. 71 Ownership of selected consumer durables (table) .............. 118 Fig. 72 Incidence of selected diseases (table) ........................ 120 Fig. 73 Development of public health services (table) ................ 122 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08S01350R000100090001-7 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 Page Fig. 74 Social welfare expenditures (table) .......................... 123 Fig. 75 Social welfare budget (chart) .. ............................ 124 Fig. 76 Literacy in 9-49 age group (table) ........................... 139 Fig. 77 Level of education attained (table) .......................... 139 Fig. 78 School enrollment rates for first and second levels of education (table) .................................................. 139 Fig. 79 Education at the third level: students and graduates (table) .... 140 Fig. 80 Higher educational institutions: students and graduates (table) . 140 Fig. 81 Nationality composition of higher education enrollment (table) .. 141 Fig. 82 Soviet educational system (chart) ........................... 142 Fig. 83 Schools, pupils, and teachers in general education (table) ...... 144 Fig. 84 Graduate student enrollment and persons graduated (table) ..... 151 Fig. 85 Teachers: qualifications, experience, and proportion who are women (table) ....................................... 152 Fig. 86 Principal "creative unions" (table) ........................... 158 Fig. 87 Production of books, periodicals, and newspapers (table) ....... 168 Fig. 88 Relative use of languages among population and publications (table) . ................................................ 169 Fig. 89 Principal newspapers (table) ................................ 170 Fig. 90 Selected major magazines (table) ............................ 171 Fig. 91 Libraries and collections (table) ............................. 173 Fig. 92 Interlocking directorate (chart) .............................. 187 Fig. 93 Party echelons and the government (chart) ................... 188 Fig. 94 Growth of the Soviet Communist Party (chart) ................ 190 Fig. 95 Social structure of new party candidates (chart) .............. 190 Fig. 96 Length of party membership (table) ......................... 191 Fig. 97 Growth of the central party machine (chart) ................. 192 Fig. 98 Flow of authority in the party (chart) ........................ 192 Fig. 99 Central party machine (chart) ............................... 193 Fig. 100 Republic, regional, and lower party structure (chart) .......... 194 Fig. 101 Seniority on Party Politburo (chart) ......................... 195 Fig. 102 Evolution of Party Politburo (chart) ......................... 196 Fig. 103 Representation and structure of Supreme Soviet (chart) ........ 203 Fig. 104 Council of Ministers (chart) ................................ 204 Fig. 105 Police and intelligence services (chart) ....................... 214 Fig. 106 Propaganda apparatus and activities (chart) .................. 218 Fig. 107 Indicators of per capita production, U.S.S.R. and United Fig. 108 States (chart) ............................................ 226 Indicators of economic growth (table) ......................... 226 Fig. 109 Gross national product, U.S.S.R. and United States (chart) ...... 227 Fig. 110 Factors affecting growth of industrial production (chart) ...... 227 Fig. 111 Strategic supply position (table) ............................. 228 Fig. 112 Distribution of civilian labor force, U.S.S.R. and United States (chart) ............................................ 229 Fig. 113 Economic regions (map) ................................... 232 Fig. 114 Sown area, by crop (table) .................................. 234 Fig. 115 Production of grain, U.S.S.R. and United States (chart) ........ 235 Fig. 116 Average annual production and yields of principal crops (table) .. 235 Fig. 117 Numbers of livestock (table) ................................ 236 Fig. 118 Output of principal food products (table) ..................... 237 Fig. 119 Comparison of average diets, U.S.S.R. and United States (chart) . 238 Fig. 120 Estimated production of primary energy (table) ............... 239 Fig. 121 Production of fuels, by type (table) .......................... 241 Fig. 122 Estimated output of refined petroleum products (table) ........ 241 Fig. 123 Production of usable iron ore and ferroalloying materials (table) . 244 Fig. 124 Pig iron and steel production (table) ......................... 245 Fig. 125 Estimated supply position of principal nonferrous metals (chart) . 247 Fig. 126 Estimated production of principal nonferrous metals (table) .... 247 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 Page Fig. 127 Durables produced by machine building industry (table) ........ 250 Fig. 128 Merchant shipbuilding by and for U.S.S.R. (table) ............ 252 Fig. 129 Production of basic chemicals and allied products (table) ...... 254 Fig. 130 Production of textiles and wearing apparel (table) .............. 256 Fig. 131 Production of principal construction materials (table) .......... 257 Fig. 132 State budget revenues and expenditures (chart) ............... 261 Fig. 133 State, cooperative, and collective farm market retail sales (table) 262 Fig. 134 Main groups of trading partners (chart) ...................... 264 Fig. 135 Value of foreign trade, by geographic area (table) ............. 265 Fig. 136 Commodity composition of trade (table) ...................... 266 Fig. 137 Organization of Soviet science and technology (chart) .......... 268 Fig. 138 Organization of U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences (chart) ......... 269 Fig. 139 Armed forces high command (chart) ........................ 295 Fig. 140 Armed forces personnel strengths (table) .................... 299 Fig. 141 Defense and space expenditures (table) ...................... 301 Fig. 142 Estimated defense and space expenditures (table) ............. 301 Fig. 143 Estimated percentage of defense and space expenditures (table) 301 Fig. 144 Estimated defense and space expenditures, by category (table) .. 301 Fig. 145 Officers' uniforms and insignia (chart) ........................ 303 Fig. 146 Enlisted men's uniforms and insignia (chart) .................. 305 Fig. 147 MAZ-537 truck with trailer carrying T-62 tank (photo) ........ 308 Fig. 148 GANEF (SA-4) surface-to-air missile system (photo) ........... 309 Fig. 149 Amphibious infantry vehicle (photo) ......................... 309 Fig. 150 122-mm. rocket launcher (photo) ............................ 309 Fig. 151 ZSU-23-4 antiaircraft weapon (photo) ........................ 310 Fig. 152 OSA class patrol boat (photo) ............................... 312 Fig. 153 KRESTA I class guided missile light cruiser (photo) .............. 313 Fig. 154 KRESTA II class guided missile light cruiser (photo) ............ 313 Fig. 155 Moskva, a guided missile helicopter ship (photo) .............. 314 Fig. 156 KANIN class guided missile destroyer (photo) ................. 314 Fig. 157 NANUCHKA class guided missile patrol gunboat (photos) ........ 314 Fig. 158 C Class nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine (photo) ..... 315 Fig. 159 V Class nuclear-powered submarine (photo) .................. 315 Fig. 160 G Class submarine (photo) ................................. 316 Fig. 161 Disposition of navy units (table) ............................ 318 Fig. 162 Naval aviation BADGER C with KIPPER missile (photo) .......... 320 Fig. 163 BEAGLE used in Soviet Naval and Tactical Aviation (photo) ..... 320 Fig. 164 HOUND used in Soviet Naval Aviation and Military Transport Aviation (photo) ......................................... 320 Fig. 165 Long Range Aviation BEAR B (photo) ....................... 321 Fig. 166 Long Range Aviation BISON B (photo) ...................... 321 Fig. 167 BADGER A used in Long Range Aviation and Soviet Naval Aviation (photo) ......................................... 321 Fig. 168 FISHBED used in Soviet Tactical Aviation (photo) .............. 321 Fig. 169 FITTER used in Soviet Tactical Aviation (photo) ............... 321 Fig. 170 BREWER used in Soviet Tactical Aviation (photo) .............. 321 Fig. 171 Military Transport Aviation CUB (photo) .................... 323 Fig. 172 Military Transport Aviation CAMP (photo) .................. 323 Fig. 173 Military Transport Aviation Coca (photo) ................... 323 Fig. 174 Military Transport Aviation HooK (photo) ................... 323 Fig. 175 Military Transport Aviation Hip (photo) .................... 323 Fig. 176 Aviation of Air Defense FIREBAR (photo) .................... 327 Fig. 177 Aviation of Air Defense FLAGON A (photo) ................. 327 Fig. 178 FARMER employed in Aviation of Air Defense and in Soviet Tactical Aviation (photo) ................................. 327 Fig. 179 FREsco employed in Aviation of Air Defense and in. Soviet Tactical Aviation (photo) ................................. 327 Fig. 180 GUIDELINE (SA-2) surface-to-air missile (photo) ............... 328 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 Page Fig. 181 GALOSH (ABM-1) antiballistic missile (photo) ................ 328 Fig. 182 TALL KING early warning radar (photo) ...................... 329 Fig. 183 BAR LocK early warning radar and SIDE NET height-finder radar (photo) ............................................ 329 Fig. 184 Marshal N. I. Krylov, Commander in Chief, Strategic Rocket Troops (photo) ................................... 329 Fig. 185 SAVAGE (SS-13) intercontinental ballistic missile (photo) ....... 330 Fig. 186 Summary Map ...................................... follows 334 Fig. 187 Summary Map insets ........................................ do Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 ABBREVIATION APN (or Novosti) RUSSIAN ENGLISH Agentstvo Pechati Novosti .......... News Press Agency Strany Vsesoyuznyy Tsentral'nyy fessional'nykh Soyuzov shchi CPSU ....... Kommunisticheskaya kogo Soyuza Unions Council for Economic Mutual Assis- tance DOSAAF .... Dobrovol'noye Obshchestvo viya Armii, Aviatsii, Flotu Sodeyst- Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, Aviation, and the Fleet GKES ....... Gosudarstvennyy Komitet Soveta Min- State Committee of the Council of istrov SSSR po Vneshnim Ekonomi- Ministers, U.S.S.R., on Foreign cheskim Svyazam Economic Relations GKNT ....... Gosudarstvennyy Komitet po Nauki State Committee for Science and Technik Technology Gosplan ...... Gosudarstvennyy Planovyy Komitet State Planning Committee GRES ....... Gosudarstvennaya Rayonnaya Elek- State Regional Electric Powerplant tricheskaya Stantsiya GRU ........ Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravle- Chief Directorate for Intelligence niye GUGK ....... Glavnoye Upravleniye Geodezii i Kar- Main Directorate of Geodesy and togra f ii Cartography GUGMS ..... Glavnoye Upravleniye Gidrometeor- Main Directorate for Hydrometeor- ologicheskoy Sluzhby ological Services INFLOT ..... Morskoye Agenstvo po Obsluzhivaniyu Maritime Agency for Servicing For- Inostrannykh Sudov v Portakh SSSR eign Ships in Soviet Ports JINR ........ Obedinennyy Institut Yadernykh Issle- Joint Institute of Nuclear Research dovaniy KGB ........ Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti Committee for State Security LRA ........ Dal'naya Aviatsiya ................. Long Range Aviation MGA ........ Ministerstvo Grazhdanskoy Aviatsii .... Ministry of Civil Aviation MOC ........ Ministerstvo Svyazi ................ Ministry of Communications PVO Strany .. Protivoyozdushnoy Obrony Strany .... Air Defense Forces R.S.F.S.R. .... Rossiyskaya Sovetskaya Federativnaya Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Sotsialisticheskaya Respublika Republic TAC ........ Frontovaya Aviatsiya ............... Tactical Aviation VLKSM (or Vsesoyuznyy Leninskiy Kommunisti- Communist Youth League Komsomol) cheskiy Soyuz Molodezhi VTA ........ Voyenno-transportnaya Aviatsiya ..... Military Transport Aviation VUZy ....... Vysshiye Uchebnyye Zavedeniya ...... Higher educational institutions VVS ........ Voyenno-vozdushnyye Sily .......... Soviet Air Forces ZAGS ........ Byuro Zapisi Aktov Grazhdanskogo So- Government Civil Registry Office stoyaniya Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 Chronology 400-700 Territory of present-day European Russia is settled by East- ern Slavs. 700-800 Prosperous mercantile state with Khazar hegemony over Slavs is established between lower Volga and Dnepr rivers. 800-912 Vikings under Rurik use river routes, to penetrate Russia; Kiyev becomes center of their dominion. 990 Christianity is introduced by Vladimir the Saint. 1237-1240 European Russia is conquered by the Mongol Golden Horde, beginning two centuries of Tatar rule. 1380 Prince Dmitry of Muscovy inflicts first defeat on Tatars in Battle of Kulikovo Field, laying basis for rise of Muscovy in 15th century. 1533-1584 Ivan the Terrible reigns, proclaiming self tsar of the "third Rome," Muscovy, and beginning settlement east of Urals. 1637 Russian pioneers reach Pacific coast of Siberia. 1689-1725 Peter the Great reigns, embarking on far-reaching reforms to "Westernize" Russia and founding Saint Petersburg (now Leningrad). 1762-1796 Catherine the Great continues "Westernization" of Russia, partitions Poland to increase European Russian territory, inaugurates Russian drive for warm--water ports by ac- quiring Crimea. 1801-1825 Alexander I reigns, withstanding Napoleonic invasion which reaches Moscow and in the wake of which the Russian army penetrates France. 1825 Revolt of Decembrists, a small group of noblemen favoring social reform, fails. 1825-1855 Nicholas I institutes reactionary regime based on autocracy and Russification, inaugurating systematic use of secret police against the people. 1857-1861 Alexander Herzen's revolutionary thought in the weekly Kolokol (The Bell) is published abroad with profound impact on Russian intellectuals. 1861 Serfs are emancipated and commune-type system of peasant social organization is established. 1876 First Russian revolutionary party, called Land and Liberty (later People's Will), is formed by Populists. 1881 Mounting revolutionary activity of Populists culminates in assassination of Alexander II. 1881-1894 Alexander III initiates severe repressions of revolutionaries and fosters pan-Slavism. Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08S01350R000100090001-7 1898 March First Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP), identified by Soviet Communist Party as its first congress, is held in Minsk. 1903 August Second Congress of the RSDLP is held in Brussels and London, ending in split into Bolshevik and Menshevik factions. 1905 October- First Russian Revolution results in a constitutional reform. December 1914 August Germany declares war on Russia. 1917 March February revolution results in abdication of tsar and forma- tion of Provisional Government. November Bolsheviks seize power in October revolution and Lenin becomes Premier. 1918 March Signing of Treaty of Brest Litovsk removes Russia from war. Bolshevik faction of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party renames itself the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). 1918-1921 Bolsheviks ultimately prevail over foreign intervention and civil war. 1921 August New Economic Policy (NEP) is introduced. 1922 April Stalin is elected General Secretary of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks). December Founding congress of the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub- lics (U.S.S.R.) is held. 1924 January Lenin dies. 1928 October NEP is abandoned. First Five Year Economic Plan (1929- 33) goes into effect. 1929 January Trotsky is exiled from U.S.S.R. 1930 January Forced collectivization of peasantry begins. 1932-1933 Millions die during serious famine. 1934 December Kirov, Stalin's viceroy in Leningrad, is assassinated; Stalin starts "great purge" and reign of terror. 1936 December "Stalin Constitution," which with minor modifications is still in effect, is adopted. 1939 March 18th Congress of All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) is held. August Stalin-Hitler Pact is signed. September Soviet troops occupy eastern Poland. November U.S.S.R. invades Finland. 1940 March Finns cede territory to U.S.S.R. August 1941 April June 1945 February Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are incorporated into U.S.S.R. Nonagression pact is signed with Japan. Germany invades U.S.S.R. U.S.S.R. again attacks Finland. Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin attend Yalta Conference. Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08S01350R000100090001-7 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08S01350R000100090001-7 July-August 1947 September 1948 March June August 1949 January February May September October 1950 February 1952 October 1953 January April June July August September December 1954 March April-July 1955 February May July Truman, Attlee, and Stalin attend Potsdam Conference to draft World War II peace settlements. U.S.S.R. declares war on Japan. Zhdanov's "two camps" speech intensifies opposition to West and leads to establishment of Cominform. Allied Control Commission ceases to function in Berlin. Cominform announces expulsion of Yugoslavia. Soviet blockade of land access to Berlin by French, U.S., and U.K. occupation forces becomes total. Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) is created to promote intrabloc cooperation and to counter- act Marshall Plan. Anti-Jewish campaign results in numerous authors. Moscow agrees to lift Berlin blockade. First nuclear explosion takes place in U.S.S.R. Communist regime is recognized by U.S.S.R. as. sole gov- ernment of China. Thirty-year Sino-Soviet alliance is concluded. 19th Party Congress (first since 1939) renames party "Communist Party of the Soviet Union" (CPSU), revises party rules, and renames Politburo "Presidium." Soviet doctors, mostly Jewish, are charged with plot to kill Soviet leaders on orders of Western intelligence. Stalin dies; Malenkov is named chairman of Council of Ministers and dropped from Party Secretariat, leaving Khrushchev the senior Doctors' Plot is reversed. Police chief Beriya is arrested for plotting to seize power. Korean armistice is signed. First thermonuclear device is detonated in U.S.S.R. Khrushchev is named First Secretary of CPSU. Execution of Beriya and top associates is announced. Central Committee approves increased grain production by "opening up virgin lands." Committee for State Security (KGB) is established. U.S.S.R. participates in Geneva Foreign Ministers Con- ference on Korea and Indochina, which concludes agree- ments on Vietnam and Laos. Bulganin succeeds Malenkov as Chairman of Council of Ministers. Warsaw Pact establishes joint command over most Soviet bloc armed forces. Austrian State Treaty is signed 15 May, ending Allied occupation. Khrushchev, Bulganin, and Mikoyan visit Belgrade to patch up Yugoslav-Soviet feud. Big Four Summit conference at Geneva attempts to fa- cilitate solution of East-West problems in Europe. Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08S01350R000100090001-7 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08S01350R000100090001-7 1956 February April October October- November 1957 February June 1958 March September November 1959 January January- February May-August September September- October 1960 January May June July September- October November- December 20th Party Congress convenes. Khrushchev denounces Stalin in secret speech. Dissolution of Cominform is announced. Khrushchev, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, and Molotov visit Poland in effort to reverse Gomulka's liberalization meas- ures; Soviet leaders accept Gomulka measures upon being made aware of their need to prevent revolt and when assured of Poland's continued loyalty to U.S.S.R. Hungarian revolt is crushed by Soviet troops. Khrushchev's scheme for reorganization of industrial man- agement is accepted by Party Central Committee. Majority in Party Presidium votes to oust Khrushchev, who turns the tables by appealing to Central Committee. So- called antiparty group of Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, and Shepilov is then expelled from Party Presidium and Central Committee. Soviet Union launches first earth satellite. Central Committee expels Marshal Zhukov from Party Presidium and calls for tightening. of party controls over armed forces. Khrushchev replaces Bulganin as Chairman of Council of Ministers while remaining Party First Secretary. Khrushchev proposes reform to improve Soviet educational system by increasing vocational training. Khrushchev demands termination of Western occupation rights in West Berlin. U.S.S.R. launches "cosmic rocket." 21st Congress of CPSU approves Seven Year Plan and attacks "antiparty" group. Foreign Ministers Conference at Geneva considers problems of Germany and Berlin. Soviet moon rocket is successfully launched. Khrushchev pays official visit to United States. Khrushchev visits Mao Tse-tung in Peking (Peiping) "to celebrate 10th anniversary of Chinese People's Republic." U.S.S.R. announces plan to cut armed forces by 1.2 million. Khrushchev announces downing of U.S. U-2 plane. Big Four Summit meeting on Germany, Berlin, and disarmament canceled. Sino-Soviet dispute flares at Bucharest blocwide con- ference and World Federation of Trade Unions General Council session, Peking. Soviet fighter shoots down U.S. RB-47 plane over interna- tional waters; surviving crew is imprisoned. Khrushchev attends U.N. General Assembly in New York, caters to African nations, and demands U.N. reorgani- zation. Moscow conference of Communist parties attempts to re- solve Sino-Soviet dispute. Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08S01350R000100090001-7 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08S01350R000100090001-7 1961 January New "heavy" ruble, equal to 10 old rubles, is introduced; new U.S. dollar rate (US$1=0.9 rubles) implies 56% ruble devaluation. April First manned space vehicle is orbited. June Khrushchev meets in Vienna with President Kennedy on East-West issues. August Berlin wall is built, stopping refugee flow from East Germany. October 22d Party Congress adopts new party program to replace one adopted in 1919 and revises party rules. Kozlov is named in second place on Party Secretariat. 1962 March U.S.S.R. participates in 18-nation disarmament talks which open in Geneva. October Soviet missiles in Cuba create crisis. November Party is reorganized into virtually separate organizations for agricultural and industrial affairs. 1963 March Government is reorganized; Supreme Council of National Economy is formed. April Kozlov, heir-apparent to Khrushchev, suffers permanently disabling stroke. June Brezhnev and Podgorny are added to Party Secretariat. ,- U.S.S.R. and United States agree to establish direct teletype communication link ("hot line") between Moscow and Washington. August U.S.S.R. and United States agree to ban all nuclear testing except underground explosions. September U.S.S.R. begins purchase of an ultimate 12.5 million tons of wheat from abroad after disastrous year in grain and fodder production. October Khrushchev launches major chemical industry program with strong accent on chemical support for agriculture. 1964 April U.S.S.R. announces agreement to reduce production of fis- sionable materials for weapons. October Three-man vehicle carries pilot, engineer, and medical doctor into space. Khrushchev is ousted from party and government jobs, being replaced as Party First Secretary by Brezhnev and as Chairman of the Council of Ministers by Kosygin. November November 1962 party reorganization is reversed. December New U.S.S.R. regime postpones-until March 1965-meet- ing of 26 Communist parties called for December by Khrushchev to prepare for convocation of world Com- munist meeting on Sino-Soviet dispute. 1965 February Premier Kosygin visits Hanoi, Peking, and P'yongyang in effort to heal disunity in Communist movement. March Nineteen Communist parties attending "26-party meeting" postponed from December change function from formal "Editorial Commission" to "consultative" meeting but disband without agreement on date for world meeting. Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08S01350R000100090001-7 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08S01350R000100090001-7 Brezhnev launches massive new program promising gov- ernment support to agriculture on a scale unprecedented in Soviet history. Soviet cosmonaut accomplishes first "walk in space," September- Government is reorganized; national and regional councils October of national economy (Sovnarkhozy) are abolished and pre-1957 ministerial system is reestablished; role of profit as measure of economic success is recognized. December Brezhnev announced separation of party-state control func- tions; Nikolay Podgomy replaces retiring Anastas Miko- yan as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. 1966 February Soviet dissident writers Sinyavsky and Daniel are im- prisoned for antistate activities in first such political trial of intellectuals since Stalin's death. Unmanned spaceship makes "soft landing" on moon. March U.S.S.R. achieves first landing of probe on Venus. April 23d Party Congress approves directives of 1966-70 economic plan; Party Presidium is renamed Politburo; Brezhnev receives Stalin's old title of General Secretary. December Brezhnev reports to Central Committee on deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations and Chinese Communist Cultural Revolution; he receives mandate to proceed with plans for an international Communist conference. 1967 March Stalin's daughter, Svetlana Alliluyeva, defects to West. April Brezhnev endorses broad united front tactics for Europe at Karlovy Vary conference of European Communist parties. June Premier Kosygin seeks political settlement of Israeli- Egyptian military clash in U.N. General Assembly and in talks with President Johnson at Glassboro, N.J. October. Soviet Government reveals cutback of agricultural invest- ment goals approved in March 1965; Deputy Premier Polyansky publicly dissents. November Brezhnev presides over Moscow celebrations on 50th anni- versary of Russian revolution. Consultative meetings of world's parties is called for Feb- ruary 1968 in Budapest to discuss future international Communist conference. 1968 January Leading members of intellectual community protest trials of young dissidents for "anti-Soviet" activities. February Budapest consultative meeting of some 60 Communist parties, without Far Eastern, Albanian, or Cuban repre- sentation, endorses Soviet call for late 1968 international conference; Romanian delegation walks out, charging Soviet use of pressure tactics. August Soviet troops occupy Czechoslovakia. 1969 January Attempt to assassinate Soviet leaders at Kremlin fails. March Soviet and Chinese border troops clash on Damansky Island. June International Conference of Communist. Parties meets in Moscow. October Sino-Soviet border talks open in Peking. Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08S01350R000100090001-7 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08S01350R000100090001-7 November December 1970 January U.S.-Soviet talks on strategic arms limitations open in Helsinki. Treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is deposited at United Nations. Moscow moves to provide air defense for United Arab Republic. March Second essay by physicist Andrei Sakharov details the need for economic and political reform in the U.S.S.R. if the Soviets are to keep pace with the West. April One hundredth anniversary of V.I. Lenin's birth is cele- brated. August Soviet-West German Renunciation of Force agreement is signed in Moscow. 1971 March- 24th Party Congress is held in Moscow. April Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08S01350R000100090001-7 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 1. Introduction Over a span of some 50 years the Soviet Union has developed from a backward, largely agricultural society into a modern industrial and military power capable of challenging the leadership of the United States on a number of fronts. Successive Soviet regimes have placed emphasis on enabling Moscow not only to maintain its domination over east and much of central Europe but also to extend its military and political influence to areas as distant from the Soviet heartland as Africa, the Indian Ocean, the Caribbean, and Southeast Asia. The impressive achievements of the last half-century, however, have been costly in terms of human suffering and lives lost-most notably during the purges and the periods of collectivization and forced industrialization. Moreover, to achieve and maintain its present position, economic policy and scientific research have favored heavy industry and those scientific fields having the most direct impact on military capability. The result has been a level of living that continues to lag behind those of most industrialized nations and an uneven economic development in which agriculture and light industry fall short of those in major Western countries. The extension of Soviet influence abroad has been adversely affected by a number of factors, chief among which are the strength and stability of the West as a whole, the bitter quarrel since 1960 with Communist China, and the growing self-assertion among Eastern European Communist nations. Moscow, once the control center of the entire Communist movement, is confronted with the erosion of its authority within the Communist camp, which includes almost 90 national Communist parties claiming an aggregate membership of 50 million, supplemented by a network of affiliated auxiliary or "front" organizations of both national and international scope. The emergence of China as a second viable Communist power center has been an important factor in reducing Soviet influence and prestige in the Communist movement and has made it more difficult for the U.S.S.R. to contain the trend toward autonomy in Eastern Europe and toward independence of foreign Communist parties elsewhere. The ability of the U.S.S.R., however, to offer substantial military, technical, and economic aid gives it an advantage in the competition with Communist China and enables it to vigorously challenge Western interests. Moscow still considers the third world a principal arena in the contest both with the Chinese and the West and has deemphasized the creation and use of indigenous Communist parties in this area-especially in countries ruled by a one-party nationalist movement-thus masking the threat of a local Communist takeover and creating a more friendly atmosphere for extending Moscow's influence through state-to-state relations. The U.S.S.R. also encourages Communist parties in developed countries of the West to form alliances with social democratic parties and other groups on local domestic issues in order to gain greater popular support and to help draw attention away from their Communist ties with Moscow. To insure consistency with Soviet interests, Moscow seeks- with varying success-to align the policies of these countries and parties with the foreign and domestic policies of the U.S.S.R., and through these tactics to extend its influence throughout the world. Soviet national interests and the Marxist-Leninist ideology are basic, if not coequal, factors which determine the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. This ideology, despite Soviet tactical shifts from belligerence to detente and from increased pressure to accommoda- tion, has always held that the Communist and capitalist systems are essentially irreconcilable and that communism will eventually triumph, although conceding that the struggle will continue for some time. A fundamental concept of Soviet ideology, advanced by Nikita Khrushchev in the 1950's, has been "peaceful coexistence," which the regime has used to rationalize its conduct of a policy of cooperation with the West while continuing the traditional aim of dividing, subverting, and weakening non-Communist nations by all means short of war. Development of the U.S. S. R.'s foreign policy on the basis of even limited collaboration with the ideological enemy tended, during Khru- shchev's rule, to increase significantly the antagonism between the U.S.S.R. and the Chinese People's Republic, whose leaders insist on uncompromising hostility toward the West. The present Soviet leadership, in vying with the militant Chinese Communists for the support of other Communist parties, has tried to avoid the taint of charges of collaboration with "imperialists." As a result, while the regime continues to take advantage of the ideologically acceptable idea of "peaceful coexistence" whenever it serves national interests to do so, the definition of the term has been narrowed to allow for greater militancy in the U.S.S.R.'s policy toward the West. The Soviet Union controls, directly or indirectly, most of the resources of Eastern Europe and dominates important strategic areas-the Polish plain and most of the Danubian basin. The economies of the Eastern European Communist nations have remained closely linked to the economy of the U.S.S.R., and the Soviet Army's harsh suppression of the Hungarian revolt of Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 1956 as well as the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968 serve as examples to would-be separatists. Romania, however, cautiously continues its efforts to pursue a more independent foreign policy and to lessen its economic dependence o'n the U.S.S.R. and the Warsaw Pact countries. The U.S.S.R. has expanded the Soviet system by imposing it on the Eastern European nations, principally through military occupation after World War II, and by supporting regimes of similar orientation in the Communist-dominated areas of Asia as well as in Cuba. Although the Soviet system is ruthless and cumbersome, some leaders in former colonial areas believe that, to varying degrees, it provides a model for the planning and authority needed to catapult an underdeveloped nation into the 20th century. Soviet economic aid programs are underway in a number of less developed nations of the non- Communist world. In many countries in Asia and Africa, the U.S.S.R., through the extension of long-term credits and the provision of technical assistance, has established itself as a major participant in ambitious plans for economic development. Concomitantly, the U.S.S.R. has become a primary source of aid for modernizing and expanding the military establishments of Afghanistan, Algeria, Syria, the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.), Iraq, Cuba, and India, and is maintaining its economic offensive among the newly independent peoples of Africa and the leftist "national revolutionary movements" of Latin America. Despite its interest in extending Soviet influence in the third world, the present regime has become more cautious in granting economic aid unless there is some certainty that the Soviet Union will also reap clear political or economic benefits. Domestic economic problems plus the failure in the past of grandiose, Soviet-funded projects to bring a rapid increase in Soviet political influence-as for example in Indonesia-probably account for Moscow's new circumspection with regard to foreign aid. An elaborate system of controls has been maintained to perpetuate within the state the dominant position of the Soviet Communist Party, to shape public opinion, and-to neutralize popular discontent. Some of the more brutal repressive measures which characterized Stalin's rule have been eliminated by his successors in their efforts to stimulate individual initiative and to encourage the people to identify themselves with the regime. The ameliorative efforts have not been entirely successful and disaffection and dissidence have increased among important elements of Soviet society, most notably among the intelligentsia. The Soviet leadership has reacted in its domestic policy by a reemphasis on "orthodoxy." Despite the immensity and topographic variety of the U.S.S.R., less than one-eighth of the country is arable and a great part lies too far north for any but Arctic type habitation. In many areas where the climate is good the soil is poor, and some of the most fertile land lies in regions of inadequate precipitation or where the growing season is short. Likewise, many of the abundant and varied raw materials in the U.S.S.R. are unfavorably located and hard to exploit. Most of the great rivers run to frozen or land-locked seas, and some flow in part through regions unsuited to settlement. The U.S.S.R. covers a large part of Europe and Asia, and its population has ethnic, religious, and historical ties with both. It has more people than any Western nation, and a sizable number are skilled in modern industrial techniques. Scientific achievements are high, but administrative and managerial skills are less well developed. The virtual abolition of private ownership of the means of production, the direction of economic development through a comprehensive and detailed economic plan, and the collectivization of millions of peasant farmers have been the foundations of a new society which its leaders maintain is superior to societies based on private enterprise. The Soviet economic system, however, has fallen far short of meeting the growing needs of the country's people. Although there has been some improvement in recent years, per capita production of consumer goods is low compared with that of Western industrial countries, and the diet is qualitatively poor by Western standards. Despite spectacular space accomplishments and high industrial growth rates, the country has a backward agriculture, many antiquated factories, underdeveloped services, and, by Western standards, relatively poor living conditions. Nevertheless, the leaders of the U.S.S.R. have created an integrated state which has survived a number of severe crises and have developed an economy which has become a tremendous force with worldwide impact. The regime regards its military establishment as a major instrument for sustaining and augmenting its position in the struggle against the capitalist world and as an outstanding example of the success and invincibility of its social system. The number of men under arms was reduced between 1960 and 1964, but in the period since the ouster of Khrushchev the downward trend was halted, and there has been a slight increase in military manpower. Throughout this period, the Soviet leadership has had the basic aim of maintaining and improving balanced military forces able to resist a Western attack on short notice, as well as to insure ultimate victory, and the resources needed to implement this policy are given priority consideration. Since 1965 the regime has significantly expanded its military forces along the Chinese border and views its military strength there as an integral element in "containing" China. The U.S.S.R. sees military power as serving two basic purposes: defense of the Soviet system and support for expansion of its influence, making one of the most important objectives of Soviet military policy the deterrence of the West while the government conducts its foreign policy and subversive activities by all means short of open commitment of Soviet forces. Military power is sometimes brought into play in direct support of Soviet political demands through the threat of force, Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 through the respect for the Soviet state and its Communist system engendered by its growing power, and through the military aid and support rendered to allies, to neutral but friendly states, and to anti-Western movements. Military strategy is also influenced by economic, technological, and geographic factors. Soviet military requirements have been a primary motivation for sustained and strenuous effort to increase economic strength and for high priorities for technological developments. Economic and technological advances have, conversely, influenced military thinking. Recent economic and technological achievements have facilitated the development of a more diversified armed force in place of one that has historically emphasized ground forces. Ground forces continue to play a vital role in Soviet armed power, but increased capabilities for air and naval warfare permit a more flexible military strategy, as illustrated by the presence of a strong naval force in the Mediterranean for the first time. The public Soviet position has long been that the world balance of forces is shifting in favor of "world socialism." Undoubtedly the Soviet leaders now see the advance of Soviet military power-from progress toward nuclear parity with the United States to global expansion of the Soviet navy-as a key component of this process. A measure of greater Soviet assertiveness may well accompany this growth of power..At the same time, however, Soviet actions regarding the Vietnam war, during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, and in the Middle East crises of 1967 and 1970 provide solid evidence that the U.S.S.R. recognizes the grave dangers posed by a direct confrontation with the United States and will act to avoid such a confrontation. Consciousness of Soviet power has by no means diminished the awareness of the danger of a nuclear confrontation in the Soviet policymaking outlook, particularly in view of apprehension over the future development of mainland China. But the degree of caution Moscow displays will probably be tied importantly to the U.S. attitude and capabilities in any given situation. Unrequited concessions on major East- West issues are not to be expected from Moscow, even if urgent domestic requirements for economic and technological progress impose certain restraints upon Soviet foreign policy, especially in Europe. The Soviet response to the U.S. statement of willingness to move toward an "era of negotiation" remains to be seen; that response will probably emerge on a case-by-case basis with differing content in different regions. - Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 2. Geography A. General The U.S.S.R., the largest country in the world, extends across much of Europe and all of northern Asia (Summary Map, Figure 186). It is bordered mostly by the broad North European Plain in the west and by an almost continuous mountain bulwark in the south; the Pacific and Arctic Oceans are to the east and north. The western border of the U.S.S.R. is within 1,000 nautical miles of all the important manufacturing centers in Western Europe; the southern border is within 750 nautical miles of the extensive oilfields of the Middle East; the easternmost extremity is within 750 nautical miles of the principal U.S. bases in Alaska. Moreover, within 4,000 nautical miles of the northern coast, across the Arctic Ocean, are the major industrial regions of North America-all within range of Soviet jet bombers and missiles. The country is unfavorably located in relation to the major sea lanes of the world, and only a few widely scattered ports are open throughout the year. One geographic factor overshadows all others in characterizing the Soviet Union: its enormous size. The U.S.S.R. is approximately 300,000 square miles larger in area than the combined land areas of the United States, Canada, and Greenland (Summary Map inset, Figure 187). Its 8.6 million square miles occupy almost one- sixth of the land surface of the earth. This vast area spans 170? of longitude across the northern part of the Eurasian continent, from the Baltic Sea in the west to the Bering Strait in the east. Continental North America, by comparison, spans only 111? of longitude. This great longitudinal extent of the U.S.S.R. landmass measures about 5,550 miles' by air from Kaliningrad to the Bering Strait via Moscow, Tomsk, and Yakutsk. Between the southernmost point (approximately 35?N.) of the continental U.S.S.R. on the Afghanistan boundary and its northernmost point (77?N.) on the Taymyr peninsula is a spread in latitude comparable to that from Chattanooga, Tennessee, to Thule, Greenland. Soviet Arctic insular possessions extend to 82?N. (Franz Josef Land). About 80% of the U.S.S.R. is north of 50?N., the latitude of Winnipeg, Canada. About 244 million people, roughly one-sixth more than the population of the United States, live in this enormous expanse of land. Approximately three-fourths of this population is concentrated west of the Ural Mountains in the European U.S.S.R., where most of the great urban centers and the best developed transporta- 'Distances are in statute miles unless nautical miles are specifically stated. tion networks are located. With the expa 5X1 of industry and agriculture, the population of the U.S.S.R. has been increasing in Siberia and in the Arctic. 1. Topography The surface of the U.S.S.R. is dominated by interior plains and plateaus drained by great rivers, the largest of which flow south in the European U.S.S.R. and north in Siberia. The area is rimmed on the south and east by a succession of mountain systems. Plains, broken at wide intervals by hills and low mountains, predominate in the western half of the country. These plains comprise four major zones from north to south: tundra, forested swampy plains, cultivated plains, and grass- and scrub- covered plains and deserts. The first, along the shores of the Arctic Ocean, is a zone of desolate tundra (Figure 1), characterized by arctic vegetation and permanently frozen subsoil (permafrost). Along its southern margin, where the tundra supports some tree growth, it merges with a second zone, a broad belt of densely forested swampy plains (taiga) (Figure 2). These forested plains extend from near the Arctic Circle southward to about 55?N. Movement is extremely difficult through these immense forested swamps, which is an important reason for the sparsity of urban centers in the zone. Natural openings and clearings prevalent near the southern boundary of the forest zone are outliers of the third zone-well- drained cultivated plains (Figure 3) and widely scattered forests of mixed evergreen and deciduous trees. These plains extend westward beyond the borders of the U.S.S.R. along the Baltic and North Sea coasts to France and have been the obvious and traditional avenue for military movement during the last thousand years. Most of the Soviet population, the most productive industries and agricultural areas, and the best developed transportation net are concentrated in these plains. South of the cultivated plains is the fourth zone, grass- and scrub-covered plains and deserts (Figure 4), which occupies an area more than half as large as the United States. Most of this zone is east of the Caspian Sea and south of about 50?N. Centers of population in these plains and deserts are widely scattered and linked by a sparse network of railroads and mostly poor roads. A plateau area cut by deeply incised river valleys is between the Yenisey and the Lena rivers. The surface of the plateau, although higher than the swampy plains in the west, resembles them in the relatively uninterrupted expanses of dense, swampy coniferous forest. Movement Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 FIGURE 1. Sandy knolls and peat bogs of the Arctic tundra 25X1 FIGURE 2. The densely forested swampy Siberian. taig 25X1 Kiyev FIGURE 4. Sand dunes and scrub vegetation in the Karakum desert Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08S01350R000100090001-7 in this area is severely restricted. Surface transportation routes north of the Trans-Siberian railroad are very sparse except for trails and inland waterways. This part of Siberia has one of the lowest population densities in the U.S.S.R. The largest concentration of people is around Irkutsk near Lake Baykal. The U.S.S.R., in general, has a continental climate. The predominant influences on the climate are the vast Eurasian landmass and the adjacent or nearby oceans and seas. Winters (principally December through February) vary from cool in some Black Sea regions to extremely cold in much of Siberia, where an absolute minimum near -95?F. has been recorded. Summers (June through August) vary from cool on the Arctic coast to hot in the southern desert regions, where absolute maximums near 115?F. have occurred (Figure 5). Annual precipitation averages less than 20 inches over most of the U.S.S.R. and ranges locally from less than 5 inches to more than 40 inches. Winter precipitation is mostly in the form of frequent light snows which cover most of the surface throughout this season. Occasional blizzards last for several days and disrupt most operations. Showers account for the greatest monthly amounts of' summer precipitation at most places. Thunderstorms occur predominantly in summer; they are most frequent in June and July, when they occur on 6 to 12 days per month in the southern mountains and 4 to 6 days per month elsewhere, except. in the Arctic regions where they are infrequent. Relative humidity varies from extremely high along the Arctic coast all year to low in the southern desert regions during the summer. Except along the Arctic coast diurnal and seasonal variations are significant, and most locations have high early morning values and lower afternoon values. Seasonal maximums of relative humidity normally occur in summer along the Pacific coast and at some locations near large lakes. By contrast, most interior locations have winter maximums. Cloudiness is generally at a maximum in summer and early autumn and at a minimum in winter and early spring over much of Siberia and the Arctic regions of the European U.S.S.R. The opposite is true over much of the remainder of the country. Greatest cloudiness, generally 65% to 90% in summer and 45% to 65% in winter, occurs along the Arctic and Pacific coasts; least cloudiness, generally 40% to 60% in winter and 10% to 40% in summer, occurs in the southern deserts and semidesert areas. In general, poorest visibilities occur during the colder months and best visibilities during the warmer months. However, along the Arctic and Pacific coasts, visibilities during summer may be poor because of fog. Chief restrictions during the colder months are falling and blowing snow, fog, ice fog in northern sections, and haze and smoke near cities and industrial areas. Summer restrictions are fog, heavy rain, and, in southern desert regions, duststorms. Surface winds over most of the U.S.S.R. normally are directed away from central Siberia in winter and toward southern Asia in summer. Winds are generally strongest in winter, when gales (wind speed equal to or greater than 28 knots) occur on 10 or more days per month on the Arctic coast and only 1 or 2 days per month in parts of the Caucasus. B. Military geographic regions The U.S.S.R. contains such a wide range of environmental conditions that broad generalizations have been used in defining military geographic regions for the country. Significant factors used to distinguish the various military geographic regions are relief, drainage, vegetation, climate, and coastal influences. Differences in these factors in the Soviet Union are sufficiently marked to provide a basis for dividing the country into seven military geographic regions: the Central Plains, the Caucasus Mountains, the Caspian- Central Asian Lowlands, the Southern and Eastern Mountains, the Subarctic Swamp and Forest, the Arctic Barrens, and the Insular and Peninsular Far East (Figure 6). The most important region, both economically and strategically, and the most favorable for sustained large-scale military operations, is the Central Plains region. 1. Central Plains This region, which contains most of the population, industry, and transportation network of the U.S.S.R., extends from the western borders of the Soviet Union eastward for about 2,700 miles into Siberia. The region is composed mostly of sparsely forested plains which are dissected by major north- or south-flowing rivers. The plains are interrupted in their central section by the narrow, relatively low Ural Mountains. Relatively small mountainous areas are also located in the southwest on the border with Romania and near Sevastopol' on the Black Sea. Because of its physical characteristics and its industrial and cultural development, this region is the part of the Soviet Union most generally suited for large- scale conventional ground operations. Cross-country movement is difficult in parts of the west and northwest because of extensive marsh and forest areas, and in the relatively small mountainous areas where vehicles would be confined to existing lines of transportation. Movement in the remaining parts of the Central Plains is fair to good but is greatly influenced by several seasonal factors. Heavy rains and melting snow from as early as late February in the south and lasting until mid-May in the north cause the ground to become deep mud, making cross-country movement very difficult. Severe cold and snowfall from late October to mid-April impose great hardships on troops. Mean daily minimum tempera- tures of -50?F. and snow as deep as 3 feet have been recorded in this region. Although winter may force a marked slowdown in military operations, it may Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08S01350R000100090001-7 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 0 JFMAM/JASOND D J FMAMJ JASON D J FMA M ~" 1J A SO D RUSSKO.UST'INSKOYE 101r.- r. .I. I D J FMAMJ JASON - tT 0 !--r-m- ~1- 1 1 JFMAMJ JASONDJ JFMAMJ JASOND FIGURE 5. Cloudiness, precipitation, temperature, and relative , humidity Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 - 120 120-- 100 100 ? 100- so- 80 80- ? 60- 60 ? ABSOLUT E MAXIMUM 60- AD- 40 MEAN D MAXIMU AILY M AD- 20- MEAN D MINIMU AILY M 0 20- 0 0-- - 20 ? ? -20 -40 7 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 . JBERIA.N SEA BERING SEA 01590 sppteuret-0-) Milian GapRreppic Region ppun0e ?Ditlerenns in.leretipn petween taps Rnp 0otumR el aplxenl upppreppic laeuree. 0 540 IDOD St-n. ee p . . 50 1 1000 . 500 Rilometen FIGURE 6. Generalized military geographic regions and terrain facilitate movement in one important respect: rivers generally freeze to sufficient depth to support light vehicles and, in some places, tanks. Military operations would be facilitated by the best developed highway and railroad network in the Soviet Union. This road and rail system is supplemented by a system of navigable rivers and canals. Construction of new roads would encounter major problems throughout much of this region. Concealment and some cover would be available in the fairly extensive forested areas in the northern part of the region and on the forested slopes of mountainous areas. Elsewhere, natural cover and concealment for large numbers of mechanized forces are sparse, though small villages throughout the region could provide cover and concealment for small numbers of troops. Extremely dry periods during summer months make vegetation and grasses readily combustible. The region is moderately well suited for bunker-type construction except in large, poorly drained areas in parts of the west and northwest and in western Siberia. The Central Plains region is well suited for airmobile and airborne operations during the months of June through September. Numerous sites are available for parachute, helicopter, and assault-type aircraft landings, which would require little or no site nF JAPAN preparation. Several reservoirs and large rivers would also be suitable for landing water-based aircraft. Construction of airfields would be relatively easy on the plains except in parts of the west and northwest, where sites are limited in size, number, and alignments by numerous marshes, swamps, and lakes. In many places, little grading would be required and runway lengths and alignments would be unrestricted. Construction material, except hard rock suitable for crushing, is generally available. Miry ground or extreme cold during much of the rest of the year would adversely affect the performance of men and equipment. The coast is mostly unsuitable for amphibious operations because of partly obstructed nearshore approaches, rugged coastal terrain, areas of marsh, and poor exits. Although there are numerous landing beaches along the coasts of the Baltic and Black Seas, the most suitable areas for large-scale landings are in the vicinity of Riga on the Baltic Sea and near Odessa, Yevpatoriya, and Feodosiya on the Black Sea. In winter, however, these beaches are generally obstructed by ice from late November through April in the Baltic Sea and early December to late March in the northern part of the Black Sea. In the Baltic Sea, offshore approaches are generally clear, but nearshore approaches are partially obstructed by rocks or shoals. Nearshore bottom slopes off the beaches range from flat to steep but are mostly Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 flat. Bottom materials generally are sand and mud, with rocks and clay off several beach areas: Beaches range from 1,200 yards to 193/a miles (the majority are up to 4 miles) in length, and beach material is sand which is firm when wet and soft when dry. Exit inland is mainly by tracks and trails to nearby surfaced or unsurfaced roads. In the Black Sea, offshore approaches are generally clear, but nearshore approaches are partly obstructed by shoals, rocks, and reefs except off the south coast of the Crimean Peninsula where they are clear. Nearshore bottom slopes off the beaches range from flat to steep, but the majority are gentle. Bottom materials generally are sand and mud, with gravel and shell off several beach areas. Beaches average about 1 mile in length and are composed of sand and gravel which is firm when wet and soft when dry. Exits from beaches are by tracks and trails to nearby surfaced and unsurfaced roads. The most feasible landing areas are shown on the Summary Map, Figure 186. The Central Plains region is fair to poor for irregular force operations. The relatively flat nonforested plains would offer little to no cover or concealment, but the forested slopes of the Ural and Carpathian Mountains would provide cover and concealment for small groups. Bogs and swamps in the west and northwest make movement on foot difficult but do offer some cover and concealment for small groups. Conventional force operations would be very difficult in the bogs and swamps. The relatively well developed road network would aid the movement of conventional forces, to the detriment of irregular force operations. Sustenance would be available on the cultivated plains but scarce in mountain regions. This region is composed mostly of two northwest- southeast-trending mountain ranges which contain many peaks over 15,000 feet above sea level (Figure 7). These high, rugged, partially forested, sparsely populated mountains are drained by north- or south- oriented, deeply incised, rapidly flowing streams and are divided by relatively narrow, densely populated, cultivated valleys. . The Caucasus Mountains region is, for the most part, unsuited for large-scale conventional ground opera- tions. Steep mountain slopes would preclude vehicular cross-country movement except in the valleys between. the two major mountain ranges. Operations could be conducted best by troops trained in mountain warfare. Cold weather during winter months would be an additional handicap to troops operating in the mountains; January mean daily minimum temperatures as low as 6?F. have been reported. Snow cover generally lasts from late October to early April. The principal roads in the region follow the coasts and extend east-west via the valleys which separate the two major ranges. Several roads, which can be easily blocked, traverse the mountains from north to south. Although construction materials are plentiful; the construction of new roads would be extremely difficult in most places because of steep slopes. Forests, most extensive in the west and on lower slopes, and surface irregularities would afford cover and concealment for troops operating in the mountains. However, in the valleys which separate the major ranges, natural cover and concealment are generally poor. Much of the region is well suited for the construction of tunnel-type installations, but access to sites is difficult. Most parts of the valleys are favorable for bunker-type installations. The region is not suited for airmobile and airborne operations. High, rugged relief would be an obstacle for low-level air approaches to most parachute drop and helicopter landing sites except in the valleys separating the two major mountain ranges. Steep slopes also preclude airfield construction in most of the area. However, there are some sites suitable for airfields in the valleys separating the two mountain ranges; approaches and runway orientations would be generally unrestricted. Rugged terrain along much of the Black Sea coast makes most of this region unsuitable for large-scale amphibious operations. There are, however, amphib- ious landing areas on the eastern part of the Black Sea coast. Approaches are clear, beaches long, and exits inland to coastal roads and railroads favorable. The Caucasus Mountains region is well suited for irregular force 'operations. Rugged, densely forested Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 slopes offer cover and concealment for small groups. Developed transportation facilities are poor, and the existing roads can be easily blocked. The valleys are cultivated and more densely populated, and may afford some food, clothing, and shelter. Natural cover and fuel would be available in the mountains. In winter, low temperatures would hinder irregular force operations. 3. Caspian-Central Asian Lowlands This lowland region is mostly east of the Caspian Sea and extends eastward for a maximum distance of about 1,800 miles. The region consists of and and simiarid sparsely populated plains where only six major rivers, in an area covering over 1 million square miles, have sufficient supplies of water to sustain flow throughout the year. The Caspian-Central Asian Lowlands are unsuited for large-scale conventional ground operations in almost every aspect except cross-country movement. The greatest problem would be overcoming the almost complete absence of an adequate water supply throughout most of the region. Only in the southeast, adjacent to the Southern and Eastern Mountains region, is sufficient water available through the year. Ample supplies are also available from mid-March to mid-June in the extreme north. The paucity of roads and railroads for movement of men and materiel would add to the problems of military operations. Only five railroads cross the region from north to south, and paved roads are almost nonexistent. The insufficiency of both water and construction materials would make construction of transportation facilities difficult. Troops operating in the region would also be handicapped by the scarcity of natural cover and concealment. Other natural conditions, however, favor the construction of bunker- type installations except in the areas of sand dunes in the south and in hilly areas in the northeast. In the hilly areas, natural conditions are moderately well suited for the construction of tunnel-type installations. Troops operating in the area would be subject to a wide variation in temperature between summer and winter. Mean daily maximum temperatures in July range from the low 80's to the upper 90's. In January, mean daily minimum temperatures range from slightly below zero to the lower 30's. Although the terrain of most of the Caspian-Central Asian Lowlands favors airmobile and airborne operations and contains numerous sites for landing of assault-type aircraft, troops dropped in the area would experience the same unfavorable conditions that would be encountered by large-scale ground operations. Construction of airfields throughout most of the area would be seriously handicapped by the lack of water, construction materials, and good natural foundations. The region is unsuited for large-scale amphibious operations because it has no approaches from the open sea. The Caspian-Central Asian Lowlands are poorly suited for irregular force operations. The flat,. semiarid, sparsely populated plains offer little to no cover or concealment, and the scarcity of water would be a constant problem. There are very few roads and railroads, but the good conditions for cross-country movement of conventional forces would be detrimental to operations of irregular forces. Natural cover, fuel, and sustenance would be scarce. This region, the largest in the U.S.S.R., extends for 6,000 miles from the Caspian Sea in the southwest to the Bering Strait in the extreme northeast. This sparsely populated region consists, for the most part, of rugged mountains (Figure 8), which contain a variety of terrain features. The mountains along the Iran border in the west are arid and barren. Those along the Afghanistan border are sparsely forested and are drained by numerous rapidly flowing, deeply incised streams. These mountains contain the highest peaks in the U.S.S.R. and are the site of extensive glaciers and snowfields. Farther east, along the Mongolia border west of Lake Baykal, the mountains are more densely forested and peaks are lower. The region east of Lake Baykal is less rugged; mountain ranges there present varied patterns of shape, height, and direction and are more frequently separated by broad, nearly level valleys than are the ranges in the west. This region is mostly unsuited for large-scale conventional ground operations. Steep slopes preclude vehicular cross-country movement. East of Lake Baykal, the region is crossed by the vital Trans-Siberian railroad, which connects the Central Plains region to important population centers on the Pacific coast and along which most of the region's population is located; however, operations would be handicapped by the almost complete absence of a road and railroad network. Steep slopes in most of the region would make construction of transportation facilities very difficult. Good cover from small arms fire and concealment from observation is afforded by the forests; irregularities in relief may give good cover from flat-trajectory fire. Most of the region is moderately to well suited for the construction of tunnel-type installations. Many valleys and basins are poorly suited for bunker-type installations because of poor drainage. In addition to rugged relief and the paucity of roads and railroads, troops operating in this area would be subject to extremely cold winter temperatures. Temperatures in the interior are among the coldest in the world. At Verkhoyansk a low of -94?F. has been recorded; in the mountains west of Lake Baykal a low of -59?F. has been recorded. The region is unsuited for airmobile and airborne operations. Steep slopes preclude parachute drops and landing of helicopter and assault-type aircraft in most localities. Marshy terrain is a hindrance in the larger Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 FIGURE 8. Rugged, partially forested slopes in the Tien Shan Mountains valleys and basins. The surrounding high relief is an obstacle for low-level approaches to these valleys and basins. Steep slopes preclude airfield construction in most of the region, and, in many basins and valleys, airfield construction would be hindered by poor drainage. The rugged relief which extends along most of the Pacific coast is generally not suitable for amphibious operations. There are, however, suitable landing areas that afford access to Vladivostok and Nakhodka. Approaches are generally clear with the exception of rocks in the nearshore approach. The beaches are composed of sand and gravel and are firm. Exits inland are by tracks and unsurfaced roads to a nearby surfaced coastal road. The Southern and Eastern Mountains region is well suited for irregular force operations. The rugged, densely forested mountains in the south offer good cover and concealment. Mountains in the east are less rugged but also offer good possibilities for undetected movement and cover. This region is characterized by extremely cold temperatures and by an almost complete absence of a road and railroad network. Cultivated and natural foods are very scarce, and supplying irregular forces by sea or air would be difficult. 5. Subarctic Swamp and Forest This sparsely populated region, which stretches eastward about 3,500 miles from the border of Finland to the mountains east of the Lena river, consists of heavily forested, poorly drained plains and highlands which are dissected by large, north-flowing rivers. That part of the region west of the Yenisey river consists almost entirely of plains except for a relatively small area of hills in the northwest and the Ural Mountains, which bisect the region in the vicinity of the 60th meridian. East of the Yenisey river the Central Siberian Plateau is hilly with a large flat to dissected plain near the Lena river. A large area of mountains is located just east of the Yenisey river. The Subarctic Swamp and Forest region is poorly suited for large-scale conventional ground operations. Though much of this region is relatively flat, movement of troops and vehicles is either highly restricted and channelized or is practically impossible because of flooded or soft ground, marshes, deep streams, and locally rugged terrain. From mid-October through April, frozen water features and ground may aid . movement provided snow cover is not greater than 11/2 feet deep. Steep slopes are additional obstacles. to cross- country movement in the Ural Mountains and the hilly to mountainous Central Siberian Plateau. Another deterrent to military operations is the almost complete absence of a road and rail network. Three railroads cross this region from north to south, west of the Urals. These run from Murmansk, Arkhangel'sk, and Vorkuta southward into the Central Plains region. Construction of additional transportation facilities Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 would require extensive clearing and drainage, and alignments would be restricted by steep slopes in the Ural Mountains and the Central Siberian Plateau. Good cover from small arms fire and concealment from observation is afforded by the dense forests; steep slopes and rugged terrain in the hilly and mountainous areas give good cover from flat-trajectory fire. The poor drainage makes much of this region unsuited for the construction of underground installations. The severe subarctic climate compounds the handicaps imposed by the swampy, forested terrain. The extremely low temperatures would severely reduce the efficiency of troops. Yakutsk on the Lena river has a January mean daily minimum temperature of -53?F. West of the Yenisey river, temperatures, although less extreme, are near or below 0?F. for long periods. This region, for the most part, is unsuited for airmobile and airborne operations. Although air approaches are generally unrestricted, except from the east, the dense forests and extensive swamps would be extremely hazardous for troops dropped into the area. Construction of airfields would be difficult and would require extensive clearing and drainage. The region borders the White Sea for a short distance in the northwest, but conditions there do not favor large-scale amphibious operations. The shores are normally blocked by ice between mid-November and mid-May. - The Subarctic Swamps and Forests region affords good to fair conditions for irregular force operations. Dense forests throughout this region afford good concealment and cover from small arms fire; the more rugged terrain in the Ural Mountains and the Central Siberian Plateau affords good concealment and very good cover from flat-trajectory fire for small groups. Sustenance, such as cultivated or natural foods, shelter, and clothing would be very scarce. The severe subarctic climate would be a hindrance to irregular force operations. This region, which lies mostly north of the Arctic Circle, extends approximately 3,500 miles along the coast of the Arctic Ocean from the borders of Finland and Norway in the west to the Kolyma river in the east. Most of the Soviet islands in the Arctic Ocean are included in the region. The mainland part of the region is a sparsely populated plain drained by large north- flowing rivers and is covered for the most part by tundra vegetation. However, the plains are interrupted in the west by the Ural Mountains and by scattered hilly and mountainous areas. Many of the islands in the Arctic Ocean are also hilly, and glaciers and snowfields cover about half their areas. This region is poorly suited for large-scale conventional ground operations. Troops would be subjected to the climatic extremes characteristic of high latitudes. Conditions are especially severe during the long, extremely cold winters, which last from early October through March. Winter darkness and frequent storms make visibility extremely poor. Winter temperatures usually remain below 0?F., and temperatures as low as -75?F. have been recorded in the east. In summer, when mean daily minimum temperatures in July and August range mostly between 40? and 60?F., the ground thaws and makes vehicular movement extremely difficult. Another handicap to ground operations is the almost complete absence of improved roads or railroads to facilitate the movement of troops and supplies. Although relief presents few problems to road or railroad construction, the presence' of permafrost in most of the region and the poor drainage during the summer make construction of these facilities very difficult. The low-growing vegetation affords no cover and little concealment. The presence of permafrost would be a handicap in the construction of bunker- and tunnel-type installations. Although the relief and vegetation of the region favor airmobile and airborne operations, such operations would encounter the same severe arctic climate factors that would adversely affect ground operations. Similarly, airfield construction would be hindered by the same problems encountered in railroad and road construction, principally permafrost and poor summer drainage. The region is not suited for amphibious operations. Except along the coast of the Kola Peninsula on the Barents Sea, which is generally ice-free throughout the year, shores are ice-free only from August through September or mid-October. There is, one landing area northeast of Murmansk suitable for large-scale amphibious operations. Offshore approaches are clear; nearshore approaches are partly obstructed by sandbars. The beach material is sand, which is firm when wet and soft when dry. Exits inland are cross-country or by trails to a minor port. The Arctic Barrens offer fair conditions for irregular force operations. The flat, sparsely vegetated plains offer little to no cover or concealment. Long, dark winters, deep snow, and extreme cold would present difficulties to irregular forces. Miry conditions in the summer months would practically preclude the movement of conventional forces on the ground. This barren land offers little or no sustenance, but the flat plains would allow supplies to be brought in by air. This region consists of the Kamchatka Peninsula, Sakhalin island, and the Kuril Islands. The Kamchatka Peninsula and Sakhalin each have two generally parallel forested mountain ranges drained by short, rapidly flowing, incised streams. These mountain ranges are separated by marshy or swampy plains. Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08S01350R000100090001-7 Marshy plains are also common along the coasts and on northern Sakhalin. Most of the Kuril Islands are mountainous. The rugged relief that comprises most of this region is unsuited for large-scale conventional ground opera- tions. Steep slopes preclude vehicular cross-country movement in most of the region. In the plains, marshes and swamps are the principal deterrents to vehicular movement. Military operations could be conducted best by troops trained in mountain warfare. The paucity of roads and railroads would add to the difficulties of troops operating in the region. Hard-surfaced roads are few and there are only two major railroad lines (3'6" gage) in Sakhalin. Construction of additional transportation facilities would be extremely difficult on steep mountain slopes and on the poorly drained areas that cover most of the plains. The forests and irregularities of relief afford cover and concealment in mountainous areas. Natural cover and concealment would be generally lacking on the plains. The region is well suited for the construction of tunnel-type installations in the mountains; most of the plains are unsuited for bunker-type installations because of poor drainage. An additional factor that would handicap ground operations is severe winter weather. Tempera- tures remain below freezing during the period late October through March, and minimums slightly below -50?F. have been recorded on the Kamchatka Peninsula and Sakhalin. Minimums near -20?F. have been recorded in the Kuril Islands. Depth of snow cover ranges from 1 to 6 feet throughout the winter and is greatest in the southern parts of the Kamchatka Peninsula and on the higher parts of Sakhalin. The region is unsuited for airmobile and airborne operations. High relief precludes the landing of troops in most of the area and is an obstacle to low-level air approaches. The steep, rugged relief also precludes airfield construction in most of the area. Poor drainage presents major construction problems in the plains. The coastline of this region is unsuited for amphibious operations, and the numerous beaches do not afford access to selected internal routes or strategic areas. The Insular and Peninsular Far East region is well suited for irregular force operations. The densely forested, rugged mountains offer good cover and concealment for small groups. Natural cover and concealment are generally lacking in the plains. Snow, ranging from 1 to 6 feet in depth, and severe cold would be problems to irregular forces in winter. Natural sustenance would be scarce in this region, and it would be difficult to supply troops by sea or air. C. Strategic area Nine strategic areas (Moscow, Donets, Volga-Ural, Leningrad, Baku, Tashkent, Kuznetsk, Baykal and Far Eastern) are of primary importance to the military potential of the Soviet Union. These vary considerably in size and in the reasons for their importance. Four important areas are located west of 50?E. and are centered on the cities of Moscow, Leningrad, and Baku and on the industrial area of the Donets Basin. Moscow is the political, and military center of the Soviet Union as well as a major industrial and communication center. Leningrad is an industrial city and port, and Baku is one of the most important petroleum centers in the nation. The Donets Basin is the most important mining and industrial district of the country. Another important area is the roughly triangular-shaped petroleum- producing, mining, and industrial district which extends from the Volga river, in the vicinity of Kuybyshev and Kazan', eastward to include the central and southern Ural Mountains. In south-central U.S.S.R., an important but relatively isolated industrial center is in the vicinity of Tashkent. East of the Ural Mountains and north of Tashkent are three widely separated areas of major strategic significance. 'Located on the Trans- Siberian railroad, they are the mining, manufacturing, and communication complexes of the Kuznetsk and Baykal strategic areas and the rail terminus and port of Vladivostok on the Sea of Japan in the Far Eastern strategic area. The Soviet Arctic also is of strategic importance. Because of its location in relation to transpolar air routes, the Soviet Arctic affords advanced sites for defensive installations such as early warning systems and interceptor bases, and for offensive bases for launching Soviet air power and missiles. The Soviet Arctic acquires additional importance because of the Northern Sea Route, which, despite severe physical limitations and the short navigation season (about 2 months), has strategic importance as the shortest route between Atlantic and Pacific Soviet ports. During a war it would become an important consideration in Soviet efforts to maintain two-ocean naval mobility. The only major Soviet port north of the Black Sea that is entirely ice free and that has year-round access to the Atlantic is Murmansk. 1. Moscow Situated on a nearly flat plain in the European U.S.S.R., the Moscow strategic area (Figure 9) is both the political and military capital of the country. Moscow (Figure 10) is the largest (population 6,942,000 in 1970) and most important urban area in the Soviet Union. The city has the largest concentration of diversified industry in the country and is a major center for scientific and industrial research. There are numerous industrial installations within the urban area which produce a wide range of products, including munitions, heavy and light machinery, electronic equipment, chemicals, guided missiles and components, airframes and jet engines, motor vehicles, and ball 25X1 bearings. The city is the site of Moscow State University and the national headquarters of the Academy of Sciences and numerous scientific institutes. In addition, Moscow is the largest telecommunication center in the country, a hub of the gas pipeline system, and the focal Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08S01350R000100090001-7 - Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 point of the transportation systems. The river port areas are among the largest inland harbors in the country. The Moscow area is the principal domestic and international air communication center with many important civil and military airfields. It is also the central headquarters of the Soviet military forces, a center of advanced military training, and the site of extensive and varied storage facilities. 2. Donets The most important mining and basic metallurgical district in the U.S.S.R., the Donets strategic area (Figure 11), contains extensive coal and iron-ore mines (Figure 12), numerous centers of heavy industry, well- developed electric power facilities, and a dense railroad network. This strategic area is about 400 miles south of Moscow, north of the Black Sea. The Donets strategic area is a major producer of pig iron (about 50% in 1965) and steel. Nowhere else in the Soviet Union is such an abundance of good coal, iron ore, limestone, and manganese found in such close proximity. The coal mines are concentrated in the eastern part of the area, about 200 miles east of the iron- ore deposits at Krivoy Rog. A major natural gas producing area is centered just south of Khar'kov, and important gas pipelines extend from the region. Rich manganese deposits are located near Nikopol'. Important industrial centers within the strategic area include Khar'kov, Donetsk, Dnepropetrovsk, Rostov, Zaporozh'ye, and Voroshilovgrad. Khar'kov (population 1,223,000 in 1970) is a leading producer of heavy industrial machinery and equipment; important products include aircraft, locomotives, tractors, tanks, turbines, heavy electrical equipment, machine tools, agricultural and mining machinery, radios, and ball bearings. Donetsk (population 879,000 in 1970) and the neighboring area is an important center of iron and steel production, coal mining, and chemical manufac- turing, particularly explosives and fertilizers. Dneprope- trovsk (population 863,000 in 1970) is one of the most important centers for the production of guided missiles, ingot steel and finished steel products, and heavy industrial equipment and machinery. Powerplants, an important coke-chemical plant, and a large rubber-tire factory are located in and near the city. Rostov (population 789,000 in 1970), a nationally important industrial center, is a leading producer of agricultural machinery. It also produces diversified industrial machinery, helicopters, and chemicals. The city is also a primary telecommunications switching center in the national network. Zaporozh'ye (population 658,000 in 1970) is one of the principal metalworking centers of the U.S.S.R. It is a producer of aluminum and an outstanding producer of high-quality steel for missile tubing, jet-engine turbine blades, and armor plate. The city al?o contains an important aircraft-engine plant, a major electric transformer plant, and is the site of a large hydroelectric powerplant. Voroshilovgrad (population 382,000 in 1970) is the site of a large thermal powerplant and is the leading producer of locomotives in the country. A dense transportation network and a power- transmission grid serve the area. Most transportation is by rail; highways are used only for short hauls. The rivers near the eastern and western margins of the strategic area are of little importance for intra-area movement. Important transportation centers are Rostov and Khar'kov. Rostov, near the mouth of the Don river, is a transshipment point between railroads and the inland water route to the Volga river. Khar'kov is the main rail junction of lines leading from the Donets Basin directly to Moscow. 3. Volga-Ural The Volga-Ural strategic area (Figure 13) is the most important petroleum-producing and refining area and the second most important mining and metallurgical district in the Soviet Union. The large reserves of metallic ore and crude petroleum have promoted the rapid industrial development of the area. This strategic area extends from east of the Ural Mountains to west of the Volga river, a distance of approximately 570 miles, and from Kuybyshev and Magnitogorsk northward about 500 miles to Berezniki. The chief assets of the Volga-Ural strategic area are its large supplies of petroleum and gas (Figure 14) and an abundance and great variety of mineral resources. In 1968 approximately 70% of the country's total crude oil production came from this region. Numerous crude oil and refined product pipelines as well as refineries and petrochemical plants are in the area. Iron ore is the principal metallic resource, and the richest deposits are on the eastern slopes of the central and southern Urals. Nickel and titanium are also mined. The local supply of good-quality iron ore and alloy minerals, in addition to coal brought in from Karaganda, has made the Ural Mountains especially important in the production of high-grade steel. Nine cities in the strategic area each have a population exceeding 250,000. Kuybyshev (population 1,047,000 in 1970), a major port on the Volga river, is the largest producer of refined petroleum products in the U.S.S.R. and ranks second as a producer of roller and ball bearings. The city is important as a center for telecommunications, the integrated aircraft industry, guided-missile production, the aerospace industry, and the manufacture of machine tools, armaments, electrical equipment, and motor vehicles. A major rocket-engine testing complex is in the northwest environs, and one of the country's largest hydroelectric powerplants is near the city. Sverdlovsk (population 1,026,000 in 1970) is one of the leading industrial, transportation, and telecommunication centers in the U.S.S.R. The city is the second largest producer of refined copper and is a major producer of metallurgical and oilfield equipment, heavy machinery, steel, armaments, electrical equipment, and chemicals. Situated in a natural gateway through the Ural Mountains, the city is a focal point for rail and highway traffic between the European U.S.S.R. and Siberia. Chelyabinsk (population 874,000 in 1970) has industrial Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 FIGURE 10. Central Moscow viewed from the Ukraina Hotel d area FIGURE 12. A shaft iron-ore mine at Krivoy Rog I 25X1 1 11-11. -?, . _. Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 FIGURE 13. Volga-Ural strategic area FIGURE 14. Gas-producing field in the Volga-Ural strategic area F__1 25X1 plants that specialize in metallurgy, machine building, and armaments. It also has a large iron and steel plant and is a major railroad center. Kazan' (population 869,000 in 1970) is a nationally significant industrial center and transshipment point on the Volga river. It is the largest producer of polyethylene in the U.S.S.R. and is a major producer of airplanes, turbine engines, and phenol. One of the largest shipyards on the Volga is near the city. Perm' (population 850,000 in 1970) is a nationally significant producer of war materiel; one of the U. S. S. R.'s largest munitions plants and a large armaments plant are located there. Other important installations produce aircraft engines, refined petroleum products, chemicals, and heavy machinery. It is also a major inland port. Ufa (population. 773,000 in 1970) is mainly an oil-refining center but also contains two aircraft engine plants. One of the engine plants is also engaged in the production of guided missile propulsion equipment. Izhevsk (population 422,000 in 1970) is the largest producer of small arms and automatic weapons in the U.S.S.R. It also produces motor vehicles, machinery, and construction materials. Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 Nizhniy Tagil (population 378,000 in 1970) contains a large steel mill, a railroad freight-car plant, and factories producing tanks and artillery shells. Magnitogorsk (population 364,000 in 1970) is the site of the largest steel mill in the country and has numerous iron mines in the vicinity. Throughout the strategic area, smaller industrial towns are engaged principally in the manufacture of products connected with the iron, steel, and petroleum industries. A large chemical plant at Berezniki, which also contains a magnesium refinery, utilizes local potash deposits. This chemical plant and another at Krasnotur'insk (outside the area at 59?46'N., 60?12'E.) are producing heavy water for the atomic energy program. A plutonium production plant and a uranium isotope separation plant are at Kyshtym and Verkh-Neyvinskiy, respectively. Production of electric power in the strategic area utilizes coal, oil, and gas from local fields and coal from northeastern Kazakhstan. Some powerplants also use gas from Central Asian and West Siberian gasfields. There are large hydroelectric stations on the Kama and Volga rivers. Most of the transportation lines that link the European U.S.S.R. with Siberia pass through the Volga- Ural strategic area. These lines consist mainly of railroads, which are also the most important means of transportation within the strategic area, and a few less important highways and navigable rivers. 4. Leningrad The Leningrad strategic area (Figure 15) is an important transportation, industrial, and cultural center located at the head of the Gulf of Finland, a narrow arm of the Baltic Sea. The area can be approached from the west through the Gulf of Finland, but this relatively narrow water approach is guarded by numerous Soviet defensive installations. Leningrad is the second largest city in the U.S.S.R. (population 3,513,000 in 1970). It has the most extensive port facilities in the country and is the Baltic Sea terminus of an inland waterway system which links it with the White, Black, and Caspian Seas. Manufactur- ing in the city consists of the production of precision instruments, optical and electrical equipment, heavy industrial machinery, machine tools, and armaments. Leningrad is also a nationally important center of the chemical industry and produces basic chemicals, mineral fertilizers, plastics, synthetic rubber, and pharmaceuticals. The city is one of the two largest centers of scientific, technological, and educational facilities in the U.S.S.R. Leningrad is the foremost shipbuilding center of the country; the shipyards produce many types of ships, including cargo vessels, submarines, tankers, destroyers, and minesweepers, and have built an atomic icebreaker. A civil airfield and many military airfields are dispersed around the city. About 15 miles west of Leningrad is the fortress of Kronshtadt, which is located on an island that serves as an operational base for the Soviet Baltic Fleet. The naval base has extensive storage facilities, including several ordnance depots. The island has the largest ship- repair facility and most extensive drydocking facilities in the country. 5. Baku An important petroleum area, the Baku strategic area (Figure 16) is situated on the west coast of the Caspian Sea and has had a nationally significant role as a supplier of fuel for the Soviet economy. More recently the area has played a greater role in refining and processing crude oil from other regions. Baku (population 847,000 in 1970), the most important city in the strategic area, is one of the largest petroleum-refining centers and a leading producer of heavy oilfield equipment in the Soviet Union. One of the largest concentrations of refined petroleum products and crude oil storage facilities in the country is located in Baku and its environs. Offshore oilfields (Figure 17) supply over half of Azerbaijan crude oil production. Chemical plants, closely associated with the petroleum industry, produce sulfuric acid, oxygen, acetylene, synthetic rubber, caustic soda, iodine, and pharmaceu- tical products. The city is the main port and naval base on the Caspian Sea. The shipyards within the port provide the most complete shipbuilding and repair facilities on the Caspian Sea coast. The Baku strategic area is the terminus of a double-track Transcaucasia railroad line, controls the railroad and highway connections to Iran, and is the eastern terminus of pipelines and a railroad that lead from Baku to the Black Sea port of Batumi. Four military airfields and a seaplane station are located in or near the city. 6. Tashkent The Tashkent strategic area (Figure 18) is an important industrial, petroleum-producing, and mining area in south-central U.S.S.R. Only 70 miles from the Communist China border, this strategic area is isolated from other parts of the U.S.S.R. by deserts to the west and north. It is bounded on the east and south by the rugged Tien Shan. The industrial significance of this area has increased greatly since World War II. There are oilfields near Fergana, and oil and natural gas fields near Andizhan. Coal is mined near Angren. Other mineral deposits have been exploited, including sulfur, zinc, copper, tungsten, and molybdenum. Mercury and uranium ores are mined in the mountains south of Fergana. Tashkent (population 1,385,000 in 1970) is the largest city in the strategic area. The city contains a nuclear research center, an aircraft plant, an electron-tube plant, and a storage-battery plant. Tractors, excavators, paper, and cotton textiles are produced in the city. Chimkent (population 247,000 in 1970) is the largest lead smelting and refining center in the U.S.S.R. and one of the most important industrial and commercial centers of the Kazakh S.S.R. It produces machinery, construction materials, textiles, processed agricultural products, pharmaceuticals, and chemicals. It is also an important junction of national transportation lines and Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 FIGURE 15. Leningrad strategic area is the site of a very important military airfield. It contains several colleges and administrative and cultural centers. Other significant industries in the strategic area include a metallurgical plant in Bekabad, construction machinery plants at Andizhan, a superphosphate plant at Kokand, and petroleum refineries at Fergana. The major railroad in the area connects Krasnovodsk, on the Caspian Sea, and Tashkent with the Kuznetsk strategic area. The rail connection from central European U.S.S.R., extending through Kuybyshev, joins this line at Tashkent. 7. Kuznetsk The Kuznetsk strategic area (Figure 19) is the most important mining and manufacturing district east of the Volga-Ural strategic area. Its industrial development is based primarily on the coal deposits around Kemerovo and Novokuznetsk. In addition to the Kuznetsk Basin, the strategic area includes the adjacent Novosibirsk- Barnaul manufacturing belt and the city of Tomsk. The most important industry in the strategic area is the manufacture of iron and steel, but nonferrous metallurgical industries such as zinc, tin, and aluminum are also significant. The iron mines near Tashtagol have increased the significance of this strategic area. Coke production, based on the coalfields centered around Prokop'yevsk, Anzhero-Sudzhensk, Leninsk-Kuznetskiy, and Kiselevsk, is the basis of gas, chemical, and fertilizer production in the area. There are six towns in the strategic area with populations exceeding 250,000. Novosibirsk (population 1,161,000 in 1970) is one of the largest cities in the U.S.S.R. and the largest producer of refined uranium and tin. It is a major machine-building and' metalworking center; factories also produce electronic and optical equipment. The city contains textile mills, extensive stockyards and slaughterhouses, and large flour mills. It is a major telecommunication center and the headquarters for the Siberian military district. The Trans-Siberian railroad crosses the north-flowing Ob' river at Novosibirsk. The city is also an important river port and the northern terminus of the railroad from the Tashkent strategic area. A large scientific center, one of the largest in the world, is located south of the city. Barnaul (population 439,000 in 1970), a port on the Ob' river, is one of the largest producers of diesel engines and high-pressure boilers in the U.S.S.R. The city also contains plants that manufacture railroad cars, small arms ammunition, and textiles. Novokuznetsk (population 499,000 in 1970) is a major producer of iron, steel, aluminum, and coke. Kemerovo (population 385,000 in 1970) is an important center of the Soviet coke-chemical industry, and a manufacturer of munitions, high explosives, chlorine, nitric acid, and caprolactam. Tomsk (population 339,000 in 1970) contains a plutonium production plant and a uranium isotope separation plant. The city has the only large ball-bearing plant outside the European U.S.S.R. FIGURE 16. Baku strategic area FIGURE 17. Offshore oilwells in the Caspian Sea near Baku 20 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 -Anzhero- Sudzhensk Road Railroad } Airfield 0 25 50 Statute miles Prokop'yevsk (population 275,000 in 1970) is a major coal center, producing about 40% of the annual coal yield in the Kuznetsk Basin. A large zinc smelter is located at Belovo. 8. Baykal The Baykal strategic area (Figure 20), which extends along the Trans-Siberian railroad for about 625 miles, derives its importance from its few but significant transportation junctions and from-the Soviet industrial policy of locating plants along this route. Seven centers-Cheremkhovo, Usol'ye Sibirskoye, Angarsk, Irkutsk, Ulan-Ude, Petrovsk-Zabaykal'skiy, and Chita-are served directly by the Trans-Siberian railroad; Irkutsk, Ulan-Ude, Chita, and Angarsk are the most important. Irkutsk (population 451,000 in 1970) is a major railroad classification and repair center, a hub of domestic and international air routes, and the leading port on the Angara river. It is also an important industrial center, whose products include aircraft, metallurgical and mining equipment, and radio equipment. A large aluminum refinery is located near the city. Irkutsk is also the site of two major airfields, many barracks, and military supply depots. Ulan-Ude (population 254,000 in 1970) is a major transportation and industrial center. It is at a strategic junction of the Trans-Siberian railroad and an important railroad and highway extending to the U.S.S.R.-Mongolia border. The city is also the site of many barracks, storage facilities, a major locomotive and railroad-car repair plant, an aircraft-assembly plant, and several large plants producing consumer goods. Chita (population 242,000 in 1970) is a large military center. The city FIGURE 20. Baykal strategic area LLeninsk-Ku tskiy Belovo Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 contains extensive troop-billeting facilities and military supply depots, an air defense sector headquarters, and two military airfields. The city also contains a large railroad repair center and is the terminus of roads from the U.S.S.R.-Mongolia border. Angarsk (population 204,000 in 1970) is the site of a uranium isotope separation plant, a large petroleum refinery, a plastics plant, a nitrogenous fertilizer plant, and several important construction materials plants. Cheremkhovo is the site of a large battery plant. Petrovsk- Zabaykal'skiy is the site of the largest steel plant in central Siberia..A chemical plant is located at Usol'ye- Sibirskoye. Effective exploitation of the coal mines between Cheremkhovo and Irkutsk is dependent on uninter- rupted operation of the Trans-Siberian railroad. This consideration is equally pertinent to the tungsten and molybdenum mines near Ulan-Ude, the uranium mines north of Petrovsk-Zabaykal'skiy, and the other rich mines, chiefly lead, zinc, and rare metal ores, near Chita. Several railroad tunnels near the southern end of Lake Baykal are critical bottlenecks. The Bratsk hydroelectric powerplant, located about 225 miles north of the strategic area, is the second largest powerplant in the world and supplies much of the electric power used in the strategic area. 9. Far Eastern The Far Eastern strategic area (Figure 21) fronts on the Sea of Japan, partly parallels the Communist China border, and extends about 600 miles from the coast near Vladivostok in the south to Komsomol'sk in the north. Vladivostok (population 442,000 in 1970) is the most important naval base, the largest ship-repair center, and the second largest commercial port in the eastern U.S.S.R. The excellently equipped port, which is kept open in winter by icebreakers, is the eastern terminus of the Trans-Siberian railroad. The city contains extensive storage facilities for refined petroleum products, munitions, and general stores, several naval training installations, and many billeting facilities. Air facilities include seaplane bases and many fighter bases. Major industries in the Vladivostok area are shipbuilding and repair, food canning, and numerous light industries, largely connected with fishing enterprises. In addition, there are industries producing electrical equipment and munitions. Nakhodka (population 105,000 in 1970) is the largest commercial port on the Pacific coast of the U.S.S.R. It has extensive wharfage, mechanized cargo-handling facilities, and a military port capacity of 36,000 long tons of general cargo per day. It is also a naval base for patrol craft. The city contains extensive storage facilities for refined petroleum products, general stores, munitions, and torpedoes, and numerous billeting facilities. Major industries include shipbuilding and repair, fishing, fish processing, sawmills, and a tin can factory. Khabarovsk (population 437,000 in 1970) is a major transportation center on the Trans-Siberian railroad Road -~F Railroad 1 Airfield Wlliillillllilllllll Landing beach o 20 40 60 80 FIGURE 21. Far Eastern strategic area and the principal industrial, oil-distribution, telecom- munication, and commercial center in the Soviet Far East; the port facilities are the largest on the Amur river. Industries of national significance include the manufacture of diesel engines, agricultural machinery, and electric wire and cable. The city also produces machine tools, power machinery, heating equipment, and refined petroleum products. Komsomol'sk (population 218,000 in 1970) is one of the major urban areas in the Soviet Far East. Situated on the Amur river, it contains the largest shipyard in eastern Siberia. Other nationally significant installations include the second largest manufacturer of submarine batteries and the third largest producer of jet fighter planes. The city derives additional importance as a producer of foundry equipment and as the site of the only steel plant and one of the two petroleum refineries in eastern Siberia.. Other important centers are scattered throughout the strategic area and include Ussuriysk, at the junction of the Trans-Siberian railroad and the line that extends Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 Approved For Release 2008/09/08: CIA-RDP08SO1 350R0001 00090001-7 across Communist China to Chita, and the coal mining areas around Suchan and Artem. Although of less significance than the strategic areas discussed above, the following urban areas are important: NAME LOCATION o IN. ? 'E. Alma-Ata .. 43 15 76 57 Population 730,000 in 1970. Sec- ond largest city in Soviet Cen- tral Asia and third largest pro- ducer of torpedoes in U.S.S.R. National industrial center pro- ducing heavy machinery, mu- nitions, electrical and telecom- munication equipment, and construction materials. Gor'kiy ... 56 20 44 00 Population 1,170,000 in 1970. Together with satellite city of Dzerzhinsk, third largest indus- trial center, ranking first in production of motor vehicles, rivercraft, chemicals, and large- caliber guns. Major Volga river port and river-railroad trans- shipment point. Kiyev ..... 50 26 30 31 Population 1,632,000 in 1970. Third largest city in U.S.S.R. Prominent cultural, military, transportation, and telecom- munication center. Produces a wide variety of industrial prod- ucts, such as aircraft, ma- chinery, machine tools, and construction materials. Krasnoyarsk 56 01 92 50 Population 648,000 in 1970. Major producer of armaments and site of one of the largest aluminum plants in U.S.S.R. Uranium isotope separation and plutonium production plants in vicinity, each the largest of its kind in country. Also pro- duces synthetic rubber, heavy machinery, and agricultural machinery. Water and rail transshipment site for much of Yenisey river basin. Site of largest powerplant in world (on Yenisey river). Headquar- ters for Trans-Siberian railroad. Odessa .... 46 28 30 43 Population 892,000 in 1970. Ma- jor commercial port (including. Il'ichevsk) on the Black Sea. Contains the country's largest maritime passenger terminal and handles the second largest volume of cargo. Center for shipbuilding, ship repair, metal processing, machine building, and food processing. NAME LOCATION ? 'N. 0 'E. Saratov ... 51 34 46 02 Population 758,000 in 1970. Cen- ter for oil and gas production, petroleum refining, the inte- grated aircraft industry, and manufacture and assembly of guided missiles. Nationally im- portant production center for industrial machinery, machine tools, electric equipment, chem- icals, trolley buses, tractor parts, and bearings. A major transportation hub on the Volga river. Tula ...... 54 12 37 37 Population 462,000 in 1970. In- dustrial center near large coal and iron-ore deposits. Major industrial activities include production of armaments,-am- munition, and agricultural ma- chinery. Volgograd. . 48 45 44 25 Population 818,000 in 1970. Na- tionally significant producer of guns, ammunition, explosives, and chemical-warfare agents. Other industrial products in- clude steel, tractors, chemicals, machinery, and rivercraft. Large aluminum and ball- bearing plants and petroleum refinery. Site of one of largest hydroelectric powerplants in U.S.S.R. (on Volga river). Major transportation center, river port, and water-rail trans- shipment point. Yaroslavl' .. 57 37 39 52 Population 517,000 in 1970. In- dustrial center, nationally im- portant in production of syn- thetic chemicals, petrochem- icals, tires, and diesel engines. Major rail center and water- rail, transshipment point. D. Internal routes (C) The selected internal routes (Figure 22) are the easiest avenues of movement between strategic areas, from land and sea approaches to strategic areas, and between internal routes. Most of the roads considered are improved and are accompanied by railroads over most of their lengths. Roads and railroads are greatly influenced by seasonal conditions. Offroad dispersal and cross-country movement are also greatly influenced by seasonal factors such as snow during the winter months and flooding during spring thaw. Conditions vary from good to fair in the plains regions to poor in the mountain and hill regions which are heavily forested and extremely rugged in places. Detailed information on internal routes is given in Figure 23. E. 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