GLOBAL CAPITAL FLOWS TO THE THIRD WORLD

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP08S01350R000300700001-7
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
31
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 9, 2012
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 1, 1970
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP08S01350R000300700001-7.pdf1.24 MB
Body: 
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000300700001-7 GLOBAL CAPITAL FLOWS TO THE THIRD WORLD Trade and Aid Conference Paper London, England October 1970 Directorate of Intelligence 3? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000300700001-7 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000300700001-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000300700001-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08S01350R000300700001-7 SECRET Global Capital Flows To The Third World* Introduction The developing nations are still faced with critical shortages of capital. Authorities estimate that developed countries should provide a minimum of $250 billion to $300 billion of capital during the decade of the 1970s. The need to help poor nations reach acceptable standards of living was recognized as an international problem early in the 1940s, and in 1944, with the creation of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), machinery was introduced for the first time to provide inter- national financing for development in the Third World. This was followed in 1946 with national aid organizations established by the United Kingdom and France and later in the United States, as an outgrowth of the Marshall Plan. Since that time, a series of national and international aid structures have been established that together comprise vital forces for development of the less developed nations. Most important among these have been two IBRD subsidiaries which were intended to expand the scope and character of the Bank's undertakings: the International Finance Corporation (IFC) established in 1956 to provide risk capital, and the International Development As- sociation (IDA) created in 1960 to provide soft loans. In addition, regional financial institutions, such as the African Development Bank and the Asian Develop- ment Bank, have been organized to supplement the as- sistance provided under international auspices. Also of significance has been the emergence of a number of aid coordinating mechanisms, especially the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), under the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The,DAC was organized to induce an expanded '' Third World refers to the Less developed countries of the Free World, which include the following: (1) all countries of Africa except the Republic of South Africa; (2) all countries of East Asia except Japan; (3) Portugal and Spain in Europe; (4) all countries in Latin America except Cuba; and (5) all countries in the Near East and South Asia. SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08S01350R000300700001-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000300700001-7 SECRET flow of aid from Western developed countries and to increase the efficiency of national aid undertak- ings by providing a forum to exchange information on global aid efforts and to harmonize aid policies. The United Nations also has provided the impetus for a more sophisticated approach to development problems, especially. through its Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The public review of goals and the identification of alternatives for achieving them have highlighted many of the critical issues among donors and recipients and have provided new challenges for their solutions Three recent major reports (the Pearson Report, sponsored by the IBRD.; the Jackson Report, prepared by the UN Commit- tee for Development Planning; and the Peterson Re- port, prepared at the request of the President of the United States). recommend increases in the amount of aid and suggest that multilateral agencies play a larger role in aid determinations (see Appendix B). In spite of these continuing efforts and in spite of the vast increases in global capital flows during the past two decades, for the most part the developing countries still have not passed beyond the most elementary stages of development. They continue to look to the developed world for ever larger amounts of capital to help them achieve their goals. But the offerings fall short of Third World requirements as the developed nations tend to look inward and are reluctant to expand their undertak- ings by significant amounts. Moreover, the net availability of external capital is being reduced as the flow to less developed countries from official sources has levelled off and debt service obliga- tions have continued to grow. This memorandum reviews the dimensions of the global aid effort as it has evolved over the past 16 years, from 1954 to 1969, with particular emphasis on official bilateral capital movements to the devel- oping nations of the Free World. It covers both Western and Communist participation and looks to the future, as an attempt is made to estimate the amount of net capital that will flow to the Third World at the end of the Second Development Decade. SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000300700001-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000300700001-7 SECRET Total Capital-Flows, 1954-69 1. As a result of international cooperation and national initiatives by the developed countries, the volume of foreign capital flowing to the less developed countries of the Free World has expanded enormously. Since the mid-1950s, following the reconstruction efforts of the post-World War II period, the developed countries -- both Free World and Communist -- have provided about $90 billion of aid to the less developed countries through official bilateral and multilateral channels. In addition, capital provided through foreign private sources has totaled more than $50 billion (see Appendix Tables A-II, and A-III). From an annual average.flow\ some $5.5 billion during 1954-59, the global flow of capital to the developing countries increased to more than $8.5 billion by 1960, and in 1969 a- record level of about $14 billion was reached (see Table 1). Gross Capital Flows to Less Developed Countries of the Free World a/' Million US $ Total. Bilateral Contributions Multilateral Agencies to Private Sources 1954-59 b/ 5,486 2,876 276 2,334 1960 8,600 4,849 601 3,150 1965 11,373 6,759 449 4,165 1969 c/ 14,346 7,558 1,000 5,788 a. Contributions to multilateral agencies and capita from private sources are net figures and thus are understated. Official sources exclude flows from New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, South Africa, and Yugos Zavia. b. Annual average. e. Preliminary estimates. SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000300700001-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000300700001-7 SECRET 2. Official bilateral assistance has made by far the most important contribution to the total flow of international capital that has gone to Third World countrieso It rose very rapidly be- tween the mid-1950s and the mid-1960s and then slowed, as contributions from principal donors, especially the United States, lagged. Between 1954 and 1965, official aid provided directly through government sources increased almost 2-1/2 times, rising from about $2.9 billion at the beginning of the period to $6.8 billion at the end. From 1965 to 1969, the increase was little more than 10%. At the same time, official contributions to multilateral agencies were nominal although.they rose to $1 billion in 1969. It has been the private sector -- always the most volatile part of the total -- that has shown the largest dollar increase since 1965 and has accounted for the largest part of the expansion in capital flows in most recent years. Between 1960 and 1969 private net flows rose by more than $2.6 billion, which roughly equalled the increase in total gross official bilateral flows during the period.* But private sector capital movements had increased 85% between 1960 and 1969, compared with little more than a 55% increase for total official flows. Although official bilateral aid still accounts for more than one-half of the total capital flow, its share has declined in recent years, while the share of private capital had increased to about 40% in 1969 from about 35% in 1960. Official Bilateral Flows 3. The total flow of capital through bilateral channels between 1954 and 1969 equalled $82 billion. Of this amount DAC member nations provided $78 billion, or 95% of the total, and Communist countries provided the remainder. Gross-official bilateral capital flows to Third World countries during 1954-68 are shown in Figure 1. The comparison of Western and Communist aid disbursements in Table 2 shows that the threat of competition posed by Communist countries, when they launched their aid offensive in the mid-1950s, never materialized and the total of all Communist aid delivered during 1954-69 was only $4.5 billion. Moreover, except The comparison between gross bilateral official flows and net private flows understates the relative increase in the private sector. - 4 - SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08S01350R000300700001-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000300700001-7 SECRET Gross Official Bilateral Capital Flows to Third World. Countries, by Donor 1954-68 -------------- 9q?lo OAC MEMBERS TOTAL: US $ 74.6 Billion. 5 - SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000300700001-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08S01350R000300700001-7 Gross Official Bilateral Capital Flows by Major Donors for Selected Years a/ 1954-69 Million US $ 7 b~ 1965-4--fr9- 1954_59 1960 1964. 1965 1968 1969 I ft Total 2,876 4,849 6,355 6,759 7,390 n n -r n n ' 73 DAC members c/ 2,812 4,700 5,798 6,233 6,934 d/ 77,634 ~~~o United States 1,742 3,149 3,479 3,665 3,775 S-0 ,1V.0 France 710 779 768 793 913 Z163 11, 482 United Kingdom 173 332 493 490 458 `4g? 5,065 West Germany 68 135 450 521 643 L ntl- 4,350 Japan 30 63 228 190 334 V3 (933) l,624 Other 90 241 379 574 811 4,799 64 149 556 526 456 408 4,515 USSR 42 107 376 356 303 286 3,094 Eastern Europe 12 32 116 92 107 78 893 China 10 10 64 78 46 45 528 a. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown. b. Annual average. c. Includes 15 Western nations and excludes Portugal. d. Preliminary estimate. The distribution among DAC members is not available. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08S01350R000300700001-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000300700001-7 SECRET for the decline in 1962, total.official bilateral aid disbursements by Western nations have increased in every year.since 1954, while Communist aid, after reaching a record of slightly more than one-half billion dollars in 1964, has declined in every subse- quent year, to some $400 million in 1969. Aid from all Communist countries for the 16-year period, 1954-69, has been roughly equal to the official bilateral dis- bursements made during that period by West Germany, the fourth ranking Western donor. But West Germany's annual disbursements, which were about equal to those of-Communist countries in 1965, continued to expand after 1965, while Communist aid was, falling. Among. the Communist countries, the USSR has been by far the largest donor, having accounted for almost 70% of the total. East European countries provided about 20% and Communist China the remainder. 4. Even though Western official flows have continued to increase in almost every year, since the mid-1960s there has been a tendency toward stagnation mostly because of the reduced growth of US aid. US aid has fluctuated between $3.5 billion and $3.8 billion since 1964, and-there has been little change in the dollar value of assistance from the United Kingdom since the mid-1960s although some increase may have taken place in 1969. French dis- bursements, however, rose sharply in 1968 and 1969, contrasting with the 1962-66 period when French capital outflows had been constant. Most other DAC member countries, especially West Germany and Japan, have consistently expanded the amount of aid they have provided annually to the developing nations. By 1968, the contributions from the group of "other coun- tries" that are DAC members also rose rapidly to a level of almost 3-1/2 times that of 1960. US aid has been by far the largest part.of the DAC member total, amounting to $43 billion during 1954-68, but it has represented a declining share in recent years. In 1968, US aid'disbursements were only 54% of the total, compared with 67% in 1960. France and the United Kingdom have ranked second and third although the volume of West Germany's annual aid disbursements began to exceed those of the United Kingdom in 1965. - 7 - SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000300700001-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08S01350R000300700001-7 SECRET 5. The distribution of official bilateral assistance has been highly concentrated for all. donors. In the aggregate, the largest share has. gone to Near East and South Asian countries; the countries of Africa ranked second; and East Asia and Latin America followed, with respective shares of 19% and 16% (see Table 3). 6. There are significant regional variations among donors, often a reflection of historic and political ties or of current strategic considera- tions. For example, 73% of French aid and 43% of the UK's aid have gone. to Africa; more than one-half of Japanese aid.has been provided to East Asia; and only the United States among all the major donors has made a significant contribution to Latin America, though 40% of total US aid went to the Near East and South Asia. and 26% to East Asia. In the case of the USSR, 85% of its aid-deliveries have gone to the Near East and South Asia. Within these area preferences, all aid donors have tended to concen- trate their undertakings in a few countries, often .the same countries. Thus, about half of the offi- cial bilateral aid from all sources delivered during 1954-68 went to ten countries (see Table 4). For Communist countries,.theratio was somewhat higher. Four of the ten countries (India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and the UAR) also were principal Communist aid recip- ients although not in the same order of rank as for Western countries. These countries also are the nations that are being most seriously burdened by debt payment requirements. At least three have already asked their creditors for relief; a number of the others may be expected to follow shortly. Repayment Terms for Official Bilateral Flows 7. Against the benefits derived from the use of foreign capital, Third World countries must weigh its cost. Out of total official bilateral deliveries of some $80 billion during 1954-69, about one-half was provided as outright grants; the remainder was in the form of long-term credits with contractually fixed debt servicing obligations.* To meet these fixed * This memorandum, where possible, has excluded credits with repayment periods of less than five years. The recent DAC definition of development capital, that excludes all export credits and includes only credits intended for development purposes, was not used. SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08S01350R000300700001-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08S01350R000300700001-7 Gross Official Bilateral Capital Flows by Donor and Recipient Area a/ 1954-6y? Million US $ .,Icc`1- 067 Communist United United Total Countries Total States France Kingdom Other r19 t/ 12-,973 cw Total b/ 74, 591 4,107 711x4-8'4 403;--1-63 1 2 5)-06 5 4-0'3, Near East and -33 /1A14 L,(,73 South Asia 25,735 3,094 2 ;6-41. 17;10'0- 1,-473 3,~0 I7 18I ?~ ,)- 66 c 3v/ 2,30"1 ` Africa 16i247 507 ) 1-5-;,-74 0 -3 252 8i?-77 2 ,=l 6-0- 1; 9 5 0 IN92. 1"2 1111 3 2x2_ :2, So O East -Asia 13,810 425 3785 i12?57 251. 240' 1,-x6'3 7 1 I~,9Z1 ~)r q2_'2- 53? 11U15 Latin America 11,62 81 1,1-,5-61 8&,938= 7 ? .4=93 lye i,.v -15? 1)3~. ? 7q ~ ate 10 , Europe 1,748 -- 1;-7?48' 1,338 _ .2-O 1.61 g) X39. 11% Other c/ 5,409 -- 5;4`09 1-,278 el ,8 2 ~y-Frs2 a. Data for 1969 by donor and recipient are not available. b. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown. c. Including unspecified countries. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08S01350R000300700001-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08S01350R000300700001-7 SECRET Distribution of.Gross official Bilateral Capital Among Principal Recipients a/ 1954-68 Million US $ a. Data for DAC member countries' isburse- ments in 1969 are not avaiZabZe. Total DAC Members Communist Countries Total 74,591 70,484 4,107 India 10,688 9,754 934 Pakistan 4,489 4,379 110 Algeria 3,838 3,780 58 South Vietnam- 3,769 3,769 0 South Korea 3,709 3,709 0 Brazil 2,843 2,813 30 Turkey 2,316 2,292 24 Indonesia 1,914 1,613 301 UAR 2,256 1,415 841 Chile 1,352 1,352 0 Other 37,418 35,609 1,809 obligations, the developing nations made payments of approximately $11 billion for debt amortization 4 and interest during the 15-year period, 1954-68. Repayment terms have varied widely among donors and over time. At one extreme is Australia's aid program which is all grant; at the other is the East European program which is no-grant and characteristically eight years for amortization and 3% interest. The terms allowed by major donors for commitments made in 1962 and 1968 are given in Table 5. 8. Of special interest is the fact that Com- munist terms -- often referred to as "easy" -- are the "hardest" among all the donors. Most importantly, Communist countries do not generally extend grant aid. With the exception of $130 million in grants SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08S01350R000300700001-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000300700001-7 Repayment Terms for Aid Commitments 1962 1968 Loan Terms a/ Loan Terms a/ Grant Number Grant Number (Percent of Years Interest (Percent of Years Interest DAC Members of Total) Maturity (Percent) of Total) Maturity (Percent) United States 67 28.6 2.5 39 30.'0 3.6 France 56 17.0 b/ 4.0 b/ 70 17.6 3.7 United Kingdom 58 24.3 5.8 37 24.0 1.0 H West Germany 11 15.2 4.4 24 18.0 4.5 7d Japan 16 10.0 6.0 36 18.1 3.7 ~ i. tzJ DAC Average 60 24.5 c/ 3.5 43 26.0 3.6 Communist d/ USSR Negl. 12 2.5 Negl. 11.8 2.4 Eastern Europe. Negl. 8 3 to 3.5 Negl. 8.6 2.6 China 25 10 e/ 0 Negl. 10.0 e/ 0 a. Weighted averages. b. Based on disbursement data. c. An average grace period of six years usually is included. d. Terms cited for 1962 are an average for 1960-62. e. These payments usually begin after a 10-year grace period. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000300700001-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08S01350R000300700001-7 SECRET provided to Afghanistan in 1959, the USSR has ex- tended grants only for small emergency-type assist- ance and the occasional model farm,hospital equip- ment, or training facility.. Communist.China pro- vided grants to Nepal and Cambodia of -$65 million and $50 million, respectively, and also has given small amounts of budgetary support and commodity assistance as gifts. For the USSR, generally amortization of credits has been extended over a 12-year period with interest of 2.5%. East European countries have been somewhat less liberal, and Com- munist China somewhat more concessionary because of a 10-year grace allowed before the start of amortiza- tion and no interest charges. On the other hand, Western aid donors, in 1968, on the average, allowed 26 years for repayment and charged 3.6% interest, but some 43% of the a.id.did not require repayment.. 9. Compared with 1962, repayment terms generally have. become more burdensome for aid recipients. DAC member countries in 1968 reduced the high grant ratios of earlier years by 17 percentage points, although average amortization periods were increased by.1-1/2 years. The increase in interest on US development loans, from a statutory minimum interest rate of 3/4% in 1962 to 3% in 1968, was counter- balanced to some extent by the reduction in average UK interest rates from almost 6% to 1% and in Japan's interest charges from 6% to 4%. Recently the growing volume of export supplier type credits* provided by a number of donors has contribu#ed to the hardening of terms. Repayments and Net Aid Flows 10. During 1954-68 the less developed countries of the Free World made payments of approximately $1.1 billion .to the developed nations for servicing the debts incurred for official bilateral assistance. About-$7 billion of the total was for repayment of their principal debt and more than $4 billion was for interest payments (see Table 6). In the case of some countries, such as West Germany, these credits may be extended directly to the buyer rather than supplier-. SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08S01350R000300700001-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08S01350R000300700001-7 SECRET Total Principal and Interest Payments by Third World Countries to Major Donors of Economic Aid 1954-68 Million US $ Total Principal Interest Total 11,028 6,954 4, 074 DAC Members 10,107 6,302 3,805 United States 6,096 3,817 2,279 France 861 629 232 United Kingdom 973 456 517 West Germany 1,030 670 360 Japan 261 149 112 Other 886 581 305 Communist Countries 921 652 269 USSR 600 420 180 Eastern Europe 321 232 89 11. Debt servicing obligations have increased very rapidly in recent years for credits extended by both Western and Communist countries. Between 1960 and 1968 the total annual debt service tripled, rising from $550 million in 1960 to $1.7 billion in 1968 (see Appendix Table A-IV). Both interest and. principal had roughly the same growth rate over the nine-year period and contributed the same share to the total in each year. Interest was 37% of the total and the principal was 63% during 1954-68. Repayments of principal and interest to DAC member countries accounted for $10 billion of the $11 billion total repaid, with only about 8% of the total going for repayment on Communist aid. The somewhat higher interest rates charged by the Western donors and shorter amortization periods for Communist aid are reflected in the fact that the interest paid Western countries was a larger percentage of the total than paid to the Communist countries. SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08S01350R000300700001-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08S01350R000300700001-7 SECRET 12. Aggregate principal repayments for official bilateral aid during 1954-68-have reduced the capital flow to the developing nations by about 10%. Interest payments reduced it by another 5%. Harder terms imposed by a-number of donors curtailed the net amount of capital outflow from these countries by more than the average. For example, debt amortiza- tion absorbed 35% of Austria's gross disbursements during 1954-68, 30% of Italy's, and 15% of West Germany's. For Communist countries the repayment/ delivery ratio rose more rapidly than for DAC member countries and principal payments for amortizing previous deliveries exceeded the average 10% mark in 1964. By 1968, when the average principal repay- ment delivery ratio had risen to 14% for all donors, Communist principal payments were preempting 36% of their total deliveries. Interest payments for Communist aid reduced the flow by an additional 13%. Thus, com- pared with total Communist deliveries of about $455 million in 1968, payments for interest and principal amounted to $220 million. This was a far heavier drain on aggregate flow than was recorded for any of the DAC countries. As a consequence, Communist deliveries will approach the debt service level with- in the next few years unless deliveries are increased significantly or debt relief is granted (see Figure 2). For DAC members there is still a wider spread between deliveries.and repayments. Inasmuch as the grant portion still constitutes a large part of total deliveries the annual net availability of official capital from DAC countries has increased somewhat in most years, reaching $5.5 billion in 1968 compared with $4.9 billion in 1964. On the other hand, the net flow. of capital from Communist countries was an esti- mated $235 million in 1968 and $465 million in 1964. 13. In spite of continued increases in net Western aid, the debt structure is not evenly dis- tributed among recipients and some countries have had serious problems in meeting their debt service obligations. As the gap between deliveries and repayments has narrowed before these countries could increase their export capabilities, they have de- faulted. Indonesia and Ghana, among others, already have had problems in meeting their contractual obligations for debts incurred under nationally sponsored aid programs, and have had to ask for debt servicing relief. India and the UAR have similar problems. Either the terms of aid must be made easier or gross lending vastly expanded to compensate SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08S01350R000300700001-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000300700001-7 Net Official Bilateral Capital Flows to Third World Countries BILLION US $ 8~ - .TOTAL DELIVERIES NET FLOW 0 C 1954-59 Annual Average PRINCIPAL INTEREST BILLION us $ FROM COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 8r- TOTAL DELIVERIES r 1960 1966 1968 1954-59 Annual Average PRINCIPAL INTEREST 1968 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000300700001-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08S01350R000300700001-7 SECRET for the increased reverse flows that are taking place. Originally, suggested reductions in repayment terms were a means for achieving uniformity among donor aid offerings. More recently, recommendations to soften. terms are intended to provide relief to aid recipients whose export surpluses are not large enough to service debts being created under existing agreements and who in some cases, because of debt obligations, are able to make only small net additions to capital formation. 14. To cope with this problem, the DAC adopted a resolution in 1965 calling for a softening of terms for official flows (see Appendix B). This was followed by similar recommendations at UNCTAD II and in 1969 in the Pearson report. To expand the net capital flow to developing nations, the.report suggested targets for net official development aid of 0.7% of donor GNP to be achieved by 1975 if possible but no later than 1980. To provide greater uniformity in aid recipient debt structures, the report recommended that official assistance carry 25 to 40 year maturities with grace periods of 7 to 10 years'and maximum interest of- 2%. Prospects for the.1970s 15. If the Pearson target of 0.7% of GNP for net official aid flows had been implemented in 1968, developed countries would have had to double their net disbursements of official capital. As shown in Table 7, the net flow of official capital (including disbursements to multilateral agencies) in 1968 averaged only about 0.34% of GNP. The Soviet con- tribution, which was less than 1/10 of 1% of GNP, represented the smallest drain among all countries on GNP. Only France met the 0.7% target. Australia and the Netherlands provided more than 0.5% of their GNP, and the United States, the United Kingdom, Belgium, and West Germany about 0.4%. 16. Under the Pearson assumption, disbursements in 1975 would be more than three times the amount actually disbursed in 1968. To reach the Pearson target by 1975, the USSR would have to increase its annual net disbursements about twentyfold''(see Figure 3). But such a rapid acceleration,. while impossible for the USSR to implement, is not even being contemplated inas- much as Moscow has refused to accept any imposed uni- form aid target. Nor is it likely that major Western. SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08S01350R000300700001-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08S01350R000300700001-7 SECRET Net Official Flows Required to Reach Pearson Target of 0.7 Percent a/ 19.75 Compared with 1968 Actual Net Flow as Percent of GNP Million US $to Reach 0.7 Percent of GNP 1968 1968 1975 0.34 14,359 19,942 DAC members 0.41. 11,587 16,173 b/ Australia 0.59 186 255 Austria 0.24 80 103 Belgium 0.45 145 194 Canada 0.33 454 587 Denmark 0.23 87 124 France 0.75 788 1,162 West Germany 0.40. 1,016 1,202 Italy 0.16 524 691 Japan. 0.25 993 2,062 Netherlands 0.52 176 239 Norway 0.26 63 86 Sweden 0.29 179 230 Switzerland 0.11. 118 151 United Kingdom 0.43 718 853 United States 0.42 6,060 8,234 0.05 2,772 3,769 flows are excluded. a. This category includes net bilateral and multi- lateral flows; the total is understated since pro- jections for East European and Communist Chinese .17; - SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08S01350R000300700001-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000300700001-7 ~r UI'cr. 1 Figure 3 Net Official Capital Flows* Required to Reach Pearson Report Target of 0.70% of GNP BILLION US $ 22r- - / DAC MEMBERS NET) FLOW SOVIET NET FLOW ,j I 01~ 1954-59 1960 1962 Annual Average PEARSON REPORT TARGET PEARSON REPORT TARGET *Excluding principal repayments. - 1.8?- / SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000300700001-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08S01350R000300700001-7 SECRET donors will triple their. disbursements during the next several years or even by the end of the decade. Only five nations, that would account for less than 10% of the total projected target flow for 1975, have indicated their intention to reach or exceed the target. In its present domestic mood, the United States probably will. not undertake major new bilateral aid initiatives .but will try to sustain recent levels and may expand its contributions to multilateral agencies. Other major donors, especially Japan-and West Germany, will probably continue to expand their undertakings, but not so rapidly as the Pearson targets require. 1.7. The vastly expanded flow of capital envisioned in the Pearson report would be associated also with a reduced debt service ratio. Under the recommenda- tion, total interest charges would equal about $400 million for each $1 billion of debt, compared with $558 million, if 1968 terms were applied and total annual debt service for principal and interest on each $1 billion of debt would be reduced by an average $18 million a year, from $75 to $57 million. The acceptance of this recommendation would be a modest 2% to the annual net flow of aid. 18. The failure of the developed world to assume significant new responsibilities for the development efforts of Third World countries in the Second Development Decade will affect the fulfillment of their development plans, and some of the developing nations will continue to have difficulties in meet- ing their debt servicing obligations. More nations will request moratoria and rescheduling of their debts. Conclusions 19. Increased world concern for the continuing development needs of Third World countries has led to pressures on national and international agencies to expand the volume of assistance to these countries and to improve the efficiency of these undertakings. As a result of the. initiatives by international groups, national aid undertakings have become an international issue and donor nations are being pressed to conform to uni.fnrm criteria and standar- dized repayment terms. Acceptance of the Pearson SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08S01350R000300700001-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000300700001-7 SECRET, recommendations would transform the concept of aid from national "largessee" to one of public respon- sibility, and the political and-strategic overtones of aid-giving would be reduced. In spite of these efforts, national aid determinations are being sub- jected to more and more critical review by many developed countries, as the major donors become increasingly preoccupied with the growing domestic claims on their resources, with balance-of-payments problems and-an indifferent public. Thus, the opening years of the Second Development Decade may be a crossroads for economic aid programs. Developed nations must decide whether their aid programs will continue as adjuncts of their national policy interests or.whether they will identify them more generally with the objectives of international agencies. In the long run, there undoubtedly will be a tendency toward greater multilaterialization, and a reduced national role, 20. In the shorter term the outlook is less encouraging. In spite of international efforts to reduce differences between rich and poor nations, the gap has widened in recent years. While it is hoped-that-total annual gross capital flow to poorer countries from all sources will exceed the present level by significant amounts, many of the developed nations have been reluctant to assume greater aid burdens by committing themselves to specific targets. In the short run, more uniform national aid struc- tures may evolve, and the new perspective of aid as a worldwide undertaking will undoubtedly begin to take'root. Possibly, one of the contributions of the Second Development Decade will be that it will have set the stage for the Third Decade when aid to developing nations will have reached a greater state of maturity. 20 - SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000300700001-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000300700001-7 SECRET Statistical. Tables ,SECRET. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000300700001-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000300700001-7 ILLEGIB Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000300700001-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000300700001-7 Donor Total 1954-59\ 7,651 Cl 1,658 Australia 136 23 d/ Austria 52 5 e/ Belgium 186, 46 Canada 274 47 Denmark 101 13 e/ France 517 76 e/ West Germany 1,297 544 Italy 288 46 Japan 273 42 Netherlands 256 39 Norway 110 18 Sweden 207 24 e/ Switzerland 61 42 United Kingdom 801 327 United States 2,087 366 N I/ 6.01 744 527 365 -'380 449 8 19 27 5 65 101 27 30` 11 9; .'6 2 95 198 2 8 2 5 23\ 15 ' 16 2 16 \ 12 8 16 6 N7 9 8 73 116 29 21 286 102 N 25 10 15 32 ~\1 -5 11 7 12 10 26 18 2016 8 6 18 1,4 7 15 16 19' 17 3 3 3 40 41 45 46 202 138 142 204 5-3, Estimated 1966 1967 1968 1969 b/ 530 736 661 1,000 13 24 10 6 7 14 14 24 19 31 46 43 16 16 13 29 42 38 36 54 100 91 34 8 50 45 49 42 38 24 8 11 10 33 34 32 -8 -3 5 56 53 45 a. Most of which is grant and,not reimbursable. The subscriptions to international loans, however, are on a net basis. Figures exclude disbursements by Portugal; figures for 195?4-55 are based on an annual average for 1950-55. b. 1969 data cannot be distributed among donors. c. Including undistributed total for 1969. Parts may not add to total due to rounding. d. Figures are for the period 1957-59. e. Figures are for the period 1956-59. 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 DAC Member Disbursementsto Multilateral Agencies a Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000300700001-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000300700001-7 Net Flow of Private Capital from DAC Member Countries to Less Developed Countries and Multilateral Agencies a/ Total Donor 1954-1969 1954-59 1960 1961 1962 1963 19 / 64 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 b 52,492 14,005 c/ 3,150 3,106 2,453 2,557 3,200 4,165 3,826 4,209 6,033 5,788 Australia A i 170 7 -- -- -- -- 15 15 20 25 30 5 ustr a B l i 206 -3 6 18 17 4 7 16 16 21 46 8 5 e g um C d 1,368 419 81 72 49 95 93 119 97 66 150 8 127 ana a 819 302 70 26 55 32 14 45 55 59 94 Denmark 227 8 32 25 7 1 21 2 -5 -3 45 67 4 Cn France West German 7,200 6 078 1,661 1 343 477 463 418 391 529 547 575 516 846 9 777 y It l , , 276 229 143 186 283 253 297 594 1 028 1 44 CO) a y 2,989 276 193 177 280 243 197 173 517 131 , 401 , 6 4 Japan N th l 2,130 228 103 160 118 94 79 132 159 214 391 01 45 e er ands Norway 2,045 148 683 5 203 144 49 97 69 169 160 115 142 2 214 rnJ S d N.A. 18 N.A. 1 6 27 4 15 35 we en S it l d 537 75 40 43 19 30 34 35 51 61 57 37 9 w zer an U it d i 1,933 348 153 187 156 197 101 188 107 130 223 2 1 n e K ngdom U it d St 6,089 1,969 474 442 323 306 426 547 413 343 341 43 505 n e ates 20,553 6,684 1,042 1,102 819 880 1,326 1,897 1,360 1,922 2,204 1,317 a. This category covers private direct investment (incuing reinvested earnings), portfolio and other lending (bilateral and multilateral), and guaranteed private export credits (including unguaranteed portions). b. Preliminary estimates. c. Figures are understated due to lack of available information. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000300700001-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000300700001-7 Annual Debt Service for DAC Member and Communist Official Bilateral Aid, Principal, and Interest Payments , Total 1954-59 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 Total repayments 11,028 1,804 550 643 637 730 1,015 1,116 1,388 1,452 1,693 Principal 6,954 1,402 341 412 364 402 581 639 866 898 1,049 Interest 4,074 402 209 231 273 328 434 477 522 554 644 DAC member total 10,107 1,779 526 610 596 670 925 1,001 1,248 1,280 1,472 Principal 6,302 1,385 324 389 336 364 520 559 766 773 886 Interest 3,805 394 202 221 260 306 405 442 482 507 586 ist total C 921 25 24 33 41 60 90 115 140 172 221 n ommun Cr1 , Principal 652 17 17 23 28 38 61 80 100 125 163 Interest 269 8 7 10 13 22 29 35 40 47 58 03 Soviet total 600 21 19 23 29 40 64 73 89 104 138 Principal 420 16 14 16 19 25 43 50 63 74 100 Interest 180 5 5 7 10 15 21 23 26 30 38 East European total 321 4 5 10 12 20 26 42 51 68 83 Principal 232 1 3 7 9 13 18 30 37 51 63 Interest 89 3 2 3 3. 7 8 12 14 17 20 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000300700001-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000300700001-7 SECRET The 1965 DAC Recommendation on Financial Terms and Conditions 1. That 70% or more of each DAC member's total official aid commitments to developing nations should be grants or grant-like contributions that involve no repayment in foreign exchange; or 2. That members should reach the 1964 perfor- mance level, which would allow them either: a. to provide 81% of their assistance as a combination of grants and 3% loans, or b. to provide 82% of their assistance as a combination of grants and loans with repayment periods of 25 years or more and grace periods of 7 years. The 1969 DAC Supplement to the 1965 Recommendation on Financial Terms and Conditions 1. That DAC members that do not contribute 70% or more of their total official development assist- ance as grants or grant-like contributions should either: a. provide a minimum concessional element* of 61% for each transaction on at least 85% of their total commitments for official development assistance, or b. provide an overall concessional element of at least 85% on 85% of their commitments of official development assistance. * A "concessionaZ element" is defined as the face value of a financial commitment, less the discounted present value plus interest payments, using a 10% discount rate. - 27 SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000300700001-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000300700001-7 SECRET Recommendations on Terms by the Second United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD II), March 1968 UNCTAD II established a target of 1% of GNP as a minimum for the net annual flow of financial resources (both public and private) from the devel- oped to the less developed nations. . The Pearson Report, 1969 1. The report suggested greater multilaterali- zation.of.aid and recommended that 20% of official development assistance should be shifted to,a multi- lateral structure.by 1975. The International' Development Agency (IDA) should be given a more central role in multilateralizing aid, and its resources should be increased from $400 million to $1.5 billion by 1975. 2. The volume of net official development assistance should be increased to 0.7% of donor's GNP by 1975 if possible, but in no case later than 1980. If private investment is included, the net flow of capital from donor countries should be increased to 1% of GNP. 3. Terms on official assistance should be re- vised to increase maturities to 25 to 40 years, with grace periods of 7 to 10 years, and maximum interest of 2%. B-5 The Jackson Capacity Study, 1970 1. Recommended an overhaul in the UN system to assure it a more effective role in technical cooperation programs with less developed countries. SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000300700001-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000300700001-7 SECRET 2. To be accomplished through integration and rationalization of presently dispersed efforts. a. A United Nations Development Coopera- tion Cycle to be established to synthesize the process of programming and to ensure pro- cedures for evaluation and followup. This would include: (1) synchronizing technical cooperation with the development plan- ning cycle of each country, (2) relating these planning cycles to IBRD plans for subsequent investment. 3. Policy decisions should be centralized in the UN Development Program and operational authority should be decentralized. The Peterson Report, 1970 1. Recommends that the United States propose joint action by lending countries and international lending institutions to devise a strategy for deal- ing with the external debt problems of less developed countries and to provide for rescheduling their debts. 2. Terms of development assistance should be improved to avoid future debt problems. 3. Recommends that the United States propose that all industrial countries agree to untie their bilateral development lending. SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000300700001-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000300700001-7 Secret Secret Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/09: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000300700001-7