THE SOVIET QUALITY CONTROL CAMPAIGN: LIMITED PROGRESS BUT DISRUPTIONS CONTINUE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08S01350R000401290003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 26, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
f,
t
The Soviet Quality Control
Campaign: Limited Progress
But Disruptions Continue
A Research Paper
-
SOV 87-10049
August 1987
Co? 242
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
The Soviet Quality Control
Campaign: Limited Progress
But Disruptions Continue
A Research Paper
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This paper was prepared by
Office of Soviet Analysis
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Comments and
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queries are welcome and may be directed to the
Chief, Economic Performance Division, SOVA
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SOV 87-10099
August 1987
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Summary
Information available
as of 20 July 1987 was
was used in this report.
The Soviet Quality Control
Campaign: Limited Progress
But Disruptions Continue
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Soviet industry is making a slow and erratic recovery from the initial
upheaval caused by the introduction this past January of a new quality
control system?gospriyemka (state acceptance). The evidence includes a
dramatic drop in product rejections, the appearance of better quality goods
on the USSR's shelves and factory floors, and a sluggish improvement in
Soviet plan fulfillment statistics. press reporting indicate
that, despite this progress, the 1,500 flagship enterprises and production
associations covered by the new standards continue to be plagued by a
strong undercurrent of problems in meeting quantity and quality targets.
State acceptance is still in its shakedown period, and its lasting impact on
Soviet industry and consumer satisfaction is yet to be decided
On the positive side, Moscow:
? Generated a modest 2.4-percent increase in industrial production in
second quarter 1987 compared with the corresponding period in 1986, up
from the dismal 0.6-percent growth rate posted in January to March.
Machine-building output, however, continues to lag plan targets.
? Reported a 20-percent decline in product rejections in April to June,
compared with first-quarter results.
? Benefited from learning-curve effects, increased quality awareness on the
factory floor, and use of inspectors as troubleshooters.
? Introduced new worker incentives to promote quality, and quickly
brought on stream simple testing and measuring equipment.
Accompanying these steps forward, however, are subtle signs that a de
facto compromise on quality has been reached, with enterprises increasing-
ly successful in bypassing state acceptance controls. Whether Moscow has
decided to ease up quietly or whether the program's opponents have forced
a dilution of the system through increased deviations from established
procedures, pressure on inspectors, and "temporary exemptions" is unclear.
Although major disruptions to industrial performance appear to have
eased, the Soviet leadership still faces a daunting array of problems created
or exacerbated by state acceptance:
? This year's poor start?especially for the critical machine-building
sector?throws off balance Gorbachev's tightly scheduled modernization
program. Production shortfalls press on the jugular of his strategy by
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August 1987
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slowing the flow of new machinery?necessary to renovate and retool the
USSR's antiquated industrial base?and by disrupting investment
timetables.
? Worker dissatisfaction with state acceptance strictures continues, mani-
festing itself through work stoppages, near strikes, "retirements," and
increased grumbling.
? Problems with deliveries of quality raw materials and components appear
to have worsened for enterprises whose suppliers remain outside state
acceptance controls.
Any push to put the volume of production back on track for 1987 may
cause quality to slip or threaten other programs on Gorbachev's economic
agenda and could put the leadership in the unpalatable position of
rationing important machinery resources.
Gospriyemka casts its shadow as well on the political front. Economists
who are pushing for radical reform see the program as just another
bureaucratic impediment to market forces. Gorbachev's moves at the June
1987 Central Committee plenum may convince critics of state acceptance
that the regime is making strides toward the kind of market-oriented
system they want, but the Soviet leader's continued unbridled support for
the program also carries the risk of alienating an important political
constituency. For the time being, leadership support for state acceptance
remains strong in the senior ranks.
Moscow appears cautiously optimistic, however, and is taking steps to
consolidate gains achieved this year and lay the groundwork for a planned
expansion of the system. An additional 727 enterprises will adopt state
acceptance procedures in January 1988. Suppliers to plants already
covered in the program will make up nearly half of the new participants,
and, for the first time, state acceptance will include enterprises in the food-
processing industry and construction.
Whatever the gains from these moves, broadening state acceptance will
also have its costs. In economic terms, Moscow could face the added
burden of increased salaries for inspectors, longer work hours, higher scrap
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rates, and heightened requirements for equipment and better quality raw
materials. For Gorbachev, the price of expanding the quality control
program may come in the form of lower worker support and morale. Extra
demands on workers' time and pay cuts linked to rejected output may sour
them on the modernization effort and possibly on Gorbachev himself. The
chances for a rocky road for gospriyemka increase if current problems
worsen, the period of adjustment drags on, costs continue to climb, or
workers see little payoff on store shelves for their efforts.
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Scope Note This paper
does not attempt to address the implications the
new quality control program has for Soviet economic performance in the
long run. Seven months after the introduction of the program, it is still too
early to judge the lasting impact of the quality strictures. We have, instead,
catalogued the program's progress and setbacks, its supporters and critics,
and its potential effect on Gorbachev's political health and his economic
agenda. Our analysis and conclusions are primarily based on an extensive
reading of the Soviet central and regional press from January through June
1987.
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Contents
Page
Summary
iii
Scope Note
vii
Introduction
1
Mixed Results
1
Signs of Progress
3
Quality Awareness 4
Necessity?The Mother of Invention 4
Different Carrots and Sticks 4
Prodding Managers To Modernize 5
A New Role for Inspectors 5
Signs of Compromise 5
Not Out of the Woods 7
The Leadership Closes Ranks 9
Gorbachev 9
Other Leaders 10
Criticism From Reformers 11
Whither Gospriyemka? 12
Appendixes
A.
Leadership Statements on Gospriyemka 15
B.
Gospriyemka: A Content Analysis 21
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The Soviet Quality Control
Campaign: Limited Progress
But Disruptions Continue
Introduction
As part of General Secretary Gorbachev's call to raise
the quality of Soviet products to world-class levels by
the end of this century, the USSR formally instituted
a high-profile system of quality control in some 1,500
industrial enterprises in January 1987.' The new
program?known as gospriyemka (state accep-
tance)?puts a staff of inspectors, independent of the
enterprise, at individual plants to ensure Soviet prod-
ucts meet stringent quality standards. Its attention is
focused largely on the machine-building sector, al-
though a wide range of other products falls under the
program.
Press reports indicate the introduction of state accep-
tance sent a jolt through Soviet industry and sparked
worker protests. Industrial production in January and
February fell far short of plan goals, posting negative
rates of growth. A sharp dropoff in machinery output
accounted for much of the poor showing. Although
severe weather and transportation bottlenecks in Jan-
uary magnified production shortfalls,
blame on the high rejection rate of products by
gospriyemka inspectors.
Mixed results
At the moment it is hard for us, under the conditions
of state acceptance of output. But the people are
doing much to improve its quality.
M.S. Gorbachev in Czechoslovakia,
April 1987
'These enterprises represent only 3 percent of the total number of
Soviet industrial facilities, but because many are "flagship" fac-
tories, the program's coverage in reality is much wider. The Soviets
have indicated that one-fifth of all industrial production and 60
percent of civil machine-building output is subject to state accep-
tance.
1
Soviet industry is making a slow?and erratic?
recovery from the initial upheaval caused by gos-
priyemka at the start of the year, marking some
limited progress in Gorbachev's drive for better
goods.' Industrial production grew by 2.4 percent in
the second quarter of 1987, up from the dismal 0.6
percent increase posted in January-March. Yet, de-
spite this upturn, enterprises continue to be plagued
by a strong undercurrent of problems in meeting
quantity and quality targets.
March plan-fulfillment statistics showed an abrupt
rebound in industrial growth, led by a surge in the
production of computers, instruments, livestock and
feed equipment, and metal-cutting machine tools (see
figure 1). press reporting indicate this 25X1
improved performance was buoyed in large part by
secondary factors?better weather, longer work hours
(including unpaid Saturday and weekday overtime),
and quick fixes to the backlog of previous rejects?
which, however, masked continuing disruptions from
gospriyemka on the factory floor. Yet, despite these
weaknesses, Soviet officials claimed victories on the
quality front, citing a dramatic drop in rejection rates,
increased participation of workers and managers in
the quality control process, and better product
appearance.
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Soviet industry as a whole posted modest output
increases in April, but growth in production of goods
heavily covered by state acceptance?such as tractors,
automobiles, grain combines, and livestock and feed
equipment?declined or just matched last April's
Although Soviet and Western analysts traditionally evaluate
Soviet economic performance on Moscow's ability to meet plan
targets and sustain increases in production, these may not be the
most appropriate measures of success at a time the Soviets have
embarked on a massive modernization program. Soviet leaders may
have begun to put more emphasis on quality improvements and
structural changes and less on quantitative gains.
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Figure 1
USSR: Selected Industries Under Gospriyemka, 1987.
Percent change
Machine Tools Tractors
10 10
5
-5
-10
5
-5
-10
-15 -15
-20 -20
Electric Motors Automobiles
10
10
5
5
-5
-5
-10
-10
-15 -15
-20 -20
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun
a Calculated from monthly production in physical units,
(except for machine tools which are reported in rubles),
1987 compared with the same month in 1986.
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313786 8.87
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Table 1
Factors Behind Selected Improvements in
Soviet Industrial Performance
Increased output
? Better weather.
? Improved raw materials
supplies.
? Quick fixes to previously
rejected output; average
backlog of 10 to 20 per-
cent of total production
for January-February
available for repair.
? Overtime, unpaid Satur-
day work.
? Disruptions ease from new
economic measures (indus-
trial experiment and self-
financing program).
Fewer rejects
? Deviation from estab-
lished procedures.
? Relaxation of quality con-
trol standards; inspectors
threatened or bribed.
? "Temporary" concessions
and exemptions made be-
cause of extenuating cir-
cumstances (obsolete
equipment and substan-
dard materials, for
example).
? Greater availability of di-
agnostic and measuring
devices for production; im-
proved documentation.
? Switch to more modern
processing methods.
? Increased cooperation be-
tween designers and pro-
duction personnel.
rates. Moreover, output of refrigerators, television
sets, and washing machines?other targets of the
quality control campaign?failed to meet plan goals
by a wide margin.
April's slowdown reflected a breather from the end-
of-quarter rush to meet physical output goals as well
as efforts by enterprises to address reemerging?and
more noticeable?problems with product quality.
The sluggish rebound in Soviet economic performance
continued in May and June, and, by the half-year
mark, growth in overall industrial production was up
1.5 percent compared with the same period last year.
The Soviets reported a 20-percent decline in product
rejections in the second quarter of the year compared
with January to March results. Pockets of improve-
ment were visible in machine building, but the sector
3
still has not caught up with growth argets for the
year.' Candid comments by senior officials in quality
control organs suggest this upturn reflected an easing
of state acceptance strictures rather than an increase
in output of higher quality products.
Signs of Progress
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In past years everyone understood that quality was
an important component of production, but in prac-
tice the attitude taken toward it was as though it was
an annoying hindrance on the path to the achievement
of the largest gross indicators. It was difficult to
expect another attitude from the economic manager
as a result of failing to fulfill the plan, he could be
removed from his assignment but for failing to keep
the quality high, he could at worst be reproved.
A Soviet economic correspondent
In a kind of "shock therapy" the introduction of state
acceptance left the 1,500 industrial enterprises with
little choice but to confront quality problems. Press
accounts indicate Moscow's tactics have paid off in
some measure with enterprises building momentum
since March in raising the quality of Soviet goods (see
table 1). These gains?often in improved physical
appearance rather than in other aspects of better
product quality?were generated by natural learning-
curve effects and short-term fixes. Fixes included
measures to increase quality awareness on the factory
floor, the introduction of quality-oriented worker in-
centives, the infusion of simple diagnostic and mea- 25X1
suring equipment, and the use of inspectors as
troubleshooters. 25X1
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' Improvements in machinery production, however, should be inter-
preted with caution. Disguised inflation and padding of ruble-
valued statistics have traditionally biased upward the performance
of the machine-building sector, prompting Western economists to
create synthetic indexes to measure growth more accurately.
Current pressures to raise quantity and quality simultaneously may
have led to an increase in the upward bias of these value indicators.
Consulate reporting, for example, indicates an improbable 11-
percent rebound in May industrial performance compared with last
May's performance for the Leningrad Oblast?a critical machine-
building region.
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In a few instances Soviet enterprises have initiated
longer term steps to correct product flaws by install-
ing more modern equipment and upgrading design
specifications?steps that fall into line with Gorba-
chev's overall modernization strategy. Nevertheless,
Nikolay Ryzhkov, Chairman of the Council of Minis-
ters, stated in June that the "replacement of fixed
capital is proceeding at only half the necessary
speed."
Quality Awareness
Gospriyemka, at the very least, has called plant
officials' attention to quality requirements and spot-
lighted deficiencies.
Soviet use of
product standards was abysmal before the introduc-
tion of state acceptance: "Technical documentation
for certain products was literally buried in dust. It had
not been touched in 10 years."
Because of this past record of neglect, increased
awareness of quality standards and the presence of
hardnosed state inspectors have by themselves spurred
a sizable boost in quality:
? From a plant in
dent reported in March that "it is no longer just the
shop chief and his deputies that consult the stan-
*dards and other technical documentation. Ordinary
workers are now referring to them more and more
frequently and checking their work against them."
Kazakhstan an economic correspon-
Necessity?The Mother of Invention
On the advent of state acceptance, inadequate prepa-
ration left both factory workers and inspectors lacking
even simple diagnostic and measuring instruments to
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test product quality. Seeing little hope of outside
assistance in the near term, enterprises took matters
into their own hands. Soviet press accounts indicate
that numerous facilities have manufactured their own
rudimentary testing equipment, while others have
created a shadow supply network to acquire
instruments:
? A nonferrous metallurgical complex in Siberia
equipped its own furnaces with control and measur-
ing instruments so that ore would not be smelted by
"guesswork" any longer.
? A tractor plant in the Ukraine?which had fallen
far short of its production targets in January and
February because of state acceptance?commis-
sioned its engineers to produce measuring equip-
ment in March.
? In Rostov, production facilities turned to local aca-
demic and research organizations to obtain simple
measurement and control devices.
? In April a machine-tool plant near Moscow man-
aged to get calibration instruments and welding
attachments from other enterprises in the region.
Different Carrots and Sticks
Moscow's initial tool to spur quality improvements
was the threatened withholding of bonuses?which
constitute a substantial portion of earnings for plant
managers and workers alike?when products are re-
jected for not meeting standards. Statements in the
Soviet press indicate that local officials, however, are
taking steps to introduce alternative incentives to shift
worker attention to quality rather than quantity goals:
? At a few light-industry plants in Central Asia,
production shops with a stipulated number of repeat
rejects now lose all of their bonuses, even if physical
output goals are achieved.
? Prorated bonuses have been instituted at the Lyu-
bertsiy machine-tool plant near Moscow. The rate is
dependent on whether output passes inspection on
the first, second, or third try.
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? Contests were held at a Voronezh machine-building
plant throughout March and April to correct defec-
tive output. Winners were awarded monetary bo-
nuses, travel packages, or coupons that allowed
them to bypass the waiting list to acquire a private
automobile.
Prodding Managers To Modernize
The above measures are designed to deal with devi-
ations from standards that are primarily the fault of
the production worker. An article in a recent issue of
a Communist party journal, Partiynaya zhizn',
however, notes that only "20 percent of all quality
problems are the fault of workers and the remaining
80 percent are a result of mistakes by management in
the area of the organization of production and quality
control." Management is responsible for making
decisions on design specifications, updating machin-
ery, and altering production processes. In the past,
managers had no motivation to retool or upgrade
technology because the downtime necessary to carry
out these tasks prevented fulfillment of short-run
physical output targets.
We have mixed signals on whether the 1,500 plant
managers are more likely to reequip and renovate
their plants now that many of them cannot meet plan
targets because of the stricter quality requirements.
We have seen indications that managers are running
existing equipment harder to increase output. But the
Soviet press has reported that some enterprise officials
have chosen?under pressure?to modernize and ren-
ovate to meet higher quality standards:
? Before the introduction of gospriyemka, a Moscow
machine-building plant used three technological
processes?grinding, milling, and plastic molding?
to manufacture drills. The introduction of state
acceptance prompted the addition of a fourth, more
advanced, technology that improved the finishing of
the drills.
'Consultants to US companies trying to raise product quality to
remain competitive with Japan cite similar findings. They note that
in the United States no more than 20 percent of quality defects can
be traced to the production line; managers cause the other 80
percent during the design phase or by purchasing poor-quality parts
and materials
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? Tired of cleaning welding equipment on unpaid
overtime to satisfy state acceptance standards, a
worker at an unidentified machine-tool plant de-
signed and built a new type of spray deflector.
? A Kazakh instruments plant accelerated its retool-
ing efforts, bringing on stream computer-controlled
machine tools, robots, and other specialized equip-
ment in response to state acceptance.
? Under the gun to make up production shortfalls
spawned by gospriyemka, the Voronezh ball bearing
plant introduced more advanced?and error-free?
production technologies.
A New Role for Inspectors
At some of the plants under gospriyemka, the role of
the state inspector has been expanded to that of
troubleshooter. This practice probably began at the
plant level when frustrated managers and workers
wanted to know why their output did not pass inspec-
tion and what they needed to do to make the neces-
sary improvements. This position also fills a gap in the
management of enterprises where there is poor coordi-
nation between production shops. The expanded role
of the state inspector appears to be officially sanc-
tioned. A recent article in Pravda stated:
The fact that gospriyemka does not give a "good
mark" to poor-quality products leaving an en-
terprise is just one of its concerns and not even
the most important one. Its main task is to
establish where flaws and defects actually origi-
nate. And not only find the weak link in the
chain, but give advice as to how this link should
be strengthened and draw on the plant's re-
sources for this purpose.
Signs of Compromise
No matter how strict the state quality control bodies
are eventually they will have to adapt themselves to
the existing conditions and possibilities in enterprises.
Worker's reaction to the
introduction of state acceptance
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Accompanying the signs of gospriyemka's success are
more subtle indications that the program has suffered
setbacks. Recent Soviet press report-
ing reveal that embattled managers and workers are
increasingly finding ways to bypass state acceptance
controls. Whether Moscow has made a conscious
decision to ease up quietly on its demands for quality
or whether opponents of state acceptance have forced
adjustments in the system is unclear. But whatever
the cause, a growing body of evidence points to a de
facto compromise on gospriyemka's initial hardline
stance.
Perhaps the strongest signal of gospriyemka's weak-
ening authority is the rise in successful "end runs"
around the new quality control apparatus?a pattern
confirmed by top Soviet leaders and local officials
alike. Not only are offenders going unpunished, ac-
cording to Soviet claims, but also diversions appear to
be becoming more blatant:
? Beginning in March, after a disastrous first two
months under state acceptance, quality checks at an
unspecified enterprise were delayed until dark so
defects were less noticeable.
? In Latvia, bicycles and mopeds that had not passed
March inspections were sent back to shop workers,
allegedly for repair. Instead, the rejected products
were shipped directly to retailers and included in
first-quarter production records.
? In March specifications at a Ukrainian machine-
tool factory were hidden so quality checks could not
be conducted.
? Throughout March and April, one resourceful di-
rector at a machine-building plant "recycled" previ-
ously issued state acceptance stamps, attaching
them to rejected consignments of goods.
At present, criminal liability exists for managers who allow "poor-
quality or nonconforming" products to be issued repeatedly or on a
large scale, however, there
are no laws that provide for the situation where managers circum-
vent inspections. A new law on product quality, scheduled to be
drafted this year, may address the problem.
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In Gospriyemka We Trust?
Has the introduction of state acceptance guaranteed
the quality of products? The following consumer
complaint suggests the answer is no.
As a surprise for her husband and son, Moscow
resident N. Kalashnikova decided to buy a color
television set. She had no doubts about what brand to
choose?the Rekord VTS-311 made by the Voronezh
Elektrosignal plant.
"When we unpacked the television at home and put it
on the table," N. A. Kalashnikova notes, "it began to
rock like a baby in a cradle. It turned out that its legs
were of different shapes and lengths. We used things
around the apartment to give it stability and then
turned it on. After exactly an hour and a half the
screen went blank. We couldn't revive it ourselves."
Searching for some solution, Mrs. Kalisnikova emp-
tied the box in which the set had come. "I looked
more carefully at the television's registration certifi-
cate, where next to the mark of the department of
technical control was the stamp 'State Inspection
No. 95.' The set had passed an extra inspection, so
the quality is guaranteed, I thought. I saved money
for three years for this purchase; I wanted to give my
family a nice surprise but as a result I got grief and
extra trouble."
Adapted from a 22 March Pravda article.
? During April, in at least four factories, enterprise
managers called workers back on the plant floor
after inspectors had quit for the day. Output pro-
duced during off-hours was immediately delivered
to customers and counted as part of the month's
plan fulfillment.
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? Three Ukrainian metallurgical combines shipped
"tens of thousands of metric tons of substandard
products" from January to May without first sub-
mitting them to state acceptance.
Veiled accusations in the Soviet press indicate that
inspectors selectively relaxed standards?most nota-
bly in March?to allow threatened enterprises to meet
plan-fulfillment targets. Although Moscow may have
tacitly sanctioned such tactics, circumstantial evi-
dence suggests that state inspectors in some cases
bowed to the barrage of pressure levied by workers
and managers. Soviet press reports that inspectors
have been removed because of "poor moral stan-
dards" indicate that bribes are being offered and
accepted. Continued consumer complaints about the
shoddiness of inspected products confirm this trend:
? An audit of March production at Tashkent textile
machine-building enterprises revealed that state ac-
ceptance staffers turned a blind eye to obviously
substandard equipment.
? One plant played "chicken" at the end of March,
sending back the same defective industrial scales to
an inspector four times in one day. The worndown
inspector finally passed the still-flawed items.
? An April lzvestiya editorial notes that "gos-
priyemka representatives now lack boldness; they
are letting defective products through."
A further sign of compromise is the growth in "tem-
porary" exemptions from gospriyemka. Although
granted to make the system more equitable to enter-
prises saddled with antiquated equipment or with
poor-quality supplies from plants outside the state
acceptance system, Soviet press statements suggest
that concessions are undermining the program:
? Because of a "pileup of problems," in March a
Kazakh instrument plant obtained a five-month
reprieve from the new quality control strictures.
? The Vitebsk television factory convinced its state
acceptance staff to limit formally, beginning in
March, the number and types of defects flagged in
inspections.
? Senior officials in Lithuania cut a deal with the
State Committee for Standards (Gosstandart) in
April to allow "deviations" in the production of
bicycles and motorcycles.
7
? A problem-laden shop was allowed to secede from
its mother enterprise late this spring and operate as
an "independent" organization outside of state ac-
ceptance to avoid further disruptions from the new
quality control system.
? As of early June, more than 40 "temporary"
changes in technical documentation have been
granted to a Moscow area instrument plant since
the beginning of the year, which in effect allow
workers to continue producing substandard goods.
Not Out of the Woods
Although major disruptions to industrial performance
appear to have eased, Moscow still faces a daunting
array of other problems created or exacerbated by the
state acceptance system.
The year's poor start?especially for the critical ma-
chine-building sector?throws off balance Gorba-
chev's tightly scheduled modernization program. Pro-
duction shortfalls press on the jugular of the Soviet
leader's strategy by slowing the flow of new machin-
ery?necessary to renovate and retool the USSR's
antiquated industrial base?and disrupting invest-
ment timetables. Growth in output of a wide range of
products remains well below planned levels for the
year (see table 2). Any push to put industry back on
track for 1987 may cause quality to slip or threaten
other programs on Gorbachev's economic agenda and
could put the leadership in the unpalatable position of
rationing important machinery resources.
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open sources suggest that worker
dissatisfaction with gospriyemka continues and in a
few instances has bubbled to the surface. Soviet
officials report increased complaints about unpaid
overtime for corrective work and persisting conflicts
between inspectors and plant employees. Recent state-
ments in the Soviet press indicate, moreover, that
there have been at least five cases of work stoppage
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Table 2
USSR: Production of Selected Industrial Products
1986
1987
Plan
1987
Plan
Growth
(percent)
Jan-Jun 1987
Actual
Growth
(percent)
Crude steel (million tons)
161
161
0
0.3
Rolled steel products (million tons)
112
113
0.9
1.1
Steel pipe (million tons)
19.8
20.3
2.5
3.1
Mineral fertilizers (million tons) a
34.7
36.2
4.3
3.4
Pesticides (million tons) b
332
346
4.2
-0.7
Sulfuric acid (million tons)
27.9
28.9
3.6
3.6
Caustic soda (thousand tons)
3,229
3,372
4.4
0.5
Chemical fibers (thousand tons)
1,480
1,578
6.6
2.6
Plastics (thousand tons)
5,344
5,689
6.5
2.0
Motor vehicle tires (millions)
66
68
3.0
1.5
Commercial timber (million cubic meters)
295
300
1.7
-0.1
Paper (thousand tons)
6,156
6,435
4.5
3.5
Cement (million tons)
135
136
0.7
1.5
Turbines (million kilowatts)
21.9
28.6
30.6
15.0
Turbine-generators (million kilowatts)
14.9
18.7
25.5
-22.0
AC electric motors (million kilowatts)
55.7
59.3
6.5
-2.9
Metal-cutting machine tools (million 1982 rubles)
2,911
2,995
2.9
-1.3
Forging and pressing machines (million 1982 rubles)
693
802
15.7
-6.5
Industrial robots (thousands)
15.3
17.4
13.7
-3.0
Instruments and automation equipment
(billion 1982 rubles)
4.8
5.1
6.2
3.0
Computer equipment (billion 1982 rubles)
4.8
5.2
8.3
7.0
Oil equipment (million 1982 rubles)
247
278
12.6
-3.1
Chemical equipment (million 1982 rubles)
966
1,107
14.6
-6.6
Tractors (million horsepower)
54.5
55.6
2.0
-5.5
Excavators (thousands)
42.9
43.4
1.2
-6.9
Grain combines (thousands)
112
102
-8.9
-16.0
Radio receivers (thousands)
8,925
8,980
0.6
-10.0
Television sets (thousands)
9,436
9,827
4.1
-10.0
Refrigerators and freezers (thousands)
5,948
6,190
4.1
-2.0
Washing machines (thousands)
5,384
6,066
12.7
5.0
Automobiles (thousands)
1,326
1,329
0.2
0.3
Textiles (billion square meters)
12.3
12.7
3.3
3.0
Knitwear (million pieces)
1,776
1,844
3.8
3.2
Footwear (million pairs)
801
816
1.9
1.0
a In terms of 100-percent nutrient equivalent.
b In terms of 100-percent active ingredient.
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and that, on at least two occasions, workers left their
jobs temporarily because of the tough new quality
standards:
? An open letter from the head of a workers' brigade
to the Minister of Chemical and Petroleum Ma-
chine Building notes, "The introduction of gos-
priyemka has been a blow to our earnings?the
average dropped by 30 percent. Twenty people
retired in January and February and a few dozen
applied to work elsewhere. . . . It can only mean they
were under real strain . .
? In March employees at a Kazakh instruments plant
refused to work after none of the truck scales they
produced passed inspection. They did not believe
that the gospriyemka inspectors were being fair.
? An article in the military's daily newspaper reported
that some workers at a television plant decided to
"retire" during the "difficult times" after the intro-
duction of the new quality control system. The
article also notes that some of the "deserters" are
returning.
? Party secretary Anatoly Dobrynin recently revealed
to an Embassy official that the party's best political
officers were sent to problem enterprises to "edu-
cate" increasin ly dissatisfied workers and to avert
strikes.
Probably the most fundamental problem is the lack of
adequate quality control at plants providing raw and
intermediate materials to factories under the state
acceptance system. Many plants have yet to work out
longstanding problems in receiving timely deliveries of
high-quality components and materials. Although
Gorbachev maintains that gospriyemka can be used
as a tool to solve problems with suppliers, the experi-
ence of its first six months shows that the system has,
for the most part, exacerbated these difficulties. We
have noted a few isolated incidents where plants under
gospriyemka have been able to make arrangements
9
with other enterprises to receive priority for better
quality supplies. To enforce this, state acceptance
personnel have begun to inspect and reject incoming
goods?emulating a function performed by military
representatives at defense plants.
If input control becomes widespread among plants
currently under gospriyemka, or if gospriyemka is
actually introduced to a larger number of supplying
plants, a limited but somewhat more effective system
could emerge for the civilian sector. Enterprises under
state acceptance would receive better supplies, utilize
outside inspectors that exercise quality control over
both output and input, and thus be able to produce
higher quality goods. Such an arrangement, if suc-
cessful, could create pockets of quality that may be
enough to improve customer satisfaction and meet the
goals of the leadership for the next few years. Howev-
er, such gains could be overshadowed if Soviet suppli-
ers merely foist shoddy goods on enterprises outside
the state acceptance system's jurisdiction.
The Leadership Closes Ranks
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Judging from public statements, gospriyemka has
strong leadership backing, particularly among those
with major economic responsibilities (see appendix A).
The leadership has forcefully asserted that, although
the introduction of state acceptance was a harsh
measure, the quality problem had reached a point
where emergency steps were required. The degree of
disruption to industry may have come as a surprise,
but Gorbachev and probably other officials responsi-
ble for industry expected some upheaval. Even after 25X1
six months of comparatively poor economic perfor-
mance, the leadership has focused its criticism on the
enterprises' poor preparation for gospriyemka rather
than on the program itself. We believe it is unlikely
that the program will be openly rescinded, unless
other political factors come into play.
Gorbachev
The strongest supporter of gospriyemka in the leader-
ship has been Gorbachev himself. He moved forceful-
ly to back the system in his opening address at the
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Central Committee meeting in November 1986, as-
sembled to discuss preparations for the program's
introduction. Since then he has extolled, on numerous
occasions, the virtues of the new quality control
system. He has taken little solace in last year's
economic improvements, believing that the good re-
sults?in terms of plan fulfillment in 1986?masked
the fact that plants were not "restructuring" and
quality improvements were not being made.
In public statements, Gorbachev has indicated that
long-term improvements on the quality front will not
be made by state acceptance alone, but will require
solving endemic problems that for the last decade
have prevented the economy from simultaneously
sustaining growth and quality gains. At the June
Central Committee plenum, Gorbachev repeatedly
emphasized that the absence of competition among
enterprises and the dearth of economic incentives for
workers have created the USSR's quality problem. He
indicated that his comprehensive reform program?to
be in place by the beginning of the 13th Five-Year
Plan in 1991?is designed to solve it. In the interim,
he views gospriyemka as the kind of shock therapy
that will not only make people work harder, but will
also force the participating enterprises to introduce
new technologies, replace outdated machinery, raise
the technical level of products, and work out supply
problems.
Gorbachev must recognize that there are both politi-
cal and economic risks in applying this shock therapy
to industry. He is supporting a program that has
interrupted the growth momentum generated in 1986.
If poor performance continues for the remainder of
1987, it might provide ammunition for Gorbachev's
opponents, who could contrast 1987 performance with
1986 results as evidence of a misguided policy. Gorba-
chev is also risking his support among workers who
are unhappy with wage cuts and demands for higher
productivity. Combined with his other policies aimed
at improving efficiency, Gorbachev's quality control
program is threatening the social contract (whereby
workers are guaranteed employment and a base
salary)?a move that could raise the hackles of ideo-
logical conservatives who fear that this could under-
mine the basis for labor quiescence.
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Gorbachev, nevertheless, is at least publicly express-
ing confidence that workers are behind him. During
his visit to Prague in April, he told his Czechoslovak
audience that Soviet workers fully supported gos-
priyemka and were not complaining, even though
some of them had lost 20 to 30 percent of their wages
under it. Moreover, he has criticized unnamed offi-
cials who have been "scaring themselves and others
with possible complications, conflict situations, and
even stoppages of factories."
Other Leaders
Thus far, other Politburo members with economic
responsibilities, especially party secretary Lev Zay-
kov, who oversees the defense industry and general
economics, and Council of Ministers Chairman Niko-
lay Ryzhkov, have voiced strong support for gos-
priyemka and have placed it on regional leaders'
agendas by devoting attention to it during trips to
various republics. At the Supreme Soviet session
following the June plenum, Ryzhkov characterized
state acceptance as a decisive and drastic measure
that was "exceptionally necessary for the whole of
society and for each and every Soviet person." Niko-
lay Slyun'kov, newly elected Politburo member and
head of the Central Committee economic department,
focused considerable attention on quality control
problems when he served as first secretary of the
Belorussian party, and he is likely to support forceful
measures in his new position.
A few leaders appear to have adopted the role of point
men for gospriyemka, railing against bureaucratic
obstacles and lower level resistance to the program.
Zaykov has spoken of "overt and covert opponents"
who believe everything will return to the old footing
after a few months. According to him, these oppo-
nents consist of many economic leaders, including
ministers as well as regional party and government
officials. He called on local party organs to police the
implementation of state acceptance to prevent these
officials from evading it. During a visit to the Ukraine
in May, party secretary Vladimir Dolgikh, who super-
vises heavy industry and the energy sector, character-
ized the situation there as the worst among the
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republics in terms of putting gospriyemka into prac-
tice. He did not blame anyone in particular, but said
that the problem was with factory managers who
found ways to bypass the inspections.6 Given Zaykov's
and Dolgikh's overall support for quality control
measures, we believe these statements reflect a recog-
nition that additional steps will have to be taken to
combat circumvention of the quality control system
rather than an inclination on their part to ease the
transition.
Although there has been no overt criticism of gos-
priyemka by senior leaders, statements that empha-
size the importance of fulfilling plans with little praise
for state acceptance could indicate weak support. In a
recent speech in Tblisi, "Second Secretary" Yegor
Ligachev stated that the increasing of economic
growth rates was the essence of the strategy of
acceleration.' Other leaders have defined acceleration
to include not only growth rates, but also quality
improvements and structural changes in the economy.
Criticism From Reformers
Gorbachev may face the strongest pressure to aban-
don or compromise on state acceptance from those
who compose a large segment of his political sup-
port?the proponents of radical economic reform.
Thus far, the most severe public criticism of gos-
priyemka has come from academics and journalists in
this group. They believe that the solution to the
quality problem is not a state-administered system,
but the introduction of market forces that give weight
to consumer judgment of quality:
'Regional leaders held meetings on preparations for state accep-
tance shortly after the 14 November 1986 Central Committee
meeting. At that time, Ukrainian First Secretary Vladimir Shcher-
bitskiy noted that a number of enterprises were searching for
loopholes to evade gospriyemka. He called on the Ukrainian
Council of Ministers, the State Planning Committee, and Gosstan-
dart to put things in order. We do not know whether Shcherbitskiy
closed his eyes to subsequent violations or was not in a position to
stop them.
' Initially, gospriyemka probably benefited from the backing of
more conservative leaders who favor administrative, rather than
economic, solutions to problems. This is the same group, however,
that gives the highest priority to increased production growth.
Disruptions that have occurred under state acceptance may have
dampened their enthusiasm for the program.
11
? At an unpublished lecture to the Leningrad Writer's
Club in December, an economics editor called state
acceptance another bureaucratic impediment to
market forces and an example of the kind of
mistakes that are still being made.
? An economic correspondent stated at a public lec-
ture in March that the best control over production
is the purchaser himself. He opposed gospriyemka
as "the greatest retreat from restructuring to date," 25X1
a statement that the crowd applauded.
? Two academics writing in the Leningrad press in
late March complained that the introduction of
gospriyemka did not improve quality as much as it
had generated additional expenses, lengthened the
production cycle, and increased the amount of un-
finished production. They argued that quality could
be improved only by using economic levers.
? At a public Moscow lecture in April, the crowd
interjected comments during the question-and-
answer period to the effect that state acceptance
meant only more bureaucrats?what was really
needed was a market.
Other officials, academics, and citizens writing to the
press appear reconciled to state acceptance only as a
temporary emergency measure that is required until
market incentives can be introduced into the econo-
my. In a controversial article published in Novyy mir
in April, Nikolay Shmelev called gospriyemka "a
good thing as a first, emergency measure, as a
palliative, but it is not an Archimedean lever." He
then went on to advocate market mechanisms as the
solution to a host of Soviet economic problems.
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When Gosstandart Chairman Georgiy Kolmogorov
was asked in an interview if gospriyemka was a
temporary measure, he replied that it should be
considered a long-term measure. Later in the inter-
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regulated largely by the market, but that state accep-
tance would still be required in those industries
operating under monopoly conditions where the con-
sumer had no choice.
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Gorbachev's moves toward more radical reform at the
June plenum may persuade state acceptance critics
that the regime is making strides toward the kind of
market-oriented system they want. Indeed, their criti-
cism may have helped push the leadership toward the
kinds of measures adopted at the plenum. Neverthe-
less, Gorbachev shows no indication that he is prepar-
ing to abandon or even modify gospriyemka for now,
and his continued reliance on the program could
eventually alienate an important political
constituency.
Whither Gospriyemka?
Gorbachev and fellow supporters of gospriyemka face
conflicting pressures from those concerned with any
change that threatens plan fulfillment and from those
pushing for more radical changes that incorporate
market mechanisms. The poor showing in economic
performance and hard-to-measure quality improve-
ments make it difficult for advocates to argue that the
benefits have been worth the cost. Moreover, even
proponents of state acceptance acknowledge, and
press reports confirm, that problems and associated
costs of the program have been much greater than
expected because of inadequate preparation for its
introduction
The adjustment period also has been much longer
than expected. Statements by the leadership indicate
they were prepared for a transition period of two to
three months?not the four to seven months that
enterprises experimenting with gospriyemka took in
1986 to turn things around. We believe that it may
take enterprises that introduced state acceptance in
January 1987 even longer to bring production levels
up to plan targets, given the depth and range of
problems that have been reported.
The long transition period clearly demonstrates the
problem in trying to make quantity and quality strides
simultaneously. The leadership may realize the con-
tradictory nature of these two goals and decide to
lower plan target growth rates for next year, hoping
enterprises concentrate on quality improvements. In
recent months, several prominent Soviet officials have
hinted that such an adjustment in thinking about
growth is under way:
Secret
? In March, Zaykov stated that in the machine-
building complex, "growth is not the most important
thing" and the present policy is designed to achieve
qualitative modernization.
? In April, Leonid Abalkin, head of the Soviet Acade-
my of Sciences Institute of Economics and frequent
adviser to the leadership, noted that it is entirely
wrong to identify the program of acceleration with
growth rates of industrial production, because the
growth rates do not reflect structural or qualitative
changes.
Gorbachev himself has hinted he may favor such a
change in emphasis. At a get-together with media
chiefs in February, he expressed concern that by
concentrating on measures of growth "we lose sight of
more important processes." He criticized the empha-
sis on output statistics because they do not reflect
progress being made in improving quality.
A change in strategy that lowers planned growth rates
to concentrate on quality issues would ease the burden
on plants trying to do both. Such a move, however,
would probably meet opposition from those in the
leadership who would object on economic and ideolog-
ical grounds or those who are concerned with the
negative impression this may give to domestic and
foreign observers. More important, it could throw into
disarray Gorbachev's tightly wound modernization
campaign, which depends on a carefully orchestrated
schedule of quantitative deliveries of producer dura-
bles and machinery components to downstream
plants.
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The issue could be on the agenda at the June 1988
party conference, which, among other things, is sup-
posed to examine the progress of the current five-year
plan. But any dramatic shift in approach to quantita-
tive growth targets is more likely to come in the next
five-year plan, when the USSR is scheduled to imple-
ment the comprehensive economic reform program
approved at the June plenum. For now, as Gorbachev
asserted at the plenum, "no one is releasing" the
USSR from meeting the goals of the current five-year
plan.
Prospects for state acceptance appear somewhat
favorable in the near term, with Moscow taking steps
to consolidate gains already achieved. In early June,
Gosstandart Chairman Kolmogorov announced that
another 50 enterprises will be added to the program
later this year. His words are ambiguous as to wheth-
er or not these are plants that supply enterprises now
operating under state acceptance. Kolmogorov said
that there is no need for the quality control system to
include "absolutely everyone" and foresees an expan-
sion to undefined "problem areas." In his view,
supplier plants will inevitably come under the influ-
ence of gospriyemka, when they are obligated to
comply with its requirements.
At the same time, senior Soviet officials seem to be
laying the groundwork for a broader expansion of the
system next year. In a June speech in Azerbaijan,
secretary for light industry Aleksandra Biryukova
stated that gospriyemka will be "significantly" ex-
tended in 1988, confirming earlier rumors of expan-
sion by senior economic adviser Abel Aganbegyan.
More recent TASS reports indicate that an additional
727 enterprises will adopt state acceptance procedures
in January 1988, bringing the total number of civilian
factories or production associations subject to the new
quality control standards to nearly 2,300.
suppliers to plants alrea ? y covered
in the program will make up nearly half of the new
participants and that, for the first time, state accep-
tance will include enterprises in the food-processing
industry and organizations in the construction sector.
Such moves suggest Moscow is encouraged by signs
that major disruptions are easing and considers re-
maining problems to be manageable.
13
Broadening a system to improve quality?whether in
a centrally planned or market economy?will raise
the costs of production. These costs include the sala-
ries of inspectors, increased work hours, higher scrap
rates associated with higher rejection rates, new
equipment, and increased costs of using higher quality
inputs.' For Gorbachev, widening the quality control
program will be costly in terms of worker support and
morale. Extra demands on workers' time and lower
pay may sour workers on the reconstruction effort and
possibly on Gorbachev himself. This will be especially
true if problems cannot be worked out, the transition
period drags on, costs continue to climb, or there is
little to show for the effort in terms of higher quality
consumer goods. Given the mixed results of gos-
priyemka so far, it appears that a situation is being set
up for greater confrontation in the future
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Gorbachev, however, may be able to shift the political 25X1
fallout to others. At the June plenum, he blamed the
Chairman of the State Planning Committee, Nikolay
Talyzin, and the head of the State Committee for
Material and Technical Supply, Lev Voronin, for the
disruptions that occurred in the first months of the
year. This criticism is particularly significant, given
that these officials were appointed by the Soviet
leader himself. Gorbachev appears to be more willing
to blame economic problems on the officials he ap-
pointed rather than criticize one of his pet programs.
He may also use gospriyemka failures as a vehicle to
weed out lower level officials who are not supporting
his other programs.
Gospriyemka is still in its shakedown period, and its
lasting impact on economic performance and the
satisfaction of the USSR's consumers remains very
much an open question. Although Moscow at present
appears cautiously optimistic, it is aware that fertile
ground for problems continues to exist and opponents
of the program are not without influence.
? A recent study of US industry indicates that the typical factory
invests 20 to 25 percent of its operating budget in finding and fixing
mistakes. This figure rises to over 30 percent when the expense of
repairing or replacing flawed products that slip out of the factory
and into the market is included
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Gospriyemka's long-term fate will depend heavily on
the course of events during the next six months.
Discerning the program's true progress will, however,
be difficult and can probably be measured only in
terms of subtle policy shifts. Indications of such
change in the near term may include:
? Signals that marginal improvements in quality?
that prolong the service life of new machinery and
spur increased worker effort on the job, for exam-
ple?may be enough to satisfy the Soviet regime's
needs.
? The introduction of a differentiation in inspection
standards for producer durables versus consumer
durables.
? Increased emphasis on quantitative output targets
or statements that emphasize the importance of
fulfilling plans with little praise for state
acceptance.
Secret
? Provisions in the new law on product quality that
penalize managers who circumvent inspections.
? Increased number of plants organizing inspections
of incoming goods.
? Signs that consumers have noticed an improvement
in the quality of goods.
? An increasing number of reports that products are
being exempted from state acceptance.
? More or less attention to gospriyemka in the press.
? Criticism of state inspectors for being too
demanding.
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General Secretary
Gorbachev
Appendix A
Leadership Statements on Gospriyemka
At the January plenum:
Many collectives have prepared well for work under state quality
control . . . but there are also those who failed to match the high
requirements. Instead of rolling up their sleeves and getting down to
improving quality, they began scaring themselves and others with
possible complications, conflict situations, and even stoppages of
factories.
In Riga in February:
We started conducting the restructuring policy. . . and it has started
to affect everybody. . . . How does it affect the worker? Well, it is
state acceptance. . . it makes us do everything differently at the
factory workplace. . . so everything has to be changed and that stirs
people up. . . keeps restructuring on the move.
In Prague in April:
At the moment it is hard for us, under the conditions of state
acceptance of output. But the people are doing much to improve its
quality. And they are not complaining. Although at some plants they
have lost 20 to 30 percent of their wages. But the worker's mood is
you should not get paid for poor-quality output.
In the first quarter of the year, when we introduced state acceptance,
when we introduced financial autonomy and the new machinery,
things were difficult. Especially state acceptance. It became clear all
at once that where they are accustomed to a last-minute rush, where
they do half the month's plan in the last 10 days, it is bad, everything
is bad. State acceptance made us change everything. Supply and
organization. So things are not easy for us at the moment. But it is
nice that the working class supports it. It cannot be any other
way. . . .
In speech in April:
As you are no doubt aware, state acceptance of output has been
introduced in our country in order to put up a reliable barrier for bad
work and violations of technical procedures. We value highly the fact
that these large-scale measures which concern the interests of
millions of people have met the active support of the working class
and all the working people of our country.
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Senior Party
Secretary Ligachev
Premier Ryzhkov
At June plenum:
Society cannot be led by its own selfish interests and actions. These
must be resolutely combated. Here, too, a worthy example is shown
by the working class and labor collectives, particularly at those
enterprises where state acceptance has been introduced. As is well
known, this is not a simple matter, it concerns the interest of
millions. Nonetheless, the working class has clearly defined its
position: state acceptance is necessary, it is needed by all society, the
entire people, and each individual.
At party and government conference in Tbilisi:
Serious failures were allowed to occur in industry's work at the
beginning of this year. The main cause of this is the inadequate
preparaton of ministries and departments, associations, and enter-
prises for transition to the new conditions of economic management.
The symptoms of the old disease have developed again; everyone was
ready for restructuring in words, but the rates of output declined as
soon as they really encountered state acceptance and the demands of
100-percent performance on contract deliveries.
At Sverdlovsk workers meeting in March:
The improvement of the quality of output is perhaps one of the most
acute problems, the speaker noted. An uncompromising struggle for
high quality has been launched in the country. Everyone has long
been convinced that the quality situation has reached the limit. . . . I
would say we have embarked on quite stringent measures in this
matter. Only thus is it possible to step up all work on the improve-
ment of the technical standard and quality of output, that is to
resolve the questions of the economy's further growth.. . .
In conversation with Sverdlovsk worker:
Have you felt state acceptance? Things are stricter. . . . We do need
it, you know. Everyone is fed up with this quality of production. You
know the way it goes, one day we make poor-quality things and the
next day we go to the shop and make a noise about poor quality
. . . . How can we go on like that? And the fact that now state
acceptance has been introduced, well, I think at first it will be hard,
of course, but then everyone will get used to working properly.
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Senior Party
Secretary Zaykov
In speech on Lenin's birthday in April:
The party has aroused the entire people to the struggle for high
quality. Serious organizational, political, and economic measures
have been adopted to prevent obsolete and poor-quality output and to
encourage conscientious work. We have also been compelled to take
the harsh step of introducing the state acceptance service. This
process is proceeding with difficulty at the enterprises and industries
where work on output quality was neglected; in a number of cases its
progress is painful. This is, above all, the case in the machine-
building industry.
As a result of stricter demands, an extremely difficult situation arose
at numerous enterprises. . . during the first quarter. Machine-build-
ing industry workers failed to supply the national economy with
output worth hundreds of millions of rubles. The situation is now
being straightened out, but serious conclusions ought to be drawn
from the first experience of the struggle for quality, since there can be
no indulgence as far as this task is concerned.
At Supreme Soviet session after June plenum:
A serious and implacable struggle has been launched in the country
against the chronic disease of poor output quality. We embarked on a
decisive and, it may be said, drastic measure: the introduction of
state acceptance. But that was necessary because quality had evolved
from an economic into a political, moral, and ethical term. Due
credit must be given to our working class which, regardless of the en-
suing difficulties, actively supported this measure as exceptionally
necessary for the whole of society and for each and every Soviet
person.
In a February address to Ulyanovsk workers:
State acceptance . . . has literally broken down many obsolete stereo-
types and widely held notions concerning the inevitability of poor
quality and has become a powerful factor in shaping people's new
thinking at al/levels?from team to ministry. Nonetheless, it must
be said very frankly that state acceptance has many overt and covert
opponents. Some believe that everything will return to the old footing
in two to three months.
Obviously there is an urgent need to extend state acceptance to
construction organizations, primarily those which are engaged in
erecting apartment blocks and sociocultural establishments.
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In Prague in March:
State acceptance. . . revealed considerable shortcomings in design
and technological documentation. It has also revealed obsolescence
in equipment, and a shortage of control, measuring, and other
equipment. Early results have shown that the introduction of state
acceptance has led not only to technical matters being tackled but
also to changes in the people's attitude to their work and to changes
in the people themselves. They are showing greater concentration and
responsibility.
During a visit to a chemical plant in Novomoskovsk:
Since the 27th Party Congress. . . many practical steps have been
taken to implement the decisions adopted. The essence of the changes
is to switch our attention from quantitative indicators to quality and
efficiency, from interim results to end results. . . . The days are gone
when no significance was attached to how much things cost, what the
quality of output was, what the price was, and how progress was
secured. Unfortunately, quality and the technical and economic
standard of articles are still vulnerable points in our economy.
Party Secretary In Orenburg in March:
Dolgikh A radical improvement in the quality of output is an important
problem that is directly linked with the strategy of acceleration and
restructuring. Gospriyemka . . . should facilitate this in many ways.
The first results show that in those areas where they have been well
prepared for this important measure, quality has increased notice-
ably. At the same time, substantial omissions have been uncovered,
and in a number of instances there has even been an irresponsible
attitude to this most important matter.
The struggle to improve the quality of work must be turned into an
offensive and must be waged along a broad front. No retreat is
possible. The main thing is to ensure everywhere the strict observance
of technological discipline, improve the rate of provision of technical
equipment for production facilities, reinforce monitoring, and estab-
lish in shops, shifts, and teams a moral climate in which honest high-
grade labor is encouraged in every way while people who produce
rejects are subjected to serious and moral pressure.
In address to Ukraine metallurgists in May:
Negative effects of slackening technological discipline manifested
themselves at a number of enterprises, particularly when state
acceptance was introduced. The way state acceptance is put into
practice in the Ukraine is worse than in the other republics. . . tens of
thousands of metric tons of substandard products have been shipped
without being presented for acceptance.
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*
Secretary Biryukova
Reverse Blank
In Azerbaijan in June:
Leaders of the Ministry of Light Industry and of enterprises were
insufficiently prepared for the introduction of state acceptance. As a
result of this certain enterprises suffered a considerable decline in
output volumes in January and February. The situation is now being
corrected. Bearing in mind that state acceptance will be significantly
expanded as of 1 January next year, the Ministry must draw the
necessary conclusions and prepare its enterprises for this responsible
work.
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Appendix B
Gospriyemka: A Content Analysis
Despite continued leadership commitment to the state
acceptance program, the amount of attention that
gospriyemka has received in the press appears to have
tapered off in recent months. We analyzed reporting
on the quality control system in a sample of four
central and six regional newspapers during February
to June, noting the number and length of articles
devoted solely to state acceptance.9 In February, we
counted a total of 10 articles in the central press (296
column-inches). The number of pieces rose to 22 in
March (549 column-inches), probably reflecting in-
creased leadership concern with the poor industrial
performance during January and February (see figure
2). In June, however, the central papers published only
seven articles on gospriyemka (133 column-inches).
Coverage in the regional press has fallen consistently
since February (17 articles, 459 column-inches). The
six regional newspapers we looked at carried only six
stories on state acceptance in June (150 column-
inches).
The newspapers were Pravda, Izvestiya, Sotsialisticheskaya in-
dustriya, Ekonomicheskaya gazeta, Leningradskaya Pravda, So-
vetskaya Estoniya, Sovetskaya Latviya Sovetskaya Litva, Pravda
Ukrainy, and Sovetskaya Belorussiya.
Reverse Blank
21
Figure 2
Number and Length of Articles on
Gospriyemka in Sample of Central and
Regional Newspapers, February-June 1997
Central
111 Regional
Number of articles
February
March
April
May
June
0 10
20
30
459 in
40
419 j
296 in
549
337
340
135
1501
255
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