KIM IL-SUNG PURGES PROBABLE OPPONENTS OF HIS ADVENTURISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08S02113R000100050001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 23, 1969
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/10: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100050001-3
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
KIM IL-SUNG PURGES PROBABLE OPPONENTS OF
HIS ADVENTURISM
Secret
104
23 April 1969
No. 0624/69
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/10: CIA-RDP08SO2113R000100050001-3
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/10 : CIA-RDP08S02113R000100050001-3
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
.23 April 1969
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Kim II-sung Purges
Probable Opponents of His Adventurism
Summary
In the 15 months between seizure of the Pueblo and
destruction of the U.S, reconnaissance aircraft, Kim Ii-
sung has chosen to purge military and party leaders who
apparently have been reluctant to take such risks. The
most important victims of the purge have been the former
defense minister and the former army chief-of-staff.
Their replacements -- generals loyal to Kim who supported
him against his domestic opponents -- have demanded un-
questioning fidelity to all of Kim's militant policies,
On 11 April 1969,-the party paper implied that "enemies
at home and abroad" had been criticizing Kim's leadership,
and it called for a struggle against anti-Kim sentiments.
But Kim's ability to impose an adventurist, risky-policy
on the North Korean regime should be further strengthened
as a result of the outcome of the recent shootdown.
Additional spectacular actions against vulnerable American
or South Korean units or facilities may be expected,
although not necessarily in the near future.
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It
was prepared by the Special Research. Staff and was
coordinated with the Office of National Estimates and
the Office of Current Intelligence.
SECRET
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.1. In shooting down a U.S. plane over international
waters 15 hs after the Pueblo incident, Kim Il-sung
has again demonstrated that he is willin to -take risks
which the Soviet and Chinese leaders avoid;
Apparently in order to continue
on his militant course-slnce the seizure of the Pueblo,,.
Kim has had to purge key military men, replacing them with
generals willing to support his adventurist policy (as
well as Kim's fortress-Korea domestic program).
2. Kim began the purge in the fall of . 1968. by
removing Defense Minister Kim,:..Chang-pong (last public
appearance in September 1968), replacing him with General
Choe Hyon. Kim then remove-d the Army Chief-of-Staff
General Choe Kwang; in February 1969, General 0 Chin-u
was identified as the new army C/S. Both of the promoted
men had proved themselves to be loyal to Kim during earlier
party infighting, and both.have since appealed to the
army to support Kim "without questioning" the wisdom of
.any of his policies.
3. The new Defense Minister proved his loyalty
to Kim during major purges of the leadership in April
1967. Within one month of this important behind-the-
scenes showdown on Kim's militarization policies, General
Choe Hyon was singled out for praise -- unprecedented
for him -- as "an intimate comrade-in-arms of Comrade Kim
I1-sung." In the same showdown, General 0 sharply criti-
cized Kim's major opponent and was personally supported
in this attack by Kim :.himself. Both generals were sub-
sequently rewarded by being given their new posts at the
head of the Defense Ministry and the army general staff,
respectively. In addition,~.loyalty may have been rein-
forced by nepotism in the case of General Choe, who re-
portedly is married to Kim's sister.
SECRET
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4e The new Army Chief-of-Staff General 0 Chin-.u
seemed to be hinting, in an important policy speech to
officers and men of the KPA on 7 February 1969-, that
opposition to Kim had developed within the army,,pro?bably
on the issue of risk-taking such-as seizure of the Pueblo.
General 0 conceded that as a consequence of taking the
Pueblo, the U.S. "threatened us with a terrific hue and
cry, sending to the Eastern Sea the 'Enterprise,' their
biggest nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, and moving many
up-to-date planes newly into South Korea." He went on
to say that the regime was "not frightened" and that the
American apology (to gain release of the crew) was "proof"
of a defeat for the U.S. He then warned that
No force on earth can dampen the fidelity
of the officers and men of the People's
Army to the party and leader.
As demonstrated by usage in polemical statements issued
during the Sino-Soviet dispute, the phrase "no force on
earth" holds a special meaning for Communist regimes,
indicating a rebuff administered to opposition forces.
This most recent usage by General 0, shortly after his
promotion, strongly suggests that he was attacking generals
disloyal to Kim (in addition to those already displaced),
and was warning the entire officer corps that they "must
firmly defend with their lives the party Central Committee,
headed by Comrade Kim Il-sung,"
5. It may be conjectured that the adventurist
seizure of the Pueblo and the trying period of negotiations
leading to release of the crew stirred dissension in the
army leadership. In addition, there may have been an
expressed unwillingness among cooler heads to go on with
new actions entailing, risks. in confronta-tion with U,S,
forces, This opposition apparen.tly was beaten down by
Kim between the fall of 1968 and spring 1969 with the
support of militant generals, who were rewarded for their
loyalty.
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SECRET
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6. This conjecture regarding internal army dissent
seems to get strong support from the important and highly
polemical editorial in Nodong Sinmun of 11 April. 1969.
The editorial seems to be defending Kim from charges that
he was not the most competent military strategist in
North Korea, insisting that a major military line can be
formulated "only by an outstanding leader, who is aware
better than anyone else" of the overall situation. It
attacked "flunkeyists and factionalists" who had "danced
to the tune of the enemy" -- that is, took a moderate line
in international matters. It implied that the army today
must act like the anti-Japanese guerrillas in earlier
days by
...resolutely safeguarding the high authority
and prestige of the guidance of the leader
from all sorts of attacks of the enemies at
home and abroad, implacably fighting without
the slightest vacillation against unsound
ideas of all hues contradictory to the ideas
of the leader whenever and wherever, uncon-
ditionally accepting the lines and policies,
orders and instructions of the leader...
(emphasis supplied)
This passage -- particularly the highly. unusual reference
to enemies "at home" -- stands as one of the clearest
indications that Kim's military line has been under
criticism in recent months.
7. It may be further conjectured that Kim was
challenged on other Policies, including the overall
subversive effort against the South, He has also purged
General Ho Pong-hak, who until October 1968 was head of
the party's Liaison Bureau (which shares responsibility
with special army units for dispatching agent teams to
the South).
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8. In addition, Kim has moved a new general into
the political watch-dog post in the army. Lt. General
An Yong-hwan was first identified in his post as Director
of the Army's General Political Bureau during the Pyongyang
celebration of Kim's 57th birthday -- i.e., on 15 April
1969.
9. Thus, by the time of the 15 April shootdown,
Kim had moved loyal followers into key military positions.
This enabled him to beat down apparent opposition to his
policy of continuing to harass Washington and of egoistically
asserting his revolutionary fervor. He has, in fact,
upstaged not only Brezhnev and Mao, but also Castro as
the leader who dares use his armed forces to pluck
feathers from the eagle's tail. His ability to enforce
this policy on the North Korean regime should be further
strengthened as a result of the outcome of the shootdown,
and additional spectacular actions against United States
or South Korean forces may be expected.
10. There are many possibilities for such actions
at some future time. For example, beyond the prospect
of new paramilitary landings south of the. demilitarized
zone, Kim may be emboldened to dispatch infiltration
missions against such targets as Kimpo Airfield near Seoul
or an American air-defense missile base.
SECRET
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Secret
Secret
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