THE PYONGYANG-PEKING-MOSCOW TRIANGLE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08S02113R000100130001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 20, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 10, 1978
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE PYONGYANG-PEKING-MOSCOW TRIANGLE
Central Intelligence Agency
National Foreign Assessment Center
10 May 1978
Key Judgments
In recent years China and the USSR have demonstrated
little enthusiasm for Kim Il-song's efforts to reunify
.the Korean peninsula on his own terms. In an unusual
convergence of interests, both the Chinese and Soviets
have an important stake in maintaining Korean stability.
A Major conflict there would seriously complicate each
country's bilateral relations with the US, stimulate pos-
sible major changes in Japanese, security policy, and in-
troduce new uncertainties into the overall power balance
in East Asia.
China and the USSR are Pyongyang's treaty allies and
traditional military suppliers. Both publicly support
North Korea's call for withdrawal of US forces from South
Korea. When tension on the peninsula increases, however,
they seek to dissociate themselves from Kim Il.-song's more
rash actions--as demonstrated in the wake of the Panmunjom
slayings in 1976. They view the US security commitment
to Seoul as a useful ingredient in the mix of factors that
keep peace on the peninsula and restrain any Japanese im-
pulse toward rearmament.
Kim is well aware that China and the USSR subordinate
North Korean ambitions to their own broader strategic in-
terests. In seeking to strengthen and preserve North
This Memorandum was prepared by the East Asia - Pacific Division of
the Office of Regional and Political Analysis in response to a
re-quest from the National Security Council.
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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
RPM-78-10193 .
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SECRET daq,
Korea's independence of action, he has tried to exploit
the mutual antagonism between China and the USSR. In
this he has had little success; China has had the inside
track since the early 1970s, and Moscow has shown little
inclination to compete with Peking for Kim's favor.
Kim's efforts to schedule a Moscow visit to balance
his highly publicized trip to Peking in 1975 have been
turned aside, although a Kim visit later this year cannot
be ruled out. Informal contacts between the Soviet Union
/ and South Korea have continued despite Pyongyang's pro-
tests. Moscow has not volunteered to ease Pyongyang's
financial plight by providing hard-currency relief. Weary
of North Korea's repeated failure to meet bilateral trade
/ commitments, the Soviets in fact have retaliated by reduc-
I ing their own exports. More important, North Korea ap-
parently has been cut off for several years from advanced
weapons of the type that Moscow has routinely provided to
a number of other clients.
More recently, some effort has been made by North
Korea and the Soviet Union to--in the words of one Soviet
official--"stabilize" their political relationship. There
have been more frequent and higher level contacts. In
January 1978, Soviet Politburo member Kunayev visited
Pyongyang to award Kim Il-song the Order of Lenin. Al-
though Kunayev admittedly is not a heavyweight on the
Politburo, he is the first Soviet leader of that party.
rank to visit Pyongyang since 1971 when relations were
distinctly warmer. North Korea discounted the significance
of the event somewhat by calling attention to the fact
that the medal was awarded originally in 1972 on Kim's
60th birthday.
We suspect, but cannot prove, that the Soviets-per-
ceived some slackening in Sino-North Korean ties and de-
cided additional effort on their part was in order They
presumably were aware of the notable absence of high-level
Chinese contacts with North Korea in the months following
Mao's death in September 1976.
The Chinese are, of course, sensitive to such Russian
maneuvering. In January 1977, for example, the departing
North, Korean ambassador in Peking was treated to a rare
audience with the top echelon of the Chinese leadership--
including party chairman Hua Kuo-feng--on the same day-
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that North Korean leader Pak Song-cholyas arriving in
Moscow for what appeared to be a spur-of-the-moment visit.
following a trip by Pak to the Middle East.
More recently, North Korea and China have published
contradictory pronouncements that Underscore their differ-
ing world, views, especially regarding the US. North Korea
denounced the US as the "main enemy" and contended that
all nations should be judged by their attitude toward "US
imperialism". China, on the other hand, tagged the Soviets
as having taken over from the US the role of "international
Gendarme," a term used by North Korea to describe the US.
This disagreement, which is not usually so forcefully
argued in public, stems largely from North Korean frustra-
tion over the unwillingness of Peking--or MOSCOW for that
matter?to support fully Pyongyang's ambitions for control
of the Korean peninsula. Pyongyang's decision to challenge,
publicly Chinese policy may in fact have been intended to
set the stage for the recent visit of Chinese party chair-
man Hua Kuo-feng to North Korea. The Hua visit Should
provide the basis for a better reading on the Current
status of Chinese-Korean relationS once the' details are_
known.
North Korea will be watching closely the reaction.
in Moscow and Peking as the US moves ahead on ground-force
withdrawals. Kim Il-song knows that in the Korean penin-
sula the interests of the major powers intersect in im-
portant ways. He recognizes that Chinese and Soviet sup-
port for his course is constrained by the desire Of both
to avoid complicating their relations with the US and
Japan. He will be looking for any signs that, as the
withdrawal proceeds, his allies might be more inclined to
increase their support or at least become less committed
to stability on the peninsula.
In keeping with their generally low-key approach to
the Korean question, the Soviets and Chinese have not
commented extensively on the US troop withdrawal plan or
the recent revision of its first phase. In their public
reaction, they have emphasized that retention of US air
power in South Korea means there is no real change in'
the situation. This emphasis on the status quo seems to
reflect their concern that any withdrawal be accomplished
in a manner that does not disrupt the basic political and
military balance on the peninsula.
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Privately, the Chinese go much further. They have
expressed concern that a US pullout would leave a vacuum
for the Soviets to fill. In recent months these Chinese
warnings have become more frequent and direct.
Kim will almost certainly press Moscow and Peking
for increased military assistance in the event that US
force reductions are accompanied by a substantial upgrad-
ing of South Korean military capabilities. This pressure
will be difficult to resist, especially if Kim can present
a convincing case that the US assistance package poses a
significant threat to North Korea. Given the pattern of
Soviet and Chinese arms restraint in recent years and the
strategic equities involved, neither ally is likely to
respond to requests for offsetting aid in a manner that
upsets the basic military equilibrium on the peninsula.
Looking to the future, it is possible that North
Korea's financial plight, in combination with continued
strengthening of South Korea's economic and military power,
might prompt Kim at some point to abandon his efforts to
preserve a balance in his ties with Moscow and Peking.
Kim might even consider aligning his country with one or
the other in an effort to extract maximum support and as-
sistance. In such a move, however, he would risk having
to bow to outside influence and control--an outcome that
Kim has long struggled to avoid.
Kim would probably take this step only as a last re-
sort and only after other alternatives had been explored.
North Korea continues to attempt to foster political and
economic contacts with the non-Communist world, and it
still displays scant concern for the sensitivities of its
major Communist allies--as demonstrated most recently by
its unilateral declaration of a 50-mile coastal security
zone. .
Although China and the USSR have indicated their lack
of enthusiasm for Kim Il-song's reunification efforts,
the rivalry limits the extent to which either is prepared
to restrain the North Korean leader. On the diplomatic
front, for example, neither has been willing to push Kim
in directions he does not want to go. They have made it
clear that their participation in any multilateral talks
on the future of the Korean peninsula will be subject to
North Korea's acceptance.
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Over the years, nevertheless, Pyongyang has exhibited
great concern over the possibility of a Korean settlement
imposed by the major powers--as is evident in Pyongyang's
intense attacks on various proposals for "two Koreas" and
for "cross recognition." Recent events unquestionably
have magnified these worries. In December visiting East
German leader Honecker, acting at Soviet behest, lectured
Kim on the applicability of a two Germanies solution for
Korea. Early this year the press played up Ambassador
Woodcock's remarks about the commonality of interests be-
tween the US and China and China's potential role in main-.
taming stability in Northeast Asia. President Tito's
proposal for tripartite talks on Korea--with the Pak gov-
ernment as a full participant--received widespread media
attention except in Pyongyang where it was greeted with
stony silence. In light of Ambassador Woodcock's earlier
statement, there seems little doubt that the parameters
of Dr.'Brzezinski's trip will promote even greater anxiety
in Pyongyang.
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