IRAN-IRAQ: ARMS PROCUREMENT PATTERNS AFTER TWO YEARS OF WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08S02113R000100230001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 20, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 3, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDPO8S02113R000100230001-3
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Iran-Iraq: Arms Procurement Patterns
After Two Years of War
During the 26 months of the Iran-Iraq war, both
Tehran and Baghdad have had to modify their
arms procurement patterns to meet military hard-
ware, munitions, and spare parts demands. Even
though at least $21 billion worth of military equip-
ment has been purchased, military inventories of
both countries are below prewar levels. Nonethe-
less, both sides appear to have received sufficient
supplies to support their forces at current levels of
combat. Iran has replaced some of its losses in US
ground forces equipment with Soviet-designed
hardware primarily from North Korea and Libya.
Iraq has lost confidence in the USSR as a depend-
able supplier of military equipment and has turned
to Western sources, China, and several East Euro-
pean nations but will require large imports of arms
from the USSR to maintain its largely Soviet
aircraft and land armaments inventorie
Iran Searching for Necessary Arms
25X1
sales provide badly needed hard currency and oil as
well as an outlet for its expanding arms industry.
25X1
North Korea probably initiated its sales in Iran
with Soviet acquiescence.
couragement from Moscow, however, because arms
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Syria and Libya also have provided Soviet-made
weaponry to Tehran because of-their mutual antag-
onism toward Iraq. Syria also has provided ammu-
nition, SA-7s, antiaircraft guns, and training. Da-
mascus does not appear affected by pressure from
Saudi Arabia and other Arab states to end this
activity. Libya's Qadhafi has provided military
assistance to illustrate Libya's value as an "arsenal
of radicalism." Ammunition, antitank missiles, ar-
tillery, and some tanks have been delivered, much
of it free of charge 25X1
At the outbreak of the war, the Soviets instituted
an arms embargo against both countries. Given t125X1
USSR's large-scale arms agreements with Iraq,
this policy constituted a tilt toward Iran. As the
war dragged on, Moscow reassessed its arms supply
policy and in early 1981, lifted its embarg I L LEG 13
Moscow agreed in June 1981 to sell an estimated
$200 million worth of artillery, ammunition, and
infantry equipment; deliveries of this equipment are
continuing. We believe that the USSR has suggest-
ed the possibility of another major arms deal to
Iran, but Tehran has largely rebuffed the offer.
25X1I
with training. Moscow welcomes the increased
dependence on Soviet-style equipment, while much
of Iran's US equipment is in disrepair 25X1
The only other major suppliers of military equip-
25X1
ment that are available to Iran are China and
Western Europe. China sold $36 million of artillery
3 December 1982
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Iran-Iraq: Arms Purchases, 1977-October 1982
Percent
Iran
1977-21 September 1980
US $5.8 Billion
Iraq _}
US$6.3 Billion
Other Western Other Communist
Italy USSR
USSR Brazil
United States Other Western
France
22 September 1980-October 1982
US $2.0 Billion a
Private Western Arms Dealers
Other Communist
USSR
Libya
Other Western'
North Korea
US $17.8 Billion
USSR
Brazi
West Germany
France
Italy
Other Western
China
Other Communist
amn addition, an undetermined amount of military equipment
and support material has been purchased from private arms dealers.
588234 12-82
Secret 28
3 December 1982
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ammunition in mid-1981 after lengthy negotia-
tions. Iran probably has lost any opportunity for
large deals because China is now selling to Iraq.
The major Western suppliers have been lukewarm
to Iranian requests, although companies in Greece,
Switzerland, Portugal, and South Korea have sold
$500 million worth of military equipment to Teh-
ran since the war began.
some older equipment from its inventories, Switzer-
land provided air defense guns, and Portuguese and
South Korean shipments have consisted mainly of
explosives and artillery munitions
In the short run, Iran has turned to Israel and
private arms brokers for critical spare parts and
other support items for its Western equipment.
Israel may have sold up to $50 million in arms to
Tehran, mostly US-desi ned maintenance items
and munitions
Iraq Increasing Western Purchases
Iraq is trying to reduce its dependence on the
USSR for military equipment. Moscow's near mo-
nopoly on Iraq's arms inventory was broken by
several large purchases from France in 1974 and
1975. Soviet-Iraqi relations, already deteriorating,
reached a low point in September 1980, when the
USSR imposed an embargo on arms deliveries on
prewar contracts.
In response to the Soviet embargo on the direct
shipment of arms to Iraq, Baghdad increasingly
turned to Western sources of supply, to China, and
to several East European nations. Almost $16
billion worth of military equipment was purchased
from these sources during the war. France contin-
ues to receive large orders because of its reputation
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as a reliable supplier. In contrast to the USSR,
France not only continued to deliver arms after the
war began, but also signed new contracts and sent
technicians to help maintain Iraqi equipment. Sinc25X1
September 1980, deals worth almost $4.5 billion
were concluded for Roland missile systems, self-
propelled 155-mm howitzers, helicopters, addition-
al Mirage F-1 fighters, ammunition, and electron-
ics gear 25X1
Italian sales have come to $2.2 billion and cover
25X1
helicopters, artillery, personnel carriers, and naval
ships, according to Italian arms brokers and Em-
bassy reporting. The bulk of these contracts are
related to a late 1980 order by the Navy for ships25X1
that will not be delivered before the mid-1980s.
Additional sales would have been completed if the
United States allowed Rome to export equipment
and components produced under US license.
25X1
China is the major new entrant into the Iraqi ailLLEGIB
supply sweepstakes. Beijing has signed contracl LLEGIB
for fighter aircraft, tanks, artillery, ammunition,
and spare parts totaling almost $3 billion. Several
reports indicate that China is committed to supply
2,000 tanks over the next five years, some of whic25X1
have already arrived. Its equipment is attractive
because they are similar to much of Iraq's Soviet-
supplied arsenal. This avoids the loss of combat
effectiveness that would occur if Western equip-
ment were substituted too rapidly for Soviet items.
Arms ordered from Egypt, Poland, Romania, and
Yugoslavia provide a similar advantage 25X1
25X1
The USSR sought to offset the negative impact of
their embargo by encouraging deliveries of Soviet-
made arms to Iraq by third countries. Several 25X1
sources indicate that East European nations were
allowed by Moscow to prevent a permanent break
by fulfilling outstanding arms contracts, concluding
new deals for badly needed ammunition and spare
parts, and signing a few agreements for major
equipment. During the course of the war, $2 billion
Secret
3 December 1982
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in sales were concluded with East European suppli=
ers. Romania, in particular, has taken advantage of
this opportunity by providing more than $850
million in primary support equipment and ammuni-
tion.
Moscow moved one step further in April 1981 when
it resumed direct deliveries of ammunition, spare
parts, and logistics items. The visit of several high-
level Iraqi delegations to Moscow beginning in
May were followed by deliveries of MIG-23 and
MIG-25 aircraft and T-72 tanks under existing
contracts
In April 1982 the USSR and Iraq finally concluded
a new deal worth at least $2 billion. Although Iraqi
bitterness over the embargo lingers, the Soviets are
delivering contracted arms at a steady pace. The
Soviet Deputy Minister of Defense Industry is due
in Iraq in the near future, probably to discuss
another military purchase that would include an
advanced ground attack aircraft
Market Prospects
When the conflict ends, arms purchases by Iraq
and Iran will almost certainly increase as these
countries attempt to rebuild depleted inventories.
Declining oil revenues and the continued softness of
the oil market will impose some restraint on their
arms purchasing efforts and almost certainly will
encourage them to try to barter oil for military
equipment. The war has highlighted the need for
both nations to stockpile large quantities of spare
parts and other materiel to provide a cushion
against supplier manipulation of arms deliveries. In
addition, substantial purchases of radars and com-
mand and control equipment are likely because
both nations have discovered their inadequacies in
these areas.
Iran is not likely to build inventories as large as
those acquired by the Shah. We believe Tehran
probably will want to increase its direct dealings
with Western suppliers when the war ends. West-
ern suppliers, already involved in the lucrative Iraqi
Secret
3 December 1982
market, will provide equipment only as long as it
does not offend their other large Arab buyers. The
suppliers of Soviet-style equipment will probably
maintain their strong position.
Iraq will have to remain dependent on Moscow or
other suppliers of Soviet-designed arms for at least
ground force equipment if it wants to maintain its
capabilities.
Baghdad has experienced the consequences of excessive
dependence on one nation or bloc of nations for arms,
however, and is still likely to seek greater diversification
in its arms supply. Large deals with West European
nations and Brazil for tanks, artillery, aircraft, and other
types of equipment are under negotiation. Over the longer
term, Iraq also hopes to build a domestic arms industry
through licensed assembly and coproduction arrange-
ments with France, Italy, and the United Kingdom. An
arms inventory balanced between Eastern and Western
suppliers is the probable Iraqi goal
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/05: CIA-RDPO8S02113R000100230001-3