IMPLICATIONS OF P'YONGYANG'S INITIATIVE TO HOLD TRIPARTITE TALKS IN BEIJING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08S02113R000100300001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 20, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 12, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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12 December 1984
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Implications of P'yongyang's Initiative to Hold
Tripartite Talks in Beijing
The North Korean proposal for tripartite talks in Beijing is
an elaboration of its initiative a year ago to engage the US in
direct contacts but shows greater flexibility. The North is
serious about talking to the US and clearly is willing to
cultivate the impression, if not the reality, of a greater
Chinese role to achieve that breakthrough. P'yongyang may well
have concluded that Beijing's indirect involvement is the price
it must pay to attract Washington to the table.
The North Koreans seem to be attempting to counter one of
the fundamental criticisms of its longstanding tripartite
initiative -- that P'yongyang is trying to address the US over
Seoul's head -- by affirming that the three sides would
participate independently and on an equal footing. P'yongyang,
recalling that the US withdrew its earlier tripartite proposal
.during Secretary Shultz's April visit to Seoul, has also been
careful td spell out a role for the South in any preparatory
discussions should these get under way.
The North, however, has implied that it wants to conduct
discussions without South Korean participation on the
US-North Korean "problem" -- presumably a reference to
transforming the armistice into a peace treaty,
including the question of the US troop presence.
The South Koreans will criticize any such arrangements and
regard them as part of the North Korean effort to drive a wedge
between Washington and Seoul.
After only two sessions of renewed North-South
dialogue -- and in light of the current postponement of
further contacts -- the South Koreans are likely to see
the North's offer as "too little too soon". President
Chun obviously does not want to be portrayed as the
recalcitrant party, but Seoul probably will argue that
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the US should stick to its position calling for
P'yongyang to make progress on bilateral issues before
tripartite talks begin.
A Beijing venue for talks would have some appeal to
Seoul because of its desire to expand dealings with the
Chinese. But such contacts would still fall short of
the returns Seoul will demand from the opening of any
US-North Korean contacts. In our view, if Seoul were
pushed by Washington to respond positively to the North
Korean proposal, it would likely counter with the demand
that the US troop presence in South Korea be excluded
from any discussions.
The Chinese role in Pyongyang's decision to offer its
tripartite proposal is unclear, but Beijing obviously used
Kim Il-song's trip to China late last month to urge him to be
flexible. Beyond the issue of venue, China does not want to come
to the table. We believe it is deferring to North Korean desires
to gain progress in its effort to engage the US.
Although many Japanese would welcome the talks, Prime
Minister Nakasone is unlikely to argue against or take steps that
would complicate a US refusal to participate. Tokyo, however,
does not want to find itself left behind in any US move toward
official contacts with the North. If the tripartite talks go
forward, the Japanese would be likely to position themselves
quickly to add a more prominent official cast to their currently
limited trade ties with P'yongyang.
The Soviets, who wish to be included in any serious
discussions on the future of the peninsula, almost certainly
would be troubled by their exclusion from talks involving some
role for China but not the USSR. They probably will view such a
development --coming on the heels of Soviet Deputy Foreign
Minister Kapitsa's recent trip to P'yongyang -- as another
example of Sino-US collusion at their expense. P'yongyang's
moves over the past ten months to improve Soviet-North Korean
ties may have been aimed, in part, at forestalling a negative
reaction by Moscow, although it is unclear whether the North ever
raised this elaboration of its initiative with the Soviets.
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