TERRORIST THREAT IN THE MIDDLE EAST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP09-00438R000605820006-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: November 1, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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I I
Cents intelligence Agency
vwshlro .D.G2050S
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM FOR: J.M. Poindexter
Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
SUBJECT: Terrorist Threat in the Middle East
1. Attached is our current assessment of the terrorist
threat to the United States and US interests in the Middle
East. As the text indicates, we view Iranian-sponsored attacks,
particularly in Lebanon, as the most immediate source of danger--
t
year.
and one that is likely to persist into nex
2. This memorandum was prepared jointly by the
Terrorism/Narcotics Analysis Division, Office of Global ssues,
and by rab-Israeli Divison,
Office of Near East and South Asian s i s .
3. Your comments and queries on this assessment are
welcome, and may be addressed to the Deputy Chief,
I
ssues,
Terrorism/Narcotics Analysis Division, Office of Global
Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Attachment:
The Terrorist Threat to US Interests in the Middle East
GI M _,November 1984
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MEMORANDUM
The Terrorist Threat to US Interests in the Middle East
Current Assessment
Terrorism continues to pose a serious near term threat to US
interests in the Middle East. A number of experienced terrorist
groups in the region have demonstrated both the will and
capability to attack US persons and facilities--as well as those
of our allies--either at their own discretion or at the behest of
patron states. Iranian-backed groups present the gravest and
most immediate danger to American lives and property, at least
through the period ending 31 January 1985. Libyan-sponsored
terrorism is likely to be directed against Egypt, while
Palestinian groups will focus their operations against Israel and
Jordan.
Our analysis
suggests that several specific threats are
active against US persons and facilities:
o Radical Lebanese Shias backed by Iran want to attack US
targets in Lebanon.
officials may be targets for kidnaping or
GI M
November 1984
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terrorism by Iranian-
backed Shias could occur with little or no warning in
Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, or Iraq. Terrorists
could attempt attacks against US diplomats in Iraq or
elsewhere in the Gulf in reaction to the anticipated
renewal of diplomatic relations between Baghdad and
Washington.
Iranian-backed attacks against US diplomatic or military
facilities in Europe are also possible in the short
term. Iranian operatives have been active in Europe in
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we believe 25X1
Jordanian, Israeli and Egyptian interests also face active
terrorist threats.
o Radical Palestinian groups, acting on their own or at
Syria's behest, are likely to attempt attacks inside
Jordan or against Jordanian diplomats abroad to
demonstrate their vehement opposition to the Palestine
National Council meeting in Amman.
o Radical as well as mainline Palestinian groups such as
Arafat's Fatah are likely to attempt spectacular
terrorist actions inside Israel and the occupied
territories in their competition for leadership of the
Palestinian movement. Radical groups such as the Fatah
rebels led by Abu Musa may attack Israeli targets
o Qadhafi almost certainly will seek revenge for his loss
of face over the bungled attempt to assassinate an
exiled opponent in Egypt.
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We believe, however, that Libya is 25X1
most likely to focus its efforts against Egyptian
targets. Qadhafi fears an American response were a
Libyan hand to be detected in operations against US
targets. 25X1
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Syrian Policy Toward the Radical Lebanese Shias
Ambassador Murphy's visit to Damascus did not alter Syrian
President Assad's attitude toward Hizballah and Iranian
activities in Lebanon. Damascus remains at odds with the
Iranian-sponsored groups because it is determined to stabilize
the security situation in and around Beirut and no longer
welcomes disruptive activities by Shia extremists. Despite
several clashes between Syrian troops and radical Shia gunmen,
however, Damascus is still unwilling to move forcefully against
the Hizballah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRG) in
Lebanon. Syria probably believes it can manipulate the terrorist
network to serve its own interests, and realizes a total
crackdown might damage its relationship with Iran and threaten
the special economic benefits Damascus receives from Tehran.
Assad probably also realizes a Syrian move could prompt the
terrorists to attack Syrian interests.
In our judgment, Syria is capable of seriously curtailing
Hizballah activities in the Bekaa Valley. The Syrian Army
maintains several divisions and special forces regiments in or
near the Bekaa, and has the ability to close down terrorist
training camps, restrict the freedom of movement now exercised by
the Iranians and the radical Shias, and effectively prevent them
from using the Bekaa as a staging ground for terrorism. Syria
cannot, however, control Shia terrorism in Beirut and its
immediate environs.
Status of Terrorist Camps in the Bekaa Valley
We believe the Shaykh Abdallah barracks remains occupied by
Lebanese Shia extremists and Iranian Revolutionary Guards.
Changes in the location and types of vehicles within the compound
have been noted
within the past two months, indicating frequent traffic
in and out of the barracks.
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generally low level of activity within the
barracks. The occupants apparently have become more cautious--
possibly because they fear a daytime retaliatory airstrike--and
probably are conducting their training
in the Ba'labakk
they probably
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area during daylight hours.
return to the barracks each night.
Iranian Revolutionary Guards have been
of the US Embassy annex.
a five-meter-deep air-raid shelter has
barracks.
the Hizballah and the
on alert since the bombing
been dug beneath the
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there has been an
increase in antiaircraft weapons in and around the compound.
The Shaykh Abdallah barracks remains the principal target in
Lebanon. Other locations
as centers of terrorist activity include the Khayyam
Hotel, a possible IRG headquarters in Batlabakk, and training
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camps near Janta (Nabi Shit), Nabi Sabat, and Nassiriyah.
unable to confirm that the Hizballah or IRG currently use these
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