USSR: CONFLICTING PERSPECTIVES ON U.S. POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP09-00997R000100490001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 15, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 2, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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IP A. 7-7
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31 August 82
RECORD OF CONTACT . _ STAT::: ?
Deputy Chief, Current Support
STAT
STATM
liked 17 August Analysis Report examining Soviet Perspectives
on US Policy (Three Poles of Opinion?) and wondered if we were con-
sidering something for the PDB. I said the only strate? likely to
work would be a joint FBIS-SOVA effort. We agreed would condense STAT
the report to PDB length and send the draft to SOV , w ere they would
add some other material to give it a SOVA flavor and propose it to
Requestor:
Rec2ived By:
Spent Filling Request:_
Nature of Peque..it and Action
the PDB Staff. I plan on calling (PDB Staff) to let him STATe
know what's in the works.
,464. so 4/4
e a. a 2 CiA t-
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/16: CIA-RDP09-00997R000100490001-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/16: CIA-liDP09-00997R000100490001-5
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,
_
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
2 September
Here is our draft for the PDB article we
talked about by phone. You of course have
more experience dealing with the PDB
people than we do and our formatting
may be inappropriate. I assume you
will get back to me when you have a
revised draft in hand for our comments.
I expect getting something like this
through the system must be a challenge.
I am prepared to fail but I would like
to give it our best shot: Please feel
free to call me with any qu
I will be out next week but will
be at the same number:
Thanks.
Chief, Strategic issues Branch
FBIS Analysis Group
P.S. I mentioned to
this piece was forqhmpming.
that
FORMv USE PREVIOUS
5-75 101 EDITIONS
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' STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
PEEL OFF LABEL AND REUSE ENVELOPE
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Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2013/07/16 : CIA-RDP09-00997R000100490001-5
CONFIDENTIAL DRAFT
FBIS ANALYSIS GROUP
2 SEPTEMBER 1982
1 -
USSR: CONFLICTING PERSPECTIVES ON U.S. POLICY
In recent months community analysts have seen evidence of debate in
the second echelons of the Soviet regime about the implications of
your Administration's foreign and defense policies. This feature
outlines the positions taken by different sides in that debate about
U.S. intentions.
Moscow of course attempts to present a picture of total unanimity
in the top Soviet leadership about sensitive policy questions. Evi-
dence of differing views can be found, however, in comments by
influential second-level officials. Public statements and private
remarks in the last several months have revealed the outline of two,
and perhaps three, poles of opinion in this Soviet elite about the
gravity of the threat presented by trends in U.S. policy under your
Administration. This polarization of views could produce mounting
pressures on the detente strategy pursued by the Brezhnev regime
for more than a decade.
Advocates of an alarmist position appear to be arguing that a more
forceful Soviet response to U.S. policy in the military realm is
needed.
Proponents of the alarmist view describe the Administration's
policies as presaging a strategic shift in the West away from
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS ANALYSIS GROUP
2 SEPTEMBER 1982
-2 -
detente and toward policies deliberately designed to seek confronta-
tion with the USSR. This group, in which professional military
spokesmen have been prominent, has portrayed the United States as
literally preparing for war against the Soviet Union. The writings
over the past year of Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov, the chief of the
USSR Armed Forces General Staff, have most prominently advocated
this view.
Last February, Ogarkov likened the U.S. drive for world domination
and its "active preparation for nuclear war" to the actions of
Napoleon and Hitler. More recently a Major General and several
hardline journalists have warned that U.S. military plans now
include preparations for delivering a surprise "disarming" nuclear
strike against the Soviet Union.
A group of optimists appears to be arguing that Moscow can afford
to bide its time until Washington changes its course.
Arrayed against spokesmen of Ogarkov's stripe are Soviet officials
who treat the shift in U.S. policy as more tentative, stressing the
obstacles standing in the way of Administration efforts to shift
U.S. foreign and defense policies rather than the danger they repre-
sent for the USSR. This optimistic posture serves a propaganda
function and has been reflected in the established Soviet media
line. But some prominent foreign policy officials at the second
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS ANALYSIS GROUP
2 SEPTEMBER 1982
-3
levels of the regime have presented more sophisticated versions of
the argument that undercut alarmist interpretations of Administra-
tion aims. The most outspoken advocates of this position have been
affiliated with Moscow's premier think-tank on the United States,
the Academy of Sciences' Institute for the Study of the USA and
Canada (IUSAC). Minimizing the threat posed by U.S. policies, they
have insisted that U.S. economic problems, domestic social needs,
internal political opposition, and resistance from U.S. allies con-
stitute serious roadblocks to U.S. objectives.
A third group of activists appears to advocate a vigorous response
to U.S. policy but to emphasize political and diplomatic measures
rather than military.
A high-ranking Central Committee official, Vadim Zagladin, intimated
at the end of July that there may be such a third pole of opinion in
Moscow. He acknowledged that the issue of how to respond to U.S.
policy had produced "extreme views" in the Soviet Union and the
communist bloc and described two poles of opinion that roughly coin-
cide with those just presented. Zagladin associated himself with a
less sharply defined view that softpedals the threat of war, notes
the constraints on U.S. policy, but apparently advocates an activist
political strategy toinourish the constraints.
This third position appears to have been taken by two men who
reportedly advise Brezhnev--the director of IUSAC, Georgiy Arbatov,
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS ANALYSIS GROUP
2 SEPTEMBER 1982
4
and former Central Committee official, Aleksandr Bovin. In two widely
publicized July newspaper articles Arbatov agreed there were serious
obstacles to current U.S. military plans but emphasized the need for
an activist strategy to encourage foreign opposition. Bovin has
expressed the opinion that Moscow cannot expect to reach any "serious
agreements" with your Administration but that Washington's "adverse
influence on world affairs" can be restricted.
Prepared by:
FBIS/AG
Extension:
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