USSR: SHIFTING PROPAGANDA STRATEGY ON THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP09-02295R000100050001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 1, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 17, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release
2013/08/01: CIA-RDP09-02295R000100050001-0
DKATI
AUTHOR:
Handcarried to PDB for
President's briefing sheet
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release
2013/08/01: CIA-RDP09-02295R000100050001-0
STAT
Declassified in Part-Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2013/08/01 CIA-RDP09-02295R000100050001-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS ANALYSIS GROUP
17 AUGUST 1981
L
- 1 -
USSR: SHP:TING PROPAGANDA STRATEGY ON THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION
Soviet propaganda on the Un'iadStates is carefully tailored to
-? .-,???%;)
reflect. the. Kremlin's expectations for bilateral dialogue. Soviet
officials and propagandists have at times painted U.S. intentions
in the direst terms, and at other times in remarkably optimistic
terms, depending on whether Moscow believed that bilateral talks
would yield agreements furthering Soviet aims. The following item
is drawn from a recently completed study exploring the Kremlin's
evolving propaganda strategy toward your
November 1980 elections.
adthini.stration since the
The current Soviet propaganda broadside against U.S. policy contrasts
starkly with Moscow's public description of your administration's
intentions in the wake of the November 1980 elections. Moscow's
interest in opening an immediate dialogue at that time was evident in
Soviet propaganda's optimistic projections of your administration's
policies and in
SALT. Brezhnev
in "the heat of
structive steps"
the leadership's effort to demonstrate flexibility on
on 17 November pledged to ignore what had been said
the election struggle" and to respond to any "con-
your administration might take. He emphasized the
importance of continuing the "SALT process" but ignored the SALT II
treaty. At the same time, Soviet propaganda claimed that you had
become increasingly "moderate" during the election campaign and that
you were giving "foremost priority" to an improvement of U.S.-Soviet
relations.
CONFIDENTIAL
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/01 : CIA-RDP09-02295R000100050001-0
Declassified in Part-Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2013/08/01 : CIA-RDP09-02295R000100050001-0
c, CONFIDENTIAL FBIS ANALYSIS GROUP
17 AUGUST 1981
- 2 -
Following your inauguration, Moscow's posture entered a period of
flux. Soviet officials mixed sharp attacks on your administration's
criticism of Soviet policy with suggestions that U.S. policy might
still prove to be more accommodating. In a major address to the
Soviet party congress at the en4 of February, Brezhnev rebuked your
administration for making statements that seem "intended to poison"
bilateral relations but he expressed hope that U.S. policymakers
would ultimately "look at things more realistically." Following
the party congress, Soviet foreign policy spokesmen disagreed openly
on whether definitive conclusions could yet be drawn about your
administration's foreign policy course.
Moscow's shift to a decidedly pessimistic public posture on your
administration was signaled in Brezhnev's 9 May speech. In this
speech, Brezhnev placed your administration in the camp of those
Western statesmen who regard military superiority over the USSR
as their "main political credo" and who reject the solution of
international problems through negotiations. In the wake of
Brezhnev's speech, Defense Minister Ustinov and other Soviet
officials have accused your administration of returning to the
cold war and breaking off the SALT process.
Moscow's shifting views of your administration coincided with its
increasing hopes that West European doubts about U.S. arms control
policy could scuttle NATO deployment of U.S. medium-range missiles.
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/01 : CIA-RDP09-02295R000100050001-0
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2013/08/01 : CIA-RDP09-02295R000100050001-0
CONFIDENTIAL FBIS ANALYSIS GROUP
17 AUGUST 1981
- 3 -
Since mid-May, Moscow has launched a major propaganda campaign
designed to foster the belief that U.S. expressions of readiness
for talks on LRTNF are "camouflage" for an unprecedented military
buildup. In a June speech, Brezhnev claimed that the United States
has made no move toward talks and accused your administration of
"trying to lull its allies and public opinion." Soviet propaganda
quickly seized on the U.S. decision to produce the Enhanced Radia-
tion Warhead as grist for the effort to encourage doubts about your
administration's commitment to arms control.
Judging from its tactics under previous administrations, Moscow's
harsh rhetoric about U.S. intentions on arms control is likely to
continue until bilateral talks on strategic arms begin to
show signs of substantive progress.
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/01 : CIA-RDP09-02295R000100050001-0