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September 30, 1974
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Approved For Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207RO01000020018-4 1 AV"" 1 %;Lu% 30 Sep 1971 By Tad Szulc "... No such overt and covert power in foreign policy has ever been vested in any man, except the president, in our history..." A shadowy group of five powerful officials silently directing America's clandestine foreign policy from the basement Situation Room in the White House in Washington-the so-called "40 Committee" of the National Secur- ity Council-is the nearest thing we have in this country to a secret super- government body. Headed by Henry A. Kissinger, this committee is not always accountable even to the president of the United States, although it has access to virtual- ly unlimited unvouchered government funds and holds the power to order far- ranging covert intelligence and para- military operations around the world. And during the Nixon Watergate era, it may have had links with secret do- mestic intelligence units, possibly in- cluding even the "Plumbers." Deriving its name from National Security Council Intelligence Decision Memorandum No. 40, which set it up in its present form in 1969, the five-man 40 Committee is the current incarna- tion of similar top-secret White House groups that since 1947 have authorized dozens of major covert intelligence un- dertakings from Asia to Latin America and from Africa to Europe. The most recent known large-scale operation conducted by the 40 Com- mittee was the assignment given the Central Intelligence Agency, at the cost of S8 million, to help orchestrate, from inside, the fall a year ago of the regime of Chile's late Socialist presi- dent, Salvador Allende Gossens, while other branches of the United States government applied a variety of simul- taneous pressures from the outside. This increasingly controversial enter- prise was stunningly confirmed by Pres- ident Ford at his news conference last Monday. His justification was both startling in philosophy and sparse on the fasts. as he sought to give public lcei:ima ,; to the 40 Committee. 1-his was somethin g no president had ever done before; actually, no-senior of[iciaLhad ever publicly mentioned the committee. Ford, in fact, institutionalized the concept of covert intelligence action (it was not even done during the cold war) when he commented that "Our government, like other governments. does take certain actions in the intelli- gence field to help' implement foteign policy and protect national security ... 1 am informed reliably that Communist nations spend vastly more money than we do for the same kind of purposes." Action against Allende between 1970 and 1973 was one of Kissinger's high-priority projects. He personally as- sumed control of the C.I.A.'s covert moves, through the 40 Committee, and of a parallel economic and financial blockade, working through an interde- partmental task force. To Kissinger, it appears, Chile was a "laboratory" test case to determine whether a regime he opposed could be "destabilized" or dislodged without the use of military force that the United States had chosen to apply elsewhere in the past. Specifically, Chile was a test of whether a democratically elec- ted leftist regime, as was Allende's, could be toppled through the creation of internal chaos by outside forces. Recent revelations of Kissinger's al- leged role in the Chilean affair-he has denied any American involvement, al- though the C.I.A., in effect, has con- firmed it-have set off the latest con- troversy swirling around the secretary of state, and have raised again ques- tions about his credibility and future intentions. There are reasons to suspect. for ex- ample, that the 40 Committee is study- ing plans for possible covert American intervention in the confused political process in Italy, where the Communist party may soon share power in a coali- tion government. Actually. mere than a year ago the former U.S. ambassador in Rome, Graham. Martin, reportedly. asked the Nixon administration for sc-1 cret funds to bolster the Christian Detn ocrats in Italy-just as the United States had done- in the crucial 1948 elections. The 40 Committee reportedly also: has on its agenda the situations in Por tugal and Greece-where rightist re- gimes collapsed earlier this year and leftist in luences are feared by the U.S. -as welt' as dangers facing the white governments in southern Africa in view of Mozambique's impending independ- ence. The C.I-.A. has a working alliance, with South African and Rhodesian in- telligence services against leftist black "liberation" movements. Continency planning to assure United States access to oil reserves in! the Middle East and elsewhere is like wise said to be on the agenda. In fact,: the C.I.A., working under a National Se- curity Council mandate, did overthrow) the Iranian government in 1953 after it nationalized foreign oil holdings. i Past activities by the 40 Committee; and its prt-decessors have ranged from; engineering the overthrow of foreigni regimes disliked by Washington to the) creation of secret armies and counter- insurgency units for the protection of governments enjoying our official fa-! vor. They have included political sub-, version, the subornation of statesmen. politicians, labor leaders, and others abroad. "black" propaganda. and the oversight of "spy-in-the-sky" espionage over the Soviet Union, China, and scores of other countries. Overhead intelligence is the only form of act,-,2' espionage in the purvi_'.v of the 40 Committee. The C.I.A., ether intelligence agencies, and separate White House committees (also chaired by Kissinger) are concerned with the collection of normal intelligence. The -'0 Committee must approve. every rmenth,overhead intelligence pro- grams-from the regular launching of photo-sadillies to secret flights by the 00603 ~pntinued Approved For Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207RO01000020018-4 regime he opposed could be dislodged without military force. Approved For Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207RO01000020018-4 ... To Kissinge , Chile was a test case t determine wlr:, SR-71 spy planes-because of the risk of serious international complications. The U-2 incident over the Soviet Union in 1960 has not been forgotten. The monthly plans are submitted to th:: 40 Committee by a C.I.A. commit- tce so secret that its existence and its name-Comrex-have never before, to my knowledge, been publicly discussed. The National Reconnaissance Office, another top-secret ? organization under the 40 Committee's overall control, is responsible for the actual launching of overhead intelligence vehicles. For nearly six years, the 40 Com- mittee has been run by Kissinger, act- ing as chairman in his capacity of spe= cial assistant to the president for na- General George S. Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S. Brown, Deputy Sec- retary of Defense William P. Clements, and Under Secretary of State for Poli- tical Affairs Joseph J. Sisco. Member- ship on'.the committee is not personal: it goes with these four jobs. Because of successive changes in the other depart- ments, Kissinger is the only man to have remained continuously on the committee for the whole period. The possibility that the 40 Commit- tee may have had connections with secret domestic intelligence stems from the fact that former Attorney General John N. Mitchell began attending meet- ings in 1970. Given the secrecy cover- ing the 40 Committee, the White House Despite its name, the '40 Com- mittee' has only five members. The group's name is derived Intelligence Decision Memo- lished the committee in its present form in 1969. 00604 Approved For Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207RO01000020018-4 ontinued tional security affairs. It is not rele- vant in this context that he has also held for a year the post of secretary of state. His power in the field of clandes- tine foreign policy has been unchal- lenged since Nixon took office in 1969. It remains so under Ford. Kissinger has been for years the de facto boss of the United States intelli- gence community, greatly cutting down the influence of the C.I.A. in decision- making. No such concentration of pow- er in foreign policy has ever been vested in any man, except the president, in modern American history. . .:Presently associated with Kissinger on the 40 Comm"tee are Director of Central Intelligence William E. Colby, Approved For Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207RO01000020018-4 i announced Mitchell's pre ...:e; became known from congressional testimony. Na other attorney general had ever before served on the 40 Com- mittee or on any of its forerunners. Richard Helms, the former C.I.A. head, also testified that he thought, but was not certain, that former White House Director of the Domestic Coun- cil John Ehrlichman and White House Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman may have come to one or two 40 Commit- tee sessions. He said that they attended either meetings of the 40 Committee or of the Washington Special Action Group (WASAG), the White House for- eign policy crisis-management commit- tee. Both bodies are headed by Kissin- ger and have identical memberships. One intriguing question is whether the 40 Committee-or Kissinger-may. have wanted the Plumbers to help out in the covert operations against Chile. A half-dozen unexplained break-ins into Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State and Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs offices and homes of Chilean diplomats in Washington and New York in the spring of 1972, just before Watergate, have been attributed to the Plumbers, although there is no proof . Kissinger had had indirect dealings with the Plumbers since 1971,when he listened to an interview tape-recorded by David Young, his former aide and subsequently a Plumber, with a navy yeoman charged with secretly passing National Security Council documents to the joint Chiefs of Staff. To understand the basic functions of the 40 Committee it is essential to real- ize that almost invariably United States policy is executed on two parallel lev- els: overt and covert. The overt policy is visibly carried out by the State De- partment and other above-the-board agencies; the U.S. takes full responsi- bility for all their actions. Covert policy, which must never be traced back to the president and the Jnited States government (though it often is so traced because of failures or disclosures in the press or elsewhere), is the province of the 40 Committee to- day, as it was the responsibility of its predecessors. It is thus an error to ascribe such American international adventures as the 1953 coup d' tat in Iran, the over- throw of the leftist Guatemalan regime in 1954, the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, the 1964 intervention in the Congo, the formation of the "secret army" in Laos in 1961, or the most re- cent involvement in Chile, to aberra- tions by a wild-running C.I.A. In every instance, major undercover intelligence operations had been for- mally approved by secret political com- mittees before the C.I.A. was free to proceed, although many, if not most, of these actions were unquestionably first proposed by the agency. Because of the extraordinary secrecy William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs 00605 cant% Approved For Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207RO01000020018-4 Approved For Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207RO01000020018-4 "... Aerial espionage plans come from `Comrex,' a C.I.A. gru - so secret that it has never ever been publicly discussed.. ." slrrounding the deliberations of the 40 Committee, and the complex system of special top-secret clearances designed to canfine the number of officials apprised of covert operations to an ab- solute minimum, the government as a whole is kept totally in the dark about undercover foreign policy, even if it carries the risk of a full-fledged war. There have been instances over the years when even secretaries of state remained uninformed about large co- vert operations and actually believed the White House-inspired "plausible denial" when the C.I.A. or the Penta- gon were caught red-handed some- where in the world. "Plausible denial" is one of the principles upon which the 40 Committee and its forerunners have operated. The idea is that the denial of a secret foreign enterprise must be believable enough to protect the presi- dent from embarrassment-or worse. Consequently, overt and covert policies often run at cross-purposes. C.I.A. Director Colby, an old hand in clandestine operations, claims that covert activities have been sharply cur- tailed in recent years. But in a speech in Washington earlier this month before a conference on "C.I.A. and Covert Ac- tions" organized by the Center for Na- tional Security Studies, Colby said that "in a world which can destroy it- self through misunderstanding or mis- calculation, it is important that our lead- ers have a clear perception of the mo- tives, intentions, and strategies of other powers so that they can be deterred, negotiated about, or countered in the interests of peace or, if necessary, the ultimate security of our country. "These kinds of insights," Colby said, "cannot be obtained only through tech- nical means or analysis. From closed societies they can only be obtained by secret intelligence operations, without which our country must risk subordi- nation to possible adversaries." This, of course, referred to espio- nage by the C.I.A., presumably in Com- munist countries. But Colby also made a case for the kinds of covert political operations-such as those in Chile- that are of immediate concern to the 40 Committee. to be able to act in such situations, and thereby forestall greater difficulties for us in the future.... I would think it mistaken to deprive our nation of the possibility of some moderate, covert action response to a foreign problem and leave us with nothing between a diplomatic protest and sending the ma- rines," Colby added. In effect, Colby was saying that the United States should act to intervene covertly in the internal affairs of other nations if a new Chile-like situation arise in the future. He could well havtr..been thinking of Italy, Greece. Portugal, or an African country when he spoke of the "control of a foreign nation's political direction." And, clear- ly, the definition of what constitutes "discreet support" and "moderate co- vert action" is left to the C.I.A. and the 40 Committee. Colby was accurate in insisting that the C.I.A. performs covert intelligence operations-its "dirty tricks"-"only when specifically authorized by the Na- tional Security Council." In fact, the National Security Act of 1947, which created the C.I.A., provides that "it shall be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council ... to perform such other func- tions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct." Colby thus laid the responsibility for the C.I.A.'s far-flung subversive activi- ties at the door of the 40 Committee, which is the National Security Council body in charge of approving covert in. of the 40 Committee's modus operandi telligence operations. This was a way do not entirely bear out Kissinger's of saying that the C.I.A. will carry,, exculpative assertions. In the end, the j out whatever Henry Kissinger deter- final decision is his-or the president's.. mines-and let him take the blame or All indications are that Kissinger the credit-even though Colby, too, sits on the secret committee. - In practice, a decision made by the 40 Committee is communicated to the director of Central Intelligence in a National Security Council Intelligence Decision Memorandum. The authoriz- ing document, known as a N.S.C.I.D., is handed by Kissinger to Colby for im- plementation. Colby, of course, wears the two hats of director of the central intelligence community and of director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Colby then issues a D.C.I.D. (Director Central Intelligence Decision) to the C.I.A (which means himself) or what- ever other agency-the Defense Intelli- gence Agency, the National Security Agency, or the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research- may be involved in a covert operation. At the C.I.A., projects approved by the 40 Committee are handled by the Covert Action Staff (formerly the Psy- chological and Paramilitary Division), one of the clandestine service branches in the Directorate of Operations. In a case. like Chile's, where the plan called for creating economic chaos, the C.A.S. would turn to its Economic Warfare Section as well as to other specialized sections. The Fi- nancial Section, for example, would be in charge of secretly purchasing cur- rency of the target country for opera- tional use. In his neZv book on the C.I.A., Philip B. F. Agee, a former clandestine services agent, tells how the agency had to covertly buy hundreds of thou- sands of dollars' worth of, Chilean escudos in New York, Lima, Rio de Janeiro, and Montevideo to help fi- nance its covert operations against Al- lende during his unsuccessful presiden tial campaign in 1964. Massive conver-' sion of dollars into escudos in Santiago would have aroused suspicion-re- cent testimony by Colby showed that the C.I.A. had invested $3 million in the . 1964 campaign-and the agency was thus forced to fly valises of Chilean money into the country. Kissinger, caught in the recent Chil- ean controversy, has been telling friend- ly newsmen that he should not be blamed because, after all, "95 per cent" of operations proposed to the 40 Committee originate with the C.I.A. The record and a certain knowledge raised the Chilean problem in the 40 Committee when it met in the White House Situation Room on June 27, 1970, to consider actions if Allende were elected on September 4. Kis- singer was quoted as saying that "I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people." It was at that meeting that the com- mittee authorized the C.I.A. to spend $400,000 for covert political propa- ganda against Allende's candidacy. A former White House official re- ports having seen a memorandum with an August, 1970, date, signed by the C.I.A. liaison oilier with the 40 Com- mittee, authorizing the expenditure of $200,000 in unvouchered funds for the covert media campaign against Allen- 00606 "There have also been, and are still, certain situations in the world in which some discreet support can as- sist America's friends against her ad- versaries in their contest for control of a foreign nation's political direction," he saia. "While these instances are few today compared to the 1950's, I believe it only prudent for our nation Approved For Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207RO01000020018-4 eontinueZr Approved For Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207RO01000020018-4 :nenioraildotn was on Whn stationery and made no reference 40 Committee. The 40 Committee .::r; no files. and written references to it in official documents, no matter NIVIV secret, are forbidden. On July 24. 1970, Kissinger ordered his regular staff to prepare a National Security Study Memorandum on Chile. Known as NSSM-97, this secret docu- ni:nt outlined options for the Nixon administration should Allende win. The options ranged from the type of clan- destine C.I.A. action ultimately un-. dcrtaken lo severe economic measures designed to undermine the Allende ..government and create chaos that, it was hoped, would lead to a military revolution. Allende won a plurality, but not a majority, in the election, and a runoff was to be held in the Chilean Congress on October 24 between Allende and Jorge Alessandri, the conservative run- ner-up supported by the United States. On September 18, therefore, Kissinger reportedly proposed to the 40 Commit- tee that the C.I.A. be authorized to ex- pend S3501000 to bribe Chilean con- gressmen to vote for Alessandri. By all accounts. then C.I.A. Director Richard Helms was cool to the idea on practical grounds, as was Charles A. Meyer, then assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, who was in- vited to be present as an expert at the 40 Committee meeting. Kissinger, how- ever, carried the day with the support of the other 40 Committee members, including U. Alexis Johnson, then un- der secretary of state for political affairs. Helms fell into line. As Colby testified in a closed con- gressional session last April, the 40 Committee ultimately approved a total of S8 million to "destabilize" the Al- lende government. In earlier testimony, Kissinger had flatly denied any United States or C.I.A. involvement in the Chilean coup. In his appearance at the Center for National Security Studies, Colby did not deny that the C.I.A. had spent the SS million in Chile. He insisted, how- ever, that the motley was not used to trigger the coup, but "to help our demo- cratic friends in Chile" to vote the Socialist regime out of office in the 1976 elections. Colby did not explain why America's friends were "democratic" while the Allende crowd, put in office in a free election, were not. But even if the C.I.A. and Kissinger really were not aiming at a coup, the fact remains that the U.S. had deeply intervened in Chile's internal politics. Intervention in inter- nal affairs of a pro-U.S. or neutral country by Communists is, of course, re`arded by Washington as a heinous act, iastifving reprisals. "... The real problem with Ford's story is. that it flies in the face of the facts ..." Ford's justification for the American interference in Chilean politics was that it was done "to help and assist the preservation of opposition newspapers and electronic media and to preserve opposition political parties." His pre- vious sentence %~as, "There was. art effort being made by the Allende gov- ernment to destroy opposition news media, both the writing press as well as the electronic press. And to destroy opposition political parties." The president then concluded, in words .probably not heard publicly since-Teddy Roosevelt's day, that what the United States had done in Chile was "in the best interest of the. people in Chile, and certainly in our best in- terest." With this, M1: Ford took us back to the `'Father Knows Best".ap- proach in American foreign policy. However, the real problem with the Ford exposition is that it flies in the face of facts, and suggests that the new president does not do his homework in a crucial area of foreign policy. Instead, he seems to rely on advisers who either do not know any better or act self- servingly. In the first place, the Allende regime never openly violated the Chilean con- stitution. The Chilean Congress, domi- nated by Allende's opponents, func- tioned until the last day (there is no Congress, nor even political parties, under the military junta that replaced Allende) ; there was no serious inter- ference with the freedom of speech and press (now there are only pro- government newspapers) ; and there were no political prisoners other than a few persons charged with political crimes such as assassination (now there are at least 20,000 political pris- oners, and torture is common). Allen- de, in fact, lost two important congres- sional and municipal elections after coming to power. Obviously, the leftist Allende re- gime fought its opposition through a variety of means-not all that different from what Mr. Ford's political party here did to the Democrats under his predecessor. To be sure, there were ex- treme leftist armed goons and terrorist squads, but the right-wing opposition had its own armed groups. It would be useful to learn whether any of the opposition's weapons came from the outside as the United States aided its "democratic friends." In the second place, the opposition press in Chile (comprising the majority of important newspapers and radio sta- tions) was never on the brink of de- struction-._rtainly not to the tune of SF million or whatever sum the C.I.A. spread among its media clients. El Mercurio, the principal opposition newspaper in Santiago, was closed down once or twice for short periods for advocating insurrection. Jr is true that El owners were dit ested of their banking and shipping hold- ings but this was hardly an injury to the freedom of the press-and certain- ly none of our business. Mr. Ford's astounding comments. coining in the wake of Co'.by's admis- sions on the role of the C.I.A. in Chip, not surpriaing!y led the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the next day to vote to reopen its investigation of the, American participation in the Chilean events. It may become the president's; first serious dispute with Congress over' foreign policy (senators take a dim' view of the Ford contention that the 40' Committee and covert "dirty tricks" abroad are fully justified), and former senior C.I.A. and State Department offi-, cials may face contempt and perjury charges for their earlier denials'that the United States was involved in anti-Al-! lende activities. Inevitably, Kissinger's I credibility is once more at stake. And there still remains the question of violating international law through such acts. Most international law ex- perts agree, at least in theory, that U.S. covert activities violate it more fre- quently than anything perpetrated by the Russians or the Chinese outside their immediate area of influence. President Ford, however, is not in- terested in legalities. He told his Mon- day news conference that "I'm not go- ing to pass judgment on whether [the destabilizing of foreign governments] is permitted or authorized under in- ternational law. It's a recognized fact that, historically as well as presently, such actions are taken in the best in- terests of the countries involved." He was apparently making the point that what was good enough in the past is good enough today. Then there is the problem of the 40 Committee's accountability. The C.I.A. is accountable to four special congres- sional subcommittees, though none of them ever seriously questions the agency's activities and expenditures. The Senate Armed Services Subcom- mittee on Intelligence sometimes fails to meet more often than once a year. But the 40 Committee is not account- able to anybody. There are no minutes of its formal meetings, which occur once or twice a month. Additionally, C0607 Approved For Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207RO01000020018-4 cOntlnued Approved For Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207RO01000020018-4 also runs the 40 Commits Ki.~in~er u h tc' ephone consultations. But ina~,^1_:h as the other four members are 5..rdened by their day-to-day duties. Kissi;,,er in effect often obtains unani- mou_ decisions almost by default. In the area of accountability, too, Pre_i :e t Ford was either misinformed himself or misinforming the public. He said that the 40 Committee's decisions are "relayed to the responsible con- committees, where [they arej r-ylewed. .. ." This, of course, is not _o. There is no known instance o tee 40 Committee-or its chairman consulting with any congressional committee about what it orders the C.I.A. to do. When a committee dis- co:ers something, it comes from the press or. begrudgingly, from the C.I.A. after the fact. There are indications, however, that Kissinger maintains private liaison with the C.I.A.'s clandestine se: vices, known as the Directorate of Operations, through another C.I.A. operative. This would make it possible for Kissinger to bypass not only his own 40 Committee but even C.I.A. Director Colby. In the past, Kissinger had a similar personal "back channel" to the joint Chiefs of Staff to bypass Melvin R. Laird, then secretary of defense, to order covert air strikes in Indochina. The National Security Council is di- rectly subordinate to the president. As Ji an organ of the N.S.C., the 40 Com- mittee is theoretically accountable to the full- National Security Council as well-as to the president. There is no evidence, however, that the 40 Commit- tee- user- reports to the-Council. What is not known is whether Kissinger seeks presidential approval for every taken by the 40 Committee. "You can argue that in some cases Kissinger will not inform the president of the United States of a covert opera- tion in order to protect him from knowledge and avoid embarrassment to him," a senior intelligence official said. "If the scheme works he can de- cide later whether the president should be bothered with the details. If it fails, there's plenty of time to tell him. And sometimes presidents figure that what they don't know doesn't hurt them, so long is it doesn't get out of hand." There is a legend in the intelligence community that only the president can authorize the assassination of a foreign leader. This is, so the story goes, one time when the chairman of the 40 Committee simply must consult the president. But no official in Washing- ton can say whether this has ever been tested. "The president doesn't order assassinations-period" is the answer to inquiries on the subject. Still, one is haunted by the thought of such extraordinary power being so tightly held and exercised in absolute secrecy by a tiny group of men-even if it does sometimes include the presi- dent. C.I.A. Director Colby's claim that, in effect, the United States must have the option to covertly do away with any foreign government it finds objec- tionable-without the repugnant alter- native of "sending the marines"-must sound alarming to a democratic society that says it stands for the rule of law in the world order. And it is Henry Kissinger, speaking for the United States, who rhetorically invokes the principle of world order. , As for President Ford and his "open administration," his view is that noth- ing needs changing: he told his news conference last Monday that "It seems to me that the 40 Committee should continue in existence." e.. Under the Kennedy and Johnson ad- ministrations, when the super govern -- men t t body was known as the 303 Committee" mittee" (under Eisenhower it was c alled the "54/12 Committee" and un- der and then "10/15"), the preparatory staff works was of greater importance than it is today. The the Pentagon, and the C.I.A. still prepare the agenda quite carefully, but it carries less weight. In the State De- pa De- partment, this function is in the hands of the Intelligence and Research Bu- reau . At the Pentagon, the work for the deputy secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is done by the special assistant to the secretary of defense for covert in- telligence. The C.I.A. prepares the agenda in Colby's executive offices. Th~e tentative agenda is first reviewed by State, Defense, and C.I.A. officials to determine which projects should presented be to the full 40 Committee. But most op operations-when they reach the 40 Committee-are approved with only limited scrutiny. They may range from ongoing operationsin, say, Indochina, to the intervention in Chile, exploratory Greece, or something as insignificant as authorizing the spending of $50,000 to help out a friendly newspaper in a foreign Committees approved expenditures th rong the C.I.A. to keep alive Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty-broad- ca sing. respectively, to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. No Not surprisingly, for security rea- son-;. the 40 Committee has virtually n no staff of its own. Formally, a single C.I.A. official is assigned to the com- mittee assisted h a typist who probably has clearance of any the highe istn Wasecusrhinitygton. sec eta, 00608 Approved For Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207RO01000020018-4