HOW KISSINGER RUNS OUR 'OTHER GOVERNMENT'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020018-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2011
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: September 30, 1974
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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1 AV"" 1 %;Lu%
30 Sep 1971
By Tad Szulc
"... No such overt and covert power in foreign policy has ever
been vested in any man, except the president, in our history..."
A shadowy group of five powerful
officials silently directing America's
clandestine foreign policy from the
basement Situation Room in the White
House in Washington-the so-called
"40 Committee" of the National Secur-
ity Council-is the nearest thing we
have in this country to a secret super-
government body.
Headed by Henry A. Kissinger, this
committee is not always accountable
even to the president of the United
States, although it has access to virtual-
ly unlimited unvouchered government
funds and holds the power to order far-
ranging covert intelligence and para-
military operations around the world.
And during the Nixon Watergate era,
it may have had links with secret do-
mestic intelligence units, possibly in-
cluding even the "Plumbers."
Deriving its name from National
Security Council Intelligence Decision
Memorandum No. 40, which set it up in
its present form in 1969, the five-man
40 Committee is the current incarna-
tion of similar top-secret White House
groups that since 1947 have authorized
dozens of major covert intelligence un-
dertakings from Asia to Latin America
and from Africa to Europe.
The most recent known large-scale
operation conducted by the 40 Com-
mittee was the assignment given the
Central Intelligence Agency, at the
cost of S8 million, to help orchestrate,
from inside, the fall a year ago of the
regime of Chile's late Socialist presi-
dent, Salvador Allende Gossens, while
other branches of the United States
government applied a variety of simul-
taneous pressures from the outside.
This increasingly controversial enter-
prise was stunningly confirmed by Pres-
ident Ford at his news conference
last Monday. His justification was both
startling in philosophy and sparse on
the fasts. as he sought to give public
lcei:ima ,; to the 40 Committee.
1-his was somethin g no president had
ever done before; actually, no-senior
of[iciaLhad ever publicly mentioned the
committee.
Ford, in fact, institutionalized the
concept of covert intelligence action
(it was not even done during the cold
war) when he commented that "Our
government, like other governments.
does take certain actions in the intelli-
gence field to help' implement foteign
policy and protect national security ...
1 am informed reliably that Communist
nations spend vastly more money than
we do for the same kind of purposes."
Action against Allende between
1970 and 1973 was one of Kissinger's
high-priority projects. He personally as-
sumed control of the C.I.A.'s covert
moves, through the 40 Committee, and
of a parallel economic and financial
blockade, working through an interde-
partmental task force.
To Kissinger, it appears, Chile was
a "laboratory" test case to determine
whether a regime he opposed could be
"destabilized" or dislodged without the
use of military force that the United
States had chosen to apply elsewhere
in the past. Specifically, Chile was a
test of whether a democratically elec-
ted leftist regime, as was Allende's,
could be toppled through the creation
of internal chaos by outside forces.
Recent revelations of Kissinger's al-
leged role in the Chilean affair-he has
denied any American involvement, al-
though the C.I.A., in effect, has con-
firmed it-have set off the latest con-
troversy swirling around the secretary
of state, and have raised again ques-
tions about his credibility and future
intentions.
There are reasons to suspect. for ex-
ample, that the 40 Committee is study-
ing plans for possible covert American
intervention in the confused political
process in Italy, where the Communist
party may soon share power in a coali-
tion government. Actually. mere than a
year ago the former U.S. ambassador
in Rome, Graham. Martin, reportedly.
asked the Nixon administration for sc-1
cret funds to bolster the Christian Detn
ocrats in Italy-just as the United States
had done- in the crucial 1948 elections.
The 40 Committee reportedly also:
has on its agenda the situations in Por
tugal and Greece-where rightist re-
gimes collapsed earlier this year and
leftist in luences are feared by the U.S.
-as welt' as dangers facing the white
governments in southern Africa in view
of Mozambique's impending independ-
ence. The C.I-.A. has a working alliance,
with South African and Rhodesian in-
telligence services against leftist black
"liberation" movements.
Continency planning to assure
United States access to oil reserves in!
the Middle East and elsewhere is like
wise said to be on the agenda. In fact,:
the C.I.A., working under a National Se-
curity Council mandate, did overthrow)
the Iranian government in 1953 after
it nationalized foreign oil holdings. i
Past activities by the 40 Committee;
and its prt-decessors have ranged from;
engineering the overthrow of foreigni
regimes disliked by Washington to the)
creation of secret armies and counter-
insurgency units for the protection of
governments enjoying our official fa-!
vor. They have included political sub-,
version, the subornation of statesmen.
politicians, labor leaders, and others
abroad. "black" propaganda. and the
oversight of "spy-in-the-sky" espionage
over the Soviet Union, China, and
scores of other countries.
Overhead intelligence is the only form
of act,-,2' espionage in the purvi_'.v of
the 40 Committee. The C.I.A., ether
intelligence agencies, and separate
White House committees (also chaired
by Kissinger) are concerned with the
collection of normal intelligence.
The -'0 Committee must approve.
every rmenth,overhead intelligence pro-
grams-from the regular launching of
photo-sadillies to secret flights by the
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 regime he opposed could be dislodged without military force.
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... To Kissinge , Chile was a test case t determine wlr:,
SR-71 spy planes-because of the risk
of serious international complications.
The U-2 incident over the Soviet Union
in 1960 has not been forgotten.
The monthly plans are submitted to
th:: 40 Committee by a C.I.A. commit-
tce so secret that its existence and its
name-Comrex-have never before, to
my knowledge, been publicly discussed.
The National Reconnaissance Office,
another top-secret ? organization under
the 40 Committee's overall control, is
responsible for the actual launching of
overhead intelligence vehicles.
For nearly six years, the 40 Com-
mittee has been run by Kissinger, act-
ing as chairman in his capacity of spe=
cial assistant to the president for na-
General George S. Brown,
Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
General George S. Brown, Deputy Sec-
retary of Defense William P. Clements,
and Under Secretary of State for Poli-
tical Affairs Joseph J. Sisco. Member-
ship on'.the committee is not personal:
it goes with these four jobs. Because of
successive changes in the other depart-
ments, Kissinger is the only man to
have remained continuously on the
committee for the whole period.
The possibility that the 40 Commit-
tee may have had connections with
secret domestic intelligence stems from
the fact that former Attorney General
John N. Mitchell began attending meet-
ings in 1970. Given the secrecy cover-
ing the 40 Committee, the White House
Despite its name, the '40 Com-
mittee' has only five members.
The group's name is derived
Intelligence Decision Memo-
lished the committee in its
present form in 1969.
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tional security affairs. It is not rele-
vant in this context that he has also
held for a year the post of secretary of
state. His power in the field of clandes-
tine foreign policy has been unchal-
lenged since Nixon took office in 1969.
It remains so under Ford.
Kissinger has been for years the de
facto boss of the United States intelli-
gence community, greatly cutting down
the influence of the C.I.A. in decision-
making. No such concentration of pow-
er in foreign policy has ever been vested
in any man, except the president, in
modern American history. .
.:Presently associated with Kissinger
on the 40 Comm"tee are Director of
Central Intelligence William E. Colby,
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i announced Mitchell's pre ...:e;
became known from congressional
testimony. Na other attorney general
had ever before served on the 40 Com-
mittee or on any of its forerunners.
Richard Helms, the former C.I.A.
head, also testified that he thought, but
was not certain, that former White
House Director of the Domestic Coun-
cil John Ehrlichman and White House
Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman may
have come to one or two 40 Commit-
tee sessions. He said that they attended
either meetings of the 40 Committee or
of the Washington Special Action
Group (WASAG), the White House for-
eign policy crisis-management commit-
tee. Both bodies are headed by Kissin-
ger and have identical memberships.
One intriguing question is whether
the 40 Committee-or Kissinger-may.
have wanted the Plumbers to help out
in the covert operations against Chile.
A half-dozen unexplained break-ins into
Henry Kissinger,
Secretary of State
and Special Assistant
to the President
for National
Security Affairs
offices and homes of Chilean diplomats
in Washington and New York in the
spring of 1972, just before Watergate,
have been attributed to the Plumbers,
although there is no proof .
Kissinger had had indirect dealings
with the Plumbers since 1971,when he
listened to an interview tape-recorded
by David Young, his former aide and
subsequently a Plumber, with a navy
yeoman charged with secretly passing
National Security Council documents
to the joint Chiefs of Staff.
To understand the basic functions of
the 40 Committee it is essential to real-
ize that almost invariably United States
policy is executed on two parallel lev-
els: overt and covert. The overt policy
is visibly carried out by the State De-
partment and other above-the-board
agencies; the U.S. takes full responsi-
bility for all their actions.
Covert policy, which must never be
traced back to the president and the
Jnited States government (though it
often is so traced because of failures or
disclosures in the press or elsewhere),
is the province of the 40 Committee to-
day, as it was the responsibility of its
predecessors.
It is thus an error to ascribe such
American international adventures as
the 1953 coup d' tat in Iran, the over-
throw of the leftist Guatemalan regime
in 1954, the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion
of Cuba, the 1964 intervention in the
Congo, the formation of the "secret
army" in Laos in 1961, or the most re-
cent involvement in Chile, to aberra-
tions by a wild-running C.I.A.
In every instance, major undercover
intelligence operations had been for-
mally approved by secret political com-
mittees before the C.I.A. was free to
proceed, although many, if not most, of
these actions were unquestionably first
proposed by the agency.
Because of the extraordinary secrecy
William E. Colby,
Director of
Central Intelligence
Joseph J. Sisco,
Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs
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"... Aerial espionage plans come from `Comrex,' a C.I.A. gru -
so secret that it has never ever been publicly discussed.. ."
slrrounding the deliberations of the
40 Committee, and the complex system
of special top-secret clearances designed
to canfine the number of officials
apprised of covert operations to an ab-
solute minimum, the government as a
whole is kept totally in the dark about
undercover foreign policy, even if it
carries the risk of a full-fledged war.
There have been instances over the
years when even secretaries of state
remained uninformed about large co-
vert operations and actually believed
the White House-inspired "plausible
denial" when the C.I.A. or the Penta-
gon were caught red-handed some-
where in the world. "Plausible denial"
is one of the principles upon which the
40 Committee and its forerunners have
operated. The idea is that the denial
of a secret foreign enterprise must be
believable enough to protect the presi-
dent from embarrassment-or worse.
Consequently, overt and covert policies
often run at cross-purposes.
C.I.A. Director Colby, an old hand
in clandestine operations, claims that
covert activities have been sharply cur-
tailed in recent years. But in a speech
in Washington earlier this month before
a conference on "C.I.A. and Covert Ac-
tions" organized by the Center for Na-
tional Security Studies, Colby said
that "in a world which can destroy it-
self through misunderstanding or mis-
calculation, it is important that our lead-
ers have a clear perception of the mo-
tives, intentions, and strategies of other
powers so that they can be deterred,
negotiated about, or countered in the
interests of peace or, if necessary, the
ultimate security of our country.
"These kinds of insights," Colby said,
"cannot be obtained only through tech-
nical means or analysis. From closed
societies they can only be obtained by
secret intelligence operations, without
which our country must risk subordi-
nation to possible adversaries."
This, of course, referred to espio-
nage by the C.I.A., presumably in Com-
munist countries. But Colby also made
a case for the kinds of covert political
operations-such as those in Chile-
that are of immediate concern to the
40 Committee.
to be able to act in such situations,
and thereby forestall greater difficulties
for us in the future.... I would think
it mistaken to deprive our nation of the
possibility of some moderate, covert
action response to a foreign problem
and leave us with nothing between a
diplomatic protest and sending the ma-
rines," Colby added.
In effect, Colby was saying that the
United States should act to intervene
covertly in the internal affairs of other
nations if a new Chile-like situation
arise in the future. He could well
havtr..been thinking of Italy, Greece.
Portugal, or an African country when
he spoke of the "control of a foreign
nation's political direction." And, clear-
ly, the definition of what constitutes
"discreet support" and "moderate co-
vert action" is left to the C.I.A. and
the 40 Committee.
Colby was accurate in insisting that
the C.I.A. performs covert intelligence
operations-its "dirty tricks"-"only
when specifically authorized by the Na-
tional Security Council." In fact, the
National Security Act of 1947, which
created the C.I.A., provides that "it
shall be the duty of the Agency, under
the direction of the National Security
Council ... to perform such other func-
tions and duties related to intelligence
affecting the national security as the
National Security Council may from
time to time direct."
Colby thus laid the responsibility for
the C.I.A.'s far-flung subversive activi-
ties at the door of the 40 Committee,
which is the National Security Council
body in charge of approving covert in. of the 40 Committee's modus operandi
telligence operations. This was a way do not entirely bear out Kissinger's
of saying that the C.I.A. will carry,, exculpative assertions. In the end, the j
out whatever Henry Kissinger deter- final decision is his-or the president's..
mines-and let him take the blame or All indications are that Kissinger
the credit-even though Colby, too,
sits on the secret committee. -
In practice, a decision made by the
40 Committee is communicated to the
director of Central Intelligence in a
National Security Council Intelligence
Decision Memorandum. The authoriz-
ing document, known as a N.S.C.I.D.,
is handed by Kissinger to Colby for im-
plementation. Colby, of course, wears
the two hats of director of the central
intelligence community and of director
of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Colby then issues a D.C.I.D. (Director
Central Intelligence Decision) to the
C.I.A (which means himself) or what-
ever other agency-the Defense Intelli-
gence Agency, the National Security
Agency, or the State Department's
Bureau of Intelligence and Research-
may be involved in a covert operation.
At the C.I.A., projects approved by
the 40 Committee are handled by the
Covert Action Staff (formerly the Psy-
chological and Paramilitary Division),
one of the clandestine service branches
in the Directorate of Operations.
In a case. like Chile's, where the
plan called for creating economic
chaos, the C.A.S. would turn to its
Economic Warfare Section as well as
to other specialized sections. The Fi-
nancial Section, for example, would be
in charge of secretly purchasing cur-
rency of the target country for opera-
tional use.
In his neZv book on the C.I.A.,
Philip B. F. Agee, a former clandestine
services agent, tells how the agency
had to covertly buy hundreds of thou-
sands of dollars' worth of, Chilean
escudos in New York, Lima, Rio de
Janeiro, and Montevideo to help fi-
nance its covert operations against Al-
lende during his unsuccessful presiden
tial campaign in 1964. Massive conver-'
sion of dollars into escudos in Santiago
would have aroused suspicion-re-
cent testimony by Colby showed that
the C.I.A. had invested $3 million in
the . 1964 campaign-and the agency
was thus forced to fly valises of Chilean
money into the country.
Kissinger, caught in the recent Chil-
ean controversy, has been telling friend-
ly newsmen that he should not be
blamed because, after all, "95 per
cent" of operations proposed to the 40
Committee originate with the C.I.A.
The record and a certain knowledge
raised the Chilean problem in the 40
Committee when it met in the White
House Situation Room on June 27,
1970, to consider actions if Allende
were elected on September 4. Kis-
singer was quoted as saying that "I
don't see why we need to stand by and
watch a country go Communist due to
the irresponsibility of its own people."
It was at that meeting that the com-
mittee authorized the C.I.A. to spend
$400,000 for covert political propa-
ganda against Allende's candidacy.
A former White House official re-
ports having seen a memorandum with
an August, 1970, date, signed by the
C.I.A. liaison oilier with the 40 Com-
mittee, authorizing the expenditure of
$200,000 in unvouchered funds for the
covert media campaign against Allen-
00606
"There have also been, and are still,
certain situations in the world in
which some discreet support can as-
sist America's friends against her ad-
versaries in their contest for control of
a foreign nation's political direction,"
he saia. "While these instances are
few today compared to the 1950's, I
believe it only prudent for our nation
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:nenioraildotn was on Whn
stationery and made no reference
40 Committee. The 40 Committee
.::r; no files. and written references
to it in official documents, no matter
NIVIV secret, are forbidden.
On July 24. 1970, Kissinger ordered
his regular staff to prepare a National
Security Study Memorandum on Chile.
Known as NSSM-97, this secret docu-
ni:nt outlined options for the Nixon
administration should Allende win. The
options ranged from the type of clan-
destine C.I.A. action ultimately un-.
dcrtaken lo severe economic measures
designed to undermine the Allende
..government and create chaos that, it
was hoped, would lead to a military
revolution.
Allende won a plurality, but not a
majority, in the election, and a runoff
was to be held in the Chilean Congress
on October 24 between Allende and
Jorge Alessandri, the conservative run-
ner-up supported by the United States.
On September 18, therefore, Kissinger
reportedly proposed to the 40 Commit-
tee that the C.I.A. be authorized to ex-
pend S3501000 to bribe Chilean con-
gressmen to vote for Alessandri.
By all accounts. then C.I.A. Director
Richard Helms was cool to the idea on
practical grounds, as was Charles A.
Meyer, then assistant secretary of state
for inter-American affairs, who was in-
vited to be present as an expert at the
40 Committee meeting. Kissinger, how-
ever, carried the day with the support
of the other 40 Committee members,
including U. Alexis Johnson, then un-
der secretary of state for political
affairs. Helms fell into line.
As Colby testified in a closed con-
gressional session last April, the 40
Committee ultimately approved a total
of S8 million to "destabilize" the Al-
lende government. In earlier testimony,
Kissinger had flatly denied any United
States or C.I.A. involvement in the
Chilean coup.
In his appearance at the Center for
National Security Studies, Colby did
not deny that the C.I.A. had spent the
SS million in Chile. He insisted, how-
ever, that the motley was not used to
trigger the coup, but "to help our demo-
cratic friends in Chile" to vote the
Socialist regime out of office in the
1976 elections.
Colby did not explain why America's
friends were "democratic" while the
Allende crowd, put in office in a free
election, were not. But even if the
C.I.A. and Kissinger really were not
aiming at a coup, the fact remains that
the U.S. had deeply intervened in Chile's
internal politics. Intervention in inter-
nal affairs of a pro-U.S. or neutral
country by Communists is, of course,
re`arded by Washington as a heinous
act, iastifving reprisals.
"... The real problem with Ford's story is.
that it flies in the face of the facts ..."
Ford's justification for the American
interference in Chilean politics was
that it was done "to help and assist the
preservation of opposition newspapers
and electronic media and to preserve
opposition political parties." His pre-
vious sentence %~as, "There was. art
effort being made by the Allende gov-
ernment to destroy opposition news
media, both the writing press as well
as the electronic press. And to destroy
opposition political parties."
The president then concluded, in
words .probably not heard publicly
since-Teddy Roosevelt's day, that what
the United States had done in Chile
was "in the best interest of the. people
in Chile, and certainly in our best in-
terest." With this, M1: Ford took us
back to the `'Father Knows Best".ap-
proach in American foreign policy.
However, the real problem with the
Ford exposition is that it flies in the
face of facts, and suggests that the new
president does not do his homework in
a crucial area of foreign policy. Instead,
he seems to rely on advisers who either
do not know any better or act self-
servingly.
In the first place, the Allende regime
never openly violated the Chilean con-
stitution. The Chilean Congress, domi-
nated by Allende's opponents, func-
tioned until the last day (there is no
Congress, nor even political parties,
under the military junta that replaced
Allende) ; there was no serious inter-
ference with the freedom of speech
and press (now there are only pro-
government newspapers) ; and there
were no political prisoners other than
a few persons charged with political
crimes such as assassination (now
there are at least 20,000 political pris-
oners, and torture is common). Allen-
de, in fact, lost two important congres-
sional and municipal elections after
coming to power.
Obviously, the leftist Allende re-
gime fought its opposition through a
variety of means-not all that different
from what Mr. Ford's political party
here did to the Democrats under his
predecessor. To be sure, there were ex-
treme leftist armed goons and terrorist
squads, but the right-wing opposition
had its own armed groups. It would
be useful to learn whether any of the
opposition's weapons came from the
outside as the United States aided its
"democratic friends."
In the second place, the opposition
press in Chile (comprising the majority
of important newspapers and radio sta-
tions) was never on the brink of de-
struction-._rtainly not to the tune
of SF million or whatever sum the
C.I.A. spread among its media clients.
El Mercurio, the principal opposition
newspaper in Santiago, was closed
down once or twice for short periods
for advocating insurrection. Jr is true
that El owners were dit ested
of their banking and shipping hold-
ings but this was hardly an injury to
the freedom of the press-and certain-
ly none of our business.
Mr. Ford's astounding comments.
coining in the wake of Co'.by's admis-
sions on the role of the C.I.A. in Chip,
not surpriaing!y led the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee the next day to
vote to reopen its investigation of the,
American participation in the Chilean
events. It may become the president's;
first serious dispute with Congress over'
foreign policy (senators take a dim'
view of the Ford contention that the 40'
Committee and covert "dirty tricks"
abroad are fully justified), and former
senior C.I.A. and State Department offi-,
cials may face contempt and perjury
charges for their earlier denials'that the
United States was involved in anti-Al-!
lende activities. Inevitably, Kissinger's I
credibility is once more at stake.
And there still remains the question
of violating international law through
such acts. Most international law ex-
perts agree, at least in theory, that U.S.
covert activities violate it more fre-
quently than anything perpetrated by
the Russians or the Chinese outside
their immediate area of influence.
President Ford, however, is not in-
terested in legalities. He told his Mon-
day news conference that "I'm not go-
ing to pass judgment on whether [the
destabilizing of foreign governments]
is permitted or authorized under in-
ternational law. It's a recognized fact
that, historically as well as presently,
such actions are taken in the best in-
terests of the countries involved." He
was apparently making the point that
what was good enough in the past is
good enough today.
Then there is the problem of the 40
Committee's accountability. The C.I.A.
is accountable to four special congres-
sional subcommittees, though none of
them ever seriously questions the
agency's activities and expenditures.
The Senate Armed Services Subcom-
mittee on Intelligence sometimes fails
to meet more often than once a year.
But the 40 Committee is not account-
able to anybody. There are no minutes
of its formal meetings, which occur
once or twice a month. Additionally,
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also runs the 40 Commits
Ki.~in~er
u h tc' ephone consultations. But
ina~,^1_:h as the other four members
are 5..rdened by their day-to-day duties.
Kissi;,,er in effect often obtains unani-
mou_ decisions almost by default.
In the area of accountability, too,
Pre_i :e t Ford was either misinformed
himself or misinforming the public. He
said that the 40 Committee's decisions
are "relayed to the responsible con-
committees, where [they
arej r-ylewed. .. ." This, of course,
is not _o. There is no known instance
o tee 40 Committee-or its chairman
consulting with any congressional
committee about what it orders the
C.I.A. to do. When a committee dis-
co:ers something, it comes from the
press or. begrudgingly, from the C.I.A.
after the fact.
There are indications, however, that
Kissinger maintains private liaison with
the C.I.A.'s clandestine se: vices, known
as the Directorate of Operations,
through another C.I.A. operative. This
would make it possible for Kissinger to
bypass not only his own 40 Committee
but even C.I.A. Director Colby. In the
past, Kissinger had a similar personal
"back channel" to the joint Chiefs of
Staff to bypass Melvin R. Laird, then
secretary of defense, to order covert
air strikes in Indochina.
The National Security Council is di-
rectly subordinate to the president. As
Ji an organ of the N.S.C., the 40 Com-
mittee is theoretically accountable to
the full- National Security Council as
well-as to the president. There is no
evidence, however, that the 40 Commit-
tee- user- reports to the-Council. What
is not known is whether Kissinger
seeks presidential approval for every
taken by the 40 Committee.
"You can argue that in some cases
Kissinger will not inform the president
of the United States of a covert opera-
tion in order to protect him from
knowledge and avoid embarrassment
to him," a senior intelligence official
said. "If the scheme works he can
de- cide later whether the president should
be bothered with the details. If it fails,
there's plenty of time to tell him. And
sometimes presidents figure that what
they don't know doesn't hurt them, so
long is it doesn't get out of hand."
There is a legend in the intelligence
community that only the president can
authorize the assassination of a foreign
leader. This is, so the story goes, one
time when the chairman of the 40
Committee simply must consult the
president. But no official in Washing-
ton can say whether this has ever
been tested. "The president doesn't
order assassinations-period" is the
answer to inquiries on the subject.
Still, one is haunted by the thought
of such extraordinary power being so
tightly held and exercised in absolute
secrecy by a tiny group of men-even
if it does sometimes include the presi-
dent. C.I.A. Director Colby's claim that,
in effect, the United States must have
the option to covertly do away with
any foreign government it finds objec-
tionable-without the repugnant alter-
native of "sending the marines"-must
sound alarming to a democratic society
that says it stands for the rule of law
in the world order. And it is Henry
Kissinger, speaking for the United
States, who rhetorically invokes the
principle of world order.
, As for President Ford and his "open
administration," his view is that noth-
ing needs changing: he told his news
conference last Monday that "It seems
to me that the 40 Committee should
continue in existence." e..
Under the Kennedy and Johnson ad- ministrations, when the super govern
--
men t t body was known as the 303
Committee" mittee" (under Eisenhower it was
c alled the "54/12 Committee" and un-
der and then "10/15"), the preparatory
staff works was of greater importance
than it is today.
The the Pentagon, and the C.I.A. still
prepare the agenda quite carefully, but
it carries less weight. In the State De-
pa De-
partment, this function is in the hands
of the Intelligence and Research Bu-
reau . At the Pentagon, the work for
the deputy secretary of defense and
the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff is done by the special assistant to
the secretary of defense for covert in- telligence. The C.I.A. prepares the
agenda in Colby's executive offices.
Th~e tentative agenda is first reviewed
by State, Defense, and C.I.A. officials to determine which projects should
presented be to the full 40 Committee.
But most op operations-when they reach
the 40 Committee-are approved with
only limited scrutiny. They may range
from ongoing operationsin, say,
Indochina, to the intervention in Chile,
exploratory Greece, or something as insignificant
as authorizing the spending of $50,000
to help out a friendly newspaper in a
foreign Committees approved expenditures
th rong the C.I.A. to keep alive Radio
Free Europe and Radio Liberty-broad- ca sing. respectively, to Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union.
No Not surprisingly, for security rea-
son-;. the 40 Committee has virtually
n no staff of its own. Formally, a single
C.I.A. official is assigned to the com-
mittee assisted h a typist who probably has
clearance of any
the highe
istn Wasecusrhinitygton.
sec eta,
00608
Approved For Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09T00207RO01000020018-4